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RFE: enable changing the number of AVC hash buckets at runtime #34

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pcmoore opened this issue May 23, 2017 · 10 comments
Open

RFE: enable changing the number of AVC hash buckets at runtime #34

pcmoore opened this issue May 23, 2017 · 10 comments

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@pcmoore
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pcmoore commented May 23, 2017

At present the number of AVC hash buckets is hard coded to 512, we should look into making this tunable at runtime. While 512 buckets tends to work well for most workloads, it is proving to be too small for systems with a large number of unique labels such as container hosts using MCS/sVirt.

@pcmoore
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pcmoore commented May 23, 2017

I'm not sure this calls for something like the kernel's lib/rhashtable.c implementation, since the AVC is a cache, and I expect size adjustments to be rare, we can probably get away with throwing out the old table and replacing it with a new, empty table.

@stephensmalley
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Do you really need to change the number of buckets, or just the threshold/max number of cache entries? The latter can already be tuned via /sys/fs/selinux/avc/cache_threshold. Do we have some data, e.g. cat /sys/fs/selinux/avc/hash_stats, from these systems?

@pcmoore
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pcmoore commented May 23, 2017

I'm hearing of systems that have bumped the threshold up to ~65k and are hitting that limit, the resulting lengthy per-bucket chains are causing spikes in CPU usage in avc_has_perm().

@stephensmalley
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Why would we end up with that many unique AVC entries? Most container accesses would be within the same category set (i.e. intra-container) and to a handful of types (mostly container or svirt types). So they shouldn't yield that many unique (source context, target context, target class) triples.

@pcmoore
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pcmoore commented May 23, 2017

Imagine thousands of containers on a single system.

@stephensmalley
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Even with thousands of containers, most accesses should be intra-container, so I wouldn't expect that many unique AVC entries; AVC entries are only ever created for actual permission checks, not potential ones. That said, given the number of unique security classes, I could see a definite multiplying factor to just represent a container's access to all file classes, many socket classes, etc. That's another area for possible improvement, i.e. allowing a single AVC entry and security server computation to represent multiple classes so that if the same permissions are allowed to e.g. all file classes, we can store that once in the AVC.

@rhatdan
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rhatdan commented Mar 27, 2018

Most people will never run more then 100 containers. Eventually we might scale beyond 100, but I think on OpenShift right now, we are only handling ~50 containers. So this would be 50 Process types and 50 object types (Maybe a few more)

@jeremyeder
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Agreed with the most people comment. OpenShift supports up to 250 per node right now, and going to try and double that by fall of this year. We currently have closing in on 100 per node in a variety of environments though. 100 is pretty common.

@stephensmalley
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Then I don't see why we'd be increasing the AVC cache threshhold to 64k; that's just making the cache slow for no benefit.

pcmoore pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 22, 2018
gpiochip_set_cascaded_irqchip() is passed 'parent_irq' as an argument
and then the address of that argument is assigned to the gpio chips
gpio_irq_chip 'parents' pointer shortly thereafter. This can't ever
work, because we've just assigned some stack address to a pointer that
we plan to dereference later in gpiochip_irq_map(). I ran into this
issue with the KASAN report below when gpiochip_irq_map() tried to setup
the parent irq with a total junk pointer for the 'parents' array.

BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in gpiochip_irq_map+0x228/0x248
Read of size 4 at addr ffffffc0dde472e0 by task swapper/0/1

CPU: 7 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.14.72 #34
Call trace:
[<ffffff9008093638>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x718
[<ffffff9008093da4>] show_stack+0x20/0x2c
[<ffffff90096b9224>] __dump_stack+0x20/0x28
[<ffffff90096b91c8>] dump_stack+0x80/0xbc
[<ffffff900845a350>] print_address_description+0x70/0x238
[<ffffff900845a8e4>] kasan_report+0x1cc/0x260
[<ffffff900845aa14>] __asan_report_load4_noabort+0x2c/0x38
[<ffffff900897e098>] gpiochip_irq_map+0x228/0x248
[<ffffff900820cc08>] irq_domain_associate+0x114/0x2ec
[<ffffff900820d13c>] irq_create_mapping+0x120/0x234
[<ffffff900820da78>] irq_create_fwspec_mapping+0x4c8/0x88c
[<ffffff900820e2d8>] irq_create_of_mapping+0x180/0x210
[<ffffff900917114c>] of_irq_get+0x138/0x198
[<ffffff9008dc70ac>] spi_drv_probe+0x94/0x178
[<ffffff9008ca5168>] driver_probe_device+0x51c/0x824
[<ffffff9008ca6538>] __device_attach_driver+0x148/0x20c
[<ffffff9008ca14cc>] bus_for_each_drv+0x120/0x188
[<ffffff9008ca570c>] __device_attach+0x19c/0x2dc
[<ffffff9008ca586c>] device_initial_probe+0x20/0x2c
[<ffffff9008ca18bc>] bus_probe_device+0x80/0x154
[<ffffff9008c9b9b4>] device_add+0x9b8/0xbdc
[<ffffff9008dc7640>] spi_add_device+0x1b8/0x380
[<ffffff9008dcbaf0>] spi_register_controller+0x111c/0x1378
[<ffffff9008dd6b10>] spi_geni_probe+0x4dc/0x6f8
[<ffffff9008cab058>] platform_drv_probe+0xdc/0x130
[<ffffff9008ca5168>] driver_probe_device+0x51c/0x824
[<ffffff9008ca59cc>] __driver_attach+0x100/0x194
[<ffffff9008ca0ea8>] bus_for_each_dev+0x104/0x16c
[<ffffff9008ca58c0>] driver_attach+0x48/0x54
[<ffffff9008ca1edc>] bus_add_driver+0x274/0x498
[<ffffff9008ca8448>] driver_register+0x1ac/0x230
[<ffffff9008caaf6c>] __platform_driver_register+0xcc/0xdc
[<ffffff9009c4b33c>] spi_geni_driver_init+0x1c/0x24
[<ffffff9008084cb8>] do_one_initcall+0x240/0x3dc
[<ffffff9009c017d0>] kernel_init_freeable+0x378/0x468
[<ffffff90096e8240>] kernel_init+0x14/0x110
[<ffffff9008086fcc>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18

The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffffbf037791c0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:          (null) index:0x0
flags: 0x4000000000000000()
raw: 4000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff
raw: ffffffbf037791e0 ffffffbf037791e0 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffffffc0dde47180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 ffffffc0dde47200: f1 f1 f1 f1 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f2 f2
>ffffffc0dde47280: f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f3 f3 f3 f3
                                                       ^
 ffffffc0dde47300: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 ffffffc0dde47380: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

Let's leave around one unsigned int in the gpio_irq_chip struct for the
single parent irq case and repoint the 'parents' array at it. This way
code is left mostly intact to setup parents and we waste an extra few
bytes per structure of which there should be only a handful in a system.

Cc: Evan Green <[email protected]>
Cc: Thierry Reding <[email protected]>
Cc: Grygorii Strashko <[email protected]>
Fixes: e0d8972 ("gpio: Implement tighter IRQ chip integration")
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <[email protected]>
pcmoore pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jan 22, 2024
Inside decrement_ttl() upon discovering that the packet ttl has exceeded,
__IP_INC_STATS and __IP6_INC_STATS macros can be called from preemptible
context having the following backtrace:

check_preemption_disabled: 48 callbacks suppressed
BUG: using __this_cpu_add() in preemptible [00000000] code: curl/1177
caller is decrement_ttl+0x217/0x830
CPU: 5 PID: 1177 Comm: curl Not tainted 6.7.0+ #34
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0xbd/0xe0
 check_preemption_disabled+0xd1/0xe0
 decrement_ttl+0x217/0x830
 __ip_vs_get_out_rt+0x4e0/0x1ef0
 ip_vs_nat_xmit+0x205/0xcd0
 ip_vs_in_hook+0x9b1/0x26a0
 nf_hook_slow+0xc2/0x210
 nf_hook+0x1fb/0x770
 __ip_local_out+0x33b/0x640
 ip_local_out+0x2a/0x490
 __ip_queue_xmit+0x990/0x1d10
 __tcp_transmit_skb+0x288b/0x3d10
 tcp_connect+0x3466/0x5180
 tcp_v4_connect+0x1535/0x1bb0
 __inet_stream_connect+0x40d/0x1040
 inet_stream_connect+0x57/0xa0
 __sys_connect_file+0x162/0x1a0
 __sys_connect+0x137/0x160
 __x64_sys_connect+0x72/0xb0
 do_syscall_64+0x6f/0x140
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76
RIP: 0033:0x7fe6dbbc34e0

Use the corresponding preemption-aware variants: IP_INC_STATS and
IP6_INC_STATS.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org).

Fixes: 8d8e20e ("ipvs: Decrement ttl")
Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
@freedom1b2830
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I am developing a policy from scratch and need the ability to reduce the cache size. This will allow me to get more messages ('execute') per program call. Instead of restarting the system each time, I want to get more paths to executables at once. Is there a way to set the cache size, for example via a kernel parameter?

pcmoore pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jan 20, 2025
…nt message

Address a bug in the kernel that triggers a "sleeping function called from
invalid context" warning when /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak is printed under
specific conditions:
- CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT=y
- Set SELinux as the LSM for the system
- Set kptr_restrict to 1
- kmemleak buffer contains at least one item

BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:48
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 136, name: cat
preempt_count: 1, expected: 0
RCU nest depth: 2, expected: 2
6 locks held by cat/136:
 #0: ffff32e64bcbf950 (&p->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: seq_read_iter+0xb8/0xe30
 #1: ffffafe6aaa9dea0 (scan_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kmemleak_seq_start+0x34/0x128
 #3: ffff32e6546b1cd0 (&object->lock){....}-{2:2}, at: kmemleak_seq_show+0x3c/0x1e0
 #4: ffffafe6aa8d8560 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: has_ns_capability_noaudit+0x8/0x1b0
 #5: ffffafe6aabbc0f8 (notif_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: avc_compute_av+0xc4/0x3d0
irq event stamp: 136660
hardirqs last  enabled at (136659): [<ffffafe6a80fd7a0>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0xa8/0xd8
hardirqs last disabled at (136660): [<ffffafe6a80fd85c>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x8c/0xb0
softirqs last  enabled at (0): [<ffffafe6a5d50b28>] copy_process+0x11d8/0x3df8
softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
Preemption disabled at:
[<ffffafe6a6598a4c>] kmemleak_seq_show+0x3c/0x1e0
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 136 Comm: cat Tainted: G            E      6.11.0-rt7+ #34
Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Call trace:
 dump_backtrace+0xa0/0x128
 show_stack+0x1c/0x30
 dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x198
 dump_stack+0x18/0x20
 rt_spin_lock+0x8c/0x1a8
 avc_perm_nonode+0xa0/0x150
 cred_has_capability.isra.0+0x118/0x218
 selinux_capable+0x50/0x80
 security_capable+0x7c/0xd0
 has_ns_capability_noaudit+0x94/0x1b0
 has_capability_noaudit+0x20/0x30
 restricted_pointer+0x21c/0x4b0
 pointer+0x298/0x760
 vsnprintf+0x330/0xf70
 seq_printf+0x178/0x218
 print_unreferenced+0x1a4/0x2d0
 kmemleak_seq_show+0xd0/0x1e0
 seq_read_iter+0x354/0xe30
 seq_read+0x250/0x378
 full_proxy_read+0xd8/0x148
 vfs_read+0x190/0x918
 ksys_read+0xf0/0x1e0
 __arm64_sys_read+0x70/0xa8
 invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0xd4/0x1d8
 el0_svc+0x50/0x158
 el0t_64_sync+0x17c/0x180

%pS and %pK, in the same back trace line, are redundant, and %pS can void
%pK service in certain contexts.

%pS alone already provides the necessary information, and if it cannot
resolve the symbol, it falls back to printing the raw address voiding
the original intent behind the %pK.

Additionally, %pK requires a privilege check CAP_SYSLOG enforced through
the LSM, which can trigger a "sleeping function called from invalid
context" warning under RT_PREEMPT kernels when the check occurs in an
atomic context. This issue may also affect other LSMs.

This change avoids the unnecessary privilege check and resolves the
sleeping function warning without any loss of information.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 3a6f33d ("mm/kmemleak: use %pK to display kernel pointers in backtrace")
Signed-off-by: Alessandro Carminati <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc: Clément Léger <[email protected]>
Cc: Alessandro Carminati <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Chanudet <[email protected]>
Cc: Gabriele Paoloni <[email protected]>
Cc: Juri Lelli <[email protected]>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Weißschuh <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
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