first batch of entries during dsst pipeline dev

source/_posts/ahl2023.md

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+---
+title: Ahl et al. (2023)
+subtitle: 'Having less means wanting more: Children hold an intuitive economic theory of diminishing marginal utility'
+date: 2023/05/01
+authors:
+- Ahl, Richard E
+- Cook, Emma
+- McAuliffe, Katherine
+journal: Cognition
+paper_url: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105367
+data_url: https://osf.io/fub2x
+tags:
+- 
+---
+
+Judgments surrounding resource acquisition and valuation are ubiquitous in daily life. How do humans decide what something is worth to themselves or someone else? One important cue to value is that of resource quantity. As described by economists, the principle of diminishing marginal utility (DMU) holds that as resource abundance increases, the value placed on each unit decreases; likewise, when resources become more scarce, the value placed on each unit rises. While prior research suggests that adults make judgments that align with this concept, it is unclear whether children do so. In Study 1 (n = 104), children (ages 5 through 8) were presented with scenarios involving losses or gains to others' resources and predicted the actions and emotions of the individuals involved. Participants made decisions that aligned with DMU, e.g., expecting individuals with fewer resources to expend more effort for an additional resource than individuals with greater resources. In Study 2 (n = 104), children incorporated information about preferences when inferring others' resource valuations, showing how quantity and preference are both included in children's inferences about others' utility. Our results indicate the early emergence of an intuitive economic theory that aligns with an important economic principle. Long before formal learning on this topic, children integrate quantity and preference information to sensibly predict others' resource valuations, with implications for economic decision-making, social preferences, and judgments of partner quality across the lifespan.

source/_posts/aka2023.md

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+---
+title: Aka et al. (2023)
+subtitle: 'Semantic determinants of memorability'
+date: 2023/10/01
+authors:
+- Aka, Ada
+- Bhatia, Sudeep
+- McCoy, John
+journal: Cognition
+paper_url: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105497
+data_url: https://osf.io/7phj6
+tags:
+- 
+---
+
+We examine why some words are more memorable than others by using predictive machine learning models applied to word recognition and recall datasets. Our approach provides more accurate out-of-sample predictions for recognition and recall than previous psychological models, and outperforms human participants in new studies of memorability prediction. Our approach's predictive power stems from its ability to capture the semantic determinants of memorability in a data-driven manner. We identify which semantic categories are important for memorability and show that, unlike features such as word frequency that influence recognition and recall differently, the memorability of semantic categories is consistent across recognition and recall. Our paper sheds light on the complex psychological drivers of memorability, and in doing so illustrates the power of machine learning methods for psychological theory development.

source/_posts/algermissen2023.md

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+---
+title: Algermissen & den-Ouden (2023)
+subtitle: 'Goal-directed recruitment of Pavlovian biases through selective visual attention'
+date: 2023/10/01
+authors:
+- Algermissen, Johannes
+- den Ouden, Hanneke E M
+journal: J. Exp. Psychol. Gen.
+paper_url: https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001425
+data_url: https://data.ru.nl/collections/di/dcc/DSC_2020.00093_989?0
+tags:
+- 
+---
+
+Prospective outcomes bias behavior in a "Pavlovian" manner: Reward prospect invigorates action, while punishment prospect suppresses it. Theories have posited Pavlovian biases as global action "priors" in unfamiliar or uncontrollable environments. However, this account fails to explain the strength of these biases-causing frequent action slips-even in well-known environments. We propose that Pavlovian control is additionally useful if flexibly recruited by instrumental control. Specifically, instrumental action plans might shape selective attention to reward/punishment information and thus the input to Pavlovian control. In two eye-tracking samples (N = 35/64), we observed that Go/NoGo action plans influenced when and for how long participants attended to reward/punishment information, which in turn biased their responses in a Pavlovian manner. Participants with stronger attentional effects showed higher performance. Thus, humans appear to align Pavlovian control with their instrumental action plans, extending its role beyond action defaults to a powerful tool ensuring robust action execution. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

source/_posts/bakst2023.md

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+---
+title: Bakst & McGuire (2023)
+subtitle: 'Experience-driven recalibration of learning from surprising events'
+date: 2023/03/01
+authors:
+- Bakst, Leah
+- McGuire, Joseph T
+journal: Cognition
+paper_url: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105343
+data_url: https://osf.io/5pmhg
+tags:
+- 
+---
+
+Different environments favor different patterns of adaptive learning. A surprising event that in one context would accelerate belief updating might, in another context, be downweighted as a meaningless outlier. Here, we investigated whether people would spontaneously regulate the influence of surprise on learning in response to event-by-event experiential feedback. Across two experiments, we examined whether participants performing a perceptual judgment task under spatial uncertainty (n = 29, n = 63) adapted their patterns of predictive gaze according to the informativeness or uninformativeness of surprising events in their current environment. Uninstructed predictive eye movements exhibited a form of metalearning in which surprise came to modulate event-by-event learning rates in opposite directions across contexts. Participants later appropriately readjusted their patterns of adaptive learning when the statistics of the environment underwent an unsignaled reversal. Although significant adjustments occurred in both directions, performance was consistently superior in environments in which surprising events reflected meaningful change, potentially reflecting a bias towards interpreting surprise as informative and/or difficulty ignoring salient outliers. Our results provide evidence for spontaneous, context-appropriate recalibration of the role of surprise in adaptive learning.

source/_posts/bartsch2023.md

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+---
+title: Bartsch & Oberauer (2023)
+subtitle: 'The contribution of episodic long-term memory to working memory for bindings'
+date: 2023/02/01
+authors:
+- Bartsch, Lea M
+- Oberauer, Klaus
+journal: Cognition
+paper_url: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105330
+data_url: https://osf.io/ymgkq
+tags:
+- 
+---
+
+The present experiments support two conclusions about the capacity limit of working memory (WM). First, they provide evidence for the Binding Hypothesis, WM capacity is limited by interference between bindings but not items. Second, they show that episodic LTM contributes substantially to binding memory when the capacity of WM is stretched to the limit by larger set sizes. We tested immediate memory for sets of word-picture pairs. With increasing set size, memory for bindings declined more precipitously than memory for items, as predicted from the binding hypothesis. Yet, at higher set sizes performance was more stable than expected from a capacity limited memory, suggesting a contribution of episodic long-term memory (LTM) to circumvent the WM capacity limit. In support of that hypothesis, we show a double dissociation of contributions of WM and episodic LTM to binding memory: Performance at set sizes larger than 3 was specifically affected by proactive interference - but were immune to influences from a distractor-filled delay. In contrast, performance at set size 2 was unaffected by proactive interference but harmed by a distractor-filled delay.

source/_posts/bornstein2023.md

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+---
+title: Bornstein et al. (2023)
+subtitle: 'Associative memory retrieval modulates upcoming perceptual decisions'
+date: 2023/06/01
+authors:
+- Bornstein, Aaron M
+- Aly, Mariam
+- Feng, Samuel F
+- Turk-Browne, Nicholas B
+- Norman, Kenneth A
+- Cohen, Jonathan D
+journal: Cogn. Affect. Behav. Neurosci.
+paper_url: https://doi.org/10.3758/s13415-023-01092-6
+data_url: https://doi.org/10.18112/openneuro.ds001614.v1.0.1
+tags:
+- 
+---
+
+Expectations can inform fast, accurate decisions. But what informs expectations? Here we test the hypothesis that expectations are set by dynamic inference from memory. Participants performed a cue-guided perceptual decision task with independently-varying memory and sensory evidence. Cues established expectations by reminding participants of past stimulus-stimulus pairings, which predicted the likely target in a subsequent noisy image stream. Participant's responses used both memory and sensory information, in accordance to their relative reliability. Formal model comparison showed that the sensory inference was best explained when its parameters were set dynamically at each trial by evidence sampled from memory. Supporting this model, neural pattern analysis revealed that responses to the probe were modulated by the specific content and fidelity of memory reinstatement that occurred before the probe appeared. Together, these results suggest that perceptual decisions arise from the continuous sampling of memory and sensory evidence.

source/_posts/bouwer2023.md

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+---
+title: Bouwer et al. (2023)
+subtitle: 'A silent disco: Differential effects of beat-based and pattern-based temporal expectations on persistent entrainment of low-frequency neural oscillations'
+date: 2023/06/01
+authors:
+- Bouwer, Fleur L
+- Fahrenfort, Johannes J
+- Millard, Samantha K
+- Kloosterman, Niels A
+- Slagter, Heleen A
+journal: J. Cogn. Neurosci.
+paper_url: https://doi.org/10.1162/jocn_a_01985
+data_url: https://osf.io/uwny8
+tags:
+- 
+---
+
+The brain uses temporal structure in the environment, like rhythm in music and speech, to predict the timing of events, thereby optimizing their processing and perception. Temporal expectations can be grounded in different aspects of the input structure, such as a regular beat or a predictable pattern. One influential account posits that a generic mechanism underlies beat-based and pattern-based expectations, namely, entrainment of low-frequency neural oscillations to rhythmic input, whereas other accounts assume different underlying neural mechanisms. Here, we addressed this outstanding issue by examining EEG activity and behavioral responses during silent periods following rhythmic auditory sequences. We measured responses outlasting the rhythms both to avoid confounding the EEG analyses with evoked responses, and to directly test whether beat-based and pattern-based expectations persist beyond stimulation, as predicted by entrainment theories. To properly disentangle beat-based and pattern-based expectations, which often occur simultaneously, we used non-isochronous rhythms with a beat, a predictable pattern, or random timing. In Experiment 1 (n = 32), beat-based expectations affected behavioral ratings of probe events for two beat-cycles after the end of the rhythm. The effects of pattern-based expectations reflected expectations for one interval. In Experiment 2 (n = 27), using EEG, we found enhanced spectral power at the beat frequency for beat-based sequences both during listening and silence. For pattern-based sequences, enhanced power at a pattern-specific frequency was present during listening, but not silence. Moreover, we found a difference in the evoked signal following pattern-based and beat-based sequences. Finally, we show how multivariate pattern decoding and multiscale entropy-measures sensitive to non-oscillatory components of the signal-can be used to probe temporal expectations. Together, our results suggest that the input structure used to form temporal expectations may affect the associated neural mechanisms. We suggest climbing activity and low-frequency oscillations may be differentially associated with pattern-based and beat-based expectations.

source/_posts/bye2023.md

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+---
+title: Bye et al. (2023)
+subtitle: 'How do humans want causes to combine their effects? The role of analytically-defined causal invariance for generalizable causal knowledge'
+date: 2023/01/01
+authors:
+- Bye, Jeffrey K
+- Chuang, Pei-Jung
+- Cheng, Patricia W
+journal: Cognition
+paper_url: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105303
+data_url: https://osf.io/znuw9
+tags:
+- 
+---
+
+The present paper reports two experiments (N = 232, 254) addressing the question: How do reasoners reconcile the desire to have useable (i.e., invariant) causal knowledge - knowledge that holds true when applied in new circumstances/contexts - with the reality that causes often interact with other causes present in the context? The experiments test two views of how reasoners learn and generalize potentially complex causal knowledge. Previous work has focused on reasoners' ability to learn rules (functions) describing how pre-defined candidate causes combine, potentially interactively, to produce an outcome in a domain. This empirical-function-learning view predicts that participants would generalize an acquired combination rule based on similarity to stimuli they experienced in the domain. An alternative causal-invariance view goes beyond empirical learning: it allows for the possibility that one's current representation may not yield useable causal knowledge. This view posits that the human causal-induction process incorporates invariant knowledge as an aspiration, entailing that observed deviation from causal invariance when the knowledge is applied serves as a signal for a need to revise causal knowledge: Only invariance across contexts with potentially new causal factors justifies generalization across them. The invariance view therefore predicts that reasoners would revise their representation so that they have whole causes - potentially consisting of interacting components - that do not interact with each other, even when in their relevant experience all (pre-defined) causes interact. Across both experiments, our results favor the causal-invariance view: Participants generalize their empirically learned function (which may involve interactions) to new stimuli, but switch to the analytic causal-invariance function for both old and new stimuli at the level of the whole cause, indicating that how humans want causes to combine their effects shapes the knowledge they induce.

source/_posts/cai2023.md

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+---
+title: Cai & Pleskac (2023)
+subtitle: 'When alternative hypotheses shape your beliefs: Context effects in probability judgments'
+date: 2023/02/01
+authors:
+- Cai, Xiaohong
+- Pleskac, Timothy J
+journal: Cognition
+paper_url: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105306
+data_url: https://osf.io/3h7v4
+tags:
+- 
+---
+
+When people are asked to estimate the probability of an event occurring, they sometimes make different subjective probability judgments for different descriptions of the same event. This implies the evidence or support recruited to make these judgments is based on the descriptions of the events (hypotheses) instead of the events themselves, as captured by Tversky and Koehler's (1994) support theory. Support theory, however, assumes each hypothesis elicits a fixed level of support (support invariance). Here, across three studies, we tested this support invariance assumption by asking participants to estimate the probability that an event would occur given a set of relevant statistics. We show that the support recruited about a target hypothesis can depend on the other hypotheses under consideration. Results reveal that for a pair of competing hypotheses, one hypothesis (the target hypothesis) appears more competitive relative to the other when a dud-a hypothesis dominated by the target hypothesis-is present. We also find that the target hypothesis can appear less competitive relative to the other when a resembler-a hypothesis that is similar to the target hypothesis-is present. These context effects invalidate the support invariance assumption in support theory and suggest that a similar process that drives preference construction may also underlie belief construction.

source/_posts/carlebach2023.md

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+---
+title: Carlebach & Yeung (2023)
+subtitle: 'Flexible use of confidence to guide advice requests'
+date: 2023/01/01
+authors:
+- Carlebach, Nomi
+- Yeung, Nick
+journal: Cognition
+paper_url: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105264
+data_url: https://osf.io/vbnux
+tags:
+- 
+---
+
+Subjective confidence plays an important role in guiding behavior, for example, people typically commit to decisions immediately if high in confidence and seek additional information if not. The present study examines whether people are flexible in their use of confidence, such that the mapping between confidence and behavior is not fixed but can instead vary depending on the specific context. To investigate this proposal, we tested the hypothesis that the seemingly natural relationship between low confidence and requesting advice varies according to whether people know, or do not know, the quality of the advice. Participants made an initial perceptual judgement and then chose between re-sampling evidence or receiving advice from a virtual advisor, before committing to a final decision. The results indicated that, when objective information about advisor reliability was not available, participants selected advice more often when their confidence was high rather than when it was low. This pattern reflects the use of confidence as a feedback proxy to learn about advisor quality: Participants were able to learn about the reliability of advice even in the absence of feedback and subsequently requested more advice from better advisors. In contrast, when participants had prior knowledge about the reliability of advisors, they requested advice more often when their confidence was low, reflecting the use of confidence as a self-monitoring tool signaling that help should be solicited. These findings indicate that people use confidence in a way that is context-dependent and directed towards achieving their current goals.

source/_posts/cavalan2023.md

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+---
+title: Cavalan et al. (2023)
+subtitle: 'From local to global estimations of confidence in perceptual decisions'
+date: 2023/09/01
+authors:
+- Cavalan, Quentin
+- Vergnaud, Jean-Christophe
+- de Gardelle, Vincent
+journal: J. Exp. Psychol. Gen.
+paper_url: https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001411
+data_url: https://osf.io/btsed
+tags:
+- 
+---
+
+Perceptual confidence has been an important topic recently. However, one key limitation in current approaches is that most studies have focused on confidence judgments made for single decisions. In three experiments, we investigate how these local confidence judgments relate and contribute to global confidence judgments, by which observers summarize their performance over a series of perceptual decisions. We report two main results. First, we find that participants exhibit more overconfidence in their local than in their global judgments of performance, an observation mirroring the aggregation effect in knowledge-based decisions. We further show that this effect is specific to confidence judgments and does not reflect a calculation bias. Second, we document a novel effect by which participants' global confidence is larger for sets which are more heterogeneous in terms of difficulty, even when actual performance is controlled for. Surprisingly, we find that this effect of variability also occurs at the level of local confidence judgments, in a manner that fully explains the effect at the global level. Overall, our results indicate that global confidence is based on local confidence, although these two processes can be partially dissociated. We discuss possible theoretical accounts to relate and empirical investigations of how observers develop and use a global sense of perceptual confidence. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

source/_posts/chen2023.md

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 ---
-title: Chen et al. (2023)
+title: Chen, Z., et al. (2023)
 subtitle: 'Differential effects of prior outcomes and pauses on the speed and quality of risky choices'
 date: 2023/04/26
 authors: