industrial-concentration-and-the-chicago-school-of-antitrust-analysis.toc

1,Industrial Concentration and the Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis,1
1,Preface,11
1,Table of Contents,13
1,Table of Abbreviations,20
1,Journals and Periodicals Cited,21
1,Survey of Figures and Tables,23
1,"Introduction: Antitrust Economics, Policy, and Law at the Crossroads: A Reorientation",25
2,I. The Context,25
2,II. Developments in U.S. Antitrust Policy During the 1970s and 1980s,27
3,1. Antitrust Economics,28
3,2. Antitrust Enforcement,33
4,a. The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice,34
4,b. The Federal Trade Commission,38
3,3. Antitrust Adjudication,40
3,4. Antitrust Legislation,43
2,III. The Source of Reorientation: The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis,47
3,1. The Foundations,47
3,2. Chicago Antitrust Philosophy,49
2,IV. Definition of the Field of Research and Course of Inquiry,51
1,Part 1: Analytical Framework for the Evaluation of Restraints of Competition by Industrial Concentration,55
2,"I. Free Enterprise System. Competition, and Public Policy",55
3,1. Economic Order and Competition,55
3,2. Nature and Meaning of Competition,57
3,3. Competition and Public Policy,60
2,II. Economic Evaluation of Industrial Concentration: Theoretical Approach and Public Policy,63
3,1. Antitrust Policy Objectives,63
4,a. Objectives and Interrelations,64
4,b. Conflicting Objectives,66
3,2. Elements of the Approach to an Evaluation of Industrial Concentration,68
4,a. Models of Competition,68
4,"b. The Structure-, Conduct-, Performance-Paradigm, and the Competitive Process",72
4,c. Effective Competition and Competition Impairment,77
4,d. Intensity of Competition and the Adequate Test,82
3,3. The Treatment of Competition Impairment and Public Policy Alternatives,84
4,a. Approaches,85
4,b. Rules,86
2,III. Competition and Industrial Concentration,88
3,1. Concentration and Economic Theory,88
4,a. Nature and Meaning of Economic Concentration,88
4,b. Economic Concentration and Power,91
4,c. Features of Industrial Concentration,95
5,aa. Significance,95
5,bb. Causes,100
5,cc. Effects,104
4,d. Forms of Industrial Concentration,106
5,aa. Internal Growth,107
5,bb. External Growth,107
6,(1) Horizontal Mergers,108
6,(2) Vertical Mergers,108
6,(3) Conglomerate Mergers,109
3,2. Measurement of Economic Concentration,110
4,a. Analysis of Economic Concentration,110
4,b. Defining the Relevant Market,111
4,c. Measures of Industrial Concentration,116
2,IV. Concluding Remarks,120
1,Part 2: The Central Elements of the Current Theoretical Edifice,123
2,I. The Current Debate on The Goals of Antitrust: Economics or Sociopolitics?,123
3,1. The Current Efficiency-Orientation,125
3,2. Evidence of the Goals of Antitrust,131
4,a. Legislative History of the Antitrust Statutes,131
4,b. Adjudicative Development,134
4,c. Plausibility Considerations,137
3,3. Antitrust Legislation and Rent-Seeking Behavior,139
3,4. The German Case,141
2,II. Methodology and Theoretical Model Underlying the Evaluation of the Competitiveness of Mergers,144
3,1. The General Methodology of Analysis,144
4,a. Neoclassical Price Theory as an Instrument of Analysis,144
4,b. Price/Quantity-Interrelations as Indicators of Consumer Welfare,148
4,c. The General Methodology: Conclusions,153
3,"2. Mergers, Efficiency, and the Model for Evaluation",154
4,a. Consumer Welfare and Efficiency: Remarks on Interdependence,154
4,b. The Incorporation of Current Efficiency Considerations,155
4,c. The Partial Equilibrium Trade-Off Model Reconsidered,157
4,d. Qualifications to the Model,161
5,aa. Premises and Assumptions,161
5,bb. General Welfare Measurement,163
5,cc. Allocative Efficiency,164
5,dd. Productive Efficiency,166
5,ee. Transfer of Wealth,170
2,III. Impediments to New Competition,174
3,"1. Perfect Competition, Monopoly, and Potential Competition",175
3,"2. The Meaning, Definition, and Importance of Barriers to New Competition",176
3,3. The Measurement of Barriers to New Competition,182
3,4. Kinds of Barriers to New Competition and their Sources: Plausibility and Empirical Evidence,184
4,a. Structural Barriers,184
5,aa. Economies of Large Scale,185
5,bb. Absolute Cost Advantages,188
5,cc. Product Differentiation Advantages,191
4,b. Strategic Barriers,197
4,c. Legal and Administrative Barriers,201
4,d. Barriers to Exit,203
3,5. An Evaluation of Impediments to New Competition,206
2,IV. Concluding Remarks,208
1,Part 3: Industrial Concentration through Horizontal Mergers: Effects on Performance,213
2,I. The Economic Rationale Underlying the Traditional Merger Policy,213
3,1. The Content of the Concentration-Collusion Doctrine,214
3,2. Economic Returns as a Standard of Measurement,216
3,3. Empirical Attempts to Verify the Concentration-Collusion Doctrine,219
4,a. Empirical Evidence,221
5,aa. Concentration and Prices,221
5,"bb. Concentration, Profit Rates, and Price-Cost Margins",224
4,b. Collusion and “Critical Levels” of Concentration,227
4,c. The Suitability of the Different Performance Criteria,229
4,d. Insufficiencies of Traditional Studies,232
2,II. The Validity of the Mainline Paradigm and the New Learning-Hypothesis,234
3,1. Efficiency as a Cause of Concentration,234
3,2. Concentration as a Possible Cause of Collusion,236
3,3. The Theoretical Basis and the Empirical Evidence of the New Learning-Hypothesis,238
3,4. Revised Policy Conclusions for Horizontal Mergers,243
3,"5. Critical Evaluation of the New Learning-Hypotheses, the Underlying Premises, and their Empirical Evidence",245
4,a. Impediments to Competition,245
4,b. Accounting Data and the Data Base,247
4,c. The Core of the Oligopoly and Other Omissions,251
4,d. The Persistence of Profits in the Long Run,254
2,III. Firm Market Share as the Essential Determinant of Interfirm Profitability Differences,256
3,1. Interfirm Profitability Differences: Efficiency or Market Power?,256
3,2. The Range of Economies of Size as an Alternative Explanatory Approach,261
3,3. The Evidence of Efficiency on the Basis of Merger Performance,272
2,IV. Concluding Remarks,274
1,Part 4: Vertical Mergers: Anticompetitive Effects and the Attainment of Efficiencies,279
2,I. Vertical Integration and Efficiency-Enhancement,280
3,1. Transaction-Costs and Different Mechanisms for the Organization of Economic Exchange,281
4,a. Economic Exchange via Markets: Costs of Using the Price Mechanism,281
4,b. Economic Exchange via Organizations: Costs of Using Internal Organization,284
3,2. Efficiency-Enhancement as the Underlying Reasoning for Vertical Integration,285
3,3. Efficiency Gains vs. Anticompetitive Consequences: Necessity for a Trade-Off?,287
2,II. Empirical Evidence on the Extent of Vertical Integration and Associated Efficiency Advantages,289
3,1. The Measurement of the Extent of Vertical Integration,289
3,2. The Empirical Evidence on Efficiency-Enhancement,290
4,a. Studies on Transaction-Specific Market Characteristics,291
4,b. Studies on Actual Cost Savings,292
3,3. A Critical Review of the Applicability of the Transaction-Cost Approach to an Efficiency Analysis of Vertical Integration,294
2,III. An Evaluation of Possible Anticompetitive Consequences Resulting from Vertical Integration,297
3,1. The Reasoning Underlying Anticipated Anticompetitive Consequences: Foreclosure of Actual and Potential Competitors,297
3,2. Particular Anticompetitive Effects Associated with Foreclosure,302
4,a. Price and Output Consequences,302
4,b. Price and Supply Squeeze,306
4,c. Price Discrimination,310
4,d. Impediments to New Competition,314
4,e. Collusive Effects,318
3,3. The Likelihood of Anticompetitive Effects and Revised Policy Conclusions,322
2,IV. Concluding Remarks,325
1,Résumée: Application of the Results of an Analysis of the Chicago School Approach Towards Industrial Concentration,329
2,I. The Legal Treatment of Industrial Concentration,329
3,1. The Approach,330
3,2. The Relevant Statutes,332
3,3. The Merger Term in the Statutes,333
3,4. The Minimum Thresholds,334
3,5. The Point of Intervention,334
3,6. Overall Justification,337
2,II. Trends and Tendencies in Enforcement and Adjudication,338
3,1. The Use of Economic Evidence in Enforcement and Adjudication,338
3,2. An Evaluation of Trends and Tendencies,339
4,a. Determining Market Delineation,339
4,b. Determining Market Domination,341
5,aa. Superior Market Position,342
6,(1) Market Structure,342
7,(a) Market Share,343
7,(b) Financial Strength,345
7,(c) Market Barriers,348
6,(2) Market Conduct,350
5,bb. Oligopolistic Domination,352
4,c. Strengthening Market Domination,355
2,III. An Evaluation of the Propositions for a Reform of Merger Control in the Fifth Amendment of the ARC,356
3,1. Political and Economic Order: Thoughts on Structural Complementarity,357
3,2. The Object of Protection: Competition vs. Competitors,360
3,3. An Evaluation of the Proposals on the Basis of Our State of Knowledge,362
4,a. The Proposals,362
4,b. The Evaluation,365
2,IV. Concluding Remarks,370
1,Bibliography,375
2,Monographies,375
2,Omnibus Volumes,385
2,Articles and Serial Publications,395
2,Official Publications, Legal and Other Sources,418
2,Index of German and U.S. American Cases Cited,420