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There is a risk in
pushing this line of alienating both the type theorists (who feel that
the philosophical essence of type theory is being abandoned) and the
linguists (who tend to feel that if one is going to move in the type
theory direction then one should probably be doing proof theory rather than
model theory).
Ultimately, the line between a proof theoretical
approach and a model-theoretic approach that advocates structured
semantic objects can be a hard one to draw when viewed from the
perspective of a theory of natural language or human cognition. Both approaches are
advocating the need for more structured objects than are provided by
classical model theory, objects whose components can be manipulated by
formal processes which are meant to model agents' cognitive
processes. In this section we will attempt to present a philosophical
view of the type theory we present in Section~\ref{sec:TTR} seen as an
important component in a theory of cognition.