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cryptenroll/cryptsetup: allow combined signed TPM2 PCR policy + pcrlo…
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…ck policy

So far you had to pick:

1. Use a signed PCR TPM2 policy to lock your disk to (i.e. UKI vendor
   blesses your setup via signature)
or
2. Use a pcrlock policy (i.e. local system blesses your setup via
   dynamic local policy stored in NV index)

It was not possible combine these two, because TPM2 access policies do
not allow the combination of PolicyAuthorize (used to implement #1
above) and PolicyAuthorizeNV (used to implement #2) in a single policy,
unless one is "further upstream" (and can simply remove the other from
the policy freely).

This is quite limiting of course, since we actually do want to enforce
on each TPM object that both the OS vendor policy and the local policy
must be fulfilled, without the chance for the vendor or the local system
to disable the other.

This patch addresses this: instead of trying to find a way to come up
with some adventurous scheme to combine both policy into one TPM2
policy, we simply shard the symmetric LUKS decryption key: one half we
protect via the signed PCR policy, and the other we protect via the
pcrlock policy. Only if both halves can be acquired the disk can be
decrypted.

This means:

1. we simply double the unlock key in length in case both policies shall
   be used.
2. We store two resulting TPM policy hashes in the LUKS token JSON, one
   for each policy
3. We store two sealed TPM policy key blobs in the LUKS token JSON, for
   both halves of the LUKS unlock key.

This patch keeps the "sharding" logic relatively generic (i.e. the low
level logic is actually fine with more than 2 shards), because I figure
sooner or later we might have to encode more shards, for example if we
add further TPM2-based access policies, for example when combining FIDO2
with TPM2, or implementing TOTP for this.
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@poettering
poettering committed Sep 2, 2024
1 parent 5885368 commit e598cf1
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Showing 13 changed files with 728 additions and 273 deletions.
152 changes: 119 additions & 33 deletions src/cryptenroll/cryptenroll-tpm2.c
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include "errno-util.h"
#include "fileio.h"
#include "hexdecoct.h"
#include "json-util.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "memory-util.h"
#include "random-util.h"
Expand All @@ -18,20 +19,20 @@

static int search_policy_hash(
struct crypt_device *cd,
const struct iovec *hash) {
const struct iovec policy_hash[],
size_t n_policy_hash) {

int r;

assert(cd);
assert(iovec_is_valid(hash));

if (!iovec_is_set(hash))
/* Searches among the already enrolled TPM2 tokens for one that matches the exact set of policies specified */

if (n_policy_hash == 0)
return -ENOENT;

for (int token = 0; token < sym_crypt_token_max(CRYPT_LUKS2); token++) {
_cleanup_(sd_json_variant_unrefp) sd_json_variant *v = NULL;
_cleanup_free_ void *thash = NULL;
size_t thash_size = 0;
int keyslot;
sd_json_variant *w;

Expand All @@ -54,12 +55,45 @@ static int search_policy_hash(
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
"TPM2 token data lacks 'tpm2-policy-hash' field.");

r = sd_json_variant_unhex(w, &thash, &thash_size);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Invalid base64 data in 'tpm2-policy-hash' field: %m");
/* This is either an array of strings (for sharded enrollments), or a single string */
if (sd_json_variant_is_array(w)) {

if (sd_json_variant_elements(w) == n_policy_hash) {
sd_json_variant *i;
bool match = true;
size_t j = 0;

JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY_FOREACH(i, w) {
_cleanup_(iovec_done) struct iovec thash = {};

r = sd_json_variant_unhex(i, &thash.iov_base, &thash.iov_len);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Invalid base64 data in 'tpm2-policy-hash' field item : %m");

if (iovec_memcmp(policy_hash + j, &thash) != 0) {
match = false;
break;
}

j++;
}

assert(j == n_policy_hash);

if (memcmp_nn(hash->iov_base, hash->iov_len, thash, thash_size) == 0)
return keyslot; /* Found entry with same hash. */
if (match) /* Found entry with the exact same set of hashes */
return keyslot;
}

} else if (n_policy_hash == 1) {
_cleanup_(iovec_done) struct iovec thash = {};

r = sd_json_variant_unhex(w, &thash.iov_base, &thash.iov_len);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Invalid base64 data in 'tpm2-policy-hash' field: %m");

if (iovec_memcmp(policy_hash + 0, &thash) == 0)
return keyslot; /* Found entry with same hash. */
}
}

return -ENOENT; /* Not found */
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -154,7 +188,8 @@ int load_volume_key_tpm2(

for (;;) {
_cleanup_(iovec_done) struct iovec pubkey = {}, salt = {}, srk = {}, pcrlock_nv = {};
_cleanup_(iovec_done) struct iovec blob = {}, policy_hash = {};
struct iovec *blobs = NULL, *policy_hash = NULL;
size_t n_blobs = 0, n_policy_hash = 0;
uint32_t hash_pcr_mask, pubkey_pcr_mask;
uint16_t pcr_bank, primary_alg;
TPM2Flags tpm2_flags;
Expand All @@ -169,8 +204,10 @@ int load_volume_key_tpm2(
&pubkey,
&pubkey_pcr_mask,
&primary_alg,
&blob,
&blobs,
&n_blobs,
&policy_hash,
&n_policy_hash,
&salt,
&srk,
&pcrlock_nv,
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -202,8 +239,10 @@ int load_volume_key_tpm2(
/* pcrlock_path= */ NULL,
primary_alg,
/* key_file= */ NULL, /* key_file_size= */ 0, /* key_file_offset= */ 0, /* no key file */
&blob,
&policy_hash,
blobs,
n_blobs,
policy_hash,
n_policy_hash,
&salt,
&srk,
&pcrlock_nv,
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -257,7 +296,7 @@ int enroll_tpm2(struct crypt_device *cd,

_cleanup_(sd_json_variant_unrefp) sd_json_variant *v = NULL, *signature_json = NULL;
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *base64_encoded = NULL;
_cleanup_(iovec_done) struct iovec srk = {}, blob = {}, pubkey = {};
_cleanup_(iovec_done) struct iovec srk = {}, pubkey = {};
_cleanup_(iovec_done_erase) struct iovec secret = {};
const char *node;
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *pin_str = NULL;
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -304,10 +343,7 @@ int enroll_tpm2(struct crypt_device *cd,
}

TPM2B_PUBLIC public = {};
/* Load the PCR public key if specified explicitly, or if no pcrlock policy was specified and
* automatic loading of PCR public keys wasn't disabled explicitly. The reason we turn this off when
* pcrlock is configured is simply that we currently not support both in combination. */
if (pcr_pubkey_path || (load_pcr_pubkey && !pcrlock_path)) {
if (pcr_pubkey_path || load_pcr_pubkey) {
r = tpm2_load_pcr_public_key(pcr_pubkey_path, &pubkey.iov_base, &pubkey.iov_len);
if (r < 0) {
if (pcr_pubkey_path || signature_path || r != -ENOENT)
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -398,42 +434,88 @@ int enroll_tpm2(struct crypt_device *cd,
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to determine best PCR bank: %m");
}

TPM2B_DIGEST policy = TPM2B_DIGEST_MAKE(NULL, TPM2_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
/* Unfortunately TPM2 policy semantics make it very hard to combine PolicyAuthorize (which we need
* for signed PCR policies) and PolicyAuthorizeNV (which we need for pcrlock policies). Hence, let's
* use a "sharded" secret, and lock the first shard to the signed PCR policy, and the 2nd to the
* pcrlock – if both are requested. */

TPM2B_DIGEST policy_hash[2] = {
TPM2B_DIGEST_MAKE(NULL, TPM2_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE),
TPM2B_DIGEST_MAKE(NULL, TPM2_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE),
};
size_t n_policy_hash = 1;

/* If both PCR public key unlock and pcrlock unlock is selected, then we create the one for PCR public key unlock first. */
r = tpm2_calculate_sealing_policy(
hash_pcr_values,
n_hash_pcr_values,
iovec_is_set(&pubkey) ? &public : NULL,
use_pin,
pcrlock_path ? &pcrlock_policy : NULL,
&policy);
pcrlock_path && !iovec_is_set(&pubkey) ? &pcrlock_policy : NULL,
policy_hash + 0);
if (r < 0)
return r;

if (device_key)
if (pcrlock_path && iovec_is_set(&pubkey)) {
r = tpm2_calculate_sealing_policy(
hash_pcr_values,
n_hash_pcr_values,
/* public= */ NULL, /* This one is off now */
use_pin,
&pcrlock_policy, /* And this one on instead. */
policy_hash + 1);
if (r < 0)
return r;

n_policy_hash ++;
}

struct iovec *blobs = NULL;
size_t n_blobs = 0;
CLEANUP_ARRAY(blobs, n_blobs, iovec_array_free);

if (device_key) {
if (n_policy_hash > 1)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP),
"Combined signed PCR policies and pcrlock policies cannot be calculated offline, currently.");

blobs = new0(struct iovec, 1);
if (!blobs)
return log_oom();

n_blobs = 1;

r = tpm2_calculate_seal(
seal_key_handle,
&device_key_public,
/* attributes= */ NULL,
/* secret= */ NULL,
&policy,
policy_hash + 0,
pin_str,
&secret,
&blob,
blobs + 0,
&srk);
else
} else
r = tpm2_seal(tpm2_context,
seal_key_handle,
&policy,
policy_hash,
n_policy_hash,
pin_str,
&secret,
&blob,
&blobs,
&n_blobs,
/* ret_primary_alg= */ NULL,
&srk);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to seal to TPM2: %m");

struct iovec policy_hash_as_iovec[2] = {
IOVEC_MAKE(policy_hash[0].buffer, policy_hash[0].size),
IOVEC_MAKE(policy_hash[1].buffer, policy_hash[1].size),
};

/* Let's see if we already have this specific PCR policy hash enrolled, if so, exit early. */
r = search_policy_hash(cd, &IOVEC_MAKE(policy.buffer, policy.size));
r = search_policy_hash(cd, policy_hash_as_iovec, n_policy_hash);
if (r == -ENOENT)
log_debug_errno(r, "PCR policy hash not yet enrolled, enrolling now.");
else if (r < 0)
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -461,8 +543,10 @@ int enroll_tpm2(struct crypt_device *cd,
pin_str,
pcrlock_path ? &pcrlock_policy : NULL,
/* primary_alg= */ 0,
&blob,
&IOVEC_MAKE(policy.buffer, policy.size),
blobs,
n_blobs,
policy_hash_as_iovec,
n_policy_hash,
&srk,
&secret2);
if (r < 0)
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -498,8 +582,10 @@ int enroll_tpm2(struct crypt_device *cd,
&pubkey,
pubkey_pcr_mask,
/* primary_alg= */ 0,
&blob,
&IOVEC_MAKE(policy.buffer, policy.size),
blobs,
n_blobs,
policy_hash_as_iovec,
n_policy_hash,
use_pin ? &IOVEC_MAKE(binary_salt, sizeof(binary_salt)) : NULL,
&srk,
pcrlock_path ? &pcrlock_policy.nv_handle : NULL,
Expand Down
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