draft-madden-jose-ecdh-1pu-02.xml

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE rfc PUBLIC "-//IETF//DTD RFC 2629//EN"
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<!ENTITY RFC8174 PUBLIC '' 'http://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8174.xml'>
]>

<rfc category="std" docName="draft-madden-jose-ecdh-1pu-02" ipr="trust200902">
<?rfc toc="yes"?>
<?rfc symrefs="yes"?>
<?rfc sortrefs="yes"?>
<?rfc compact="yes"?>
<?rfc subcompact="no"?>
<?rfc private=""?>
<?rfc topblock="yes"?>
<?rfc comments="no"?>
    
    <front>
        <title abbrev="JOSE ECDH-1PU">Public Key Authenticated Encryption for JOSE: ECDH-1PU</title>

        <author initials="N.E." surname="Madden" fullname="Neil Madden">
            <organization>ForgeRock</organization>
            <address>
                <postal>
                    <street>Broad Quay House</street>
                    <street>Prince Street</street>
                    <city>Bristol</city>
                    <code>BS1 4DJ</code>
                    <country>United Kingdom</country>
                </postal>
                <email>neil.madden@forgerock.com</email>
            </address>
        </author>

        <date day="13" month="August" year="2019"/>

        <area>Security</area>
        <!-- <workgroup>OAuth</workgroup> -->

        <keyword>Internet-Draft</keyword>
        <keyword>JSON Object Signing and Encryption</keyword>
        <keyword>JOSE</keyword>
        <keyword>JSON Web Encryption</keyword>
        <keyword>JWE</keyword>
        <keyword>JSON Web Algorithms</keyword>
        <keyword>JWA</keyword>
        <keyword>Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement</keyword>
        <keyword>ECDH</keyword>
        <keyword>ECDH-1PU</keyword>

        <abstract>
            <t>
                This document describes the ECDH-1PU public key authenticated encryption algorithm
                for JWE. The algorithm is similar to the existing ECDH-ES encryption algorithm, but
                adds an additional ECDH key agreement between static keys of the sender and recipient.
                This additional step allows the recipient to be assured of sender authenticity without
                requiring a nested signed-then-encrypted message structure. 
            </t>
        </abstract>
    </front>

    <middle>
        <section anchor="intro" title="Introduction">
            <t>
                JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) defines a number of encryption (JWE) 
                <xref target="RFC7516"/> and digital signature (JWS) <xref target="RFC7515"/> 
                algorithms.  When symmetric cryptography is used, JWE provides authenticated
                encryption that ensures both confidentiality and sender authentication. However,
                for public key cryptography the existing JWE encryption algorithms provide only
                confidentiality and some level of ciphertext integrity. When sender authentication
                is required, users must resort to nested signed-then-encrypted structures, which
                increases the overhead and size of resulting messages. This document describes an
                alternative encryption algorithm called ECDH-1PU that provides public key
                authenticated encryption, allowing the benefits of authenticated encryption to be
                enjoyed for public key JWE as it currently is for symmetric cryptography.
            </t>

            <t>
                ECDH-1PU is based on the One-Pass Unified Model for Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
                key agreement described in <xref target="NIST.800-56A"/>. 
            </t>

            <t>
                The advantages of public key authenticated encryption with ECDH-1PU compared to
                using nested signed-then-encrypted documents include the following:
                <list style="symbols">
                    <t>
                        The resulting message size is more compact as an additional layer of headers
                        and base64url-encoding is avoided. A 500-byte payload when encrypted and
                        authenticated with ECDH-1PU (with P-256 keys and "A256GCM" Content Encryption
                        Method) results in a 1087-byte JWE in Compact Encoding. An equivalent nested 
                        signed-then-encrypted JOSE message using the same keys and encryption method 
                        is 1489 bytes (37% larger).
                    </t>
                    <t>
                        The same primitives are used for both confidentiality and authenticity,
                        providing savings in code size for constrained environments.
                    </t>
                    <t>
                        The generic composition of signatures and public key encryption involves
                        a number of subtle details that are essential to security <xref target="PKAE"/>.
                        Providing a dedicated algorithm for public key authenticated encryption
                        reduces complexity for users of JOSE libraries.
                    </t>
                    <t>
                        ECDH-1PU provides only authenticity and not the stronger security properties of
                        non-repudiation or third-party verifiability. This can be an advantage in
                        applications where privacy, anonymity, or plausible deniability are goals. 
                    </t>
                </list>
            </t>

            <section title="Requirements Terminology">
                <t>The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 
                    "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", 
                    and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described 
                    in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they appear
                    in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
            </section>

        </section>

        <section anchor="ecdh-1pu" 
            title="Key Agreement with Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman One-Pass Unified Model (ECDH-1PU)">
            <t>
                This section defines the specifics of key agreement with Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
                One-Pass Unified Model, in combination with the one-step KDF, as defined in
                Section 5.8.2.1 of <xref target="NIST.800-56A"/> using the Concatenation Format of
                Section 5.8.2.1.1. This is identical to the ConcatKDF function used by the existing
                JWE ECDH-ES algorithm defined in Section 4.6 of <xref target="RFC7518"/>. As for ECDH-ES,
                the key agreement result can be used in one of two ways:
                <list style="numbers">
                    <t>directly as the Content Encryption Key (CEK) for the "enc" algorithm, in the
                        Direct Key Agreement mode, or</t>
                    <t>as a symmetric key used to wrap the CEK with the "A128KW", "A192KW", or "A256KW"
                        algorithms, in the Key Agreement with Key Wrapping mode.</t>
                </list>
            </t>
            <t>
                A new ephemeral public key value MUST be generated for each key agreement operation.
            </t>
            <t>
                In Direct Key Agreement mode, the output of the KDF MUST be a key of the same length
                as that used by the "enc" algorithm. In this case, the empty octet sequence is used
                as the JWE Encrypted Key value. The "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter value "ECDH-1PU"
                is used in Direct Key Agreement mode.
            </t>
            <t>
                In Key Agreement with Key Wrapping mode, the output of the KDF MUST be a key of the length
                needed for the specified key wrapping algorithm. In this case, the JWE Encrypted Key is
                the CEK wrapped with the agreed-upon key.
            </t>
            <t>
                The following "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter values are used to indicate the JWE
                Encrypted Key is the result of encrypting the CEK using the result of the key agreement
                algorithm as the key encryption key for the corresponding key wrapping algorithm:
            </t>
            <texttable>
                <ttcol align="left" width="13%">"alg" Param Value</ttcol>
                <ttcol align="left">Key Management Algorithm</ttcol>

                <c>ECDH-1PU+A128KW</c>
                <c>ECDH-1PU using one-pass KDF and CEK wrapped with "A128KW"</c>

                <c>ECDH-1PU+A192KW</c>
                <c>ECDH-1PU using one-pass KDF and CEK wrapped with "A192KW"</c>

                <c>ECDH-1PU+A256KW</c>
                <c>ECDH-1PU using one-pass KDF and CEK wrapped with "A256KW"</c>
            </texttable>

            <section title="Header Parameters used for ECDH Key Agreement">
                <t>
                    The "epk" (ephemeral public key), "apu" (Agreement PartyUInfo), and "apv" (Agreement PartyVInfo)
                    header parameters are used in ECDH-1PU exactly as defined in Section 4.6.1 of
                    <xref target="RFC7518"/>.
                </t>
                <t>
                    When no other values are supplied, it is RECOMMENDED that the producer software
                    initializes the "apu" header to the base64url-encoding of the SHA-256 hash of the
                    concatenation of the sender's static public key and the ephemeral public key, and
                    the "apv" header to the base64url-encoding of the SHA-256 hash of the recipient's
                    static public key. This ensures that all keys involved in the key agreement are
                    cryptographically bound to the derived keys.
                </t>
                <section anchor="skid" title="&quot;skid&quot; Header Parameter">
                    <t>
                        A new Header Parameter "skid" (Sender Key ID) is registered as a hint as to which 
                        of the sender's keys was used to authenticate the JWE. The structure of the "skid"
                        value is unspecified. Its value MUST be a case-sensitive string. Use of this Header
                        Parameter is OPTIONAL. When used with a JWK, the "skid" value is used to match a JWK
                        "kid" parameter value <xref target="RFC7517"/>.
                    </t>
                </section>
            </section>

            <section title="Key Derivation for ECDH-1PU Key Agreement">
                <t>
                    The key derivation process derives the agreed-upon key from the shared secret Z
                    established through the ECDH algorithm, per Section 6.2.1.2 of <xref target="NIST.800-56A"/>.
                    For the NIST prime order curves "P-256", "P-384", and "P-521", the ECC CDH primitive
                    for cofactor Diffie-Hellman defined in Section 5.7.1.2 of <xref target="NIST.800-56A"/> is
                    used (taking note that the cofactor for all these curves is 1). For curves "X25519" and
                    "X448" the appropriate ECDH primitive from Section 5 of <xref target="RFC7748"/> is used.
                </t>
                <t>
                    Key derivation is performed using the one-step KDF, as defined in Section 5.8.1 and
                    Section 5.8.2.1 of <xref target="NIST.800-56A"/> using the Concatenation Format of
                    Section 5.8.2.1.1, where the Auxilary Function H is SHA-256. The KDF parameters
                    are set as follows:

                    <list style="hanging">
                        <t hangText="Z">
                            This is set to the representation of the shared secret Z as an octet sequence.
                            As per Section 6.2.1.2 of <xref target="NIST.800-56A"/> Z is the concatenation
                            of Ze and Zs, where Ze is the shared secret derived from applying the ECDH
                            primitive to the sender's ephemeral private key and the recipient's static
                            public key. Zs is the shared secret derived from applying the ECDH primitive
                            to the sender's static private key and the recipient's static public key.
                        </t>
                        <t hangText="keydatalen">
                            This is set to the number of bits in the desired output key. For "ECDH-1PU",
                            this is the length of the key used by the "enc" algorithm. For "ECDH-1PU+A128KW",
                            "ECDH-1PU+A192KW", and "ECDH-1PU+A256KW", this is 128, 192, and 256, respectively.
                        </t>
                        <t hangText="AlgorithmID">
                            The AlgorithmID values is of the form Datalen || Data, where Data is a variable-length
                            string of zero or more octets, and Datalen is a fixed-length, big-endian 32-bit counter
                            that indicates the length (in octets) of Data. In the Direct Key Agreement case,
                            Data is set to the octets of the ASCII representation of the "enc" Header Parameter value.
                            In the Key Agreement with Key Wrapping case, Data is set to the octets of the ASCII
                            representation of the "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter value.
                        </t>
                        <t hangText="PartyUInfo">
                          The PartyUInfo value is of the form Datalen || Data, where Data is
                          a variable-length string of zero or more octets, and Datalen is a
                          fixed-length, big-endian 32-bit counter that indicates the length
                          (in octets) of Data.  If an "apu" (agreement PartyUInfo) Header
                          Parameter is present, Data is set to the result of base64url
                          decoding the "apu" value and Datalen is set to the number of
                          octets in Data.  Otherwise, Datalen is set to 0 and Data is set to
                          the empty octet sequence.
                        </t>
                        <t hangText="PartyVInfo">
                          The PartyVInfo value is of the form Datalen || Data, where Data is
                          a variable-length string of zero or more octets, and Datalen is a
                          fixed-length, big-endian 32-bit counter that indicates the length
                          (in octets) of Data.  If an "apv" (agreement PartyVInfo) Header
                          Parameter is present, Data is set to the result of base64url
                          decoding the "apv" value and Datalen is set to the number of
                          octets in Data.  Otherwise, Datalen is set to 0 and Data is set to
                          the empty octet sequence.
                        </t>
                        <t hangText="SuppPubInfo">
                            This is set to the keydatalen represented as a 32-bit big-endian integer.
                        </t>
                        <t hangText="SuppPrivInfo">
                            This is set to the empty octet sequence.
                        </t>
                    </list>

                    Applications need to specify how the "apu" and "apv" Header Parameters are used for that
                    application. The "apu" and "apv" values MUST be distinct, when used. Applications wishing
                    to conform to <xref target="NIST.800-56A"/> need to provide values that meet the requirements
                    of that doucument, e.g., by using values that identify the producer and consumer.
                </t>
                <t>
                    See <xref target="example"/> for an example key agreement computation using this method.
                </t>

            </section>
        </section>

        <section anchor="IANA" title="IANA considerations">
            <?rfc subcompact="yes" ?>
            <t>
                This section registers identifiers under the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms
                Registry established by <xref target="RFC7518"/> and the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption
                Header Parameters registry established by <xref target="RFC7515"/>.
            </t>
            <section title="JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms Registration">
                <t>
                    This section registers JWE algorithms as per the registry established in
                    <xref target="RFC7518"/>. 
                </t>

                <section title="ECDH-1PU">
                    <t>
                        <list style="bullets">
                            <t>Algorithm Name: "ECDH-1PU"</t>
                            <t>Algorithm Description: ECDH One-Pass Unified Model using one-pass KDF</t>
                            <t>Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"</t>
                            <t>JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional</t>
                            <t>Change Controller: IESG</t>
                            <t>Specification Document(s): <xref target="ecdh-1pu"/></t>
                            <t>Algorithm Analysis Document(s): <xref target="NIST.800-56A"/> (Section 7.3), 
                                <xref target="PKAE"/></t>
                        </list>
                    </t>
                </section>
            </section>

            <section title="JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters Registration">
                <t>
                    This section registers new Header Parameters as per the registry established in
                    <xref target="RFC7515"/>.
                </t>

                <section title="skid">
                    <t>
                        <list style="bullets">
                            <t>Header Parameter Name: "skid"</t>
                            <t>Header Parameter Description: Sender Key ID</t>
                            <t>Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE</t>
                            <t>Change Controller: IESG</t>
                            <t>Specification Document(s): <xref target="skid"/></t>
                        </list>
                    </t>
                </section>
            </section>

        </section>

        <section anchor="security" title="Security Considerations">
            <t>
                The security considerations of <xref target="RFC7516"/> and <xref target="RFC7518"/> 
                relevant to ECDH-ES also apply to this specification.
            </t>
            <t>The security considerations of <xref target="NIST.800-56A"/> apply here.</t>

            <t>
                When performing an ECDH key agreement between a static private key and any untrusted
                public key, care should be taken to ensure that the public key is a valid point on
                the same curve as the private key. Failure to do so may result in compromise of the
                static private key. For the NIST curves P-256, P-384, and P-521, appropriate validation
                routines are given in Section 5.6.2.3.3 of <xref target="NIST.800-56A"/>. For the curves
                used by X25519 and X448, consult the security considerations of <xref target="RFC7748"/>.
            </t>

            <t>
                The ECDH-1PU algorithm is vulnerable to Key Compromise Impersonation (KCI) attacks. If
                the long-term static private key of a party is compromised, then the attacker can not
                only impersonate that party to other parties, but also impersonate any other party when
                communicating with the compromised party. If resistance to KCI is desired in a single 
                message, then it is RECOMMENDED to use a nested JWS signature over the content. An interactive
                handshake protocol, such as those described in <xref target="Noise"/> can also be used
                to prevent KCI.
            </t>

            <t>
                When Key Agreement with Key Wrapping is used, with the same Content Encryption Key (CEK)
                reused for multiple recipients, any of those recipients can produce a new message that
                appears to come from the original sender. The new message will be indistinguishable from 
                a genuine message from the original sender to any of the other participants. The sender
                SHOULD use a unique CEK for each recipient of a message.
            </t>

            <t>
                The security properties of the one-pass unified model are given in Section 7.3 of
                <xref target="NIST.800-56A"/>. 
            </t>

        </section>

    </middle>

    <back>
        <references title="Normative References">
            &RFC7515;
            &RFC7516;
            &RFC7517;
            &RFC7518;
            &RFC7748;
            &RFC8174;  
            
            <reference anchor="NIST.800-56A">
              <front>
                  <title>Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography Revision 3.</title>
                  <author surname="Barker" initials="E.">
                      <organization>Computer Security Division, Information Technology Laboratory</organization>
                  </author>
                  <author surname="Chen" initials="L.">
                      <organization>Computer Security Division, Information Technology Laboratory</organization>
                  </author>
                  <author surname="Roginsky" initials="A.">
                      <organization>Computer Security Division, Information Technology Laboratory</organization>
                  </author>
                  <author surname="Vassilev" initials="A.">
                      <organization>Computer Security Division, Information Technology Laboratory</organization>
                  </author>
                  <author surname="Davis" initials="R.">
                      <organization>National Security Agency</organization>
                  </author>
                  <date month="April" year="2018"/>
              </front>
              <seriesInfo name="NIST Special Publication" value="800-56A"/>
              <format target="https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3.pdf" type="PDF"/>
          </reference>

        </references>


        <references title="Informative References">
            <reference anchor="PKAE">
                <front>
                    <title>Authenticated Encryption in the Public-Key Setting: Security Notions and Analyses</title>
                    <author surname="An" initials="J.">
                        <organization>University of California at Davis</organization>
                    </author>
                    <date year="2001"/>
                </front>
                <seriesInfo name="IACR" value="ePrint 2001/079"/>
                <format target="https://eprint.iacr.org/2001/079.ps" type="PS"/>
            </reference>
            <reference anchor="Noise">
                <front>
                    <title>The Noise Protocol Framework, Revision 34</title>
                    <author surname="Perrin" initials="T."/>
                    <date year="2018" month="July" day="11"/>
                </front>
                <format target="https://noiseprotocol.org/noise.pdf" type="PDF"/>
            </reference>
          </references>

      <section anchor="example" title="Example ECDH-1PU Key Agreement Computation with A256GCM">
          <t>
              This example uses ECDH-1PU in Direct Key Agreement mode ("alg" value "ECDH-1PU")
              to produce an agreed-upon key for AES GCM with a 256-bit key ("enc" value "A256GCM").
              The example re-uses the keys and parameters of the example computation in Appendix C
              of <xref target="RFC7518"/>, with the addition of an extra static key-pair for Alice.
          </t>
          <t>
              When used in this way, ECDH-1PU has similar security properties to the "K" one-way
              handshake pattern of <xref target="Noise"/>, although it is quite different in details.
          </t>
          <t>
              In this example, a producer Alice is encrypting content to a consumer Bob. Alice's
              static key-pair (in JWK format) used for the key agreement in this example (including
              the private part) is:
          </t>
<figure>
  <artwork><![CDATA[
      {"kty":"EC",
       "crv":"P-256",
       "x":"WKn-ZIGevcwGIyyrzFoZNBdaq9_TsqzGl96oc0CWuis",
       "y":"y77t-RvAHRKTsSGdIYUfweuOvwrvDD-Q3Hv5J0fSKbE",
       "d":"Hndv7ZZjs_ke8o9zXYo3iq-Yr8SewI5vrqd0pAvEPqg"}
      ]]></artwork>
</figure>
          <t>
              Bob's static key-pair (in JWK format) is:
          </t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
      {"kty":"EC",
       "crv":"P-256",
       "x":"weNJy2HscCSM6AEDTDg04biOvhFhyyWvOHQfeF_PxMQ",
       "y":"e8lnCO-AlStT-NJVX-crhB7QRYhiix03illJOVAOyck",
       "d":"VEmDZpDXXK8p8N0Cndsxs924q6nS1RXFASRl6BfUqdw"}
      ]]></artwork></figure>
          <t>
              The producer (Alice) generates an ephemeral key for the key agreement computation.
              Alice's ephemeral key (in JWK format) is:
          </t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
      {"kty":"EC",
       "crv":"P-256",
       "x":"gI0GAILBdu7T53akrFmMyGcsF3n5dO7MmwNBHKW5SV0",
       "y":"SLW_xSffzlPWrHEVI30DHM_4egVwt3NQqeUD7nMFpps",
       "d":"0_NxaRPUMQoAJt50Gz8YiTr8gRTwyEaCumd-MToTmIo"}
      ]]></artwork></figure>
          <t>
           Header Parameter values used in this example are as follows.  The
           "apu" (agreement PartyUInfo) Header Parameter value is the base64url
           encoding of the UTF-8 string "Alice" and the "apv" (agreement
           PartyVInfo) Header Parameter value is the base64url encoding of the
           UTF-8 string "Bob".  The "epk" (ephemeral public key) Header
           Parameter is used to communicate the producer's (Alice's) ephemeral
           public key value to the consumer (Bob).
          </t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
     {"alg":"ECDH-1PU",
      "enc":"A256GCM",
      "apu":"QWxpY2U",
      "apv":"Qm9i",
      "epk":
       {"kty":"EC",
        "crv":"P-256",
        "x":"gI0GAILBdu7T53akrFmMyGcsF3n5dO7MmwNBHKW5SV0",
        "y":"SLW_xSffzlPWrHEVI30DHM_4egVwt3NQqeUD7nMFpps"
       }
     }
      ]]></artwork></figure>
          <t>
              The resulting one-pass KDF <xref target="NIST.800-56A"/> parameter values are:
              <list style="hanging">
                  <t hangText="Ze">
                      This is set to the output of the ECDH key agreement between Alice's
                      ephemeral private key and Bob's static public key. In this example,
                      Ze is the following octet sequence (in hexadecimal notation):
                  </t>
              </list>
          </t>
          <t>
              <figure><artwork>
      9e 56 d9 1d 81 71 35 d3 72 83 42 83 bf 84 26 9c 
      fb 31 6e a3 da 80 6a 48 f6 da a7 79 8c fe 90 c4</artwork></figure>
          </t>
          <t>
              <list style="hanging">

                  <t hangText="Zs">
                      This is set to the output of the ECDH key agreement between Alice's
                      static private key and Bob's static public key. In this example,
                      Zs is the following octet sequence (in hexadecimal notation):
                  </t>
              </list>
          </t>
          <t>
              <figure><artwork><![CDATA[
      e3 ca 34 74 38 4c 9f 62 b3 0b fd 4c 68 8b 3e 7d
      41 10 a1 b4 ba dc 3c c5 4e f7 b8 12 41 ef d5 0d]]></artwork></figure>
          </t>
          <t>
              <list style="hanging">
                  <t hangText="Z">
                      This is set to the concatenation of Ze followed by Zs. In this example,
                      Z is the following octet sequence (in hexadecimal notation):
                  </t>
              </list>
          </t>
          <t>
                      <figure><artwork><![CDATA[
      9e 56 d9 1d 81 71 35 d3 72 83 42 83 bf 84 26 9c 
      fb 31 6e a3 da 80 6a 48 f6 da a7 79 8c fe 90 c4
      e3 ca 34 74 38 4c 9f 62 b3 0b fd 4c 68 8b 3e 7d
      41 10 a1 b4 ba dc 3c c5 4e f7 b8 12 41 ef d5 0d]]></artwork></figure>
          </t>
          <t>
              <list style="hanging">
                  <t hangText="keydatalen">
                      This value is 256 - the number of bits in the desired output key
                      (because "A256GCM" uses a 256-bit key).
                  </t>
                  <t hangText="AlgorithmID">
                      This is set to the octets representing the 32-bit big-endian value
                      7 - 00 00 00 07 in hexadecimal notation - the number of octets in
                      the AlgorithmID content "A256GCM", followed by the octets representing
                      the ASCII string "A256GCM" - 41 32 35 36 47 43 4d (in hex). The
                      complete value is therefore: 00 00 00 07 41 32 35 36 47 43 4d
                  </t>
                  <t hangText="PartyUInfo">
                      This is set to the octets representing the 32-bit big-endian value
                      5, followed by the octets representing the UTF-8 string "Alice". In
                      hexadecimal notation: 00 00 00 05 41 6c 69 63 65
                  </t>
                  <t hangText="PartyVInfo">
                      This is set to the octets representing the 32-bit big-endian value
                      3, followed by the octets representing the UTF-8 string "Bob". In
                      hexadecimal notation: 00 00 00 03 42 6f 62
                  </t>
                  <t hangText="SuppPubInfo">
                      This is set to the octets representing the 32-bit big-endian value
                      256 - the keydatalen value. In hexadecimal notation: 00 00 01 00
                  </t>
                  <t hangText="SuppPrivInfo">
                      This is set to the empty octet sequence.
                  </t>
              </list>
          </t>
          <t>
              Concatenating the parameters AlgorithmID through SuppPrivInfo results in a FixedInfo
              value in Concatenation Format (as per Section 5.8.2.1.1 of <xref target="NIST.800-56A"/>)
              of (in hexidecimal notation):
          </t>
          <t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
      00 00 00 07 41 32 35 36 47 43 4d 00 00 00 05 41 
      6c 69 63 65 00 00 00 03 42 6f 62 00 00 01 00
]]></artwork></figure>
          </t>
          <t>
              Concatenating the round number 1 (00 00 00 01), Z, and the FixedInfo value results in
              a one-pass KDF round 1 hash input of (hexadecimal):
          </t>
          <t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
      00 00 00 01 9e 56 d9 1d 81 71 35 d3 72 83 42 83
      bf 84 26 9c fb 31 6e a3 da 80 6a 48 f6 da a7 79
      8c fe 90 c4 e3 ca 34 74 38 4c 9f 62 b3 0b fd 4c
      68 8b 3e 7d 41 10 a1 b4 ba dc 3c c5 4e f7 b8 12
      41 ef d5 0d 00 00 00 07 41 32 35 36 47 43 4d 00
      00 00 05 41 6c 69 63 65 00 00 00 03 42 6f 62 00
      00 01 00 ]]></artwork></figure>
          </t>
          <t>
              The resulting derived key, which is the full 256 bits of the round 1 hash output is:
          </t>
          <t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
      6c af 13 72 3d 14 85 0a d4 b4 2c d6 dd e9 35 bf 
      fd 2f ff 00 a9 ba 70 de 05 c2 03 a5 e1 72 2c a7
]]></artwork></figure>
          </t>
          <t>
              The base64url-encoded representation of this derived key is:
          </t>
          <t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
      bK8Tcj0UhQrUtCzW3ek1v_0v_wCpunDeBcIDpeFyLKc
]]></artwork></figure>
          </t>
      </section>

      <section title="Document History">
          <t>
              <list style="hanging">
                  <t hangText="-02">
                      Removed two-way interactive handshake protocol section and example after
                      discussion with Hannes Tschofenig.
                  </t>
                  <t hangText="-01">
                      Added examples in <xref target="example"/> and a two-way handshake example.
                      Added "skid" Header Parameter and registration. Fleshed out Security Considerations.
                  </t>
              </list>
          </t>
      </section>

    </back>
</rfc>