accountability-and-the-law-rights-authority-and-transparency-of-public-power.toc

1,Accountability and the Law,2
1,Comparative Constitutional Change,3
1,Contents,6
1,Contributors,8
1,1 Introduction,12
2,References,16
1,Part I Law,18
2,2 Accountability in the globalised digital age: online content moderation and hate speech in the European Union,20
3,2.1 Introduction: a new accountability environment,20
3,2.2 Digital constitutionalism and the regulatory shift,24
3,2.3 Content moderation instruments and accountability,26
4,2.3.1 Automated social media content moderation tools and accountability,28
4,2.3.2 Appeals system,29
3,2.4 Online platforms’ accountability in a European context,30
3,2.5 Concluding remarks,35
3,References,36
2,3 Economic crises and transformation to the theoretical model of budget process: a comparative constitutional analysis via an example of EU Member States,39
3,3.1 Introduction,39
3,"3.2 The notion, phases, and course of budget process in the EU Member States",40
3,3.3 Economic crisis and budget process,44
3,3.4 Final remarks,53
3,References,54
2,4 Financial accountability and transparency of public sector institutions in the Republic of Serbia,57
3,4.1 Introduction,57
3,4.2 The role of internal financial control in the public sector,59
3,4.3 Assessment of the financial management and control system according to the reports of the State Audit Institution,61
3,4.4 The role of the State Audit Institution and Budget Inspection,64
3,4.5 Conclusion,67
1,Part II Fairness and rights,72
2,5 Disciplinary liability of judges: the Polish case,74
3,5.1 Introduction,74
3,5.2 Models of disciplinary liability of judges and the Polish solutions,76
3,5.3 Scope of disciplinary liability of judges and disciplinary penalties in Poland after the changes provided under the PiS administration,77
3,5.4 Current jurisdiction of disciplinary courts and of disciplinary commissioners,82
3,5.5 Final remarks,88
3,References,88
2,6 Transparency and accountability versus secrecy in intelligence operations: an Italian case study,91
3,6.1 Introduction,91
3,6.2 The history of intelligence: a brief overview,92
4,6.2.1 Intelligence from early history to the Restoration: a comparative perspective,93
4,6.2.2 Intelligence from the 19th century onwards: focus on Italy,94
3,6.3 The current intelligence legal framework,98
4,6.3.1 Law no. 124/2007: main features,98
3,6.4 The Italian intelligence system and its interactions with state powers,102
4,6.4.1 Political oversight of secret services’ activities,102
4,6.4.2 Judicial oversight and the use of state secrecy in criminal proceedings,104
3,6.5 Intelligence agencies ‘in action’ in times of international terrorism,105
4,6.5.1 International terrorism and the metamorphosis of security threats,106
4,"6.5.2 Extraordinary renditions, state secrecy, and the Italian Constitutional Court",107
3,6.6 Concluding remarks,109
3,References,110
2,7 Non-judicial legal accountability: the case of the Chilean comptroller-general,113
3,7.1 Introduction,113
3,7.2 Constitutional and legal framework,116
4,7.2.1 Constitutional regulation,116
4,7.2.2 Organisational structure,116
5,7.2.2.1 Hierarchical arrangements,116
5,7.2.2.2 The office head,118
3,7.3 Mandate and powers,120
4,7.3.1 Multitasking,120
4,7.3.2 Ex-ante legality review,120
5,7.3.2.1 Basic provisions,120
5,7.3.2.2 Types of administrative actions under review,121
5,7.3.2.3 Participants,123
5,7.3.2.4 Standard of review,124
5,7.3.2.5 The insistence mechanism—the presidential override,124
4,7.3.3 The power of dispute resolution,127
5,7.3.3.1 Basic provisions,127
5,7.3.3.2 Aims and functions,128
5,7.3.3.3 Access,129
5,7.3.3.4 Legal authority and limits,130
3,7.4 Conclusion,131
3,References,132
1,Part III Authority,138
2,8 Presidents’ (mis)use of public accountability: going-public tactics in European semi-presidential regimes,140
3,8.1 Introduction,140
3,8.2 Research design and data,142
3,8.3 Theory and definitions,143
3,"8.4 Semi-presidentialism in Finland, Lithuania, and Romania",145
3,8.5 Analysis,149
4,"8.5.1 Presidents, cabinets, and intra-executive conflicts",149
4,8.5.2 A strictly constrained but highly popular presidency in post-2000 Finland,149
4,8.5.3 The presidency in Lithuania: popular leadership as a lever for power grabs,154
4,"8.5.4 Challenged mediation, popular support, and intra-executive conflict in Romania",156
3,8.6 Conclusions,160
3,References,162
2,9 Ministerial criminal liability in the Greek legal order: a concise critical review,167
3,9.1 Introduction,167
3,9.2 The scope of ministerial offences under Article 86,169
3,9.3 Statute of limitations and the extinguishing deadline: a hasty elimination of punishability,175
3,9.4 Issues on complicity,176
3,9.5 In defence of amending Article 86,177
3,References,183
2,10 Transparency and accountability of the Italian public administration in the context of public procurement: the case of below-threshold contracts,185
3,10.1 Introduction,185
3,10.2 Transparency and accountability as two sides of the same coin,187
3,10.3 Transparency and accountability in the context of Italian public procurement,189
3,10.4 Procurement of services and supplies with economic costs below the threshold of European relevance after the recent reform of the Italian Public Contract Code (CCP),192
3,10.5 The case of the so-called pure direct award (for contracts whose amounts are lower than EUR 40,000),194
3,10.6 The case of the so-called hybrid or mixed direct award (for contracts whose amounts are from EUR 40,000 up to the level of European relevance),197
3,10.7 Final considerations on balancing the principles of transparency and accountability with the aim of simplification in the context of below-threshold contracts,200
3,References,203
2,11 Transparency and government accountability in Brexit negotiations,204
3,11.1 Introduction,204
3,11.2 The UK’s exit from the EU,205
4,11.2.1 The conduct of the UK’s foreign affairs—a brief outline,205
4,11.2.2 Triggering of Article 50(2) of the TEU without parliamentary authorisation,206
5,11.2.2.1 Miller I case judgement,208
3,11.3 The EU and the UK positions in the Brexit negotiations and the impact of the principle of transparency,209
4,11.3.1 Brexit negotiation strategy,211
4,11.3.2 The EU/UK approach to transparency in the Brexit negotiations,213
3,11.4 The Brexit negotiations and the UK Government’s accountability,217
4,11.4.1 The role of the UK’s Select Committees in influencing the EU decision-making process,220
4,11.4.2 The process of constitutional change in ‘regaining’ the UK Parliament’s sovereignty,224
3,11.5 Conclusion,227
2,References,229
1,Index,232